diff --git a/.github/workflows/validate-and-build.yml b/.github/workflows/validate-and-build.yml
index a3476f84cc..1e4ddc884f 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/validate-and-build.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/validate-and-build.yml
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ jobs:
        
       - uses: actions/setup-python@v4
         with:
-          python-version: '3.9' #Available versions here - https://github.com/actions/python-versions/releases  easy to change/make a matrix/use pypy
+          python-version: '3.11' #Available versions here - https://github.com/actions/python-versions/releases  easy to change/make a matrix/use pypy
           architecture: 'x64' # optional x64 or x86. Defaults to x64 if not specified
 
       - name: Install System Packages
@@ -25,24 +25,22 @@ jobs:
           sudo apt install jq -qq
       
 
-      - name: Install Python Dependencies and ContentCTL
+      - name: Install Python Dependencies and ContentCTL and Atomic Red Team
         run: |
-          pip3 install poetry
-          git submodule update --init contentctl
-          cd contentctl
-          git checkout main
-          poetry install
+          python3.11 -m venv .venv
+          source .venv/bin/activate
+          pip install contentctl
+          git clone --depth=1 --single-branch --branch=master https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team.git
       
       - name: content_ctl validate
         run: |
-          cd contentctl
-          poetry run contentctl -p ../ validate 
+          source .venv/bin/activate
+          contentctl validate 
 
       - name: contentctl generate
         run: |
-          cd contentctl
-          poetry run contentctl -p ../ build
-          cd ..
+          source .venv/bin/activate
+          contentctl build --enrichments
           mkdir artifacts
           mv dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate-latest.tar.gz artifacts/
 
diff --git a/contentctl.yml b/contentctl.yml
index 5e094d1800..df5b79f170 100644
--- a/contentctl.yml
+++ b/contentctl.yml
@@ -6,9 +6,7 @@ app:
   version: 4.31.0
   description: Explore the Analytic Stories included with ES Content Updates.
   prefix: ESCU
-  build: 004210
-  version: 4.31.0
-  label: ES Content Updates
+  label: ESCU
   author_name: Splunk Threat Research Team
   author_email: research@splunk.com
   author_company: Splunk
@@ -185,4 +183,3 @@ apps:
   description: description of app
   hardcoded_path: https://attack-range-appbinaries.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Latest/url-toolbox_192.tgz
 githash: d6fac80e6d50ae06b40f91519a98489d4ce3a3fd
-
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/app.manifest b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/app.manifest
index 709ba9f6f0..8a190f7d1f 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/app.manifest
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/app.manifest
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
         "company": "Splunk"
       }
     ], 
-    "releaseDate": "2024-05-08", 
+    "releaseDate": "2024-05-10", 
     "description": "Explore the Analytic Stories included with ES Content Updates.", 
     "classification": {
       "intendedAudience": null, 
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/analyticstories.conf b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/analyticstories.conf
index 89cf0bd336..0598c511a7 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/analyticstories.conf
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/analyticstories.conf
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:53 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:36 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
 
 ### DETECTIONS ###
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = Legitimate router connections may appear as new connections
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Risky SPL using Pretrained ML Model - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Risky SPL using Pretrained ML Model - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if suspicious behavior is observed, as determined by frequent usage of risky keywords.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = None at this time
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators and users sometimes prefer backing up their email data by moving the email files into a different folder. These attempts will be detected by the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = None at this time
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = None identified
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = A user may have accidentally entered the wrong credentials during the MFA challenge. If the user is new to MFA, they may have trouble authenticating. Ensure that the user is aware of the MFA process and has the correct credentials.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It's possible for legitimate administrative actions or automated processes to trigger this detection, especially if there are bulk modifications to Okta IDP lifecycle events. Review the context of the modification, such as the user making the change and the specific lifecycle event modified, to determine if it aligns with expected behavior.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune Okta and tune the analytic to ensure proper fidelity. Modify risk score as needed. Drop to anomaly until tuning is complete.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on organization size and configuration of Okta. Monitor, tune and filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Legitimate use case may require for users to disable MFA. Filter lightly and monitor for any unusual activity.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Multiple account lockouts may be also triggered by an application malfunction. Filter as needed, and monitor for any unusual activity.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Multiple Failed MFA requests may also be a sign of authentication or application issues. Filter as needed and monitor for any unusual activity.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on organization size and configuration of Okta.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A source Ip failing to authenticate with multiple users in a short period of time is not common legitimate behavior.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta New API Token Created - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta New API Token Created - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune Okta and tune the analytic to ensure proper fidelity. Modify risk score as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta New Device Enrolled on Account - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta New Device Enrolled on Account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = It is possible that the user has legitimately added a new device to their account. Please verify this activity.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Infrastructure
 confidence = medium
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Fidelity of this is high as Okta is specifying malicious infrastructure. Filter and modify as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to the number of events generated by the analytics tied to the stories. Analytics will need to be tested and tuned, and the risk score reduced as needed based on the organization.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Although not recommended, certain users may be exempt from multi-factor authentication. Adjust the filter as necessary.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta Suspicious Activity Reported - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Suspicious Activity Reported - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = False positives should be minimal, given the high fidelity of this detection. marker.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may occur, depending on the organization's size and the configuration of Okta.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Infrastructure
 confidence = medium
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = False positives may occur. It is recommended to fine-tune Okta settings and the analytic to ensure high fidelity. Adjust the risk score as necessary.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta Unauthorized Access to Application - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Unauthorized Access to Application - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = There is a possibility that a user may accidentally click on the wrong application, which could trigger this event. It is advisable to verify the location from which this activity originates.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta User Logins from Multiple Cities - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta User Logins from Multiple Cities - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization"], "mit
 known_false_positives = It is uncommon for a user to log in from multiple cities simultaneously, which may indicate a false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Path traversal SPL injection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Path traversal SPL injection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This search may find additional path traversal exploitation attempts.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Persistent XSS in RapidDiag through User Interface Views - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Persistent XSS in RapidDiag through User Interface Views - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This is a hunting search, it will not deobfuscate base64 payload, it provides however it will provide what user added the view artifact and what user opened it. It will require further investigation based on the information presented by this hunting search.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Identity
 confidence = medium
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may be generated by users working out the geographic region where the organizations services or technology is hosted.
 providing_technologies = ["Ping ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PingID Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PingID Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Identity
 confidence = medium
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = False positives may be generated by normal provisioning workflows for user device registration.
 providing_technologies = ["Ping ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Identity
 confidence = medium
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may be generated by normal provisioning workflows that generate a password reset followed by a device registration.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows", "Ping ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PingID New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PingID New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Identity
 confidence = medium
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may be generated by normal provisioning workflows for user device registration.
 providing_technologies = ["Ping ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Absolute Path Traversal Using runshellscript - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Absolute Path Traversal Using runshellscript - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The command runshellscript can be used for benign purposes. Analyst will have to review the searches and determined maliciousness specially by looking at targeted script.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Account Discovery Drilldown Dashboard Disclosure - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Account Discovery Drilldown Dashboard Disclosure - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This search may reveal non malicious URLs with environment variables used in organizations.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk App for Lookup File Editing RCE via User XSLT - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk App for Lookup File Editing RCE via User XSLT - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This search will provide information for investigation and hunting of lookup creation via user-supplied XSLT which may be indications of possible exploitation. There will be false positives as it is not possible to detect the payload executed via this exploit.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Authentication Token Exposure in Debug Log - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Authentication Token Exposure in Debug Log - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Splunk Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Only applies to affected versions of Splunk Enterprise below 9.2.1, 9.1.4, and 9.0.9
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Code Injection via custom dashboard leading to RCE - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Code Injection via custom dashboard leading to RCE - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Not all exports and downloads are malicious, special attention must be put as well on /en-US/splunkd/__raw/services/pdfgen/render in the context of this search.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if this command is used as a common practice. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present until properly filtered by Username and search name.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = If the run time of a search exceeds the boundaries of outlier defined by the fitted density function model, false positives can occur, incorrectly labeling a long running search as potentially risky.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk csrf in the ssg kvstore client endpoint - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk csrf in the ssg kvstore client endpoint - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This hunting search only applies to the affected versions and setup mentioned in the description of this search, it does not extract payload so it requires manual investigation after executing search. This search will produce false positives.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Data exfiltration from Analytics Workspace using sid query - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Data exfiltration from Analytics Workspace using sid query - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = This search may produce false positives.  This detection does not require you to ingest any new data. The detection does require the ability to search the _audit index. Special attention must be paid to "/en-US/app/search/analytics_workspace?sid=[sid]" which is where the malicious code will be inserted to trigger attack at victim.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization"], "mit
 known_false_positives = No known at this time.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization"], "mit
 known_false_positives = None at this time
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk DoS Using Malformed SAML Request - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk DoS Using Malformed SAML Request - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = This search will show false positives. The analyst must look for errors and a pointer indicating a malicious file.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk DOS Via Dump SPL Command - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk DOS Via Dump SPL Command - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Segmentation faults may occur due to other causes, so this search may produce false positives
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = None.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk DOS via printf search function - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk DOS via printf search function - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = This search may produces false positives, analyst most focuse in the use of printf conversion function of eval to craft an expression that splunkd cannot interpret correctly causing it to crash.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Edit User Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Edit User Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This search may produce false positives as password changing actions may be part of normal behavior. Operator will need to investigate these actions in order to discern exploitation attempts.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Endpoint Denial of Service DoS Zip Bomb - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Endpoint Denial of Service DoS Zip Bomb - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = This search may reveal non malicious zip files causing errors as well.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Enterprise KV Store Incorrect Authorization - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Enterprise KV Store Incorrect Authorization - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Splunk Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This is a hunting search and will produce false positives. Operator must follow results into instances where curl requests coming from actual users may indicate intent of exploitation.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Enterprise Windows Deserialization File Partition - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Windows Deserialization File Partition - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Splunk Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = Irregular path with files that may be purposely called for benign reasons may produce false positives.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk ES DoS Investigations Manager via Investigation Creation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk ES DoS Investigations Manager via Investigation Creation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = The vulnerability requires an authenticated session and access to create an Investigation. It only affects the availability of the Investigations manager, but without the manager, the Investigations functionality becomes unusable for most users. This search gives the exact offending event.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk ES DoS Through Investigation Attachments - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk ES DoS Through Investigation Attachments - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = This search will show the exact DoS event via error message and investigation id. The error however does not point exactly at the uploader as any users associated with the investigation will be affected. Operator must investigate using investigation id the possible origin of the malicious upload. Attack only affects specific investigation not the investigation manager.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk HTTP Response Splitting Via Rest SPL Command - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk HTTP Response Splitting Via Rest SPL Command - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This search may have produce false positives as malformed or erroneous requests made to this endpoint may be executed willingly or erroneously by operators.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Improperly Formatted Parameter Crashes splunkd - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Improperly Formatted Parameter Crashes splunkd - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = This is a hunting search it should be focused on affected products, otherwise it is likely to produce false positives.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Information Disclosure in Splunk Add-on Builder - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Information Disclosure in Splunk Add-on Builder - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Splunk Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This search is highly specific for vulnerable versions of Splunk Add-on Builder. There are no known false positives.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk list all nonstandard admin accounts - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk list all nonstandard admin accounts - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = It is not possible to discern from the user table whether or not users with admin rights have been created intentionally, accidentally, or as a result of exploitation. Each user with these rights should be investigated and, if legitimate, added to the filter macro above.  If a user is not believed to be legitimate, then further investigation should take place.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Low Privilege User Can View Hashed Splunk Password - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Low Privilege User Can View Hashed Splunk Password - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This search may produce false positives as accounts with high privileges may access this file. Operator will need to investigate these actions in order to discern exploitation attempts.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Path Traversal In Splunk App For Lookup File Edit - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Path Traversal In Splunk App For Lookup File Edit - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This search may find additional path traversal exploitation attempts or malformed requests.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Persistent XSS Via URL Validation Bypass W Dashboard - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Persistent XSS Via URL Validation Bypass W Dashboard - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This search will produce numerous false positives as it shows ANY accesses to vulnerable bootstrap Javascript files.  Accesses to these files occur during normal Splunk usage. To reduce or eliminate false positives, update the a version of Splunk which has addressed the vulnerability.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = None at this time.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = While all of the settings on each device returned by this search may appear to be hardened, you will still need to verify the value of PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY in $SPLUNK_HOME/etc/splunk-launch.conf on each device in order to harden the python configuration.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization"], "mit
 known_false_positives = This searches finds self signed certificates issued by Splunk which are not recommended from Splunk version 9 forward.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization"], "mit
 known_false_positives = This search tries to address validation of server and client certificates within Splunk infrastructure, it might produce results from accidental or unintended requests to port 8089.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk RBAC Bypass On Indexing Preview REST Endpoint - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk RBAC Bypass On Indexing Preview REST Endpoint - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This is a hunting search which provides verbose results against this endpoint. Operator must consider things such as IP address, useragent and user(specially low privelege) and host to investigate possible attack.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via Serialized Session Payload - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk RCE via Serialized Session Payload - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = There are numerous many uses of the 'makeresults' and 'collect' SPL commands. Please evaluate the results of this search for potential abuse.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via Splunk Secure Gateway  Splunk Mobile alerts feature - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk RCE via Splunk Secure Gateway  Splunk Mobile alerts feature - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This detection does not require you to ingest any new data. The detection does require the ability to search the _internal index. Focus of this search is "uri_path=/servicesNS/nobody/splunk_secure_gateway/storage/collections/data/mobile_alerts*" which is the injection point.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via User XSLT - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk RCE via User XSLT - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This search will provide information for investigation and hunting possible abuse of user-supplied XSLT. There may be false positives and results should individually evaluated. Please evaluate the source IP and useragent responsible for creating the requests.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Reflected XSS in the templates lists radio - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Reflected XSS in the templates lists radio - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This search may produce false positives as it is difficult to pinpoint all possible XSS injection characters in a single search string. Special attention is required to "en-US/list/entities/x/ui/views" which is the vulnerable injection point.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Reflected XSS on App Search Table Endpoint - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Reflected XSS on App Search Table Endpoint - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This search will produce false positives. It is necessary to also look at uri_query parameter to determine the possible malicious intention of inserting makeresults within the uri string.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk risky Command Abuse disclosed february 2023 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk risky Command Abuse disclosed february 2023 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Splunk Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This search encompasses many commands.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Stored XSS via Data Model objectName field - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Stored XSS via Data Model objectName field - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -756,7 +756,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This search may produce false positives and does not cover exploitation attempts via code obfuscation, focus of search is suspicious requests against "/en-US/splunkd/__raw/servicesNS/*/launcher/datamodel/model" which is the injection point.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Unauthenticated Log Injection Web Service Log - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Unauthenticated Log Injection Web Service Log - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This hunting search will produce false positives if ANSI escape characters are included in URLs either voluntarily or by accident. This search will not detect obfuscated ANSI characters.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk unnecessary file extensions allowed by lookup table uploads - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk unnecessary file extensions allowed by lookup table uploads - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This is a hunting search, the search provides information on upload, edit, and delete activity on Lookup Tables. Manual investigation is necessary after executing search. This search will produce false positives as payload cannot be directly discerned.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -786,7 +786,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Automation executing authentication attempts against your Splunk infrastructure with outdated credentials may cause false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS in Highlighted JSON Events - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk XSS in Highlighted JSON Events - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -796,7 +796,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This is a hunting search and will produce false positives as it is not possible to view contents of a request payload. It shows the artifact resulting from a potential exploitation payload (the creation of a user with admin privileges).
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = Use of the monitoring console where the less-than sign (<) is the first character in the description field.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS in Save table dialog header in search page - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk XSS in Save table dialog header in search page - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = If host is vulnerable and XSS script strings are inputted they will show up in search. Not all Post requests are malicious as they will show when users create and save dashboards. This search may produce several results with non malicious POST requests. Only affects Splunk Web enabled instances.
 providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS via View - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk XSS via View - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = The error detected above can be generated for a wide variety of improperly formatted XML views.  There will be false positives as the search cannot extract the malicious payload and the view should be manually investigated.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = None identified
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -848,7 +848,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = There are no known false positives.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -858,7 +858,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Some of these processes may be used legitimately on web servers during maintenance or other administrative tasks.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = None.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Cloud Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -878,7 +878,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within a cloud infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Cloud Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -888,7 +888,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = None.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs will provide context.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster Pod
 confidence = medium
@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, UA and source IPs and direct request to API provide context.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A user with concurrent sessions from different Ips may also represent the legitimate use of more than one device. Filter as needed and/or customize the threshold to fit your environment.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ASL AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ASL AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -938,7 +938,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has stopped cloudTrail logging. Please investigate this activity.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -958,7 +958,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has deleted CloudWatch logging. Please investigate this activity.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that it is a legitimate admin activity. Please consider filtering out these noisy events using userAgent, user_arn field names.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ASL AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -978,7 +978,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ASL AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ASL AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -988,7 +988,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete policies (least privilege). In addition, this may be saved seperately and tuned for failed or success attempts only.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = AWS Administrators may disable MFA but it is highly unlikely for this event to occur without prior notice to the company
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ASL AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ASL AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Newly onboarded users who are registering an MFA method for the first time will also trigger this detection.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ASL AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately triggered an AWS audit tool activity which may trigger this event.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = EC2 Snapshot
 confidence = medium
@@ -1028,7 +1028,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for  a specific purpose.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A user with concurrent sessions from different Ips may also represent the legitimate use of more than one device. Filter as needed and/or customize the threshold to fit your environment.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1048,7 +1048,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = Legitimate users may miss to reply the MFA challenge within the time window or deny it by mistake.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1058,7 +1058,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources and you must verify this activity.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1078,7 +1078,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a login profile for another user.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access Failed Login - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Credential Access Failed Login - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1088,7 +1088,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = Users may genuinely mistype or forget the password.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = Administrator tooling or automated scripts may make these calls but it is highly unlikely to make several calls in a short period of time.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1108,7 +1108,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = Users may genuinely reset the RDS password.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -1118,7 +1118,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is perfectly valid behavior. It's suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it hasn't before. You should validate with the account owner that this is a legitimate request.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has stopped cloudTrail logging. Please investigate this activity.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1138,7 +1138,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has deleted CloudWatch logging. Please investigate this activity.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1148,7 +1148,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that it is a legitimate admin activity. Please consider filtering out these noisy events using userAgent, user_arn field names.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion PutBucketLifecycle - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion PutBucketLifecycle - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1158,7 +1158,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that it is a legitimate admin activity. Please consider filtering out these noisy events using userAgent, user_arn field names.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1168,7 +1168,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has stopped cloudtrail logging. Please investigate this activity.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1178,7 +1178,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has updated cloudtrail logging. Please investigate this activity.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Attach to policy can create a lot of noise. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse (i.e status=failure). The search can provide context for common users attaching themselves to higher privilege policies or even newly created policies.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1198,7 +1198,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Not all permanent key creations are malicious. If there is a policy of rotating keys this search can be adjusted to provide better context.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - aws detect role creation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = CreateRole is not very common in common users. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In general AWS provides plenty of trust policies that fit most use cases.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1218,7 +1218,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a standard mechanism to provide cross account and cross resources access. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1228,7 +1228,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in certain environments numerous calls of this type can be executed. This search can be adjusted to provide specific values to identify cases of abuse. In specific environments the use of field requestParameters.serialNumber will need to be used.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = S3 Bucket
 confidence = medium
@@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = There maybe buckets provisioned with S3 encryption
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Disable Bucket Versioning - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Disable Bucket Versioning - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1258,7 +1258,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS Administrator has legitimately disabled versioning on certain buckets to avoid costs.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = EC2 Snapshot
 confidence = medium
@@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with others for  a specific purpose.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1278,7 +1278,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1288,7 +1288,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1298,7 +1298,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1308,7 +1308,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = When your development is spreaded in different time zones, applying this rule can be difficult.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1318,7 +1318,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1328,7 +1328,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Anomalous GetObject API Activity - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Anomalous GetObject API Activity - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1338,7 +1338,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible that a user downloaded these files to use them locally and there are AWS services in configured that perform these activities for a legitimate reason. Filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Batch Service - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Batch Service - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS Administrator or a user has legitimately created this job for some tasks.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = EC2 Snapshot
 confidence = medium
@@ -1359,7 +1359,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately implemented data replication to ensure data availability and improve data protection/backup strategies.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1369,7 +1369,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS Administrator has legitimately created this task for creating backup. Please check the `sourceLocationArn` and `destinationLocationArn` of this task
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = EC2 Snapshot
 confidence = medium
@@ -1379,7 +1379,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately shared a snapshot with an other account for a specific purpose. Please check any recent change requests filed in your organization.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1389,7 +1389,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A user with more than 20 failed authentication attempts in the span of 5 minutes may also be triggered by a broken application.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1399,7 +1399,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = An Ip address with more than 20 failed authentication attempts in the span of 5 minutes may also be triggered by a broken application.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1409,7 +1409,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible to start this detection will need to be tuned by source IP or user. In addition, change the count values to an upper threshold to restrict false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1419,7 +1419,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1429,7 +1429,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete policies (least privilege). In addition, this may be saved seperately and tuned for failed or success attempts only.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1449,7 +1449,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provide high fidelity detection capabilties. Tune based on src addresses (corporate offices, VPN terminations) or by groups of users. Not every user with AWS access should have permission to delete groups (least privilege).
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1459,7 +1459,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin or an autorized IAM user has updated the lambda fuction code legitimately.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1469,7 +1469,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = AWS Administrators may disable MFA but it is highly unlikely for this event to occur without prior notice to the company
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1479,7 +1479,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = Multiple Failed MFA requests may also be a sign of authentication or application issues. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1489,7 +1489,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = No known false postives for this detection. Please review this alert
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -1499,7 +1499,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It's possible that an admin has created this ACL with all ports open for some legitimate purpose however, this should be scoped and not allowed in production environment.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -1509,7 +1509,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1519,7 +1519,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Newly onboarded users who are registering an MFA method for the first time will also trigger this detection.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1529,7 +1529,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately triggered an AWS audit tool activity which may trigger this event.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1539,7 +1539,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = alse positives may be present based on automated tooling or system administrators. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Federated Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1549,7 +1549,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertion hijacks or forgeries are very difficult to detect as accessing cloud providers with these assertions looks exactly like normal access, however things such as source IP sourceIPAddress user, and principal targeted at receiving cloud provider along with endpoint credential access and abuse detection searches can provide the necessary context to detect these attacks.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Federated Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1559,7 +1559,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Updating a SAML provider or creating a new one may not necessarily be malicious however it needs to be closely monitored.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1569,7 +1569,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately set a default policy to allow a user to access all resources. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to all AWS resources
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1579,7 +1579,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = A user with successful authentication events from different Ips may also represent the legitimate use of more than one device. Filter as needed and/or customize the threshold to fit your environment.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1589,7 +1589,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = It is possible that some accounts do not have MFA enabled for the AWS account however its agaisnt the best practices of securing AWS.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1599,7 +1599,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = No known false postives for this detection. Please review this alert
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -1609,7 +1609,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1619,7 +1619,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = Details for the risk calculation algorithm used by Identity Protection are unknown and may be prone to false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1629,7 +1629,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Service Principals are sometimes configured to legitimately bypass the consent process for purposes of automation. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1639,7 +1639,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrators may legitimately assign the Application Administrator role to a user. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1649,7 +1649,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Legitimate users may miss to reply the MFA challenge within the time window or deny it by mistake.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -1659,7 +1659,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Legitimate changes to the 'risk-based step-up consent' setting by administrators, perhaps as part of a policy update or security assessment, may trigger this alert, necessitating verification of the change's intent and authorization
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -1669,7 +1669,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A user with concurrent sessions from different Ips may also represent the legitimate use of more than one device. Filter as needed and/or customize the threshold to fit your environment.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Device Code Authentication - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Device Code Authentication - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -1679,7 +1679,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = In most organizations, device code authentication will be used to access common Microsoft service but it may be legitimate for others. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD External Guest User Invited - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD External Guest User Invited - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1689,7 +1689,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator may legitimately invite external guest users. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1699,7 +1699,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = The full_access_as_app API permission may be assigned to legitimate applications. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1709,7 +1709,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrators may legitimately assign the Global Administrator role to a user. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -1719,7 +1719,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A user with more than 20 failed authentication attempts in the span of 5 minutes may also be triggered by a broken application.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -1729,7 +1729,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = An Ip address with more than 20 failed authentication attempts in the span of 10 minutes may also be triggered by a broken application.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1739,7 +1739,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Legitimate use case may require for users to disable MFA. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -1749,7 +1749,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = This detection may yield false positives in scenarios where legitimate bulk sign-in activities occur, such as during company-wide system updates or when users are accessing resources from varying locations in a short time frame, such as in the case of VPNs or cloud services that rotate IP addresses. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -1759,7 +1759,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Rapid authentication from the same user using more than 5 different user agents and 3 application IDs is highly unlikely under normal circumstances. However, there are potential scenarios that could lead to false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Denied MFA Requests For User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Denied MFA Requests For User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1769,7 +1769,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Multiple denifed MFA requests in a short period of span may also be a sign of authentication errors. Investigate and filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1779,7 +1779,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Multiple Failed MFA requests may also be a sign of authentication or application issues. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1789,7 +1789,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Certain users or applications may create multiple service principals in a short period of time for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1799,7 +1799,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Certain users or applications may create multiple service principals in a short period of time for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1810,7 +1810,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = A source Ip failing to authenticate with multiple users is not a common for legitimate behavior.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD New Custom Domain Added - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD New Custom Domain Added - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1820,7 +1820,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = In most organizations, new customm domains will be updated infrequently. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD New Federated Domain Added - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD New Federated Domain Added - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1830,7 +1830,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = In most organizations, domain federation settings will be updated infrequently. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -1840,7 +1840,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Users may register MFA methods legitimally, investigate and filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1850,7 +1850,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Newly onboarded users who are registering an MFA method for the first time will also trigger this detection.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD OAuth Application Consent Granted By User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD OAuth Application Consent Granted By User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -1860,7 +1860,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may occur if users are granting consents as part of legitimate application integrations or setups. It is crucial to review the application and the permissions it requests to ensure they align with organizational policies and security best practices.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD PIM Role Assigned - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD PIM Role Assigned - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1870,7 +1870,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = As part of legitimate administrative behavior, users may be assigned PIM roles. Filter as needed
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1880,7 +1880,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = As part of legitimate administrative behavior, users may activate PIM roles. Filter as needed
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Authentication Administrator Role Assigned - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Authentication Administrator Role Assigned - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1890,7 +1890,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may legitimately assign the Privileged Authentication Administrator role as part of administrative tasks. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1900,7 +1900,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Privileged Graph API permissions may be assigned for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1910,7 +1910,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrators will legitimately assign the privileged roles users as part of administrative tasks. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1920,7 +1920,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrators may legitimately assign the privileged roles to Service Principals as part of administrative tasks. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Authentication - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Authentication - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1930,7 +1930,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Service Principals will legitimally authenticate remotely to your tenant. Implementing this detection after establishing a baseline enables a more accurate identification of security threats, ensuring proactive and informed responses to safeguard the Azure AD environment. source ips.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Created - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Created - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1940,7 +1940,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator may legitimately create Service Principal. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1950,7 +1950,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Service Principal client credential modifications may be part of legitimate administrative operations. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1960,7 +1960,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator may legitimately add new owners for Service Principals. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -1970,7 +1970,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A user with successful authentication events from different Ips may also represent the legitimate use of more than one device. Filter as needed and/or customize the threshold to fit your environment.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1980,7 +1980,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Administrative users will likely use PowerShell commandlets to troubleshoot and maintain the environment. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -1990,7 +1990,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Although not recommended, certain users may be required without multi-factor authentication. Filter as needed
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -2000,7 +2000,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may be granted tenant wide consent, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -2012,7 +2012,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = A source Ip failing to authenticate with multiple users is not a common for legitimate behavior.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -2022,7 +2022,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -2032,7 +2032,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Users may deny consent for legitimate applications by mistake, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Enabled And Password Reset - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD User Enabled And Password Reset - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -2042,7 +2042,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = While not common, Administrators may enable accounts and reset their passwords for legitimate reasons. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure AD User ImmutableId Attribute Updated - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure AD User ImmutableId Attribute Updated - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Active Directory
 confidence = medium
@@ -2052,7 +2052,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = The SourceAnchor (also called ImmutableId) Azure AD attribute has legitimate uses for directory synchronization. Investigate and filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure Automation Account Created - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure Automation Account Created - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -2062,7 +2062,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may legitimately create Azure Automation accounts. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure Automation Runbook Created - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure Automation Runbook Created - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -2072,7 +2072,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may legitimately create Azure Automation Runbooks. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Azure Runbook Webhook Created - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Azure Runbook Webhook Created - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -2082,7 +2082,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Administrators may legitimately create Azure Runbook Webhooks. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = CircleCI
 confidence = medium
@@ -2092,7 +2092,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = CircleCI
 confidence = medium
@@ -2102,7 +2102,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2112,7 +2112,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = None.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2122,7 +2122,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create compute instances for the first time, for any number of reasons. Verify with the user launching instances that this is the intended behavior.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2132,7 +2132,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2142,7 +2142,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = After a new image is created, the first systems created with that image will cause this alert to fire.  Verify that the image being used was created by a legitimate user.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Cloud Compute Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2152,7 +2152,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type that has never been used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2173,7 +2173,7 @@ known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "fals
 This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2184,7 +2184,7 @@ known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "fals
 This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2195,7 +2195,7 @@ known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "fals
 This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2206,7 +2206,7 @@ known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "fals
 This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Cloud Security Groups Modifications by User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Security Groups Modifications by User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Cloud Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2219,7 +2219,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible that legitimate user/admin may modify a number of security groups
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2229,7 +2229,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2239,7 +2239,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2249,7 +2249,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2259,7 +2259,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GCP Storage Bucket
 confidence = medium
@@ -2269,7 +2269,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any IP (if the ACLs are open to allow it), as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past two hours.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GCP Storage Bucket
 confidence = medium
@@ -2279,7 +2279,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that a GCP admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, GCP strongly advises against granting full control to the "allUsers" group.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = S3 Bucket
 confidence = medium
@@ -2289,7 +2289,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = S3 Bucket
 confidence = medium
@@ -2299,7 +2299,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a public bucket for a specific purpose. That said, AWS strongly advises against granting full control to the "All Users" group.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = S3 Bucket
 confidence = medium
@@ -2309,7 +2309,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as long as it can make a successful connection. This will be a false postive, since the search is looking for a new IP within the past hour
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2319,7 +2319,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = None
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2329,7 +2329,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = None
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -2339,7 +2339,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Additionally, false positives may result when AWS administrators roll out policies enforcing network blocks, causing sudden increases in the number of blocked outbound connections.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = S3 Bucket
 confidence = medium
@@ -2349,7 +2349,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Google Cloud Platform tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -2359,7 +2359,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Legitimate users may miss to reply the MFA challenge within the time window or deny it by mistake.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GCP Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -2369,7 +2369,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Payload.request.function.timeout value can possibly be match with other functions or requests however the source user and target request account may indicate an attempt to move laterally accross acounts or projects
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GCP Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -2379,7 +2379,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent, source IPs and pods  will provide context.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GCP
 confidence = medium
@@ -2389,7 +2389,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Legitimate use case may require for users to disable MFA. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Google Cloud Platform tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -2399,7 +2399,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Multiple Failed MFA requests may also be a sign of authentication or application issues. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Google Cloud Platform tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -2409,7 +2409,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = No known false postives for this detection. Please review this alert.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Google Cloud Platform tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -2419,7 +2419,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Although not recommended, certain users may be required without multi-factor authentication. Filter as needed
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Google Cloud Platform tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -2429,7 +2429,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = No known false positives for this detection. Please review this alert
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GDrive
 confidence = medium
@@ -2439,7 +2439,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This is an anomaly search, you must specify your domain in the parameters so it either filters outside domains or focus on internal domains. This search may also help investigate compromise of accounts. By looking at for example source ip addresses, document titles and abnormal number of shares and shared target users.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GitHub Actions Disable Security Workflow - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GitHub Actions Disable Security Workflow - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GitHub
 confidence = medium
@@ -2449,7 +2449,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GitHub
 confidence = medium
@@ -2459,7 +2459,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = Admin can do changes directly to master branch
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Github Commit In Develop - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GitHub
 confidence = medium
@@ -2469,7 +2469,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = admin can do changes directly to develop branch
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GitHub
 confidence = medium
@@ -2479,7 +2479,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GitHub
 confidence = medium
@@ -2489,7 +2489,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GSuite
 confidence = medium
@@ -2499,7 +2499,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = network admin or normal user may share files to customer and external team.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GSuite
 confidence = medium
@@ -2509,7 +2509,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GSuite
 confidence = medium
@@ -2519,7 +2519,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GSuite
 confidence = medium
@@ -2529,7 +2529,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = normal email contains this link that are known application within the organization or network can be catched by this detection.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GSuite
 confidence = medium
@@ -2539,7 +2539,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this file attachment as part of their day to day work. having a good protocol in attaching this file type to an e-mail may reduce the risk of having a spear phishing attack.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GSuite
 confidence = medium
@@ -2549,7 +2549,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This search will also produce normal activity statistics. Fields such as email, ip address, name, parameters.organizer_calendar_id, parameters.target_calendar_id and parameters.event_title may give away phishing intent.For more specific results use email parameter.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GSuite
 confidence = medium
@@ -2559,7 +2559,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contain the subject and file type attachment that this detection try to search
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -2569,7 +2569,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = An Ip address with more than 10 failed authentication attempts in the span of 5 minutes may also be triggered by a broken application.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual Location - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual Location - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2579,7 +2579,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Agent - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Agent - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2589,7 +2589,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Group - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Group - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2599,7 +2599,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Name - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Name - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2609,7 +2609,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Access Scanning - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Access Scanning - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2619,7 +2619,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Network Activity from Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Network Activity from Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2633,7 +2633,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Outbound Network IO - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Outbound Network IO - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2654,7 +2654,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound to Outbound Network IO Ratio - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound to Outbound Network IO Ratio - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2675,7 +2675,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Outbound Network Activity from Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Outbound Network Activity from Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2689,7 +2689,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Traffic on Network Edge - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Traffic on Network Edge - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2703,7 +2703,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2713,7 +2713,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Create or Update Privileged Pod - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Create or Update Privileged Pod - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2723,7 +2723,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Cron Job Creation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Cron Job Creation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2733,7 +2733,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes DaemonSet Deployed - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes DaemonSet Deployed - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2743,7 +2743,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Falco Shell Spawned - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Falco Shell Spawned - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2753,7 +2753,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes newly seen TCP edge - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes newly seen TCP edge - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2767,7 +2767,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes newly seen UDP edge - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes newly seen UDP edge - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2781,7 +2781,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2791,7 +2791,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2801,7 +2801,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Node Port Creation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Node Port Creation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2811,7 +2811,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2821,7 +2821,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Pod With Host Network Attachment - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Pod With Host Network Attachment - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2831,7 +2831,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Container Image Name - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Container Image Name - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2852,7 +2852,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2873,7 +2873,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Process Running From New Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Process Running From New Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2894,7 +2894,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Process with Anomalous Resource Utilisation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Process with Anomalous Resource Utilisation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2915,7 +2915,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Process with Resource Ratio Anomalies - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Process with Resource Ratio Anomalies - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2936,7 +2936,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2946,7 +2946,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Scanning by Unauthenticated IP Address - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Scanning by Unauthenticated IP Address - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2956,7 +2956,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2977,7 +2977,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node with CPU Activity - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node with CPU Activity - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -2998,7 +2998,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Suspicious Image Pulling - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Suspicious Image Pulling - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -3008,7 +3008,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Unauthorized Access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Unauthorized Access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Kubernetes
 confidence = medium
@@ -3018,7 +3018,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3028,7 +3028,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however this events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3038,7 +3038,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a different cloud provider.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3048,7 +3048,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Service Principals are sometimes configured to legitimately bypass the consent process for purposes of automation. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Advanced Audit Disabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Advanced Audit Disabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3058,7 +3058,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators might temporarily disable the advanced audit for troubleshooting, performance reasons, or other administrative tasks. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Application Registration Owner Added - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Application Registration Owner Added - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3068,7 +3068,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Application owners may be added for legitimate reasons, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3078,7 +3078,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = While infrequent, the ApplicationImpersonation role may be granted for leigimate reasons, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3088,7 +3088,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Legitimate changes to the 'risk-based step-up consent' setting by administrators, perhaps as part of a policy update or security assessment, may trigger this alert, necessitating verification of the change's intent and authorization.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3098,7 +3098,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to continually update Trusted IPs to MFA configuration.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Compliance Content Search Exported - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Compliance Content Search Exported - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3108,7 +3108,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Compliance content searche exports may be executed for legitimate purposes, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Compliance Content Search Started - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Compliance Content Search Started - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3118,7 +3118,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Compliance content searches may be executed for legitimate purposes, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3128,7 +3128,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Disable MFA - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3138,7 +3138,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon to disable MFA or Strong Authentication
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3148,7 +3148,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = FullAccess mailbox delegation may be assigned for legitimate purposes, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3158,7 +3158,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts and this should reduce the number of false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3168,7 +3168,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Logon errors may not be malicious in nature however it may indicate attempts to reuse a token or password obtained via credential access attack.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 File Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 File Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3178,7 +3178,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = OAuth applications that require file permissions may be legitimate, investigate and filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3188,7 +3188,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = The full_access_as_app API permission may be assigned to legitimate applications. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 High Number Of Failed Authentications for User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 High Number Of Failed Authentications for User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3198,7 +3198,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unusual, users who have lost their passwords may trigger this detection. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 High Privilege Role Granted - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 High Privilege Role Granted - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3208,7 +3208,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Privilege roles may be assigned for legitimate purposes, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Mail Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Mail Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3218,7 +3218,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = OAuth applications that require mail permissions may be legitimate, investigate and filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3228,7 +3228,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Email forwarding may be configured for legitimate purposes, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Assigned - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Assigned - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3238,7 +3238,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Mailbox folder permissions may be configured for legitimate purposes, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Granted - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Granted - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3248,7 +3248,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Mailbox folder permissions may be configured for legitimate purposes, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Inbox Folder Shared with All Users - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Mailbox Inbox Folder Shared with All Users - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3258,7 +3258,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators might temporarily share a mailbox with all users for legitimate reasons, such as troubleshooting, migrations, or other administrative tasks. Some organizations use shared mailboxes for teams or departments where multiple users need access to the same mailbox. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3268,7 +3268,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = There are legitimate scenarios in wich an Application registrations requires Mailbox read access. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3278,7 +3278,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = This detection may yield false positives in scenarios where legitimate bulk sign-in activities occur, such as during company-wide system updates or when users are accessing resources from varying locations in a short time frame, such as in the case of VPNs or cloud services that rotate IP addresses. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3288,7 +3288,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Rapid authentication from the same user using more than 5 different user agents and 3 application IDs is highly unlikely under normal circumstances. However, there are potential scenarios that could lead to false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3298,7 +3298,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Multiple Failed MFA requests may also be a sign of authentication or application issues. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3308,7 +3308,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may access multiple mailboxes via an API. You can filter by the ClientAppId or the CLientIpAddress fields.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3318,7 +3318,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Certain users or applications may create multiple service principals in a short period of time for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3328,7 +3328,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Certain users or applications may create multiple service principals in a short period of time for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3338,7 +3338,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weapo
 known_false_positives = A source Ip failing to authenticate with multiple users in a short period of time is not common legitimate behavior.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Created - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Created - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3348,7 +3348,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Users may create email forwarding rules for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Enabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Enabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3358,7 +3358,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Users may create email forwarding rules for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3368,7 +3368,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 New Forwarding Mailflow Rule Created - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 New Forwarding Mailflow Rule Created - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3378,7 +3378,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Forwarding mail flow rules may be created for legitimate reasons, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 New MFA Method Registered - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 New MFA Method Registered - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3388,7 +3388,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Users may register MFA methods legitimally, investigate and filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3398,7 +3398,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = OAuth applications may access mailboxes for legitimate purposes, you can use the src_ip to add trusted sources to an allow list.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3408,7 +3408,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = OAuth applications may access mailboxes for legitimate purposes, you can use the ClientAppId to add trusted applications to an allow list.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3418,7 +3418,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Privileged Graph API permissions may be assigned for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 PST export alert - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3428,7 +3428,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Security And Compliance Alert Triggered - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Security And Compliance Alert Triggered - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3438,7 +3438,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = O365 Security and Compliance may also generate false positives or trigger on legitimate behavior, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3448,7 +3448,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Service Principal client credential modifications may be part of legitimate administrative operations. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3458,7 +3458,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may be granted tenant wide consent, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3468,7 +3468,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Microsofts algorithm to identify risky applications is unknown and may flag legitimate applications.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -3478,7 +3478,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = OAuth applications that require mail permissions may be legitimate, investigate and filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Amazon Elastic Container Registry
 confidence = medium
@@ -3488,7 +3488,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3498,7 +3498,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3508,7 +3508,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3518,7 +3518,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured with your AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify whether this search alerted on a human user.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3528,7 +3528,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure are known to exhibit this behavior. Please adjust the threshold values and filter out service accounts from the output. Always verify if this search alerted on a human user.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3539,7 +3539,7 @@ known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "fals
 This search will fire any time a new city is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your city, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3550,7 +3550,7 @@ known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "fals
 This search will fire any time a new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3561,7 +3561,7 @@ known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "fals
 This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your country, there should be few false positives. If you are located in countries where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3572,7 +3572,7 @@ known_false_positives = This is a strictly behavioral search, so we define "fals
 This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database for any kind of provisioning activity. If you typically do all provisioning from tools inside of your region, there should be few false positives. If you are located in regions where the free version of **MaxMind GeoIP** that ships by default with Splunk has weak resolution (particularly small countries in less economically powerful regions), this may be much less valuable to you.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -3582,7 +3582,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -3595,7 +3595,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = It's possible that an enterprise has more than five DNS servers that are configured in a round-robin rotation. Please customize the search, as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3605,7 +3605,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has legitimately deleted a network ACL.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -3615,7 +3615,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -3625,7 +3625,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -3635,7 +3635,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM systems may be detected by this search. Please investigate as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3650,7 +3650,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an AWS infrastructure do not have multi factor authentication enabled. Please ignore the service accounts, if triggered and instead add them to the aws_service_accounts.csv file to fine tune the detection. It is also possible that the search detects users in your environment using Single Sign-On systems, since the MFA is not handled by AWS.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3665,7 +3665,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = It's likely that you'll find activity detected by users/service accounts that are not listed in the `identity_lookup_expanded` or ` aws_service_accounts.csv` file. If the user is a legitimate service account, update the `aws_service_accounts.csv` table with that entry.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -3678,7 +3678,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = If a known good domain is not listed in the legit_domains.csv file, then the search could give you false postives. Please update that lookup file to filter out DNS requests to legitimate domains.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -3688,7 +3688,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = It's possible that legitimate TXT record responses can be long enough to trigger this search. You can modify the packet threshold for this search to help mitigate false positives.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
 confidence = medium
@@ -3698,7 +3698,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Other tools can import the same DLLs. These tools should be part of a whitelist. False positives may be present with any process that authenticates or uses credentials, PowerShell included. Filter based on parent process.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
 confidence = medium
@@ -3708,7 +3708,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell is often used by administrators to perform various tasks, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3718,7 +3718,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = It is possible that there are legitimate user roles making new or infrequently used API calls in your infrastructure, causing the search to trigger.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3728,7 +3728,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3743,7 +3743,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = None.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3753,7 +3753,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`. Please modify this according the your environment.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3763,7 +3763,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` and `deviationThreshold`, the false positive rate may vary. Please modify this according the your environment.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect USB device insertion - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -3773,7 +3773,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify and investigate as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -3786,7 +3786,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = It is possible that list of dynamic DNS providers is outdated and/or that the URL being requested is legitimate.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -3797,7 +3797,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = It's possible that normal DNS traffic will exhibit this behavior. If an alert is generated, please investigate and validate as appropriate. The threshold can also be modified to better suit your environment.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -3807,7 +3807,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of authorized DNS servers as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - DNS record changed - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -3820,7 +3820,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in this search. Investigate, verify and update the list of provided current answers for the domains in question as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -3831,7 +3831,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = None identified.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3841,7 +3841,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to modify EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is modifying instances that this is the intended behavior.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3851,7 +3851,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly started an instance in a new region. Please verify that this activity is legitimate.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3861,7 +3861,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = After a new AMI is created, the first systems created with that AMI will cause this alert to fire.  Verify that the AMI being used was created by a legitimate user.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3871,7 +3871,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a new system using a new instance type never used before. Verify with the creator that they intended to create the system with the new instance type.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS Instance
 confidence = medium
@@ -3881,7 +3881,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to create EC2 instances when they haven't before for any number of reasons. Verify with the user that is launching instances that this is the intended behavior.
 providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -3891,7 +3891,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = None identified.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -3901,7 +3901,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = None identified
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - First time seen command line argument - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -3911,7 +3911,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Legitimate programs can also use command-line arguments to execute. Please verify the command-line arguments to check what command/program is being executed. We recommend customizing the `first_time_seen_cmd_line_filter` macro to exclude legitimate parent_process_name
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GCP Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -3921,7 +3921,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Accounts with high risk roles should be reduced to the minimum number needed, however specific tasks and setups may be simply expected behavior within organization
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GCP Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -3931,7 +3931,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = High risk permissions are part of any GCP environment, however it is important to track resource and accounts usage, this search may produce false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GCP Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -3941,7 +3941,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only work if there are access policies in place along with audit logs.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GCP Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -3951,7 +3951,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but frequency, User Agent and source IPs will provide context.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Identify New User Accounts - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Domain Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -3961,7 +3961,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = If the Identity_Management data model is not updated regularly, this search could give you false positive alerts. Please consider this and investigate appropriately.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -3971,7 +3971,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness.
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -3981,7 +3981,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -3991,7 +3991,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. 
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -4001,7 +4001,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -4011,7 +4011,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP and verb context when trying to detect maliciousness.
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -4021,7 +4021,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -4031,7 +4031,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection.
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -4041,7 +4041,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, namespace and user group may indicate possible malicious use. 
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -4051,7 +4051,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -4061,7 +4061,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, verb and Object can reveal potential malicious activity, specially suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -4071,7 +4071,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context.
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Azure AKS Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -4081,7 +4081,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicious, but source IPs, userAgent, verb, request URI and response status will provide context.
 providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -4091,7 +4091,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are malicious. Analyst must consider IP, verb and decision context when trying to detect maliciousness.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace", "Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -4101,7 +4101,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. RBAC authorizations can uncover malicious activity specially if sensitive Roles have been granted.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace", "Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -4111,7 +4111,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily malicious but user and object context can provide guidance for detection.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace", "Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GCP GKE EKS Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -4121,7 +4121,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary for cluster operation, however source IP, user agent, decision and reason may indicate possible malicious use. 
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace", "Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -4131,7 +4131,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as there might be inherent issues with authentications and permissions at cluster.
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace", "Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = GCP GKE Kubernetes cluster
 confidence = medium
@@ -4141,7 +4141,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. However source IP, source user, user agent, object path, and authorization context can reveal potential malicious activity, specially anonymous suspicious IPs and sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets
 providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace", "Kubernetes"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4151,7 +4151,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = None at this time
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Okta Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -4161,7 +4161,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = A single public IP address servicing multiple legitmate users may trigger this search. In addition, the threshold of 5 distinct users may be too low for your needs. You may modify the included filter macro `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` to raise the threshold or except specific IP adresses from triggering this search.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -4171,7 +4171,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -4181,7 +4181,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = While there are legitimate scenarios for these permissions, such as an executive assistant needing access to an executive's mailbox, there are also malicious scenarios. Investigate and filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = O365 Tenant
 confidence = medium
@@ -4191,7 +4191,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta Account Locked Out - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Account Locked Out - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Infrastructure
 confidence = medium
@@ -4201,7 +4201,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune Okta and tune the analytic to ensure proper fidelity. Modify risk score as needed. Drop to anomaly until tuning is complete.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Infrastructure
 confidence = medium
@@ -4211,7 +4211,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = None. Account lockouts should be followed up on to determine if the actual user was the one who caused the lockout, or if it was an unauthorized actor.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Infrastructure
 confidence = medium
@@ -4221,7 +4221,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = There may be a faulty config preventing legitmate users from accessing apps they should have access to.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Infrastructure
 confidence = medium
@@ -4231,7 +4231,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Fidelity of this is high as it is Okta ThreatInsight. Filter and modify as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Infrastructure
 confidence = medium
@@ -4241,7 +4241,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Fidelity of this is high as it is Okta ThreatInsight. Filter and modify as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Infrastructure
 confidence = medium
@@ -4251,7 +4251,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune Okta and tune the analytic to ensure proper fidelity. Modify risk score as needed. Drop to anomaly until tuning is complete.
 providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Splunk Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -4261,7 +4261,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = None identified
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4271,7 +4271,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = There are no known false positives.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Processes created by netsh - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4281,7 +4281,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. It makes sense to investigate the child process and verify whether the process spawned is legitimate. We explicitely exclude "C:\Program Files\rempl\sedlauncher.exe" process path since it is a legitimate process by Mircosoft.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4291,7 +4291,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = None identified
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4301,7 +4301,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = None at the moment
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4311,7 +4311,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4321,7 +4321,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = No known false positives
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4331,7 +4331,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = It is possible that your vulnerability scanner is not detecting that the patches have been applied.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Splunk Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -4341,7 +4341,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = Retrieving server information may be a legitimate API request. Verify that the attempt is a valid request for information.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4351,7 +4351,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = There may be other processes in your environment that users may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4361,7 +4361,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a legitimate sender.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious File Write - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4371,7 +4371,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = It's possible for a legitimate file to be created with the same name as one noted in the lookup file. Filenames listed in the lookup file should be unique enough that collisions are rare. Looking at the location of the file and the process responsible for the activity can help determine whether or not the activity is legitimate.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4381,7 +4381,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4391,7 +4391,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
 confidence = medium
@@ -4401,7 +4401,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible that other utilities or system processes may legitimately write to this folder. Investigate and modify the search to include exceptions as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4411,7 +4411,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = None identified
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
 confidence = medium
@@ -4421,7 +4421,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason. But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4431,7 +4431,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = None identified
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -4441,7 +4441,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamolous behavior. This search will need to be customized to fit your environment&#151;improving its fidelity by counting based on something much more specific, such as a device ID that may be present in your dataset. Consideration for whether the large number of registrations are occuring from a first-time seen domain may also be important.  Extending the search window to look further back in time, or even calculating the average per hour/day for each email domain to look for an anomalous spikes, will improve this search.  You can also use Shannon entropy or Levenshtein Distance (both courtesy of URL Toolbox) to consider the randomness or similarity of the email name or email domain, as the names are often machine-generated.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -4451,7 +4451,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosly written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Account
 confidence = medium
@@ -4461,7 +4461,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searches, we are usually looking to attribute risk or synthesize relevant context with loosely written detections that simply detect anamoluous behavior.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4471,7 +4471,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This process should not be ran forcefully, we have not see any false positives for this detection
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4481,7 +4481,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on paths. Filter or add other paths to the exclusion as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows hosts file modification - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4491,7 +4491,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons for system administrators to add entries to this file.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - 3CX Supply Chain Attack Network Indicators - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - 3CX Supply Chain Attack Network Indicators - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -4501,7 +4501,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present for accessing the 3cx[.]com website. Remove from the lookup as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4511,7 +4511,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
 confidence = medium
@@ -4521,7 +4521,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4531,7 +4531,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Admin or power user may used this series of command.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Active Directory Lateral Movement Identified - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Active Directory Lateral Movement Identified - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4541,7 +4541,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will most likely be present based on risk scoring and how the organization handles system to system communication. Filter, or modify as needed. In addition to count by analytics, adding a risk score may be useful. In our testing, with 22 events over 30 days, the risk scores ranged from 500 to 80,000. Your organization will be different, monitor and modify as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Active Directory Privilege Escalation Identified - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Active Directory Privilege Escalation Identified - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4551,7 +4551,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will most likely be present based on risk scoring and how the organization handles system to system communication. Filter, or modify as needed. In addition to count by analytics, adding a risk score may be useful. In our testing, with 22 events over 30 days, the risk scores ranged from 500 to 80,000. Your organization will be different, monitor and modify as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4561,7 +4561,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Active setup installer may add or modify this registry.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4571,7 +4571,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4581,7 +4581,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Admin or user may choose to use this windows features. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4591,7 +4591,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4601,7 +4601,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4611,7 +4611,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = network admin may add/remove/modify public inbound firewall rule that may cause this rule to be triggered.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4621,7 +4621,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrator may allow inbound traffic in certain network or machine.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4631,7 +4631,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4641,7 +4641,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4651,7 +4651,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this behavior is not normal for `rundll32.exe` or `dllhost.exe` to spawn and run 7zip.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4661,7 +4661,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control",
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4671,7 +4671,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control",
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering will need to occur by parent process or command line argument. It may be required to modify this query to an EDR product for more granular coverage.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4681,7 +4681,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Recon
 known_false_positives = Some administrator activity can be potentially triggered, please add those users to the filter macro.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4691,7 +4691,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons for administrators to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store. In such cases, this will typically be done on a large number of systems.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4701,7 +4701,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = None identified. Attempts to disable security-related services should be identified and understood.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4711,7 +4711,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = None identified.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4721,7 +4721,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4731,7 +4731,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible for this search to generate a notable event for a batch file write to a path that includes the string "system32", but is not the actual Windows system directory. As such, you should confirm the path of the batch file identified by the search. In addition, a false positive may be generated by an administrator copying a legitimate batch file in this directory tree. You should confirm that the activity is legitimate and modify the search to add exclusions, as necessary.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4741,7 +4741,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4751,7 +4751,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - BITS Job Persistence - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4761,7 +4761,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present. Typically, applications will use `BitsAdmin.exe`. Any filtering should be done based on command-line arguments (legitimate applications) or parent process.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4771,7 +4771,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control",
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however it may be required to filter based on parent process name or network connection.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4781,7 +4781,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4791,7 +4791,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives in most environments, however tune as needed based on parent-child relationship or network connection.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4801,7 +4801,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = Unless there are specific use cases, manipulating or exporting certificates using certutil is uncommon. Extraction of certificate has been observed during attacks such as Golden SAML and other campaigns targeting Federated services.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4811,7 +4811,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Typically seen used to `encode` files, but it is possible to see legitimate use of `decode`. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file paths, endpoint or user.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Change Default File Association - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4821,7 +4821,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4831,7 +4831,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - CHCP Command Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4841,7 +4841,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = other tools or script may used this to change code page to UTF-* or others
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4851,7 +4851,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4861,7 +4861,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Some legitimate printer-related processes may show up as children of spoolsv.exe. You should confirm that any activity as legitimate and may be added as exclusions in the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4871,7 +4871,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrator may execute this app to manage disk
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4881,7 +4881,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Operators can execute third party tools using these parameters.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4891,7 +4891,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4901,7 +4901,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be high based on legitimate scripted code in any environment. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4911,7 +4911,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4921,7 +4921,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4931,7 +4931,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Legitimate windows application that are not on the list loading this dll. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4942,7 +4942,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt Strike is to blend in. Therefore, some of the named pipes identified and added may cause false positives. Filter by process name or pipe name to reduce false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4952,7 +4952,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = It is possible for a legitimate file with these extensions to be created. If this is a true ransomware attack, there will be a large number of files created with these extensions.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4962,7 +4962,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = It's possible that a legitimate file could be created with the same name used by ransomware note files.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4972,7 +4972,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives are not expected, as the detection is based on the presence of file system events that indicate path traversal attempts. The analytic may be modified to look for any file writes to this path as it is not common for files to write here.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Windows SACL - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Windows SACL - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4982,7 +4982,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to ScreenConnect path traversal attempts. Tune as needed, or restrict to specific hosts if false positives are encountered.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -4992,7 +4992,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = 3rd party tool may have commandline parameter that can trigger this detection.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5002,7 +5002,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present as control.exe does not natively load from writable paths as defined. One may add .cpl or .inf to the command-line if there is any false positives. Tune as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5012,7 +5012,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators often leverage net.exe to create admin accounts.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5022,7 +5022,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators often leverage net.exe to create or delete network shares. You should verify that the activity was intentional and is legitimate.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5032,7 +5032,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
 confidence = medium
@@ -5042,7 +5042,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate reasons and generate an event. In these cases, tweaking the search may help eliminate noise.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
 confidence = medium
@@ -5052,7 +5052,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators can create memory dumps for debugging purposes, but memory dumps of the LSASS process would be unusual.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5062,7 +5062,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin or Wmic will create false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5072,7 +5072,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to create a shadow copy.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5082,7 +5082,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5092,7 +5092,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5102,7 +5102,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated powershell script taht execute .net code that may generate false positive. filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5112,7 +5112,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5122,7 +5122,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5132,7 +5132,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5142,7 +5142,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard applications shipped with modern versions of windows. They may be used by administrators to legitimately delete old backup copies, although this is typically rare.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5152,7 +5152,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect AzureHound File Modifications - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect AzureHound File Modifications - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5162,7 +5162,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5172,7 +5172,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5182,7 +5182,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other reasons this will pick those up too.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5192,7 +5192,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Certify Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Certify Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5202,7 +5202,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control",
 known_false_positives = Unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5212,7 +5212,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Unknown, partial script block matches.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5222,7 +5222,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
 confidence = medium
@@ -5232,7 +5232,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = None thus far found
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5245,7 +5245,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives as the scope is limited to SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
 confidence = medium
@@ -5255,7 +5255,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. Other tools can access lsass for legitimate reasons, and it's possible this event could be generated in those cases. In these cases, false positives should be fairly obvious and you may need to tweak the search to eliminate noise.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5268,7 +5268,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may only pertain to it not being related to Empire, but another framework. Filter as needed if any applications use the same pattern.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
 confidence = medium
@@ -5280,7 +5280,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = It's possible that a widely used system, such as a kiosk, could cause a large number of account lockouts.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
 confidence = medium
@@ -5290,7 +5290,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = It is possible that a legitimate user is experiencing an issue causing multiple account login failures leading to lockouts.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5300,7 +5300,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5310,7 +5310,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely a renamed instance of hh.exe will be used legitimately, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5320,7 +5320,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications (ex. web browsers) may spawn a child process. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5330,7 +5330,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may retrieve a CHM remotely, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5340,7 +5340,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is rare to see instances of InfoTech Storage Handlers being used, but it does happen in some legitimate instances. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5353,7 +5353,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the commands being identifies are quite specific to EventCode 4104 and Mimikatz. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5363,7 +5363,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect mshta renamed - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5373,7 +5373,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of mshta.exe, but never renamed, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5383,7 +5383,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate applications may perform this behavior and will need to be filtered.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
 confidence = medium
@@ -5393,7 +5393,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. For this reason, it's best to verify the account with an administrator and ask whether there was a valid service request for the account creation. If your local administrator group name is not "Administrators", this search may generate an excessive number of false positives
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5403,7 +5403,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5413,7 +5413,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5423,7 +5423,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is uncommon for normal users to execute a series of commands used for network discovery. System administrators often use scripts to execute these commands. These can generate false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5433,7 +5433,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = There are circumstances where an application may legitimately execute and interact with the Windows command-line interface. Investigate and modify the lookup file, as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5443,7 +5443,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators can leverage PsExec for accessing remote systems and might pass `accepteula` as an argument if they are running this tool for the first time. However, it is not likely that you'd see multiple occurrences of this event on a machine
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Rare Executables - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5453,7 +5453,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5463,7 +5463,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this is restricted to the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5473,7 +5473,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5483,7 +5483,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe with a network connection may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5493,7 +5493,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5503,7 +5503,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5513,7 +5513,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5523,7 +5523,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5534,7 +5534,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives related to third party software registering .DLL's.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5544,7 +5544,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = Known or approved applications used by the organization or usage of built-in functions.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5554,7 +5554,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = Known or approved applications used by the organization or usage of built-in functions.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5564,7 +5564,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = It is possible that legitimate remote access software is used within the environment. Ensure that the lookup is reviewed and updated with any additional remote access software that is used within the environment.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5574,7 +5574,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however this analytic will need to be modified for each environment if Sysmon is not used.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5584,7 +5584,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present. It is possible some third party applications may use older versions of PsExec, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5594,7 +5594,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this analytic identifies renamed instances of `rclone.exe`. Filter as needed if there is a legitimate business use case.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5604,7 +5604,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible third party applications use renamed instances of WinRAR.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect RTLO In File Name - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect RTLO In File Name - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5614,7 +5614,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Implementation in regions that use right to left in native language.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect RTLO In Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect RTLO In Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5624,7 +5624,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Implementation in regions that use right to left in native language.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5634,7 +5634,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use advpack.dll or ieadvpack.dll, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5644,7 +5644,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5654,7 +5654,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use syssetup.dll, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5664,7 +5664,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5674,7 +5674,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the arguments used are specific to SharpHound. Filter as needed or add more command-line arguments as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5684,7 +5684,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the analytic is specific to a filename with extension .zip. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5694,7 +5694,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this is specific to a file attribute not used by anything else. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect suspicious processnames using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect suspicious processnames using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5704,7 +5704,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if a suspicious processname is similar to a benign processname.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5714,7 +5714,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This detection may also be triggered by legitimate applications and numerous service accounts, which often end with a $ sign. To manage this, it's advised to check the service account's activities and, if they are valid, modify the filter macro to exclude them.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5724,7 +5724,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Legitimate OS functions called by vendor applications, baseline the environment and filter before enabling. Recommend throttle by dest/process_name
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5739,7 +5739,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = It is possible some applications will create a consumer and may be required to be filtered. For tuning, add any additional LOLBin's for further depth of coverage.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5749,7 +5749,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5759,7 +5759,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5769,7 +5769,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5779,7 +5779,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5789,7 +5789,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = user may choose to disable windows defender AV
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5799,7 +5799,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5809,7 +5809,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5819,7 +5819,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5829,7 +5829,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5839,7 +5839,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = network operator may disable audit event logs for debugging purposes.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disable Registry Tool - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5849,7 +5849,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disable Schedule Task - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5859,7 +5859,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin may disable problematic schedule task
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5869,7 +5869,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5879,7 +5879,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5889,7 +5889,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin may set this policy for non-critical machine.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5899,7 +5899,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5909,7 +5909,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5919,7 +5919,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5929,7 +5929,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use search for accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled for legitimate purposes.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5940,7 +5940,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disabling CMD Application - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5950,7 +5950,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5960,7 +5960,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disabling Defender Services - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Defender Services - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5970,7 +5970,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable windows defender product
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5980,7 +5980,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin may disable firewall during testing or fixing network problem.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -5990,7 +5990,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disabling Net User Account - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Net User Account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6000,7 +6000,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6010,7 +6010,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6020,7 +6020,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This registry key may be modified via administrators to implement a change in system policy. This type of change should be a very rare occurrence.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6030,7 +6030,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = in some cases admin can disable systemrestore on a machine.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disabling Task Manager - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6040,7 +6040,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non technical user.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6050,7 +6050,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Potential to be triggered by an administrator disabling protections for troubleshooting purposes.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6060,7 +6060,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate third party applications may use a moved copy of dllhost, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6070,7 +6070,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = admin nslookup usage
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6080,7 +6080,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6090,7 +6090,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6100,7 +6100,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6110,7 +6110,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6120,7 +6120,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6130,7 +6130,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6140,7 +6140,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6150,7 +6150,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6160,7 +6160,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6170,7 +6170,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = normal download of file in telegram app. (if it was a common app in network)
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6180,7 +6180,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6195,7 +6195,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6205,7 +6205,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = None identified.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6216,7 +6216,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = None identified.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6226,7 +6226,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6236,7 +6236,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerView for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6246,7 +6246,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6256,7 +6256,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6266,7 +6266,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6276,7 +6276,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6286,7 +6286,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6296,7 +6296,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6306,7 +6306,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Some false positives may be present and will need to be filtered.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6316,7 +6316,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6326,7 +6326,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed. In some instances, `cscript.exe` is used for legitimate business practices.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6336,7 +6336,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6346,7 +6346,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Many benign applications will create processes from executables in Windows\Temp, although unlikely to exceed the given threshold.  Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6356,7 +6356,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Windows Defender AV updates may trigger this alert. Please adjust the filter macros to mitigate false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6366,7 +6366,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Legitimate programs and administrators will execute sc.exe with the start disabled flag.  It is possible, but unlikely from the telemetry of normal Windows operation we observed, that sc.exe will be called more than seven times in a short period of time.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6376,7 +6376,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators, administrative actions or certain applications may run many instances of taskhost and taskhostex concurrently.  Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6386,7 +6386,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6396,7 +6396,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or administrative scripts may use this application. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6406,7 +6406,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = unknown. Filter as needed. Modify the time span as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6416,7 +6416,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6426,7 +6426,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = excessive execution of sc.exe is quite suspicious since it can modify or execute app in high privilege permission.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6436,7 +6436,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6452,7 +6452,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however, tune as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6466,7 +6466,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6476,7 +6476,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = System Administrators may use looks like PsExec for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6486,7 +6486,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6496,7 +6496,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6506,7 +6506,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = None identified.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6516,7 +6516,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - File with Samsam Extension - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6526,7 +6526,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = Because these extensions are not typically used in normal operations, you should investigate all results.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6536,7 +6536,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execution of this firewall rule that may generate false positives. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6546,7 +6546,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A new child process of zoom isn't malicious by that fact alone. Further investigation of the actions of the child process is needed to verify any malicious behavior is taken.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6556,7 +6556,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A previously unseen service is not necessarily malicious. Verify that the service is legitimate and that was installed by a legitimate process.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6570,7 +6570,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited to no false positives are expected.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6580,7 +6580,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6590,7 +6590,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6600,7 +6600,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6610,7 +6610,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6620,7 +6620,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6630,7 +6630,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6640,7 +6640,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6650,7 +6650,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6660,7 +6660,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6670,7 +6670,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6683,7 +6683,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible certain system management frameworks utilize this command to gather trust information.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6693,7 +6693,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6703,7 +6703,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6713,7 +6713,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives as this requires an active Administrator or adversary to bring in, import, and execute.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6726,7 +6726,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6736,7 +6736,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6749,7 +6749,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6759,7 +6759,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6769,7 +6769,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6779,7 +6779,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6789,7 +6789,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6799,7 +6799,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6809,7 +6809,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6819,7 +6819,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6829,7 +6829,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6839,7 +6839,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerView for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6849,7 +6849,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6859,7 +6859,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6869,7 +6869,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerView functions for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6879,7 +6879,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6889,7 +6889,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6899,7 +6899,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6909,7 +6909,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6919,7 +6919,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6929,7 +6929,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6939,7 +6939,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6949,7 +6949,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6959,7 +6959,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6969,7 +6969,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6979,7 +6979,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6989,7 +6989,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -6999,7 +6999,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Headless Browser Mockbin or Mocky Request - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Headless Browser Mockbin or Mocky Request - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7009,7 +7009,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are not expected with this detection, unless within the organization there is a legitimate need for headless browsing accessing mockbin.org or mocky.io.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Headless Browser Usage - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Headless Browser Usage - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7019,7 +7019,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This hunting analytic is meant to assist with baselining and understanding headless browsing in use. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7029,7 +7029,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7039,7 +7039,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Some applications and users may legitimately use attrib.exe to interact with the files.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7049,7 +7049,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = This behavior may seen in normal transfer of file within network if network share is common place for sharing documents.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7059,7 +7059,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = admin or user tool that can terminate multiple process.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Hunting 3CXDesktopApp Software - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Hunting 3CXDesktopApp Software - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7069,7 +7069,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = There may be false positives generated due to the reliance on version numbers for identification purposes. Despite this limitation, the primary goal of this approach is to aid in the detection of the software within the environment.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Icacls Deny Command - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7079,7 +7079,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible some administrative scripts use ICacls. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7089,7 +7089,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7099,7 +7099,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7109,7 +7109,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Although uncommon, Administrators may leverage Impackets tools to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7119,7 +7119,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Although uncommon, Administrators may leverage Impackets tools to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7129,7 +7129,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Although uncommon, Administrators may leverage Impackets tools to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7139,7 +7139,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for administrative and troubleshooting tasks. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -7149,7 +7149,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = Filtering may be required in some instances, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Java Writing JSP File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7159,7 +7159,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives are possible and filtering may be required. Restrict by assets or filter known jsp files that are common for the environment.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7169,7 +7169,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7179,7 +7179,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by default like NetApp may generate false positives. Filter as needed
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7189,7 +7189,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7199,7 +7199,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, Administrators may need to set this flag for legitimate purposes.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7209,7 +7209,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Based on Microsoft documentation, legacy systems or applications will use RC4-HMAC as the default encryption for Kerberos Service Ticket requests. Specifically, systems before Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista. Newer systems will use AES128 or AES256.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7219,7 +7219,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Based on Microsoft documentation, legacy systems or applications will use RC4-HMAC as the default encryption for TGT requests. Specifically, systems before Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista. Newer systems will use AES128 or AES256.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7229,7 +7229,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mi
 known_false_positives = Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7239,7 +7239,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Admin activities or installing related updates may do a sudden stop to list of services we monitor.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Account Manipulation Of SSH Config and Keys - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Account Manipulation Of SSH Config and Keys - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7249,7 +7249,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7259,7 +7259,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in crontab folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Add User Account - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7269,7 +7269,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7279,7 +7279,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7289,7 +7289,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux APT Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux APT Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7299,7 +7299,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7310,7 +7310,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create this file for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux At Application Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7322,7 +7322,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux AWK Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux AWK Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7332,7 +7332,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are present based on automated tooling or system administrative usage. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7342,7 +7342,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux c89 Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux c89 Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7352,7 +7352,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux c99 Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux c99 Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7362,7 +7362,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7372,7 +7372,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Clipboard Data Copy - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Clipboard Data Copy - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7382,7 +7382,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present on Linux desktop as it may commonly be used by administrators or end users. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7392,7 +7392,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Composer Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Composer Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7402,7 +7402,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7412,7 +7412,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7422,7 +7422,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7432,7 +7432,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = Filtering may be required. In addition to AWS credentials, add other important files and monitor. The inverse would be to look for _all_ -F behavior and tune from there.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Data Destruction Command - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Data Destruction Command - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7442,7 +7442,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7452,7 +7452,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Decode Base64 to Shell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Decode Base64 to Shell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7462,7 +7462,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on legitimate software being utilized. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7472,7 +7472,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7482,7 +7482,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7492,7 +7492,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7502,7 +7502,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7512,7 +7512,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Disable Services - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Disable Services - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7522,7 +7522,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7532,7 +7532,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7542,7 +7542,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Docker Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Docker Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7552,7 +7552,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are present based on automated tooling or system administrative usage. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7565,7 +7565,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7575,7 +7575,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7585,7 +7585,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7595,7 +7595,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in this folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7605,7 +7605,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in profile.d folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Find Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Find Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7615,7 +7615,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are present based on automated tooling or system administrative usage. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux GDB Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux GDB Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7625,7 +7625,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Gem Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Gem Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7635,7 +7635,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7645,7 +7645,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7655,7 +7655,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = administrator may disable swapping of devices in a linux host. Filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7665,7 +7665,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = linux package installer/uninstaller may cause this event. Please update you filter macro to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7675,7 +7675,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = linux package installer/uninstaller may cause this event. Please update you filter macro to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7685,7 +7685,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = network admin can terminate a process using this linux command. Filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7695,7 +7695,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7705,7 +7705,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = network admin can delete services unit configuration file as part of normal software installation. Filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7715,7 +7715,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present. This query is meant to help tune other curl and wget analytics.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7725,7 +7725,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present. Tune and then change type to TTP.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7735,7 +7735,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7745,7 +7745,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7755,7 +7755,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrator may do this commandline for auditing and testing purposes. In this scenario filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7765,7 +7765,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on asset type.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Kernel Module Enumeration - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Kernel Module Enumeration - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7775,7 +7775,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are present based on automated tooling or system administrative usage. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7785,7 +7785,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Make Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Make Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7795,7 +7795,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7805,7 +7805,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are present based on automated tooling or system administrative usage. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7815,7 +7815,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if Ngrok is an authorized utility. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Node Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Node Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7825,7 +7825,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are present based on automated tooling or system administrative usage. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7835,7 +7835,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Obfuscated Files or Information Base64 Decode - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Obfuscated Files or Information Base64 Decode - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7845,7 +7845,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present and will require some tuning based on processes. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Octave Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Octave Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7855,7 +7855,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7865,7 +7865,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7875,7 +7875,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on many factors. Tune the correlation as needed to reduce too many triggers.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux PHP Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux PHP Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7885,7 +7885,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7895,7 +7895,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7905,7 +7905,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7915,7 +7915,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7925,7 +7925,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7936,7 +7936,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7946,7 +7946,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7958,7 +7958,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may arise from legitimate actions by administrators or network operators who may use these commands for automation purposes. Therefore, it's recommended to adjust filter macros to eliminate such false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7971,7 +7971,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7981,7 +7981,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create file in ~/.ssh folders for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -7991,7 +7991,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Proxy Socks Curl - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Proxy Socks Curl - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8001,7 +8001,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on proxy usage internally. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8011,7 +8011,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux RPM Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux RPM Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8021,7 +8021,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are present based on automated tooling or system administrative usage. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8031,7 +8031,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are present based on automated tooling or system administrative usage. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8042,7 +8042,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may arise when administrators or network operators create files in systemd directories for legitimate automation tasks. Therefore, it's important to adjust filter macros to account for valid activities. To implement this search successfully, it's crucial to ingest appropriate logs, preferably using the Linux Sysmon Add-on from Splunkbase for those using Sysmon.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Service Restarted - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8054,7 +8054,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8064,7 +8064,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8074,7 +8074,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8084,7 +8084,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8094,7 +8094,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8104,7 +8104,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8114,7 +8114,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Filtering will be required as system administrators will add and remove. One way to filter query is to add "echo".
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux SSH Remote Services Script Execute - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux SSH Remote Services Script Execute - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8124,7 +8124,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This is not a common command to be executed. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8134,7 +8134,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Stop Services - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Stop Services - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8144,7 +8144,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use this application for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8154,7 +8154,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8164,7 +8164,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8174,7 +8174,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8184,7 +8184,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8194,7 +8194,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8204,7 +8204,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Living Off The Land Detection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Living Off The Land Detection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8214,7 +8214,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control",
 known_false_positives = There are no known false positive for this search, but it could contain false positives as multiple detections can trigger and not have successful exploitation. Modify the static value distinct_detection_name to a higher value. It is also required to tune analytics that are also tagged to ensure volume is never too much.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8224,7 +8224,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default).
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8234,7 +8234,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8244,7 +8244,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8254,7 +8254,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control",
 known_false_positives = There are no known false positive for this search, but it could contain false positives as multiple detections can trigger and not have successful exploitation.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8264,7 +8264,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - LOLBAS With Network Traffic - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - LOLBAS With Network Traffic - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8274,7 +8274,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Legitmate usage of internal automation or scripting, espically powershell.exe internal to internal or logon scripts. It may be necessary to omit internal IP ranges if extremely noisy. ie NOT dest_ip IN ("10.0.0.0/8","172.16.0.0/12","192.168.0.0/16","170.98.0.0/16","0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1") 
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8284,7 +8284,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be added to an allow list.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - MacOS LOLbin - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - MacOS LOLbin - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8294,7 +8294,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = None identified.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - MacOS plutil - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - MacOS plutil - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8304,7 +8304,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators using plutil to change plist files.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8314,7 +8314,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8324,7 +8324,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, filter as needed. In our test case, Remcos used regsvr32.exe to modify the registry. It may be required, dependent upon the EDR tool producing registry events, to remove (Default) from the command-line.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8334,7 +8334,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instances.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8347,7 +8347,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = System administrators may use this option, but it's not common.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8357,7 +8357,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated to ensure that it is legitimate.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8367,7 +8367,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8377,7 +8377,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although highly unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line parameters as Mimikatz.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8387,7 +8387,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8397,7 +8397,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = 3rd party tool may used to changed the wallpaper of the machine
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8407,7 +8407,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrators may use this command. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8417,7 +8417,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8427,7 +8427,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8437,7 +8437,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8447,7 +8447,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = automation scripting language may used by network operator to do ldap query.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8457,7 +8457,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as developers do not spawn MSBuild via a WSH.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8467,7 +8467,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = limitted. this anomaly behavior is not commonly seen in clean host.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8477,7 +8477,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present, however, tune as necessary. Some applications may legitimately load mshtml.dll.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8493,7 +8493,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = It is possible some Administrative utilities will load msi.dll outside of normal system paths, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8503,7 +8503,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = quite minimal false positive expected.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8513,7 +8513,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8523,7 +8523,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = limited false positive. It may trigger by some windows update that will modify this registry.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8533,7 +8533,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8543,7 +8543,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8553,7 +8553,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8563,7 +8563,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated host discovery application that may generate false positives or an amazon ec2 script that uses this application. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Network Share Discovery Via Dir Command - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Network Share Discovery Via Dir Command - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8573,7 +8573,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = System Administrators may use looks like net.exe or "dir commandline" for troubleshooting or administrations tasks. However, this will typically come only from certain users and certain systems that can be added to an allow list.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -8583,7 +8583,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the destination port is specific to Active Directory Web Services Protocol, however we recommend utilizing this analytic to hunt for non-standard processes querying the ADWS port. Filter by App or dest_ip to AD servers and remove known proceses querying ADWS.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8593,7 +8593,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filter as needed based on initial analysis.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8603,7 +8603,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may use nltest for troubleshooting purposes, otherwise, rarely used.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8613,7 +8613,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8623,7 +8623,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Notepad with no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Notepad with no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8633,7 +8633,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering may need to occur based on organization endpoint behavior.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8645,7 +8645,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Highly possible Server Administrators will troubleshoot with ntdsutil.exe, generating false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8655,7 +8655,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = office macro for automation may do this behavior
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8665,7 +8665,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8675,7 +8675,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8685,7 +8685,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives may occur if legitimate office documents are creating scheduled tasks. Ensure to investigate the scheduled task and the command to be executed. If the task is benign, add the task name to the exclusion list. Some applications may legitimately load taskschd.dll.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8695,7 +8695,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives may occur if legitimate office documents are executing macro code. Ensure to investigate the macro code and the command to be executed. If the macro code is benign, add the document name to the exclusion list. Some applications may legitimately load VBE7INTL.DLL, VBE7.DLL, or VBEUI.DLL.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8705,7 +8705,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = Default browser not in the filter list.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8715,7 +8715,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = IT or network admin may create an document automation that will run shell script.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8725,7 +8725,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8735,7 +8735,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8745,7 +8745,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8755,7 +8755,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8765,7 +8765,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on macro based approved documents in the organization. Filtering may be needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8775,7 +8775,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8785,7 +8785,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Office Spawning Control - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8795,7 +8795,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8805,7 +8805,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = Legitimate Java applications may use perform outbound connections to these ports. Filter as needed
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8815,7 +8815,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Microsoft may provide updates to these binaries. Verify that these changes do not correspond with your normal software update cycle.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PaperCut NG Suspicious Behavior Debug Log - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PaperCut NG Suspicious Behavior Debug Log - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -8825,7 +8825,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, as this is based on the admin user accessing the Papercut NG instance from a public IP address. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8835,7 +8835,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8845,7 +8845,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = takeown.exe is a normal windows application that may used by network operator.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8859,7 +8859,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives have been limited when the Anonymous Logon is used for Account Name.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8869,7 +8869,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8879,7 +8879,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator may execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8889,7 +8889,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positive is quite limited. Filter is needed
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8900,7 +8900,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process of the the identified processes. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Potential password in username - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Potential password in username - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8910,7 +8910,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Valid usernames with high entropy or source/destination system pairs with multiple authenticating users will make it difficult to identify the real user authenticating.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8920,7 +8920,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This model is an anomaly detector that identifies usage of APIs and scripting constructs that are correllated with malicious activity.  These APIs and scripting constructs are part of the programming langauge and advanced scripts may generate false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8930,7 +8930,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives. May filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8940,7 +8940,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8950,7 +8950,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present if any scripts are adding to inprocserver32. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8960,7 +8960,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = powershell developer may used this function in their script for instance checking too.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8970,7 +8970,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this action.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8983,7 +8983,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PowerShell Enable PowerShell Remoting - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Enable PowerShell Remoting - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -8993,7 +8993,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Note that false positives may occur due to the use of the Enable-PSRemoting cmdlet by legitimate users, such as system administrators. It is recommended to apply appropriate filters as needed to minimize the number of false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9003,7 +9003,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = network operator may enable or disable this windows feature.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9013,7 +9013,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = network operrator may use this command.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9027,7 +9027,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9042,7 +9042,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9052,7 +9052,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9065,7 +9065,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9075,7 +9075,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on third-party applications or administrators using CIM. It is recommended to apply appropriate filters as needed to minimize the number of false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PowerShell Invoke WmiExec Usage - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Invoke WmiExec Usage - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9085,7 +9085,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this analytic is designed to detect a specific utility. It is recommended to apply appropriate filters as needed to minimize the number of false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Powershell Load Module in Meterpreter - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Load Module in Meterpreter - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9098,7 +9098,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be very limited as this is strict to MetaSploit behavior.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9111,7 +9111,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9121,7 +9121,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = powershell may used this function to process compressed data.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Powershell Remote Services Add TrustedHost - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Remote Services Add TrustedHost - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9131,7 +9131,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = user and network administrator may used this function to add trusted host.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9141,7 +9141,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9151,7 +9151,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PowerShell Script Block With URL Chain - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Script Block With URL Chain - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9161,7 +9161,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control",
 known_false_positives = Unknown, possible custom scripting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9171,7 +9171,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent process or command-line arguments.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PowerShell Start or Stop Service - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell Start or Stop Service - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9181,7 +9181,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This behavior may be noisy, as these cmdlets are commonly used by system administrators or other legitimate users to manage services. Therefore, it is recommended not to enable this analytic as a direct notable or TTP. Instead, it should be used as part of a broader set of security controls to detect and investigate potential threats.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9191,7 +9191,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = powershell may used this function to store out object into memory.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PowerShell WebRequest Using Memory Stream - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PowerShell WebRequest Using Memory Stream - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9201,7 +9201,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control",
 known_false_positives = Unknown, possible custom scripting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9211,7 +9211,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to use this windows features.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9221,7 +9221,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration ignore failure during testing and debugging.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9231,7 +9231,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = possible new printer installation may add driver component on this registry.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9244,7 +9244,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Unknown. This may require filtering.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9257,7 +9257,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives are unknown and filtering may be required.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9267,7 +9267,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no false positive results. It is uncommon for LNK files to be executed from temporary or user directories.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9277,7 +9277,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Process Execution via WMI - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9287,7 +9287,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to execute commands for legitimate purposes.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9297,7 +9297,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9307,7 +9307,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default).
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Processes launching netsh - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9317,7 +9317,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run commands.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9327,7 +9327,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = There might be some false positives as keyboard event taps are used by processes like Siri and Zoom video chat, for some good examples of processes to exclude please see [this](https://github.com/facebook/osquery/pull/5345#issuecomment-454639161) comment.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9337,7 +9337,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may use random Scheduled Task names.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9347,7 +9347,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may use random Windows Service names.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9357,7 +9357,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9367,7 +9367,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mi
 known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9377,7 +9377,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Recon
 known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9387,7 +9387,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = network operator may use this batch command to delete recursively a directory or files within directory
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9397,7 +9397,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = It is unusual for a service to be created or modified by directly manipulating the registry. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate, as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9407,7 +9407,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that leverage shim databases for compatibility purposes for legacy applications
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9417,7 +9417,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that must execute on system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9427,7 +9427,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9437,7 +9437,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Other third part application may used this parameter but not so common in base windows environment.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9447,7 +9447,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = minimal. but network operator can use this application to load dll.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9457,7 +9457,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9467,7 +9467,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9477,7 +9477,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9487,7 +9487,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9497,7 +9497,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9507,7 +9507,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. However, this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9517,7 +9517,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invoke-Command` to start a process on remote systems for system administration or automation use cases. This activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. In certain environments, tuning may not be possible.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9527,7 +9527,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and WinRs to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9537,7 +9537,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows application. It may be used legitimately by Administrators with these parameters for remote system administration, but it's relatively uncommon.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9547,7 +9547,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9557,7 +9557,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WWMI and powershell.exe to start a process on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9567,7 +9567,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use Adsisearcher for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9577,7 +9577,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9587,7 +9587,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9597,7 +9597,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9607,7 +9607,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may use this legitimately to gather info from remote systems. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9617,7 +9617,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = network admin can resize the shadowstorage for valid purposes.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9627,7 +9627,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = third party tool may have same command line parameters as revil ransomware.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Revil Registry Entry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9637,7 +9637,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9647,7 +9647,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, legitimate applications may use the same command line parameters as Rubeus. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9657,7 +9657,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may obtain a handle for winlogon.exe. Filter as needed
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9667,7 +9667,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execute this command that may generate false positives. filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9677,7 +9677,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This is a hunting detection, meant to provide a understanding of how voluminous control_rundll is within the environment.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9687,7 +9687,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This may be tuned, or a new one related, by adding .cpl to command-line. However, it's important to look for both. Tune/filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9697,7 +9697,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9707,7 +9707,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9717,7 +9717,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9727,7 +9727,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9737,7 +9737,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9747,7 +9747,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9757,7 +9757,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9767,7 +9767,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are possible with native utilities and third party applications. Filtering may be needed based on command-line, or add world writeable paths to restrict query.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9777,7 +9777,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = If there are files with this keywoord as file names it might trigger false possitives, please make use of our filters to tune out potential FPs.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9787,7 +9787,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited to no known false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9797,7 +9797,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Natively, `dllhost.exe` will access the files. Every environment will have additional native processes that do as well. Filter by process_name. As an aside, one can remove process_name entirely and add `Object_Name=*ShadowCopy*`.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Samsam Test File Write - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9807,7 +9807,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = No false positives have been identified.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9817,7 +9817,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services is uncommon. However, there may be legitimate instances of this behavior. It is important to validate and investigate as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9827,7 +9827,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = normal application like mmc.exe and other ldap query tool may trigger this detections.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9840,7 +9840,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9853,7 +9853,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9864,7 +9864,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9874,7 +9874,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = While it is possible for legitimate scripts or administrators to trigger this behavior, filtering can be applied based on the parent process and application to reduce false positives. Analysts should reference the provided references to understand the context and threat landscape associated with this activity.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9884,7 +9884,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrators may start scheduled tasks on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9894,7 +9894,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Bear in mind, administrators debugging Scheduled Task entries may trigger this analytic, necessitating fine-tuning and filtering to distinguish between legitimate and potentially malicious use of 'schtasks.exe'.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9904,7 +9904,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = While it is possible to have false positives, due to legitimate administrative tasks, these are usually limited and should still be validated and investigated as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9914,7 +9914,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = This analytic may also capture legitimate administrative activities such as system updates or maintenance tasks, which can be classified as false positives. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9924,7 +9924,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Script Execution via WMI - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9934,7 +9934,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use wmi to launch scripts for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9944,7 +9944,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited to no false positives are expected.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9954,7 +9954,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = user may execute and use this application
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9964,7 +9964,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9974,7 +9974,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -9988,7 +9988,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10005,7 +10005,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs or querying for SPNs. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Services Escalate Exe - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10015,7 +10015,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as `services.exe` should never spawn a process from `ADMIN$`. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10025,7 +10025,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10035,7 +10035,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may attempt to change the default execution policy on a system for a variety of reasons. However, setting the policy to "unrestricted" or "bypass" as this search is designed to identify, would be unusual. Hits should be reviewed and investigated as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Shim Database File Creation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10045,7 +10045,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Because legitimate shim files are created and used all the time, this event, in itself, is not suspicious. However, if there are other correlating events, it may warrant further investigation.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10055,7 +10055,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = None identified
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10068,7 +10068,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Although uncommon, legitimate applications may create and delete a Scheduled Task within 30 seconds. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
 confidence = medium
@@ -10078,7 +10078,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible that an administrator created and deleted an account in a short time period.  Verifying activity with an administrator is advised.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10088,7 +10088,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10098,7 +10098,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Single-letter executables are not always malicious. Investigate this activity with your normal incident-response process.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10108,7 +10108,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legitimate applications.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10118,7 +10118,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering will be needed to ensure proper monitoring.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Spike in File Writes - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10128,7 +10128,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = It is important to understand that if you happen to install any new applications on your hosts or are copying a large number of files, you can expect to see a large increase of file modifications.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10138,7 +10138,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives have been identified. There are limited instances where `rundll32.exe` may be spawned by a legitimate print driver.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10148,7 +10148,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10158,7 +10158,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10168,7 +10168,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Unknown.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10178,7 +10178,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10188,7 +10188,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Behavior Identified - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Behavior Identified - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10198,7 +10198,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on automated tooling or system administrators. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
 confidence = medium
@@ -10208,7 +10208,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10218,7 +10218,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Renaming a computer account name to a name that not end with '$' is highly unsual and may not have any legitimate scenarios.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10228,7 +10228,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = every user may do this event but very un-ussual.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10238,7 +10238,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10248,7 +10248,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10258,7 +10258,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10268,7 +10268,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible the Event Logging service gets shut down due to system errors or legitimately administration tasks. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10278,7 +10278,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10288,7 +10288,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = limitted. this parameter is not commonly used by windows application but can be used by the network operator.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10298,7 +10298,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10308,7 +10308,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = We have tested this detection logic with ~2 million 4769 events and did not identify false positives. However, they may be possible in certain environments. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10319,7 +10319,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unless an administrator is using these commands to troubleshoot or audit a system, the execution of these commands should be monitored.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10329,7 +10329,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10339,7 +10339,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances have been identified coming from native Microsoft utilities similar to SCCM.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10349,7 +10349,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild.exe, triggering a false positive. Baselining of MSBuild.exe usage is recommended to better understand it's path usage. Visual Studio runs an instance out of a path that will need to be filtered on.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10359,7 +10359,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10369,7 +10369,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10379,7 +10379,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10389,7 +10389,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit this behavior, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10406,7 +10406,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10423,7 +10423,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use PlistBuddy to create or modify property lists and possibly generate false positives. Review the property list being modified or created to confirm.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10433,7 +10433,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10443,7 +10443,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Various business process or userland applications and behavior.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10453,7 +10453,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10463,7 +10463,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10473,7 +10473,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It's possible for system administrators to write scripts that exhibit this behavior. If this is the case, the search will need to be modified to filter them out.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10483,7 +10483,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10493,7 +10493,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This is likely to produce false positives and will require some filtering. Tune the query by adding command line paths to known good DLLs, or filtering based on parent process names.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10503,7 +10503,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10513,7 +10513,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = third party application may used this dll export name to execute function.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10523,7 +10523,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use Start as a function and call it via the command line. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10534,7 +10534,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = The main source of false positives could be the legitimate use of scheduled tasks from these directories. Careful tuning of this search may be necessary to suit the specifics of your environment, reducing the rate of false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10544,7 +10544,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in small environments. Tuning may be required based on parent process.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10554,7 +10554,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10564,7 +10564,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = A computer account name change event inmediately followed by a kerberos TGT request with matching fields is unsual. However, legitimate behavior may trigger it. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10574,7 +10574,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10584,7 +10584,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
 confidence = medium
@@ -10594,7 +10594,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder in modern versions of Windows, it would be unusual for a process other than explorer.exe to write to it. Incidents should be investigated as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10604,7 +10604,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10614,7 +10614,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mi
 known_false_positives = This commandline can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus, a filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Windows
 confidence = medium
@@ -10624,7 +10624,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators debugging servers
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10636,7 +10636,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This detection may require tuning based on third party applications utilizing native Windows binaries in non-standard paths.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Query - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10646,7 +10646,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10656,7 +10656,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10666,7 +10666,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10676,7 +10676,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10686,7 +10686,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown. all of the dll loaded by mmc.exe is microsoft signed dll.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10696,7 +10696,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10706,7 +10706,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10716,7 +10716,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Custom applications may leverage the Kerberos protocol. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10726,7 +10726,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown at the moment
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10739,7 +10739,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Potential for some third party applications to disable AMSI upon invocation. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10749,7 +10749,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = An single endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systeams and missconfigured systems.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10760,7 +10760,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = An single endpoint requesting a large number of kerberos service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systems and missconfigured systems.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10770,7 +10770,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = An single endpoint authenticating to a large number of hosts is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, jump servers and missconfigured systems.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10780,7 +10780,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications start with long command lines.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10790,7 +10790,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications use long command lines for installs or updates. You should review identified command lines for legitimacy. You may modify the first part of the search to omit legitimate command lines from consideration. If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider changing the value of threshold in the search to a smaller value. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. You may get unexpected results if the user identified in the results is not present in the data used to build the associated model.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10800,7 +10800,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10810,7 +10810,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this PowerShell commandlet for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - USN Journal Deletion - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10820,7 +10820,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = None identified
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10830,7 +10830,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10840,7 +10840,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = windows can used this application for its normal COM object validation.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10850,7 +10850,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10860,7 +10860,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configuration.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10870,7 +10870,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = legitimate process that are not in the exception list may trigger this event.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10880,7 +10880,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mi
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10890,7 +10890,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10900,7 +10900,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10910,7 +10910,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filtering may be required.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Abused Web Services - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Abused Web Services - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10920,7 +10920,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10930,7 +10930,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Some native binaries and browser applications may request SeDebugPrivilege. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10940,7 +10940,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate applications will request access to winlogon, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10950,7 +10950,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate applications will request access to winlogon, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10960,7 +10960,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerView for legitimate purposes, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery for Sam Account Name - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Account Discovery for Sam Account Name - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10970,7 +10970,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerView for legitimate purposes, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery With NetUser PreauthNotRequire - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Account Discovery With NetUser PreauthNotRequire - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10980,7 +10980,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerView for legitimate purposes, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD Abnormal Object Access Activity - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD Abnormal Object Access Activity - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -10990,7 +10990,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Service accounts or applications that routinely query Active Directory for information.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD AdminSDHolder ACL Modified - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD AdminSDHolder ACL Modified - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11000,7 +11000,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Adding new users or groups to the AdminSDHolder ACL is not usual. Filter as needed
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11010,7 +11010,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Domain mergers and migrations may generate large volumes of false positives for this analytic.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11020,7 +11020,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD Domain Controller Promotion - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD Domain Controller Promotion - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11030,7 +11030,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = None.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD Domain Replication ACL Addition - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD Domain Replication ACL Addition - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11040,7 +11040,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = When there is a change to nTSecurityDescriptor, Windows logs the entire ACL with the newly added components. If existing accounts are present with this permission, they will raise an alert each time the nTSecurityDescriptor is updated unless whitelisted.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11050,7 +11050,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Disaster recovery events.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD DSRM Password Reset - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD DSRM Password Reset - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11060,7 +11060,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Resetting the DSRM password for legitamate reasons, i.e. forgot the password. Disaster recovery. Deploying AD backdoor deliberately.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD Privileged Account SID History Addition - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD Privileged Account SID History Addition - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11070,7 +11070,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Migration of privileged accounts.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD Privileged Object Access Activity - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD Privileged Object Access Activity - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11080,7 +11080,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Service accounts or applications that routinely query Active Directory for information.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11090,7 +11090,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Azure AD Connect syncing operations.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11100,7 +11100,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Genuine DC promotion may trigger this alert.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11110,7 +11110,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD ServicePrincipalName Added To Domain Account - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD ServicePrincipalName Added To Domain Account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11120,7 +11120,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = A Service Principal Name should only be added to an account when an application requires it. While infrequent, this detection may trigger on legitimate actions. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Account ServicePrincipalName - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Account ServicePrincipalName - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11130,7 +11130,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = A Service Principal Name should only be added to an account when an application requires it. Adding an SPN and quickly deleting it is less common but may be part of legitimate action. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Controller SPN Attribute - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Controller SPN Attribute - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11140,7 +11140,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = None.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Server Object - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Server Object - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11150,7 +11150,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Creating and deleting a server object within 30 seconds or less is unusual but not impossible in a production environment. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD SID History Attribute Modified - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD SID History Attribute Modified - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11160,7 +11160,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Domain mergers and migrations may generate large volumes of false positives for this analytic.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11170,7 +11170,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = ADfind is a command-line tool for AD administration and management that is seen to be leveraged by various adversaries. Filter out legitimate administrator usage using the filter macro.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Admin Permission Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Admin Permission Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11180,7 +11180,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may occur if there are legitimate accounts with the privilege to drop files in the root of the C drive. It's recommended to verify the legitimacy of such actions and the accounts involved.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11190,7 +11190,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = An single endpoint accessing windows administrative shares across a large number of endpoints is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systems and missconfigured systems.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11200,7 +11200,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The default Group Policy Objects within an AD network may be legitimately updated for administrative operations, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11210,7 +11210,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Group Policy Objects are created as part of regular administrative operations, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Base64 Content - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Base64 Content - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11220,7 +11220,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Executable Content - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Executable Content - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11230,7 +11230,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Process Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Process Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11240,7 +11240,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be generated by process executions within the commandline, regex has been provided to minimize the possibilty.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Apache Benchmark Binary - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Apache Benchmark Binary - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11250,7 +11250,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as there is a small subset of binaries that contain the original file name of ab.exe. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows App Layer Protocol Qakbot NamedPipe - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows App Layer Protocol Qakbot NamedPipe - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11260,7 +11260,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows App Layer Protocol Wermgr Connect To NamedPipe - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows App Layer Protocol Wermgr Connect To NamedPipe - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11270,7 +11270,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Application Layer Protocol RMS Radmin Tool Namedpipe - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Application Layer Protocol RMS Radmin Tool Namedpipe - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11280,7 +11280,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Filter based on pipe name or process.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Block Events - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AppLocker Block Events - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11290,7 +11290,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may legitimately use AppLocker to allow applications.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Execution from Uncommon Locations - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AppLocker Execution from Uncommon Locations - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11300,7 +11300,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate users are executing applications from file paths that are not permitted by AppLocker. It is recommended to investigate the context of the application execution to determine if it is malicious or not. Modify the threshold as needed to reduce false positives.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Privilege Escalation via Unauthorized Bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AppLocker Privilege Escalation via Unauthorized Bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11310,7 +11310,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate users are attempting to bypass application restrictions. This could occur if a user is attempting to run an application that is not permitted by AppLocker. It is recommended to investigate the context of the bypass attempt to determine if it is malicious or not. Modify the threshold as needed to reduce false positives.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Rare Application Launch Detection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AppLocker Rare Application Launch Detection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11320,7 +11320,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate users are launching applications that are not permitted by AppLocker. It is recommended to investigate the context of the application launch to determine if it is malicious or not. Modify the threshold as needed to reduce false positives.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Archive Collected Data via Powershell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Archive Collected Data via Powershell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11330,7 +11330,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = powershell may used this function to archive data.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Archive Collected Data via Rar - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Archive Collected Data via Rar - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11340,7 +11340,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = user and network administrator can execute this command.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AutoIt3 Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AutoIt3 Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11350,7 +11350,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the application is legitimately used, filter by user or endpoint as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Autostart Execution LSASS Driver Registry Modification - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Autostart Execution LSASS Driver Registry Modification - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11360,7 +11360,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present on recent Windows Operating Systems. Filtering may be required based on process_name. In addition, look for non-standard, unsigned, module loads into LSASS. If query is too noisy, modify by adding Endpoint.processes process_name to query to identify the process making the modification.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Binary Proxy Execution Mavinject DLL Injection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Binary Proxy Execution Mavinject DLL Injection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11370,7 +11370,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter on DLL name or parent process.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11380,7 +11380,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in this path.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows BootLoader Inventory - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows BootLoader Inventory - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11390,7 +11390,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = No false positives here, only bootloaders. Filter as needed or create a lookup as a baseline.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Bypass UAC via Pkgmgr Tool - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Bypass UAC via Pkgmgr Tool - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11400,7 +11400,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present on recent Windows Operating Systems. Filtering may be required based on process_name. In addition, look for non-standard, unsigned, module loads into LSASS. If query is too noisy, modify by adding Endpoint.processes process_name to query to identify the process making the modification.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows CAB File on Disk - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows CAB File on Disk - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11410,7 +11410,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives will only be present if a process legitimately writes a .cab file to disk. Modify the analytic as needed by file path. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11420,7 +11420,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11430,7 +11430,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11440,7 +11440,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11450,7 +11450,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present and some filtering may be required.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11460,7 +11460,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = false positive may vary depends on the score you want to check. The bigger number of path traversal string count the better.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11470,7 +11470,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Not known at this moment.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Command Shell DCRat ForkBomb Payload - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Command Shell DCRat ForkBomb Payload - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11480,7 +11480,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Command Shell Fetch Env Variables - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Command Shell Fetch Env Variables - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11490,7 +11490,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = shell process that are not included in this search may cause False positive. Filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11500,7 +11500,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on many factors. Tune the correlation as needed to reduce too many triggers.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11510,7 +11510,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible third party applications may have a computer account that adds computer accounts, filtering may be required.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11520,7 +11520,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible false positives will be present based on third party applications. Filtering may be needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11530,7 +11530,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible third party applications may add these SPNs to Computer Accounts, filtering may be needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows ConHost with Headless Argument - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows ConHost with Headless Argument - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11540,7 +11540,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the application is legitimately used, filter by user or endpoint as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Create Local Account - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Create Local Account - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11550,7 +11550,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible that an administrator created the account. Verifying activity with an administrator is advised. This analytic is set to anomaly to allow for risk to be added. Filter and tune as needed. Restrict to critical infrastructure to reduce any volume.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Credential Access From Browser Password Store - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Credential Access From Browser Password Store - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11560,7 +11560,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The lookup file `browser_app_list` may not contain all the browser applications that are allowed to access the browser user data profiles. Consider updating the lookup files to add allowed object paths for the browser applications that are not included in the lookup file.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Createdump - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Createdump - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11570,7 +11570,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if an application is dumping processes, filter as needed. Recommend reviewing createdump.exe usage across the fleet to better understand all usage and by what.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11580,7 +11580,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Uninstall chrome browser extension application may access this file and folder path to removed chrome installation in the target host. Filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11590,7 +11590,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Uninstall chrome application may access this file and folder path to removed chrome installation in target host. Filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11600,7 +11600,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Uninstall application may access this registry to remove the entry of the target application. filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11610,7 +11610,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = network administrator can use this tool for auditing process.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11620,7 +11620,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = network administrator can use this tool for auditing process.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11630,7 +11630,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = network administrator can use this tool for auditing process.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11640,7 +11640,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11652,7 +11652,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = It is possible Administrators or super users will use Curl for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11669,7 +11669,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = False positives may be limited to source control applications and may be required to be filtered out.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11679,7 +11679,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = The uninstallation of a large software application or the use of cleanmgr.exe may trigger this detection. A filter is necessary to reduce false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Defacement Modify Transcodedwallpaper File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Defacement Modify Transcodedwallpaper File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11689,7 +11689,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = 3rd part software application can change the wallpaper. Filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11699,7 +11699,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The default Group Policy Objects within an AD network may be legitimately updated for administrative operations, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11709,7 +11709,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The default Group Policy Objects within an AD network may be legitimately updated for administrative operations, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Audit Events - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Audit Events - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11719,7 +11719,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives are expected from legitimate applications generating events that are similar to those generated by malicious activity. For example, Event ID 1122 is generated when a process attempts to load a DLL that is blocked by an ASR rule. This can be triggered by legitimate applications that attempt to load DLLs that are not blocked by ASR rules. This is audit only.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Defender"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Block Events - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Block Events - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11729,7 +11729,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives are expected from legitimate applications generating events that are similar to those generated by malicious activity. For example, Event ID 1122 is generated when a process attempts to load a DLL that is blocked by an ASR rule. This can be triggered by legitimate applications that attempt to load DLLs that are not blocked by ASR rules. This is block only.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Defender"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Registry Modification - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Registry Modification - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11739,7 +11739,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are expected from legitimate applications generating events that are similar to those generated by malicious activity. For example, Event ID 5007 is generated when a process attempts to modify a registry key that is related to ASR rules. This can be triggered by legitimate applications that attempt to modify registry keys that are not blocked by ASR rules.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Defender"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Rule Disabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Rule Disabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11749,7 +11749,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may occur if applications are typically disabling ASR rules in the environment. Monitor for changes to ASR rules to determine if this is a false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Defender"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Rules Stacking - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Rules Stacking - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11760,7 +11760,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives are not expected with this analytic, since it is a hunting analytic. It is meant to show the use of ASR rules and how they can be used to detect malicious activity.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Defender"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11770,7 +11770,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to use this windows features.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Delete or Modify System Firewall - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Delete or Modify System Firewall - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11780,7 +11780,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator may modify or delete firewall configuration.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11790,7 +11790,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This detection can catch for third party application updates or installation. In this scenario false positive filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11800,7 +11800,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This windows feature may implemented by administrator to prevent normal user to change the password of a critical host or server, In this type of scenario filter is needed to minimized false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11810,7 +11810,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11820,7 +11820,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This windows feature may implement by administrator in some server where shutdown is critical. In that scenario filter of machine and users that can modify this registry is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11830,7 +11830,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11840,7 +11840,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable this windows features.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Disable or Modify Tools Via Taskkill - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Disable or Modify Tools Via Taskkill - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11850,7 +11850,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Network administrator can use this application to kill process during audit or investigation.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11860,7 +11860,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This windows feature may implement by administrator in some server where shutdown is critical. In that scenario filter of machine and users that can modify this registry is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11870,7 +11870,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present only if scripts or Administrators are disabling logging. Filter as needed by parent process or other.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11880,7 +11880,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Disabling these features for legitimate purposes is not a common use case but can still be implemented by the administrators. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11890,7 +11890,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11900,7 +11900,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = It is possible false positives may be present based on the internal name dcinst.exe, filter as needed. It may be worthy to alert on the service name.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11910,7 +11910,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators using the DiskShadow tool in their infrastructure as a main backup tool with scripts will cause false positives that can be filtered with `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter`
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11920,7 +11920,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Some legitimate administrative tools leverage `dism.exe` to manipulate packages and features of the operating system. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11930,7 +11930,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on paths. Filter or add other paths to the exclusion as needed. Some applications may legitimately load libraries from non-standard paths.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11940,7 +11940,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filtering may be required. Remove the Windows Shells macro to determine if other utilities are using iscsicpl.exe.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Side-Loading In Calc - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DLL Side-Loading In Calc - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11950,7 +11950,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Side-Loading Process Child Of Calc - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DLL Side-Loading Process Child Of Calc - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11960,7 +11960,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows DNS Gather Network Info - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DNS Gather Network Info - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11970,7 +11970,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mi
 known_false_positives = network administrator can execute this command to enumerate DNS record. Filter or add other paths to the exclusion as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11980,7 +11980,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = New members can be added to the DnsAdmins group as part of legitimate administrative tasks. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -11990,7 +11990,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerView for legitimate purposes, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12000,7 +12000,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may trigger the detections certain scenarios like directory service delays or out of date lookups. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12010,7 +12010,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Driver Inventory - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Driver Inventory - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12020,7 +12020,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Filter and modify the analytic as you'd like. Filter based on path. Remove the system32\drivers and look for non-standard paths.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12030,7 +12030,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on legitimate third party applications needing to install drivers. Filter, or allow list known good drivers consistently being installed in these paths.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12040,7 +12040,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This analytic is meant to assist with identifying drivers loaded in the environment and not to be setup for notables off the bat.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12050,7 +12050,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = In some cases, an automated script or system may enable this setting continuously, leading to false positives. To avoid such situations, it is recommended to monitor the frequency and context of the registry modification and modify or filter the detection rules as needed. This can help to reduce the number of false positives and ensure that only genuine threats are identified. Additionally, it is important to investigate any detected instances of this modification and analyze them in the broader context of the system and network to determine if further action is necessary.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12060,7 +12060,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Windows service update may cause this event. In that scenario, filtering is needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12070,7 +12070,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible that these logs may be legitimately cleared by Administrators. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Event Triggered Image File Execution Options Injection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Event Triggered Image File Execution Options Injection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12080,7 +12080,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present and tuning will be required before turning into a TTP or notable.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12090,7 +12090,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Executable in Loaded Modules - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Executable in Loaded Modules - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12100,7 +12100,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12110,7 +12110,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed. Added .xml to potentially capture any answer file usage. Remove as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Invoke RestMethod - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Invoke RestMethod - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12120,7 +12120,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Powershell UploadString - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Powershell UploadString - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12130,7 +12130,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Export Certificate - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Export Certificate - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12140,7 +12140,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be generated based on an automated process or service that exports certificates on the regular. Review is required before setting to alert. Monitor for abnormal processes performing an export.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12150,7 +12150,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Security teams may leverage PowerView proactively to identify and remediate sensitive file shares. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12160,7 +12160,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = third party application may use this network protocol as part of its feature. Filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12170,7 +12170,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Unknown at this point
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Files and Dirs Access Rights Modification Via Icacls - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Files and Dirs Access Rights Modification Via Icacls - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12180,7 +12180,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible some administrative scripts use ICacls. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Find Domain Organizational Units with GetDomainOU - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Find Domain Organizational Units with GetDomainOU - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12190,7 +12190,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerSploit tools for legitimate reasons, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Find Interesting ACL with FindInterestingDomainAcl - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Find Interesting ACL with FindInterestingDomainAcl - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12200,7 +12200,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerSploit tools for legitimate reasons, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Findstr GPP Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Findstr GPP Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12210,7 +12210,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage findstr to find passwords in GPO to validate exposure. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Forest Discovery with GetForestDomain - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Forest Discovery with GetForestDomain - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12220,7 +12220,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerSploit tools for legitimate reasons, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Host Information Camera - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Host Information Camera - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12230,7 +12230,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mi
 known_false_positives = Administrators may execute this powershell command to get hardware information related to camera on $dest$.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Identity SAM Info - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Identity SAM Info - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12240,7 +12240,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mi
 known_false_positives = this module can be loaded by a third party application. Filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12250,7 +12250,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mi
 known_false_positives = Filter internet browser application to minimize the false positive of this detection.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12260,7 +12260,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may leverage PowerView for system management or troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Get Local Admin with FindLocalAdminAccess - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Get Local Admin with FindLocalAdminAccess - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12270,7 +12270,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerSploit tools for legitimate reasons, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Group Policy Object Created - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Group Policy Object Created - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12280,7 +12280,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Group Policy Objects are created as part of regular administrative operations, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12290,7 +12290,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12300,7 +12300,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12310,7 +12310,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Users may delete a large number of pictures or files in a folder, which could trigger this detection. Additionally, heavy usage of PowerBI and Outlook may also result in false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Hijack Execution Flow Version Dll Side Load - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Hijack Execution Flow Version Dll Side Load - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12320,7 +12320,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12330,7 +12330,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess and SourceUser, filter based on source image as needed. Utilize this hunting analytic to tune out false positives in TTP or anomaly analytics.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Identify Protocol Handlers - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Identify Protocol Handlers - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12340,7 +12340,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be found. https and http is a URL Protocol handler that will trigger this analytic. Tune based on process or command-line.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Add New Module - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows IIS Components Add New Module - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12350,7 +12350,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present until properly tuned. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12360,7 +12360,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This analytic is meant to assist with hunting modules across a fleet of IIS servers. Filter and modify as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Module Failed to Load - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows IIS Components Module Failed to Load - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12370,7 +12370,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present until all module failures are resolved or reviewed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components New Module Added - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows IIS Components New Module Added - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12380,7 +12380,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present when updates or an administrator adds a new module to IIS. Monitor and filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Add Xml Applocker Rules - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Add Xml Applocker Rules - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12390,7 +12390,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may execute this command that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12400,7 +12400,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12410,7 +12410,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12420,7 +12420,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12430,7 +12430,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12440,7 +12440,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12450,7 +12450,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12460,7 +12460,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12470,7 +12470,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Deny Security Software With Applocker - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Deny Security Software With Applocker - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12480,7 +12480,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on organization use of Applocker. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12490,7 +12490,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12500,7 +12500,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12510,7 +12510,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12520,7 +12520,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12530,7 +12530,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12540,7 +12540,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12550,7 +12550,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12560,7 +12560,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12570,7 +12570,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12580,7 +12580,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12590,7 +12590,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12600,7 +12600,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12610,7 +12610,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12620,7 +12620,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12630,7 +12630,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12640,7 +12640,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12650,7 +12650,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to administrative scripts disabling HVCI. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12660,7 +12660,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Windows system since it is a default security control, although it is not rare for some policies to disable it. Although no false positives have been identified, use the provided filter macro to tune the search.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Indicator Removal Via Rmdir - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Indicator Removal Via Rmdir - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12670,7 +12670,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = user and network administrator can execute this command.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12680,7 +12680,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Some legacy applications may be run using pcalua.exe. Similarly, forfiles.exe may be used in legitimate batch scripts.  Filter these results as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12690,7 +12690,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Some legacy applications may be run using pcalua.exe.  Filter these results as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12700,7 +12700,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Information Discovery Fsutil - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Information Discovery Fsutil - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12710,7 +12710,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Ingress Tool Transfer Using Explorer - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Ingress Tool Transfer Using Explorer - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12720,7 +12720,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on legitimate applications or third party utilities. Filter out any additional parent process names.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows InProcServer32 New Outlook Form - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InProcServer32 New Outlook Form - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12730,7 +12730,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = False positives are possible if the organization adds new forms to Outlook via an automated method. Filter by name or path to reduce false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Input Capture Using Credential UI Dll - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Input Capture Using Credential UI Dll - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12740,7 +12740,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = this module can be loaded by a third party application. Filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12753,7 +12753,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Typically, this will not trigger because, by its very nature, InstallUtil does not require credentials. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12763,7 +12763,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering may be required. Certain utilities will run from non-standard paths based on the third-party application in use.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12776,7 +12776,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12790,7 +12790,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present. Filter as needed by parent process or application.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12804,7 +12804,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12817,7 +12817,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as InstallUtil is not typically used to download remote files. Filter as needed based on Developers requirements.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12827,7 +12827,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives may be high depending on the environment and consistent use of ISOs mounting. Restrict to servers, or filter out based on commonly used ISO names. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12837,7 +12837,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = Filtering may be required on internal developer build systems or classify assets as web facing and restrict the analytic based on that.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12847,7 +12847,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are possible, filtering may be required to restrict to workstations vs domain controllers. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Known Abused DLL Created - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Known Abused DLL Created - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12857,7 +12857,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = This analytic may flag instances where DLLs are loaded by user mode programs for entirely legitimate and benign purposes. It is important for users to be aware that false positives are not only possible but likely, and that careful tuning of this analytic is necessary to distinguish between malicious activity and normal, everyday operations of applications. This may involve adjusting thresholds, whitelisting known good software, or incorporating additional context from other security tools and logs to reduce the rate of false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Known GraphicalProton Loaded Modules - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Known GraphicalProton Loaded Modules - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12867,7 +12867,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12877,7 +12877,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this is specific to KrbRelayUp based attack. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12888,7 +12888,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = An single endpoint requesting a large number of kerberos service tickets is not common behavior. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, administration systems and missconfigured systems.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Lateral Tool Transfer RemCom - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Lateral Tool Transfer RemCom - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12898,7 +12898,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on Administrative use. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Ldifde Directory Object Behavior - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Ldifde Directory Object Behavior - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12908,7 +12908,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control",
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12918,7 +12918,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12928,7 +12928,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Vulnerability scanners or system administration tools may also trigger this detection. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows LSA Secrets NoLMhash Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows LSA Secrets NoLMhash Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12938,7 +12938,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator may change this registry setting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Mail Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Mail Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12948,7 +12948,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = third party application may use this network protocol as part of its feature. Filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Mark Of The Web Bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Mark Of The Web Bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12958,7 +12958,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12968,7 +12968,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Masquerading Msdtc Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Masquerading Msdtc Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12978,7 +12978,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12988,7 +12988,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this is directly looking for Mimikatz, the credential dumping utility.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -12998,7 +12998,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present and may need to be reviewed before this can be turned into a TTP. In addition, remove .pfx (standalone) if it's too much volume.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry AuthenticationLevelOverride - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry AuthenticationLevelOverride - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13008,7 +13008,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive, however is not common. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Auto Minor Updates - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Auto Minor Updates - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13018,7 +13018,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Auto Update Notif - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Auto Update Notif - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13028,7 +13028,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Default Icon Setting - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Default Icon Setting - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13038,7 +13038,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Restricted Admin - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Restricted Admin - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13048,7 +13048,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator may change this registry setting. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Toast Notifications - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Toast Notifications - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13058,7 +13058,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13068,7 +13068,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13078,7 +13078,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13088,7 +13088,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13098,7 +13098,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive, however is not common. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13108,7 +13108,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive, however is not common. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13118,7 +13118,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive, however is not common. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisAllow Windows App - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisAllow Windows App - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13128,7 +13128,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Do Not Connect To Win Update - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Do Not Connect To Win Update - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13138,7 +13138,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DontShowUI - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DontShowUI - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13148,7 +13148,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive, however is not common. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry EnableLinkedConnections - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry EnableLinkedConnections - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13158,7 +13158,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry LongPathsEnabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry LongPathsEnabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13168,7 +13168,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry MaxConnectionPerServer - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry MaxConnectionPerServer - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13178,7 +13178,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Reboot With Logon User - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Reboot With Logon User - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13188,7 +13188,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13198,7 +13198,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry NoChangingWallPaper - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry NoChangingWallPaper - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13208,7 +13208,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive, however is not common. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry ProxyEnable - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry ProxyEnable - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13218,7 +13218,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive, however is not common. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry ProxyServer - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry ProxyServer - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13228,7 +13228,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive, however is not common. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Qakbot Binary Data Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Qakbot Binary Data Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13238,7 +13238,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13248,7 +13248,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = network administrator can use this command tool to backup registry before updates or modifying critical registries.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Regedit Silent Reg Import - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Regedit Silent Reg Import - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13258,7 +13258,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may execute this command that may cause some false positive. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Risk Behavior - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Risk Behavior - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13268,7 +13268,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on many factors. Tune the correlation as needed to reduce too many triggers.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13278,7 +13278,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Tamper Protection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Tamper Protection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13288,7 +13288,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry UpdateServiceUrlAlternate - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry UpdateServiceUrlAlternate - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13298,7 +13298,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry USeWuServer - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry USeWuServer - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13308,7 +13308,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry With MD5 Reg Key Name - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry With MD5 Reg Key Name - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13318,7 +13318,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry WuServer - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry WuServer - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13328,7 +13328,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry wuStatusServer - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Registry wuStatusServer - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13338,7 +13338,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13348,7 +13348,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Modify System Firewall with Notable Process Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Modify System Firewall with Notable Process Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13358,7 +13358,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator may utilize an automated or manual execution of this firewall rule that may generate false positives. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows MOF Event Triggered Execution via WMI - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows MOF Event Triggered Execution via WMI - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13368,7 +13368,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present from automation based applications (SCCM), filtering may be required. In addition, break the query out based on volume of usage. Filter process names or f
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows MOVEit Transfer Writing ASPX - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows MOVEit Transfer Writing ASPX - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13378,7 +13378,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create) is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary. It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13388,7 +13388,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present when an Administrator utilizes the cmdlets in the query. Filter or monitor as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Mshta Execution In Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Mshta Execution In Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13398,7 +13398,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13410,7 +13410,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may occur if legitimate processes are writing to world-writable directories. It is recommended to investigate the context of the file write operation to determine if it is malicious or not. Modify the search to include additional known good paths for `mshta.exe` to reduce false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13420,7 +13420,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This analytic will need to be tuned for your environment based on legitimate usage of msiexec.exe. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows MsiExec HideWindow Rundll32 Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows MsiExec HideWindow Rundll32 Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13430,7 +13430,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Other possible 3rd party msi software installers use this technique as part of its installation process.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Remote Download - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows MSIExec Remote Download - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13440,7 +13440,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter by destination or parent process as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13450,7 +13450,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present with MSIExec spawning Cmd or PowerShell. Filtering will be needed. In addition, add other known discovery processes to enhance query.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Spawn WinDBG - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows MSIExec Spawn WinDBG - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13460,7 +13460,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will only be present if the MSIExec process legitimately spawns WinDBG. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13470,7 +13470,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This analytic will need to be tuned for your environment based on legitimate usage of msiexec.exe. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec With Network Connections - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows MSIExec With Network Connections - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13480,7 +13480,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present and filtering is required.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13490,7 +13490,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = third party application may use this proxies if allowed in production environment. Filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Account Passwords Changed - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Multiple Account Passwords Changed - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13500,7 +13500,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Service accounts may be responsible for the creation, deletion or modification of accounts for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Accounts Deleted - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Multiple Accounts Deleted - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13510,7 +13510,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Service accounts may be responsible for the creation, deletion or modification of accounts for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Accounts Disabled - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Multiple Accounts Disabled - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13520,7 +13520,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Service accounts may be responsible for the creation, deletion or modification of accounts for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13532,7 +13532,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13544,7 +13544,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13556,7 +13556,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13568,7 +13568,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A source user failing attempting to authenticate multiple users on a host is not a common behavior for regular systems. Some applications, however, may exhibit this behavior in which case sets of users hosts can be added to an allow list. Possible false positive scenarios include systems where several users connect to like Mail servers, identity providers, remote desktop services, Citrix, etc.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13580,7 +13580,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13592,7 +13592,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A process failing to authenticate with multiple users is not a common behavior for legitimate user sessions. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13604,7 +13604,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, missconfigured systems and multi-user systems like Citrix farms.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13616,7 +13616,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid users against a remote host is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, missconfigyred systems, etc.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows New InProcServer32 Added - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows New InProcServer32 Added - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13626,7 +13626,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are expected. Filtering will be needed to properly reduce legitimate applications from the results.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13636,7 +13636,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on organizations that allow the use of Ngrok. Filter or monitor as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13646,7 +13646,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization"], "mit
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as it is specific to AdvancedRun. Filter as needed based on legitimate usage.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13656,7 +13656,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization"], "mit
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Filtering may be required before setting to alert.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Njrat Fileless Storage via Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Njrat Fileless Storage via Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13666,7 +13666,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Non Discord App Access Discord LevelDB - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Non Discord App Access Discord LevelDB - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13676,7 +13676,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13686,7 +13686,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on legitimate application requests, filter based on source image as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Hunting - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Hunting - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13696,7 +13696,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present as this is meant to assist with filtering and tuning.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Load DLL - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Load DLL - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13706,7 +13706,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering may need to occur based on legitimate application usage. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Load Response File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Load Response File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13716,7 +13716,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering may need to occur based on legitimate application usage. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13726,7 +13726,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows PaperCut NG Spawn Shell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PaperCut NG Spawn Shell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13736,7 +13736,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, but most likely not. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Parent PID Spoofing with Explorer - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Parent PID Spoofing with Explorer - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13746,7 +13746,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Password Managers Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Password Managers Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13756,7 +13756,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Outlook Drop Dll In FORM Dir - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Phishing Outlook Drop Dll In FORM Dir - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13766,7 +13766,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13776,7 +13776,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives in PDF file opened PDF Viewer having legitimate URL link, however filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13786,7 +13786,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives may be high depending on the environment and consistent use of ISOs. Restrict to servers, or filter out based on commonly used ISO names. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13801,7 +13801,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess 0x1010 and 0x1400, filter based on source image as needed or remove them. Concern is Cobalt Strike usage of Mimikatz will generate 0x1010 initially, but later be caught.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13811,7 +13811,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on many factors. Tune the correlation as needed to reduce too many triggers.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Add Module to Global Assembly Cache - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerShell Add Module to Global Assembly Cache - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13821,7 +13821,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on developers or third party utilities adding items to the GAC.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13831,7 +13831,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13841,7 +13841,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = It is possible administrators or scripts may run these commands, filtering may be required.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Export Certificate - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerShell Export Certificate - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13851,7 +13851,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible administrators or scripts may run these commands, filtering may be required.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Export PfxCertificate - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerShell Export PfxCertificate - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13861,7 +13861,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible administrators or scripts may run these commands, filtering may be required.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Get CIMInstance Remote Computer - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerShell Get CIMInstance Remote Computer - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13871,7 +13871,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This is meant to be a low risk RBA anomaly analytic or to be used for hunting. Enable this with a low risk score and let it generate risk in the risk index.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell IIS Components WebGlobalModule Usage - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerShell IIS Components WebGlobalModule Usage - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13881,7 +13881,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible administrators or scripts may run these commands, filtering may be required.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13891,7 +13891,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = administrators may execute this command that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell RemoteSigned File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Powershell RemoteSigned File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13901,7 +13901,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = It is possible administrators or scripts may run these commands, filtering may be required.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell ScheduleTask - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerShell ScheduleTask - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13911,7 +13911,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Benign administrative tasks can also trigger alerts, necessitating a firm understanding of the typical system behavior and precise tuning of the analytic to reduce false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell WMI Win32 ScheduledJob - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerShell WMI Win32 ScheduledJob - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13921,7 +13921,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on legacy applications or utilities. Win32_ScheduledJob uses the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) protocol to create scheduled tasks on remote computers. It uses the DCOM (Distributed Component Object Model) infrastructure to establish a connection with the remote computer and invoke the necessary methods. The RPC service needs to be running on both the local and remote computers for the communication to take place.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13931,7 +13931,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13941,7 +13941,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerView for legitimate purposes, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13951,7 +13951,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may leverage PowerView for system management or troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13961,7 +13961,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positive may include Administrators using PowerView for troubleshooting and management.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13971,7 +13971,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positive may include Administrators using PowerView for troubleshooting and management.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13981,7 +13981,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may leverage PowerView for system management or troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Private Keys Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Private Keys Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -13991,7 +13991,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation Suspicious Process Elevation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation Suspicious Process Elevation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14001,7 +14001,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be generated by administrators installing benign applications using run-as/elevation.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation System Process Without System Parent - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation System Process Without System Parent - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14011,7 +14011,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14021,7 +14021,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Process Commandline Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Process Commandline Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14031,7 +14031,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection In Non-Service SearchIndexer - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Process Injection In Non-Service SearchIndexer - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14041,7 +14041,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection into Notepad - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Process Injection into Notepad - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14051,7 +14051,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on SourceImage paths. If removing the paths is important, realize svchost and many native binaries inject into notepad consistently. Restrict or tune as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Of Wermgr to Known Browser - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Process Injection Of Wermgr to Known Browser - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14061,7 +14061,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14071,7 +14071,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14081,7 +14081,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection With Public Source Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Process Injection With Public Source Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14091,7 +14091,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Some security products or third party applications may utilize CreateRemoteThread, filter as needed before enabling as a notable.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14101,7 +14101,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Normal browser application may use this technique. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Process Writing File to World Writable Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Process Writing File to World Writable Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14111,7 +14111,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may occur if legitimate software writes to these paths. Modify the search to include additional file name extensions. To enhance it further, adding a join on Processes.process_name may assist with restricting the analytic to specific process names. Investigate the process and file to determine if it is malicious.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14121,7 +14121,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to terminate this process during testing or updates. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Protocol Tunneling with Plink - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Protocol Tunneling with Plink - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14131,7 +14131,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control",
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the organization allows for SSH tunneling outbound or internally. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Proxy Via Netsh - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Proxy Via Netsh - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14141,7 +14141,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = Some VPN applications are known to launch netsh.exe. Outside of these instances, it is unusual for an executable to launch netsh.exe and run commands.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Proxy Via Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Proxy Via Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14151,7 +14151,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry Browser List Application - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Query Registry Browser List Application - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14161,7 +14161,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = uninstall application may access this registry to remove the entry of the target application. filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14171,7 +14171,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = network administrator can use this command tool to backup registry before updates or modifying critical registries.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry UnInstall Program List - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Query Registry UnInstall Program List - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14181,7 +14181,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Uninstall application may access this registry to remove the entry of the target application. Filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14191,7 +14191,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14201,7 +14201,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Vulnerability scanners or system administration tools may also trigger this detection. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14211,7 +14211,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to applications that require Rasautou.exe to load a DLL from disk. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14221,7 +14221,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14231,7 +14231,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = This event is really notable but we found minimal number of normal application from system32 folder like svchost.exe accessing it too. In this case we used 'system32' and 'syswow64' path as a filter for this detection.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows RDP Connection Successful - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows RDP Connection Successful - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14241,7 +14241,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present, filter as needed or restrict to critical assets on the perimeter.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Registry BootExecute Modification - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Registry BootExecute Modification - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14251,7 +14251,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present and will need to be filtered.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14261,7 +14261,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to a legitimate business applicating consistently adding new root certificates to the endpoint. Filter by user, process, or thumbprint.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14272,7 +14272,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the activity is not common to delete ONLY the SD from the registry. Filter as needed. Update the analytic Modified or Deleted values based on product that is in the datamodel.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14282,7 +14282,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = updated windows application needed in safe boot may used this registry
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Payload Injection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Registry Payload Injection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14292,7 +14292,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Unknown, possible custom scripting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14302,7 +14302,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Be aware of potential false positives - legitimate applications may cause benign activities to be flagged.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Regsvr32 Renamed Binary - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Regsvr32 Renamed Binary - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14312,7 +14312,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software BRC4 Loaded Dll - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software BRC4 Loaded Dll - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14322,7 +14322,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control",
 known_false_positives = This module can be loaded by a third party application. Filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14332,7 +14332,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = False positives will be found. Filter as needed and create higher fidelity analytics based off banned remote access software.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software RMS Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software RMS Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14342,7 +14342,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14352,7 +14352,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, filter as needed. Add additional shells as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Create Service - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Remote Create Service - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14362,7 +14362,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Note that false positives may occur, and filtering may be necessary, especially when it comes to remote service creation by administrators or software management utilities.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Service Rdpwinst Tool Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Remote Service Rdpwinst Tool Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14372,7 +14372,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = This tool was designed for home usage and not commonly seen in production environment. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Allow Rdp In Firewall - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Remote Services Allow Rdp In Firewall - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14382,7 +14382,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Allow Remote Assistance - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Remote Services Allow Remote Assistance - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14392,7 +14392,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Rdp Enable - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Remote Services Rdp Enable - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14402,7 +14402,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14412,7 +14412,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14422,7 +14422,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Rundll32 Apply User Settings Changes - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Rundll32 Apply User Settings Changes - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14432,7 +14432,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Rundll32 WebDAV Request - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Rundll32 WebDAV Request - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14442,7 +14442,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on legitimate software, filtering may need to occur.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Rundll32 WebDav With Network Connection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Rundll32 WebDav With Network Connection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14452,7 +14452,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on legitimate software, filtering may need to occur.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14463,7 +14463,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = It is possible scripts or administrators may trigger this analytic. Filter as needed based on parent process, application.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14473,7 +14473,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Unknown, possible custom scripting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14484,7 +14484,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may arise from legitimate applications that create tasks to run as SYSTEM. Therefore, it's recommended to adjust filters based on parent process or modify the query to include world writable paths for restriction.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14494,7 +14494,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to legitimate applications creating a task to run as SYSTEM. Filter as needed based on parent process, or modify the query to have world writeable paths to restrict it.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Screen Capture Via Powershell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Screen Capture Via Powershell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14504,7 +14504,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14514,7 +14514,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = SAM is a critical windows service, stopping it would cause major issues on an endpoint this makes false positive rare. AlthoughNo false positives have been identified.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14524,7 +14524,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14534,7 +14534,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if gacutil.exe is utilized day to day by developers. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14544,7 +14544,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on common applications adding new drivers, however, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create RemComSvc - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Create RemComSvc - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14554,7 +14554,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed based on administrative activity.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create SliverC2 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Create SliverC2 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14564,7 +14564,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if another service out there is named Sliver, filtering may be needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create with Tscon - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Create with Tscon - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14574,7 +14574,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may arise in the RDP Hijacking analytic when legitimate administrators access remote sessions for maintenance or troubleshooting purposes. These activities might resemble an attacker''s attempt to hijack a disconnected session, leading to false alarms. To mitigate the risk of false positives and improve the overall security posture, organizations can implement Group Policy to automatically disconnect RDP sessions when they are complete. By enforcing this policy, administrators ensure that disconnected sessions are promptly terminated, reducing the window of opportunity for an attacker to hijack a session. Additionally, organizations can also implement access control mechanisms and monitor the behavior of privileged accounts to further enhance security and reduce the chances of false positives in RDP Hijacking detection.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14584,7 +14584,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14594,7 +14594,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may install services with uncommon services paths.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14604,7 +14604,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrators may create Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14614,7 +14614,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Third party tools may used this technique to create services but not so common.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Service Deletion In Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Deletion In Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14624,7 +14624,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = This event can be seen when administrator delete a service or uninstall/reinstall a software that creates service entry, but it is still recommended to check this alert with high priority.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14634,7 +14634,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrators may start Windows Services on remote systems, but this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop By Deletion - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Stop By Deletion - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14644,7 +14644,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = It is possible administrative scripts may start/stop/delete services. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14654,7 +14654,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Windows OS or software may stop and restart services due to some critical update.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop Win Updates - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Service Stop Win Updates - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14664,7 +14664,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Network administrator may disable this services as part of its audit process within the network. Filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows SIP Provider Inventory - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows SIP Provider Inventory - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14674,7 +14674,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are limited as this is a hunting query for inventory.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows SIP WinVerifyTrust Failed Trust Validation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows SIP WinVerifyTrust Failed Trust Validation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14684,7 +14684,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present in some instances of legitimate binaries with invalid signatures. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware File Modification Crmlog - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Snake Malware File Modification Crmlog - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14694,7 +14694,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present as the file pattern does match legitimate files on disk. It is possible other native tools write the same file name scheme.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14704,7 +14704,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Registry Modification wav OpenWithProgIds - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Registry Modification wav OpenWithProgIds - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14714,7 +14714,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present and will require tuning based on program Ids in large organizations.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Service Create - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Service Create - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14724,7 +14724,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this is a strict primary indicator used by Snake Malware.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14734,7 +14734,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the command-line arguments are specific to SOAPHound. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14744,7 +14744,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = Windows Office document may contain legitimate url link other than MS office Domain. filter is needed
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14754,7 +14754,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14764,7 +14764,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Vulnerability scanners or system administration tools may also trigger this detection. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows SQL Spawning CertUtil - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows SQL Spawning CertUtil - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14774,7 +14774,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = The occurrence of false positives should be minimal, given that the SQL agent does not typically download software using CertUtil.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows SqlWriter SQLDumper DLL Sideload - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows SqlWriter SQLDumper DLL Sideload - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14784,7 +14784,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate processes are loading vcruntime140.dll from non-standard directories. It is recommended to investigate the context of the process loading vcruntime140.dll to determine if it is malicious or not. Modify the search to include additional known good paths for vcruntime140.dll to reduce false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Abuse - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Abuse - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14794,7 +14794,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be generated in environments where administrative users or processes are allowed to generate certificates with Subject Alternative Names. Sources or templates used in these processes may need to be tuned out for accurate function.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14804,7 +14804,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be generated in environments where administrative users or processes are allowed to generate certificates with Subject Alternative Names for authentication. Sources or templates used in these processes may need to be tuned out for accurate function.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Issued - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Issued - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14814,7 +14814,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be generated based on normal certificates issued. Leave enabled to generate Risk, as this is meant to be an anomaly analytic.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Request - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Request - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14824,7 +14824,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be generated based on normal certificate requests. Leave enabled to generate Risk, as this is meant to be an anomaly analytic.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CertUtil Backup - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CertUtil Backup - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14834,7 +14834,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be generated based on normal certificate store backups. Leave enabled to generate Risk, as this is meant to be an anomaly analytic. If CS backups are not normal, enable as TTP.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CryptoAPI - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CryptoAPI - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14844,7 +14844,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present in some instances of legitimate applications requiring to export certificates. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CS Backup - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CS Backup - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14854,7 +14854,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be generated based on normal certificate store backups. Leave enabled to generate Risk, as this is meant to be an anomaly analytic. If CS backups are not normal, enable as TTP.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export Certificate - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export Certificate - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14864,7 +14864,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Filtering may be requried based on automated utilities and third party applications that may export certificates.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export PfxCertificate - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export PfxCertificate - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14874,7 +14874,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Filtering may be requried based on automated utilities and third party applications that may export certificates.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14884,7 +14884,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14894,7 +14894,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Known applications running from these locations for legitimate purposes. Targeting only kerberos (port 88) may significantly reduce noise.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14904,7 +14904,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14914,7 +14914,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = dministrator may execute this commandline tool for auditing purposes. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows System Discovery Using Qwinsta - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows System Discovery Using Qwinsta - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14924,7 +14924,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrator may execute this commandline tool for auditing purposes. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows System File on Disk - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows System File on Disk - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14934,7 +14934,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows System LogOff Commandline - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows System LogOff Commandline - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14944,7 +14944,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Administrator may execute this commandline to trigger shutdown, logoff or restart the host machine.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14954,7 +14954,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14964,7 +14964,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = network administrator can use this tool for auditing process.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14974,7 +14974,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Administrator may execute this commandline to trigger shutdown or restart the host machine.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows System Script Proxy Execution Syncappvpublishingserver - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows System Script Proxy Execution Syncappvpublishingserver - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14984,7 +14984,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the vbscript syncappvpublishingserver is used for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed. Adding a n; to the command-line arguments may help reduce any noise.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -14994,7 +14994,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Administrator may execute this commandline to trigger shutdown or restart the host machine.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows System Time Discovery W32tm Delay - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows System Time Discovery W32tm Delay - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15004,7 +15004,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows System User Discovery Via Quser - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows System User Discovery Via Quser - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15014,7 +15014,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = network administrator can use this command tool to audit RDP access of user in specific network or host.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows System User Privilege Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows System User Privilege Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15024,7 +15024,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15034,7 +15034,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Time Based Evasion - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Time Based Evasion - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15044,7 +15044,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Time Based Evasion via Choice Exec - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Time Based Evasion via Choice Exec - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15054,7 +15054,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrator may use choice.exe to allow user to choose from and indexes of choices from a batch script.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15064,7 +15064,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Including Werfault.exe may cause some unintended false positives related to normal application faulting, but is used in a number of UAC bypass techniques.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15074,7 +15074,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Including Werfault.exe may cause some unintended false positives related to normal application faulting, but is used in a number of UAC bypass techniques.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Unsecured Outlook Credentials Access In Registry - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Unsecured Outlook Credentials Access In Registry - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15084,7 +15084,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = third party software may access this outlook registry.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15094,7 +15094,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = It is possible some Administrative utilities will load dismcore.dll outside of normal system paths, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Unsigned MS DLL Side-Loading - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Unsigned MS DLL Side-Loading - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15104,7 +15104,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate processes are loading vcruntime140.dll from non-standard directories. It is recommended to investigate the context of the process loading vcruntime140.dll to determine if it is malicious or not. Modify the search to include additional known good paths for vcruntime140.dll to reduce false positives.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15117,7 +15117,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15130,7 +15130,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15143,7 +15143,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15156,7 +15156,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A source user failing attempting to authenticate multiple users on a host is not a common behavior for regular systems. Some applications, however, may exhibit this behavior in which case sets of users hosts can be added to an allow list. Possible false positive scenarios include systems where several users connect to like Mail servers, identity providers, remote desktop services, Citrix, etc.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15169,7 +15169,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, missconfigured systems and multi-user systems like Citrix farms.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15182,7 +15182,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A process failing to authenticate with multiple users is not a common behavior for legitimate user sessions. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15195,7 +15195,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15208,7 +15208,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid users against a remote host is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, missconfigyred systems, etc.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15218,7 +15218,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in this path.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Valid Account With Never Expires Password - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Valid Account With Never Expires Password - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15228,7 +15228,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = This behavior is not commonly seen in production environment and not advisable, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Vulnerable 3CX Software - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Vulnerable 3CX Software - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15238,7 +15238,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on file version, modify the analytic to only look for version between 18.12.407 and 18.12.416 as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15248,7 +15248,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present. Drill down into the driver further by version number and cross reference by signer. Review the reference material in the lookup. In addition, modify the query to look within specific paths, which will remove a lot of "normal" drivers.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows WinDBG Spawning AutoIt3 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows WinDBG Spawning AutoIt3 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15258,7 +15258,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will only be present if the WinDBG process legitimately spawns AutoIt3. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows WinLogon with Public Network Connection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows WinLogon with Public Network Connection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15270,7 +15270,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present and filtering will be required. Legitimate IPs will be present and need to be filtered.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Impersonate Token - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows WMI Impersonate Token - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15280,7 +15280,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = administrator may execute impersonate wmi object script for auditing. Filter is needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process And Service List - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows WMI Process And Service List - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15290,7 +15290,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = netowrk administrator or IT may execute this command for auditing processes and services.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15300,7 +15300,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators may execute this command for testing or auditing.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15313,7 +15313,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15326,7 +15326,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks in public paths. Filter as needed based on paths that are used legitimately.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15340,7 +15340,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present. Filter based on ActionName paths or specify keywords of interest.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15350,7 +15350,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as winhlp32.exe is typically not used with the latest flavors of Windows OS. However, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - WinRAR Spawning Shell Application - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - WinRAR Spawning Shell Application - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15360,7 +15360,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = Be aware of potential false positives - legitimate uses of WinRAR and the listed processes in your environment may cause benign activities to be flagged. Upon triage, review the destination, user, parent process, and process name involved in the flagged activity. Capture and inspect any relevant on-disk artifacts, and look for concurrent processes to identify the attack source. This approach helps analysts detect potential threats earlier and mitigate the risks.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15370,7 +15370,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = Unknown. Add new processes or filter as needed. It is possible system management software may spawn processes from `wsmprovhost.exe`.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15380,7 +15380,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15390,7 +15390,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15400,7 +15400,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = There will be limited false positives and it will be different for every environment. Tune by child process or command-line as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15410,7 +15410,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15425,7 +15425,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15435,7 +15435,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mi
 known_false_positives = Network administrator may used this command for checking purposes
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15445,7 +15445,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Some software may create WMI temporary event subscriptions for various purposes. The included search contains an exception for two of these that occur by default on Windows 10 systems. You may need to modify the search to create exceptions for other legitimate events.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15457,7 +15457,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15467,7 +15467,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Third party application may use this approach to uninstall applications.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15477,7 +15477,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives are limited as legitimate applications typically do not download files or xsl using WMIC. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15487,7 +15487,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15497,7 +15497,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = Administrators may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its execution. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15507,7 +15507,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15517,7 +15517,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15527,7 +15527,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited.
 providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15537,7 +15537,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Infrastructure
 confidence = medium
@@ -15547,7 +15547,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping or ARP inspection has been incorrectly configured, or if a device normally sends many ARP packets (unlikely).
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15565,7 +15565,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if domain name is similar to dga generated domains.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15583,7 +15583,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if DNS data exfiltration request look very similar to benign DNS requests.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15598,7 +15598,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = Some users and applications may leverage Dynamic DNS to reach out to some domains on the Internet since dynamic DNS by itself is not malicious, however this activity must be verified.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Infrastructure
 confidence = medium
@@ -15608,7 +15608,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = None currently known
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15618,7 +15618,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with Command And Control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15628,7 +15628,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall. Please check those servers to verify if the activity is legitimate.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15638,7 +15638,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = It is likely that the outbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic is legitimate, if the company's internal networks are not well-defined in the Assets and Identity Framework. Categorize the internal CIDR blocks as `internal` in the lookup file to avoid creating notable events for traffic destined to those CIDR blocks. Any other network connection that is going out to the Internet should be investigated and blocked. Best practices suggest preventing external communications of all SMB versions and related protocols at the network boundary.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Infrastructure
 confidence = medium
@@ -15648,7 +15648,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if you have malfunctioning devices connected to your ethernet ports or if end users periodically connect physical devices to the network.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15658,7 +15658,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = It is possible that legitimate remote access software is used within the environment. Ensure that the lookup is reviewed and updated with any additional remote access software that is used within the environment.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -15668,7 +15668,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = It is possible that legitimate remote access software is used within the environment. Ensure that the lookup is reviewed and updated with any additional remote access software that is used within the environment.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Infrastructure
 confidence = medium
@@ -15678,7 +15678,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives if DHCP Snooping has been incorrectly configured or in the unlikely event that the DHCP server has been moved to another network interface.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -15688,7 +15688,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Zeek"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Infrastructure
 confidence = medium
@@ -15698,7 +15698,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Insta
 known_false_positives = This search will also report any legitimate attempts of software downloads to network devices as well as outbound SSH sessions from network devices.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15717,7 +15717,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if DNS TXT record contents are similar to benign DNS TXT record contents.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Infrastructure
 confidence = medium
@@ -15727,7 +15727,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = This search will return false positives for any legitimate traffic captures by network administrators.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Infrastructure
 confidence = medium
@@ -15737,7 +15737,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false positives. Please consider this when conducting analysis or investigations. Authorized devices may be detected as unauthorized. If this is the case, verify the MAC address of the system responsible for the false positive and add it to the Assets and Identity framework with the proper information.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15747,7 +15747,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15757,7 +15757,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -15767,7 +15767,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = ["Zeek"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15782,7 +15782,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value for threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15792,7 +15792,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = It's possible there can be long domain names that are legitimate.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15802,7 +15802,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate traffic can trigger this rule. Please investigate as appropriate. The threshold for generating an event can also be customized to better suit your environment.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -15812,7 +15812,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the activity is blocked or was not successful. Filter known vulnerablity scanners. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - High Volume of Bytes Out to Url - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - High Volume of Bytes Out to Url - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15822,7 +15822,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = This search may trigger false positives if there is a legitimate reason for a high volume of bytes out to a URL. We recommend to investigate these findings. Consider updating the filter macro to exclude the applications that are relevant to your environment.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15832,7 +15832,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on how you set the deviation_threshold and data_samples values. Our recommendation is to adjust these values based on your network traffic to and from your email servers.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = DNS Servers
 confidence = medium
@@ -15842,7 +15842,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this search, however it is unusual to see a large volume of them under typical circumstances. You may modify the threshold in the search to better suit your environment.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15852,7 +15852,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = Normal archive transfer via HTTP protocol may trip this detection.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15862,7 +15862,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on organizations that allow the use of Ngrok. Filter or monitor as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15872,7 +15872,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15882,7 +15882,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = None identified
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15892,7 +15892,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives
 known_false_positives = None identified
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15902,7 +15902,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = Some networks may use kerberized FTP or telnet servers, however, this is rare.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15912,7 +15912,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts of traffic from all other hosts' RDP applications in the network.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15922,7 +15922,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15932,7 +15932,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = A file server may experience high-demand loads that could cause this analytic to trigger.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15945,7 +15945,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = If you are seeing more results than desired, you may consider reducing the value of the threshold in the search. You should also periodically re-run the support search to re-build the ML model on the latest data. Please update the `smb_traffic_spike_mltk_filter` macro to filter out false positive results
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Proxy
 confidence = medium
@@ -15955,7 +15955,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives will not be present as it is meant to assist with identifying default certificates being utilized.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - SSL Certificates with Punycode - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - SSL Certificates with Punycode - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -15965,7 +15965,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the organization works with international businesses. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - TOR Traffic - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15975,7 +15975,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = None at this time
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -15985,7 +15985,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.AE"]}
 known_false_positives = Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will have a length greater than 100 characters.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Service Traffic - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD Replication Service Traffic - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -15995,7 +15995,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = New domain controllers or certian scripts run by administrators.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -16005,7 +16005,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = None.
 providing_technologies = ["Zeek"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Zeek x509 Certificate with Punycode - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Zeek x509 Certificate with Punycode - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -16015,7 +16015,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the organization works with international businesses. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = ["Zeek"]
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Access to Vulnerable Ivanti Connect Secure Bookmark Endpoint - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Access to Vulnerable Ivanti Connect Secure Bookmark Endpoint - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = VPN Appliance
 confidence = medium
@@ -16025,7 +16025,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This analytic is limited to HTTP Status 403; adjust as necessary. False positives may occur if the URI path is IP-restricted or externally blocked. It's recommended to review the context of the alerts and adjust the analytic parameters to better fit the specific environment.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Adobe ColdFusion Access Control Bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Adobe ColdFusion Access Control Bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -16035,7 +16035,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This analytic is limited to HTTP Status 200; adjust as necessary. False positives may occur if the URI path is IP-restricted or externally blocked. It's recommended to review the context of the alerts and adjust the analytic parameters to better fit the specific environment.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Adobe ColdFusion Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Adobe ColdFusion Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -16047,7 +16047,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = In the wild, we have observed three different types of attempts that could potentially trigger false positives if the HTTP status code is not in the query. Please check this github gist for the specific URIs : https://gist.github.com/patel-bhavin/d10830f3f375a2397233f6a4fe38d5c9 . These could be legitimate requests depending on the context of your organization. Therefore, it is recommended to modify the analytic as needed to suit your specific environment.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Cisco IOS XE Implant Access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Cisco IOS XE Implant Access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -16057,7 +16057,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, restrict to Cisco IOS XE devices or perimeter appliances. Modify the analytic as needed based on hunting for successful exploitation of CVE-2023-20198.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Citrix ADC and Gateway Unauthorized Data Disclosure - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Citrix ADC and Gateway Unauthorized Data Disclosure - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16070,7 +16070,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on organization use of Citrix ADC and Gateway. Filter, or restrict the analytic to Citrix devices only.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Citrix ADC Exploitation CVE-2023-3519 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Citrix ADC Exploitation CVE-2023-3519 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -16083,7 +16083,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on organization use of SAML utilities. Filter, or restrict the analytic to Citrix devices only.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Citrix ShareFile Exploitation CVE-2023-24489 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Citrix ShareFile Exploitation CVE-2023-24489 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -16096,7 +16096,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filtering may be needed. Also, restricting to known web servers running IIS or ShareFile will change this from Hunting to TTP.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Confluence CVE-2023-22515 Trigger Vulnerability - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Confluence CVE-2023-22515 Trigger Vulnerability - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16106,7 +16106,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present with legitimate applications. Attempt to filter by dest IP or use Asset groups to restrict to Confluence servers.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16116,7 +16116,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present with legitimate applications. Attempt to filter by dest IP or use Asset groups to restrict to confluence servers.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Confluence Pre-Auth RCE via OGNL Injection CVE-2023-22527 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Confluence Pre-Auth RCE via OGNL Injection CVE-2023-22527 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Application
 confidence = medium
@@ -16126,7 +16126,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present with legitimate applications. Attempt to filter by dest IP or use Asset groups to restrict to confluence servers.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16136,7 +16136,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = Tune based on assets if possible, or restrict to known Confluence servers. Remove the ${ for a more broad query. To identify more exec, remove everything up to the last parameter (Runtime().exec) for a broad query.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16146,7 +16146,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives are not expected, as the detection is based on the presence of web requests to the SetupWizard.aspx page, which is not a common page to be accessed by legitimate users. Note that the analytic is limited to HTTP POST and a status of 200 to reduce false positives. Modify the query as needed to reduce false positives or hunt for additional indicators of compromise.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16156,7 +16156,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests to be made to URLs containing the suspicious paths.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -16166,7 +16166,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = unknown
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16176,7 +16176,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = No known false positives for this detection.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -16186,7 +16186,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]
 known_false_positives = It is possible that legitimate remote access software is used within the environment. Ensure that the lookup is reviewed and updated with any additional remote access software that is used within the environment.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16196,7 +16196,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives are present when the values are set to 1 for utf and lookup. It's possible to raise this to TTP (direct notable) if removal of other_lookups occur and Score is raised to 2 (down from 4).
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Exploit Public-Facing Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Exploit Public-Facing Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -16206,7 +16206,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Modify the query as needed to POST, or add additional filtering (based on log source).
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - F5 TMUI Authentication Bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - F5 TMUI Authentication Bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -16216,7 +16216,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited to as this is strict to active exploitation. Reduce noise by filtering to F5 devices with TMUI enabled or filter data as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -16230,7 +16230,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = GET requests will be noisy and need to be filtered out or removed from the query based on volume. Restrict analytic to known publically facing Fortigates, or run analytic as a Hunt until properly tuned. It is also possible the user agent may be filtered on Report Runner or Node.js only for the exploit, however, it is unknown at this if other user agents may be used.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16250,7 +16250,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = It is highly possible you will find false positives, however, the base score is set to 2 for _any_ jndi found in raw logs. tune and change as needed, include any filtering.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure Command Injection Attempts - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure Command Injection Attempts - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = VPN Appliance
 confidence = medium
@@ -16260,7 +16260,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This analytic is limited to HTTP Status 200; adjust as necessary. False positives may occur if the URI path is IP-restricted or externally blocked. It's recommended to review the context of the alerts and adjust the analytic parameters to better fit the specific environment.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure SSRF in SAML Component - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure SSRF in SAML Component - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = VPN Appliance
 confidence = medium
@@ -16270,7 +16270,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This analytic is limited to HTTP Status 200; adjust as necessary. False positives may occur if the HTTP Status is removed, as most failed attempts result in a 301. It's recommended to review the context of the alerts and adjust the analytic parameters to better fit the specific environment.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure System Information Access via Auth Bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure System Information Access via Auth Bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = VPN Appliance
 confidence = medium
@@ -16280,7 +16280,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = This analytic is limited to HTTP Status 200; adjust as necessary. False positives may occur if the URI path is IP-restricted or externally blocked. It's recommended to review the context of the alerts and adjust the analytic parameters to better fit the specific environment.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35078 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35078 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16290,7 +16290,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = The Proof of Concept exploit script indicates that status=200 is required for successful exploitation of the vulnerability. False positives may be present if status=200 is removed from the search.  If it is removed,then the search also alert on status=301 and status=404 which indicates unsuccessful exploitation attempts.  Analysts may find it useful to hunt for these status codes as well, but it is likely to produce a significant number of alerts as this is a widespread vulnerability.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35082 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35082 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16300,7 +16300,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = Similar to CVE-2023-35078, the path for exploitation indicates that status=200 is required for successful exploitation of the vulnerability. False positives may be present if status=200 is removed from the search.  If it is removed,then the search also alert on status=301 and status=404 which indicates unsuccessful exploitation attempts.  Analysts may find it useful to hunt for these status codes as well, but it is likely to produce a significant number of alerts as this is a widespread vulnerability.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Network
 confidence = medium
@@ -16310,7 +16310,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = It is important to note that false positives may occur if the search criteria are expanded beyond the HTTP status code 200. In other words, if the search includes other HTTP status codes, the likelihood of encountering false positives increases. This is due to the fact that HTTP status codes other than 200 may not necessarily indicate a successful exploitation attempt.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16320,7 +16320,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this detection is based on a specific URL path and HTTP status code. Adjust the search as necessary to fit the environment.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass CVE-2024-27198 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass CVE-2024-27198 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16330,7 +16330,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives are not expected, as this detection is based on the presence of specific URI paths and HTTP methods that are indicative of the CVE-2024-27198 vulnerability exploitation. Monitor, filter and tune as needed based on organization log sources.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27198 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27198 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16340,7 +16340,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives are not expected, as this detection is based on the presence of specific URI paths and HTTP methods that are indicative of the CVE-2024-27198 vulnerability exploitation. Monitor, filter and tune as needed based on organization log sources.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Limited Auth Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27199 - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Limited Auth Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27199 - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16350,7 +16350,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives are not expected, however, monitor, filter, and tune as needed based on organization log sources. The analytic is restricted to 200 and GET requests to specific URI paths, which should limit false positives.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16360,7 +16360,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = If TeamCity is not in use, this analytic will not return results. Monitor and tune for your environment.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Juniper Networks Remote Code Execution Exploit Detection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Juniper Networks Remote Code Execution Exploit Detection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16370,7 +16370,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control",
 known_false_positives = Be aware of potential false positives - legitimate uses of the /webauth_operation.php endpoint may cause benign activities to be flagged.The URL in the analytic is specific to a successful attempt to exploit the vulnerability. Review contents of the HTTP body to determine if the request is malicious. If the request is benign, add the URL to the whitelist or continue to monitor.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -16380,7 +16380,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -16390,7 +16390,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = If there is a vulnerablility scannner looking for log4shells this will trigger, otherwise likely to have low false positives.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16400,7 +16400,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitr
 known_false_positives = False positives may occur if there are legitimate activities that mimic the exploitation pattern. It's recommended to review the context of the alerts and adjust the analytic parameters to better fit the specific environment.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Endpoint
 confidence = medium
@@ -16410,7 +16410,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
 known_false_positives = None at this time
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Nginx ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Nginx ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Proxy
 confidence = medium
@@ -16420,7 +16420,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives are not expected, as the detection is based on the presence of web requests to the SetupWizard.aspx page, which is not a common page to be accessed by legitimate users. Note that the analytic is limited to HTTP POST and a status of 200 to reduce false positives. Modify the query as needed to reduce false positives or hunt for additional indicators of compromise.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - PaperCut NG Remote Web Access Attempt - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - PaperCut NG Remote Web Access Attempt - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16430,7 +16430,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16440,7 +16440,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives will be limited, however tune or modify the query as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Spring4Shell Payload URL Request - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Spring4Shell Payload URL Request - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16450,7 +16450,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = The jsp file names are static names used in current proof of concept code. =
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Database Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16460,7 +16460,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = It's possible that legitimate traffic will have long URLs or long user agent strings and that common SQL commands may be found within the URL. Please investigate as appropriate.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Supernova Webshell - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16470,7 +16470,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = There might be false positives associted with this detection since items like args as a web argument is pretty generic.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16483,7 +16483,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitat
 known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on gateways in use, modify the status field as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16493,7 +16493,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the activity is blocked or was not successful. Filter known vulnerablity scanners. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16503,7 +16503,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the activity is blocked or was not successful. Filter known vulnerablity scanners. Filter as needed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Web JSP Request via URL - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Web JSP Request via URL - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16513,7 +16513,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present with legitimate applications. Attempt to filter by dest IP or use Asset groups to restrict to servers.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Web Remote ShellServlet Access - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Remote ShellServlet Access - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16523,7 +16523,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives may occur depending on the web server's configuration. If the web server is intentionally configured to utilize the Remote ShellServlet, then the detections by this analytic would not be considered true positives.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16533,7 +16533,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives may occur and filtering may be required. Restrict analytic to asset type.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16543,7 +16543,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives may be present with legitimate applications. Attempt to filter by dest IP or use Asset groups to restrict to servers.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16553,7 +16553,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installat
 known_false_positives = False positives are limited.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16563,7 +16563,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives may be possible, however we restricted it to HTTP Status 200 and POST requests, based on the POC. Upon investigation review the POST body for the actual payload - or command - being executed.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - WS FTP Remote Code Execution - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - WS FTP Remote Code Execution - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16573,7 +16573,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = If WS_FTP Server is not in use, this analytic will not return results. Monitor and tune for your environment. Note the MetaSploit module is focused on only hitting /AHT/ and not the full /AHT/AhtApiService.asmx/AuthUser URL.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Zscaler Adware Activities Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Zscaler Adware Activities Threat Blocked - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16583,7 +16583,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscaler configuration.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Zscaler Behavior Analysis Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Zscaler Behavior Analysis Threat Blocked - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16593,7 +16593,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscalar configuration.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Zscaler CryptoMiner Downloaded Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Zscaler CryptoMiner Downloaded Threat Blocked - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16603,7 +16603,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscaler configuration.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Zscaler Employment Search Web Activity - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Zscaler Employment Search Web Activity - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16613,7 +16613,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscaler configuration.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Zscaler Exploit Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Zscaler Exploit Threat Blocked - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16623,7 +16623,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscaler configuration.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Zscaler Legal Liability Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Zscaler Legal Liability Threat Blocked - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16633,7 +16633,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscaler configuration.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Zscaler Malware Activity Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Zscaler Malware Activity Threat Blocked - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16643,7 +16643,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscalar configuration.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Zscaler Phishing Activity Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Zscaler Phishing Activity Threat Blocked - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16653,7 +16653,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscalar configuration.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Zscaler Potentially Abused File Download - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Zscaler Potentially Abused File Download - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16663,7 +16663,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscaler configuration.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Zscaler Privacy Risk Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Zscaler Privacy Risk Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16673,7 +16673,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscaler configuration.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Zscaler Scam Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Zscaler Scam Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16683,7 +16683,7 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_at
 known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscaler configuration.
 providing_technologies = null
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Zscaler Virus Download threat blocked - Rule]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Zscaler Virus Download threat blocked - Rule]
 type = detection
 asset_type = Web Server
 confidence = medium
@@ -16704,7 +16704,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/smoothoperator-ongoing-campaign-trojanizes-3cx-software-in-software-supply-chain-attack/", "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/03/30/supply-chain-attack-against-3cxdesktopapp", "https://www.reddit.com/r/crowdstrike/comments/125r3uu/20230329_situational_awareness_crowdstrike/", "https://www.3cx.com/community/threads/crowdstrike-endpoint-security-detection-re-3cx-desktop-app.119934/page-2#post-558898", "https://www.3cx.com/community/threads/3cx-desktopapp-security-alert.119951/", "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/elastic-users-protected-from-suddenicon-supply-chain-attack", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2023/03/30/3cx-supply-chain-compromise-leads-to-iconic-incident/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - 3CX Supply Chain Attack Network Indicators - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hunting 3CXDesktopApp Software - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Vulnerable 3CX Software - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - 3CX Supply Chain Attack Network Indicators - Rule", "ESCU - Hunting 3CXDesktopApp Software - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Vulnerable 3CX Software - Rule"]
 description = On March 29, 2023, CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch observed unexpected malicious activity emanating from a legitimate, signed binary, 3CXDesktopApp,  a softphone application from 3CX. The malicious activity includes beaconing to actor controlled infrastructure, deployment of second stage payloads, and, in a small number of cases, hands on keyboard activity. (CrowdStrike)
 narrative = On March 22, 2023, cybersecurity firm SentinelOne observed a surge in behavioral detections of trojanized 3CXDesktopApp installers, a popular PABX voice and video conferencing software. The multi-stage attack chain, which automatically quarantines trojanized installers, involves downloading ICO files with base64 data from GitHub and eventually leads to a 3rd stage infostealer DLL that is still under analysis. While the Mac installer remains unconfirmed as trojanized, ongoing investigations are also examining other potentially compromised applications, such as Chrome extensions. The threat actor behind the supply chain compromise, which started in February 2022, has used a code signing certificate to sign the trojanized binaries, but connections to existing threat clusters remain unclear. SentinelOne updated their IOCs on March 30th, 2023, with contributions from the research community and continues to monitor the situation for further developments. 3CX identified the vulnerability in the recent versions 18.12.407 and 18.12.416 for the desktop app. A new certificate for the app will also be produced.
 
@@ -16715,7 +16715,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/", "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5247"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Matthew Moore"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Network Activity from Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Outbound Network IO - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound to Outbound Network IO Ratio - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Outbound Network Activity from Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Traffic on Network Edge - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes newly seen TCP edge - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes newly seen UDP edge - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Container Image Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Process Running From New Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Process with Anomalous Resource Utilisation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Process with Resource Ratio Anomalies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node with CPU Activity - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Network Activity from Process - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Outbound Network IO - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound to Outbound Network IO Ratio - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Outbound Network Activity from Process - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Traffic on Network Edge - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes newly seen TCP edge - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes newly seen UDP edge - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Container Image Name - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Process - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Process Running From New Path - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Process with Anomalous Resource Utilisation - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Process with Resource Ratio Anomalies - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node with CPU Activity - Rule"]
 description = Kubernetes, a complex container orchestration system, is susceptible to a variety of security threats. This story delves into the different strategies and methods adversaries employ to exploit Kubernetes environments. These include attacks on the control plane, exploitation of misconfigurations, and breaches of containerized applications. Observability data, such as metrics, play a crucial role in identifying abnormal and potentially malicious behavior within these environments.
 narrative = Kubernetes, a complex container orchestration system, is a prime target for adversaries due to its widespread use and inherent complexity. This story focuses on the abnormal behavior within Kubernetes environments that can be indicative of security threats. Key areas of concern include the control plane, worker nodes, and network communication, all of which can be exploited by attackers. Observability data, such as metrics, play a crucial role in identifying these abnormal behaviors. These behaviors could be a result of attacks on the control plane, exploitation of misconfigurations, or breaches of containerized applications. For instance, attackers may attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in the Kubernetes API, misconfigured containers, or insecure network policies. The control plane, which manages cluster operations, is a prime target and its compromise can give attackers control over the entire cluster. Worker nodes, which run the containerized applications, can also be targeted to disrupt services or to gain access to sensitive data.
 
@@ -16726,7 +16726,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/acidrain-a-modem-wiper-rains-down-on-europe/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Linux Account Manipulation Of SSH Config and Keys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Linux Account Manipulation Of SSH Config and Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate - Rule", "ESCU - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the acidrain malware including deleting of files and etc. AcidRain is an ELF MIPS malware specifically designed to wipe modems and routers. The complete list of targeted devices is unknown at this time, but WatchGuard FireBox has specifically been listed as a target. This malware is capable of wiping and deleting non-standard linux files and overwriting storage device files that might related to router, ssd card and many more.
 narrative = Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.
 
@@ -16737,7 +16737,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2535", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ES Content Updates - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Abnormal Object Access Activity - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Privileged Object Access Activity - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Find Domain Organizational Units with GetDomainOU - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Find Interesting ACL with FindInterestingDomainAcl - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Forest Discovery with GetForestDomain - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Get Local Admin with FindLocalAdminAccess - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Lateral Tool Transfer RemCom - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create RemComSvc - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Abnormal Object Access Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Privileged Object Access Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Find Domain Organizational Units with GetDomainOU - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Find Interesting ACL with FindInterestingDomainAcl - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Forest Discovery with GetForestDomain - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Get Local Admin with FindLocalAdminAccess - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Lateral Tool Transfer RemCom - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Create RemComSvc - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Discovery and Reconnaissance within with Active Directory environments.
 narrative = Discovery consists of techniques an adversay uses to gain knowledge about an internal environment or network. These techniques provide adversaries with situational awareness and allows them to have the necessary information before deciding how to act or who/what to target next.\
 Once an attacker obtains an initial foothold in an Active Directory environment, she is forced to engage in Discovery techniques in the initial phases of a breach to better understand and navigate the target network. Some examples include but are not limited to enumerating domain users, domain admins, computers, domain controllers, network shares, group policy objects, domain trusts, etc.
@@ -16749,7 +16749,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerberos_(protocol)", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/2a32282e-dd48-4ad9-a542-609804b02cc9", "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule", "ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Kerberos based attacks within with Active Directory environments.
 narrative = Kerberos, initially named after Cerberus, the three-headed dog in Greek mythology, is a network authentication protocol that allows computers and users to prove their identity through a trusted third-party. This trusted third-party issues Kerberos tickets using symmetric encryption to allow users access to services and network resources based on their privilege level. Kerberos is the default authentication protocol used on Windows Active Directory networks since the introduction of Windows Server 2003. With Kerberos being the backbone of Windows authentication, it is commonly abused by adversaries across the different phases of a breach including initial access, privilege escalation, defense evasion, credential access, lateral movement, etc.\
 This Analytic Story groups detection use cases in which the Kerberos protocol is abused. Defenders can leverage these analytics to detect and hunt for adversaries engaging in Kerberos based attacks.
@@ -16761,7 +16761,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html", "http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon7/t405-hunting-lateral-movement-for-fun-and-profit-mauricio-velazco"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Mauricio Velazco Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Active Directory Lateral Movement Identified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Start or Stop Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Get CIMInstance Remote Computer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell WMI Win32 ScheduledJob - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows RDP Connection Successful - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Create Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create with Tscon - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Active Directory Lateral Movement Identified - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Start or Stop Service - Rule", "ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule", "ESCU - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell Get CIMInstance Remote Computer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell WMI Win32 ScheduledJob - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Windows RDP Connection Successful - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Create Service - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Create with Tscon - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within an Active Directory environment. Since lateral movement is often a necessary step in a breach, it is important for cyber defenders to deploy detection coverage.
 narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\
 Indications of lateral movement in an Active Directory network can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, Service Control Manager, the DCOM protocol, WinRM or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor.\
@@ -16776,7 +16776,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/23/protecting-organization-password-spray-attacks/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn452415(v=ws.11)"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Create Local Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Create Local Account - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Password Spraying attacks within Active Directory environments.
 narrative = In a password spraying attack, adversaries leverage one or a small list of commonly used / popular passwords against a large volume of usernames to acquire valid account credentials. Unlike a Brute Force attack that targets a specific user or small group of users with a large number of passwords, password spraying follows the opposite aproach and increases the chances of obtaining valid credentials while avoiding account lockouts. This allows adversaries to remain undetected if the target organization does not have the proper monitoring and detection controls in place.\
 Password Spraying can be leveraged by adversaries across different stages in an attack. It can be used to obtain an iniial access to an environment but can also be used to escalate privileges when access has been already achieved. In some scenarios, this technique capitalizes on a security policy most organizations implement, password rotation. As enterprise users change their passwords, it is possible some pick predictable, seasonal passwords such as `$CompanyNameWinter`, `Summer2021`, etc.\
@@ -16789,7 +16789,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2362"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Active Directory Privilege Escalation Identified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Findstr GPP Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Group Policy Object Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Active Directory Privilege Escalation Identified - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Findstr GPP Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Group Policy Object Created - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Privilege Escalation attacks within Active Directory environments.
 narrative = Privilege Escalation consists of techniques that adversaries use to gain higher-level permissions on a system or network. Adversaries can often enter and explore a network with unprivileged access but require elevated permissions to follow through on their objectives. Common approaches are to take advantage of system weaknesses, misconfigurations, and vulnerabilities.\
 Active Directory is a central component of most enterprise networks, providing authentication and authorization services for users, computers, and other resources. It stores sensitive information such as passwords, user accounts, and security policies, and is therefore a high-value target for attackers. Privilege escalation attacks in Active Directory typically involve exploiting vulnerabilities or misconfigurations across the network to gain elevated privileges, such as Domain Administrator access. Once an attacker has escalated their privileges and taken full control of a domain, they can easily move laterally throughout the network, access sensitive data, and carry out further attacks. Security teams should monitor for privilege escalation attacks in Active Directory to identify a breach before attackers achieve operational success.\
@@ -16802,7 +16802,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/coldfusion/apsb23-25.html", "https://twitter.com/stephenfewer/status/1678881017526886400?s=20", "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/07/11/cve-2023-29298-adobe-coldfusion-access-control-bypass", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cisa-warns-of-adobe-coldfusion-bug-exploited-as-a-zero-day/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Adobe ColdFusion Access Control Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Adobe ColdFusion Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Adobe ColdFusion Access Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Adobe ColdFusion Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read - Rule"]
 description = In July 2023, a significant vulnerability, CVE-2023-29298, affecting Adobe ColdFusion was uncovered by Rapid7, shedding light on an access control bypass mechanism. This vulnerability allows attackers to access sensitive ColdFusion Administrator endpoints by exploiting a flaw in the URL path validation. Disturbingly, this flaw can be chained with another critical vulnerability, CVE-2023-26360, which has been actively exploited. The latter enables unauthorized arbitrary code execution and file reading. Adobe has promptly addressed these vulnerabilities, but the intricacies and potential ramifications of their combination underscore the importance of immediate action by organizations. With active exploitation in the wild and the ability to bypass established security measures, the situation is alarming. Organizations are urged to apply the updates provided by Adobe immediately, considering the active threat landscape and the severe implications of these chained vulnerabilities.
 narrative = Adobe ColdFusion, a prominent application server, has been thrust into the cybersecurity spotlight due to two intertwined vulnerabilities. The first, CVE-2023-29298, identified by Rapid7 in July 2023, pertains to an access control bypass in ColdFusion's security mechanisms. This flaw allows attackers to access protected ColdFusion Administrator endpoints simply by manipulating the URL path, specifically by inserting an additional forward slash. Compounding the threat is the revelation that CVE-2023-29298 can be chained with CVE-2023-26360, another severe ColdFusion vulnerability. This latter vulnerability, which has seen active exploitation, permits unauthorized attackers to execute arbitrary code or read arbitrary files on the affected system. In practice, an attacker could exploit the access control bypass to access sensitive ColdFusion endpoints and subsequently exploit the arbitrary code execution vulnerability, broadening their control and access over the targeted system. The consequences of these vulnerabilities are manifold. Attackers can potentially login to the ColdFusion Administrator with known credentials, bruteforce their way in, leak sensitive information, or exploit other vulnerabilities in the exposed CFM and CFC files. This combination of vulnerabilities significantly heightens the risk profile for organizations using the affected versions of Adobe ColdFusion. Addressing the urgency, Adobe released fixes for these vulnerabilities in July 2023, urging organizations to update to ColdFusion 2023 GA build, ColdFusion 2021 Update 7, and ColdFusion 2018 Update 17. However, Rapid7's disclosure highlights a potential incomplete fix, suggesting that organizations should remain vigilant and proactive in their security measures.\
 In conclusion, the discovery of these vulnerabilities and their potential to be exploited in tandem presents a significant security challenge. Organizations using Adobe ColdFusion must prioritize the application of security updates, monitor their systems closely for signs of intrusion, and remain updated on any further developments related to these vulnerabilities.
@@ -16814,7 +16814,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.agent_tesla", "https://cert.gov.ua/article/861292", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-216a", "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/702680/0/html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mail Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mail Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the AgentTesla malware including .chm application child process, ftp/smtp connection, persistence and many more. AgentTesla is one of the advanced remote access trojans (RAT) that are capable of stealing sensitive information from the infected or targeted host machine. It can collect various types of data, including browser profile information, keystrokes, capture screenshots and vpn credentials. AgentTesla has been active malware since 2014 and often delivered as a malicious attachment in phishing emails.It is also the top malware in 2021 based on the CISA report.
 narrative = Adversaries or threat actor may use this malware to maximize the impact of infection on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.
 
@@ -16825,7 +16825,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.amadey", "https://darktrace.com/blog/amadey-info-stealer-exploiting-n-day-vulnerabilities"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Files and Dirs Access Rights Modification Via Icacls - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell RemoteSigned File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Files and Dirs Access Rights Modification Via Icacls - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Powershell RemoteSigned File - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"]
 description = This analytic story contains searches that aims to detect activities related to Amadey, a type of malware that primarily operates as a banking Trojan. It is designed to steal sensitive information such as login credentials, credit card details, and other financial data from infected systems. The malware typically targets Windows-based computers.
 narrative = Amadey is one of the active trojans that are capable of stealing sensitive information via its from the infected or targeted host machine. It can collect various types of data, including browser profile information, clipboard data, capture screenshots and system information. Adversaries or threat actors may use this malware to maximize the impact of infection on the target organization in operations where data collection and exfiltration is the goal. The primary function is to steal information and further distribute malware. It aims to extract a variety of information from infected devices and attempts to evade the detection of security measures by reducing the volume of data exfiltration compared to that seen in other malicious instances.
 
@@ -16836,7 +16836,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
 narrative = In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's <a href=https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/07/nations-biggest-hacks-and-data-breaches-millions/644311001/> 5th largest data breach</a>. The target, credit giant Equifax, <a href=https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/16/technology/equifax-breach-security-hole/index.html>told investigators</a> that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack.\
 The exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\
@@ -16860,7 +16860,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-wineloader-german-political-parties", "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/european-diplomats-targeted-spikedwine-wineloader"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Writing File to World Writable Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows SqlWriter SQLDumper DLL Sideload - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unsigned MS DLL Side-Loading - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Writing File to World Writable Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows SqlWriter SQLDumper DLL Sideload - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unsigned MS DLL Side-Loading - Rule"]
 description = APT29, a sophisticated threat actor linked to the Russian SVR, has expanded its cyber espionage activities to target European diplomats and German political parties. Utilizing a novel backdoor variant, WINELOADER, these campaigns leverage diplomatic-themed lures to initiate infection chains, demonstrating APT29's evolving tactics and interest in geopolitical intelligence. The operations, marked by their low volume and high precision, underscore the broad threat APT29 poses to Western political and diplomatic entities.
 narrative = APT29, also known as Cozy Bear, has historically focused on espionage activities aligned with Russian intelligence interests. In recent campaigns, APT29 has notably shifted its operational focus, targeting not only its traditional diplomatic missions but also expanding into the political domain, specifically German political parties. These campaigns have been characterized by the deployment of WINELOADER, a sophisticated backdoor that facilitates the exfiltration of sensitive information. The use of themed lures, such as invitations from the Ambassador of India and CDU-themed documents, highlights APT29's strategic use of social engineering to compromise targets. The operations against European diplomats and German political entities reveal APT29's adaptive tactics and its persistent effort to gather intelligence that could influence Russia's geopolitical strategy. The precision of these attacks, coupled with the use of compromised websites for command and control, underscores the evolving threat landscape and the need for heightened cybersecurity vigilance among potential targets.
 
@@ -16871,7 +16871,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.
 narrative = This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.
 
@@ -16882,7 +16882,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.asyncrat", "https://www.netskope.com/blog/asyncrat-using-fully-undetected-downloader"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the AsyncRAT malware including mshta application child process, bat loader execution, persistence and many more. AsyncRAT is an open source remote administration tool released last 2019. It's designed to remotely control computers via an encrypted connection, with view screen, keylogger, chat communication, persistence, defense evasion (e.g. Windows defender), DOS attack and many more.
 narrative = although this project contains legal disclaimer, Adversaries or threat actors are popularly used in some attacks. This malware recently came across a Fully undetected batch script loader that downloads and loads the AsyncRAT from its C2 server. The batch script is obfuscated and will load a powershell loader that will decode and decrypt (AES256) the actual AsyncRAT malware.
 
@@ -16893,7 +16893,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/atlassian-confluence-vulnerability-cve-2022-26134.html", "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/06/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-cve-2022-26134/", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Java Writing JSP File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule", "ESCU - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule"]
 description = On June 2, security researchers at Volexity published a blog outlining the discovery of an unauthenticated remote code execution zero day vulnerability (CVE-2022-26134) being actively exploited in Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center instances in the wild. Atlassian released a fix within 24 hours of the blog''s release.
 narrative = Atlassian describes the vulnerability as an Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) injection allowing an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Server instance. Volexity did not release proof-of-concept (POC) exploit code, but researchers there have observed coordinated, widespread exploitation. Volexity first discovered the vulnerability over the weekend on two Internet-facing web servers running Confluence Server software. The investigation was due to suspicious activity on the hosts, including JSP webshells that were written to disk.
 
@@ -16904,7 +16904,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/overview-of-the-cyber-weapons-used-in-the-ukraine-russia-war/", "https://cert.gov.ua/article/3718487"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Linux Data Destruction Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Disable Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Stop Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Linux Data Destruction Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Disable Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Stop Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the AwfulShred malware including wiping files, process kill, system reboot via system request, shred,  and service stops.
 narrative = AwfulShred is a malicious linux shell script designed to corrupt or wipe the linux targeted system. It uses shred command to overwrite files and to increase data damage. This obfuscated malicious script can also disable and corrupts apache, HTTP and SSH services, deactivate swap files, clear bash history and finally reboot the system.
 
@@ -16915,7 +16915,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ES Content Updates - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 Herein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -16928,7 +16928,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Gowthamaraj Rajendran"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion PutBucketLifecycle - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule", "ESCU - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule", "ESCU - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion PutBucketLifecycle - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail - Rule"]
 description = Identify activity and techniques associated with the Evasion of Defenses within AWS, such as Disabling CloudTrail, Deleting CloudTrail and many others.
 narrative = Adversaries employ a variety of techniques in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security monitoring tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes analytics that identify activity consistent with adversaries attempting to disable various security mechanisms on AWS. Such activity may involve deleting the CloudTrail logs , as this is where all the AWS logs get stored or explicitly changing the retention policy of S3 buckets. Other times, adversaries attempt deletion of a specified AWS CloudWatch log group.
 
@@ -16939,7 +16939,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - ASL AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ASL AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - ASL AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - ASL AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ESCU - ASL AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule"]
 description = This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation.
 narrative = Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\
 However, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunks research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. 
@@ -16951,7 +16951,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Bhavin Patel,  Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Gowthamaraj Rajendran"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ASL AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access Failed Login - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - ASL AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Credential Access Failed Login - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset - Rule", "ESCU - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"]
 description = Identify activity and techniques associated with accessing credential files from AWS resources, monitor unusual authentication related activities to the AWS Console and other services such as RDS.
 narrative = Amazon Web Services provides a web service known as Identity and Access Management(IAM) for controlling and securly managing various AWS resources. This is basically the foundation of how users in AWS interact with various resources/services in cloud and vice versa. Account Takeover (ATO) is an attack whereby cybercriminals gain unauthorized access to online accounts by using different techniques like brute force, social engineering, phishing & spear phishing, credential stuffing, etc. Adversaries employ a variety of techniques to steal AWS Cloud credentials like account names, passwords and keys and takeover legitmate user accounts. Usage of legitimate keys will assist the attackers to gain access to other sensitive system and they can also mimic legitimate behaviour making them harder to be detected. Such activity may involve multiple failed login to the console, new console logins and password reset activities.
 
@@ -16962,7 +16962,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.
 
@@ -16973,7 +16973,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task"]
 description = This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS
 narrative = AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.
 
@@ -16984,7 +16984,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - ASL AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
 narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
 In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage.\
@@ -16998,7 +16998,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://success.trendmicro.com/dcx/s/solution/000146108-azorult-malware-information?language=en_US\u0026sfdcIFrameOrigin=null", "https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Application Layer Protocol RMS Radmin Tool Namedpipe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Add Xml Applocker Rules - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Deny Security Software With Applocker - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Toast Notifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisAllow Windows App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Regedit Silent Reg Import - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software RMS Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Service Rdpwinst Tool Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Allow Rdp In Firewall - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Allow Remote Assistance - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Rdp Enable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop By Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Valid Account With Never Expires Password - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Application Layer Protocol RMS Radmin Tool Namedpipe - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Add Xml Applocker Rules - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Deny Security Software With Applocker - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Toast Notifications - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisAllow Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Regedit Silent Reg Import - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software RMS Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Service Rdpwinst Tool Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Services Allow Rdp In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Services Allow Remote Assistance - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Services Rdp Enable - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Stop By Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Valid Account With Never Expires Password - Rule", "ESCU - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Azorult malware including firewall modification, icacl execution, spawning more process, botnet c2 communication, defense evasion and etc. The AZORULT malware was first discovered in 2016 to be an information stealer that steals browsing history, cookies, ID/passwords, cryptocurrency information and more. It can also be a downloader of other malware. A variant of this malware was able to create a new, hidden administrator account on the machine to set a registry key to establish a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connection. Exploit kits such as Fallout Exploit Kit (EK) and phishing mails with social engineering technique are one of the major infection vectors of the AZORult malware. The current malspam and phishing emails use fake product order requests, invoice documents and payment information requests. This Trojan-Spyware connects to Command And Control (C&C) servers of attacker to send and receive information.
 narrative = Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.
 
@@ -17009,7 +17009,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-whatis", "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/active-directory/#overview", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-compare-azure-ad-to-ad", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/account-takeover-ato/", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/azure-active-directory", "https://www.barracuda.com/glossary/account-takeover"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Device Code Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Denied MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD OAuth Application Consent Granted By User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Device Code Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Denied MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD OAuth Application Consent Granted By User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Account Takeover attacks against Azure Active Directory tenants.
 narrative = Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) is Microsofts enterprise cloud-based identity and access management (IAM) service. Azure AD is the backbone of most of Azure services like Office 365. It can sync with on-premise Active Directory environments and provide authentication to other cloud-based systems via the OAuth protocol. According to Microsoft, Azure AD manages more than 1.2 billion identities and processes over 8 billion authentications per day. Account Takeover (ATO) is an attack whereby cybercriminals gain unauthorized access to online accounts by using different techniques like brute force, social engineering, phishing & spear phishing, credential stuffing, etc. By posing as the real user, cyber-criminals can change account details, send out phishing emails, steal financial information or sensitive data, or use any stolen information to access further accounts within the organization. This analytic storic groups detections that can help security operations teams identify the potential compromise of Azure Active Directory accounts.
 
@@ -17020,7 +17020,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-whatis", "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/active-directory/#overview", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-compare-azure-ad-to-ad", "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/", "https://microsoft.github.io/Azure-Threat-Research-Matrix/Persistence/Persistence/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Azure AD External Guest User Invited - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD New Custom Domain Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD PIM Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Enabled And Password Reset - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD User ImmutableId Attribute Updated - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure Automation Account Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure Automation Runbook Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure Runbook Webhook Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Account Passwords Changed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Accounts Deleted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Accounts Disabled - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Azure AD External Guest User Invited - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD New Custom Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD PIM Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Created - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD User Enabled And Password Reset - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD User ImmutableId Attribute Updated - Rule", "ESCU - Azure Automation Account Created - Rule", "ESCU - Azure Automation Runbook Created - Rule", "ESCU - Azure Runbook Webhook Created - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Account Passwords Changed - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Accounts Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Accounts Disabled - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with the execution of Persistence techniques against Azure Active Directory tenants.
 narrative = Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) is Microsofts enterprise cloud-based identity and access management (IAM) service. Azure AD is the backbone of most of Azure services like Office 365. It can sync with on-premise Active Directory environments and provide authentication to other cloud-based systems via the OAuth protocol. According to Microsoft, Azure AD manages more than 1.2 billion identities and processes over 8 billion authentications per day. Persistence consists of techniques that adversaries use to keep access to systems across restarts, changed credentials, and other interruptions that could cut off their access. This analytic storic groups detections that can help security operations teams identify the potential execution of Persistence techniques targeting Azure Active Directory tenants. 
 
@@ -17031,7 +17031,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/", "https://cloudbrothers.info/en/azure-attack-paths/", "https://microsoft.github.io/Azure-Threat-Research-Matrix/PrivilegeEscalation/PrivEsc/", "https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD PIM Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Authentication Administrator Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD PIM Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Authentication Administrator Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Privilege Escalation attacks within Azure Active Directory tenants.
 narrative = Privilege Escalation consists of techniques that adversaries use to gain higher-level permissions on a system or network. Adversaries can often enter and explore a network with unprivileged access but require elevated permissions to follow through on their objectives. Common approaches are to take advantage of system weaknesses, misconfigurations or vulnerabilities.\
 Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) is Microsofts enterprise cloud-based identity and access management (IAM) service. Azure AD is the backbone of most of Azure services like Office 365 and Microsoft Teams. It can sync with on-premise Active Directory environments and provide authentication to other cloud-based systems via the OAuth protocol. According to Microsoft, Azure AD manages more than 1.2 billion identities and processes over 8 billion authentications per day.\
@@ -17045,7 +17045,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.
 narrative = A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing "\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.
 
@@ -17056,7 +17056,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cybereason.com/blog/sliver-c2-leveraged-by-many-threat-actors", "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory%20Further%20TTPs%20associated%20with%20SVR%20cyber%20actors.pdf", "https://www.proofpoint.com/uk/blog/security-briefs/ta551-uses-sliver-red-team-tool-new-activity", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-analysis-report-bumblebee-loader-the-high-road-to-enterprise-domain-control", "https://github.com/sliverarmory/armory", "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Notepad with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection into Notepad - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create SliverC2 - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Notepad with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection into Notepad - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Create SliverC2 - Rule"]
 description = The following analytic story providers visibility into the latest adversary TTPs in regard to the use of Sliver. Sliver has gained more traction with adversaries as it is often seen as an alternative to Cobalt Strike. It is designed to be scalable and can be used by organizations of all sizes to perform security testing. Sliver is highly modular and contains an Extension package manager (armory) allowing easy install (automatic compilation) of various 3rd party tools such as BOFs and .NET tooling like Ghostpack (Rubeus, Seatbelt, SharpUp, Certify, and so forth) (CyberReason,2023).
 narrative = Sliver is an open source cross-platform adversary emulation/red team framework produced by BishopFox.
 
@@ -17067,7 +17067,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule"]
 description = Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.
 narrative = Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool. Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).
 
@@ -17078,7 +17078,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/06/the-five-day-job-a-blackbyte-ransomware-intrusion-case-study/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry EnableLinkedConnections - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry LongPathsEnabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows RDP Connection Successful - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry EnableLinkedConnections - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry LongPathsEnabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - Windows RDP Connection Successful - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded - Rule", "ESCU - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the BlackByte ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with BlackByte, persistence, initial access, account registry modification and more.
 narrative = BlackByte ransomware campaigns targeting business operations, involve the use of ransomware payloads, infection chain to collect and exfiltrate data and drop payload on the targeted system. BlackByte Ransomware operates by infiltrating a system through various methods, such as malicious email attachments, exploit kits, or compromised websites. Once inside a system, it begins encrypting files using strong encryption algorithms, rendering them unusable. After completing the encryption process, BlackByte Ransomware typically leaves a ransom note that explains the situation to the victim and provides instructions on how to pay the ransom to obtain the decryption key.
 
@@ -17089,7 +17089,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/03/01/blacklotus-uefi-bootkit-myth-confirmed/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Windows BootLoader Inventory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WinLogon with Public Network Connection - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows BootLoader Inventory - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WinLogon with Public Network Connection - Rule"]
 description = The first in-the-wild UEFI bootkit bypassing UEFI Secure Boot on fully updated UEFI systems is now a reality
 narrative = The number of UEFI vulnerabilities discovered in recent years and the failures in patching them or revoking vulnerable binaries within a reasonable time window hasn't gone unnoticed by threat actors. As a result, the first publicly known UEFI bootkit bypassing the essential platform security feature  UEFI Secure Boot  is now a reality. present the first public analysis of this UEFI bootkit, which is capable of running on even fully-up-to-date Windows 11 systems with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. Functionality of the bootkit and its individual features leads us to believe that we are dealing with a bootkit known as BlackLotus, the UEFI bootkit being sold on hacking forums for $5,000 since at least October 2022. (ESET, 2023) The following content aims to aid defenders in detecting suspicious bootloaders and understanding the diverse techniques employed in this campaign.
 
@@ -17100,7 +17100,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackmatter-ransomware-gang-rises-from-the-ashes-of-darkside-revil/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/ransomware/2021/07/blackmatter-a-new-ransomware-group-claims-link-to-darkside-revil/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the BlackMatter ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with BlackMatter, force safe mode boot, autadminlogon account registry modification and more.
 narrative = BlackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.
 
@@ -17111,7 +17111,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.
 narrative = While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible&#51;phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\
 You can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\
@@ -17124,7 +17124,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/brute-ratel-c4-tool/", "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/08/part-3-how-i-met-your-beacon-brute-ratel/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defacement Modify Transcodedwallpaper File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Identity SAM Info - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hijack Execution Flow Version Dll Side Load - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Input Capture Using Credential UI Dll - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection With Public Source Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software BRC4 Loaded Dll - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Deletion In Registry - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defacement Modify Transcodedwallpaper File - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Identity SAM Info - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hijack Execution Flow Version Dll Side Load - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Input Capture Using Credential UI Dll - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection With Public Source Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software BRC4 Loaded Dll - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Deletion In Registry - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that may be related to Brute Ratel Red Teaming tool. This includes creation, modification and deletion of services, collection or data, ping IP, DNS cache, process injection, debug privileges adjustment, winlogon process duplicate token, lock workstation, get clipboard or screenshot and much more.
 narrative = Brute RATEL BRC4 is the latest red-teaming tool that simulate several TTP's. It uses several techniques like syscall, patching ETW/AMSI and written in native C to minimize noise in process command-line. This tool was seen in the wild being abused by some ransomware (blackcat) and adversaries in their campaigns to install the BRC4 agent that can serve as remote admin tool to compromise the target host or network.
 
@@ -17135,7 +17135,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1503436420886712321", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/03/15/caddywiper-new-wiper-malware-discovered-ukraine/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule"]
 description = Caddy Wiper is a destructive payload that detects if its running on a Domain Controller and executes killswitch if detected. If not in a DC it destroys Users and subsequent mapped drives. This wiper also destroys drive partitions inculding boot partitions.
 narrative = Caddy Wiper is destructive malware operation found by ESET multiple organizations in Ukraine. This malicious payload destroys user files, avoids executing on Dnomain Controllers and destroys boot and drive partitions.
 
@@ -17146,7 +17146,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/01/17/the-chaos-ransomware-can-be-ravaging", "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/chaos-ransomware-variant-in-fake-minecraft-alt-list-brings-destruction", "https://marcoramilli.com/2021/06/14/the-allegedly-ryuk-ransomware-builder-ryukjoke/", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/h/chaos-ransomware-a-dangerous-proof-of-concept.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule", "ESCU - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Chaos ransomware, including looking for file writes (file encryption and ransomware notes), deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, dropping of files in startup folder, and more.
 narrative = CHAOS ransomware has been seen and monitored since 2021. This ransomware is purportedly a .NET version of Ryuk ransomware but upon closer look to its code and behavior, this malware sample reveals that it doesn't share much relation to the notorious RYUK ransomware. This ransomware is one of the known ransomware that was used in the ongoing geo-political war. This ransomware is capable to check that only one copy of itself is running on the targeted host, delay of execution as part of its defense evasion technique, persistence through registry and startup folder, drop a copy of itself in each root drive of the targeted host and also in %appdata% folder and many more. As of writing this ransomware is still active and keeps on infecting Windows Operating machines and Windows networks.
 
@@ -17157,7 +17157,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-257a", "https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2021/210527.pdf", "https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/AA22-257A.stix.xml", "https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/iran"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Protocol Tunneling with Plink - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Protocol Tunneling with Plink - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule"]
 description = The Iranian government-sponsored APT actors are actively targeting a broad range of victims across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including the Transportation Sector and the Healthcare and Public Health Sector, as well as Australian organizations.
 narrative = This advisory updates joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities, which provides information on these Iranian government-sponsored APT actors exploiting known Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities to gain initial access to a broad range of targeted entities in furtherance of malicious activities, including ransom operations. The authoring agencies now judge these actors are an APT group affiliated with the IRGC. Since the initial reporting of this activity in the FBI Liaison Alert System (FLASH) report APT Actors Exploiting Fortinet Vulnerabilities to Gain Access for Malicious Activity from May 2021, the authoring agencies have continued to observe these IRGC-affiliated actors exploiting known vulnerabilities for initial access. In addition to exploiting Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, the authoring agencies have observed these APT actors exploiting VMware Horizon Log4j vulnerabilities for initial access. The IRGC-affiliated actors have used this access for follow-on activity, including disk encryption and data extortion, to support ransom operations. The IRGC-affiliated actors are actively targeting a broad range of entities, including entities across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors as well as Australian, Canadian, and United Kingdom organizations. These actors often operate under the auspices of Najee Technology Hooshmand Fater LLC, based in Karaj, Iran, and Afkar System Yazd Company, based in Yazd, Iran. The authoring agencies assess the actors are exploiting known vulnerabilities on unprotected networks rather than targeting specific targeted entities or sectors. This advisory provides observed tactics, techniques, and indicators of compromise (IOCs) that the authoring agencies assess are likely associated with this IRGC-affiliated APT. The authoring agencies urge organizations, especially critical infrastructure organizations, to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this advisory to mitigate risk of compromise from these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors.
 
@@ -17168,7 +17168,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-264a", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-264a-iranian-cyber-actors-conduct-cyber-operations-against-the-government-of-albania.pdf", "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/likely-iranian-threat-actor-conducts-politically-motivated-disruptive-activity-against", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System File on Disk - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System File on Disk - Rule"]
 description = Iranian State Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against the Government of Albania.
 narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory to provide information on recent cyber operations against the Government of Albania in July and September. This advisory provides a timeline of activity observed, from initial access to execution of encryption and wiper attacks. Additional information concerning files used by the actors during their exploitation of and cyber attack against the victim organization is provided in Appendices A and B. In September 2022, Iranian cyber actors launched another wave of cyber attacks against the Government of Albania, using similar TTPs and malware as the cyber attacks in July. These were likely done in retaliation for public attribution of the cyber attacks in July and severed diplomatic ties between Albania and Iran.
 
@@ -17179,7 +17179,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-277a", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-277a-impacket-and-exfiltration-tool-used-to-steal-sensitive-information-from-defense-industrial-base-organization.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule"]
 description = From November 2021 through January 2022, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) responded to advanced persistent threat (APT) activity on a Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector organization's enterprise network. During incident response activities, multiple utilities were utilized.
 narrative = CISA uncovered that likely multiple APT groups compromised the organization's network, and some APT actors had long-term access to the environment. APT actors used an open-source toolkit called Impacket to gain their foothold within the environment and further compromise the network, and also used a custom data exfiltration tool, CovalentStealer, to steal the victim's sensitive data.
 
@@ -17190,7 +17190,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-320a", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-320a_joint_csa_iranian_government-sponsored_apt_actors_compromise_federal%20network_deploy_crypto%20miner_credential_harvester.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver - Rule", "ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule", "ESCU - Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network - Rule", "ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule"]
 description = CISA and the FBI have identified an APT activity where the adversary gained initial access via Log4Shell via a unpatched VMware Horizon server. From there the adversary moved laterally and continued to its objective.
 narrative = From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an incident response engagement at a Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) organization where CISA observed suspected advanced persistent threat (APT) activity. In the course of incident response activities, CISA determined that cyber threat actors exploited the Log4Shell vulnerability in an unpatched VMware Horizon server, installed XMRig crypto mining software, moved laterally to the domain controller (DC), compromised credentials, and then implanted Ngrok reverse proxies on several hosts to maintain persistence. CISA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assess that the FCEB network was compromised by Iranian government-sponsored APT actors.
 
@@ -17201,7 +17201,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery for Sam Account Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery With NetUser PreauthNotRequire - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Archive Collected Data via Powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Known GraphicalProton Loaded Modules - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows LSA Secrets NoLMhash Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Restricted Admin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Commandline Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Create Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop Win Updates - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System User Privilege Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Account Discovery for Sam Account Name - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Account Discovery With NetUser PreauthNotRequire - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Archive Collected Data via Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Known GraphicalProton Loaded Modules - Rule", "ESCU - Windows LSA Secrets NoLMhash Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Restricted Admin - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Commandline Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Create Service - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Stop Win Updates - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System User Privilege Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might be related to the  SVR cyber activity tactics and techniques. While SVR followed a similar playbook in each compromise, they also adjusted to each operating environment and not all presented steps or actions below were executed on every host.
 narrative = SVR cyber operations pose a persistent threat to public and private organizations' networks globally. Since 2013, cybersecurity companies and governments have reported on SVR operations targeting victim networks to steal confidential and proprietary information. A decade later, the authoring agencies can infer a long-term targeting pattern aimed at collecting, and enabling the collection of, foreign intelligence, a broad concept that for Russia encompasses information on the politics, economics, and military of foreign states; science and technology; and foreign counterintelligence. The SVR also conducts cyber operations targeting technology companies that enable future cyber operations. The SVR's recent operation has targeted networks hosting TeamCity servers, further underscoring its persistent focus on technology companies. By leveraging CVE-2023-42793, a vulnerability within a software development program, the SVR seeks to gain access to victims, potentially compromising numerous software developers' networks. JetBrains responded to this threat by issuing a patch in mid-September 2023, limting the SVR's ability to exploit Internet-accessible TeamCity servers lacking the necessary updates. Despite this mitigation, the SVR has yet to utilize its acquired access to software developers' networks for breaching customer systems. It appears that the SVR is still in the preparatory stages of its operation.
 
@@ -17212,7 +17212,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.talosintelligence.com/active-exploitation-of-cisco-ios-xe-software/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Cisco IOS XE Implant Access - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cisco IOS XE Implant Access - Rule"]
 description = Cisco has identified active exploitation of a previously unknown vulnerability in the Web User Interface (Web UI) feature of Cisco IOS XE software (CVE-2023-20198) when exposed to the internet or untrusted networks. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to create an account on the affected device with privilege level 15 access, effectively granting them full control of the compromised device and allowing possible subsequent unauthorized activity.
 narrative = Cisco discovered early evidence of potentially malicious activity on September 28, 2023, when a case was opened with Cisco's Technical Assistance Center (TAC) that identified unusual behavior on a customer device. Upon further investigation, they observed what they have determined to be related activity as early as September 18. The activity included an authorized user creating a local user account under the username cisco_tac_admin from a suspicious IP address. On October 12, Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) and TAC detected what they later determined to be an additional cluster of related activity that began on that same day. In this cluster, an unauthorized user was observed creating a local user account under the name cisco_support from a second suspicious IP address. Unlike the September case, this October activity included several subsequent actions, including the deployment of an implant consisting of a configuration file (cisco_service.conf). The configuration file defines the new web server endpoint (URI path) used to interact with the implant. That endpoint receives certain parameters, described in more detail below, that allows the actor to execute arbitrary commands at the system level or IOS level. For the implant to become active, the web server must be restarted; in at least one observed case the server was not restarted so the implant never became active despite being installed.
 
@@ -17223,7 +17223,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.netscaler.com/blog/news/cve-2023-4966-critical-security-update-now-available-for-netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway/", "https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX579459/netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway-security-bulletin-for-cve20234966-and-cve20234967", "https://www.assetnote.io/resources/research/citrix-bleed-leaking-session-tokens-with-cve-2023-4966", "https://github.com/assetnote/exploits/tree/main/citrix/CVE-2023-4966", "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/b815d23b908de52996060163091395d1c89fbeea/http/cves/2023/CVE-2023-4966.yaml"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Citrix ADC and Gateway Unauthorized Data Disclosure - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Citrix ADC and Gateway Unauthorized Data Disclosure - Rule"]
 description = A critical security update, CVE-2023-4966, has been released for NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway. This vulnerability, discovered by our internal team, can result in unauthorized data disclosure if exploited. Reports of incidents consistent with session hijacking have been received. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added an entry for CVE-2023-4966 to its Known Exploited and Vulnerabilities Catalog. No workarounds are available for this vulnerability, and immediate installation of the recommended builds is strongly advised.
 narrative = On October 10, 2023, Cloud Software Group released builds to fix CVE-2023-4966, a vulnerability affecting NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway. This vulnerability, if exploited, can lead to unauthorized data disclosure and possibly session hijacking. Although there were no known exploits at the time of disclosure, we have since received credible reports of targeted attacks exploiting this vulnerability. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added an entry for CVE-2023-4966 to its Known Exploited and Vulnerabilities Catalog, which contains detection and mitigation guidance for observed exploitations of CVE-2023-4966 by threat actors against NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway. We strongly recommend that users of affected builds immediately install the recommended builds, as this vulnerability has been identified as critical. No workarounds are available for this vulnerability.
 
@@ -17234,7 +17234,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attackerkb.com/topics/si09VNJhHh/cve-2023-3519", "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/aa23-201a_csa_threat_actors_exploiting_citrix-cve-2023-3519_to_implant_webshells.pdf", "https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX561482/citrix-adc-and-citrix-gateway-security-bulletin-for-cve20233519-cve20233466-cve20233467"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Citrix ADC Exploitation CVE-2023-3519 - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Citrix ADC Exploitation CVE-2023-3519 - Rule"]
 description = The CVE-2023-3519 vulnerability in NetScaler (formerly Citrix) Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and NetScaler Gateway has been exploited by threat actors, as detailed in a recent advisory. The unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability was utilized as a zero-day to establish a webshell on a non-production environment NetScaler ADC appliance within a critical infrastructure organization. This facilitated the execution of discovery on the victim's active directory and the collection and exfiltration of data. The advisory offers a comprehensive examination of the threat actors' tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), alongside recommended detection methods and incident response guidelines. Immediate patch application from Citrix and the use of the detection guidance in the advisory is strongly recommended for critical infrastructure organizations to mitigate system compromises.
 narrative = Recent advisories have highlighted the exploitation of CVE-2023-3519, a critical vulnerability in Citrix's NetScaler Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and NetScaler Gateway. In June 2023, threat actors utilized this vulnerability to implant a webshell on a NetScaler ADC appliance within a critical infrastructure organization's non-production environment. This action granted them the ability to perform active directory discovery, data collection, and exfiltration. Notably, attempts for lateral movement to a domain controller were obstructed by network-segmentation controls.\
 The compromised organization reported the breach, leading Citrix to issue a patch on July 18, 2023. Multiple advisories have since outlined the threat actors' tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), including their initial access, persistence, privilege escalation, defense evasion, credential access, discovery, collection, command and control, and impact. These advisories also provide detection methods and recommend incident response measures.\
@@ -17248,7 +17248,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.greynoise.io/blog/introducing-cve-2023-24489-a-critical-citrix-sharefile-rce-vulnerability", "https://blog.assetnote.io/2023/07/04/citrix-sharefile-rce/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Citrix ShareFile Exploitation CVE-2023-24489 - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Citrix ShareFile Exploitation CVE-2023-24489 - Rule"]
 description = A critical vulnerability has been discovered in ShareFile's Storage Zones Controller software (CVE-2023-24489), used by numerous organizations for file sharing and storage. The vulnerability allows unauthenticated arbitrary file upload and remote code execution due to a cryptographic bug in the software's encryption but lack of authentication system. The risk comes from a failing encryption check, allowing potential cybercriminals to upload malicious files to the server. The bug was found in the Documentum Connector's .aspx files. The security risk has a potentially large impact due to the software's wide use and the sensitivity of the stored data. Citrix has released a security update to address this issue.
 narrative = The ShareFile Storage Zones Controller is a .NET web application running under IIS, which manages the storage of files in ShareFile's system. It was discovered that this software has a critical vulnerability (CVE-2023-24489) in the file upload functionality provided by the Documentum Connector's .aspx files. Specifically, the security flaw lies in the encryption check in the file upload process which could be bypassed, allowing for unauthenticated arbitrary file uploads and remote code execution.\
 The application sets the current principal from a session cookie, but if this is missing, the application continues without authentication. The application uses AES encryption, with CBC mode and PKCS#7 padding. A decryption check is in place which returns an error if the decryption fails, but this can be bypassed by supplying a ciphertext that results in valid padding after decryption, thereby not causing an exception.\
@@ -17262,7 +17262,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/analyst-note-cl0p-tlp-white.pdf", "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115250/data-breach/qualys-clop-ransomware.html", "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/qualys-is-the-latest-victim-of-accellion-data-breach/d/d-id/1340323"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.
 narrative = Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.
 
@@ -17273,7 +17273,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority.\
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN.\
@@ -17287,7 +17287,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule"]
 description = This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.
 narrative = This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.
 
@@ -17298,7 +17298,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule"]
 description = Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.
 narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\
 Splunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\
@@ -17318,7 +17318,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.
 narrative = Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before&#151;a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\
 This Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\
@@ -17331,7 +17331,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. 
 narrative = A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\
 Attacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence.\
@@ -17344,7 +17344,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ES Content Updates - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate Command And Control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
 narrative = Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\
 Because this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.
@@ -17356,7 +17356,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/compromised-account"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PingID Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PingID New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response - Rule", "ESCU - PingID Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ESCU - PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset - Rule", "ESCU - PingID New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - ASL AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ESCU - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Compromised User Account attacks.
 narrative = Compromised User Account occurs when cybercriminals gain unauthorized access to accounts by using different techniques like brute force, social engineering, phishing & spear phishing, credential stuffing, etc. By posing as the real user, cyber-criminals can change account details, send out phishing emails, steal financial information or sensitive data, or use any stolen information to access further accounts within the organization. This analytic story groups detections that can help security operations teams identify the potential signs of Compromised User Accounts.
 
@@ -17367,7 +17367,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://confluence.atlassian.com/security/cve-2023-22527-rce-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-confluence-data-center-and-confluence-server-1333990257.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Confluence Pre-Auth RCE via OGNL Injection CVE-2023-22527 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Confluence Pre-Auth RCE via OGNL Injection CVE-2023-22527 - Rule", "ESCU - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule"]
 description = The following analytic story covers use cases for detecting and investigating potential attacks against Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server.
 narrative = The analytic story of Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server encompasses a comprehensive approach to safeguarding these platforms from a variety of threats. By leveraging the analytics created in the project, security teams are equipped to detect, investigate, and respond to potential attacks that target Confluence environments.
 
@@ -17378,7 +17378,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.huntress.com/blog/a-catastrophe-for-control-understanding-the-screenconnect-authentication-bypass", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/detection-guidance-for-connectwise-cwe-288-2", "https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/connectwise-screenconnect-23.9.8"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Windows SACL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Nginx ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal - Rule", "ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Windows SACL - Rule", "ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Nginx ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule"]
 description = This analytic story provides a comprehensive overview of the ConnectWise ScreenConnect vulnerabilities.
 narrative = The following analytic story includes content for recently disclosed CWE-288 Authentication Bypass and CWE-22 Path Traversal. The vulnerabilities, identified as critical with CVSS scores of 10 and 9.8, respectively, enable unauthorized users to bypass authentication and perform path traversal attacks on affected ScreenConnect instances. The analytic story includes detection analytics for both vulnerabilities, which are crucial for identifying and responding to active exploitation in environments running affected versions of ScreenConnect (23.9.7 and prior). It is recommended to update to version 23.9.8 or above immediately to remediate the issues, as detailed in the ConnectWise security advisory and further analyzed by Huntress researchers. The analytic story also includes guidance on how to implement the detection analytics, known false positives, and references to additional resources for further analysis and remediation.
 
@@ -17389,7 +17389,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Potential password in username - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Createdump - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Potential password in username - Rule", "ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Createdump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.
 narrative = Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\
 Once attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\
@@ -17402,7 +17402,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2022/10/threat-advisory-cve-2022-40684-fortinet-appliance-auth-bypass/", "https://www.horizon3.ai/fortios-fortiproxy-and-fortiswitchmanager-authentication-bypass-technical-deep-dive-cve-2022-40684/", "https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2022-40684", "https://attackerkb.com/topics/QWOxGIKkGx/cve-2022-40684/rapid7-analysis", "https://www.greynoise.io/blog/fortios-authentication-bypass"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass - Rule"]
 description = Fortinet recently patched a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in their FortiOS, FortiProxy, and FortiSwitchManager projects CVE-2022-40684.
 narrative = FortiOS exposes a management web portal that allows a user configure the system. Additionally, a user can SSH into the system which exposes a locked down CLI interface. Any HTTP requests to the management interface of the system that match the conditions above should be cause for concern. An attacker can use this vulnerability to do just about anything they want to the vulnerable system. This includes changing network configurations, adding new users, and initiating packet captures. Note that this is not the only way to exploit this vulnerability and there may be other sets of conditions that work. For instance, a modified version of this exploit uses the User-Agent Node.js. This exploit seems to follow a trend among recently discovered enterprise software vulnerabilities where HTTP headers are improperly validated or overly trusted. (ref Horizon3.ai)
 
@@ -17413,7 +17413,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/proof-of-concept-released-for-critical-microsoft-word-rce-bug/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule"]
 description = A proof-of-concept for CVE-2023-21716, a critical vulnerability in Microsoft Word that allows remote code execution utilizing a heap corruption in rich text files.
 narrative = This analytic story covers content that will assist organizations in identifying potential RTF RCE abuse on endpoints. The vulnerability was assigned a 9.8 out of 10 severity score, with Microsoft addressing it in the February Patch Tuesday security updates along with a couple of workarounds. Security researcher Joshua Drake last year discovered the vulnerability in Microsoft Office''s "wwlib.dll" and sent Microsoft a technical advisory containing proof-of-concept (PoC) code showing the issue is exploitable. A remote attacker could potentially take advantage of the issue to execute code with the same privileges as the victim that opens a malicious .RTF document. Delivering the malicious file to a victim can be as easy as an attachment to an email, although plenty of other methods exist. Microsoft warns that users don''t have to open a malicious RTF document and simply loading the file in the Preview Pane is enough for the compromise to start. (BleepingComputer, 2023)
 
@@ -17424,7 +17424,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://confluence.atlassian.com/security/cve-2023-22515-privilege-escalation-vulnerability-in-confluence-data-center-and-server-1295682276.html", "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/10/04/etr-cve-2023-22515-zero-day-privilege-escalation-in-confluence-server-and-data-center/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Confluence CVE-2023-22515 Trigger Vulnerability - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Web Remote ShellServlet Access - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Confluence CVE-2023-22515 Trigger Vulnerability - Rule", "ESCU - Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Web Remote ShellServlet Access - Rule"]
 description = On October 4, 2023, Atlassian disclosed a critical privilege escalation vulnerability, CVE-2023-22515, affecting on-premises instances of Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center. This flaw might allow external attackers to exploit accessible Confluence instances, creating unauthorized Confluence administrator accounts. Indicators suggest the vulnerability is remotely exploitable. The affected versions range from 8.0.0 to 8.5.1, but versions prior to 8.0.0 and Atlassian Cloud sites are unaffected. Atlassian advises customers to update to a fixed version or implement mitigation strategies. Indicators of compromise (IoCs) and mitigation steps, such as blocking access to /setup/* endpoints, are provided.
 narrative = Upon Atlassian's disclosure of CVE-2023-22515, there's an immediate need to assess the threat landscape of on-premises Confluence installations. As the vulnerability affects privilege escalation and may be exploited remotely, SIEM solutions should be poised to detect potential threats.\
 By monitoring for specific indicators of compromise, security teams can get ahead of any potential breaches. Key indicators include unexpected members in the 'confluence-administrator' group, newly created user accounts, and specific HTTP requests to /setup/*.action endpoints. Any unusual spikes or patterns associated with these indicators might signify an ongoing or attempted exploitation.\
@@ -17438,7 +17438,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://twitter.com/ACEResponder/status/1636116096506818562?s=20", "https://twitter.com/domchell/status/1635999068282408962?s=20", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2023/03/microsoft-mitigates-outlook-elevation-of-privilege-vulnerability/", "https://www.pwndefend.com/2023/03/15/the-long-game-persistent-hash-theft/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Windows Rundll32 WebDAV Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Rundll32 WebDav With Network Connection - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows Rundll32 WebDAV Request - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rundll32 WebDav With Network Connection - Rule"]
 description = Microsoft has released CVE-2023-23397 to address the critical elevation of privilege (EoP) vulnerability affecting Microsoft Outlook for Windows.
 narrative = Microsoft Threat Intelligence discovered limited, targeted abuse of a vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook for Windows that allows for new technology LAN manager (NTLM) credential theft. Microsoft has released CVE-2023-23397 to address the critical elevation of privilege (EoP) vulnerability affecting Microsoft Outlook for Windows. We strongly recommend all customers update Microsoft Outlook for Windows to remain secure. CVE-2023-23397 is a critical EoP vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook that is triggered when an attacker sends a message with an extended MAPI property with a UNC path to an SMB (TCP 445) share on a threat actor-controlled server. No user interaction is required. The connection to the remote SMB server sends the user''s NTLM negotiation message, which the attacker can then relay for authentication against other systems that support NTLM authentication. Online services such as Microsoft 365 do not support NTLM authentication and are not vulnerable to being attacked by these messages. (2023, Microsoft)
 
@@ -17449,7 +17449,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/22ad19081300493e70ce0b873e98b2d0", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2023-36884", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-july-2023-patch-tuesday-warns-of-6-zero-days-132-flaws/", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/11/storm-0978-attacks-reveal-financial-and-espionage-motives/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule"]
 description = CVE-2023-36884 is an unpatched zero-day vulnerability affecting Windows and Microsoft Office products. The vulnerability allows for remote code execution through specially crafted Microsoft Office documents, enabling an attacker to operate in the context of the victim. As of now, there are no security updates available. However, users of Microsoft Defender for Office and the "Block all Office applications from creating child processes" Attack Surface Reduction Rule are safeguarded against this exploit. For other users, temporary mitigation can be achieved by adding specific application names to a designated registry key.
 narrative = CVE-2023-36884 is a serious security vulnerability that affects a range of Microsoft Office products and Windows systems. It is a zero-day flaw, meaning it was already being exploited before Microsoft became aware of it or had a chance to develop a patch.\
 An attacker exploiting this vulnerability would create a Microsoft Office document containing malicious code. This document, when opened by the victim, allows for remote code execution, giving the attacker the ability to run their own code on the victim's machine. This poses a significant risk as the attacker could perform actions like data theft, system damage, or creating backdoors for future access.\
@@ -17465,7 +17465,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Cyclops-Blink-Malware-Analysis-Report.pdf", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/c/cyclops-blink-sets-sights-on-asus-routers--.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the cyclopsblink malware including firewall modification, spawning more process, botnet c2 communication, defense evasion and etc. Cyclops Blink is a Linux ELF executable compiled for 32-bit x86 and PowerPC architecture that has targeted several network devices. The complete list of targeted devices is unknown at this time, but WatchGuard FireBox has specifically been listed as a target. The modular malware consists of core components and modules that are deployed as child processes using the Linux API fork. At this point, four modules have been identified that download and upload files, gather system information and contain updating mechanisms for the malware itself. Additional modules can be downloaded and executed from the Command And Control (C2) server.
 narrative = Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.
 
@@ -17476,7 +17476,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.mandiant.com/resources/analyzing-dark-crystal-rat-backdoor", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.dcrat"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Command Shell DCRat ForkBomb Payload - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Host Information Camera - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Ingress Tool Transfer Using Explorer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System LogOff Commandline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Time Discovery W32tm Delay - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command Shell DCRat ForkBomb Payload - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Host Information Camera - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Ingress Tool Transfer Using Explorer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System LogOff Commandline - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Time Discovery W32tm Delay - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DcRat malware including ddos, spawning more process, botnet c2 communication, defense evasion and etc. The DcRat malware is known commercial backdoor that was first released in 2018. This tool was sold in underground forum and known to be one of the cheapest commercial RATs. DcRat is modular and bespoke plugin framework make it a very flexible option, helpful for a range of nefearious uses.
 narrative = Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.
 
@@ -17487,7 +17487,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.security.telekom.com/2023/08/darkgate-loader.html", "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-october-2023"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Remote Services Add TrustedHost - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Archive Collected Data via Rar - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AutoIt3 Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows CAB File on Disk - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Indicator Removal Via Rmdir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry AuthenticationLevelOverride - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DontShowUI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry ProxyEnable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry ProxyServer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Spawn WinDBG - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WinDBG Spawning AutoIt3 - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Remote Services Add TrustedHost - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Archive Collected Data via Rar - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AutoIt3 Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows CAB File on Disk - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Indicator Removal Via Rmdir - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry AuthenticationLevelOverride - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DontShowUI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry ProxyEnable - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry ProxyServer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSIExec Spawn WinDBG - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WinDBG Spawning AutoIt3 - Rule"]
 description = Telekom Security CTI has uncovered a new phishing-driven malware campaign distributing DarkGate malware. This campaign utilizes stolen email threads to trick users into downloading malicious payloads via hyperlinks. An initial false link to Emotet stirred the security community, but deeper analysis confirmed its true identity as DarkGate, with characteristics like AutoIt scripts and a known command-and-control protocol. This report by Fabian Marquardt details the intricate infection mechanisms, including MSI and VBS file deliveries, sophisticated evasion techniques, and a robust configuration extraction method surpassing current standards. The single developer behind DarkGate, active on cybercrime forums, has shifted the malware's use from private to a rent-out model, implying an expected rise in its deployment. Researchers have also developed a decryption technique for the DarkGate malware, which aids in static analysis and detection, though it requires careful validation to avoid false positives.
 narrative = Telekom Security CTi has recently put a spotlight on the proliferation of DarkGate malware via a sophisticated malspam campaign, initially mistaken for the notorious Emotet malware. The campaign smartly manipulates stolen email conversations, embedding hyperlinks that, once clicked, activate a malware download. Fabian Marquardt's analysis traces the infection's footprint, revealing a dual delivery mechanism through MSI and VBS files. These files, cloaked in legitimate wrappers or obscured with junk code, ultimately download the malware via embedded scripts.\
 Marquardt delves into the AutoIt script-based infection, uncovering the calculated use of compiled scripts and base64-encoded data to disguise the execution of malicious shellcode. The subsequent stages of infection exhibit the malware's capability to evade detection, leveraging memory allocation techniques to bypass security measures. Marquardt also explores the loader's function, which decrypts further malicious payloads by interacting with the script's encoded components.\
@@ -17501,7 +17501,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware
 narrative = This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.
 
@@ -17512,7 +17512,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/", "https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/a-brief-history-and-further-technical-analysis-of-sodinokibi-ransomware", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-advisory-strt-ta02-destructive-software.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hermeticwiper.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-doublezero-destructor.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-caddywiper.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/strt-ta03-cpe-destructive-software.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-cyclopsblink.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-acidrain-wiper.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-industroyer2.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-advisory-swiftslicer-wiper-strt-ta03.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Data Destruction Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Disable Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Stop Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Data Destruction Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Disable Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff - Rule", "ESCU - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Stop Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions - Rule", "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the data destruction, including deleting files, overwriting files, wiping disk and unrecoverable file encryption. This analytic story may cover several known activities related to malware implants used in geo-political war to wipe disks or files to interrupt the network-wide operation of a targeted organization. Analytics can detect the behavior of "DoubleZero Destructor", "CaddyWiper", "AcidRain", "AwfulShred", "Hermetic Wiper", "Swift Slicer", "Whisper Gate" and many more.
 narrative = Adversaries may partially or completely overwrite the contents of a storage device rendering the data irrecoverable through the storage interface or using 3rd party drivers to directly access disk content like Master Boot Record to wipe it. Some of these attacks were seen in geo-political war to impair the operation of targeted organizations or to interrupt network-wide services.
 
@@ -17523,7 +17523,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/", "https://bleemb.medium.com/data-exfiltration-with-native-aws-s3-features-c94ae4d13436", "https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/how-to-exfiltrate-aws-ec2-data/", "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-277a"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Disable Bucket Versioning - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Anomalous GetObject API Activity - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Batch Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - High Volume of Bytes Out to Url - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Disable Bucket Versioning - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Anomalous GetObject API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Batch Service - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified - Rule", "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule", "ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule", "ESCU - High Volume of Bytes Out to Url - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Data exfiltration refers to the unauthorized transfer or extraction of sensitive or valuable data from a compromised system or network during a cyber attack. It is a critical phase in many targeted attacks, where adversaries aim to steal confidential information, such as intellectual property, financial records, personal data, or trade secrets.
 narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) leveraged by adversaries to exfiltrate data from your environments. Exfiltration comes in many flavors and its done differently on every environment. Adversaries can collect data over encrypted or non-encrypted channels.  They can utilise Command And Control channels that are already in place to exfiltrate data.  They can use both standard data transfer protocols such as FTP, SCP, etc to exfiltrate data.  Or they can use non-standard protocols such as DNS, ICMP, etc with specially crafted fields to try and circumvent security technologies in place.\
 Techniques for getting data out of a target network typically include transferring it over their command and control channel or an alternate channel and may also include putting size limits on the transmission. In context of the cloud, this refers to the unauthorized transfer or extraction of sensitive data from cloud-based systems or services. It involves the compromise of cloud infrastructure or accounts to gain access to valuable information stored in the cloud environment. Attackers may employ various techniques, such as exploiting vulnerabilities, stealing login credentials, or using malicious code to exfiltrate data from cloud repositories or services without detection.
@@ -17535,7 +17535,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
 description = Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.
 narrative = Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.
 
@@ -17546,7 +17546,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule"]
 description = Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis.
 narrative = An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable executable to a certificate file, which is base64 encoded, to hide the originating file. There are many utilities cross-platform to encode using XOR, using compressed .cab files to hide contents and scripting languages that may perform similar native Windows tasks. Triaging an event related will require the capability to review related process events and file modifications. Using a tool such as CyberChef will assist with identifying the encoding that was used, and potentially assist with decoding the contents.
 
@@ -17557,7 +17557,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
 narrative = Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority.\
 Cryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN.\
@@ -17571,7 +17571,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
 narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -17583,7 +17583,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/", "https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task"]
 description = Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email. 
 narrative = As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Because phishing is a technique that relies on human psychology, you will never be able to eliminate this vulnerability 100%. But you can use automated detection to significantly reduce the risks.\
 This Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs of MiTM attacks enabled by [EvilGinx2](https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2), a toolkit that sets up a transparent proxy between the targeted site and the user. In this way, the attacker is able to intercept credentials and two-factor identification tokens. It employs a proxy template to allow a registered domain to impersonate targeted sites, such as Linkedin, Amazon, Okta, Github, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Office 365, and others. It can even register SSL certificates and camouflage them via a URL shortener, making them difficult to detect. Searches in this story look for signs of MiTM attacks enabled by EvilGinx2.
@@ -17606,7 +17606,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.
 narrative = Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.
 
@@ -17617,7 +17617,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities
 
@@ -17628,7 +17628,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description =  DEPRECATED IN FAVOR OF ACTIVE DIRECTORY LATERAL MOVEMENT. Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.
 narrative = Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation. Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or "crown jewels" to a persistent threat actor. An adversary can use lateral movement for multiple purposes, including remote execution of tools, pivoting to additional systems, obtaining access to specific information or files, access to additional credentials, exfiltrating data, or delivering a secondary effect. Adversaries may use legitimate credentials alongside inherent network and operating-system functionality to remotely connect to other systems and remain under the radar of network defenders. If there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to collect evidence of the associated offending hosts. For example, an attacker might leverage host A to gain access to host B. From there, the attacker may try to move laterally to host C. In this example, the analyst should gather as much information as possible from all three hosts. It is also important to collect authentication logs for each host, to ensure that the offending accounts are well-documented. Analysts should account for all processes to ensure that the attackers did not install unauthorized software.
 
@@ -17639,7 +17639,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ES Content Updates - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
 narrative = Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations.  Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.
 
@@ -17650,7 +17650,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. 
 narrative = It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\
 It is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. 
@@ -17673,7 +17673,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://meltdownattack.com/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story.
 narrative = Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs that allow unintended access to data in memory. This Analytic Story will help you identify the systems can be patched for these vulnerabilities, as well as those that still need to be patched.
 
@@ -17684,7 +17684,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
 narrative = AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
 
@@ -17695,7 +17695,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.
 narrative = A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised.\
 Searches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.
@@ -17707,7 +17707,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jim Apger"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.
 narrative = The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\
 These crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\
@@ -17723,7 +17723,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.
 narrative = This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.
 
@@ -17734,7 +17734,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GitHub Actions Disable Security Workflow - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Github Commit In Develop - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Actions Disable Security Workflow - Rule", "ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule", "ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule", "ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule", "ESCU - Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule"]
 description = This story is focused around detecting attacks on a DevSecOps lifeccycle which consists of the phases plan, code, build, test, release, deploy, operate and monitor.
 narrative = DevSecOps is a collaborative framework, which thinks about application and infrastructure security from the start. This means that security tools are part of the continuous integration and continuous deployment pipeline. In this analytics story, we focused on detections around the tools used in this framework such as GitHub as a version control system, GDrive for the documentation, CircleCI as the CI/CD pipeline, Kubernetes as the container execution engine and multiple security tools such as Semgrep and Kube-Hunter.
 
@@ -17745,7 +17745,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.
 narrative = The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity.\
 There is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic data&#1151;all of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure.\
@@ -17759,7 +17759,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://web.archive.org/web/20220425194457/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
 narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).
 
@@ -17770,7 +17770,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims.
 narrative = The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification or redirection attacks against victims. Because DNS responses to `ANY` queries are so much larger than the queries themselves--and can be made with a UDP packet, which does not require a handshake--attackers can spoof the source address of the packet and cause much more data to be sent to the victim than if they sent the traffic themselves. The `ANY` requests are will be larger than normal DNS server requests, due to the fact that the server provides significant details, such as MX records and associated IP addresses. A large volume of this traffic can result in a DOS on the victim's machine. This misconfiguration leads to two possible victims, the first being the DNS servers participating in an attack and the other being the hosts that are the targets of the DOS attack.\
 The search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service to other victims.
@@ -17782,7 +17782,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS record changed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
 description = Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.
 narrative = Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\
 The gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well.\
@@ -17801,7 +17801,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"]
 description = Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments.
 narrative = Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.
 
@@ -17812,7 +17812,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://cert.gov.ua/article/38088", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/threat-advisory-doublezero.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule"]
 description = Double Zero Destructor is a destructive payload that enumerates Domain Controllers and executes killswitch if detected. Overwrites files with Zero blocks or using MS Windows API calls such as NtFileOpen, NtFSControlFile. This payload also deletes registry hives HKCU,HKLM, HKU, HKLM BCD.
 narrative = Double zero destructor enumerates domain controllers, delete registry hives and overwrites files using zero blocks and API calls.
 
@@ -17823,7 +17823,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
 narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
 
@@ -17834,7 +17834,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.
 narrative = The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/).  For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants.\
 According to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\
@@ -17847,7 +17847,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.praetorian.com/blog/refresh-compromising-f5-big-ip-with-request-smuggling-cve-2023-46747/", "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/3b0bb71bd627c6c3139e1d06c866f8402aa228ae/http/cves/2023/CVE-2023-46747.yaml"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - F5 TMUI Authentication Bypass - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - F5 TMUI Authentication Bypass - Rule"]
 description = Research into leading software revealed vulnerabilities in both Apache Tomcat and the F5 BIG-IP suite. Apache's AJP protocol vulnerability, designated CVE-2022-26377, relates to AJP request smuggling. Successful exploitation enables unauthorized system activities. F5 BIG-IP Virtual Edition exhibited a distinct vulnerability, an authentication bypass in the Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI), resulting in system compromise. Assigned CVE-2023-46747, this vulnerability also arose from request smuggling, bearing similarity to CVE-2022-26377. Given the wide adoption of both Apache Tomcat and F5 products, these vulnerabilities present grave risks to organizations. Remediation and vulnerability detection mechanisms are essential to address these threats effectively.
 narrative = Both Apache Tomcat's AJP protocol and F5's BIG-IP Virtual Edition have been exposed to critical vulnerabilities. Apache's CVE-2022-26377 pertains to request smuggling by manipulating the "Transfer-Encoding" header. If successfully exploited, this allows attackers to bypass security controls and undertake unauthorized actions.\
 Similarly, F5 BIG-IP unveiled an authentication bypass vulnerability, CVE-2023-46747. Originating from the TMUI, this vulnerability leads to full system compromise. While distinct, it shares characteristics with Apache's vulnerability, primarily rooted in request smuggling. This vulnerability drew from past F5 CVEs, particularly CVE-2020-5902 and CVE-2022-1388, both previously exploited in real-world scenarios. These highlighted vulnerabilities in Apache HTTP and Apache Tomcat services, as well as authentication flaws in the F5 BIG-IP API.\
@@ -17860,7 +17860,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/dk4trin/templates-nuclei/blob/main/CVE-2022-1388.yaml", "https://www.randori.com/blog/vulnerability-analysis-cve-2022-1388/", "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-1388", "https://twitter.com/da_667/status/1523770267327250438?s=20\u0026t=-JnB_aNWuJFsmcOmxGUWLQ", "https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2022-1388/blob/main/CVE-2022-1388.py"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388 - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388 - Rule"]
 description = CVE-2022-1388 is a unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerablity against BIG-IP iControl REST API.
 narrative = CVE-2022-1388 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.8) in the management interface of F5 Networks'' BIG-IP solution that enables an unauthenticated attacker to gain remote code execution on the system through bypassing F5''s iControl REST authentication. The vulnerability was first discovered by F5''s internal product security team and disclosed publicly on May 4, 2022, per Randori. This vulnerability,CVE-2022-1388, may allow an unauthenticated attacker with network access to the BIG-IP system through the management port and/or self IP addresses to execute arbitrary system commands, create or delete files, or disable services. There is no data plane exposure; this is a control plane issue only per F5 article K23605346. Is CVE-2022-1388 Exploitable? Yes. There are now multiple POC scripts available and reports of threat actors scanning and potentially exploiting the vulnerablity. Per Randori the specific interface needed to exploit this vulnerability is rarely publicly exposed, and the risk to most organizations of exploitation by an unauthenticated external actor is low.
 
@@ -17871,7 +17871,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code.  This vulnerability can result in full system compromise.
 narrative = A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable system. The detection search in this Analytic Story uses syslog to detect the malicious behavior. Syslog is going to be the best detection method, as any systems using SSL to protect their management console will make detection via wire data difficult.  The searches included used Splunk Connect For Syslog (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4740/), and used a custom destination port to help define the data as F5 data (covered in https://splunk-connect-for-syslog.readthedocs.io/en/master/sources/F5/)
 
@@ -17882,7 +17882,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIN7", "https://threatpost.com/fin7-windows-11-release/169206/", "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/jssloader-recoded-and-reloaded"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule", "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule", "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the FIN7 JS Implant and JSSLoader, including looking for Image Loading of ldap and wmi modules, associated with its payload, data collection and script execution.
 narrative = FIN7 is a Russian criminal advanced persistent threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. A portion of FIN7 is run out of the front company Combi Security. It has been called one of the most successful criminal hacking groups in the world. this passed few day FIN7 tools and implant are seen in the wild where its code is updated. the FIN& is known to use the spear phishing attack as a entry to targetted network or host that will drop its staging payload like the JS and JSSloader. Now this artifacts and implants seen downloading other malware like cobaltstrike and event ransomware to encrypt host.
 
@@ -17893,7 +17893,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/24/flax-typhoon-using-legitimate-software-to-quietly-access-taiwanese-organizations/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows SQL Spawning CertUtil - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows SQL Spawning CertUtil - Rule"]
 description = Microsoft has identified a nation-state activity group, Flax Typhoon, based in China, targeting Taiwanese organizations for espionage. The group maintains long-term access to networks with minimal use of malware, relying on built-in OS tools and benign software. The group's activities are primarily focused on Taiwan, but the techniques used could be easily reused in other operations outside the region. Microsoft has not observed Flax Typhoon using this access to conduct additional actions.
 narrative = Flax Typhoon has been active since mid-2021, targeting government agencies, education, critical manufacturing, and IT organizations in Taiwan. The group uses the China Chopper web shell, Metasploit, Juicy Potato privilege escalation tool, Mimikatz, and SoftEther VPN client. However, they primarily rely on living-off-the-land techniques and hands-on-keyboard activity. Initial access is achieved by exploiting known vulnerabilities in public-facing servers and deploying web shells. Following initial access, Flax Typhoon uses command-line tools to establish persistent access over the remote desktop protocol, deploy a VPN connection to actor-controlled network infrastructure, and collect credentials from compromised systems. The group also uses this VPN access to scan for vulnerabilities on targeted systems and organizations from the compromised systems.
 
@@ -17904,7 +17904,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://cert.gov.ua/article/5702579", "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/steal-it-campaign", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Headless Browser Mockbin or Mocky Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Headless Browser Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule", "ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Headless Browser Mockbin or Mocky Request - Rule", "ESCU - Headless Browser Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule"]
 description = CERT-UA has unveiled a cyberattack on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, orchestrated via deceptive emails. These emails, once accessed, lead to a multi-stage cyber operation downloading and executing malicious payloads. Concurrently, Zscaler's "Steal-It" campaign detection revealed striking similarities, hinting at a shared origin - APT28 or Fancy Bear. This notorious group, linked to Russia's GRU, utilizes legitimate platforms like Mockbin, making detection challenging. Their operations underline the evolving cyber threat landscape and stress the importance of advanced defenses.
 narrative = APT28, also known as Fancy Bear, blends stealth and expertise in its cyber operations. Affiliated with Russia's GRU, their signature move involves spear-phishing emails, leading to multi-tiered cyberattacks. In Ukraine's recent breach, a ZIP archive's execution triggered a series of actions, culminating in information flow redirection via the TOR network. Simultaneously, Zscaler's "Steal-It" campaign pinpointed similar tactics, specifically targeting NTLMv2 hashes. This campaign used ZIP archives containing LNK files to exfiltrate data via Mockbin. APT28's hallmark is their "Living Off The Land" strategy, manipulating legitimate tools and services to blend in, evading detection. Their innovative tactics, coupled with a geofencing focus on specific regions, make them a formidable cyber threat, highlighting the urgent need for advanced defense strategies.
 
@@ -17915,7 +17915,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.horizon3.ai/fortinet-fortinac-cve-2022-39952-deep-dive-and-iocs/", "https://viz.greynoise.io/tag/fortinac-rce-attempt?days=30", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fortinet-fixes-critical-rce-flaws-in-fortinac-and-fortiweb/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Exploit Public-Facing Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952 - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Exploit Public-Facing Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952 - Rule"]
 description = On Thursday, 16 February 2023, Fortinet released a PSIRT that details CVE-2022-39952, a critical vulnerability affecting its FortiNAC product (Horizon3.ai).
 narrative = This vulnerability, discovered by Gwendal Guegniaud of Fortinet, allows an unauthenticated attacker to write arbitrary files on the system and as a result obtain remote code execution in the context of the root user (Horizon3.ai). Impacting FortiNAC, is tracked as CVE-2022-39952 and has a CVSS v3 score of 9.8 (critical). FortiNAC is a network access control solution that helps organizations gain real time network visibility, enforce security policies, and detect and mitigate threats. An external control of file name or path vulnerability CWE-73 in FortiNAC webserver may allow an unauthenticated attacker to perform arbitrary write on the system, reads the security advisory.
 
@@ -17926,7 +17926,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://cloud.google.com/gcp", "https://cloud.google.com/architecture/identity/overview-google-authentication", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/account-takeover-ato/", "https://www.barracuda.com/glossary/account-takeover"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Account Takeover attacks against Google Cloud Platform tenants.
 narrative = Account Takeover (ATO) is an attack whereby cybercriminals gain unauthorized access to online accounts by using different techniques like brute force, social engineering, phishing & spear phishing, credential stuffing, etc. By posing as the real user, cyber-criminals can change account details, send out phishing emails, steal financial information or sensitive data, or use any stolen information to access further accounts within the organization. This analytic story groups detections that can help security operations teams identify the potential compromise of Google cloud accounts.
 
@@ -17937,7 +17937,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.
 narrative = Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\
 In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\
@@ -17950,7 +17950,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://thedfirreport.com/2023/06/12/a-truly-graceful-wipe-out/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop By Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Stop By Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application - Rule"]
 description = This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive attack or campaign found by "THE DFIR Report" that uses Truebot, FlawedGrace and MBR killer malware. This analytic story looks for suspicious dropped files, cobalt strike execution, im-packet execution, registry modification, scripts, persistence, lateral movement, impact, exfiltration and recon.
 narrative = Graceful Wipe Out Attack is a destructive malware campaign found by "The DFIR Report" targeting multiple organizations to collect, exfiltrate and wipe the data of targeted networks. This malicious payload corrupts or wipes Master Boot Records by using an NSIS script after the exfiltration of sensitive information from the targeted host or system.
 
@@ -17961,7 +17961,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule"]
 description = HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.
 narrative = On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\
 While the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\
@@ -17974,7 +17974,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Rod Soto, Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule"]
 description = This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as "Hermetic Wiper". This analytic story looks for abuse of Regsvr32, executables written in administrative SMB Share, suspicious processes, disabling of memory crash dump and more.
 narrative = Hermetic Wiper is destructive malware operation found by Sentinel One targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. This malicious payload corrupts Master Boot Records, uses signed drivers and manipulates NTFS attributes for file destruction.
 
@@ -17985,7 +17985,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://web.archive.org/web/20191220004307/https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://web.archive.org/web/20220421112536/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
 narrative = North Korea's government-sponsored "cyber army" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as "Hidden Cobra," has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\
 These state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie "The Interview" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\
@@ -17999,7 +17999,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Schedule Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Defender Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Share Discovery Via Dir Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", "ES Content Updates - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Defender Services - Rule", "ESCU - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ESCU - Network Share Discovery Via Dir Command - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ESCU - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the IcedID banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection.
 narrative = IcedId banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS targetting browser such as firefox and chrom to steal banking information. It is also known to its unique payload downloaded in C2 where it can be a .png file that hides the core shellcode bot using steganography technique or gzip dat file that contains "license.dat" which is the actual core icedid bot.
 
@@ -18010,7 +18010,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/12/12/iis-modules-the-evolution-of-web-shells-and-how-to-detect-them/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/004/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/crowdstrike-iceapple-a-novel-internet-information-services-post-exploitation-framework-1.pdf", "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-oilrig-uses-rgdoor-iis-backdoor-targets-middle-east/", "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/appcmd.exe-055B2B09409F980BF9B5A3969D01E5B2.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Add New Module - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Module Failed to Load - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components New Module Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Add Module to Global Assembly Cache - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell IIS Components WebGlobalModule Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows IIS Components Add New Module - Rule", "ESCU - Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows IIS Components Module Failed to Load - Rule", "ESCU - Windows IIS Components New Module Added - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell Add Module to Global Assembly Cache - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell IIS Components WebGlobalModule Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC - Rule"]
 description = Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence.
 narrative = IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions - Get{Extension/Filter}Version, Http{Extension/Filter}Proc, and (optionally) Terminate{Extension/Filter}. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.\
 Adversaries may install malicious ISAPI extensions and filters to observe and/or modify traffic, execute commands on compromised machines, or proxy command and control traffic. ISAPI extensions and filters may have access to all IIS web requests and responses. For example, an adversary may abuse these mechanisms to modify HTTP responses in order to distribute malicious commands/content to previously comprised hosts.\
@@ -18023,7 +18023,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://cert.gov.ua/article/39518", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/04/12/industroyer2-industroyer-reloaded/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Disable Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Stop Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Disable Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Stop Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Industroyer2 attack, including file writes associated with its payload, lateral movement, persistence, privilege escalation and data destruction.
 narrative = Industroyer2 is part of continuous attack to ukraine targeting energy facilities. This malware is a windows binary that implement IEC-104 protocol to communicate with industrial equipments. This attack consist of several destructive linux script component to wipe or delete several linux critical files, powershell for domain enumeration and caddywiper to wipe boot sector of the targeted host.
 
@@ -18034,7 +18034,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/insider-threat-deep-dive-it-sabotage/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might correlate to insider threat specially in terms of information sabotage.
 narrative = Information sabotage is the type of crime many people associate with insider threat. Where the current or former employees, contractors, or business partners intentionally exceeded or misused an authorized level of access to networks, systems, or data with the intention of harming a specific individual, the organization, or the organization's data, systems, and/or daily business operations.
 
@@ -18045,7 +18045,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Certify Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Proxy Socks Curl - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Certify Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Proxy Socks Curl - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule"]
 description = Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the Command And Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.
 narrative = Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command And Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\ During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors.
 
@@ -18056,7 +18056,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/insider-threats/", "https://www.cisa.gov/defining-insider-threats", "https://www.code42.com/glossary/types-of-insider-threats/", "https://github.com/Insider-Threat/Insider-Threat", "https://ctid.mitre-engenuity.org/our-work/insider-ttp-kb/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Potential password in username - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule", "ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule", "ESCU - Potential password in username - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with insider threats and specifically focusing on malicious insiders operating with in a corporate environment.
 narrative = Insider Threats are best defined by CISA: "Insider threat incidents are possible in any sector or organization. An insider threat is typically a current or former employee, third-party contractor, or business partner. In their present or former role, the person has or had access to an organization's network systems, data, or premises, and uses their access (sometimes unwittingly). To combat the insider threat, organizations can implement a proactive, prevention-focused mitigation program to detect and identify threats, assess risk, and manage that risk - before an incident occurs." An insider is any person who has or had authorized access to or knowledge of an organization's resources, including personnel, facilities, information, equipment, networks, and systems. These are the common insiders that create insider threats: Departing Employees, Security Evaders, Malicious Insiders, and Negligent Employees. This story aims at detecting the malicious insider.
 
@@ -18067,7 +18067,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/RootUp/PersonalStuff/blob/master/http-vuln-cve2023-46805_2024_21887.nse", "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/c6b351e71b0fb0e40e222e97038f1fe09ac58194/http/misconfiguration/ivanti/CVE-2023-46085-CVE-2024-21887-mitigation-not-applied.yaml", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/18708/files", "https://attackerkb.com/topics/AdUh6by52K/cve-2023-46805/rapid7-analysis", "https://labs.watchtowr.com/welcome-to-2024-the-sslvpn-chaos-continues-ivanti-cve-2023-46805-cve-2024-21887/", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2024/01/10/active-exploitation-of-two-zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-ivanti-connect-secure-vpn/", "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/suspected-apt-targets-ivanti-zero-day", "https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2023-46805-Authentication-Bypass-CVE-2024-21887-Command-Injection-for-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-and-Ivanti-Policy-Secure-Gateways?language=en_US"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Access to Vulnerable Ivanti Connect Secure Bookmark Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure Command Injection Attempts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure SSRF in SAML Component - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure System Information Access via Auth Bypass - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Access to Vulnerable Ivanti Connect Secure Bookmark Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure Command Injection Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure SSRF in SAML Component - Rule", "ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure System Information Access via Auth Bypass - Rule"]
 description = The following analytic story addresses critical vulnerabilities CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure Gateways. CVE-2023-46805 is an authentication bypass vulnerability, while CVE-2024-21887 is a command injection flaw, both presenting significant risks in versions 9.x and 22.x. Combined, these vulnerabilities enable unauthenticated threat actors to execute arbitrary commands, compromising system integrity. Immediate mitigation is imperative, with patches scheduled for staggered release. Ivanti has provided interim mitigation steps, and it's crucial for customers to apply these measures to protect their systems against potential exploits.
 narrative = Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways face a severe security challenge with the discovery of CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887. CVE-2023-46805 allows attackers to bypass authentication in critical web components of versions 9.x and 22.x. More alarmingly, when paired with CVE-2024-21887, a command injection vulnerability, it enables remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands without authentication. This combination poses a heightened threat, undermining the security of enterprise networks. Ivanti has mobilized resources to address these vulnerabilities, offering immediate mitigation advice and scheduling patch releases. Customers are urged to apply these mitigations without delay to safeguard their networks.
 
@@ -18078,7 +18078,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.securityweek.com/second-ivanti-epmm-zero-day-vulnerability-exploited-in-targeted-attacks/", "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/07/28/ivanti-releases-security-updates-epmm-address-cve-2023-35081", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-35078", "https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2023-35078-Remote-unauthenticated-API-access-vulnerability?language=en_US"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35078 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35082 - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35078 - Rule", "ESCU - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35082 - Rule"]
 description = Ivanti, a leading technology company, has disclosed two critical zero-day vulnerabilities in its Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) product, CVE-2023-35078 and CVE-2023-35081. A recent update concerning CVE-2023-35082, closely related to CVE-2023-35078, reveals its impact on more versions of Ivanti's software than initially believed. The former allows unauthenticated attackers to obtain sensitive data, modify servers, and access the API, potentially leading to data breaches or malicious system modifications. Meanwhile, CVE-2023-35081 lets authenticated administrators remotely write arbitrary files to the server. Both vulnerabilities have been exploited in targeted attacks against government ministries and could be used in conjunction. With the presence of PoC code for CVE-2023-35078, the risk of broader exploitation has increased. While initially leveraged in limited attacks, the exploitation is expected to rise, possibly involving state-sponsored actors. Organizations are urged to apply immediate patches and conduct regular system assessments to ensure security.
 narrative = Ivantis Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) product, formerly known as MobileIron Core and extensively utilized by IT teams to manage mobile devices, applications, and content, has been found to harbor several critical vulnerabilities. Specifically, CVE-2023-35078 allows remote unauthenticated attackers to access sensitive data and make changes to servers. This flaw has been leveraged in targeted attacks against Norwegian government ministries. In addition, CVE-2023-35081 permits an authenticated attacker with administrative privileges to remotely write arbitrary files to the server.\
 Recently, attention has shifted to CVE-2023-35082, which was initially believed to affect only MobileIron Core 11.2 and below. Subsequent investigations revealed its wider influence, affecting EPMM versions 11.10, 11.9, 11.8, and MobileIron Core 11.7 and earlier. This vulnerability facilitates unauthorized access to the API via the URI path /mifs/asfV3/api/v2/.\
@@ -18091,7 +18091,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2023-38035/blob/main/CVE-2023-38035.py", "https://www.horizon3.ai/ivanti-sentry-authentication-bypass-cve-2023-38035-deep-dive/", "https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/KB-API-Authentication-Bypass-on-Sentry-Administrator-Interface-CVE-2023-38035?language=en_US"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass - Rule"]
 description = A critical vulnerability, designated as CVE-2023-38035, has been identified in Ivanti Sentry (formerly MobileIron Sentry). It affects all supported versions, including 9.18, 9.17, and 9.16, as well as older versions. The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to access the System Manager Portal (typically hosted on port 8443) and make configuration changes, potentially executing OS commands as root. However, the risk is low for users who haven't exposed port 8443 online. This flaw is distinct from other Ivanti products. It's imperative for organizations to check for unrecognized HTTP requests to /services/* as a potential indicator of compromise.
 narrative = CVE-2023-38035 presents a significant security risk in the Ivanti Sentry administration interface. The vulnerability was identified shortly after another notable vulnerability in Ivanti EPMM (CVE-2023-35078) was discovered being exploited in the wild. The current vulnerability allows a malicious actor, without requiring authentication, to access the System Manager Portal, typically hosted on port 8443. Upon successful exploitation, the attacker can make configuration alterations to both the Sentry system and its underlying OS. The potential damage is significant, enabling the attacker to execute commands on the system with root privileges.\
 While this vulnerability scored high on the CVSS scale, its risk is relatively mitigated for clients who have not exposed port 8443 to the internet. The primary exploitation vector is the System Manager Portal, an administrative interface for Sentry.\
@@ -18104,7 +18104,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.
 narrative = This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\
 It is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\
@@ -18129,7 +18129,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2024-01-24/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897 - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897 - Rule"]
 description = This analytic story provides a comprehensive view of Jenkins server vulnerabilities and associated detection analytics.
 narrative = The following analytic story provides a comprehensive view of Jenkins server vulnerabilities and associated detection analytics. Jenkins is a popular open-source automation server that is used to automate tasks associated with building, testing, and deploying software. Jenkins is often used in DevOps environments and is a critical component of the software development lifecycle. As a result, Jenkins servers are often targeted by adversaries to gain access to sensitive information, credentials, and other critical assets. This analytic story provides a comprehensive view of Jenkins server vulnerabilities and associated detection analytics.
 
@@ -18140,7 +18140,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.jetbrains.com/teamcity/2023/09/critical-security-issue-affecting-teamcity-on-premises-update-to-2023-05-4-now/", "https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/teamcity-vulnerability/", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/18408", "https://attackerkb.com/topics/1XEEEkGHzt/cve-2023-42793/rapid7-analysis"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule"]
 description = A critical security vulnerability, CVE-2023-42793, has been discovered affecting all versions of TeamCity On-Premises up to 2023.05.3. This vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to execute remote code and gain administrative control of the TeamCity server, posing a significant risk for supply chain attacks. Although the issue has been fixed in version 2023.05.4, servers running older versions remain at risk. A security patch plugin has been released for immediate mitigation, applicable to TeamCity versions 8.0 and above. Organizations are strongly advised to update to the fixed version or apply the security patch, especially if their TeamCity server is publicly accessible. No impact has been reported on TeamCity Cloud as it has been upgraded to the secure version.
 narrative = The CVE-2023-42793 vulnerability in TeamCity On-Premises allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass authentication and gain administrative access through Remote Code Execution (RCE). Specifically, the attacker can send a malicious POST request to /app/rest/users/id:1/tokens/RPC2 to create an administrative token. Once the token is obtained, the attacker has the ability to perform various unauthorized activities, including creating new admin users and executing arbitrary shell commands on the server. For Splunk Security Content, the focus should be on identifying suspicious POST requests to /app/rest/users/id:1/tokens/RPC2 and other affected API endpoints, as this is the initial point of exploitation. Monitoring logs for changes to the internal.properties file or the creation of new admin users could also provide crucial indicators of compromise. Furthermore, Splunk can be configured to alert on multiple failed login attempts followed by a successful login from the same IP, which could indicate exploitation attempts.
 
@@ -18151,7 +18151,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2024/03/04/etr-cve-2024-27198-and-cve-2024-27199-jetbrains-teamcity-multiple-authentication-bypass-vulnerabilities-fixed/", "https://blog.jetbrains.com/teamcity/2024/03/teamcity-2023-11-4-is-out/", "https://blog.jetbrains.com/teamcity/2024/03/additional-critical-security-issues-affecting-teamcity-on-premises-cve-2024-27198-and-cve-2024-27199-update-to-2023-11-4-now/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass CVE-2024-27198 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27198 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Limited Auth Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27199 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass CVE-2024-27198 - Rule", "ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27198 - Rule", "ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Limited Auth Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27199 - Rule", "ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule"]
 description = This story provides a high-level overview of JetBrains TeamCity vulnerabilities and how to detect and respond to them using Splunk.
 narrative = JetBrains TeamCity is a continuous integration and deployment server that allows developers to automate the process of building, testing, and deploying code. It is a popular tool used by many organizations to streamline their development and deployment processes. However, like any software, JetBrains TeamCity is not immune to vulnerabilities.
 
@@ -18162,7 +18162,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://supportportal.juniper.net/s/article/2023-08-Out-of-Cycle-Security-Bulletin-Junos-OS-SRX-Series-and-EX-Series-Multiple-vulnerabilities-in-J-Web-can-be-combined-to-allow-a-preAuth-Remote-Code-Execution?language=en_US", "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/main/http/cves/2023/CVE-2023-36844.yaml", "https://thehackernews.com/2023/08/new-juniper-junos-os-flaws-expose.html", "https://github.com/watchtowrlabs/juniper-rce_cve-2023-36844", "https://labs.watchtowr.com/cve-2023-36844-and-friends-rce-in-juniper-firewalls/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Juniper Networks Remote Code Execution Exploit Detection - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Juniper Networks Remote Code Execution Exploit Detection - Rule"]
 description = Juniper Networks has resolved multiple critical vulnerabilities in the J-Web component of Junos OS on SRX and EX Series devices. These vulnerabilities, when chained together, could allow an unauthenticated, network-based attacker to remotely execute code on the devices. The vulnerabilities affect all versions of Junos OS on SRX and EX Series, but specific fixes have been released to address each vulnerability. Juniper Networks recommends applying the necessary fixes to mitigate potential remote code execution threats. As a workaround, users can disable J-Web or limit access to only trusted hosts. Proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code has been released, demonstrating the severity of these flaws and the urgency to apply the fixes.
 narrative = Juniper Networks, a networking hardware company, has released an "out-of-cycle" security update to address multiple flaws in the J-Web component of Junos OS that could be combined to achieve remote code execution on susceptible installations. The flaws have a cumulative CVSS rating of 9.8, making them critical in severity. They affect all versions of Junos OS on SRX and EX Series. The J-Web interface allows users to configure, manage, and monitor Junos OS devices. The vulnerabilities include two PHP external variable modification vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-36844 and CVE-2023-36845) and two missing authentications for critical function vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-36846 and CVE-2023-36847). These vulnerabilities could allow an unauthenticated, network-based attacker to control certain important environment variables, cause limited impact to the file system integrity, or upload arbitrary files via J-Web without any authentication.\
 The vulnerabilities have been addressed in specific Junos OS versions for EX Series and SRX Series devices. Users are recommended to apply the necessary fixes to mitigate potential remote code execution threats. As a workaround, Juniper Networks suggests disabling J-Web or limiting access to only trusted hosts.\
@@ -18176,7 +18176,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.
 
@@ -18187,7 +18187,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "no", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual Location - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Agent - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Group - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Access Scanning - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Create or Update Privileged Pod - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Cron Job Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes DaemonSet Deployed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Falco Shell Spawned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Node Port Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Pod With Host Network Attachment - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Scanning by Unauthenticated IP Address - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Suspicious Image Pulling - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Unauthorized Access - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual Location - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Agent - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Group - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Name - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Access Scanning - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Create or Update Privileged Pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Cron Job Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes DaemonSet Deployed - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Falco Shell Spawned - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Node Port Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Pod With Host Network Attachment - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Scanning by Unauthenticated IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Suspicious Image Pulling - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Unauthorized Access - Rule"]
 description = Kubernetes, as a container orchestration platform, faces unique security challenges. This story explores various tactics and techniques adversaries use to exploit Kubernetes environments, including attacking the control plane, exploiting misconfigurations, and compromising containerized applications.
 narrative = Kubernetes, a widely used container orchestration system, presents a complex environment that can be targeted by adversaries. Key areas of concern include the control plane, worker nodes, and network communication. Attackers may attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in the Kubernetes API, misconfigured containers, or insecure network policies. The control plane, responsible for managing cluster operations, is a prime target. Compromising this can give attackers control over the entire cluster. Worker nodes, running the containerized applications, can be targeted to disrupt services or to gain access to sensitive data. Common attack vectors include exploiting vulnerabilities in container images, misconfigured role-based access controls (RBAC), exposed Kubernetes dashboards, and insecure network configurations. Attackers can also target the supply chain, injecting malicious code into container images or Helm charts. To mitigate these threats, it is essential to enforce robust security practices such as regular vulnerability scanning, implementing least privilege access, securing the control plane, network segmentation, and continuous monitoring for suspicious activities. Tools like Kubernetes Network Policies, Pod Security Policies, and third-party security solutions can provide additional layers of defense.
 
@@ -18198,7 +18198,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.
 narrative = Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.
 
@@ -18209,7 +18209,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://gtfobins.github.io/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux APT Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux AWK Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux c89 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux c99 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Clipboard Data Copy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Composer Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Decode Base64 to Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Docker Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Find Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux GDB Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Gem Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Make Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Node Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Obfuscated Files or Information Base64 Decode - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Octave Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux PHP Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Proxy Socks Curl - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux RPM Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux SSH Remote Services Script Execute - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux APT Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux AWK Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux c89 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux c99 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Clipboard Data Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Composer Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Decode Base64 to Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Docker Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Find Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux GDB Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Gem Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Make Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Node Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Obfuscated Files or Information Base64 Decode - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Octave Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux PHP Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Proxy Socks Curl - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux RPM Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Linux SSH Remote Services Script Execute - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule"]
 description = Linux Living Off The Land consists of binaries that may be used to bypass local security restrictions within misconfigured systems.
 narrative = Similar to Windows LOLBAS project, the GTFOBins project focuses solely on Unix binaries that may be abused in multiple categories including Reverse Shell, File Upload, File Download and much more. These binaries are native to the operating system and the functionality is typically native. The behaviors are typically not malicious by default or vulnerable, but these are built in functionality of the applications. When reviewing any notables or hunting through mountains of events of interest, it's important to identify the binary, review command-line arguments, path of file, and capture any network and file modifications. Linux analysis may be a bit cumbersome due to volume and how process behavior is seen in EDR products. Piecing it together will require some effort.
 
@@ -18220,7 +18220,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", "https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/", "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/", "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2021-CTI-005.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Add User Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Linux system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
 narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Linux environment.
 
@@ -18231,7 +18231,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/linux/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "no", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule"]
 description = This analytic story identifies popular Linux post exploitation tools such as autoSUID, LinEnum, LinPEAS, Linux Exploit Suggesters, MimiPenguin.
 narrative = These tools allow operators find possible exploits or paths for privilege escalation based on SUID binaries, user permissions, kernel version and distro version.
 
@@ -18242,7 +18242,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Add User Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux APT Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux AWK Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux c89 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux c99 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Composer Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Docker Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Find Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux GDB Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Gem Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Make Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Node Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Octave Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux PHP Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux RPM Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux APT Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux AWK Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux c89 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux c99 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Composer Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Docker Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Find Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux GDB Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Gem Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Make Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Node Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Octave Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Linux PHP Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux RPM Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Linux privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, schedule task, services, setuid, root execution and more.
 narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Linux machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.
 
@@ -18253,7 +18253,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/", "https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41", "https://medium.com/chronicle-blog/winnti-more-than-just-windows-and-gates-e4f03436031a"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Kernel Module Enumeration - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Kernel Module Enumeration - Rule"]
 description = Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information.
 narrative = Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or System Firmware. Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. Linux rootkits may not standout as much as a Windows rootkit, therefore understanding what kernel modules are installed today and monitoring for new is important. As with any rootkit, it may blend in using a common kernel name or variation of legitimate names.
 
@@ -18264,7 +18264,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Lou Stella"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Schedule Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Living Off The Land Detection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - LOLBAS With Network Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MacOS LOLbin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MacOS plutil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", "ES Content Updates - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Binary Proxy Execution Mavinject DLL Injection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Identify Protocol Handlers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Known Abused DLL Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MOF Event Triggered Execution via WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Load DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Load Response File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Script Proxy Execution Syncappvpublishingserver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Living Off The Land Detection - Rule", "ESCU - LOLBAS With Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - MacOS LOLbin - Rule", "ESCU - MacOS plutil - Rule", "ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Binary Proxy Execution Mavinject DLL Injection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Identify Protocol Handlers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Known Abused DLL Created - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MOF Event Triggered Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Load DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Load Response File - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Script Proxy Execution Syncappvpublishingserver - Rule", "ESCU - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"]
 description = Leverage analytics that allow you to identify the presence of an adversary leveraging native applications within your environment.
 narrative = Living Off The Land refers to an adversary methodology of using native applications already installed on the target operating system to achieve their objective. Native utilities provide the adversary with reduced chances of detection by antivirus software or EDR tools. This allows the adversary to blend in with native process behavior.
 
@@ -18275,7 +18275,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp", "https://gist.github.com/tothi/bf6c59d6de5d0c9710f23dae5750c4b9", "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html", "https://dirkjanm.io/relaying-kerberos-over-dns-with-krbrelayx-and-mitm6/", "https://github.com/cube0x0/KrbRelay"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule", "ESCU - Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation - Rule"]
 description = KrbRelayUp is a tool that allows local privilege escalation from low-priviliged domain user to local system on domain-joined computers.
 narrative = In October 2021, James Forshaw from Googles Project Zero released a research  blog post titled `Using Kerberos for Authentication Relay Attacks`. This research introduced, for the first time, ways to make Windows authenticate to a different Service Principal Name (SPN) than what would normally be derived from the hostname the client is connecting to. This effectively proved that relaying Kerberos authentication is possible\\. In April 2022, security researcher Mor Davidovich released a tool named KrbRelayUp which implements Kerberos relaying as well as other known Kerberos techniques with the goal of escalating privileges from a low-privileged domain user on a domain-joined device and obtain a SYSTEM shell.
 
@@ -18286,7 +18286,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/10/lockbit-3-0-also-known-as-lockbit-black.html", "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/04/24/lockbit-ransomware-borrows-tricks-to-keep-up-with-revil-and-maze/", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-analysis-report-lockbit-2.0-all-paths-lead-to-ransom", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/g/lockbit-ransomware-group-augments-its-latest-variant--lockbit-3-.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Default Icon Setting - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Default Icon Setting - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the LockBit ransomware, including looking for file writes (file encryption and ransomware notes), deleting services, terminating processes, registry key modification and more.
 narrative = LockBit ransomware was first seen in 2019. This ransomware was used by cybercriminal in targeting multiple sectors and organizations. Lockbit is one of the ransomware being offered as a Ransomware-as-a-Service(RaaS) and also known to affiliates to implement the 'double extortion' techniques by uploading the stolen and sensitive victim information to their dark website and then threatening to sell/release it in public if their demands are not met. LockBit Ransomware advertised opportunities for threat actors that could provide credential access via RDP and VPN. Aside from this it is also uses threat emulation like Cobalt Strike and Metasploit to gain foot hold to the targeted host and persist if needed.
 
@@ -18297,7 +18297,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://mbechler.github.io/2021/12/10/PSA_Log4Shell_JNDI_Injection/", "https://www.fastly.com/blog/digging-deeper-into-log4shell-0day-rce-exploit-found-in-log4j", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/log4j2-vulnerability-analysis-and-mitigation-recommendations/", "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/log-jammin-log4j-2-rce.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "no", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule", "ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule"]
 description = Log4Shell or CVE-2021-44228 is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Apache Log4j library, a widely used and ubiquitous logging framework for Java. The vulnerability allows an attacker who can control log messages to execute arbitrary code loaded from attacker-controlled servers and we anticipate that most apps using the Log4j library will meet this condition.
 narrative = In late November 2021, Chen Zhaojun of Alibaba identified a remote code execution vulnerability. Previous work was seen in a 2016 Blackhat talk by Alvaro Munoz and Oleksandr Mirosh called ["A Journey from JNDI/LDAP Manipulation to Remote Code Execution Dream Land"](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Munoz-A-Journey-From-JNDI-LDAP-Manipulation-To-RCE.pdf). Reported under the CVE ID : CVE-2021-44228, released to the public on December 10, 2021. The vulnerability is exploited through improper deserialization of user input passed into the framework. It permits remote code execution and it can allow an attacker to leak sensitive data, such as environment variables, or execute malicious software on the target system.
 
@@ -18308,7 +18308,7 @@ version = 5
 references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Enable PowerShell Remoting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Script Block With URL Chain - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell WebRequest Using Memory Stream - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Enable PowerShell Remoting - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Script Block With URL Chain - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell WebRequest Using Memory Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
 narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\
 The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious:\
@@ -18330,7 +18330,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule"]
 description = Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities.
 narrative = Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths.\
 The following content is here to assist with binaries within `system32` or `syswow64` being moved to a new location or an adversary bringing a the binary in to execute.\
@@ -18343,7 +18343,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/what-is-metasploit"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Powershell Load Module in Meterpreter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Apache Benchmark Binary - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Powershell Load Module in Meterpreter - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Apache Benchmark Binary - Rule"]
 description = The following analytic story highlights content related directly to MetaSploit, which may be default configurations attributed to MetaSploit or behaviors of known knowns that are related.
 narrative = The Metasploit framework is a very powerful tool which can be used by cybercriminals as well as ethical hackers to probe systematic vulnerabilities on networks and servers. Because it is an open-source framework, it can be easily customized and used with most operating systems.\
 The Metasploit Project was undertaken in 2003 by H.D. Moore for use as a Perl-based portable network tool, with assistance from core developer Matt Miller. It was fully converted to Ruby by 2007, and the license was acquired by Rapid7 in 2009, where it remains as part of the Boston-based company repertoire of IDS signature development and targeted remote exploit, fuzzing, anti-forensic, and evasion tools.\\
@@ -18357,7 +18357,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/", "https://doubleoctopus.com/security-wiki/threats-and-tools/meterpreter/", "https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "no", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Hart"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule"]
 description = Meterpreter provides red teams, pen testers and threat actors interactive access to a compromised host to run commands, upload payloads, download files, and other actions.
 narrative = This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Meterpreter. Meterpreter is a Metasploit payload for remote execution that leverages DLL injection to make it extremely difficult to detect.  Since the software runs in memory, no new processes are created upon injection.  It also leverages encrypted communication channels.\
 Meterpreter enables the operator to remotely run commands on the target machine, upload payloads, download files, dump password hashes, and much more.  It is difficult to determine from the forensic evidence what actions the operator performed.  Splunk Research, however, has observed anomalous behaviors on the compromised hosts that seem to only appear when Meterpreter is executing various commands.  With that, we have written new detections targeted to these detections.\
@@ -18370,7 +18370,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/windows-mshtml-zero-day-actively-exploited-mitigations-required/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule"]
 description = CVE-2021-40444 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML, recently used to delivery targeted spearphishing documents.
 narrative = Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444 by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents. MSHTML is a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it is 2019s most commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software. CVE-2021-40444 received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. MSHTML is the beating heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft Office applications use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office documents. The attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware. At the moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks.\
 1. Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones will be added, including malicious ones. Open documents from the Internet in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed.
@@ -18382,7 +18382,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://socradar.io/microsoft-sharepoint-server-elevation-of-privilege-vulnerability-exploit-cve-2023-29357/", "https://github.com/Chocapikk/CVE-2023-29357"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege - Rule"]
 description = This analytic story focuses on the Microsoft SharePoint Server vulnerability CVE-2023-29357, which allows for an elevation of privilege due to improper handling of authentication tokens. Exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to a serious security breach where an attacker might gain privileged access to the SharePoint environment, potentially leading to data theft or other malicious activities. This story is associated with the detection `Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege` which identifies attempts to exploit this vulnerability.
 narrative = Microsoft SharePoint Server is a widely used web-based collaborative platform. The vulnerability CVE-2023-29357 exposes a flaw in the handling of authentication tokens, allowing an attacker to escalate privileges and gain unauthorized access to the SharePoint environment. This could potentially lead to data theft, unauthorized system modifications, or other malicious activities. Organizations are urged to apply immediate patches and conduct regular system assessments to ensure security.
 
@@ -18393,7 +18393,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/30/guidance-for-cve-2022-30190-microsoft-support-diagnostic-tool-vulnerability/", "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28694", "https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e", "https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984?s=20\u0026t=ZiXYI4dQuA-0_dzQzSUb3A", "https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4a24048f81afbe9fb62e7a6a49adbd1faf41f266b5f9feecdceb567aec096784/detection", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/msdt.exe-152D4C9F63EFB332CCB134C6953C0104.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule"]
 description = On Monday May 30, 2022, Microsoft issued CVE-2022-30190 regarding the Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) in Windows vulnerability.
 narrative = A remote code execution vulnerability exists when MSDT is called using the URL protocol from a calling application such as Word. An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can run arbitrary code with the privileges of the calling application. The attacker can then install programs, view, change, or delete data, or create new accounts in the context allowed by the user''s rights.
 
@@ -18404,7 +18404,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches.
 narrative = It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important to eliminate known vulnerabilities that may be exploited by various threat actors.\
 Searches in this analytic story are designed to help analysts monitor endpoints for system patches and/or updates. This helps analysts identify any systems that are not successfully updated in a timely matter.\
@@ -18417,7 +18417,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://community.progress.com/s/article/MOVEit-Transfer-Critical-Vulnerability-31May2023", "https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/13wxuej/critical_vulnerability_moveit_file_transfer/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-moveit-transfer-zero-day-mass-exploited-in-data-theft-attacks/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/13wxuej/critical_vulnerability_moveit_file_transfer/", "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/faa672b1929a23fc48fc0ee47585cc48"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Windows MOVEit Transfer Writing ASPX - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows MOVEit Transfer Writing ASPX - Rule"]
 description = A critical zero-day vulnerability has been discovered in the MOVEit Transfer file transfer software, widely used by businesses and developers worldwide. The vulnerability has been exploited by unknown threat actors to perform mass data theft from organizations. Progress Software Corporation, the developer of MOVEit, has issued a security advisory urging customers to take immediate action to protect their environments. They recommend blocking external traffic to ports 80 and 445 on the MOVEit server, and to check the c:\MOVEitTransfer\wwwroot\ folder for unusual files. A patch is currently released.
 narrative = Hackers have been actively exploiting a zero-day vulnerability found in the MOVEit Transfer software. This software, developed by Progress Software Corporation, a US-based company and its subsidiary Ipswitch, is a managed file transfer solution. It is used by thousands of organizations worldwide, including Chase, Disney, GEICO, and MLB, and by 3.5 million developers. The software allows for secure file transfers between business partners and customers using SFTP, SCP, and HTTP-based uploads.\
 The zero-day vulnerability has been exploited to steal data on a large scale from various organizations. The identity of the threat actors and the exact timeline of the exploitation remains unclear. However, it has been confirmed that multiple organizations have experienced breaches and data theft.\
@@ -18433,7 +18433,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\
 To get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.
@@ -18445,7 +18445,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ESET_Kobalos.pdf", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the network discovery, including looking for network configuration, settings such as IP, MAC address, firewall settings and many more.
 narrative = Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.
 
@@ -18456,7 +18456,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/what-is-njrat-malware/#:~:text=NJRat%20%E2%80%94%20also%20known%20as%20Bladabindi,malware%20variant%20in%20March%202023.", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.njrat"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Abused Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Admin Permission Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Delete or Modify System Firewall - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable or Modify Tools Via Taskkill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Executable in Loaded Modules - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry With MD5 Reg Key Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify System Firewall with Notable Process Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Njrat Fileless Storage via Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System LogOff Commandline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Time Based Evasion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Abused Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Admin Permission Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Delete or Modify System Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable or Modify Tools Via Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Executable in Loaded Modules - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry With MD5 Reg Key Name - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify System Firewall with Notable Process Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Njrat Fileless Storage via Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System LogOff Commandline - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Time Based Evasion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"]
 description = NjRat is a notorious remote access trojan (RAT) predominantly wielded by malicious operators to infiltrate and wield remote control over compromised systems. This analytical story harnesses targeted search methodologies to uncover and investigate activities that could be indicative of NjRAT's presence. These activities include tracking file write operations for dropped files, scrutinizing registry modifications aimed at establishing persistence mechanisms, monitoring suspicious processes, self-deletion behaviors, browser credential parsing, firewall configuration alterations, spread itself via removable drive and an array of other potentially malicious actions.
 narrative = NjRat is also known as Bladabindi malware that was first discovered in the wild in 2012. Since then this malware remain active and uses different campaign to spred its malware. While its primary infection vectors are phishing attacks and drive-by downloads, it also has "worm" capability to spread itself via infected removable drives. This RAT has various of capabilities including keylogging, webcam access, browser credential parsing, file upload and downloads, file and process list, service list, shell command execution, registry modification, screen capture, view the desktop of the infected computer and many more. NjRat does not target any industry in particular, but attacking a wide variety of individuals and organizations to gather sensitive information.
 
@@ -18467,7 +18467,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/25/midnight-blizzard-guidance-for-responders-on-nation-state-attack/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Patrick Bareiss"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Application Registration Owner Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Supernova Webshell - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Created - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Application Registration Owner Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS - Rule", "ESCU - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule", "ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule"]
 description = NOBELIUM, also known as APT29, The Dukes, Cozy Bear, CozyDuke, Blue Kitsune, and Midnight Blizzard, is a sophisticated nation-state threat actor, reportedly associated with Russian intelligence. Active since at least 2008, this group primarily targets government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, along with research institutes and think tanks. Their operations typically involve advanced persistent threats (APT), leveraging techniques like spear-phishing, malware deployment, and long-term network compromise to achieve information theft and espionage. Notably, APT29 has been implicated in significant cyber espionage incidents, including the 2015 breach of the Pentagon's Joint Staff email system and attacks on the Democratic National Committee in 2016. Their advanced tactics and persistent approach underscore the serious nature of threats posed by this group to global cybersecurity.
 narrative = This Analytic Story groups detections designed to trigger on a comprehensive range of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) leveraged by the NOBELIUM Group, with a focus on their methods as observed in well-known public breaches.
 
@@ -18478,7 +18478,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security/compass/incident-response-playbook-password-spray", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-sign-ins-error-codes", "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/", "https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/22/malicious-oauth-applications-used-to-compromise-email-servers-and-spread-spam/", "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/investigate-risky-oauth", "https://www.alteredsecurity.com/post/introduction-to-365-stealer", "https://github.com/AlteredSecurity/365-Stealer"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 File Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 High Number Of Failed Authentications for User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Mail Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Security And Compliance Alert Triggered - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 File Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 High Number Of Failed Authentications for User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Mail Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Security And Compliance Alert Triggered - Rule", "ESCU - O365 User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule", "ESCU - O365 User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for activities and anomalies indicative of initial access techniques within Office 365 environments.
 narrative = Office 365 (O365) is Microsoft's cloud-based suite of productivity tools, encompassing email, collaboration platforms, and office applications, all integrated with Azure Active Directory for identity and access management. O365's centralized storage of sensitive data and widespread adoption make it a key asset, yet also a prime target for security threats. The "Office 365 Account Takeover" analytic story focuses on the initial techniques attackers employ to breach or compromise these identities. Initial access, in this context, consists of techniques that use various entry vectors to gain their initial foothold . Identifying these early indicators is crucial for establishing the first line of defense against unauthorized access and potential security incidents within O365 environments.
 
@@ -18489,7 +18489,7 @@ version = 1
 references = []
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Compliance Content Search Exported - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Compliance Content Search Started - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Granted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Enabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 New Forwarding Mailflow Rule Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Compliance Content Search Exported - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Compliance Content Search Started - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Granted - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Created - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Forwarding Mailflow Rule Created - Rule", "ESCU - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS - Rule", "ESCU - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for activities and anomalies indicative of potential collection techniques within Office 365 environments.
 narrative = Office 365 (O365) is Microsoft's cloud-based suite of productivity tools, encompassing email, collaboration platforms, and office applications, all integrated with Azure Active Directory for identity and access management. O365's centralized storage of sensitive data and widespread adoption make it a key asset, yet also a prime target for security threats. The 'Office 365 Collection Techniques' analytic story focuses on the strategies and methodologies that attackers might use to gather critical information within the O365 ecosystem. 'Collection' in this context refers to the various techniques adversaries deploy to accumulate data that are essential for advancing their malicious objectives. This could include tactics such as intercepting communications, accessing sensitive documents, or extracting data from collaboration tools and email platforms. By identifying and monitoring these collection activities, organizations can more effectively spot and counteract attempts to illicitly gather information
 
@@ -18500,7 +18500,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://blog.sygnia.co/detection-and-hunting-of-golden-saml-attack?hsLang=en", "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2022-08/remediation-hardening-strategies-for-m365-defend-against-apt29-white-paper.pdf", "https://www.csoonline.com/article/570381/microsoft-365-advanced-audit-what-you-need-to-know.html", "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/manage-apps/overview-assign-app-owners", "https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Advanced Audit Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Application Registration Owner Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 High Privilege Role Granted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Inbox Folder Shared with All Users - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 New MFA Method Registered - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Advanced Audit Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Application Registration Owner Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 High Privilege Role Granted - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Mailbox Inbox Folder Shared with All Users - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New MFA Method Registered - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for activities and anomalies indicative of potential persistence techniques within Office 365 environments.
 narrative = Office 365 (O365) is Microsoft's cloud-based suite of productivity tools, encompassing email, collaboration platforms, and office applications, all integrated with Azure Active Directory for identity and access management. O365's centralized storage of sensitive data and widespread adoption make it a key asset, yet also a prime target for security threats. The "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms" analytic story delves into the tactics and techniques attackers employ to maintain prolonged unauthorized access within the O365 environment. Persistence in this context refers to methods used by adversaries to keep their foothold after an initial compromise. This can involve actions like modifying mailbox rules, establishing covert forwarding rules, manipulating application permissions. By monitoring signs of persistence, organizations can effectively detect and respond to stealthy threats, thereby protecting their O365 assets and data.
 
@@ -18511,7 +18511,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/account-takeover-ato/", "https://www.barracuda.com/glossary/account-takeover", "https://www.okta.com/customer-identity/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Mauricio Velazco, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta New API Token Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta New Device Enrolled on Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Suspicious Activity Reported - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Unauthorized Access to Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta User Logins from Multiple Cities - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ESCU - Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - Okta New API Token Created - Rule", "ESCU - Okta New Device Enrolled on Account - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Suspicious Activity Reported - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie - Rule", "ESCU - Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Unauthorized Access to Application - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins from Multiple Cities - Rule"]
 description = The Okta Account Takeover analytic story encompasses a comprehensive suite of detections aimed at identifying unauthorized access and potential takeover attempts of Okta accounts. This collection leverages diverse data points and behavioral analytics to safeguard user identities and access within cloud environments. Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Account Takeover attacks against Okta tenants.
 narrative = Okta is a cloud-based identity management service that provides organizations with a secure way to manage user access to various applications and services. It enables single sign-on (SSO), multi-factor authentication (MFA), lifecycle management, and more, helping organizations streamline the user authentication process. Account Takeover (ATO) is an attack whereby cybercriminals gain unauthorized access to online accounts by using different techniques like brute force, social engineering, phishing & spear phishing, credential stuffing, etc. By posing as the real user, cyber-criminals can change account details, send out phishing emails, access sensitive applications, or use any stolen information to access further accounts within the organization. This analytic story groups detections that can help security operations teams identify the potential compromise of Okta accounts.
 
@@ -18522,7 +18522,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/mfa-fatigue-hackers-new-favorite-tactic-in-high-profile-breaches/", "https://www.csoonline.com/article/3674156/multi-factor-authentication-fatigue-attacks-are-on-the-rise-how-to-defend-against-them.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Account Locked Out - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Locked Out - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes - Rule"]
 description = A social engineering technique called 'MFA Fatigue', aka 'MFA push spam' or 'MFA Exhaustion', is growing more popular with threat actors as it does not require malware or phishing infrastructure and has proven to be successful in attacks.
 narrative = An MFA Fatigue attack is when a threat actor runs a script that attempts to log in with stolen credentials over and over, causing what feels like an endless stream of MFA push requests to be sent to the account's owner's mobile device. The goal is to keep this up, day and night, to break down the target's cybersecurity posture and inflict a sense of "fatigue" regarding these MFA prompts.
 
@@ -18533,7 +18533,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2022/11/01/email-address-overflows/", "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h8jm-2x53-xhp5", "https://community.emergingthreats.net/t/out-of-band-ruleset-update-summary-2022-11-01/117", "https://github.com/corelight/CVE-2022-3602/tree/master/scripts"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - SSL Certificates with Punycode - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zeek x509 Certificate with Punycode - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - SSL Certificates with Punycode - Rule", "ESCU - Zeek x509 Certificate with Punycode - Rule"]
 description = OpenSSL recently disclosed two vulnerabilities CVE-2022-3602 and CVE-2022-3786. CVE-2022-3602 is a X.509 Email Address 4-byte Buffer Overflow where puny code is utilized. This only affects OpenSSL 3.0.0 - 3.0.6.
 narrative = A buffer overrun can be triggered in X.509 certificate verification, specifically in name constraint checking. Note that this occurs after certificate chain signature verification and requires either a CA to have signed a malicious certificate or for an application to continue certificate verification despite failure to construct a path to a trusted issuer. An attacker can craft a malicious email address in a certificate to overflow an arbitrary number of bytes containing the . character (decimal 46) on the stack. This buffer overflow could result in a crash (causing a denial of service). In a TLS client, this can be triggered by connecting to a malicious server. In a TLS server, this can be triggered if the server requests client authentication and a malicious client connects. Users of OpenSSL 3.0.0 - 3.0.6 are encouraged to upgrade to 3.0.7 as soon as possible. If you obtain your copy of OpenSSL from your Operating System vendor or other third party then you should seek to obtain an updated version from them as soon as possible. SSL Certificates with Punycode will identify SSL certificates with Punycode. Note that it does not mean it will capture malicious payloads. If using Zeek, modify the Zeek x509 certificate with punycode to match your environment. We found during this exercise that the FULL x509 with SAN must be captured and stored, decoded, in order to query against it.
 
@@ -18544,7 +18544,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
 narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
 Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
@@ -18558,7 +18558,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/red-team-operations/microsoft-outlook-remote-code-execution-cve-2024-21378/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Windows InProcServer32 New Outlook Form - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows New InProcServer32 Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Outlook Drop Dll In FORM Dir - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows InProcServer32 New Outlook Form - Rule", "ESCU - Windows New InProcServer32 Added - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing Outlook Drop Dll In FORM Dir - Rule"]
 description = CVE-2024-21378 exposes a critical vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook, allowing for authenticated remote code execution (RCE) through the manipulation of synced form objects. Discovered by NetSPI in 2023, this vulnerability capitalizes on the unchanged syncing capability of form objects, despite previous patches aimed at securing script code in custom forms. This technical blog delves into the discovery and weaponization of CVE-2024-21378, enhancing the Outlook penetration testing tool, Ruler, to exploit this flaw. A forthcoming pull request will provide a proof-of-concept code, aiding organizations in mitigating this security risk.
 narrative = CVE-2024-21378 is a weakness in Microsoft Outlook that lets hackers execute code remotely if they can authenticate themselves. Researchers at NetSPI found this issue in 2023. The problem started with a technique from 2017 by Etienne Stalmans at SensePost, who found a way to run code using VBScript in Outlook forms. Microsoft tried to fix it by only allowing approved script code in custom forms, but they didn't fix the main issue, which is how these forms sync. To exploit this vulnerability, you need to know how Outlook forms sync, using something called MAPI, and how they use certain properties and attachments when they're set up for the first time. Hackers can mess with these properties and attachments to run their own code. They do this by tricking the form's setup process, changing registry keys and files to get past Outlook's security. To show how this could be done, researchers modified Ruler, a tool for testing Outlook's security. They changed it so it could sync a harmful form with the right properties to run a specific type of file, a COM compliant native DLL. This not only showed that CVE-2024-21378 could be exploited but also that it could affect a lot of companies since so many use Microsoft Outlook. The discovery and the way it was exploited remind us that we always need to be on the lookout for security risks and work hard to protect against them. The cybersecurity world is always watching for the next big threat that could put our digital world at risk. As companies rush to fix this issue, it's a reminder of how important it is to stay ahead of these threats.
 
@@ -18569,7 +18569,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/05/11/cisa-and-fbi-release-joint-advisory-response-active-exploitation-papercut-vulnerability", "https://www.papercut.com/kb/Main/PO-1216-and-PO-1219", "https://www.horizon3.ai/papercut-cve-2023-27350-deep-dive-and-indicators-of-compromise/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-actively-exploit-critical-rce-bug-in-papercut-servers/", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - PaperCut NG Suspicious Behavior Debug Log - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PaperCut NG Spawn Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PaperCut NG Remote Web Access Attempt - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - PaperCut NG Suspicious Behavior Debug Log - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PaperCut NG Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - PaperCut NG Remote Web Access Attempt - Rule"]
 description = The FBI has issued a joint advisory concerning the exploitation of a PaperCut MF/NG vulnerability (CVE-2023-27350) by malicious actors, which began in mid-April 2023 and has been ongoing. In early May 2023, a group identifying themselves as the Bl00dy Ransomware Gang targeted vulnerable PaperCut servers within the Education Facilities Subsector. The advisory provides information on detecting exploitation attempts and shares known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the group's activities.
 narrative = PaperCut MF/NG versions 19 and older have reached their end-of-life, as documented on the End of Life Policy page. Customers using these older versions are advised to purchase an updated license online for PaperCut NG or through their PaperCut Partner for PaperCut MF. For users with a currently supported version (version 20 or later), they can upgrade to any maintenance release version they are licensed for. If upgrading to a security patch is not possible, there are alternative options to enhance security. Users can lock down network access to their server(s) by blocking all inbound traffic from external IPs to the web management port (port 9191 and 9192 by default) and blocking all inbound traffic to the web management portal on the firewall to the server. Additionally, users can apply "Allow list" restrictions under Options > Advanced > Security > Allowed site server IP addresses, setting this to only allow the IP addresses of verified Site Servers on their network.\
 The vulnerabilities CVE-2023-27350 and CVE-2023-27351 have CVSS scores of 9.8 (Critical) and 8.2 (High), respectively. PaperCut and its partner network have activated response teams to assist PaperCut MF and NG customers, with service desks available 24/7 via their support page. The security response team at PaperCut has been working with external security advisors to compile a list of unpatched PaperCut MF/NG servers that have ports open on the public internet. They have been proactively reaching out to potentially exposed customers since Wednesday afternoon (AEST) and are working around the clock through the weekend.\
@@ -18583,7 +18583,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/07/27/microsoft-releases-guidance-mitigating-petitpotam-ntlm-relay", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005413-mitigating-ntlm-relay-attacks-on-active-directory-certificate-services-ad-cs-3612b773-4043-4aa9-b23d-b87910cd3429", "https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf", "https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam/", "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases/tag/2.2.0-20210723", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule", "ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule"]
 description = PetitPotam (CVE-2021-36942,) is a vulnerablity identified in Microsofts EFSRPC Protocol that can allow an unauthenticated account to escalate privileges to domain administrator given the right circumstances.
 narrative = In June 2021, security researchers at SpecterOps released a blog post and white paper detailing several potential attack vectors against Active Directory Certificated Services (ADCS). ADCS is a Microsoft product that implements Public Key Infrastrucutre (PKI) functionality and can be used by organizations to provide and manage digital certiticates within Active Directory.\ In July 2021, a security researcher released PetitPotam, a tool that allows attackers to coerce Windows systems into authenticating to arbitrary endpoints.\ Combining PetitPotam with the identified ADCS attack vectors allows attackers to escalate privileges from an unauthenticated anonymous user to full domain admin privileges.
 
@@ -18594,7 +18594,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.trendmicro.com/en_vn/research/23/b/investigating-the-plugx-trojan-disguised-as-a-legitimate-windows.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule"]
 description = Phemedrone Stealer is a potent data-stealing malware designed to infiltrate systems discreetly, primarily targeting sensitive user information. Operating with a stealthy modus operandi, it covertly collects and exfiltrates critical data such as login credentials, personal details, and financial information. Notably evasive, Phemedrone employs sophisticated techniques to bypass security measures and remain undetected. Its capabilities extend to exploiting vulnerabilities, leveraging command and control infrastructure, and facilitating remote access. As a formidable threat, Phemedrone Stealer poses a significant risk to user privacy and system integrity, demanding vigilant cybersecurity measures to counteract its malicious activities.
 narrative = Phemedrone Stealer, spotlighted in a recent Trend Micro blog, unveils a concerning chapter in cyber threats. Leveraging the CVE-2023-36025 vulnerability for defense evasion, this malware exhibits a relentless pursuit of sensitive data. Originating from the shadows of the dark web, it capitalizes on forums where cybercriminals refine its evasive maneuvers. The blog sheds light on Phemedrone's exploitation of intricate tactics, illustrating its agility in sidestepping security protocols. As cybersecurity experts delve into the intricacies of CVE-2023-36025, the narrative surrounding Phemedrone Stealer underscores the urgency for heightened vigilance and proactive defense measures against this persistent and evolving digital adversary.
 
@@ -18605,7 +18605,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.plugx", "https://blog.sekoia.io/my-teas-not-cold-an-overview-of-china-cyber-threat/", "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/carderbee-software-supply-chain-certificate-abuse", "https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2023-0808.pdf", "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/infected-usb-steal-secrets", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Masquerading Msdtc Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Deletion In Registry - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Masquerading Msdtc Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Deletion In Registry - Rule"]
 description = PlugX, also referred to as "PlugX RAT" or "Kaba," is a highly sophisticated remote access Trojan (RAT) discovered in 2012. This malware is notorious for its involvement in targeted cyberattacks, primarily driven by cyber espionage objectives. PlugX provides attackers with comprehensive remote control capabilities over compromised systems, granting them the ability to execute commands, collect sensitive data, and manipulate the infected host.
 narrative = PlugX, known as the "silent infiltrator of the digital realm, is a shadowy figure in the world of cyber threats. This remote access Trojan (RAT), first unveiled in 2012, is not your run-of-the-mill malware. It's the go-to tool for sophisticated hackers with one goal in mind, espionage. PlugX's repertoire of capabilities reads like a spy thriller. It doesn't just breach your defenses; it goes a step further, slipping quietly into your systems, much like a ghost. Once inside, it opens the door to a world of possibilities for cybercriminals. With a few keystrokes, they can access your data, capture your screen, and silently watch your every move. In the hands of skilled hackers, it's a versatile instrument for cyber espionage. This malware thrives on persistence. It's not a one-time hit; it's in it for the long haul. Even if you reboot your system, PlugX remains, ensuring that its grip on your infrastructure doesn't waver.
 
@@ -18616,7 +18616,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "iDefense", "email": "-", "name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.
 narrative = This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\
 iDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, "Orz," which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as "temp.Periscope" and "Leviathan"). The file is executed using Wscript.\
@@ -18653,7 +18653,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/14/new-prestige-ransomware-impacts-organizations-in-ukraine-and-poland/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Information Discovery Fsutil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Password Managers Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Private Keys Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System User Discovery Via Quser - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process And Service List - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Information Discovery Fsutil - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Password Managers Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Private Keys Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System User Discovery Via Quser - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process And Service List - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Prestige Ransomware
 narrative = This story addresses Prestige ransomware. This ransomware payload seen by Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center(MSTIC) as a ransomware campaign targeting organization in the transportation and logistic industries in some countries. This ransomware campaign highlight the destructive attack to its target organization that directly supplies or transporting military and humanitarian services or assistance. MSTIC observed this ransomware has similarities in terms of its deployment techniques with CaddyWiper and HermeticWiper which is also known malware campaign impacted multiple targeted critical infrastructure organizations. This analytic story will provide techniques and analytics that may help SOC or security researchers to monitor this threat.
 
@@ -18664,7 +18664,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "no", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Threat Research Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule"]
 description = The following analytic story identifies behaviors related PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously known as (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine.
 narrative = This vulnerability affects the Print Spooler service, enabled by default on Windows systems, and allows adversaries to trick this service into installing a remotely hosted print driver using a low privileged user account. Successful exploitation effectively allows adversaries to execute code in the target system (Remote Code Execution) in the context of the Print Spooler service which runs with the highest privileges (Privilege Escalation).\
 The prerequisites for successful exploitation consist of:\
@@ -18680,7 +18680,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ES Content Updates - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule", "ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.
 narrative = A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.
 
@@ -18691,7 +18691,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/09/29/customer-guidance-for-reported-zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/", "https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1575762721353916417?s=20\u0026t=67gq9xCWuyPm1VEm8ydfyA", "https://twitter.com/cglyer/status/1575793769814728705?s=20\u0026t=67gq9xCWuyPm1VEm8ydfyA", "https://www.gteltsc.vn/blog/warning-new-attack-campaign-utilized-a-new-0day-rce-vulnerability-on-microsoft-exchange-server-12715.html", "https://research.splunk.com/stories/proxyshell/", "https://www.inversecos.com/2022/07/hunting-for-apt-abuse-of-exchange.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule", "ESCU - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule"]
 description = Two new zero day Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities have been identified actively exploited in the wild - CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082.
 narrative = Microsoft is investigating two reported zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019. The first vulnerability, identified as CVE-2022-41040, is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability, while the second, identified as CVE-2022-41082, allows remote code execution (RCE) when PowerShell is accessible to the attacker. Originally identified by GTSC monitoring Exchange, some adversary post-exploitation activity was identified and is tagged to this story.
 
@@ -18702,7 +18702,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://y4y.space/2021/08/12/my-steps-of-reproducing-proxyshell/", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do", "https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf", "https://www.inversecos.com/2022/07/hunting-for-apt-abuse-of-exchange.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ESCU - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule", "ESCU - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule"]
 description = ProxyShell is a chain of exploits targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server - CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207.
 narrative = During Pwn2Own April 2021, a security researcher demonstrated an attack chain targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server. August 5th, the same researcher publicly released further details and demonstrated the attack chain. CVE-2021-34473 Pre-auth path confusion leads to ACL Bypass (Patched in April by KB5001779) CVE-2021-34523 - Elevation of privilege on Exchange PowerShell backend (Patched in April by KB5001779) . CVE-2021-31207 - Post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write leads to RCE (Patched in May by KB5003435) Upon successful exploitation, the remote attacker will have SYSTEM privileges on the Exchange Server. In addition to remote access/execution, the adversary may be able to run Exchange PowerShell Cmdlets to perform further actions.
 
@@ -18713,7 +18713,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/202010221030_QakBot%20TLPWHITE.pdf", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.QakBot", "https://securelist.com/QakBot-technical-analysis/103931/", "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-variant-of-QakBot-spread-by-phishing-emails", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650/", "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/the-rise-of-qakbot"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows App Layer Protocol Qakbot NamedPipe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows App Layer Protocol Wermgr Connect To NamedPipe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Command Shell Fetch Env Variables - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Side-Loading In Calc - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Side-Loading Process Child Of Calc - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Qakbot Binary Data Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MsiExec HideWindow Rundll32 Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection In Non-Service SearchIndexer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Of Wermgr to Known Browser - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Regsvr32 Renamed Binary - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Discovery Using Qwinsta - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Impersonate Token - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows App Layer Protocol Qakbot NamedPipe - Rule", "ESCU - Windows App Layer Protocol Wermgr Connect To NamedPipe - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command Shell Fetch Env Variables - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DLL Side-Loading In Calc - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DLL Side-Loading Process Child Of Calc - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Qakbot Binary Data Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MsiExec HideWindow Rundll32 Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection In Non-Service SearchIndexer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection Of Wermgr to Known Browser - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Regsvr32 Renamed Binary - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Discovery Using Qwinsta - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Impersonate Token - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"]
 description = QakBot is a modular banking trojan that has been used primarily by financially-motivated actors since at least 2007. QakBot is continuously maintained and developed and has evolved from an information stealer into a delivery agent for ransomware (ref. MITRE ATT&CK).
 narrative = QakBot notably has made its way on the CISA top malware list for 2021. QakBot for years has been under continious improvement when it comes to initial access, injection and post-exploitation. Multiple adversaries use QakBot to gain initial access and persist, most notably TA551. The actor(s) behind QakBot possess a modular framework consisting of maldoc builders, signed loaders, and DLLs that produce initially low detection rates at the beginning of the attack, which creates opportunities to deliver additional malware such as Egregor and Cobalt Strike. (ref. Cybersecurity ATT) The more recent campaigns utilize HTML smuggling to deliver a ISO container that has a LNK and QakBot payload. QakBot will either load via regsvr32.exe directly, it will attempt to perform DLL sideloading.
 
@@ -18724,7 +18724,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://web.archive.org/web/20190826231258/https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ES Content Updates - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule", "ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", "ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
 narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.
 
@@ -18735,7 +18735,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.
 narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.
 
@@ -18746,7 +18746,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.redline_stealer", "https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2021/10/threat-thursday-redline-infostealer-update"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Defender Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Auto Minor Updates - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Auto Update Notif - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Do Not Connect To Win Update - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Reboot With Logon User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Tamper Protection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry UpdateServiceUrlAlternate - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry USeWuServer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry WuServer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry wuStatusServer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry Browser List Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry UnInstall Program List - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop Win Updates - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Defender Services - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Auto Minor Updates - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Auto Update Notif - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Do Not Connect To Win Update - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Reboot With Logon User - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Tamper Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry UpdateServiceUrlAlternate - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry USeWuServer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry WuServer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry wuStatusServer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Query Registry Browser List Application - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Query Registry UnInstall Program List - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Stop Win Updates - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Redline Stealer trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, screencapture, registry modification, persistence and data collection..
 narrative = RedLine Stealer is a malware available on underground forum and subscription basis that are compiled or written in C#. This malware is capable of harvesting sensitive information from browsers such as saved credentials, auto file data, browser cookies and credit card information. It also gathers system information of the targeted or compromised host like username, location IP, RAM size available, hardware configuration and software installed. The current version of this malware contains features to steal wallet and crypto currency information.
 
@@ -18757,7 +18757,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.remcos#:~:text=Remcos%20(acronym%20of%20Remote%20Control,used%20to%20remotely%20control%20computers.\u0026text=Remcos%20can%20be%20used%20for,been%20used%20in%20hacking%20campaigns."]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", "ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule", "ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule", "ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule", "ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Remcos RAT trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, screencapture, registry modification, UAC bypassed, persistence and data collection..
 narrative = Remcos or Remote Control and Surveillance, marketed as a legitimate software for remotely managing Windows systems is now widely used in multiple malicious campaigns both APT and commodity malware by threat actors.
 
@@ -18768,7 +18768,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508/", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-320a_joint_csa_iranian_government-sponsored_apt_actors_compromise_federal%20network_deploy_crypto%20miner_credential_harvester.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Linux Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Linux Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network - Rule"]
 description = The following analytic story describes applications that may be abused to reverse proxy back into an organization, either for persistence or remote access.
 narrative = This analytic story covers tools like Ngrok which is a legitimate reverse proxy tool that can create a secure tunnel to servers located behind firewalls or on local machines that do not have a public IP. Ngrok in particular has been leveraged by threat actors in several campaigns including use for lateral movement and data exfiltration. There are many open source and closed/paid that fall into this reverse proxy category. The analytic story and complemented analytics will be released as more are identified.
 
@@ -18779,7 +18779,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Revil ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Revil, encrypting network shares, deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.
 narrative = Revil ransomware is a RaaS,that a single group may operates and manges the development of this ransomware. It involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.
 
@@ -18790,7 +18790,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-319a"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry NoChangingWallPaper - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Rundll32 Apply User Settings Changes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry NoChangingWallPaper - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rundll32 Apply User Settings Changes - Rule", "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule"]
 description = Utilize analytics designed to identify and delve into atypical behaviors, potentially associated with the Rhysida Ransomware. Employing these searches enables the detection of irregular patterns or actions within systems or networks, serving as proactive measures to spot potential indicators of compromise or ongoing threats. By implementing these search strategies, security analysts can effectively pinpoint anomalous activities, such as unusual file modifications, deviations in system behavior, that could potentially signify the presence or attempt of Rhysida Ransomware infiltration. These searches serve as pivotal tools in the arsenal against such threats, aiding in swift detection, investigation, and mitigation efforts to counter the impact of the Rhysida Ransomware or similar malicious entities.
 narrative = This story addresses Rhysida ransomware. Rhysida Ransomware emerges as a silent predator, infiltrating systems stealthily and unleashing havoc upon its victims. Employing sophisticated encryption tactics, it swiftly locks critical files and databases, holding them hostage behind an impenetrable digital veil. The haunting demand for ransom sends shockwaves through affected organizations, rendering operations inert and plunging them into a tumultuous struggle between compliance and resilience. Threat actors leveraging Rhysida ransomware are known to impact "targets of opportunity," including victims in the education, healthcare, manufacturing, information technology, and government sectors. Open source reporting details similarities between Vice Society activity and the actors observed deploying Rhysida ransomware. Additionally, open source reporting has confirmed observed instances of Rhysida actors operating in a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) capacity, where ransomware tools and infrastructure are leased out in a profit-sharing model. Any ransoms paid are then split between the group and the affiliates.
 
@@ -18801,7 +18801,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://web.archive.org/web/20210420020040/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.
 narrative = Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\
 This Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure&#151; effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.
@@ -18813,7 +18813,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Jose Hernandez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ES Content Updates - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.
 
@@ -18824,7 +18824,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287", "https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Mauricio Velazco"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with the exploitation of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) vulnerabilities.
 narrative = On November 9, 2021, Microsoft released patches to address two vulnerabilities that affect Windows Active Directory networks, sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287). On December 10, 2021, security researchers Charlie Clark and Andrew Schwartz released a blog post where they shared how to weaponise these vulnerabilities in a target network an the initial detection opportunities. When successfully exploited, CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 allow an adversary, who has stolen the credentials of a low priviled domain user, to obtain a Kerberos Service ticket for a Domain Controller computer account. The only requirement is to have network connectivity to a domain controller. This attack vector effectivelly allows attackers to escalate their privileges in an Active Directory from a regular domain user account and take control of a domain controller. While patches have been released to address these vulnerabilities, deploying detection controls for this attack may help help defenders identify attackers attempting exploitation.
 
@@ -18835,7 +18835,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.
 narrative = The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\
 Although categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a "spray-and-pray" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\
@@ -18851,7 +18851,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://cert.gov.ua/article/3718487", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DNS Gather Network Info - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule", "ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DNS Gather Network Info - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"]
 description = This analytic story features detections that enable security analysts to identify and investigate unusual activities potentially related to the destructive malware and tools employed by the "Sandworm" group. This analytic story focuses on monitoring suspicious process executions, command-line activities, Master Boot Record (MBR) wiping, data destruction, and other related indicators.
 narrative = The Sandworm group's tools are part of destructive malware operations designed to disrupt or attack Ukraine's National Information Agencies. This operation campaign consists of several malware components, including scripts, native Windows executables (LOLBINs), data wiper malware that overwrites or destroys the Master Boot Record (MBR), and file wiping using sdelete.exe on targeted hosts.
 
@@ -18862,7 +18862,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell ScheduleTask - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell ScheduleTask - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"]
 description = The MITRE ATT&CK technique T1053 refers to Scheduled Task/Job. Adversaries might use task scheduling utilities to execute programs or scripts at a predefined date and time. This method is often used for persistence but can also be used for privilege escalation or to execute tasks under certain conditions. Scheduling tasks can be beneficial for an attacker as it can allow them to execute actions at times when the system is less likely to be monitored actively. Different operating systems have different utilities for task scheduling, for example, Unix-like systems have Cron, while Windows has Scheduled Tasks and At Jobs.
 narrative = MITRE ATT&CK technique T1053, labeled "Scheduled Task/Job", is a categorization of methods that adversaries use to execute malicious code by scheduling tasks or jobs on a system. This technique is widely utilized for persistence, privilege escalation, and the remote execution of tasks. The technique is applicable across various environments and platforms, including Windows, Linux, and macOS.\
 The technique consists of multiple sub-techniques, each highlighting a distinct mechanism for scheduling tasks or jobs. These sub-techniques include T1053.001 (Scheduled Task), T1053.002 (At for Windows), T1053.003 (Cron), T1053.004 (Launchd), T1053.005 (At for Linux), and T1053.006 (Systemd Timers).\
@@ -18881,7 +18881,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule"]
 description = Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility.
 narrative = InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v\InstallUtil.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v\InstallUtil.exe.\
 There are multiple ways to instantiate InstallUtil and they are all outlined within Atomic Red Team - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md. Two specific ways may be used and that includes invoking via  installer assembly class constructor through .NET and via InstallUtil.exe.\
@@ -18896,7 +18896,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule"]
 description = Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.
 narrative = Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party affiliates or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references.
 
@@ -18907,7 +18907,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.404keylogger", "https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/snake-keylogger-malware/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credential Access From Browser Password Store - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Non Discord App Access Discord LevelDB - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Time Based Evasion via Choice Exec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unsecured Outlook Credentials Access In Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credential Access From Browser Password Store - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Non Discord App Access Discord LevelDB - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Time Based Evasion via Choice Exec - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unsecured Outlook Credentials Access In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule"]
 description = SnakeKeylogger is a stealthy malware designed to secretly record keystrokes on infected devices. It operates covertly in the background, capturing sensitive information such as passwords and credit card details. This keylogging threat poses a significant risk to user privacy and security.
 narrative = SnakeKeylogger, a notorious malware, first emerged in the early 2010s, gaining infamy for its clandestine ability to capture keystrokes on compromised systems. As a stealthy threat, it infiltrates computers silently, recording every keystroke entered by users, including sensitive information like passwords and financial details. Over time, it has evolved to evade detection mechanisms, posing a persistent threat to cybersecurity. Its widespread use in various cybercrime activities underscores its significance as a tool for espionage and data theft. Despite efforts to combat it, SnakeKeylogger continues to lurk in the shadows, perpetuating its malicious activities with devastating consequences.
 
@@ -18918,7 +18918,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/09/2003218554/-1/-1/0/JOINT_CSA_HUNTING_RU_INTEL_SNAKE_MALWARE_20230509.PDF"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware File Modification Crmlog - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Registry Modification wav OpenWithProgIds - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Service Create - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Snake Malware File Modification Crmlog - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Registry Modification wav OpenWithProgIds - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Service Create - Rule"]
 description = The Snake implant is considered the most sophisticated cyber espionage tool designed and used by Center 16 of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) for long-term intelligence collection on sensitive targets.
 narrative = The Snake implant is considered the most sophisticated cyber espionage tool designed and used by Center 16 of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) for long-term intelligence collection on sensitive targets. To conduct operations using this tool, the FSB created a covert peer-to-peer (P2P) network of numerous Snake-infected computers worldwide. Many systems in this P2P network serve as relay nodes which route disguised operational traffic to and from Snake implants on the FSB's ultimate targets. Snake's custom communications protocols employ encryption and fragmentation for confidentiality and are designed to hamper detection and collection efforts. We consider Snake to be the most sophisticated cyber espionage tool in the FSB's arsenal. The sophistication of Snake stems from three principal areas. First, Snake employs means to achieve a rare level of stealth in its host components and network communications. Second, Snake's internal technical architecture allows for easy incorporation of new or replacement components. This design also facilitates the development and interoperability of Snake instances running on different host operating systems. We have observed interoperable Snake implants for Windows, MacOS, and Linux operating systems. Lastly, Snake demonstrates careful software engineering design and implementation, with the implant containing surprisingly few bugs given its complexity. (CISA, 2023)
 
@@ -18929,7 +18929,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://adsecurity.org/?p=1929", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lz6haohGAMc\u0026feature=youtu.be", "https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/DEFCON23-2015-Metcalf-RedvsBlue-ADAttackAndDefense-Final.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/", "https://www.dcshadow.com/", "https://gist.github.com/gentilkiwi/dcc132457408cf11ad2061340dcb53c2", "https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/mimikatz-dcsync-event-log-detections-john-dwyer"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Dean Luxton"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD AdminSDHolder ACL Modified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Domain Controller Promotion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Domain Replication ACL Addition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD DSRM Password Reset - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Privileged Account SID History Addition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD ServicePrincipalName Added To Domain Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Account ServicePrincipalName - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Controller SPN Attribute - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Server Object - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD SID History Attribute Modified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Group Policy Object Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Service Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD AdminSDHolder ACL Modified - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Domain Controller Promotion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Domain Replication ACL Addition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD DSRM Password Reset - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Privileged Account SID History Addition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD ServicePrincipalName Added To Domain Account - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Account ServicePrincipalName - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Controller SPN Attribute - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Server Object - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD SID History Attribute Modified - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Group Policy Object Created - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Replication Service Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity - Rule"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Windows Active Directory persistence techniques.
 narrative = Persistence consists of techniques that adversaries use to keep access to systems across restarts, changed credentials, and other interruptions that could cut off their access. Active Directory is a centralized and hierarchical database that stores information about users, computers, and other resources on a network. It provides secure and efficient management of these resources and enables administrators to enforce security policies and delegate administrative tasks.\
 In 2015 Active Directory security researcher Sean Metcalf published a blog post titled `Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks`. In this blog post, Sean described several methods through which an attacker could persist administrative access on an Active Directory network after having Domain Admin level rights for a short period of time. At the time of writing, 8 years after the initial blog post, most of these techniques are still possible since they abuse legitimate administrative functionality and not software vulnerabilities. Security engineers defending Active Directory networks should be aware of these technique available to adversaries post exploitation and deploy both preventive and detective security controls for them.\
@@ -18942,7 +18942,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Splunk Research Team"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect RTLO In File Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect RTLO In Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ConHost with Headless Argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RTLO In File Name - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RTLO In Process - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ConHost with Headless Argument - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule"]
 description = Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.
 narrative = Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email.\
 As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely "automate" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack.\
@@ -18960,7 +18960,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/product-security/announcements.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Rod Soto, Eric McGinnis, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Lou Stella"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Risky SPL using Pretrained ML Model - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Path traversal SPL injection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Persistent XSS in RapidDiag through User Interface Views - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Absolute Path Traversal Using runshellscript - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Account Discovery Drilldown Dashboard Disclosure - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk App for Lookup File Editing RCE via User XSLT - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Authentication Token Exposure in Debug Log - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Code Injection via custom dashboard leading to RCE - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk csrf in the ssg kvstore client endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Data exfiltration from Analytics Workspace using sid query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk DoS Using Malformed SAML Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk DOS Via Dump SPL Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk DOS via printf search function - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Edit User Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Endpoint Denial of Service DoS Zip Bomb - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Enterprise KV Store Incorrect Authorization - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Enterprise Windows Deserialization File Partition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk ES DoS Investigations Manager via Investigation Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk ES DoS Through Investigation Attachments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk HTTP Response Splitting Via Rest SPL Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Improperly Formatted Parameter Crashes splunkd - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Information Disclosure in Splunk Add-on Builder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk list all nonstandard admin accounts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Low Privilege User Can View Hashed Splunk Password - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Path Traversal In Splunk App For Lookup File Edit - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Persistent XSS Via URL Validation Bypass W Dashboard - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk RBAC Bypass On Indexing Preview REST Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via Serialized Session Payload - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via Splunk Secure Gateway  Splunk Mobile alerts feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via User XSLT - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Reflected XSS in the templates lists radio - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Reflected XSS on App Search Table Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk risky Command Abuse disclosed february 2023 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Stored XSS via Data Model objectName field - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Unauthenticated Log Injection Web Service Log - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk unnecessary file extensions allowed by lookup table uploads - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS in Highlighted JSON Events - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS in Save table dialog header in search page - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS via View - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Risky SPL using Pretrained ML Model - Rule", "ESCU - Path traversal SPL injection - Rule", "ESCU - Persistent XSS in RapidDiag through User Interface Views - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Absolute Path Traversal Using runshellscript - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Account Discovery Drilldown Dashboard Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk App for Lookup File Editing RCE via User XSLT - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Authentication Token Exposure in Debug Log - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Code Injection via custom dashboard leading to RCE - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk csrf in the ssg kvstore client endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Data exfiltration from Analytics Workspace using sid query - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk DoS Using Malformed SAML Request - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk DOS Via Dump SPL Command - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk DOS via printf search function - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Edit User Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Endpoint Denial of Service DoS Zip Bomb - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Enterprise KV Store Incorrect Authorization - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Windows Deserialization File Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk ES DoS Investigations Manager via Investigation Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk ES DoS Through Investigation Attachments - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk HTTP Response Splitting Via Rest SPL Command - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Improperly Formatted Parameter Crashes splunkd - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Information Disclosure in Splunk Add-on Builder - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk list all nonstandard admin accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Low Privilege User Can View Hashed Splunk Password - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Path Traversal In Splunk App For Lookup File Edit - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Persistent XSS Via URL Validation Bypass W Dashboard - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk RBAC Bypass On Indexing Preview REST Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk RCE via Serialized Session Payload - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk RCE via Splunk Secure Gateway  Splunk Mobile alerts feature - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk RCE via User XSLT - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Reflected XSS in the templates lists radio - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Reflected XSS on App Search Table Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk risky Command Abuse disclosed february 2023 - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Stored XSS via Data Model objectName field - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Unauthenticated Log Injection Web Service Log - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk unnecessary file extensions allowed by lookup table uploads - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk XSS in Highlighted JSON Events - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk XSS in Save table dialog header in search page - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk XSS via View - Rule", "ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule"]
 description = Keeping your Splunk Enterprise deployment up to date is critical and will help you reduce the risk associated with vulnerabilities in the product.
 narrative = This analytic story includes detections that focus on attacker behavior targeted at your Splunk environment directly.
 
@@ -18971,7 +18971,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.tenable.com/blog/spring4shell-faq-spring-framework-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Java Writing JSP File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spring4Shell Payload URL Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Web JSP Request via URL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Spring4Shell Payload URL Request - Rule", "ESCU - Web JSP Request via URL - Rule", "ESCU - Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module - Rule", "ESCU - Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter - Rule"]
 description = Spring4Shell is the nickname given to a zero-day vulnerability in the Spring Core Framework, a programming and configuration model for Java-based enterprise applications.
 narrative = An attacker could exploit Spring4Shell by sending a specially crafted request to a vulnerable server. However, exploitation of Spring4Shell requires certain prerequisites, whereas the original Log4Shell vulnerability affected all versions of Log4j 2 using the default configuration.\
 According to Spring, the following requirements were included in the vulnerability report, however the post cautions that there may be other ways in which this can be exploited so this may not be a complete list of requirements at this time:\
@@ -18988,7 +18988,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters.
 narrative = It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\
 This Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target environment.
@@ -19000,7 +19000,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003/", "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_sip_persistence.yml", "https://specterops.io/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/06/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf", "https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/SIP", "https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage", "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/11/06/hijacking-digital-signatures/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows SIP Provider Inventory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows SIP WinVerifyTrust Failed Trust Validation - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Windows SIP Provider Inventory - Rule", "ESCU - Windows SIP WinVerifyTrust Failed Trust Validation - Rule"]
 description = Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. This technique involves modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP's function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value to all files using that SIP. This can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation.
 narrative = In user mode, Windows Authenticode digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code. The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. Because of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and application control tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed.
 
@@ -19011,7 +19011,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.
 
@@ -19022,7 +19022,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://github.com/nagwww/s3-leaks", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - AWS Disable Bucket Versioning - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Disable Bucket Versioning - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story using Cloudtrail logs to to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP, permission and policy updates to the bucket, potential misuse of other services leading to data being leaked.
 narrative = One of the most common ways that attackers attempt to steal data from S3 is by gaining unauthorized access to S3 buckets and copying or exfiltrating data to external locations.\
 However, suspicious S3 activities can refer to any unusual behavior detected within an Amazon Web Services (AWS) Simple Storage Service (S3) bucket, including unauthorized access, unusual data transfer patterns, and access attempts from unknown IP addresses.\
@@ -19035,7 +19035,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).
 narrative = A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network.\
 Amazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\
@@ -19049,7 +19049,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
 narrative = It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\
 This Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.
@@ -19061,7 +19061,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
 narrative = Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.
 
@@ -19072,7 +19072,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
 narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
@@ -19084,7 +19084,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Security Groups Modifications by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Security Groups Modifications by User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
 narrative = It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\
 In addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.
@@ -19096,7 +19096,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect suspicious processnames using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect suspicious processnames using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.
 narrative = The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.
 
@@ -19107,7 +19107,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/htmlhelp/nf-htmlhelp-htmlhelpa"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe).\
 HH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file.\
@@ -19121,7 +19121,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.
 narrative = Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness).  However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.
 
@@ -19132,7 +19132,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.
 narrative = It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\
 Once a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions:\
@@ -19147,7 +19147,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.
 narrative = Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model. This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access control lists and permissions on your GCP resources.\ This Analytics Story concentrates on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write) along with storage bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses.
 
@@ -19158,7 +19158,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\
@@ -19181,7 +19181,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Account Locked Out - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Locked Out - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users - Rule", "ESCU - Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes - Rule", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.
 narrative = Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom.\
 While SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important.\
@@ -19194,7 +19194,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md", "https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative =  Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code.
 
@@ -19205,7 +19205,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with "SquiblyDoo" using the "scrobj.dll" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? Module loads.  Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.
 
@@ -19216,7 +19216,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.
 narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.
 
@@ -19227,7 +19227,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mshta Execution In Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mshta Execution In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.
 narrative = Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\
 The registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called "registry" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\
@@ -19240,7 +19240,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://web.archive.org/web/20210921091529/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Invoke WmiExec Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Invoke WmiExec Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule", "ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
 narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems. In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end.
 
@@ -19251,7 +19251,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.
 narrative = Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\
 Current detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation.
@@ -19263,7 +19263,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1618960022150729728", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/01/27/swiftslicer-new-destructive-wiper-malware-ukraine/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the swift slicer malware including overwriting of files and etc.
 narrative = Swift Slicer is one of Windows destructive malware found by ESET that was used in a targeted organizarion to wipe critical files like windows drivers and other files to destroy and left the machine inoperable. This malware like Caddy Wiper was deliver through GPO which suggests that the attacker had taken control of the victims active directory environment.
 
@@ -19274,7 +19274,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.sysaid.com/blog/service-desk/on-premise-software-security-vulnerability-notification"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Java Writing JSP File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule"]
 description = A zero-day vulnerability was discovered in SysAid's on-premise software, exploited by the group DEV-0950 (Lace Tempest). The attackers uploaded a WebShell and other payloads, gaining unauthorized access and control. SysAid has released a patch (version 23.3.36) to remediate the vulnerability and urges customers to conduct a comprehensive compromise assessment.
 narrative = The analytics tagged to this analytic story will aid in capturing initial access and some post-exploitation activities. In addition to the application spawning a shell, consider reviewing STRT's Cobalt Strike and PowerShell script block logging analytic stories. On November 2nd, SysAid's security team identified a potential vulnerability in their on-premise software. The investigation revealed a zero-day vulnerability exploited by the group known as DEV-0950 (Lace Tempest). The attackers uploaded a WebShell and other payloads into the webroot of the SysAid Tomcat web service, thereby gaining unauthorized access and control over the affected system. SysAid promptly initiated their incident response protocol and began proactive communication with their on-premise customers to implement a mitigation solution. SysAid has released a patch (version 23.3.36) to remediate the vulnerability and strongly recommends all customers to conduct a comprehensive compromise assessment of their network.
 
@@ -19285,7 +19285,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://sysdig.com/blog/cve-2022-42889-text4shell/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text - Rule"]
 description = A new critical vulnerability CVE-2022-42889 a.k.a. Text4shell, similar to the old Spring4Shell and Log4Shell, was originally reported by Alvaro Munoz on the very popular Apache Commons Text library.
 narrative = Apache Commons Text is a Java library described as "a library focused on algorithms working on strings." We can see it as a general-purpose text manipulation toolkit. This vulnerability affects the StringSubstitutor interpolator class, which is included in the Commons Text library. A default interpolator allows for string lookups that can lead to Remote Code Execution. This is due to a logic flaw that makes the "script," "dns," and "url" lookup keys interpolated by default, as opposed to what it should be, according to the documentation of the StringLookupFactory class. Those keys allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code via lookups. In order to exploit the vulnerabilities, the following requirements must be met - Run a version of Apache Commons Text from version 1.5 to 1.9 and use the StringSubstitutor interpolator. It is important to specify that the StringSubstitutor interpolator is not as widely used as the string substitution in Log4j, which led to Log4Shell. According to the CVSSv3 system, it scores 9.8 as CRITICAL severity. The severity is Critical due to the easy exploitability and huge potential impact in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. As we showed in the previous section, you can take full control over the vulnerable system with a crafted request. However, it is not likely the vulnerabilities will have the same impacts as the previous Log4Shell and Spring4Shell.
 
@@ -19296,7 +19296,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickbot", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the trickbot banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection even in LDAP environment.
 narrative = trickbot banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS where target security Microsoft Defender to prevent its detection and removal. steal Verizon credentials and targeting banks using its multi component modules that collect and exfiltrate data.
 
@@ -19307,7 +19307,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code.
 narrative = Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code.
@@ -19319,7 +19319,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule"]
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code.
 narrative = Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\
 The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\
@@ -19343,7 +19343,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://web.archive.org/web/20210921093439/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", "ES Content Updates - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Payload Injection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Payload Injection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule", "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.
 narrative = Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\
 This Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\
@@ -19356,7 +19356,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 description = Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.
 narrative = Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.
 
@@ -19367,7 +19367,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20887", "https://summoning.team/blog/vmware-vrealize-network-insight-rce-cve-2023-20887/", "https://viz.greynoise.io/tag/VMware-aria-operations-for-networks-rce-attempt?days=30", "https://github.com/sinsinology/CVE-2023-20887"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt - Rule"]
 description = CVE-2023-20887 is a critical vulnerability affecting VMware's vRealize Network Insight (also known as VMware Aria Operations for Networks). It allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges via the Apache Thrift RPC interface. The exploit, which has a severity score of 9.8, targets an endpoint ("/saas./resttosaasservlet") in the application and delivers a malicious payload designed to create a reverse shell, granting the attacker control over the system. VMware has released an advisory recommending users to update to the latest version to mitigate this threat.
 narrative = CVE-2023-20887 is a highly critical vulnerability found in VMware's vRealize Network Insight. This software is widely used for intelligent operations management across physical, virtual, and cloud environments, so a vulnerability in it poses a significant risk to many organizations.\
 This particular vulnerability lies in the application's Apache Thrift RPC interface. The exploit allows an attacker to inject commands that are executed with root privileges, leading to a potential total compromise of the system. The attacker does not need to be authenticated, which further increases the risk posed by this vulnerability.\
@@ -19382,7 +19382,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attackerkb.com/topics/BDXyTqY1ld/cve-2022-22954/rapid7-analysis", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-138b"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection - Rule"]
 description = Recently disclosed CVE-2022-22954 and CVE-2022-22960 have been identified in the wild abusing VMware products to compromise internet faced devices and escalate privileges.
 narrative = On April 6, 2022, VMware published VMSA-2022-0011, which discloses multiple vulnerabilities discovered by Steven Seeley (mr_me) of Qihoo 360 Vulnerability Research Institute. The most critical of the CVEs published in VMSA-2022-0011 is CVE-2022-22954, which is a server-side template injection issue with a CVSSv3 base score of 9.8. The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user with network access to the web interface to execute an arbitrary shell command as the VMware user. To further exacerbate this issue, VMware also disclosed a local privilege escalation issue, CVE-2022-22960, which permits the attacker to gain root after exploiting CVE-2022-22954. Products affected include - VMware Workspace ONE Access (Access) 20.10.0.0 - 20.10.0.1, 21.08.0.0 - 21.08.0.1 and VMware Identity Manager (vIDM) 3.3.3 - 3.3.6.
 
@@ -19393,7 +19393,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DNS Gather Network Info - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Ldifde Directory Object Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Proxy Via Netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Proxy Via Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DNS Gather Network Info - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Ldifde Directory Object Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Proxy Via Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Proxy Via Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule"]
 description = This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the "Volt Typhoon" group targeting critical infrastructure organizations in United States and Guam. The affected organizations include the communications, manufacturing, utility, transportation, construction, maritime, government, information technology, and education sectors. This Analytic story looks for suspicious process execution, lolbin execution, command-line activity, lsass dump and many more.
 narrative = Volt Typhoon is a state sponsored group typically focuses on espionage and information gathering. Based on Microsoft Threat Intelligence, This threat actor group puts strong emphasis on stealth in this campaign by relying almost exclusively on living-off-the-land techniques and hands-on-keyboard activity.\
 They issue commands via the command line to: 1. collect data, including credentials from local and network systems,\
@@ -19408,7 +19408,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.blackberry.com/us/en/solutions/endpoint-security/ransomware-protection/warzone#:~:text=Warzone%20RAT%20(AKA%20Ave%20Maria)%20is%20a%20remote%20access%20trojan,is%20as%20an%20information%20stealer.", "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/02/2-birds-in-one-stone-ave-maria-wshrat.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Bypass UAC via Pkgmgr Tool - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mark Of The Web Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry MaxConnectionPerServer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Bypass UAC via Pkgmgr Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mark Of The Web Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry MaxConnectionPerServer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - Rule"]
 description = This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might related to warzone (Ave maria) RAT. This analytic story looks for suspicious process execution, command-line activity, downloads, persistence, defense evasion and more.
 narrative = Warzone RAT, also known as Ave Maria, is a sophisticated remote access trojan (RAT) that surfaced in January 2019. Originally offered as malware-as-a-service (MaaS), it rapidly gained notoriety and became one of the most prominent malware strains by 2020. Its exceptional capabilities in stealth and anti-analysis techniques make it a formidable threat in various campaigns, including those targeting sensitive geopolitical entities. The malware's impact is particularly concerning as it has been associated with attacks aimed at compromising government employees and military personnel, notably within India's National Informatics Centre (NIC). Its deployment by several advanced persistent threat (APT) groups further underlines its potency and adaptability in the hands of skilled threat actors. Warzone RAT's capabilities enable attackers to gain unauthorized access to targeted systems, facilitating data theft, surveillance, and the potential to wreak havoc on critical infrastructures. As the threat landscape continues to evolve, vigilance and robust cybersecurity measures are crucial in defending against such malicious tools." This version provides more context and elaborates on the malware's capabilities and potential impact. Additionally, it emphasizes the importance of cybersecurity measures to combat such threats effectively.
 
@@ -19419,7 +19419,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", "https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"]
 description = This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as "WhisperGate". This analytic story looks for suspicious process execution, command-line activity, downloads, DNS queries and more.
 narrative = WhisperGate/DEV-0586 is destructive malware operation found by MSTIC (Microsoft Threat Inteligence Center) targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. This operation campaign consist of several malware component like the downloader that abuses discord platform, overwrite or destroy master boot record (MBR) of the targeted host, wiper and also windows defender evasion techniques.
 
@@ -19430,7 +19430,7 @@ version = 1
 references = []
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Block Events - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Execution from Uncommon Locations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Privilege Escalation via Unauthorized Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Rare Application Launch Detection - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows AppLocker Block Events - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AppLocker Execution from Uncommon Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AppLocker Privilege Escalation via Unauthorized Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AppLocker Rare Application Launch Detection - Rule"]
 description = Windows AppLocker is a feature that enhances security by allowing administrators to specify which users or groups can run particular applications in their organization based on unique identities of files. This story covers various aspects of monitoring and managing AppLocker policies, including detecting unauthorized software installations, enforcing best practices for software usage, and identifying potential security breaches through advanced threat detection techniques. Through the use of Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, and Splunk Cloud, organizations can gain insights into AppLocker events, ensuring compliance with corporate security policies and mitigating risks associated with unauthorized applications.
 narrative = AppLocker, a built-in Windows security feature, provides organizations with the ability to control application usage across their networks. It enables administrators to define rules based on file names, publishers, and file hashes to allow or deny the execution of applications. This level of control helps in preventing malware and unlicensed software from running, thereby enhancing the security posture of an organization. \\
 Organizations should leverage AppLocker for several reasons. Firstly, it aids in the enforcement of software compliance policies by ensuring that only licensed and approved applications are run on the network. Secondly, by restricting the execution of unauthorized applications, AppLocker significantly reduces the attack surface, making it harder for attackers to exploit vulnerabilities in unapproved software. Thirdly, AppLocker's ability to log attempts to run unauthorized applications provides valuable insights for security monitoring and incident response activities. This logging capability enables organizations to detect and respond to potential security threats in real time. \\
@@ -19443,7 +19443,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://asrgen.streamlit.app/", "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction?view=o365-worldwide"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Audit Events - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Block Events - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Registry Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Rule Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Rules Stacking - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Audit Events - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Block Events - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Registry Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Rule Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Rules Stacking - Rule"]
 description = This story contains detections for Windows Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This story contains detections for ASR events that are generated when a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule.
 narrative = This story contains detections for Windows Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This story contains detections for ASR events that are generated when a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule. It includes detections for both block and audit event IDs. Block event IDs are generated when an action is blocked by an ASR rule, while audit event IDs are generated when an action that would be blocked by an ASR rule is allowed to proceed for auditing purposes.
 
@@ -19454,7 +19454,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/03/01/blacklotus-uefi-bootkit-myth-confirmed/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Windows BootLoader Inventory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry BootExecute Modification - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows BootLoader Inventory - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry BootExecute Modification - Rule"]
 description = Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.
 narrative = A bootkit is a sophisticated type of malware that targets the boot sectors of a hard drive, specifically the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). The MBR is the initial section of the disk that is loaded following the hardware initialization process executed by the Basic Input/Output System (BIOS). It houses the boot loader, which is responsible for loading the operating system. In contrast, the VBR is located at the beginning of each partition and contains the boot code for that specific partition. When an adversary gains raw access to the boot drive, they can overwrite the MBR or VBR, effectively diverting the execution during startup from the standard boot loader to the malicious code injected by the attacker. This tampering allows the malware to load before the operating system, enabling it to execute malicious activities stealthily and maintain persistence on the compromised system. Bootkits are particularly dangerous because they can bypass security measures implemented by the operating system and antivirus software. Since they load before the operating system, they can easily evade detection and manipulate the system's behavior from the earliest stages of the boot process. This capability makes bootkits a potent tool in an attacker's arsenal for gaining unauthorized access, stealing sensitive information, or launching further attacks on other systems. To defend against bootkit attacks, organizations should implement multiple layers of security, including strong endpoint protection, regular software updates, user awareness training, and monitoring for unusual system behavior. Additionally, hardware-based security features, such as Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot and Trusted Platform Module (TPM), can help protect the integrity of the boot process and reduce the risk of bootkit infections.
 
@@ -19465,7 +19465,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Certify Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Behavior Identified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Export Certificate - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Export Certificate - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Export PfxCertificate - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Abuse - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Issued - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CertUtil Backup - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CryptoAPI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CS Backup - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export Certificate - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export PfxCertificate - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Certify Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Behavior Identified - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Export Certificate - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell Export Certificate - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell Export PfxCertificate - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Issued - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Request - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CertUtil Backup - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CryptoAPI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CS Backup - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export Certificate - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export PfxCertificate - Rule"]
 description = Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material.
 narrative = The following analytic story focuses on remote and local endpoint certificate theft and abuse. Authentication certificates can be both stolen and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files), misplaced certificate files (i.e. Unsecured Credentials), or directly from the Windows certificate store via various crypto APIs.With appropriate enrollment rights, users and/or machines within a domain can also request and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certificate authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various settings and permissions associated with the certificate. Abusing certificates for authentication credentials may enable other behaviors such as Lateral Movement. Certificate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities for Privilege Escalation, by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs) associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable Persistence via stealing or forging certificates that can be used as Valid Accounts for the duration of the certificate's validity, despite user password resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen and forged for machine accounts. (MITRE ATT&CK)
 
@@ -19476,7 +19476,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Base64 Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Executable Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Process Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Known Abused DLL Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Parent PID Spoofing with Explorer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Base64 Content - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Executable Content - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Process Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Known Abused DLL Created - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Parent PID Spoofing with Explorer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others 
 narrative = Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.
 
@@ -19487,7 +19487,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", "https://cyberd.us/penetration-testing", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Hart"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AzureHound File Modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AzureHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol - Rule", "ESCU - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution - Rule"]
 description = Monitors for behaviors associated with adversaries discovering objects in the environment that can be leveraged in the progression of the attack.
 narrative = Attackers may not have much if any insight into their target's environment before the initial compromise.  Once a foothold has been established, attackers will start enumerating objects in the environment (accounts, services, network shares, etc.) that can be used to achieve their objectives.  This Analytic Story provides searches to help identify activities consistent with adversaries gaining knowledge of compromised Windows environments.
 
@@ -19498,7 +19498,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Shannon Davis"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 description = Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise.  The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.
 narrative = When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s).  If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB).  This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included.  The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json.  These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).
 
@@ -19509,7 +19509,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/e/avoslocker-ransomware-variant-abuses-driver-file-to-disable-anti-Virus-scans-log4shell.html", "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/daxin-backdoor-espionage", "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064459/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/01/11/signed-kernel-drivers-unguarded-gateway-windows-core/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Driver Inventory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System File on Disk - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Driver Inventory - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System File on Disk - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded - Rule"]
 description = Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.
 narrative = A rootkit on Windows may sometimes be in the form of a Windows Driver. A driver typically has a file extension of .sys, however the internals of a sys file is similar to a Windows DLL. For Microsoft Windows to load a driver, a few requirements are needed. First, it must have a valid signature. Second, typically it should load from the windows\system32\drivers path. There are a few methods to investigate drivers in the environment. Drivers are noisy. An inventory of all drivers is important to understand prevalence. A driver location (Path) is also important when attempting to baseline. Looking at a driver name and path is not enough, we must also explore the signing information. Product, description, company name, signer and signing result are all items to take into account when reviewing drivers. What makes a driver malicious? Depending if a driver was dropped during a campaign or you are baselining drivers after, triaging a driver to determine maliciousness may be tough. We break this into two categories - 1. vulnerable drivers 2. driver rootkits. Attempt to identify prevelance of the driver. Is it on one or many? Review the signing information if it is present. Is it common? A lot of driver hunting will lead down rabbit holes, but we hope to help lead the way.
 
@@ -19520,7 +19520,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-complete-zero-day-exploit-cve-2023-36874/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule"]
 description = In July 2023, CrowdStrike's Falcon Complete managed detection and response (MDR) team uncovered an exploit kit using an unknown vulnerability in the Windows Error Reporting (WER) component. The vulnerability, now identified as CVE-2023-36874, was also independently discovered by Google's Threat Analysis Group. The exploit came to light when suspicious binaries were observed on a European technology system. CrowdStrike's Counter Adversary Operations' analysis revealed a zero-day exploit targeting the WER service, allowing attackers to execute unauthorized code with elevated privileges. The exploit kit seen aimed to spawn a privileged interpreter, displaying the versatility and adaptability of the threat. CrowdStrike has listed some potential indicators of compromise, but these are of low fidelity due to their mutable nature.
 narrative = In June 2023, CrowdStrike's Falcon Complete team observed suspicious activities on a European technology entity's system. Multiple binaries were dropped onto the system via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), some of which were flagged as potential exploits for a known vulnerability. However, a string containing the Russian term for "0day" suggested an unknown vulnerability was at play. Subsequent investigations identified this as a zero-day vulnerability affecting the Windows Error Reporting (WER) component, now known as CVE-2023-36874.\
 The WER service's function is to report software issues on Windows hosts. The exploit centered around manipulating the WER service by redirecting file systems to execute attacker-controlled code with elevated privileges. This was achieved by creating a symbolic link redirection from the C:\ drive to an attacker-controlled directory, and then triggering certain WER functions. Consequently, an unauthorized executable was run instead of the legitimate one, giving the attacker high-level access.\
@@ -19534,7 +19534,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.
 narrative = Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications.\
 Since its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe.\
@@ -19549,7 +19549,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.
 narrative = Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\
 The Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).
@@ -19561,7 +19561,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Bhavin Patel"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Event Triggered Image File Execution Options Injection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mshta Execution In Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Triggered Image File Execution Options Injection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mshta Execution In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.
 narrative = Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.
 
@@ -19572,7 +19572,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/14/new-prestige-ransomware-impacts-organizations-in-ukraine-and-poland/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Information Discovery Fsutil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Password Managers Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Private Keys Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System User Discovery Via Quser - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process And Service List - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Information Discovery Fsutil - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Password Managers Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Private Keys Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System User Discovery Via Quser - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process And Service List - Rule"]
 description = This analytic story identifies popular Windows post exploitation tools for example winpeas.bat, winpeas.exe, WinPrivCheck.bat and many more.
 narrative = These tools allow operators to find possible exploits or paths for privilege escalation and persistence on a targeted host. Ransomware operator like the "Prestige ransomware" also used or abuses these post exploitation tools such as winPEAS to scan for possible avenue to gain privileges and persistence to a targeted Windows Operating System.
 
@@ -19583,7 +19583,7 @@ version = 2
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation Suspicious Process Elevation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation System Process Without System Parent - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation Suspicious Process Elevation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation System Process Without System Parent - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.
 narrative = Privilege escalation is a "land-and-expand" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.
 
@@ -19594,7 +19594,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Defender Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Autostart Execution LSASS Driver Registry Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Defender Services - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Autostart Execution LSASS Driver Registry Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"]
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence, privilege escalation, lateral movement, defense evasion, collection of data, a tool for recon, credential dumping and payload impact. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows registry are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
 narrative = Windows Registry is one of the powerful and yet still mysterious Windows features that can tweak or manipulate Windows policies and low-level configuration settings. Because of this capability,  most malware, adversaries or threat actors abuse this hierarchical database to do their malicious intent on a targeted host or network environment. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify registry in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.
 
@@ -19605,7 +19605,7 @@ version = 3
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
+searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.
 narrative = The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.
 
@@ -19616,7 +19616,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Remote Download - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec With Network Connections - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSIExec Remote Download - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSIExec With Network Connections - Rule"]
 description = Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).
 narrative = Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs. Since it may be signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.
 
@@ -19627,7 +19627,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cve-2023-38831-winrar-zero-day/", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-38831"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - WinRAR Spawning Shell Application - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - WinRAR Spawning Shell Application - Rule"]
 description = Group-IB Threat Intelligence unit discovered a zero-day vulnerability, CVE-2023-38831, in WinRAR, a popular compression tool. Cybercriminals exploited this vulnerability to deliver various malware families, including DarkMe and GuLoader, by crafting ZIP archives with spoofed extensions, which were then distributed on trading forums. Once the malware was executed, it allowed cybercriminals to withdraw funds from brokers' accounts. RARLAB was immediately notified about the vulnerability and released a patch. Group-IB recommends users update WinRAR to the latest version, stay informed about cyber threats, be cautious with unknown attachments, enable 2FA, backup data, and follow the principle of least privilege.
 narrative = Group-IB Threat Intelligence unit identified a critical zero-day vulnerability, CVE-2023-38831, in WinRAR, a widely used compression tool. This vulnerability was exploited by cybercriminals to craft ZIP archives containing malicious and non-malicious files, distributed on specialized trading forums. The exploit allowed them to spoof file extensions, hiding the launch of malicious scripts within an archive masquerading as a '.jpg', '.txt', or any other file format. When victims opened the specially crafted archive, it executed the malware, leading to unauthorized access to their broker accounts and enabling the cybercriminals to perform illicit financial transactions and withdraw funds.\
 The vulnerability was discovered while researching the spread of DarkMe malware, a VisualBasic spy Trojan attributed to the financially motivated group, Evilnum. The malware was distributed alongside other malware families, such as GuLoader and Remcos RAT, via malicious ZIP archives posted on popular trading forums or distributed via file-sharing services. Despite efforts by forum administrators to warn users and disable threat actors' accounts, the cybercriminals continued to spread the malicious files, compromising devices, and leading to financial losses.\
@@ -19641,7 +19641,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://cert.gov.ua/article/3761023"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Invoke RestMethod - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Powershell UploadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Screen Capture Via Powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Invoke RestMethod - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Powershell UploadString - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Screen Capture Via Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"]
 description = Utilize searches that enable you to detect and investigate unusual activities potentially related to the Winter Vivern malicious software. This includes examining multiple timeout executions, scheduled task creations, screenshots, and downloading files through PowerShell, among other indicators.
 narrative = The Winter Vivern malware, identified by CERT UA, is designed to download and run multiple PowerShell scripts on targeted hosts. These scripts aim to gather a variety of files with specific extensions, including (.edb, .ems, .eme, .emz, .key, .pem, .ovpn, .bat, .cer, .p12, .cfg, .log, .txt, .pdf, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, and .rdg), primarily from desktop directories. In addition to this, the malware captures desktop screenshots and performs data exfiltration using HTTP. To maintain its presence on the targeted host, Winter Vivern also establishes a persistence mechanism, such as creating a scheduled task.
 
@@ -19652,7 +19652,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190", "https://github.com/Tornad0007/CVE-2024-25600-Bricks-Builder-plugin-for-WordPress/blob/main/exploit.py", "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-25600", "https://op-c.net/blog/cve-2024-25600-wordpresss-bricks-builder-rce-flaw-under-active-exploitation/", "https://thehackernews.com/2024/02/wordpress-bricks-theme-under-active.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE - Rule"]
 description = This analytic story provides a collection of analytics that detect potential exploitation of WordPress vulnerabilities. The analytics are focused on the detection of known vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins and themes.
 narrative = The following collection of analytics are focused on the detection of known vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins and themes. The analytics are focused on the detection of known vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins and themes.
 
@@ -19663,7 +19663,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://www.assetnote.io/resources/research/rce-in-progress-ws-ftp-ad-hoc-via-iis-http-modules-cve-2023-40044", "https://community.progress.com/s/article/WS-FTP-Server-Critical-Vulnerability-September-2023", "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-40044", "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/09/29/etr-critical-vulnerabilities-in-ws_ftp-server/", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/fantastic-iis-modules-and-how-to-find-them.html"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Michael Haag"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WS FTP Remote Code Execution - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query - Rule", "ESCU - WS FTP Remote Code Execution - Rule"]
 description = A critical security advisory was released by Progress Software on September 27, 2023, concerning multiple vulnerabilities in WS_FTP Server, a widely-used secure file transfer solution. The two critical vulnerabilities are CVE-2023-40044, a .NET deserialization flaw, and CVE-2023-42657, a directory traversal vulnerability. Rapid7 has observed active exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Affected versions are prior to 8.7.4 and 8.8.2. Immediate action is advised - upgrade to WS_FTP Server version 8.8.2. For those unable to update, disabling the Ad Hoc Transfer module is suggested as a temporary measure. This comes in the wake of increased scrutiny following the Cl0p ransomware attack on MOVEit Transfer in May 2023.
 narrative = Two critical vulnerabilities have been identified in WS_FTP Server, a widely-used secure file transfer solution. The first, CVE-2023-40044, is a .NET deserialization flaw that targets the Ad Hoc Transfer module of WS_FTP Server versions earlier than 8.7.4 and 8.8.2. This flaw allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the server's operating system without needing authentication. The second vulnerability, CVE-2023-42657, is a directory traversal flaw that allows attackers to perform unauthorized file operations outside of their authorized WS_FTP folder. In severe cases, the attacker could escape the WS_FTP Server file structure and perform operations on the underlying operating system. Both vulnerabilities have been observed being exploited in the wild and immediate action for mitigation is strongly advised. Updating to WS_FTP Server version 8.8.2 is recommended. For those unable to update, disabling the Ad Hoc Transfer module is suggested as a temporary measure.
 
@@ -19674,7 +19674,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig", "https://www.getmonero.org/resources/user-guides/mine-to-pool.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Rod Soto Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Net User Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Net User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the xmrig monero, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process command-line, defense evasion (killing services, deleting users, modifying files or folder permission, killing other malware or other coin miner) and hacking tools including Telegram as mean of Command And Control (C2) to download other files. Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. (1) Servers and cloud-based (2) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.
 narrative = XMRig is a high performance, open source, cross platform RandomX, KawPow, CryptoNight and AstroBWT unified CPU/GPU miner. This monero is seen in the wild on May 2017.
 
@@ -19685,7 +19685,7 @@ version = 1
 references = ["https://threatlibrary.zscaler.com/", "https://help.zscaler.com/zia/about-threat-categories"]
 maintainers = [{"company": "Gowthamaraj Rajendran", "email": "-", "name": "Rod Soto"}]
 spec_version = 3
-searches = ["ES Content Updates - Zscaler Adware Activities Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Behavior Analysis Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler CryptoMiner Downloaded Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Employment Search Web Activity - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Exploit Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Legal Liability Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Malware Activity Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Phishing Activity Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Potentially Abused File Download - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Privacy Risk Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Scam Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Virus Download threat blocked - Rule"]
+searches = ["ESCU - Zscaler Adware Activities Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Behavior Analysis Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler CryptoMiner Downloaded Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Employment Search Web Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Exploit Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Legal Liability Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Malware Activity Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Phishing Activity Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Potentially Abused File Download - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Privacy Risk Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Scam Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Virus Download threat blocked - Rule"]
 description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to malicious activity from Zscaler. This also encompasses monitoring for events such as users downloading harmful files or accessing websites that pose a risk to system and network security. Additionally, the narrative extends to the detection of insider threats, ensuring comprehensive protection from both external and internal vulnerabilities. By leveraging Zscaler with Splunk, organizations can fortify their defenses, safeguarding against a wide spectrum of cyber threats and maintaining a secure operational environment.
 narrative = Zscaler Client Connector is an application installed on your device to ensure that your internet traffic and access to your organization's internal apps are secure and in compliance with your organization's policies, even when you're off your corporate network.
 
@@ -19693,7 +19693,7 @@ narrative = Zscaler Client Connector is an application installed on your device
 
 ### RESPONSE TASKS ###
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - All backup logs for host - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = The successfully implement this search you must first send your backup logs to Splunk.
@@ -19701,7 +19701,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your Cloud Watch EKS inputs.
@@ -19709,7 +19709,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
@@ -19717,7 +19717,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
@@ -19725,7 +19725,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
@@ -19733,7 +19733,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.
@@ -19741,7 +19741,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS configuration inputs
@@ -19749,7 +19749,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS inputs.
@@ -19757,7 +19757,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must install the GCP App for Splunk (version 2.0.0 or later), then configure stackdriver and set a Pub/Sub subscription to be imported to Splunk. You must also install Cloud Infrastructure data model.Customize the macro kubernetes_gcp_scan_fingerprint_attack_detection to filter out FPs.
@@ -19765,7 +19765,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
@@ -19773,7 +19773,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
@@ -19781,7 +19781,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
@@ -19789,7 +19789,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
@@ -19797,7 +19797,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your backup logs.
@@ -19805,7 +19805,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your certificates or SSL logs from your network traffic into your Certificates datamodel. Please note the wildcard(*) before domain in the search syntax, we use to match for all domain and subdomain combinations
@@ -19813,7 +19813,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your DNS traffic
@@ -19821,7 +19821,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your network traffic
@@ -19829,7 +19829,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.
@@ -19837,7 +19837,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = In order to implement this search, you must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS(version 4.4.0 or later) and configure your AWS description inputs.
@@ -19845,7 +19845,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get Email Info - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your email logs or capturing unencrypted network traffic which contains email communications.
@@ -19853,7 +19853,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.
@@ -19861,7 +19861,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the logs from your DHCP server.
@@ -19869,7 +19869,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.
@@ -19877,7 +19877,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your Windows event logs
@@ -19885,7 +19885,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting your Windows event logs
@@ -19893,7 +19893,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = If you are using Enterprise Security you are likely already creating notable events with your correlation rules. No additional configuration is necessary.
@@ -19901,7 +19901,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must ingest your email logs or capture unencrypted email communications within network traffic, and populate the Email data model.
@@ -19909,7 +19909,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that tracks process activity, including parent-child relationships from your endpoints to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model.
@@ -19917,7 +19917,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get Process File Activity - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.
@@ -19925,7 +19925,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data and populating the Endpoint data model.
@@ -19933,7 +19933,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events and populate the Endpoint Datamodel
@@ -19941,7 +19941,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must be ingesting endpoint data that associates processes with network events into the Endpoint datamodel. This can come from endpoint protection products such as carbon black, or endpoint data sources such as Sysmon.
@@ -19949,7 +19949,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be collecting Sysmon data using Sysmon version 6.1 or greater and have Sysmon configured to generate events for WMI activity. In addition, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA installed to properly parse the fields.
@@ -19957,7 +19957,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = This search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the HTTP stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server.
@@ -19965,7 +19965,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
@@ -19973,7 +19973,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs.
@@ -19981,7 +19981,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model.
@@ -19989,7 +19989,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web-traffic logs and populating the web data model.
@@ -19997,7 +19997,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Okta logs
@@ -20005,7 +20005,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Okta logs
@@ -20013,7 +20013,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need be ingesting windows security logs. This search uses an input macro named `wineventlog_security`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.
@@ -20021,7 +20021,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting windows security logs. This search uses an input macro named `wineventlog_security`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Security logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.
@@ -20029,7 +20029,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting authentication logs from your various systems and populating the Authentication data model.
@@ -20037,7 +20037,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must be populating the Authentication data model with security events from your Windows event logs.
@@ -20045,7 +20045,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = This particular search leverages data extracted from Stream:HTTP. You must configure the http stream using the Splunk Stream App on your Splunk Stream deployment server to extract the cs_content_type field.
@@ -20053,7 +20053,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = You must be ingesting Okta logs
@@ -20061,7 +20061,7 @@ known_false_positives = not defined
 earliest_time_offset = 14400
 latest_time_offset = 0
 
-[savedsearch://ES Content Updates - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task]
+[savedsearch://ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task]
 type = investigation
 explanation = none
 how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting your web-traffic logs and populating the web data model.
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/app.conf b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/app.conf
index d91db10bbe..163eccf042 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/app.conf
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/app.conf
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:53 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:36 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 is_configured = false
 state = enabled
 state_change_requires_restart = false
-build = 20240508171020
+build = 20240510180009
 
 [triggers]
 reload.analytic_stories = simple
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/collections.conf b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/collections.conf
index bc2754918a..2070f9c851 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/collections.conf
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/collections.conf
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:53 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:36 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/content-version.conf b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/content-version.conf
index b2c9369f59..fbd862e6f9 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/content-version.conf
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/content-version.conf
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:53 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:36 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task.xml
index 7eb5729966..ba951353c6 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml
index 63d4b96092..f4f0624fc8 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task.xml
index 0164622644..ddc6518be0 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task.xml
index 95e7c42d4b..c6815e2083 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task.xml
index 70ff2875ab..7a824e3945 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task.xml
index 647ee77033..da8793824c 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task.xml
index 9016547b82..9e38d4732c 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task.xml
index 33b08322b1..7075a06db0 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml
index a36502fe79..f8f6393f7e 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task.xml
index 5a59b5f550..c0feb2b9be 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task.xml
index ac0fc28a46..a8780a5c8f 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task.xml
index d095934d3d..450e0cbf25 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task.xml
index ba6e55358d..3eb8ac0266 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task.xml
index 73af8bd92f..44c23ccb3c 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task.xml
index 18add8b8d5..fcca501dff 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task.xml
index f0c11ddda2..2a6df5e942 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task.xml
index df9197c72d..66c218e0d3 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_dns_traffic_ratio___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task.xml
index d6977b84cd..0f38bde281 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task.xml
index a31a9e5541..ac6f3b814c 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task.xml
index c86c5ef715..d4e6b3446a 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task.xml
index 3e6c9a7143..9a787cc314 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task.xml
index 8cfdbea01b..77c799f3ad 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task.xml
index 9d907abea9..73698e2867 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task.xml
index e2eca10635..5e2bbb9b09 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task.xml
index a1152702ae..b5989662b6 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task.xml
index 0160efa86f..2585763d0e 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task.xml
index b47a0cf2c3..1a2d4b2d88 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_parent_process_info___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task.xml
index d1d1927755..09be7f6902 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_file_activity___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task.xml
index edf9fa23b9..124e655a4e 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_info___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task.xml
index 9a1ae59a93..ba5ae93528 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_information_for_port_activity___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task.xml
index 87a7e84ac5..0f26851121 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task.xml
index 6601b67f6b..9c56fb79b7 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_sysmon_wmi_activity_for_host___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task.xml
index dc4c736b90..ecac9d5521 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task.xml
index f06ae30009..56a2d6ccd6 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task.xml
index 2cc05e2fd7..f50a805f8a 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task.xml
index 11f3e6b6c3..8eff60ffa5 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task.xml
index b50a1e4431..f77c384775 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task.xml
index 48c32fd14c..778464f9d0 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task.xml
index adc156e663..e0f8b0f48c 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task.xml
index 29d185cd40..c304d8b64d 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task.xml
index 4a4daaefdb..fc69f3661f 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task.xml
index 8622b79116..155a0baadd 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task.xml
index 6e7f48509c..a4afc17d85 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_suspicious_strings_in_http_header___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task.xml
index ec93b58f3b..7334f251e2 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task.xml b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task.xml
index 92fb87f7bc..3f3344c251 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task.xml
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task.xml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:54 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:37 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/es_investigations.conf b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/es_investigations.conf
index 2f0e9e8356..0528915125 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/es_investigations.conf
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/es_investigations.conf
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:53 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:36 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/macros.conf b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/macros.conf
index 6fb0c9b41b..f963b2f73b 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/macros.conf
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/macros.conf
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:53 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:36 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/savedsearches.conf b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/savedsearches.conf
index d1e168e390..cf7d6d03ab 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/savedsearches.conf
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/savedsearches.conf
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:53 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:36 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
-### ES Content Updates DETECTIONS ###
+### ESCU DETECTIONS ###
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search queries the authentication logs for assets that are categorized as routers in the ES Assets and Identity Framework, to identify connections that have not been seen before in the last 30 days. 
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate router connections may appear as
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bce3ed7c-9b1f-42a0-abdf-d8b123a34836", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest_category=router by Authentication.dest Authentication.user| eval isOutlier=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), "-30d@d"), 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | `detect_new_login_attempts_to_routers_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Risky SPL using Pretrained ML Model - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Risky SPL using Pretrained ML Model - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic uses a pretrained machine learning text classifier to detect potentially risky commands. The model is trained independently and then the model file is packaged within ESCU for usage. A command is deemed risky based on the presence of certain trigger keywords, along with the context and the role of the user (please see references). The model uses custom features to predict whether a SPL is risky using text classification. The model takes as input the command text, user and search type and outputs a risk score between [0,1]. A high score indicates higher likelihood of a command being risky. This model is on-prem only. 
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if suspicious
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Risky SPL using Pretrained ML Model - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Risky SPL using Pretrained ML Model - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Risky SPL using Pretrained ML Model - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Risky SPL using Pretrained ML Model - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 40, "cve": ["CVE-2022-32154"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b4aefb5f-1037-410d-a149-1e091288ba33", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity where Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user by Search_Activity.search Search_Activity.user Search_Activity.search_type | eval spl_text = 'Search_Activity.search'. " " .'Search_Activity.user'. " " .'Search_Activity.search_type'| dedup spl_text | apply risky_spl_pre_trained_model | where risk_score > 0.5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Search_Activity)` | table search, user, search_type, risk_score | `detect_risky_spl_using_pretrained_ml_model_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule]
+[ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Attackers often use spaces as a means to obfuscate an attachment's file extension. This search looks for messages with email attachments that have many spaces within the file names. 
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", "Hermetic Wiper", "Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "56e877a6-1455-4479-ada6-0550dc1e22f8", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Email.recipient) as recipient_address min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` | eval space_ratio = (mvcount(split(file_name," "))-1)/len(file_name) | search space_ratio >= 0.1 |  rex field=recipient_address "(?<recipient_user>.*)@" | `email_attachments_with_lots_of_spaces_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule]
+[ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks at the change-analysis data model and detects email files created outside the normal Outlook directory. 
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators and users sometimes prefer ba
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8d52cf03-ba25-4101-aa78-07994aed4f74", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name=*.pst OR Filesystem.file_name=*.ost) Filesystem.file_path != "C:\\Users\\*\\My Documents\\Outlook Files\\*"  Filesystem.file_path!="C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Outlook*" by Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Filesystem")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `email_files_written_outside_of_the_outlook_directory_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule]
+[ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. 
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on h
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556378", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.src_category=email_server by All_Traffic.dest_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats avg(bytes_out) as avg_bytes_out stdev(bytes_out) as stdev_bytes_out | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), "@d"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_out stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), "@d"), bytes_out, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_out by dest_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_out > (avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_out)) AND bytes_out > (per_source_avg_bytes_out + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_out)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), "@d") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_out - avg_bytes_out) / stdev_bytes_out, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_out - per_source_avg_bytes_out) / per_source_stdev_bytes_out, 2) | table dest_ip, _time, bytes_out, avg_bytes_out, per_source_avg_bytes_out, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `email_servers_sending_high_volume_traffic_to_hosts_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule]
+[ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for emails claiming to be sent from a domain similar to one that you want to have monitored for abuse. 
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-01-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-01-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring", "Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b2ea1f38-3a3e-4b8a-9cf1-82760d86a6b8", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.recipient) as recipients, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.message_id | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval temp=split(src_user, "@") | eval email_domain=mvindex(temp, 1) | lookup update=true brandMonitoring_lookup domain as email_domain OUTPUT domain_abuse | search domain_abuse=true | table message_id, src_user, email_domain, recipients, firstTime, lastTime | `monitor_email_for_brand_abuse_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule]
+[ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for Windows endpoints that have not generated an event indicating a successful Windows update in the last 60 days. Windows updates are typically released monthly and applied shortly thereafter. An endpoint that has not successfully applied an update in this time frame indicates the endpoint is not regularly being patched for some reason. 
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor for Updates"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1a77c08c-2f56-409c-a2d3-7d64617edd4f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Updates where Updates.status=Installed Updates.vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" by Updates.dest Updates.status Updates.vendor_product | rename Updates.dest as Host | rename Updates.status as "Update Status" | rename Updates.vendor_product as Product | eval isOutlier=if(lastTime <= relative_time(now(), "-60d@d"), 1, 0)  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`  | search isOutlier=1 | rename lastTime as "Last Update Time", | table Host, "Update Status", Product, "Last Update Time" | `no_windows_updates_in_a_time_frame_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an authentication attempt event against an Okta tenant that fails during the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge. This detection is written against the Authentication datamodel and we look for a specific failed events where the authentication signature is `user.authentication.auth_via_mfa`. This behavior may represent an adversary trying to authenticate with compromised credentials for an account that has multi-factor authentication enabled.
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A user may have accidentally entered the wro
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1078", "T1078.004", "T1621"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e2b99e7d-d956-411a-a120-2b14adfdde93", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  values(Authentication.app) as app values(Authentication.reason) as reason values(Authentication.signature) as signature  values(Authentication.method) as method  from datamodel=Authentication where  Authentication.signature=user.authentication.auth_via_mfa Authentication.action = failure by _time Authentication.src Authentication.user Authentication.dest Authentication.action | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| iplocation src | `okta_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection identifies modifications to Okta Identity Provider (IDP) lifecycle events, such as creation, activation, deactivation, and deletion of IDP configurations. Monitoring these events is crucial for maintaining the integrity and security of authentication mechanisms within an organization. By detecting unauthorized or anomalous changes, organizations can quickly respond to potential security breaches or misconfigurations, ensuring that their identity management systems remain secure and operational.
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible for legitimate administrative
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e0be2c83-5526-4219-a14f-c3db2e763d15", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` eventType IN ("system.idp.lifecycle.activate","system.idp.lifecycle.create","system.idp.lifecycle.delete","system.idp.lifecycle.deactivate") |  stats count  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(target{}.id) as target_id values(target{}.type) as target_modified by src dest src_user_id user user_agent command description | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_idp_lifecycle_modifications_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies patterns within Okta data to determine the amount of successful and failed pushes. Based on that, eval statements determine a finding of whether this is suspicious or not. The events are within a window of time and may be tuned as needed.
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune Okta an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover", "Okta MFA Exhaustion"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "97e2fe57-3740-402c-988a-76b64ce04b8d", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` eventType=system.push.send_factor_verify_push OR ((legacyEventType=core.user.factor.attempt_success) AND (debugContext.debugData.factor=OKTA_VERIFY_PUSH)) OR ((legacyEventType=core.user.factor.attempt_fail) AND (debugContext.debugData.factor=OKTA_VERIFY_PUSH)) | stats count(eval(legacyEventType="core.user.factor.attempt_success"))  as successes count(eval(legacyEventType="core.user.factor.attempt_fail")) as failures count(eval(eventType="system.push.send_factor_verify_push")) as pushes by user,_time | stats latest(_time) as lasttime earliest(_time) as firsttime sum(successes) as successes sum(failures) as failures sum(pushes) as pushes by user | eval seconds=lasttime-firsttime | eval lasttime=strftime(lasttime, "%c") | search (pushes>1) | eval totalattempts=successes+failures | eval finding="Normal authentication pattern" | eval finding=if(failures==pushes AND pushes>1,"Authentication attempts not successful because multiple pushes denied",finding) | eval finding=if(totalattempts==0,"Multiple pushes sent and ignored",finding) | eval finding=if(successes>0 AND pushes>3,"Probably should investigate. Multiple pushes sent, eventual successful authentication!",finding) | `okta_mfa_exhaustion_hunt_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic identifies variations in client-based values for source and response events to identify suspicious request behavior. The detection is enhanced if the org is evaluating behavior conditions in sign-on policies using Okta Behavior Detection. NOTE: This detection requires the use of Okta Identity Engine (OIE) and will not function on Okta Classic.\
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on orga
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover", "Okta MFA Exhaustion"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1621"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8085b79b-9b85-4e67-ad63-351c9e9a5e9a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` eventType IN (system.push.send_factor_verify_push) OR (eventType IN (user.authentication.auth_via_mfa) debugContext.debugData.factor="OKTA_VERIFY_PUSH") | eval groupby="authenticationContext.externalSessionId" | eval group_push_time=_time | bin span=2s group_push_time | fillnull value=NULL | stats min(_time) as _time by authenticationContext.externalSessionId eventType debugContext.debugData.factor outcome.result actor.alternateId client.device client.ipAddress client.userAgent.rawUserAgent debugContext.debugData.behaviors group_push_time groupby | iplocation client.ipAddress | fields - lat, lon, group_push_time | stats min(_time) as _time dc(client.ipAddress) as dc_ip sum(eval(if(eventType="system.push.send_factor_verify_push" AND "outcome.result"="SUCCESS",1,0))) as total_pushes sum(eval(if(eventType="user.authentication.auth_via_mfa" AND "outcome.result"="SUCCESS",1,0))) as total_successes sum(eval(if(eventType="user.authentication.auth_via_mfa" AND "outcome.result"="FAILURE",1,0))) as total_rejected sum(eval(if(eventType="system.push.send_factor_verify_push" AND "debugContext.debugData.behaviors" LIKE "%New Device=POSITIVE%",1,0))) as suspect_device_from_source sum(eval(if(eventType="system.push.send_factor_verify_push" AND "debugContext.debugData.behaviors" LIKE "%New IP=POSITIVE%",0,0))) as suspect_ip_from_source values(eval(if(eventType="system.push.send_factor_verify_push","client.ipAddress",""))) as src values(eval(if(eventType="user.authentication.auth_via_mfa","client.ipAddress",""))) as dest values(*) as * by groupby | eval ratio = round(total_successes/total_pushes,2) | search ((ratio < 0.5 AND total_pushes > 1) OR (total_rejected > 0)) AND dc_ip > 1 AND suspect_device_from_source > 0 AND suspect_ip_from_source > 0 | `okta_mismatch_between_source_and_response_for_verify_push_request_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an attempt to disable multi-factor authentication for an Okta user. An adversary who has obtained access to an Okta tenant may disable multi-factor authentication as a way to plant a backdoor and maintain persistence using a valid account. This way the attackers can keep persistance in the environment without adding new users.
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate use case may require for users to
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Okta Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556", "T1556.006"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7c0348ce-bdf9-45f6-8a57-c18b5976f00a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Change where sourcetype="OktaIM2:log" All_Changes.object_category=User AND All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.command=user.mfa.factor.deactivate by All_Changes.user All_Changes.result All_Changes.command sourcetype All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes the user.acount.lock event to identify multiple Okta accounts locking out in a short period of time. An adversary attempting to brute force or password spray account names may lock accounts out depending on the threshold set by the organization. Monitoring for multiple account lockouts can help detect potential account takeover attempts or unauthorized access to Okta accounts.
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Multiple account lockouts may be also trigge
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a511426e-184f-4de6-8711-cfd2af29d1e1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.change_type=AAA All_Changes.object_category=User AND All_Changes.action=lockout AND All_Changes.command=user.account.lock by _time span=5m All_Changes.result All_Changes.command sourcetype All_Changes.src | where count > 5 | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_multiple_accounts_locked_out_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication requests for a single user within an Okta tenant. Specifically, the analytic triggers when more than 10 MFA user prompts fail within 10 minutes. The reasons for these failure could be several, like the user not responding in time or receiving multiple duplicate MFA requests. Okta tenants can be very different depending on the organization, Security teams should test this detection and customize these arbitrary thresholds. The detected behavior may represent an adversary who has obtained legitimate credentials for a user and continuously repeats login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request. Threat actors like the Lapsus team and APT29 have leveraged this technique to bypass multi-factor authentication controls as reported by Mandiant and others.
@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Multiple Failed MFA requests may also be a s
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1621"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "826dbaae-a1e6-4c8c-b384-d16898956e73", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `okta` eventType=user.authentication.auth_via_mfa outcome.result=FAILURE debugContext.debugData.factor!=PASSWORD_AS_FACTOR | bucket _time span=5m | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) values(src_ip) as src_ip values(debugContext.debugData.factor) by _time src_user | where count >= 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic identifies multiple failed app requests in an attempt to identify the reuse a stolen web session cookie. The logic of the analytic is as follows: * Retrieves policy evaluation and SSO details in events that contain the Application requested\
@@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on orga
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Okta Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Okta Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550.004", "T1538"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1c21fed1-7000-4a2e-9105-5aaafa437247", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` target{}.type=AppInstance (eventType=policy.evaluate_sign_on outcome.result=CHALLENGE) OR (eventType=user.authentication.sso outcome.result=SUCCESS) | eval targets=mvzip('target{}.type', 'target{}.displayName', ": ") | eval targets=mvfilter(targets LIKE "AppInstance%") | stats count min(_time) as _time values(outcome.result) as outcome.result dc(eval(if(eventType="policy.evaluate_sign_on",targets,NULL))) as total_challenges sum(eval(if(eventType="user.authentication.sso",1,0))) as total_successes by authenticationContext.externalSessionId targets actor.alternateId client.ipAddress | search total_challenges > 0 | stats min(_time) as _time values(*) as * sum(total_challenges) as total_challenges sum(total_successes) as total_successes values(eval(if("outcome.result"="SUCCESS",targets,NULL))) as success_apps values(eval(if(":outcome.result"!="SUCCESS",targets,NULL))) as no_success_apps by authenticationContext.externalSessionId actor.alternateId client.ipAddress | fillnull | eval ratio=round(total_successes/total_challenges,2), severity="HIGH", mitre_technique_id="T1538", description="actor.alternateId". " from " . "client.ipAddress" . " seen opening " . total_challenges . " chiclets/apps with " . total_successes . " challenges successfully passed" | fields - count, targets | search ratio < 0.5 total_challenges > 2 | `okta_multiple_failed_requests_to_access_applications_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies instances where multiple users (more than 10 unique accounts) have failed to authenticate from a single IP address within a short time span (5 minutes) within an Okta tenant. Such a pattern can be indicative of malicious activities, such as brute-force attacks or password spraying attempts. Identifying and responding to such patterns promptly is crucial to prevent potential account compromises and unauthorized access to organizational resources. If the detection is a true positive, it suggests that an external entity is actively trying to breach security by targeting multiple user accounts.
@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A source Ip failing to authenticate with mul
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "de365ffa-42f5-46b5-b43f-fa72290b8218", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime dc(Authentication.user) as unique_accounts values(Authentication.signature) as signature values(Authentication.user) as user values(Authentication.app) as app values(Authentication.authentication_method) as authentication_method from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action="failure" AND Authentication.signature=user.session.start by _time span=5m Authentication.src sourcetype | where unique_accounts > 9 | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta New API Token Created - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta New API Token Created - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies when a new API token is created within an Okta tenant. An adversary may create a new API token to maintain persistence within the environment. Monitoring for new API tokens can help detect potential account takeover attempts or unauthorized access to Okta accounts.
@@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune Okta an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta New API Token Created - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta New API Token Created - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Okta New API Token Created - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta New API Token Created - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c3d22720-35d3-4da4-bd0a-740d37192bd4", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.command=system.api_token.create by _time span=5m All_Changes.user All_Changes.result All_Changes.command sourcetype All_Changes.src All_Changes.action All_Changes.object_category | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_new_api_token_created_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta New Device Enrolled on Account - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta New Device Enrolled on Account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies when a new device is enrolled on an Okta account. This behavior is indicative of a user adding a new device to their account. This activity is common when a user is setting up a new device or when a user has lost access to their previous device. However, this activity can also be indicative of an adversary adding a new device to an account to maintain access to an account. Monitoring for this activity can help detect potential account takeover attempts or unauthorized access to Okta accounts.
@@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that the user has legitimatel
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta New Device Enrolled on Account - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta New Device Enrolled on Account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Okta New Device Enrolled on Account - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta New Device Enrolled on Account - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1098.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bb27cbce-d4de-432c-932f-2e206e9130fb", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -815,7 +815,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created All_Changes.command=device.enrollment.create by _time span=5m All_Changes.user All_Changes.result All_Changes.command sourcetype All_Changes.src All_Changes.action All_Changes.object_category | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_new_device_enrolled_on_account_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic identifies when Okta''s FastPass prevents known phishing sites. When your users are enrolled in FastPass, Okta can provide defenders a high-fidelity signal for when user applications are being targeted by attackers wielding real-time (AiTM) proxies. Okta''s Defensive Cyber Operations team routinely identifies phishing infrastructure configured to imitate an Okta sign-in page and proactively notify Okta customers when suspicious infrastructure we detect appears to be targeting their users. Since March 2020, we have delivered over 1000 notifications to customers. 
@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Fidelity of this is high as Okta is specifyi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001", "T1556"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f4ca0057-cbf3-44f8-82ea-4e330ee901d3", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -862,7 +862,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` eventType="user.authentication.auth_via_mfa" AND result="FAILURE" AND outcome.reason="FastPass declined phishing attempt" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) by user eventType client.userAgent.rawUserAgent client.userAgent.browser outcome.reason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_phishing_detection_with_fastpass_origin_check_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This correlation computes the risk events associated with the detection analytics from "Suspicious Okta Activity", "Okta Account Takeover", and "Okta MFA Exhaustion" analytic stories. This analytic will trigger a notable event in your incident review when there are 5 or more distinct TTPs related to these analytic stories in the last 24 hours. This incident highlights potentially suspicious activity by a compromised user.
@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to the numbe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - RIR - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - RIR - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover", "Okta MFA Exhaustion", "Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Correlation"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d8b967dd-657f-4d88-93b5-c588bcd7218c", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -904,7 +904,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Risk.analyticstories) as analyticstories  sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count,values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk  where All_Risk.risk_object_type = user All_Risk.analyticstories IN ("Okta Account Takeover", "Suspicious Okta Activity","Okta MFA Exhaustion") by All_Risk.risk_object,All_Risk.risk_object_type | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Risk")` |  search mitre_technique_id_count > 5 | `okta_risk_threshold_exceeded_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies successful authentication events against the Okta Dashboard for accounts without Multi-Factor Authentication enabled. It specifically searches for events where "Okta Verify" is not detected during authentication. This could indicate a misconfiguration, a policy violation, or an account takeover attempt that warrants investigation. If your organization has other authenticators configured in the environment, consider excluding those from the "targets" in the detection search.
@@ -916,7 +916,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although not recommended, certain users may
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1078", "T1078.004", "T1621"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "98f6ad4f-4325-4096-9d69-45dc8e638e82", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -945,7 +945,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta`  action=success src_user_type = User eventType = user.authentication.verify OR eventType = user.authentication.auth_via_mfa| stats dc(eventType) values(eventType) as eventType values(target{}.displayName) as targets values(debugContext.debugData.url) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(authentication_method) by src_ip user action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search targets !="Okta Verify" | `okta_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta Suspicious Activity Reported - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta Suspicious Activity Reported - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This event is generated when an associate receives an email from Okta inquiring whether a login attempt was suspicious. If the associate deems it suspicious, an event is generated for review.
@@ -957,7 +957,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be minimal, given the
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta Suspicious Activity Reported - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Suspicious Activity Reported - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Okta Suspicious Activity Reported - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta Suspicious Activity Reported - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bfc840f5-c9c6-454c-aa13-b46fd0bf1e79", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` eventType=user.account.report_suspicious_activity_by_enduser | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) by user eventType client.userAgent.rawUserAgent client.userAgent.browser client.geographicalContext.city  client.geographicalContext.country | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_suspicious_activity_reported_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic looks for one or more policy evaluation events in which multiple client values (IP, User Agent, etc.) change associated to the same Device Token for a specific user. A detection opportunity arises when an adversary attempts to reuse a stolen web session cookie.\
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may occur, depending on the
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover", "Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1539"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "71ad47d1-d6bd-4e0a-b35c-020ad9a6959e", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1039,7 +1039,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` eventType IN (policy.evaluate_sign_on) outcome.result IN (ALLOW, SUCCESS) | stats earliest(_time) as _time, values(client.ipAddress) as src_ip, values(client.userAgent.rawUserAgent) as user_agent, values(client.userAgent.os) as userAgentOS_list, values(client.geographicalContext.city) as city, values(client.userAgent.browser) as userAgentBrowser_list, values(device.os_platform) as okta_device_os, dc(client.userAgent.browser) as dc_userAgentBrowser, dc(client.userAgent.os) as dc_userAgentOS, dc(client.ipAddress) as dc_src_ip, values(outcome.reason) as reason by debugContext.debugData.dtHash, user | where dc_src_ip>1 AND (dc_userAgentOS>1 OR dc_userAgentBrowser>1) | `okta_suspicious_use_of_a_session_cookie_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This anomaly is based on the identification of threats by Okta ThreatInsight. It allows for the escalation of risk based on src_ip or the addition of fields for further tracking. Possible identifications include password spraying, login failures, and login failures with a high count of unknown users.
@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may occur. It is recommended
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "140504ae-5fe2-4d65-b2bc-a211813fbca6", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1080,7 +1080,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` eventType = security.threat.detected | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by app src_ip signature eventType displayMessage client.device city state country user_agent outcome.reason outcome.result severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_threatinsight_threat_detected_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta Unauthorized Access to Application - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta Unauthorized Access to Application - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search detects instances where a user attempts to access an Okta application that has not been assigned to them. Such unauthorized access to applications poses a significant security risk, potentially leading to the exposure of sensitive information, disruption of services, and breaches of data protection laws. Ensuring that only authorized users have access to applications is crucial for maintaining a secure and compliant IT environment.
@@ -1092,7 +1092,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There is a possibility that a user may accid
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta Unauthorized Access to Application - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Unauthorized Access to Application - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Okta Unauthorized Access to Application - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta Unauthorized Access to Application - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5f661629-9750-4cb9-897c-1f05d6db8727", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1121,7 +1121,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats values(Authentication.app) as app values(Authentication.action) as action values(Authentication.user) as user values(Authentication.reason) as reason from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=app.generic.unauth_app_access_attempt Authentication.action="failure" by _time Authentication.src Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | iplocation src | `okta_unauthorized_access_to_application_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta User Logins from Multiple Cities - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta User Logins from Multiple Cities - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search identifies instances where the same user logs in from different cities within a 24-hour period, potentially indicating a compromised account. Such behavior may be indicative of an attacker attempting to gain unauthorized access to an Okta account from multiple locations. Investigating and responding to such incidents promptly is crucial to prevent account takeovers and data breaches.
@@ -1133,7 +1133,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is uncommon for a user to log in from mul
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta User Logins from Multiple Cities - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta User Logins from Multiple Cities - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -1147,7 +1147,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Okta User Logins from Multiple Cities - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Okta User Logins from Multiple Cities - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a3d1df37-c2a9-41d0-aa8f-59f82d6192a8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats  `security_content_summariesonly` values(Authentication.app) as app values(Authentication.action) as action values(Authentication.user) as user values(Authentication.reason) as reason values(Authentication.dest) as dest values(Authentication.signature) as signature  values(Authentication.method) as method  from datamodel=Authentication where  Authentication.signature=user.session.start by _time Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | iplocation src | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(src) as distinct_src dc(City) as distinct_city values(src) as src values(City) as City values(Country) as Country values(action) as action by user | where distinct_city > 1 | `okta_user_logins_from_multiple_cities_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Path traversal SPL injection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Path traversal SPL injection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = On May 3rd, 2022, Splunk published a security advisory for a Path traversal in search parameter that can potentiall allow SPL injection. An attacker can cause the application to load data from incorrect endpoints, urls leading to outcomes such as running arbitrary SPL queries.
@@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search may find additional path travers
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Path traversal SPL injection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Path traversal SPL injection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Path traversal SPL injection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Path traversal SPL injection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2022-26889"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1083"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dfe55688-82ed-4d24-a21b-ed8f0e0fda99", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `path_traversal_spl_injection` | search "\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/..\/"  | stats count by host status clientip method uri_path uri_query | `path_traversal_spl_injection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Persistent XSS in RapidDiag through User Interface Views - Rule]
+[ESCU - Persistent XSS in RapidDiag through User Interface Views - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In Splunk Enterprise 9.0 versions before 9.0.4, a View allows for Cross-Site Scripting through the error message in a Base64-encoded image. The vulnerability affects instances with Splunk Web enabled. It does not affect Splunk Enterprise versions below 9.0. This search provides information on what user may have potentially added a malicious payload and what users were exposed to it.
@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a hunting search, it will not deobfu
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Persistent XSS in RapidDiag through User Interface Views - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Persistent XSS in RapidDiag through User Interface Views - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Persistent XSS in RapidDiag through User Interface Views - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Persistent XSS in RapidDiag through User Interface Views - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2023-22932"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ce6e1268-e01c-4df2-a617-0f034ed49a43", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `audit_searches` path=/opt/splunk/etc/users/*/search/local/data/ui/views/* action=* |table user action roles info roles path | dedup user action | `persistent_xss_in_rapiddiag_through_user_interface_views_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response - Rule]
+[ESCU - PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies variations in the authentication event IP address versus the verification response event IP address to identify suspicious sign-in behavior. Currently this detection is configured to identify when the originating country of an authentication request is different than the verification country.
@@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be generated by users wo
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Ping ID"]
@@ -1282,7 +1282,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Compromised User Account"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1621", "T1556.006", "T1098.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "15b0694e-caa2-4009-8d83-a1f98b86d086", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1303,7 +1303,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `pingid` ("result.status" IN ("SUCCESS*","FAIL*","UNSUCCESSFUL*") NOT "result.message" IN ("*pair*","*create*","*delete*")) | eval user = upper('actors{}.name'), session_id = 'resources{}.websession', dest = 'resources{}.ipaddress', reason = 'result.message', object = 'resources{}.devicemodel', status = 'result.status' | join user session_id [ search `pingid` ("result.status" IN ("POLICY") AND "resources{}.ipaddress"=*) AND "result.message" IN("*Action: Authenticate*","*Action: Approve*","*Action: Allowed*") | rex field=result.message "IP Address: (?:N\/A)?(?<policy_ipaddress>.+)?\n" | rex field=result.message "Action: (?:N\/A)?(?<signature>.+)?\n" | rex field=result.message "Requested Application Name: (?:N\/A)?(?<Requested_Application_Name>.+)?\n" | rex field=result.message "Requested Application ID: (?:N\/A)?(?<Requested_Application_ID>.+)?\n" | eval user = upper('actors{}.name'), session_id = 'resources{}.websession', src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress',policy_ipaddress), app = coalesce(Requested_Application_ID,Requested_Application_Name) | fields app, user, session_id, src, signature ] | iplocation prefix=auth_ dest | iplocation prefix=verify_ src | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as app values(session_id) as session_id by user, dest, auth_Country, src, verify_Country, object, signature, status, reason | where auth_Country != verify_Country | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `pingid_mismatch_auth_source_and_verification_response_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PingID Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
+[ESCU - PingID Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication requests for a single user within a PingID (PingOne) environment. Specifically, the analytic triggers when 10 or more MFA user prompts fail within 10 minutes. PingID environments can be very different depending on the organization, Security teams should test this detection and customize these arbitrary thresholds. The detected behavior may represent an adversary who has obtained legitimate credentials for a user and continuously repeats login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request. Threat actors like the Lapsus team and APT29 have leveraged this technique to bypass multi-factor authentication controls as reported by Mandiant and others.
@@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be generated by normal p
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PingID Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PingID Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Ping ID"]
@@ -1329,7 +1329,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PingID Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PingID Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Compromised User Account"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1621", "T1078", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c1bc706a-0025-4814-ad30-288f38865036", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1350,7 +1350,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `pingid` "result.status" IN ("FAILURE,authFail","UNSUCCESSFUL_ATTEMPT") | eval time = _time, src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress','resources{}.devicemodel'), user = upper('actors{}.name'), object = 'resources{}.devicemodel', reason = 'result.message'| bucket span=10m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS mfa_prompts min(time) as firstTime, max(time) as lastTime values(src) as src by user, reason, _time | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where mfa_prompts >= 10 | `pingid_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset - Rule]
+[ESCU - PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = A common social engineering technique used by threat actors is the impersonation of a valid user to organizational support staff for a password reset. During the same support call or quickly afterwards the threat actor will request provisioning of a new MFA device. This does not require malware or phishing infrastructure and has proven to be successful in numerous historical attacks. This detection looks for the pattern of password reset, followed by MFA device provisioning.
@@ -1362,7 +1362,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be generated by normal p
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows", "Ping ID"]
@@ -1376,7 +1376,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Compromised User Account"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1621", "T1556.006", "T1098.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2fcbce12-cffa-4c84-b70c-192604d201d0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1397,7 +1397,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `pingid` "result.message" = "*Device Paired*" | rex field=result.message "Device (Unp)?(P)?aired (?<device_extract>.+)" | eval src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress','resources{}.devicemodel'), user = upper('actors{}.name'), reason = 'result.message' | eval object=CASE(ISNOTNULL('resources{}.devicemodel'),'resources{}.devicemodel',true(),device_extract) | eval action=CASE(match('result.message',"Device Paired*"),"created",match('result.message', "Device Unpaired*"),"deleted") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime, values(reason) as reason by src,user,action,object | join type=outer user [| search `wineventlog_security` EventID IN(4723,4724) | eval PW_Change_Time = _time, user = upper(user) | fields user,src_user,EventID,PW_Change_Time] | eval timeDiffRaw = round(lastTime - PW_Change_Time) | eval timeDiff = replace(tostring(abs(timeDiffRaw) ,"duration"),"(\d*)\+*(\d+):(\d+):(\d+)","\2 hours \3 minutes") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(PW_Change_Time)` | where timeDiffRaw > 0 AND timeDiffRaw < 3600 | `pingid_new_mfa_method_after_credential_reset_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PingID New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule]
+[ESCU - PingID New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the registration of a new Multi Factor authentication method for a PingID (PingOne) account. Adversaries who have obtained unauthorized access to a user account may register a new MFA method to maintain persistence.
@@ -1409,7 +1409,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be generated by normal p
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PingID New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PingID New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Ping ID"]
@@ -1423,7 +1423,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PingID New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PingID New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Compromised User Account"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1621", "T1556.006", "T1098.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "892dfeaf-461d-4a78-aac8-b07e185c9bce", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1444,7 +1444,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `pingid` "result.message"="Device Paired*" result.status="SUCCESS"   | rex field=result.message "Device (Unp)?(P)?aired (?<device_extract>.+)" | eval src = coalesce('resources{}.ipaddress','resources{}.devicemodel'), user = upper('actors{}.name'), reason = 'result.message' | eval object=CASE(ISNOTNULL('resources{}.devicemodel'),'resources{}.devicemodel',true(),device_extract) | eval action=CASE(match('result.message',"Device Paired*"),"created",match('result.message', "Device Unpaired*"),"deleted") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime by src,user,object,action,reason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `pingid_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Absolute Path Traversal Using runshellscript - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Absolute Path Traversal Using runshellscript - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In Splunk Enterprise versions lower than 8.2.12, 9.0.6, and 9.1.1, an attacker can exploit an absolute path traversal to execute arbitrary code that is located on a separate disk.
@@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The command runshellscript can be used for b
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Absolute Path Traversal Using runshellscript - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Absolute Path Traversal Using runshellscript - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -1465,7 +1465,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Absolute Path Traversal Using runshellscript - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Absolute Path Traversal Using runshellscript - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2023-40597"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1083"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "356bd3fe-f59b-4f64-baa1-51495411b7ad", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1480,7 +1480,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunk_python` *runshellscript*  | eval log_split=split(_raw, "runshellscript: ") | eval array_raw = mvindex(log_split,1) | eval data_cleaned=replace(replace(replace(array_raw,"\[",""),"\]",""),"'","") | eval array_indices=split(data_cleaned,",") | eval runshellscript_args_count=mvcount(array_indices) | where runshellscript_args_count = 10 | eval interpreter=mvindex(array_indices,0) | eval targetScript=mvindex(array_indices,1) | eval targetScript != "*C:*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by splunk_server interpreter targetScript | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_absolute_path_traversal_using_runshellscript_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Account Discovery Drilldown Dashboard Disclosure - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Account Discovery Drilldown Dashboard Disclosure - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Splunk drilldown vulnerability disclosure in Dashboard application that can potentially allow exposure of tokens from privilege users. An attacker can create dashboard and share it to privileged user (admin) and detokenize variables using external urls within dashboards drilldown function. 
@@ -1492,7 +1492,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search may reveal non malicious URLs wi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Account Discovery Drilldown Dashboard Disclosure - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Account Discovery Drilldown Dashboard Disclosure - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -1506,7 +1506,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Splunk Account Discovery Drilldown Dashboard Disclosure - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Splunk Account Discovery Drilldown Dashboard Disclosure - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2022-37438"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f844c3f6-fd99-43a2-ba24-93e35fe84be6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1527,7 +1527,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | rest splunk_server=local /servicesNS/-/-/data/ui/views | search eai:data="*$env:*" eai:data="*url*" eai:data="*options*" | rename author AS Author eai:acl.sharing AS Permissions eai:appName AS App eai:data AS "Dashboard XML" | fields Author Permissions App "Dashboard XML" | `splunk_account_discovery_drilldown_dashboard_disclosure_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk App for Lookup File Editing RCE via User XSLT - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk App for Lookup File Editing RCE via User XSLT - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information to investigate possible remote code execution exploitation via user-supplied Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformations (XSLT), affecting Splunk versions 9.1.x. 
@@ -1539,7 +1539,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search will provide information for inv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk App for Lookup File Editing RCE via User XSLT - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk App for Lookup File Editing RCE via User XSLT - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -1548,7 +1548,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Splunk App for Lookup File Editing RCE via User XSLT - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Splunk App for Lookup File Editing RCE via User XSLT - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 2, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a053e6a6-2146-483a-9798-2d43652f3299", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1563,7 +1563,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | rest splunk_server=local /services/data/lookup-table-files/ | fields title author disabled eai:acl.app eai:acl.owner eai:acl.sharing eai:appName eai:data | `splunk_app_for_lookup_file_editing_rce_via_user_xslt_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Authentication Token Exposure in Debug Log - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Authentication Token Exposure in Debug Log - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection search finds exposed authentication tokens in debug logs. This issue occurs in Splunk Enterprise versions below 9.2.1, 9.1.4, and 9.0.9, which may be affected by a vulnerability where JsonWebTokens can be exposed if the log level is set to DEBUG.
@@ -1575,7 +1575,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Only applies to affected versions of Splunk
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Authentication Token Exposure in Debug Log - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Authentication Token Exposure in Debug Log - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -1589,7 +1589,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Authentication Token Exposure in Debug Log - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Authentication Token Exposure in Debug Log - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2024-29945"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1654"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9a67e749-d291-40dd-8376-d422e7ecf8b5", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1610,7 +1610,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd` component=JsonWebToken log_level=DEBUG eventtype="splunkd-log" event_message="Validating token:*" | rex "Validating token: (?<token>.*)\.$" | search token!=None | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(log_level) as log_level values(event_message) as event_message by index, sourcetype, host, token | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_authentication_token_exposure_in_debug_log_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Code Injection via custom dashboard leading to RCE - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Code Injection via custom dashboard leading to RCE - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This hunting search provides information about a vulnerability in Splunk Enterprise versions below 8.2.9, 8.1.12, 9.0.2, where an authenticated user can execute arbitrary code via the dashboard pdf generation component. Please review events with file=export in the _internal index for the potential targets of exploitation. 
@@ -1622,7 +1622,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all exports and downloads are malicious,
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Code Injection via custom dashboard leading to RCE - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Code Injection via custom dashboard leading to RCE - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -1631,7 +1631,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Splunk Code Injection via custom dashboard leading to RCE - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Splunk Code Injection via custom dashboard leading to RCE - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2022-43571"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b06b41d7-9570-4985-8137-0784f582a1b3", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1646,7 +1646,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd_ui` uri_path=*/data/ui/views/* OR uri_path=*saved/searches/* | dedup uri_path | eval URL=urldecode("uri_path")| rex field=URL "\/saved\/searches\/(?<NAME>[^\/]*)" | rex field=URL "\/data\/ui\/views\/(?<NAME1>[^\/]*)" | eval NAME=NAME."( Saved Search )",NAME1=NAME1."( Dashboard )" | eval NAME=coalesce(NAME,NAME1) | eval STATUS=case(match(status,"2\d+"),"SUCCESS",match(status,"3\d+"),"REDIRECTION",match(status,"4\d+") OR match(status,"5\d+"),"ERROR") | stats list(NAME) as DASHBOARD_TITLE,list(method) as HTTP_METHOD,list(status) as Status_Code,list(STATUS) as STATUS by user | rename user as User | `splunk_code_injection_via_custom_dashboard_leading_to_rce_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of the risky command - Delete - that may be utilized in Splunk to delete some or all data queried for. In order to use Delete in Splunk, one must be assigned the role. This is typically not used and should generate an anomaly if it is used.
@@ -1658,7 +1658,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if this comma
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -1672,7 +1672,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "cve": ["CVE-2022-32154"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8d3d5d5e-ca43-42be-aa1f-bc64375f6b04", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1687,7 +1687,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity where Search_Activity.search IN ("*| delete*") Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user by Search_Activity.search Search_Activity.info Search_Activity.total_run_time Search_Activity.user Search_Activity.search_type | `drop_dm_object_name(Search_Activity)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_delete_usage_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The Splunk platform contains built-in search processing language (SPL) safeguards to warn you when you are about to unknowingly run a search that contains commands that might be a security risk. This warning appears when you click a link or type a URL that loads a search that contains risky commands. The warning does not appear when you create ad hoc searches. This warning alerts you to the possibility of unauthorized actions by a malicious user. Unauthorized actions include - Copying or transferring data (data exfiltration), Deleting data and Overwriting data. All risky commands may be found here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warninga. A possible scenario when this might occur is when a malicious actor creates a search that includes commands that exfiltrate or damage data. The malicious actor then sends an unsuspecting user a link to the search. The URL contains a query string (q) and a search identifier (sid), but the sid is not valid. The malicious actor hopes the user will use the link and the search will run. During analysis, pivot based on user name and filter any user or queries not needed. Queries ran from a dashboard are seen as adhoc queries. When a query runs from a dashboard it will not show in audittrail logs the source dashboard name. The query defaults to adhoc and no Splunk system user activity. In addition, modify this query by removing key commands that generate too much noise, or too little, and create separate queries with higher confidence to alert on.
@@ -1699,7 +1699,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present until proper
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -1708,7 +1708,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 40, "cve": ["CVE-2022-32154", "CVE-2024-29946"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1cf58ae1-9177-40b8-a26c-8966040f11ae", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1723,7 +1723,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity where Search_Activity.search IN ("*| runshellscript *", "*| collect *","*| delete *", "*| fit *", "*| outputcsv *", "*| outputlookup *", "*| run *", "*| script *", "*| sendalert *", "*| sendemail *", "*| tscolle*") Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user by Search_Activity.search Search_Activity.info Search_Activity.total_run_time Search_Activity.user Search_Activity.search_type | `drop_dm_object_name(Search_Activity)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_commands_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection utilizes machine learning model named "risky_command_abuse" trained from "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK Baseline". It should be scheduled to run hourly to detect whether a user has run searches containing risky SPL from this list https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warninga with abnormally long running time in the past one hour, comparing with his/her past seven days history. This search uses the trained baseline to infer whether a search is an outlier (isOutlier ~= 1.0) or not (isOutlier~= 0.0)
@@ -1735,7 +1735,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = If the run time of a search exceeds the boun
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -1749,7 +1749,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 40, "cve": ["CVE-2022-32154"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "19d0146c-2eae-4e53-8d39-1198a78fa9ca", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1764,7 +1764,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats sum(Search_Activity.total_run_time) AS run_time, values(Search_Activity.search) as searches, count FROM datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity WHERE (Search_Activity.user!="") AND (Search_Activity.total_run_time>1) AND (earliest=-1h@h latest=now) AND (Search_Activity.search IN ("*| runshellscript *", "*| collect *","*| delete *", "*| fit *", "*| outputcsv *", "*| outputlookup *", "*| run *", "*| script *", "*| sendalert *", "*| sendemail *", "*| tscolle*")) AND (Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc) AND (Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user) BY _time, Search_Activity.user span=1h | apply risky_command_abuse | fields _time, Search_Activity.user, searches, run_time, IsOutlier(run_time) | rename IsOutlier(run_time) as isOutlier, _time as timestamp | where isOutlier>0.5 | `splunk_command_and_scripting_interpreter_risky_spl_mltk_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk csrf in the ssg kvstore client endpoint - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk csrf in the ssg kvstore client endpoint - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In Splunk Enterprise versions below 8.1.13, 8.2.10, and 9.0.4, a cross-site request forgery in the Splunk Secure Gateway (SSG) app in the kvstore_client endpoint allows for updating SSG KV store collections via a GET request. SSG is a Splunk Built app included by default with Splunk Enterprise. The vulnerability affects instances with SSG and Splunk Web enabled. This hunting search provides information on affected server specific method and post data that may reveal exploitation of this vulnerability.
@@ -1776,7 +1776,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This hunting search only applies to the affe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk csrf in the ssg kvstore client endpoint - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk csrf in the ssg kvstore client endpoint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -1790,7 +1790,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk csrf in the ssg kvstore client endpoint - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk csrf in the ssg kvstore client endpoint - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2023-22942"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4742d5f7-ce00-45ce-9c79-5e98b43b4410", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1811,7 +1811,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkda` uri_path="/en-US/splunkd/__raw/services/ssg/kvstore_client" method="GET" delete_field_value="spacebridge_server" status="200"  | table splunk_server status uri delete_field_value method post_data  | `splunk_csrf_in_the_ssg_kvstore_client_endpoint_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Data exfiltration from Analytics Workspace using sid query - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Data exfiltration from Analytics Workspace using sid query - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This hunting search allows operator to discover attempts to exfiltrate data by executing a prepositioned malicious search ID in Analytic Workspace in Splunk Enterprise versions 8.2.9,8.1.12,9.0.2. The attack is browser-based. It requires the attacker to compel a victim to initiate a request within their browser (phishing). The attacker cannot exploit the vulnerability at will.
@@ -1823,7 +1823,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search may produce false positives.  Th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Data exfiltration from Analytics Workspace using sid query - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Data exfiltration from Analytics Workspace using sid query - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -1832,7 +1832,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Data exfiltration from Analytics Workspace using sid query - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Data exfiltration from Analytics Workspace using sid query - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2022-43566"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1567"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b6d77c6c-f011-4b03-8650-8f10edb7c4a8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `audit_searches` info=granted search NOT ("audit_searches") search NOT ("security_content_summariesonly") AND ((search="*mstats*[*]*" AND provenance="N/A") OR (search="*mstats*\\\"*[*]*\\\"*"))| eval warning=if(match(search,"\\\\\""), "POTENTIAL INJECTION STAGING", "POTENTIAL INJECTION EXECUTION") | table search, user, warning, timestamp | `splunk_data_exfiltration_from_analytics_workspace_using_sid_query_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search will check the TLS validation is properly configured on the search head it is run from as well as its search peers after Splunk version 9. Other components such as additional search heads or anything this rest command cannot be distributed to will need to be manually checked.
@@ -1859,7 +1859,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = No known at this time.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -1868,7 +1868,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2022-32153"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1587.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3c162281-7edb-4ebc-b9a4-5087aaf28fa7", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1883,7 +1883,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | rest /services/server/info | table splunk_server version server_roles | join splunk_server [| rest /servicesNS/nobody/search/configs/conf-server/ search="sslConfig"| table splunk_server sslVerifyServerCert sslVerifyServerName serverCert] | fillnull value="Not Set" | rename sslVerifyServerCert as "Server.conf:SslConfig:sslVerifyServerCert", sslVerifyServerName as "Server.conf:SslConfig:sslVerifyServerName", serverCert as "Server.conf:SslConfig:serverCert" | `splunk_digital_certificates_infrastructure_version_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to the authentication that happens between Universal Forwarders and Deployment Servers. In some circumstances, an unauthenticated client can download forwarder bundles from the Deployment Server. In other circumstances, a client may be allowed to publish a forwarder bundle to other clients, which may allow for arbitrary code execution. The fixes for these require upgrading to at least Splunk 9.0 on the forwarder as well. This is a great opportunity to configure TLS across the environment. This search looks for forwarders that are not using TLS and adds risk to those entities.
@@ -1895,7 +1895,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -1909,7 +1909,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2022-32151"], "impact": 25, "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1587.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "386a7ebc-737b-48cf-9ca8-5405459ed508", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1924,7 +1924,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd` group="tcpin_connections" ssl="false" | stats values(sourceIp) latest(fwdType) latest(version) by hostname | `splunk_digital_certificates_lack_of_encryption_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk DoS Using Malformed SAML Request - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk DoS Using Malformed SAML Request - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In Splunk Enterprise versions lower than 9.0.6, and 8.2.12, an attacker can send a malformed security assertion markup language SAML request to the /saml/acs REST endpoint which can cause a denial of service through a crash or hang of the Splunk daemon.The SAML extensible markup language (XML) parser does not fail SAML signature validation when the attacker modifies the URI in the SAML request. Instead it attempts to access the modified URI, which causes the Splunk daemon to crash or hang.
@@ -1936,7 +1936,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search will show false positives. The a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk DoS Using Malformed SAML Request - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk DoS Using Malformed SAML Request - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -1945,7 +1945,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk DoS Using Malformed SAML Request - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk DoS Using Malformed SAML Request - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1498"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8e8a86d5-f323-4567-95be-8e817e2baee6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1960,7 +1960,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd` event_message=*error* expr=*xpointer* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by component expr splunk_server event_message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_dos_using_malformed_saml_request_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk DOS Via Dump SPL Command - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk DOS Via Dump SPL Command - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In Splunk Enterprise versions below 9.0.5, 8.2.11, and 8.1.14, an attacker can exploit a vulnerability in the dump SPL command to cause a Denial of Service by crashing the Splunk daemon.
@@ -1972,7 +1972,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Segmentation faults may occur due to other c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk DOS Via Dump SPL Command - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk DOS Via Dump SPL Command - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -1981,7 +1981,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk DOS Via Dump SPL Command - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk DOS Via Dump SPL Command - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1499.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fb0e6823-365f-48ed-b09e-272ac4c1dad6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -1996,7 +1996,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunk_crash_log` "*Segmentation fault*" | stats count by host _time | `splunk_dos_via_dump_spl_command_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = On March 24th, 2022, Splunk published a security advisory for a possible Denial of Service stemming from the lack of validation in a specific key-value field in the Splunk-to-Splunk (S2S) protocol. This detection will alert on attempted exploitation in patched versions of Splunk.
@@ -2008,7 +2008,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -2022,7 +2022,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2021-3422"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1498"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fc246e56-953b-40c1-8634-868f9e474cbd", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2043,7 +2043,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd` log_level="ERROR" component="TcpInputProc" thread_name="FwdDataReceiverThread" "Invalid _meta atom" | table host, src | `splunk_dos_via_malformed_s2s_request_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk DOS via printf search function - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk DOS via printf search function - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This hunting search provides information on detecting a vulnerability In Splunk Enterprise versions lower than 8.1.14, 8.2.12, 9.0.6, and 9.1.1, an attacker can use the printf SPL function to perform a denial of service against the Splunk Enterprise instance.
@@ -2055,7 +2055,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search may produces false positives, an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk DOS via printf search function - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk DOS via printf search function - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -2064,7 +2064,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk DOS via printf search function - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk DOS via printf search function - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2023-40594"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1499.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "78b48d08-075c-4eac-bd07-e364c3780867", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2079,7 +2079,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `audit_searches` "*makeresults * eval * fieldformat *printf*" user!="splunk_system_user" search!="*audit_searches*" | stats count by user splunk_server host search | convert ctime(*time) |`splunk_dos_via_printf_search_function_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Edit User Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Edit User Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = A low-privilege user who holds a role that has the edit_user capability assigned to it can escalate their privileges to that of the admin user by providing specially crafted web requests.
@@ -2091,7 +2091,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search may produce false positives as p
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Edit User Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Edit User Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -2100,7 +2100,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Edit User Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Edit User Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2023-32707"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "39e1c326-67d7-4c0d-8584-8056354f6593", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2115,7 +2115,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `audittrail` action IN ("change_own_password","password_change","edit_password") AND info="granted" AND NOT user IN (admin, splunk-system-user) | stats earliest(_time) as event_time values(index) as index values(sourcetype) as sourcetype values(action) as action values(info) as info by user | `splunk_edit_user_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Endpoint Denial of Service DoS Zip Bomb - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Endpoint Denial of Service DoS Zip Bomb - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search allows operator to identify Splunk search app crashes resulting from specially crafted ZIP file using file monitoring that affects UF versions 8.1.11 and 8.2 versions below 8.2.7.1. It is not possible to detect Zip Bomb attack before crash. This search will provide Universal Forwarder errors from uploaded binary files (zip compression) which are used for this attack. If an analyst sees results from this search we suggest you investigate and triage what zip file was uploaded, zip compressed files may have different extensions.
@@ -2127,7 +2127,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search may reveal non malicious zip fil
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Endpoint Denial of Service DoS Zip Bomb - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Endpoint Denial of Service DoS Zip Bomb - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -2141,7 +2141,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Endpoint Denial of Service DoS Zip Bomb - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Endpoint Denial of Service DoS Zip Bomb - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 75, "cve": ["CVE-2022-37439"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1499"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b237d393-2f57-4531-aad7-ad3c17c8b041", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd` component=FileClassifierManager event_message=*invalid* event_message=*binary* |stats count by host component event_message | `splunk_endpoint_denial_of_service_dos_zip_bomb_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Enterprise KV Store Incorrect Authorization - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Enterprise KV Store Incorrect Authorization - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In Splunk Enterprise versions below 9.0.8 and 9.1.3, Splunk app key value store KV Store improperly handles permissions for users using the REST application programming interface (API). This can potentially result in the deletion of KV Store collections.
@@ -2174,7 +2174,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a hunting search and will produce fa
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Enterprise KV Store Incorrect Authorization - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Enterprise KV Store Incorrect Authorization - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -2183,7 +2183,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Enterprise KV Store Incorrect Authorization - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Enterprise KV Store Incorrect Authorization - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2024-23675"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8f0e8380-a835-4f2b-b749-9ce119364df0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2198,7 +2198,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkda` uri=/servicesNS/nobody/search/admin/collections-conf/_reload status=2* method="POST" user=* file=_reload | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(status) as status by host clientip file method | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_enterprise_kv_store_incorrect_authorization_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Enterprise Windows Deserialization File Partition - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Windows Deserialization File Partition - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In Splunk Enterprise for Windows versions below 9.0.8 and 9.1.3, Splunk Enterprise does not correctly sanitize path input data resulting in the unsafe deserialization of untrusted data. This vulnerability only affects Splunk Enterprise for Windows.
@@ -2210,7 +2210,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Irregular path with files that may be purpos
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Enterprise Windows Deserialization File Partition - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Windows Deserialization File Partition - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -2224,7 +2224,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Enterprise Windows Deserialization File Partition - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Windows Deserialization File Partition - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2024-23678"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "947d4d2e-1b64-41fc-b32a-736ddb88ce97", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2245,7 +2245,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunk_python` request_path="/en-US/app/search/C:\\Program" *strings* | rex "request_path=(?<file_path>[^\"]+)" | rex field=file_path "[^\"]+/(?<file_name>[^\"\'\s/\\\\]+)" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(file_path) as file_path values(file_name) as file_name by index, sourcetype, host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_enterprise_windows_deserialization_file_partition_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk ES DoS Investigations Manager via Investigation Creation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk ES DoS Investigations Manager via Investigation Creation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In Splunk Enterprise Security (ES) versions lower than 7.1.2, an attacker can create a malformed Investigation to perform a denial of service (DoS). The malformed investigation prevents the generation and rendering of the Investigations manager until it is deleted.
@@ -2257,7 +2257,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The vulnerability requires an authenticated
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk ES DoS Investigations Manager via Investigation Creation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk ES DoS Investigations Manager via Investigation Creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise Security"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -2271,7 +2271,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk ES DoS Investigations Manager via Investigation Creation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk ES DoS Investigations Manager via Investigation Creation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2024-22165"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1499"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7f6a07bd-82ef-46b8-8eba-802278abd00e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2292,7 +2292,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd_investigation_rest_handler` method=put msg=*investigation* status=error | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user host method msg | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_es_dos_investigations_manager_via_investigation_creation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk ES DoS Through Investigation Attachments - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk ES DoS Through Investigation Attachments - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In Splunk Enterprise Security (ES) versions below 7.1.2, an attacker can use investigation attachments to perform a denial of service (DoS) to the Investigation. The attachment endpoint does not properly limit the size of the request which lets an attacker cause the Investigation to become inaccessible.
@@ -2304,7 +2304,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search will show the exact DoS event vi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk ES DoS Through Investigation Attachments - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk ES DoS Through Investigation Attachments - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise Security"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -2318,7 +2318,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk ES DoS Through Investigation Attachments - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk ES DoS Through Investigation Attachments - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2024-22164"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1499"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bb85b25e-2d6b-4e39-bd27-50db42edcb8f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2339,7 +2339,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd_investigation_rest_handler` status=error object=investigation | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(status) as status values(msg) as msg values(id) as investigation_id by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_es_dos_through_investigation_attachments_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk HTTP Response Splitting Via Rest SPL Command - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk HTTP Response Splitting Via Rest SPL Command - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = A low-privileged user, using a specially crafted search command, can trigger an HTTP response splitting vulnerability with the rest SPL command that lets them potentially access other REST endpoints in the system arbitrarily, including accessing restricted content such as password files. This is because the user is able to inject the rest SPL command into the q parameter of an HTTP GET web request. The vulnerability requires the attacker to phish the victim by tricking them into initiating a request within their browser. The attacker cannot exploit the vulnerability at will.
@@ -2351,7 +2351,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search may have produce false positives
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk HTTP Response Splitting Via Rest SPL Command - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk HTTP Response Splitting Via Rest SPL Command - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -2360,7 +2360,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk HTTP Response Splitting Via Rest SPL Command - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk HTTP Response Splitting Via Rest SPL Command - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.006"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e615a0e1-a1b2-4196-9865-8aa646e1708c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2375,7 +2375,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `audit_searches` AND search IN ("*|*rest*POST*","*|*rest*PUT*","*|*rest*PATCH*","*|*rest*DELETE*") AND NOT search="*audit_searches*" | table user info has_error_msg search _time  | `splunk_http_response_splitting_via_rest_spl_command_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Improperly Formatted Parameter Crashes splunkd - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Improperly Formatted Parameter Crashes splunkd - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. In Splunk Enterprise versions below 8.1.13, 8.2.10, and 9.0.4, when the INGEST\\_EVAL parameter is improperly formatted, it crashes splunkd. This hunting search provides the user, timing and number of times the crashing command was executed. 
@@ -2387,7 +2387,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a hunting search it should be focuse
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Improperly Formatted Parameter Crashes splunkd - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Improperly Formatted Parameter Crashes splunkd - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -2401,7 +2401,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Splunk Improperly Formatted Parameter Crashes splunkd - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Splunk Improperly Formatted Parameter Crashes splunkd - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2023-22941"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1499"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "08978eca-caff-44c1-84dc-53f17def4e14", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2422,7 +2422,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity where (Search_Activity.search="*makeresults*"AND Search_Activity.search="*ingestpreview*transforms*") Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc Search_Activity.search!="*splunk_improperly_formatted_parameter_crashes_splunkd_filter*" Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user by Search_Activity.search, Search_Activity.info, Search_Activity.total_run_time, Search_Activity.user, Search_Activity.search_type | `drop_dm_object_name(Search_Activity)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_improperly_formatted_parameter_crashes_splunkd_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Information Disclosure in Splunk Add-on Builder - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Information Disclosure in Splunk Add-on Builder - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In Splunk Add-on Builder versions below 4.1.4, the application writes sensitive information to its internal log files when you visit the Splunk Add-on Builder or when you build or edit a custom app or add-on.
@@ -2434,7 +2434,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search is highly specific for vulnerabl
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Information Disclosure in Splunk Add-on Builder - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Information Disclosure in Splunk Add-on Builder - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -2443,7 +2443,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Information Disclosure in Splunk Add-on Builder - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Information Disclosure in Splunk Add-on Builder - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b7b82980-4a3e-412e-8661-4531d8758735", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2458,7 +2458,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | rest /services/apps/local | search disabled=0 core=0 label="Splunk Add-on Builder" | dedup label | search version < 4.1.4 | eval WarningMessage="Splunk Add-on Builder Versions older than v4.1.4 contain a critical vulnerability. Update to Splunk Add-on Builder v4.1.4 or higher immediately. For more information about this vulnerability, please refer to https://advisory.splunk.com/advisories/SVD-2024-0111" | table label version WarningMessage | `splunk_information_disclosure_in_splunk_add_on_builder_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk list all nonstandard admin accounts - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk list all nonstandard admin accounts - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will enumerate all Splunk Accounts with administrative rights on this instance.  It deliberately ignores the default admin account since this is assumed to be present.  This search may help in a detection the Cross-Site Scripting Attack listed: In Splunk Enterprise versions below 8.1.13, 8.2.10, and 9.0.4, a View allows for Cross-Site Scripting in an XML View through the 'layoutPanel' attribute in the 'module' tag. The vulnerability affects instances with Splunk Web enabled. 
@@ -2470,7 +2470,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is not possible to discern from the user
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk list all nonstandard admin accounts - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk list all nonstandard admin accounts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -2479,7 +2479,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Splunk list all nonstandard admin accounts - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Splunk list all nonstandard admin accounts - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2023-22933"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "401d689c-8596-4c6b-a710-7b6fdca296d3", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2494,7 +2494,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | rest splunk_server=local /services/authentication/users |search capabilities=admin* OR imported_capabilities=admin* title!=admin | table title roles capabilities splunk_server | `splunk_list_all_nonstandard_admin_accounts_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Low Privilege User Can View Hashed Splunk Password - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Low Privilege User Can View Hashed Splunk Password - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In Splunk Enterprise versions below 9.0.5, 8.2.11, and 8.1.14, a low-privilege user who holds the user role can see the hashed version of the initial user name and password for the Splunk instance by using the rest SPL command against the conf-user-seed REST endpoint. This can lead to a privilege escalation that lets the user take over the admin account on the instance.
@@ -2506,7 +2506,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search may produce false positives as a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Low Privilege User Can View Hashed Splunk Password - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Low Privilege User Can View Hashed Splunk Password - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -2515,7 +2515,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Low Privilege User Can View Hashed Splunk Password - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Low Privilege User Can View Hashed Splunk Password - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a1be424d-e59c-4583-b6f9-2dcc23be4875", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2530,7 +2530,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd_web` uri="*/servicesNS/nobody/system/configs/conf-user-seed*" | stats earliest(_time) as event_time values(method) as method values(status) as status values(clientip) as clientip values(useragent) as useragent values(file) as file by user | convert ctime(*time) | `splunk_low_privilege_user_can_view_hashed_splunk_password_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Path Traversal In Splunk App For Lookup File Edit - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Path Traversal In Splunk App For Lookup File Edit - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In Splunk Enterprise versions below 9.0.5, 8.2.11, and 8.1.14, a low-privilege user with access to the Splunk App for Lookup File Editing can, with a specially crafted web request, trigger a path traversal exploit that can then be used to read and write to restricted areas of the Splunk installation directory, including but not limited to the password hash file for the instance.
@@ -2542,7 +2542,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search may find additional path travers
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Path Traversal In Splunk App For Lookup File Edit - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Path Traversal In Splunk App For Lookup File Edit - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -2551,7 +2551,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Path Traversal In Splunk App For Lookup File Edit - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Path Traversal In Splunk App For Lookup File Edit - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1083"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8ed58987-738d-4917-9e44-b8ef6ab948a6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2566,7 +2566,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkda` uri_query=*lookup_file* | table clientip uri_query lookup_file owner namespace  version | stats count by clientip namespace lookup_file uri_query | `splunk_path_traversal_in_splunk_app_for_lookup_file_edit_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Persistent XSS Via URL Validation Bypass W Dashboard - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Persistent XSS Via URL Validation Bypass W Dashboard - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In Splunk Enterprise versions below 9.0.4, 8.2.10, and 8.1.13, a low-privileged user can bypass URL validation to perform a path traversal and access restricted and confidential information by targeting other users on the instance, including the admin user.  The only affected version of bootstrap which shipped with Splunk was version 2.3.1, so the search is targeted at that version alone.
@@ -2578,7 +2578,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search will produce numerous false posi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Persistent XSS Via URL Validation Bypass W Dashboard - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Persistent XSS Via URL Validation Bypass W Dashboard - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -2587,7 +2587,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Persistent XSS Via URL Validation Bypass W Dashboard - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Persistent XSS Via URL Validation Bypass W Dashboard - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 20, "cve": ["CVE-2019-8331"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8a43558f-a53c-4ee4-86c1-30b1e8ef3606", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2602,7 +2602,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd_web` method=GET uri_path="*bootstrap-2.3.1*" file="*.js" | table _time clientip uri_path file status | `splunk_persistent_xss_via_url_validation_bypass_w_dashboard_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to the authentication that happens between Universal Forwarders and Deployment Servers. In some circumstances, an unauthenticated client can download forwarder bundles from the Deployment Server. This hunting search pulls a full list of forwarder bundle downloads where the peer column is the forwarder, the host column is the Deployment Server, and then you have a list of the apps downloaded and the serverclasses in which the peer is a member of. You should look for apps or clients that you do not recognize as being part of your environment.
@@ -2614,7 +2614,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -2623,7 +2623,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2022-32157"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8ea57d78-1aac-45d2-a913-0cd603fb6e9e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2638,7 +2638,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd` component="PackageDownloadRestHandler" | stats values(app) values(serverclass) by peer, host | `splunk_process_injection_forwarder_bundle_downloads_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = On June 14th, 2022, Splunk released a security advisory relating to TLS validation occuring within the httplib and urllib python libraries shipped with Splunk. In addition to upgrading to Splunk Enterprise 9.0 or later, several configuration settings need to be set. This search will check those configurations on the search head it is run from as well as its search peers. In addition to these settings, the PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY setting in $SPLUNK_HOME/etc/splunk-launch.conf needs to be enabled as well. Other components such as additional search heads or anything this rest command cannot be distributed to will need to be manually checked.
@@ -2650,7 +2650,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While all of the settings on each device ret
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -2659,7 +2659,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2022-32151"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1001.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "900892bf-70a9-4787-8c99-546dd98ce461", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2674,7 +2674,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | rest /services/server/info | table splunk_server version server_roles | join splunk_server [| rest /servicesNS/nobody/search/configs/conf-server/ search="PythonSslClientConfig" | table splunk_server sslVerifyServerCert sslVerifyServerName] | join splunk_server [| rest /servicesNS/nobody/search/configs/conf-web/settings |  table splunk_server serverCert sslVersions] | rename sslVerifyServerCert as "Server.conf:PythonSSLClientConfig:sslVerifyServerCert", sslVerifyServerName as "Server.conf:PythonSSLClientConfig:sslVerifyServerName", serverCert as "Web.conf:Settings:serverCert", sslVersions as "Web.conf:Settings:sslVersions" | `splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_configuration_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = On June 14th 2022, Splunk released vulnerability advisory addresing Python TLS validation which was not set before Splunk version 9. This search displays events showing WARNING of using Splunk issued default selfsigned certificates.
@@ -2686,7 +2686,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This searches finds self signed certificates
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -2695,7 +2695,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2022-32152"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c76c7a2e-df49-414a-bb36-dce2683770de", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2710,7 +2710,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd` certificate event_message="X509 certificate* should not be used*" | stats count by host CN component log_level | `splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_selfsigned_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = On Splunk version 9 on Python3 client libraries verify server certificates by default and use CA certificate store. This search warns a user about a failure to validate a certificate using python3 request.
@@ -2722,7 +2722,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search tries to address validation of s
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -2731,7 +2731,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2022-32152"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "839d12a6-b119-4d44-ac4f-13eed95412c8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2746,7 +2746,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunk_python` "simpleRequest SSL certificate validation is enabled without hostname verification" | stats count by host path | `splunk_protocol_impersonation_weak_encryption_simplerequest_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk RBAC Bypass On Indexing Preview REST Endpoint - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk RBAC Bypass On Indexing Preview REST Endpoint - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = An unauthorized user can use the /services/indexing/preview REST endpoint to overwrite search results if they know the search ID (SID) of an existing search job.
@@ -2758,7 +2758,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a hunting search which provides verb
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk RBAC Bypass On Indexing Preview REST Endpoint - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk RBAC Bypass On Indexing Preview REST Endpoint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -2767,7 +2767,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk RBAC Bypass On Indexing Preview REST Endpoint - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk RBAC Bypass On Indexing Preview REST Endpoint - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bbe26f95-1655-471d-8abd-3d32fafa86f8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2782,7 +2782,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkda` method="POST" uri="*/services/indexing/preview*" | table host clientip status useragent user uri_path | `splunk_rbac_bypass_on_indexing_preview_rest_endpoint_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via Serialized Session Payload - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk RCE via Serialized Session Payload - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In Splunk Enterprise versions lower than 8.2.12, 9.0.6, and 9.1.1, an attacker can execute a specially crafted query that they can then use to serialize untrusted data. The attacker can use the query to execute arbitrary code. The exploit requires the use of the 'collect' SPL command which writes a file within the Splunk Enterprise installation.  The attacker can then use this file to submit a serialized payload that can result in execution of code within the payload. Please refer to the following URL for additional information on these disclosures - https://advisory.splunk.com
@@ -2794,7 +2794,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There are numerous many uses of the 'makeres
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via Serialized Session Payload - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk RCE via Serialized Session Payload - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -2803,7 +2803,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via Serialized Session Payload - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk RCE via Serialized Session Payload - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2023-40595"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d1d8fda6-874a-400f-82cf-dcbb59d8e4db", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2818,7 +2818,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `audit_searches` file=* (search="*makeresults*" AND search="*collect*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action file user splunk_server search | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_rce_via_serialized_session_payload_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via Splunk Secure Gateway  Splunk Mobile alerts feature - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk RCE via Splunk Secure Gateway  Splunk Mobile alerts feature - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This hunting search provides information on possible exploitation attempts against Splunk Secure Gateway App Mobile Alerts feature in Splunk versions 9.0, 8.2.x, 8.1.x. An authenticated user can run arbitrary operating system commands remotely through the use of specially crafted requests to the mobile alerts feature in the Splunk Secure Gateway app.
@@ -2830,7 +2830,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection does not require you to inges
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via Splunk Secure Gateway  Splunk Mobile alerts feature - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk RCE via Splunk Secure Gateway  Splunk Mobile alerts feature - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -2839,7 +2839,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via Splunk Secure Gateway  Splunk Mobile alerts feature - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk RCE via Splunk Secure Gateway  Splunk Mobile alerts feature - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2022-43567"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "baa41f09-df48-4375-8991-520beea161be", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2854,7 +2854,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkda` uri_path="/servicesNS/nobody/splunk_secure_gateway/storage/collections/data/mobile_alerts*" sort="notification.created_at:-1" | table  clientip file host method uri_query sort | `splunk_rce_via_splunk_secure_gateway__splunk_mobile_alerts_feature_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via User XSLT - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk RCE via User XSLT - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search provides information to investigate possible remote code execution exploitation via user-supplied Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformations (XSLT), affecting Splunk versions 9.1.x.
@@ -2866,7 +2866,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search will provide information for inv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via User XSLT - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk RCE via User XSLT - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -2875,7 +2875,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via User XSLT - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk RCE via User XSLT - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6cb7e011-55fb-48e3-a98d-164fa854e37e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2890,7 +2890,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd_ui` ((uri="*NO_BINARY_CHECK=1*" AND "*input.path=*.xsl*") OR uri="*dispatch*.xsl*") AND uri!= "*splunkd_ui*" | rex field=uri "(?<string>=\s*([\S\s]+))" | eval decoded_field=urldecode(string) | eval action=case(match(status,"200"),"Allowed",match(status,"303|500|401|403|404|301|406"),"Blocked",1=1,"Unknown") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by clientip useragent uri decoded_field action host | rename clientip as src, uri as dest_uri | iplocation src | fillnull value="N/A" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime, lastTime src, useragent, action, count, Country, Region, City, dest_uri, decoded_field
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Reflected XSS in the templates lists radio - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Reflected XSS in the templates lists radio - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Splunk versions below 8.1.12,8.2.9 and 9.0.2 are vulnerable to reflected cross site scripting (XSS). A View allows for a Reflected Cross Site scripting via JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) in a query parameter when ouput_mode=radio.
@@ -2902,7 +2902,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search may produce false positives as i
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Reflected XSS in the templates lists radio - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Reflected XSS in the templates lists radio - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -2911,7 +2911,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Reflected XSS in the templates lists radio - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Reflected XSS in the templates lists radio - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2022-43568"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d532d105-c63f-4049-a8c4-e249127ca425", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2926,7 +2926,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd_webx` user=admin status=200 uri=*/lists/entities/x/ui/views* uri_query!=null | stats count earliest(_time) as event_time values(status) as status values(clientip) as clientip by index, sourcetype, _time, host, user, uri | `splunk_reflected_xss_in_the_templates_lists_radio_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Reflected XSS on App Search Table Endpoint - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Reflected XSS on App Search Table Endpoint - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In Splunk Enterprise versions below 9.1.1, 9.0.6, and 8.2.12, an attacker can craft a special web request that can result in reflected cross-site scripting XSS on the app search table web endpoint, which presents as the Create Table View page in Splunk Web. Exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to the execution of arbitrary commands on the Splunk platform instance. A JavaScript file within this web endpoint does not properly validate input which lets an attacker insert a payload into a function.
@@ -2938,7 +2938,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search will produce false positives. It
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Reflected XSS on App Search Table Endpoint - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Reflected XSS on App Search Table Endpoint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -2947,7 +2947,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Reflected XSS on App Search Table Endpoint - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Reflected XSS on App Search Table Endpoint - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 40, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "182f9080-4137-4629-94ac-cb1083ac981a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2962,7 +2962,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd_web` (dataset_commands="*makeresults*" AND dataset_commands="*count*" AND dataset_commands="*eval*" AND dataset_commands="*baseSPL*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by clientip status user view root uri_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_reflected_xss_on_app_search_table_endpoint_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk risky Command Abuse disclosed february 2023 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk risky Command Abuse disclosed february 2023 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for a variety of high-risk commands throughout a number of different Splunk Vulnerability Disclosures.  Please refer to the following URL for additional information on these disclosures - https://advisory.splunk.com
@@ -2974,7 +2974,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search encompasses many commands.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk risky Command Abuse disclosed february 2023 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk risky Command Abuse disclosed february 2023 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -2983,7 +2983,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk risky Command Abuse disclosed february 2023 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk risky Command Abuse disclosed february 2023 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2023-22931", "CVE-2023-22934", "CVE-2023-22935", "CVE-2023-22936", "CVE-2023-22939", "CVE-2023-22940", "CVE-2023-40598", "CVE-2023-40598", "CVE-2023-46214", "CVE-2024-23676"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548", "T1202"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ee69374a-d27e-4136-adac-956a96ff60fd", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -2998,7 +2998,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats fillnull_value="N/A" count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity where Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user by Search_Activity.search Search_Activity.info Search_Activity.total_run_time Search_Activity.user Search_Activity.search_type | `drop_dm_object_name(Search_Activity)` | lookup splunk_risky_command splunk_risky_command as search output splunk_risky_command description vulnerable_versions CVE other_metadata | where splunk_risky_command != "false" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_risky_command_abuse_disclosed_february_2023_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Stored XSS via Data Model objectName field - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Stored XSS via Data Model objectName field - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Splunk Enterprise versions 8.1.12, 8.2.9, 9.0.2 are vulnerable to persistent cross site scripting via Data Model object name. An authenticated user can inject and store arbitrary scripts that can lead to persistent cross-site scripting (XSS) in the object name Data Model.
@@ -3010,7 +3010,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search may produce false positives and
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Stored XSS via Data Model objectName field - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Stored XSS via Data Model objectName field - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -3019,7 +3019,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Stored XSS via Data Model objectName field - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Stored XSS via Data Model objectName field - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2022-43569"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "062bff76-5f9c-496e-a386-cb1adcf69871", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3034,7 +3034,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd_webx` uri=/en-US/splunkd/__raw/servicesNS/*/launcher/datamodel/model* uri_query!=null | stats count by _time host status clientip user uri | `splunk_stored_xss_via_data_model_objectname_field_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Unauthenticated Log Injection Web Service Log - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Unauthenticated Log Injection Web Service Log - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = An attacker can use a specially crafted web URL in their browser to cause log file injection, in which the attack inserts American National Standards Institute (ANSI) escape codes into specific files using a terminal program that supports those escape codes. The attack requires a terminal program that supports the translation of ANSI escape codes and requires additional user interaction to successfully execute. This following analytic detects potential log injection attempts into the Splunk server.
@@ -3046,7 +3046,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This hunting search will produce false posit
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Unauthenticated Log Injection Web Service Log - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Unauthenticated Log Injection Web Service Log - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -3055,7 +3055,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Unauthenticated Log Injection Web Service Log - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Unauthenticated Log Injection Web Service Log - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "cve": ["CVE-2023-32712"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "de3908dc-1298-446d-84b9-fa81d37e959b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3070,7 +3070,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd_webx`  uri_path IN ("*\x1B*", "*\u001b*", "*\033*", "*\0x9*", "*\0x8*") | stats count by uri_path method host status clientip | `splunk_unauthenticated_log_injection_web_service_log_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk unnecessary file extensions allowed by lookup table uploads - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk unnecessary file extensions allowed by lookup table uploads - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In Splunk Enterprise versions below 8.1.13, 8.2.10, and 9.0.4, the lookup table uploads let a user upload lookup tables with unnecessary filename extensions. Lookup table file extensions may now only be one of .csv, .csv.gz, .kmz, .kml, .mmdb, or .mmdb.gz. This search provides user activity focus on uploads which aims to help hunt for malicious file uploads.
@@ -3082,7 +3082,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a hunting search, the search provide
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk unnecessary file extensions allowed by lookup table uploads - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk unnecessary file extensions allowed by lookup table uploads - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -3096,7 +3096,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk unnecessary file extensions allowed by lookup table uploads - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk unnecessary file extensions allowed by lookup table uploads - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2023-22937"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b7d1293f-e78f-415e-b5f6-443df3480082", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3117,7 +3117,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkda` method IN ("POST", "DELETE") uri_path=/servicesNS/*/ui/views/* | eval activity = case( method=="POST" AND like( uri_path , "%/acl" ) , "Permissions Update", method=="POST" AND NOT like( uri_path , "%/acl" ) , "Edited" , method=="DELETE" , "Deleted" ) | rex field=uri_path "(?<user_and_app>.*?)\/ui\/views/(?<dashboard_encoded>.*)" | eval dashboard = urldecode( dashboard_encoded ) | table _time, uri_path, user, dashboard, activity, uri_path | `splunk_unnecessary_file_extensions_allowed_by_lookup_table_uploads_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = On May 3rd, 2022, Splunk published a security advisory for  username enumeration stemming from verbose login failure messages present on some REST endpoints. This detection will alert on attempted exploitation in patched versions of Splunk as well as actual exploitation in unpatched version of Splunk.
@@ -3129,7 +3129,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Automation executing authentication attempts
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -3143,7 +3143,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2021-33845"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "25625cb4-1c4d-4463-b0f9-7cb462699cde", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3164,7 +3164,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `splunkd_failed_auths` | stats count(user) as auths by user, src | where auths>5 | stats values(user) as user, sum(auths) as TotalFailedAuths by src | `splunk_user_enumeration_attempt_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS in Highlighted JSON Events - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk XSS in Highlighted JSON Events - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection provides information about possible exploitation against affected versions of Splunk Enterprise 9.1.2. The ability to view JSON logs in the web GUI may be abused by crafting a specific request, causing the execution of javascript in script tags. This vulnerability can be used to execute javascript to access the API at the permission level of the logged-in user. If user is admin it can be used to create an admin user, giving an attacker broad access to the Splunk Environment.
@@ -3176,7 +3176,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a hunting search and will produce fa
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS in Highlighted JSON Events - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk XSS in Highlighted JSON Events - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -3185,7 +3185,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS in Highlighted JSON Events - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk XSS in Highlighted JSON Events - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1030bc63-0b37-4ac9-9ae0-9361c955a3cc", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3200,7 +3200,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd_ui` "/en-US/splunkd/__raw/servicesNS/nobody/search/authentication/users" status=201 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by clientip, uri_path, method | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_xss_in_highlighted_json_events_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. On May 3rd, 2022, Splunk published a security advisory for a reflective Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability stemming from the lack of input validation in the Distributed Monitoring Console app. This detection will alert on attempted exploitation in patched versions of Splunk as well as actual exploitation in unpatched version of Splunk. 
@@ -3212,7 +3212,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Use of the monitoring console where the less
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -3226,7 +3226,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2022-27183"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b11accac-6fa3-4103-8a1a-7210f1a67087", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3247,7 +3247,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `splunkd_web` method="GET" uri_query="description=%3C*" | table _time host status clientip user uri | `splunk_xss_in_monitoring_console_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS in Save table dialog header in search page - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk XSS in Save table dialog header in search page - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This is a hunting search to find persistent cross-site scripting XSS code that was included while inputing data in 'Save Table' dialog in Splunk Enterprise (8.1.12,8.2.9,9.0.2). A remote user with "power" Splunk role can store this code that can lead to persistent cross site scripting.
@@ -3259,7 +3259,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = If host is vulnerable and XSS script strings
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS in Save table dialog header in search page - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk XSS in Save table dialog header in search page - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Splunk Internal Logs"]
@@ -3268,7 +3268,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS in Save table dialog header in search page - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk XSS in Save table dialog header in search page - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2022-43561"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a974d1ee-ddca-4837-b6ad-d55a8a239c20", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3283,7 +3283,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `splunkd_webx` method=POST  uri=/en-US/splunkd/__raw/servicesNS/nobody/search/datamodel/model | table _time host status clientip user uri | `splunk_xss_in_save_table_dialog_header_in_search_page_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS via View - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk XSS via View - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In Splunk Enterprise versions below 8.1.13, 8.2.10, and 9.0.4, a View allows for Cross-Site Scripting in an XML View through the 'layoutPanel' attribute in the 'module' tag. The vulnerability affects instances with Splunk Web enabled. This hunting search shows users action, application and role used for creating views related to this vulnerability.
@@ -3295,7 +3295,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The error detected above can be generated fo
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS via View - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk XSS via View - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -3304,7 +3304,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS via View - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk XSS via View - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2023-22933"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9ac2bfea-a234-4a18-9d37-6d747e85c2e4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3319,7 +3319,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = index = _internal sourcetype IN ("splunk_web_service", "splunk_python") message="*loadParams*" | `security_content_ctime(_time)` |  table _time message fileName | `splunk_xss_via_view_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects emails that contain attachments with suspicious file extensions. Detecting and responding to emails with suspicious attachments can mitigate the risks associated with phishing and malware attacks, thereby protecting the organization's data and systems from potential harm. The detection is made by using a Splunk query that searches for emails in the datamodel=Email where the filename of the attachment is not empty. The analytic uses the tstats command to summarize the count, first time, and last time of the emails that meet the criteria. It groups the results by the source user, file name, and message ID of the email. The detection is important because it indicates potential phishing or malware delivery attempts in which an attacker attempts to deliver malicious content through email attachments, which can lead to data breaches, malware infections, or unauthorized access to sensitive information. Next steps include reviewing the identified emails and attachments and analyzing the source user, file name, and message ID to determine if they are legitimate or malicious. Additionally, you must inspect any relevant on-disk artifacts associated with the attachments and investigate any concurrent processes to identify the source of the attack. 
@@ -3333,7 +3333,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -3347,7 +3347,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", "Hermetic Wiper", "Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "473bd65f-06ca-4dfe-a2b8-ba04ab4a0084", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3362,7 +3362,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where All_Email.file_name="*" by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.file_name All_Email.message_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Email")` | `suspicious_email_attachments` | `suspicious_email_attachment_extensions_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for suspicious Java classes that are often used to exploit remote command execution in common Java frameworks, such as Apache Struts. 
@@ -3374,7 +3374,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There are no known false positives.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -3388,7 +3388,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6ed33786-5e87-4f55-b62c-cb5f1168b831", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3403,7 +3403,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `stream_http` http_method=POST http_content_length>1 | regex form_data="(?i)java\.lang\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)" | rename src_ip as src | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(url) as uri, values(status) as status, values(http_user_agent) as http_user_agent by src, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_java_classes_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule]
+[ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects suspicious processes on systems labeled as web servers. This detection is made by a Splunk query that searches for specific process names that might indicate malicious activity. These suspicious processes include "whoami", "ping", "iptables", "wget", "service", and "curl". Uses the Splunk data model "Endpoint.Processes" and filters the results to only include systems categorized as web servers. This detection is important because it indicates unauthorized or malicious activity on web servers since these processes are commonly used by attackers to perform reconnaissance, establish persistence, or exfiltrate data from compromised systems. The impact of such an attack can be significant, ranging from data theft to the deployment of additional malicious payloads, potentially leading to ransomware or other damaging outcomes. False positives might occur since the legitimate use of these processes on web servers can trigger the analytic. Next steps include triaging and investigating to determine the legitimacy of the activity. Also, review the source and command of the suspicious process. You must also examine any relevant on-disk artifacts and look for concurrent processes to identify the source of the attack. 
@@ -3415,7 +3415,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some of these processes may be used legitima
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -3429,7 +3429,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ec3b7601-689a-4463-94e0-c9f45638efb9", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3450,7 +3450,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest_category="web_server" AND (Processes.process="*whoami*" OR Processes.process="*ping*" OR Processes.process="*iptables*" OR Processes.process="*wget*" OR Processes.process="*service*" OR Processes.process="*curl*") by Processes.process Processes.process_name, Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_servers_executing_suspicious_processes_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule]
+[ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment by a user. 
@@ -3462,7 +3462,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -3476,7 +3476,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Compromised User Account", "Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0840ddf1-8c89-46ff-b730-c8d6722478c0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3491,7 +3491,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count as api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename "IsOutlier(api_calls)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), ":"), 0) | where api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_infrastructure_api_calls_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule]
+[ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search finds for the number successfully destroyed cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. 
@@ -3503,7 +3503,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within a cl
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -3517,7 +3517,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ef629fc9-1583-4590-b62a-f2247fbf7bbf", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3532,7 +3532,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count as instances_destroyed values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename "IsOutlier(instances_destroyed)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), ":"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_destroyed - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_destroyed, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_destroyed_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule]
+[ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search finds for the number successfully created cloud instances for every 4 hour block. This is split up between weekdays and the weekend. It then applies the probability densitiy model previously created and alerts on any outliers. 
@@ -3544,7 +3544,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an A
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -3558,7 +3558,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f2361e9f-3928-496c-a556-120cd4223a65", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3573,7 +3573,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count as instances_launched values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join HourOfDay isWeekend [summary cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename "IsOutlier(instances_launched)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), ":"), 0) | eval distance_from_threshold = instances_launched - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, instances_launched, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold, object_id | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_instances_launched_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule]
+[ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect a spike in the number of API calls made to your cloud infrastructure environment about security groups by a user. 
@@ -3585,7 +3585,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -3599,7 +3599,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d4dfb7f3-7a37-498a-b5df-f19334e871af", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3614,7 +3614,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count as security_group_api_calls values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | join user HourOfDay isWeekend [ summary cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1] | where cardinality >=16 | apply cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 threshold=0.005 | rename "IsOutlier(security_group_api_calls)" as isOutlier | where isOutlier=1 | eval expected_upper_threshold = mvindex(split(mvindex(BoundaryRanges, -1), ":"), 0) | where security_group_api_calls > expected_upper_threshold | eval distance_from_threshold = security_group_api_calls - expected_upper_threshold | table _time, user, command, security_group_api_calls, expected_upper_threshold, distance_from_threshold | `abnormally_high_number_of_cloud_security_group_api_calls_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster in AWS 
@@ -3626,7 +3626,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicio
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -3635,7 +3635,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "294c4686-63dd-4fe6-93a2-ca807626704a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3650,7 +3650,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" userAgent!="AWS Security Scanner" | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(source) as cluster_name values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) as http_user_agent values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`amazon_eks_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects unauthenticated requests made against the Kubernetes' Pods API through proactive monitoring to protect the Kubernetes environment from unauthorized access and potential security breaches. The detection is made by using the Splunk query `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` with specific filters to identify these requests. Identifies events where the `user.username` is set to "system:anonymous", the `verb` is set to "list", and the `objectRef.resource` is set to "pods". Additionally, the search checks if the `requestURI` is equal to "/api/v1/pods". Analyzing these events helps you to identify any unauthorized access attempts to the Kubernetes' Pods API. Unauthenticated requests can indicate potential security breaches or unauthorized access to sensitive resources within the Kubernetes environment. The detection is important because unauthorized access to Kubernetes' Pods API can lead to the compromise of sensitive data, unauthorized execution of commands, or even the potential for lateral movement within the Kubernetes cluster. False positives might occur since there might be legitimate use cases for unauthenticated requests in certain scenarios. Therefore, you must review and validate any detected events before taking any action.  Next steps include investigating the incident to mitigate any ongoing threats, and strengthening the security measures to prevent future unauthorized access attempts. 
@@ -3662,7 +3662,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicio
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -3671,7 +3671,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dbfca1dd-b8e5-4ba4-be0e-e565e5d62002", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3686,7 +3686,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` "user.username"="system:anonymous" verb=list objectRef.resource=pods requestURI="/api/v1/pods" | rename source as cluster_name sourceIPs{} as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(responseStatus.reason) values(responseStatus.code) values(userAgent) values(verb) values(requestURI) by src_ip cluster_name user.username user.groups{} | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `amazon_eks_kubernetes_pod_scan_detection_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule]
+[ESCU - ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic identifies an AWS IAM account with concurrent sessions coming from more than one unique IP address within the span of 5 minutes. This behavior could represent a session hijacking attack whereby an adversary has extracted cookies from a victims browser and is using them from a different location to access corporate online resources. When a user navigates the AWS Console after authentication, the API call with the event name `DescribeEventAggregates` is registered in the AWS CloudTrail logs. The Splunk Threat Research team leveraged this event name to identify 2 concurrent sessions. The presence of this event occurring from two different IP addresses is highly unlikely. As users may behave differently across organizations, security teams should test and customize this detection to fit their environments. 
@@ -3698,7 +3698,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A user with concurrent sessions from differe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
@@ -3712,7 +3712,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", "Compromised User Account"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1185"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b3424bbe-3204-4469-887b-ec144483a336", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3727,7 +3727,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DescribeEventAggregates src_endpoint.domain!="AWS Internal" | bin span=5m _time | stats values(src_endpoint.ip) as src_endpoint.ip dc(src_endpoint.ip) as distinct_ip_count by _time identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name | where distinct_ip_count > 1 | `aws_concurrent_sessions_from_different_ips_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - ASL AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule]
+[ESCU - ASL AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection rule monitors for the creation of AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) access keys. An IAM access key consists of an access key ID and secret access key, which are used to sign programmatic requests to AWS services. While IAM access keys can be legitimately used by developers and administrators for API access, their creation can also be indicative of malicious activity. Attackers who have gained unauthorized access to an AWS environment might create access keys as a means to establish persistence or to exfiltrate data through the APIs. Moreover, because access keys can be used to authenticate with AWS services without the need for further interaction, they can be particularly appealing for bad actors looking to operate under the radar. Consequently, it's important to vigilantly monitor and scrutinize access key creation events, especially if they are associated with unusual activity or are created by users who don't typically perform these actions. This hunting query identifies when a potentially compromised user creates a IAM access key for another user who may have higher privilleges, which can be a sign for privilege escalation. Hunting queries are designed to be executed manual during threat hunting. 
@@ -3739,7 +3739,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ASL AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ASL AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
@@ -3748,7 +3748,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - ASL AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - ASL AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ccb3e4af-23d6-407f-9842-a26212816c9e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3763,7 +3763,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `amazon_security_lake` api.operation=CreateAccessKey http_request.user_agent!=console.amazonaws.com api.response.error=null | rename unmapped{}.key as unmapped_key , unmapped{}.value as unmapped_value | eval keyjoin=mvzip(unmapped_key,unmapped_value) | mvexpand keyjoin | rex field=keyjoin "^(?<key>[^,]+),(?<value>.*)$" | eval {key} = value | search responseElements.accessKey.userName = * | rename identity.user.name as identity_user_name, responseElements.accessKey.userName as responseElements_accessKey_userName | eval match=if(identity_user_name=responseElements_accessKey_userName,1,0) | search match=0 | rename identity_user_name as identity.user.name , responseElements_accessKey_userName as responseElements.accessKey.userName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by responseElements.accessKey.userName api.operation api.service.name identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name identity.user.type identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`asl_aws_createaccesskey_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule]
+[ESCU - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This analytic identifies AWS `DeleteTrail` events within CloudTrail logs. Adversaries often try to impair their target's defenses by stopping their malicious activity from being logged, so that they may operate with stealth and avoid detection. When the adversary has the right type of permissions in the compromised AWS environment, they may delete the the entire cloudtrail that is logging activities in the environment. 
@@ -3775,7 +3775,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
@@ -3789,7 +3789,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Defense Evasion"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.008", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1f0b47e5-0134-43eb-851c-e3258638945e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3810,7 +3810,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteTrail | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name identity.user.type identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudtrail_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule]
+[ESCU - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This analytic identifies AWS `DeleteLogGroup` events in CloudTrail logs. Attackers may evade the logging capability by deleting the log group in CloudWatch. This will stop sending the logs and metrics to CloudWatch. When the adversary has the right type of permissions within the compromised AWS environment, they may delete the CloudWatch log group that is logging activities in the environment. 
@@ -3822,7 +3822,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
@@ -3836,7 +3836,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Defense Evasion"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562", "T1562.008"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0f701b38-a0fb-43fd-a83d-d12265f71f33", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3857,7 +3857,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeleteLogGroup | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name identity.user.type identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `asl_aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudwatch_log_group_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule]
+[ESCU - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This analytic looks for several delete specific API calls made to AWS Security Services like CloudWatch, GuardDuty and Web Application Firewalls. These API calls are often leveraged by adversaries to weaken existing security defenses by deleting logging configurations in the CloudWatch alarm, delete a set of detectors from your Guardduty environment or simply delete a bunch of CloudWatch alarms to remain stealthy and avoid detection. 
@@ -3869,7 +3869,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
@@ -3878,7 +3878,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Defense Evasion"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.008", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5029b681-0462-47b7-82e7-f7e3d37f5a2d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3893,7 +3893,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `amazon_security_lake` api.operation IN ("DeleteLogStream","DeleteDetector","DeleteIPSet","DeleteWebACL","DeleteRule","DeleteRuleGroup","DeleteLoggingConfiguration","DeleteAlarms") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name identity.user.type identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|  `asl_aws_defense_evasion_impair_security_services_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule]
+[ESCU - ASL AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment. 
@@ -3905,7 +3905,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ASL AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
@@ -3919,7 +3919,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - ASL AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - ASL AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ff2bfdbc-65b7-4434-8f08-d55761d1d446", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3934,7 +3934,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `amazon_security_lake` api.operation=Describe* OR api.operation=List* OR api.operation=Get* | stats dc(api.operation) as dc_api_operations min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(http_request.user_agent) as http_request.user_agent values(src_endpoint.ip) as src_endpoint.ip values(cloud.region) as cloud.region values(identity.user.account_uid) as identity.user.account_uid by identity.user.name | where dc_api_operations > 50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`asl_aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - ASL AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule]
+[ESCU - ASL AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following detection identifes when a policy is deleted on AWS. This does not identify whether successful or failed, but the error messages tell a story of suspicious attempts. There is a specific process to follow when deleting a policy. First, detach the policy from all users, groups, and roles that the policy is attached to, using DetachUserPolicy , DetachGroupPolicy , or DetachRolePolicy. 
@@ -3946,7 +3946,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provid
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ASL AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ASL AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
@@ -3955,7 +3955,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - ASL AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - ASL AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "609ced68-d420-4ff7-8164-ae98b4b4018c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -3970,7 +3970,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `amazon_security_lake` api.operation=DeletePolicy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation api.service.name identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name identity.user.type identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_iam_delete_policy_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic identifies an attempt to disable multi-factor authentication for an AWS IAM user. An adversary who has obtained access to an AWS tenant may disable multi-factor authentication as a way to plant a backdoor and maintain persistence using a valid account. This way the attackers can keep persistance in the environment without adding new users. 
@@ -3982,7 +3982,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = AWS Administrators may disable MFA but it is
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
@@ -3996,7 +3996,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1621", "T1556", "T1556.006"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4d2df5e0-1092-4817-88a8-79c7fa054668", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4017,7 +4017,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `amazon_security_lake` (api.operation=DeleteVirtualMFADevice OR api.operation=DeactivateMFADevice) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation api.service.name identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name identity.user.type identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - ASL AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule]
+[ESCU - ASL AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the registration of a new Multi Factor authentication method for an AWS account logged through Amazon Secruity Lake (ASL). Adversaries who have obtained unauthorized access to an AWS account may register a new MFA method to maintain persistence.
@@ -4029,7 +4029,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Newly onboarded users who are registering an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ASL AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ASL AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
@@ -4043,7 +4043,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - ASL AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ASL AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556", "T1556.006"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "33ae0931-2a03-456b-b1d7-b016c5557fbd", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4064,7 +4064,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `amazon_security_lake` api.operation=CreateVirtualMFADevice | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation api.service.name identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name identity.user.type identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule]
+[ESCU - ASL AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from Amazon Security Lake where a user is making successful API calls to view/update/delete the existing password policy in an AWS organization. It is unlikely for a regular user to conduct this operation. These events may potentially be malicious, adversaries often use this information to gain more understanding of the password defenses in place and exploit them to increase their attack surface when a user account is compromised.
@@ -4076,7 +4076,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ASL AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Security Lake"]
@@ -4085,7 +4085,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ASL AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation", "Compromised User Account"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5ade5937-11a2-4363-ba6b-39a3ee8d5b1a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4100,7 +4100,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `amazon_security_lake` "api.service.name"="iam.amazonaws.com" "api.operation" IN ("UpdateAccountPasswordPolicy","GetAccountPasswordPolicy","DeleteAccountPasswordPolicy") "api.response.error"=null | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by identity.user.account_uid identity.user.credential_uid identity.user.name identity.user.type identity.user.uid identity.user.uuid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `asl_aws_password_policy_changes_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for suspicious AWS AMI attribute modifications, such as sharing it with another AWS account or making the full AMI image public. Adversaries are known to abuse these APIs to exfiltrate sensitive organization information stored in the AWS Resources, there by its very important to monitor these seemingly benign API activity in Cloudtrail logs.
@@ -4112,7 +4112,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS admin has legitim
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -4126,7 +4126,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f2132d74-cf81-4c5e-8799-ab069e67dc9f", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4147,7 +4147,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ModifyImageAttribute (requestParameters.launchPermission.add.items{}.userId = * OR requestParameters.launchPermission.add.items{}.group = all) |  rename requestParameters.launchPermission.add.items{}.group as group_added |  rename requestParameters.launchPermission.add.items{}.userId as accounts_added | eval ami_status=if(match(group_added,"all") ,"Public AMI", "Not Public")  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  values(group_added) values(accounts_added) as accounts_added values(ami_status) by  src_ip region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id userIdentity.principalId |  `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ami_attribute_modification_for_exfiltration_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an AWS IAM account with concurrent sessions coming from more than one unique IP address within the span of 5 minutes. This behavior could represent a session hijacking attack whereby an adversary has extracted cookies from a victims browser and is using them from a different location to access corporate online resources. When a user navigates the AWS Console after authentication, the API call with the event name `DescribeEventAggregates` is registered in the AWS CloudTrail logs. The Splunk Threat Research team leveraged this event name to identify 2 concurrent sessions. The presence of this event occurring from two different IP addresses is highly unlikely. As users may behave differently across organizations, security teams should test and customize this detection to fit their environments.
@@ -4159,7 +4159,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A user with concurrent sessions from differe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -4173,7 +4173,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", "Compromised User Account"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1185"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "51c04fdb-2746-465a-b86e-b413a09c9085", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4194,7 +4194,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `cloudtrail` eventName = DescribeEventAggregates src_ip!="AWS Internal" | bin span=5m _time | stats values(userAgent) values(eventName) values(src_ip) as src_ip  dc(src_ip) as distinct_ip_count by _time user_arn | where distinct_ip_count > 1 | `aws_concurrent_sessions_from_different_ips_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an authentication attempt event against an AWS Console that fails during the Multi Factor Authentication challenge. AWS Cloudtrail logs provide a a very useful field called `additionalEventData` that logs information regarding usage of MFA. This behavior may represent an adversary trying to authenticate with compromised credentials for an account that has multi-factor authentication enabled.
@@ -4206,7 +4206,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate users may miss to reply the MFA c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -4220,7 +4220,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", "Compromised User Account"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1621"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "55349868-5583-466f-98ab-d3beb321961e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4241,7 +4241,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName= ConsoleLogin errorMessage="Failed authentication" additionalEventData.MFAUsed = "Yes" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion user_name userIdentity.arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_console_login_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user created a policy version that allows them to access any resource in their account. A widely open AWS IAM policy, especially in the context of creating a new policy version with the CreatePolicyVersion action, typically grants extensive permissions across a broad range of resources. Such policies are considered risky because they can provide more permissions than necessary, violating the principle of least privilege.
@@ -4253,7 +4253,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -4267,7 +4267,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-212bf3d0dac4", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4288,7 +4288,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=CreatePolicyVersion  eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | spath input=requestParameters.policyDocument output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | spath input=key_policy_statements output=effect path=Effect | search  effect=Allow | regex key_policy_action_1="^(\*|[\w-]+:\*)$" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(key_policy_statements) as policy_added by eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion user user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_create_policy_version_to_allow_all_resources_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection rule monitors for the creation of AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) access keys. An IAM access key consists of an access key ID and secret access key, which are used to sign programmatic requests to AWS services. While IAM access keys can be legitimately used by developers and administrators for API access, their creation can also be indicative of malicious activity. Attackers who have gained unauthorized access to an AWS environment might create access keys as a means to establish persistence or to exfiltrate data through the APIs. Moreover, because access keys can be used to authenticate with AWS services without the need for further interaction, they can be particularly appealing for bad actors looking to operate under the radar. Consequently, it's important to vigilantly monitor and scrutinize access key creation events, especially if they are associated with unusual activity or are created by users who don't typically perform these actions. This hunting query identifies when a potentially compromised user creates a IAM access key for another user who may have higher privilleges, which can be a sign for privilege escalation. Hunting queries are designed to be executed manual during threat hunting.
@@ -4300,7 +4300,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -4309,7 +4309,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4324,7 +4324,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName),1,0) | search match=0 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_createaccesskey_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A(victim A) creates a login profile for user B, followed by a AWS Console login event from user B from the same src_ip as user B. This correlated event can be indicative of privilege escalation since both events happened from the same src_ip
@@ -4336,7 +4336,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -4350,7 +4350,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf444d111", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4371,7 +4371,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName = CreateLoginProfile | rename requestParameters.userName as new_login_profile | table src_ip eventName new_login_profile userIdentity.userName  | join new_login_profile src_ip [| search `cloudtrail` eventName = ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.userName  as new_login_profile | stats count values(eventName) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn new_login_profile src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`] | `aws_createloginprofile_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access Failed Login - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Credential Access Failed Login - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = It shows that there have been an unsuccessful attempt to log in using the user identity to the AWS management console. Since the user identity has access to AWS account services and resources, an attacker might try to brute force the password for that identity.
@@ -4383,7 +4383,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Users may genuinely mistype or forget the pa
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access Failed Login - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Credential Access Failed Login - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -4397,7 +4397,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access Failed Login - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Credential Access Failed Login - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1110", "T1110.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a19b354d-0d7f-47f3-8ea6-1a7c36434968", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4418,7 +4418,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action = failure Authentication.app=AwsConsoleSignIn Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin BY Authentication.app Authentication.signature Authentication.dest  Authentication.user Authentication.action Authentication.user_id Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_credential_access_failed_login_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection analytic identifies more than 10 GetPasswordData API calls made to your AWS account with a time window of 5 minutes. Attackers can retrieve the encrypted administrator password for a running Windows instance.
@@ -4430,7 +4430,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator tooling or automated scripts m
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -4444,7 +4444,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1110", "T1110.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4d347c4a-306e-41db-8d10-b46baf71b3e2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4459,7 +4459,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=GetPasswordData eventSource = ec2.amazonaws.com |  bin _time span=5m |  stats count values(errorCode) as errorCode dc(requestParameters.instanceId) as distinct_instance_ids values(requestParameters.instanceId) as instance_ids by aws_account_id src_ip user_arn userAgent eventName _time |  where distinct_instance_ids > 10 | `aws_credential_access_getpassworddata_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The master user password for Amazon RDS DB instance can be reset using the Amazon RDS console. Using this technique, the attacker can get access to the sensitive data from the DB. Usually, the production databases may have sensitive data like Credit card information, PII, Health care Data. This event should be investigated further.
@@ -4471,7 +4471,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Users may genuinely reset the RDS password.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -4485,7 +4485,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6153c5ea-ed30-4878-81e6-21ecdb198189", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4506,7 +4506,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventSource="rds.amazonaws.com" eventName=ModifyDBInstance "requestParameters.masterUserPassword"=* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.dBInstanceIdentifier) as database_id by src awsRegion eventName userAgent user_arn| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_credential_access_rds_password_reset_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AssumeRole events where an IAM role in a different account is requested for the first time. 
@@ -4518,7 +4518,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Using multiple AWS accounts and roles is per
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -4532,7 +4532,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "21193641-cb96-4a2c-a707-d9b9a7f7792b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4547,7 +4547,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role "arn:aws:sts:*:(?<dest_account>.*):" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | lookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId, OUTPUTNEW firstTime | eval status = if(firstTime > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h"),"New Cross Account Activity","Previously Seen") |  where status = "New Cross Account Activity" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_cross_account_activity_from_previously_unseen_account_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies AWS `DeleteTrail` events within CloudTrail logs. Adversaries often try to impair their target's defenses by stopping their malicious activity from being logged, so that they may operate with stealth and avoid detection. When the adversary has the right type of permissions in the compromised AWS environment, they may delete the the entire cloudtrail that is logging activities in the environment.
@@ -4559,7 +4559,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -4573,7 +4573,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Defense Evasion"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.008", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "82092925-9ca1-4e06-98b8-85a2d3889552", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4594,7 +4594,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName = DeleteTrail eventSource = cloudtrail.amazonaws.com userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.name) as deleted_cloudtrail_name by src region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudtrail_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies AWS `DeleteLogGroup` events in CloudTrail logs. Attackers may evade the logging capability by deleting the log group in CloudWatch. This will stop sending the logs and metrics to CloudWatch. When the adversary has the right type of permissions within the compromised AWS environment, they may delete the CloudWatch log group that is logging activities in the environment.
@@ -4606,7 +4606,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -4620,7 +4620,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Defense Evasion"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562", "T1562.008"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d308b0f1-edb7-4a62-a614-af321160710f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4641,7 +4641,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName = DeleteLogGroup eventSource = logs.amazonaws.com userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.logGroupName) as log_group_name by src region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_defense_evasion_delete_cloudwatch_log_group_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for several delete specific API calls made to AWS Security Services like CloudWatch, GuardDuty and Web Application Firewalls. These API calls are often leveraged by adversaries to weaken existing security defenses by deleting logging configurations in the CloudWatch alarm, delete a set of detectors from your Guardduty environment or simply delete a bunch of CloudWatch alarms to remain stealthy and avoid detection.
@@ -4653,7 +4653,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -4662,7 +4662,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Defense Evasion"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.008", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b28c4957-96a6-47e0-a965-6c767aac1458", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4677,7 +4677,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName IN ("DeleteLogStream","DeleteDetector","DeleteIPSet","DeleteWebACL","DeleteRule","DeleteRuleGroup","DeleteLoggingConfiguration","DeleteAlarms") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName)  as eventName values(eventSource) as eventSource values(requestParameters.*) as * by src region user_arn aws_account_id user_type user_agent errorCode| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|  `aws_defense_evasion_impair_security_services_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion PutBucketLifecycle - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion PutBucketLifecycle - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies `PutBucketLifecycle` events in CloudTrail logs where a user has created a new lifecycle rule for an S3 bucket with a short expiration period. Attackers may use this API call to impair the CloudTrail logging by removing logs from the S3 bucket by changing the object expiration day to 1 day, in which case the CloudTrail logs will be deleted.
@@ -4689,7 +4689,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion PutBucketLifecycle - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion PutBucketLifecycle - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -4698,7 +4698,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion PutBucketLifecycle - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion PutBucketLifecycle - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Defense Evasion"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 40, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.008", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ce1c0e2b-9303-4903-818b-0d9002fc6ea4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4713,7 +4713,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=PutBucketLifecycle user_type=IAMUser errorCode=success |  spath path=requestParameters{}.LifecycleConfiguration{}.Rule{}.Expiration{}.Days output=expiration_days |  spath path=requestParameters{}.bucketName output=bucket_name | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  by src region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id expiration_days  bucket_name user_type| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where expiration_days < 3 | `aws_defense_evasion_putbucketlifecycle_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies `StopLogging` events in CloudTrail logs. Adversaries often try to impair their target's defenses by stopping their macliious activity from being logged, so that they may operate with stealth and avoid detection. When the adversary has the right type of permissions in the compromised AWS environment, they may easily stop logging.
@@ -4725,7 +4725,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -4739,7 +4739,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Defense Evasion"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.008", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8a2f3ca2-4eb5-4389-a549-14063882e537", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4760,7 +4760,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName = StopLogging eventSource = cloudtrail.amazonaws.com userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.name) as stopped_cloudtrail_name by src region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_defense_evasion_stop_logging_cloudtrail_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies `UpdateTrail` events in CloudTrail logs. Attackers may evade the logging capability by updating the settings and impairing them with wrong parameters. For example, Attackers may change the multi-regional log into a single region logs, which evades the logging for other regions. When the adversary has the right type of permissions in the compromised AWS environment, they may update the CloudTrail settings that is logging activities in your environment.
@@ -4772,7 +4772,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -4786,7 +4786,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Defense Evasion"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562", "T1562.008"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7c921d28-ef48-4f1b-85b3-0af8af7697db", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4807,7 +4807,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateTrail eventSource = cloudtrail.amazonaws.com userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.name) as cloudtrail_name by src region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_defense_evasion_update_cloudtrail_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule]
+[ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of an user attaching itself to a different role trust policy. This can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. 
@@ -4819,7 +4819,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Attach to policy can create a lot of noise.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -4828,7 +4828,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "88fc31dd-f331-448c-9856-d3d51dd5d3a1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4843,7 +4843,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` attach policy| spath requestParameters.policyArn | table sourceIPAddress user_access_key userIdentity.arn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn eventName errorCode errorMessage status action requestParameters.policyArn userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.creationDate  | `aws_detect_attach_to_role_policy_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule]
+[ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of accounts creating permanent keys. Permanent keys are not created by default and they are only needed for programmatic calls. Creation of Permanent key is an important event to monitor. 
@@ -4855,7 +4855,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all permanent key creations are maliciou
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -4864,7 +4864,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "12d6d713-3cb4-4ffc-a064-1dca3d1cca01", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4879,7 +4879,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` CreateAccessKey | spath eventName | search eventName=CreateAccessKey "userIdentity.type"=IAMUser | table sourceIPAddress userName userIdentity.type userAgent action status responseElements.accessKey.createDate responseElements.accessKey.status responseElements.accessKey.accessKeyId |`aws_detect_permanent_key_creation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - aws detect role creation - Rule]
+[ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of role creation by IAM users. Role creation is an event by itself if user is creating a new role with trust policies different than the available in AWS and it can be used for lateral movement and escalation of privileges. 
@@ -4891,7 +4891,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = CreateRole is not very common in common user
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - aws detect role creation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -4900,7 +4900,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - aws detect role creation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - aws detect role creation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5f04081e-ddee-4353-afe4-504f288de9ad", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4915,7 +4915,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` event_name=CreateRole action=created userIdentity.type=AssumedRole requestParameters.description=Allows* | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.principalId userIdentity.arn action event_name awsRegion http_user_agent mfa_auth msg requestParameters.roleName requestParameters.description responseElements.role.arn responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_role_creation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule]
+[ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:AssumeRole. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. 
@@ -4927,7 +4927,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Sts:AssumeRole can be very noisy as it is a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -4936,7 +4936,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8e565314-b6a2-46d8-9f05-1a34a176a662", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4951,7 +4951,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` user_type=AssumedRole userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.type=Role | table sourceIPAddress userIdentity.arn user_agent user_access_key status action requestParameters.roleName responseElements.role.roleName responseElements.role.createDate | `aws_detect_sts_assume_role_abuse_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule]
+[ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of suspicious use of sts:GetSessionToken. These tokens can be created on the go and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. 
@@ -4963,7 +4963,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Sts:GetSessionToken can be very noisy as in
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -4972,7 +4972,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cross Account Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "85d7b35f-b8b5-4b01-916f-29b81e7a0551", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -4987,7 +4987,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` ASIA  userIdentity.type=IAMUser| spath eventName | search eventName=GetSessionToken | table sourceIPAddress eventTime userIdentity.arn userName userAgent user_type status region | `aws_detect_sts_get_session_token_abuse_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search provides detection of KMS keys where action kms:Encrypt is accessible for everyone (also outside of your organization). This is an indicator that your account is compromised and the attacker uses the encryption key to compromise another company.
@@ -4999,7 +4999,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5013,7 +5013,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware Cloud"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c79c164f-4b21-4847-98f9-cf6a9f49179e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5034,7 +5034,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateKey OR eventName=PutKeyPolicy | spath input=requestParameters.policy output=key_policy_statements path=Statement{} | mvexpand key_policy_statements | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_1 path=Action | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_action_2 path=Action{} | eval key_policy_action=mvappend(key_policy_action_1, key_policy_action_2) | spath input=key_policy_statements output=key_policy_principal path=Principal.AWS | search key_policy_action="kms:Encrypt" AND key_policy_principal="*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventName eventSource eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_creating_keys_with_encrypt_policy_without_mfa_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search provides detection of users with KMS keys performing encryption specifically against S3 buckets.
@@ -5046,7 +5046,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There maybe buckets provisioned with S3 encr
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5060,7 +5060,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware Cloud"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "884a5f59-eec7-4f4a-948b-dbde18225fdc", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5075,7 +5075,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=CopyObject requestParameters.x-amz-server-side-encryption="aws:kms" | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName, requestParameters.x-amz-copy-source AS src_file, requestParameters.key AS dest_file | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(bucketName) as bucketName values(src_file) AS src_file values(dest_file) AS dest_file values(userAgent) AS userAgent values(region) AS region values(src) AS src by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_detect_users_with_kms_keys_performing_encryption_s3_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Disable Bucket Versioning - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Disable Bucket Versioning - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects AWS cloudtrail events where bucket versioning is suspended by a user. Versioning allows the AWS Administrators to maintain different version of the S3 bucket which can be used to recover deleted data. Adversaries have leveraged this technique in the wild during a ransomware incident to disable versioning so the client cannot recover the data.
@@ -5087,7 +5087,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS Administrator has
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Disable Bucket Versioning - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Disable Bucket Versioning - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5101,7 +5101,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Disable Bucket Versioning - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Disable Bucket Versioning - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration", "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "657902a9-987d-4879-a1b2-e7a65512824b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5116,7 +5116,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName= PutBucketVersioning "requestParameters.VersioningConfiguration.Status"=Suspended |  stats count values(requestParameters.bucketName) as bucket_name values(resources{}.ARN) as resource_arn by src_ip aws_account_id awsRegion eventName userAgent user_arn userIdentity.principalId  errorCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `aws_disable_bucket_versioning_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes AWS CloudTrail events to identify when an EC2 snapshot permissions are modified to be shared with a different AWS account. This method is used by adversaries to exfiltrate the EC2 snapshot.
@@ -5128,7 +5128,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS admin has legitim
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5142,7 +5142,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d222c4", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5163,7 +5163,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ModifySnapshotAttribute | rename requestParameters.createVolumePermission.add.items{}.userId as requested_account_id | search requested_account_id != NULL | eval match=if(requested_account_id==aws_account_id,"Match","No Match") | table _time user_arn src_ip requestParameters.attributeType requested_account_id aws_account_id match vendor_region user_agent userIdentity.principalId | where match = "No Match" | `aws_ec2_snapshot_shared_externally_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.
@@ -5175,7 +5175,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5189,7 +5189,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "30a0e9f8-f1dd-4f9d-8fc2-c622461d781c", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5210,7 +5210,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings | search severity=HIGH | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as repository, userIdentity.principalId as user | eval finding = finding_name.", ".finding_description | eval phase="release" | eval severity="high" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, repository, user, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_high_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.
@@ -5222,7 +5222,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5236,7 +5236,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cbc95e44-7c22-443f-88fd-0424478f5589", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5251,7 +5251,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity IN ("LOW", "INFORMATIONAL", "UNKNOWN") | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as repository, userIdentity.principalId as user | eval finding = finding_name.", ".finding_description | eval phase="release" | eval severity="low" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, repository, user, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_low_informational_unknown_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). You need to activate image scanning in order to get the event DescribeImageScanFindings with the results.
@@ -5263,7 +5263,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5277,7 +5277,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0b80e2c8-c746-4ddb-89eb-9efd892220cf", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5292,7 +5292,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=DescribeImageScanFindings | spath path=responseElements.imageScanFindings.findings{} output=findings | mvexpand findings | spath input=findings| search severity=MEDIUM | rename name as finding_name, description as finding_description, requestParameters.imageId.imageDigest as imageDigest, requestParameters.repositoryName as repository, userIdentity.principalId as user| eval finding = finding_name.", ".finding_description | eval phase="release" | eval severity="medium" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, imageDigest, repository, user, src_ip, finding, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_scanning_findings_medium_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done during business hours. When done outside business hours, we want to take a look into it.
@@ -5304,7 +5304,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = When your development is spreaded in differe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5318,7 +5318,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d4c4d4eb-3994-41ca-a25e-a82d64e125bb", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5333,7 +5333,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage date_hour>=20 OR date_hour<8 OR date_wday=saturday OR date_wday=sunday | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS repository | eval phase="release" | eval severity="medium" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, repository, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_outside_business_hours_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events from AWS Elastic Container Service (ECR). A upload of a new container is normally done from only a few known users. When the user was never seen before, we should have a closer look into the event.
@@ -5345,7 +5345,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5359,7 +5359,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "300688e4-365c-4486-a065-7c884462b31d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5374,7 +5374,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=ecr.amazonaws.com eventName=PutImage NOT `aws_ecr_users` | rename requestParameters.* as * | rename repositoryName AS image | eval phase="release" | eval severity="high" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by awsRegion, eventName, eventSource, user, userName, src_ip, imageTag, registryId, image, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_ecr_container_upload_unknown_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events and analyse the amount of eventNames which starts with Describe by a single user. This indicates that this user scans the configuration of your AWS cloud environment.
@@ -5386,7 +5386,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5400,7 +5400,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1fdd164a-def8-4762-83a9-9ffe24e74d5a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5421,7 +5421,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=Describe* OR eventName=List* OR eventName=Get*  | stats dc(eventName) as dc_events min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as command values(src) as src values(userAgent) as userAgent by user userIdentity.arn | where dc_events > 50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_excessive_security_scanning_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Anomalous GetObject API Activity - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Anomalous GetObject API Activity - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search uses built in  Splunk command `| anomalydetection` to detect anomalies with respect to users making high number of GetObject API calls to download objects from S3 in a 10 minute time window. The field `probable_cause` is the name of the field that best explains why the event is anomalous. This command identifies anomalous events by computing a probability for each GetObject event by "count" "user_type" "user_arn" and detects anomaly based on the frequencies.
@@ -5433,7 +5433,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that a user downloaded these
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Anomalous GetObject API Activity - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Anomalous GetObject API Activity - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5447,7 +5447,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Anomalous GetObject API Activity - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Anomalous GetObject API Activity - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1119"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e4384bbf-5835-4831-8d85-694de6ad2cc6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5462,7 +5462,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=GetObject | bin _time span=10m |  stats count values(requestParameters.bucketName) as bucketName by _time src_ip aws_account_id user_type user_arn userIdentity.principalId | anomalydetection "count" "user_type" "user_arn" action=annotate | search probable_cause=* |`aws_exfiltration_via_anomalous_getobject_api_activity_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Batch Service - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Batch Service - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for events where AWS Batch Service is used for creating a job that could potentially abuse the AWS Bucket Replication feature on S3 buckets. This AWS service can used to transfer data between different AWS S3 buckets and an attacker can leverage this to exfiltrate data by creating a malicious batch job.
@@ -5474,7 +5474,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS Administrator or
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Batch Service - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Batch Service - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5488,7 +5488,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Batch Service - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Batch Service - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1119"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "04455dd3-ced7-480f-b8e6-5469b99e98e2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5509,7 +5509,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName = JobCreated |  stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(serviceEventDetails.jobArn) as job_arn values(serviceEventDetails.status) as status by src_ip  aws_account_id eventName errorCode userAgent| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_exfiltration_via_datasync_task_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects API calls made to an S3 bucket when bucket replication services are enabled. S3 bucket replication is a feature offered by Amazon Web Services (AWS) that allows you to automatically and asynchronously copy data from one S3 bucket to another in the same or different region.\
@@ -5523,7 +5523,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS admin has legitim
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5537,7 +5537,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration", "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "eeb432d6-2212-43b6-9e89-fcd753f7da4c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5559,7 +5559,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail`  eventName = PutBucketReplication eventSource = s3.amazonaws.com |  rename requestParameters.* as * | stats count values(bucketName) as source_bucket values(ReplicationConfiguration.Rule.ID) as rule_id values(ReplicationConfiguration.Rule.Destination.Bucket) as destination_bucket by _time user_arn userName user_type src_ip aws_account_id userIdentity.principalId user_agent | `aws_exfiltration_via_ec2_snapshot_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for potential misuse of an AWS service known as DataSync. This AWS service is used to transfer data between different AWS cloud storage services, such as Amazon S3, Amazon EFS, and Amazon FSx for Windows File Server. Attackers can create a task in AWS to periodically copy data from a private AWS location to a public location resulting in the compromise of the data.
@@ -5571,7 +5571,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS Administrator has
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5585,7 +5585,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration", "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1119"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "05c4b09f-ea28-4c7c-a7aa-a246f665c8a2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5606,7 +5606,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName = CreateTask eventSource="datasync.amazonaws.com" | rename  requestParameters.*  as *  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip aws_account_id awsRegion eventName destinationLocationArn sourceLocationArn userAgent user_arn userIdentity.principalId  errorCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_exfiltration_via_datasync_task_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search detects a series of AWS API calls, made in a short time window, related to EC2 snapshots that can detect a potential exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot modifications. In this attack, the attacker typically proceeds by listing and creating EC2 snapshots of the available EC2 instances followed by modifying snapshot attributes such that it can be shared externally. Once this is done, the attacker can then load that EC2 snapshot and access all the sensitive information.
@@ -5618,7 +5618,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an AWS admin has legitim
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5632,7 +5632,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ac90b339-13fc-4f29-a18c-4abbba1f2171", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5653,7 +5653,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName IN ("CreateSnapshot", "DescribeSnapshotAttribute", "ModifySnapshotAttribute", "DeleteSnapshot") src_ip !="guardduty.amazonaws.com" |  bin _time span=5m |  stats count dc(eventName) as distinct_api_calls values(eventName)  values(requestParameters.attributeType) as attributeType values(requestParameters.createVolumePermission.add.items{}.userId) as aws_account_id_added values(userAgent) as userAgent by _time userName src_ip aws_account_id | where distinct_api_calls >= 2 | `aws_exfiltration_via_ec2_snapshot_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an AWS account with more than 20 failed authentication events in the span of 5 minutes. This behavior could represent a brute force attack against the account. As environments differ across organizations, security teams should customize the threshold of this detection.
@@ -5665,7 +5665,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A user with more than 20 failed authenticati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5679,7 +5679,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", "Compromised User Account"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e3236f49-daf3-4b70-b808-9290912ac64d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5694,7 +5694,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin action=failure | bucket span=10m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS failed_attempts values(src_ip) as src_ip values(user_agent) by _time, user_name, eventName, eventSource aws_account_id | where failed_attempts > 20 | `aws_high_number_of_failed_authentications_for_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an IP address failing to authenticate 20 or more times to the AWS Web Console in the span of 5 minutes. This behavior could represent a brute force attack against an AWS tenant to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As environments differ across organizations, security teams should customize the threshold of this detection.
@@ -5706,7 +5706,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = An Ip address with more than 20 failed authe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5720,7 +5720,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", "Compromised User Account"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110", "T1110.003", "T1110.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f75b7f1a-b8eb-4975-a214-ff3e0a944757", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5735,7 +5735,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin action=failure | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS failed_attempts values(user_name) as tried_accounts values(user_agent) by _time, src_ip, eventName, eventSource aws_account_id | where failed_attempts > 20 |  `aws_high_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe. It is possible that an access key to AWS may have been stolen and is being misused to perform discovery events. In these instances, the access is not available with the key stolen therefore these events will be generated.
@@ -5747,7 +5747,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible to start this detection will
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5761,7 +5761,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1580"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3e1f1568-9633-11eb-a69c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5776,7 +5776,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` (errorCode = "AccessDenied") user_type=IAMUser (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as failures min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime, dc(eventName) as methods, dc(eventSource) as sources by src_ip, userIdentity.arn, _time | where failures >= 5 and methods >= 1 and sources >= 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_accessdenied_discovery_events_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies any malformed policy document exceptions with a status of `failure`. A malformed policy document exception occurs in instances where roles are attempted to be assumed, or brute forced. In a brute force attempt, using a tool like CloudSploit or Pacu, an attempt will look like `arn:aws:iam::111111111111:role/aws-service-role/rds.amazonaws.com/AWSServiceRoleForRDS`.  Meaning, when an adversary is attempting to identify a role name, multiple failures will occur. This detection focuses on the errors of a remote attempt that is failing.
@@ -5788,7 +5788,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provid
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5802,7 +5802,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1580", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f19e09b0-9308-11eb-b7ec-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5823,7 +5823,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` (errorCode=MalformedPolicyDocumentException) status=failure (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyName) as policy_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode requestParameters.policyDocument userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | where count >= 2 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_assume_role_policy_brute_force_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies when a policy is deleted on AWS. This does not identify whether successful or failed, but the error messages tell a story of suspicious attempts. There is a specific process to follow when deleting a policy. First, detach the policy from all users, groups, and roles that the policy is attached to, using DetachUserPolicy , DetachGroupPolicy , or DetachRolePolicy.
@@ -5835,7 +5835,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provid
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5844,7 +5844,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ec3a9362-92fe-11eb-99d0-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5859,7 +5859,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeletePolicy (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policyArn by src user_arn eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_delete_policy_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection identifies failure attempts to delete groups. We want to identify when a group is attempting to be deleted, but either access is denied, there is a conflict or there is no group. This is indicative of administrators performing an action, but also could be suspicious behavior occurring. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth.
@@ -5871,7 +5871,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provid
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5885,7 +5885,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "723b861a-92eb-11eb-93b8-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5900,7 +5900,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode IN (NoSuchEntityException,DeleteConflictException, AccessDenied) (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_name by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode errorMessage userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_failure_group_deletion_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following query uses IAM events to track the success of a group being deleted on AWS. This is typically not indicative of malicious behavior, but a precurser to additional events thay may unfold. Review parallel IAM events - recently added users, new groups and so forth. Inversely, review failed attempts in a similar manner.
@@ -5912,7 +5912,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection will require tuning to provid
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5921,7 +5921,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.003", "T1098", "T1069"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e776d06c-9267-11eb-819b-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5936,7 +5936,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=iam.amazonaws.com eventName=DeleteGroup errorCode=success (userAgent!=*.amazonaws.com) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.groupName) as group_deleted by src eventName eventSource errorCode user_agent awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_iam_successful_group_deletion_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to detect IAM users attempting to update/modify AWS lambda code via the AWS CLI to gain persistence, futher access into your AWS environment and to facilitate planting backdoors. In this instance, an attacker may upload malicious code/binary to a lambda function which will be executed automatically when the funnction is triggered.
@@ -5948,7 +5948,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5957,7 +5957,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "211b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -5972,7 +5972,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=lambda.amazonaws.com eventName=UpdateFunctionCode*  errorCode = success  user_type=IAMUser | stats  count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  values(requestParameters.functionName) as function_updated by src_ip user_arn user_agent user_type eventName aws_account_id |`aws_lambda_updatefunctioncode_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an attempt to disable multi-factor authentication for an AWS IAM user. An adversary who has obtained access to an AWS tenant may disable multi-factor authentication as a way to plant a backdoor and maintain persistence using a valid account. This way the attackers can keep persistance in the environment without adding new users.
@@ -5984,7 +5984,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = AWS Administrators may disable MFA but it is
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -5998,7 +5998,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1621", "T1556", "T1556.006"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "374832b1-3603-420c-b456-b373e24d34c0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6019,7 +6019,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` (eventName= DeleteVirtualMFADevice OR eventName=DeactivateMFADevice) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id userAgent eventID awsRegion user_name userIdentity.arn status | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication requests to an AWS Console for a single user. AWS Cloudtrail logs provide a a very useful field called `additionalEventData` that logs information regarding usage of MFA. Specifically, the analytic triggers when more than 10 MFA user prompts fail within 10 minutes. AWS Environments can be very different depending on the organization, Security teams should test this detection and customize these arbitrary thresholds. The detected behavior may represent an adversary who has obtained legitimate credentials for a user and continuously repeats login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request. Threat actors like the Lapsus team and APT29 have leveraged this technique to bypass multi-factor authentication controls as reported by Mandiant and others.
@@ -6031,7 +6031,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Multiple Failed MFA requests may also be a s
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -6045,7 +6045,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1621"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1fece617-e614-4329-9e61-3ba228c0f353", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6060,7 +6060,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName= ConsoleLogin "additionalEventData.MFAUsed"=Yes errorMessage="Failed authentication" | bucket span=5m _time |  stats dc(_raw) as mfa_prompts values(userAgent) as userAgent values(src) as src by _time user_name user_arn aws_account_id eventName errorMessage | where mfa_prompts > 10| `aws_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies one source Ip failing to authenticate into the AWS Console with 30 unique valid users within 10 minutes. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an AWS environment tenant to obtain initial access or elevate privileges.
@@ -6072,7 +6072,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = No known false postives for this detection.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -6086,7 +6086,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", "Compromised User Account"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110", "T1110.003", "T1110.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "71e1fb89-dd5f-4691-8523-575420de4630", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6101,7 +6101,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin action=failure | bucket span=10m _time | stats  dc(user_name) AS unique_accounts values(user_name) as tried_accounts by _time, src_ip |`aws_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The search looks for AWS CloudTrail events to detect if any network ACLs were created with all the ports open to a specified CIDR.
@@ -6113,7 +6113,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that an admin has created this
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -6127,7 +6127,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd75", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6148,7 +6148,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol=-1 | append [search `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateNetworkAclEntry OR eventName=ReplaceNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.ruleAction=allow requestParameters.egress=false requestParameters.aclProtocol!=-1 | eval port_range='requestParameters.portRange.to' - 'requestParameters.portRange.from' | where port_range>1024] | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userName user_arn userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.ruleAction requestParameters.egress requestParameters.aclProtocol requestParameters.portRange.to requestParameters.portRange.from src userAgent requestParameters.cidrBlock | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_created_with_all_open_ports_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the AWS console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the AWS CloudTrail logs to detect users deleting network ACLs.
@@ -6160,7 +6160,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has legitimately d
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -6174,7 +6174,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6fd75", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6189,7 +6189,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAclEntry requestParameters.egress=false | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_arn userIdentity.principalId eventName requestParameters.egress src userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the registration of a new Multi Factor authentication method for an AWS account. Adversaries who have obtained unauthorized access to an AWS account may register a new MFA method to maintain persistence.
@@ -6201,7 +6201,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Newly onboarded users who are registering an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -6215,7 +6215,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556", "T1556.006"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4e3c26f2-4fb9-4bd7-ab46-1b76ffa2a23b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6236,7 +6236,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `cloudtrail` eventName=CreateVirtualMFADevice | stats count values(requestParameters.virtualMFADeviceName) as virtualMFADeviceName min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user is making successful API calls to view/update/delete the existing password policy in an AWS organization. It is unlikely for a regular user to conduct this operation. These events may potentially be malicious, adversaries often use this information to gain more understanding of the password defenses in place and exploit them to increase their attack surface when a user account is compromised.
@@ -6248,7 +6248,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -6257,7 +6257,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation", "Compromised User Account"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "aee4a575-7064-4e60-b511-246f9baf9895", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6272,7 +6272,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName IN ("UpdateAccountPasswordPolicy","GetAccountPasswordPolicy","DeleteAccountPasswordPolicy") errorCode=success | stats count values(eventName) as eventName values(userAgent) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventSource aws_account_id errorCode  awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`  | `aws_password_policy_changes_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This correlation search looks at the risk events created by the detection analytics related Collection and Exfiltration techniques used by adversaries. The rule is designed to identify instances where 2 or more analytics unique AWS analytics and 2 or more distinct mitre IDs has triggered for a particular risk object. This alert when triggered may indicate a potential exfiltration in progress. By aggregating these analytics, security teams can swiftly respond to and investigate any suspicious activities, enhancing their ability to protect critical assets and prevent unauthorized access to sensitive information.
@@ -6284,7 +6284,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = alse positives may be present based on autom
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -6293,7 +6293,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - RIR - AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - RIR - AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration", "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Correlation"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "85096389-a443-42df-b89d-200efbb1b560", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6314,7 +6314,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count values(All_Risk.risk_message) as risk_message  from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic = "collection" OR All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic = "exfiltration" source = *AWS*  by All_Risk.risk_object | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 2 and mitre_tactic_id_count>=2 | `aws_s3_exfiltration_behavior_identified_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search provides specific SAML access from specific Service Provider, user and targeted principal at AWS. This search provides specific information to detect abnormal access or potential credential hijack or forgery, specially in federated environments using SAML protocol inside the perimeter or cloud provider.
@@ -6326,7 +6326,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Attacks using a Golden SAML or SAML assertio
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -6340,7 +6340,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bbe23980-6019-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6355,7 +6355,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=Assumerolewithsaml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventName requestParameters.principalArn requestParameters.roleArn requestParameters.roleSessionName recipientAccountId responseElements.issuer sourceIPAddress userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_saml_access_by_provider_user_and_principal_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search provides detection of updates to SAML provider in AWS. Updates to SAML provider need to be monitored closely as they may indicate possible perimeter compromise of federated credentials, or backdoor access from another cloud provider set by attacker.
@@ -6367,7 +6367,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Updating a SAML provider or creating a new o
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -6381,7 +6381,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2f0604c6-6030-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6402,7 +6402,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=UpdateSAMLProvider | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventType eventName requestParameters.sAMLProviderArn userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.arn sourceIPAddress userIdentity.accessKeyId userIdentity.principalId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_saml_update_identity_provider_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has set a default policy versions. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case the previous versions of the policy had permissions to access more resources than the current version of the policy
@@ -6414,7 +6414,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -6428,7 +6428,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0dac4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6449,7 +6449,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=SetDefaultPolicyVersion eventSource = iam.amazonaws.com | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.policyArn) as policy_arn by src requestParameters.versionId eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_setdefaultpolicyversion_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an AWS account successfully authenticating from more than one unique Ip address in the span of 5 minutes. This behavior could represent an adversary who has stolen credentials via a phishing attack or some other method and using them to access corporate online resources around the same time as a legitimate user. As users may behave differently across organizations, security teams should test and customize this detection to fit their environments.
@@ -6461,7 +6461,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A user with successful authentication events
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -6475,7 +6475,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Compromised User Account", "Suspicious AWS Login Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "395e50e1-2b87-4fa3-8632-0dfbdcbcd2cb", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6490,7 +6490,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `cloudtrail` eventName = ConsoleLogin | bin span=5m _time | stats values(userAgent) as userAgent values(eventName) as eventName values(src_ip) as src_ip dc(src_ip) as distinct_ip_count by _time user_arn | where distinct_ip_count>1 | `aws_successful_console_authentication_from_multiple_ips_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a successful Console Login authentication event against an AWS IAM user for an account without Multi-Factor Authentication enabled. This could be evidence of a misconfiguration, a policy violation or an account take over attempt that should be investigated
@@ -6502,7 +6502,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that some accounts do not hav
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -6516,7 +6516,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a520b1fe-cc9e-4f56-b762-18354594c52f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6537,7 +6537,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName= ConsoleLogin errorCode=success "additionalEventData.MFAUsed"=No | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode additionalEventData.MFAUsed userAgent eventID awsRegion user_name userIdentity.arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies one source IP failing to authenticate into the AWS Console with multiple valid users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an AWS environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. The detection calculates the standard deviation for source IP and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of failed authentication attempts. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the bucket span time and the calculation of the upperBound field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises. While looking for anomalies using statistical methods like the standard deviation can have benefits, we also recommend using threshold-based detections to complement coverage. A similar analytic following the threshold model is `AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip`.
@@ -6549,7 +6549,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = No known false postives for this detection.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -6563,7 +6563,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1110", "T1110.003", "T1110.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0b5c9c2b-e2cb-4831-b4f1-af125ceb1386", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6578,7 +6578,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin action=failure | bucket span=10m _time | stats  dc(_raw) AS distinct_attempts values(user_name) as tried_accounts by _time, src_ip | eventstats  avg(distinct_attempts) as avg_attempts , stdev(distinct_attempts) as ip_std by _time | eval  upperBound=(avg_attempts+ip_std*3) | eval  isOutlier=if(distinct_attempts > 10 and distinct_attempts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | where isOutlier = 1 |`aws_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to update login profile, makes an API call to update login profile for another user B . Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)
@@ -6590,7 +6590,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -6604,7 +6604,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS IAM Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2a9b80d3-6a40-4115-11ad-212bf3d0d111", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6625,7 +6625,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateLoginProfile userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName), 1,0) | search match=0 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.userName user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_updateloginprofile_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic triggers on a high risk sign-in against Azure Active Directory identified by Azure Identity Protection. Identity Protection monitors sign-in events using heuristics and machine learning to identify potentially malicious events and categorizes them in three categories high, medium and low.
@@ -6637,7 +6637,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Details for the risk calculation algorithm u
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -6651,7 +6651,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1110", "T1110.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1ecff169-26d7-4161-9a7b-2ac4c8e61bea", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6672,7 +6672,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad` category=UserRiskEvents properties.riskLevel=high | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip, activity, riskLevel, riskEventType, additionalInfo | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_active_directory_high_risk_sign_in_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection focuses on identifying instances in Azure Active Directory where a service principal assigns app roles without standard admin consent, using Entra ID logs. It operates on the azure_monitor_aad data source, scrutinizing the "Add app role assignment to service principal" operation, specifically from service principals. The query dissects details such as role ID, value, and description, important for understanding the nature of the roles being assigned. Monitoring this in a SOC is critical as it flags potential bypasses of vital administrative consent processes in Azure AD, which could result in unauthorized privileges being granted. A true positive detection suggests that a service principal may be exploiting automation to assign sensitive permissions without proper oversight.
@@ -6684,7 +6684,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Service Principals are sometimes configured
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -6698,7 +6698,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9d4fea43-9182-4c5a-ada8-13701fd5615d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6719,7 +6719,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add app role assignment to service principal" src_user_type=servicePrincipal | rename properties.* as *  | eval roleId = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue', 0) | eval roleValue = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue', 1) | eval roleDescription = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue', 2) | eval dest_user = mvindex('targetResources{}.id', 0) | rename initiatedBy.app.displayName as src_user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by src_user dest_user roleId roleValue roleDescription | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`  | `azure_ad_admin_consent_bypassed_by_service_principal_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the assignment of the Application Administrator role to an Azure AD user. Users in this role can create and manage all aspects of enterprise applications, application registrations, and application proxy settings. This role also grants the ability to manage application credentials. Users assigned this role can add credentials to an application, and use those credentials to impersonate the applications identity. If the applications identity has been granted access to a resource, such as the ability to create or update User or other objects, then a user assigned to this role could perform those actions while impersonating the application. This ability to impersonate the applications identity may be an elevation of privilege over what the user can do via their role assignments. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse this role to escalate their privileges in an Azure AD tenant.
@@ -6731,7 +6731,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may legitimately assign the A
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -6745,7 +6745,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1098.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "eac4de87-7a56-4538-a21b-277897af6d8d", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6766,7 +6766,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad`  "operationName"="Add member to role"  "properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue"="\"Application Administrator\"" | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user initiatedBy, result, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_application_administrator_role_assigned_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an authentication attempt event against an Azure AD tenant that fails during the Multi Factor Authentication challenge. Error Code 500121 represents a failed attempt to authenticate using a second factor. This behavior may represent an adversary trying to authenticate with compromised credentials for an account that has multi-factor authentication enabled. 
@@ -6778,7 +6778,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate users may miss to reply the MFA c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -6792,7 +6792,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1078", "T1078.004", "T1621"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e62c9c2e-bf51-4719-906c-3074618fcc1c", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6813,7 +6813,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=500121 | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, status.additionalDetails, appDisplayName, user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic detects when the risk-based step-up consent security setting in Azure AD is disabled. This setting, when enabled, prevents regular users from granting consent to potentially malicious OAuth applications, requiring an administrative step-up for consent instead. Disabling this feature could expose the organization to OAuth phishing threats.The detection operates by monitoring Azure Active Directory logs for events where the "Update authorization policy" operation is performed. It specifically looks for changes to the "AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps" setting, identifying instances where this setting is switched to "true," effectively disabling the risk-based step-up consent. Monitoring for changes to critical security settings like the "risk-based step-up consent" is vital for maintaining the integrity of an organization's security posture. Disabling this feature can make the environment more susceptible to OAuth phishing attacks, where attackers trick users into granting permissions to malicious applications. Identifying when this setting is disabled can help blue teams to quickly respond, investigate, and potentially uncover targeted phishing campaigns against their users. If an attacker successfully disables the "risk-based step-up consent" and subsequently launches an OAuth phishing campaign, they could gain unauthorized access to user data and other sensitive information within the M365 environment. This could lead to data breaches, unauthorized access to emails, and potentially further compromise within the organization
@@ -6825,7 +6825,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate changes to the 'risk-based step-u
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -6839,7 +6839,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "875de3d7-09bc-4916-8c0a-0929f4ced3d8", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6860,7 +6860,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Update authorization policy" | rename properties.* as *  | eval index_number = if(mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', "AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps") >= 0, mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', "AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps"), -1) | search index_number >= 0  | eval AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',index_number) | search AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps = "[true]" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, operationName, AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_block_user_consent_for_risky_apps_disabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an Azure AD account with concurrent sessions coming from more than one unique Ip address within the span of 5 minutes. This behavior could represent a session hijacking attack whereby an adversary has extracted cookies from a victims browser and is using them from a different location to access corporate online resources. As users may behave differently across organizations, security teams should test and customize this detection to fit their environments.
@@ -6872,7 +6872,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A user with concurrent sessions from differe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -6886,7 +6886,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", "Compromised User Account"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1185"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a9126f73-9a9b-493d-96ec-0dd06695490d", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6907,7 +6907,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad` properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=true category=NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=30m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(src_ip) AS unique_ips values(src_ip) as src_ip values(appDisplayName) as appDisplayName by user | where unique_ips  > 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_concurrent_sessions_from_different_ips_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Device Code Authentication - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Device Code Authentication - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the execution of the Azure Device Code Phishing attack, which can lead to Azure Account Take-Over (ATO). The detection leverages Azure AD logs specifically focusing on authentication requests to identify the attack. This technique involves creating malicious infrastructure, bypassing Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), and bypassing Conditional Access Policies (CAPs). The attack aims to compromise users by sending them phishing emails from attacker-controlled domains and trick the victims into performing OAuth 2.0 device authentication. A successful execution of this attack can result in adversaries gaining unauthorized access to Azure AD, Exchange mailboxes, and the target's Outlook Web Application (OWA). This attack technique was detailed by security researchers including Bobby Cooke, Stephan Borosh, and others. It's crucial for organizations to be aware of this threat, as it can lead to unauthorized access and potential data breaches.
@@ -6919,7 +6919,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = In most organizations, device code authentic
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Device Code Authentication - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Device Code Authentication - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -6933,7 +6933,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Device Code Authentication - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Device Code Authentication - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1528", "T1566", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d68d8732-6f7e-4ee5-a6eb-737f2b990b91", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -6954,7 +6954,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs "properties.authenticationProtocol"=deviceCode | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user src_ip, appDisplayName, userAgent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_device_code_authentication_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD External Guest User Invited - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD External Guest User Invited - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the invitation of an external guest user within Azure AD. With Azure AD B2B collaboration, users and administrators can invite external users to collaborate with internal users. External guest account invitations should be monitored by security teams as they could potentially lead to unauthorized access. An example of this attack vector was described at BlackHat 2022 by security researcher Dirk-Jan during his tall `Backdooring and Hijacking Azure AD Accounts by Abusing External Identities`
@@ -6966,7 +6966,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator may legitimately invite extern
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD External Guest User Invited - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD External Guest User Invited - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -6980,7 +6980,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD External Guest User Invited - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD External Guest User Invited - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c1fb4edb-cab1-4359-9b40-925ffd797fb5", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7001,7 +7001,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Invite external user" | rename properties.*  as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | rename targetResources{}.type as type | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by type, initiatedBy, result, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_external_guest_user_invited_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies when the 'full_access_as_app' permission, marked by the GUID 'dc890d15-9560-4a4c-9b7f-a736ec74ec40', is assigned to an application within Office 365 Exchange Online, identified by ResourceAppId '00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000'. This permission grants broad control over Office 365 operations, including full access to all mailboxes and the capability to send emails as any user. The query utilizes the azure_monitor_aad data source, focusing on AuditLogs with the operation name 'Update application'. This monitoring is crucial for early detection of potential unauthorized access or data exfiltration, as the 'full_access_as_app' permission could lead to significant security incidents if exploited.
@@ -7013,7 +7013,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The full_access_as_app API permission may be
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7027,7 +7027,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.002", "T1098.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ae286126-f2ad-421c-b240-4ea83bd1c43a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7048,7 +7048,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName="Update application"  | eval newvalue = mvindex('properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',0) | spath input=newvalue  | search "{}.ResourceAppId"="00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000"  "{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId"="dc890d15-9560-4a4c-9b7f-a736ec74ec40" | eval Permissions = '{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId' | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(Permissions) by user, object, user_agent, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_fullaccessasapp_permission_assigned_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the assignment of the Azure AD Global Administrator role to an Azure AD user. The Global Administrator role is the most powerful administrator role in Azure AD and provides almost unlimited access to data, resources and settings. It is equivalent to the Domain Administrator group in an Active Directory environment. While Azure AD roles do not grant access to Azure services and resources, it is possible for a Global Administrator account to gain control of Azure resources. Adversaries and red teams alike may assign this role to a compromised account to establish Persistence or escalate their privileges in an Azure AD environment.
@@ -7060,7 +7060,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may legitimately assign the G
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7074,7 +7074,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence", "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "825fed20-309d-4fd1-8aaf-cd49c1bb093c", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7095,7 +7095,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `azure_monitor_aad`  operationName="Add member to role"  properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue="\"Global Administrator\"" | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by initiatedBy, result, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_global_administrator_role_assigned_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an Azure AD account with more than 20 failed authentication events in the span of 10 minutes. This behavior could represent a brute force attack against the account. As environments differ across organizations, security teams should customize the threshold of this detection.
@@ -7107,7 +7107,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A user with more than 20 failed authenticati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7121,7 +7121,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", "Compromised User Account"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110", "T1110.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "630b1694-210a-48ee-a450-6f79e7679f2c", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7142,7 +7142,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad` category= SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=10m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(src_ip) as src_ip by user | where count > 20 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_high_number_of_failed_authentications_for_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an Ip address failing to authenticate 20 or more times to an Azure AD tenant in the span of 10 minutes. This behavior could represent a brute force attack againstan Azure AD to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As environments differ across organizations, security teams should customize the threshold of this detection.
@@ -7154,7 +7154,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = An Ip address with more than 20 failed authe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7168,7 +7168,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", "Compromised User Account", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110", "T1110.001", "T1110.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e5ab41bf-745d-4f72-a393-2611151afd8e", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7189,7 +7189,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad` category= SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=10m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip | where count > 20 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_high_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an attempt to disable multi-factor authentication for an Azure AD user. An adversary who has obtained access to an Azure AD tenant may disable multi-factor authentication as a way to plant a backdoor and maintain persistence using a valid account. This way the attackers can keep persistance in the environment without adding new users.
@@ -7201,7 +7201,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate use case may require for users to
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7215,7 +7215,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1556", "T1556.006"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "482dd42a-acfa-486b-a0bb-d6fcda27318e", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7236,7 +7236,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName="Disable Strong Authentication" | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.type as type | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, type, operationName, initiatedBy, result | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic detects potential distributed password spraying attacks within an Azure AD environment. It identifies a notable increase in failed authentication attempts across a variety of unique user-and-IP address combinations, originating from multiple source IP addresses and countries, and employing different user agents. Such patterns suggest an adversary's attempt to bypass security controls by using a range of IP addresses to test commonly used passwords against numerous user accounts. The detection scrutinizes SignInLogs from Azure AD logs, particularly focusing on events with error code 50126, which signals a failed authentication due to incorrect credentials. By collating data over a five-minute interval, the analytic computes the distinct counts of user-and-IP combinations, unique users, source IPs, and countries. It then applies a set of thresholds to these metrics to pinpoint unusual activities that could indicate a coordinated attack effort. The thresholds set within the analytic (such as unique IPs, unique users, etc.) are initial guidelines and should be customized based on the organization's user behavior and risk profile. Recognizing this behavior is vital for security operations centers (SOCs) as distributed password spraying represents a more complex form of traditional password spraying. Attackers distribute the source of their attempts to evade detection mechanisms that typically monitor for single-source IP anomalies. Prompt detection of such distributed activities is essential to thwart unauthorized access attempts, prevent account compromises, and mitigate the risk of further malicious activities within the organization's network. A true positive alert from this analytic suggests an active distributed password spraying attack against the organization's Azure AD tenant. A successful attack could result in unauthorized access, particularly to accounts with elevated privileges, leading to data breaches, privilege escalation, persistent threats, and lateral movement within the organization's infrastructure.
@@ -7248,7 +7248,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection may yield false positives in
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7257,7 +7257,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1110", "T1110.003", "T1110.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "116e11a9-63ea-41eb-a66a-6a13bdc7d2c7", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7272,7 +7272,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | eval uniqueIPUserCombo = src_ip . "-" . user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(uniqueIPUserCombo) as uniqueIpUserCombinations, dc(user) as uniqueUsers, dc(src_ip) as uniqueIPs, dc(user_agent) as uniqueUserAgents, dc(location.countryOrRegion) as uniqueCountries values(user) as user, values(src_ip) as ips, values(user_agent) as user_agents, values(location.countryOrRegion) as countries | where uniqueIpUserCombinations > 20 AND uniqueUsers > 20 AND uniqueIPs > 20 AND uniqueUserAgents = 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multi_source_failed_authentications_spike_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is crafted to identify unusual and potentially malicious authentication activity within an Azure AD environment. It triggers when a single user account is involved in more than 8 authentication attempts, using 3 or more unique application IDs and more than 5 unique user agents within a short timeframe. This pattern is atypical for regular user behavior and may indicate an adversary's attempt to probe the environment, testing for multi-factor authentication requirements across different applications and platforms. The detection is based on analysis of Azure AD audit logs, specifically focusing on authentication events. It employs statistical thresholds to highlight instances where the volume of authentication attempts and the diversity of application IDs and user agents associated with a single user account exceed normal parameters. Identifying this behavior is crucial as it provides an early indication of potential account compromise. Adversaries, once in possession of user credentials, often conduct reconnaissance to understand the security controls in place, including multi-factor authentication configurations. Tools like Invoke-MFASweep are commonly used for this purpose, automating the process of testing different user agents and application IDs to bypass MFA. By detecting these initial probing attempts, security teams can swiftly respond, potentially stopping an attack in its early stages and preventing further unauthorized access. This proactive stance is vital for maintaining the integrity of the organization's security posture. If validated as a true positive, this detection points to a compromised account, signaling that an attacker is actively attempting to navigate security controls to maintain access and potentially escalate privileges. This could lead to further exploitation, lateral movement within the network, and eventual data exfiltration. Recognizing and responding to this early stage of an attack is vital for preventing substantial harm and safeguarding sensitive organizational data and systems.
@@ -7284,7 +7284,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Rapid authentication from the same user usin
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7298,7 +7298,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5d8bb1f0-f65a-4b4e-af2e-fcdb88276314", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7313,7 +7313,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs operationName="Sign-in activity" (properties.authenticationRequirement="multiFactorAuthentication" AND properties.status.additionalDetails="MFA required in Azure AD") OR (properties.authenticationRequirement=singleFactorAuthentication AND "properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded"=true) | bucket span=5m _time | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(appId) as unique_app_ids dc(userAgent) as unique_user_agents values(appDisplayName) values(deviceDetail.operatingSystem) by user, src_ip | where count > 5 and unique_app_ids > 2 and unique_user_agents > 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_appids_and_useragents_authentication_spike_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Denied MFA Requests For User - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Denied MFA Requests For User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic targets the detection of an unusually high number of denied Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) requests for a single user within a 10-minute window, specifically identifying instances where more than nine MFA prompts were declined by the user. Utilizing Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) sign-in logs, particularly focusing on "Sign-in activity" events, it filters for scenarios where the MFA request was denied due to the user declining the authentication, as indicated by error code 500121 and additional details stating "MFA denied; user declined the authentication." The data is then aggregated into 10-minute intervals, counting distinct raw events and capturing the earliest and latest times of occurrence for each user. This behavior is significant for a Security Operations Center (SOC) as it could be an early indicator of a targeted attack or an account compromise attempt, with an attacker having obtained the user's credentials and the user actively declining the MFA prompts, preventing unauthorized access. A true positive detection would imply that an attacker is on the verge of gaining full access to the user's account, posing a threat that could lead to data exfiltration, lateral movement, or further malicious activities within the organization, necessitating immediate investigation and response to safeguard the organization's assets.
@@ -7325,7 +7325,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Multiple denifed MFA requests in a short per
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Denied MFA Requests For User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Denied MFA Requests For User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7339,7 +7339,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Denied MFA Requests For User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Denied MFA Requests For User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1621"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d0895c20-de71-4fd2-b56c-3fcdb888eba1", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7360,7 +7360,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs operationName="Sign-in activity" | rename properties.* as * | search status.errorCode=500121 status.additionalDetails="MFA denied; user declined the authentication" | bucket span=10m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, status.additionalDetails, appDisplayName, user_agent | where count > 9 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_denied_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication requests for a single user within an Azure AD tenant. Error Code 500121 represents a failed attempt to authenticate using a second factor. Specifically, the analytic triggers when more than 10 MFA user prompts fail within 10 minutes. The reasons for these failure could be several, like the user not responding in time or receiving multiple duplicate MFA requests. Azure AD tenants can be very different depending on the organization, Security teams should test this detection and customize these arbitrary thresholds. The detected behavior may represent an adversary who has obtained legitimate credentials for a user and continuously repeats login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request. Threat actors like the Lapsus team and APT29 have leveraged this technique to bypass multi-factor authentication controls as reported by Mandiant and others.
@@ -7372,7 +7372,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Multiple Failed MFA requests may also be a s
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7386,7 +7386,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1621", "T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "264ea131-ab1f-41b8-90e0-33ad1a1888ea", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7407,7 +7407,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs operationName="Sign-in activity" properties.status.errorCode=500121 properties.status.additionalDetails!="MFA denied; user declined the authentication" | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=10m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, status.additionalDetails, appDisplayName, user_agent | where count > 9 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection identifies when a single service principal in Azure AD creates more than three unique OAuth applications within a 10-minute span, potentially signaling malicious activity. It monitors the 'Add service principal' operation, focusing on the activity of service principals rather than individual users. By aggregating the creation events over a 10-minute period, the analytic tracks how many distinct OAuth applications are created by each service principal. This is key for SOC teams to pinpoint potential attack staging, where an attacker might use a compromised or malicious service principal to rapidly establish multiple service principals, facilitating network infiltration or expansion. While the default threshold is set to trigger on more than three applications, security teams should adjust this to fit their specific environment's norm
@@ -7419,7 +7419,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Certain users or applications may create mul
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7433,7 +7433,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "66cb378f-234d-4fe1-bb4c-e7878ff6b017", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7448,7 +7448,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add service principal" properties.initiatedBy.app.appId=* | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=10m _time | rename targetResources{}.displayName as displayName | rename targetResources{}.type as type | rename initiatedBy.app.displayName as src_user | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName dc(displayName) as unique_apps by src_user | where unique_apps > 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_service_principals_created_by_sp_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection focuses on identifying instances where a single user creates more than three unique OAuth applications within a 10-minute timeframe in Azure AD, a potential indicator of malicious activity. By monitoring the 'Add service principal' operation and aggregating the data with a 10-minute bucket span, it tracks the number of distinct OAuth applications created by each user. This analytic is crucial for SOC teams to detect possible staging of attacks, where an adversary might rapidly create multiple service principals as part of their infiltration or expansion strategy within the network. The threshold of three applications is set to flag unusual behavior, but security teams are advised to adjust this value to suit the normal operational patterns of their environment
@@ -7460,7 +7460,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Certain users or applications may create mul
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7474,7 +7474,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "32880707-f512-414e-bd7f-204c0c85b758", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7489,7 +7489,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add service principal" properties.initiatedBy.user.id=* | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=10m _time | rename targetResources{}.displayName as displayName | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName dc(displayName) as unique_apps by src_user | where unique_apps > 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_service_principals_created_by_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies one source Ip failing to authenticate with 30 unique valid users within 5 minutes. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Azure Active Directory tenant to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Error Code 50126 represents an invalid password. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\
@@ -7503,7 +7503,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A source Ip failing to authenticate with mul
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7517,7 +7517,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1110", "T1110.003", "T1110.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "94481a6a-8f59-4c86-957f-55a71e3612a6", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7532,7 +7532,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad`  category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(user) AS unique_accounts values(user) as user by src_ip | where unique_accounts > 30 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD New Custom Domain Added - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD New Custom Domain Added - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the addition of a new custom domain within an Azure Active Directory tenant. Adding a custom domain is a step required to set up the Azure Active Directory identity federation backdoor technique discovered by security researcher Nestori Syynimaa. Similar to Active Directory, Azure AD uses the concept of domains to manage directories of identities. A new Azure AD tenant will initially contain a single domain that is commonly called the `cloud-only` onmicrosoft.com domain. Organizations can also add their registered custom domains to Azure AD for email addresses to match the organizations domain name. If the organization intends to use a third-party identity provider such as ADFS for authentication, the added custom domains can be configured as federated. An adversary who has obtained privileged access to an Azure AD tenant may leverage this technique to establish persistence and be able to authenticate to Azure AD impersonating any user and bypassing the requirement to have a valid password and/or perform MFA.
@@ -7544,7 +7544,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = In most organizations, new customm domains w
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD New Custom Domain Added - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD New Custom Domain Added - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7558,7 +7558,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD New Custom Domain Added - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD New Custom Domain Added - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1484", "T1484.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "30c47f45-dd6a-4720-9963-0bca6c8686ef", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7579,7 +7579,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad`  operationName="Add unverified domain" properties.result=success | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.displayName as domain | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, domain, result, operationName, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_new_custom_domain_added_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD New Federated Domain Added - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD New Federated Domain Added - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the addition of a new federated domain within an Azure Active Directory tenant. This event could represent the execution of the Azure Active Directory identity federation backdoor technique discovered by security researcher Nestori Syynimaa. Similar to Active Directory, Azure AD uses the concept of domains to manage directories of identities. A new Azure AD tenant will initially contain a single domain that is commonly called the `cloud-only` onmicrosoft.com domain. Organizations can also add their registered custom domains to Azure AD for email addresses to match the organizations domain name. If the organization intends to use a third-party identity provider such as ADFS for authentication, the added custom domains can be configured as federated. An adversary who has obtained privileged access to an Azure AD tenant may leverage this technique to establish persistence and be able to authenticate to Azure AD impersonating any user and bypassing the requirement to have a valid password and/or perform MFA.
@@ -7591,7 +7591,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = In most organizations, domain federation set
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD New Federated Domain Added - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD New Federated Domain Added - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7605,7 +7605,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD New Federated Domain Added - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD New Federated Domain Added - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1484", "T1484.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a87cd633-076d-4ab2-9047-977751a3c1a0", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7626,7 +7626,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad`  operationName="Set domain authentication" "properties.result"=success | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.displayName as domain | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, domain, result, operationName, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_new_federated_domain_added_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic detects the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method associated with a user account within Azure Active Directory by monitoring Azure AD audit logs and configurations. While adding a new MFA method can be a routine and legitimate action, it can also be indicative of an attacker's attempt to maintain persistence on a compromised account. By registering a new MFA method, attackers can potentially bypass existing security measures, allowing them to authenticate using stolen credentials without raising alarms. Monitoring for such changes is crucial, especially if the addition is not preceded by a user request or if it deviates from typical user behavior. If an attacker successfully registers a new MFA method on a compromised account, they can solidify their access, making it harder for legitimate users to regain control. The attacker can then operate with the privileges of the compromised account, potentially accessing sensitive data, making unauthorized changes, or even escalating their privileges further. Immediate action would be required to verify the legitimacy of the MFA change and, if malicious, to remediate and secure the affected account.
@@ -7638,7 +7638,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Users may register MFA methods legitimally,
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7652,7 +7652,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1098.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0488e814-eb81-42c3-9f1f-b2244973e3a3", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7673,7 +7673,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `azure_monitor_aad`  operationName="Update user" | rename properties.* as *  | eval propertyName = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', 0) | search propertyName = StrongAuthenticationMethod | eval oldvalue = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.oldValue',0) | eval newvalue = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',0) | rex field=newvalue max_match=0 "(?i)(?<new_method_type>\"MethodType\")" | rex field=oldvalue max_match=0 "(?i)(?<old_method_type>\"MethodType\")" | eval count_new_method_type = coalesce(mvcount(new_method_type), 0) | eval count_old_method_type = coalesce(mvcount(old_method_type), 0) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(propertyName) by user newvalue oldvalue | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_new_mfa_method_registered_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the registration of a new Multi Factor authentication method for an Azure AD account. Adversaries who have obtained unauthorized access to an Azure AD account may register a new MFA method to maintain persistence.
@@ -7685,7 +7685,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Newly onboarded users who are registering an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7699,7 +7699,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", "Compromised User Account"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556", "T1556.006"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2628b087-4189-403f-9044-87403f777a1b", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7720,7 +7720,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName="User registered security info" properties.operationType=Add | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, resultDescription, result, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_new_mfa_method_registered_for_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD OAuth Application Consent Granted By User - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD OAuth Application Consent Granted By User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic detects when a user in an Azure AD environment grants consent to an OAuth application, capturing any consent granted regardless of the specific permissions requested. Utilizing Azure AD audit logs, it focuses on events related to OAuth application consents, alerting security teams to instances where users actively grant consent to applications. This monitoring is crucial as it highlights potential risks associated with third-party applications gaining access to organizational data, a tactic often exploited by malicious actors to gain unauthorized access. A true positive from this analytic necessitates immediate investigation to validate the application's legitimacy, review the granted permissions, and assess potential risks, helping to prevent unauthorized access and protect sensitive data and resources. While false positives may occur with legitimate application integrations, ensuring alignment with organizational policies and security best practices is paramount.
@@ -7732,7 +7732,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may occur if users are grant
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD OAuth Application Consent Granted By User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD OAuth Application Consent Granted By User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7746,7 +7746,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD OAuth Application Consent Granted By User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD OAuth Application Consent Granted By User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1528"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "10ec9031-015b-4617-b453-c0c1ab729007", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7767,7 +7767,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Consent to application" properties.result=success | rename properties.* as *  | eval permissions_index = if(mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', "ConsentAction.Permissions") >= 0, mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', "ConsentAction.Permissions"), -1) | eval permissions = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',permissions_index) | rex field=permissions "Scope: (?<Scope>[^,]+)" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by operationName, user, Scope | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_oauth_application_consent_granted_by_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD PIM Role Assigned - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD PIM Role Assigned - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the assignment of the Azure AD PIM role. Privileged Identity Management (PIM) is a service within Azure Azure AD that enables administrators to manage, control, and monitor access to sensitive resources. PIM provides time-based and approval-based role activation to mitigate the risks of excessive, unnecessary, or misused access permissions on resources. Once a user has been made eligible for an administrative role, she must activate this role assignment to perform the privileged actions. When a role is activated, Azure AD PIM temporarily adds active assignment for the role. While PIM can be leveraged as a powerful security control, it may also abused by adversaries to obtain privileged access. Security teams should monitor for the assignment and activation of PIM roles and validate their legitimacy.
@@ -7779,7 +7779,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = As part of legitimate administrative behavio
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD PIM Role Assigned - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD PIM Role Assigned - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7793,7 +7793,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD PIM Role Assigned - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD PIM Role Assigned - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence", "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1098.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fcd6dfeb-191c-46a0-a29c-c306382145ab", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7814,7 +7814,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add eligible member to role in PIM completed*" | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user values(targetResources{}.displayName) as displayName  by result, operationName, initiatedBy.user.displayName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_pim_role_assigned_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the assignment of the Azure AD PIM role. Privileged Identity Management (PIM) is a service within Azure Azure AD that enables administrators to manage, control, and monitor access to sensitive resources. PIM provides time-based and approval-based role activation to mitigate the risks of excessive, unnecessary, or misused access permissions on resources. Once a user has been made eligible for an administrative role, she must activate this role assignment to perform the privileged actions. When a role is activated, Azure AD PIM temporarily adds active assignment for the role. While PIM can be leveraged as a powerful security control, it may also abused by adversaries to obtain privileged access. Security teams should monitor for the assignment and activation of PIM roles and validate their legitimacy.
@@ -7826,7 +7826,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = As part of legitimate administrative behavio
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7840,7 +7840,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence", "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1098.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "952e80d0-e343-439b-83f4-808c3e6fbf2e", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7861,7 +7861,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add member to role completed (PIM activation)" | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user values(targetResources{}.displayName) as displayName by initiatedBy, result, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_pim_role_assignment_activated_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Authentication Administrator Role Assigned - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Authentication Administrator Role Assigned - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the assignment of the Privileged Authentication Administrato role to an Azure AD user. Users in this role can set or reset authentication methods for any user in Azure Active Directory, including privileged roles like Global Administrators. Users with this role can change credentials for people who may have access to sensitive or private information or critical configuration inside and outside of Azure Active Directory. Changing the credentials of a user may mean the ability to assume that users identity and permissions. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse this role to escalate their privileges.
@@ -7873,7 +7873,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may legitimately assign the P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Authentication Administrator Role Assigned - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Authentication Administrator Role Assigned - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7887,7 +7887,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Authentication Administrator Role Assigned - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Authentication Administrator Role Assigned - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a7da845d-6fae-41cf-b823-6c0b8c55814a", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7908,7 +7908,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad`  "operationName"="Add member to role"  "properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue"="\"Privileged Authentication Administrator\"" | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by initiatedBy, result, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_privileged_authentication_administrator_role_assigned_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This Splunk analytic flags the assignment of three high-risk Graph API permissions in Azure AD, Application.ReadWrite.All (1bfefb4e-e0b5-418b-a88f-73c46d2cc8e9), AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All (06b708a9-e830-4db3-a914-8e69da51d44f), and RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory (9e3f62cf-ca93-4989-b6ce-bf83c28f9fe8). These permissions enable broad control over Azure AD, including application and directory settings. Utilizing azure_monitor_aad data, the query scans AuditLogs for 'Update application' operations, identifying when these permissions are assigned. It collects data on user, object, and user agent. Immediate attention is needed upon detection, as misuse of these permissions can lead to unauthorized Azure AD modifications and potential security breaches.
@@ -7920,7 +7920,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Privileged Graph API permissions may be assi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7934,7 +7934,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5521f8c5-1aa3-473c-9eb7-853701924a06", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -7955,7 +7955,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `azure_monitor_aad` category=AuditLogs operationName="Update application"  | eval newvalue = mvindex('properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',0) | spath input=newvalue  | search "{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId"="1bfefb4e-e0b5-418b-a88f-73c46d2cc8e9" OR "{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId"="06b708a9-e830-4db3-a914-8e69da51d44f" OR "{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId"="9e3f62cf-ca93-4989-b6ce-bf83c28f9fe8"  | eval Permissions = '{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId' | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(Permissions) by user, object, user_agent, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`   | `azure_ad_privileged_graph_api_permission_assigned_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the assignment of sensitive and privileged Azure Active Directory roles to an Azure AD user. Adversaries and red teams alike may assign these roles to a compromised account to establish Persistence in an Azure AD environment.
@@ -7967,7 +7967,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators will legitimately assign the
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -7981,7 +7981,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1098.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a28f0bc3-3400-4a6e-a2da-89b9e95f0d2a", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8002,7 +8002,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad`  "operationName"="Add member to role" | rename properties.*  as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | rename targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue  as roles | eval role=mvindex(roles,1) | lookup privileged_azure_ad_roles azureadrole AS role OUTPUT isprvilegedadrole description | search isprvilegedadrole = True | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by initiatedBy, result, operationName, role, description | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_privileged_role_assigned_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects potential privilege escalation threats in Azure Active Directory (AD). The detection is made by running a specific search within the ingested Azure Active Directory events to leverage the AuditLogs log category. This detection is important because it identifies instances where privileged roles that hold elevated permissions are assigned to service principals. This prevents unauthorized access or malicious activities, which occur when these non-human entities access Azure resources to exploit them. False positives might occur since administrators can legitimately assign privileged roles to service principals.
@@ -8014,7 +8014,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may legitimately assign the p
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -8028,7 +8028,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1098.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5dfaa3d3-e2e4-4053-8252-16d9ee528c41", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8049,7 +8049,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad`  operationName="Add member to role" | rename properties.* as * | search "targetResources{}.type"=ServicePrincipal | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | rename targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue  as roles | eval role=mvindex(roles,1) | rename targetResources{}.displayName as apps | eval displayName=mvindex(apps,0) | lookup privileged_azure_ad_roles azureadrole AS role OUTPUT isprvilegedadrole description | search isprvilegedadrole = True | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName by initiatedBy, result, operationName, role | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_privileged_role_assigned_to_service_principal_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Authentication - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Authentication - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Monitoring service principal authentication events in Azure Active Directory is crucial, but to effectively leverage this detection, teams should first conduct a thorough inventory of all service principals and their source IPs to establish a baseline of normal behavior. The detection, using azure_monitor_aad, specifically targets "Sign-in activity" within ServicePrincipalSignInLogs, gathering key details like sign-in frequency, timing, source IPs, and accessed resources. This baseline is essential for SOC teams to distinguish between regular application authentication and anomalous patterns that might suggest compromised credentials or malicious activities.
@@ -8061,7 +8061,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Service Principals will legitimally authenti
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Authentication - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Authentication - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -8075,7 +8075,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Authentication - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Authentication - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5a2ec401-60bb-474e-b936-1e66e7aa4060", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8096,7 +8096,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Sign-in activity" category=ServicePrincipalSignInLogs | rename properties.* as * | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user, user_id, src_ip, resourceDisplayName, resourceId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_service_principal_authentication_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Created - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Created - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the creation of a Service Principal in an Azure AD environment. An Azure Service Principal is an identity designed to be used with applications, services, and automated tools to access resources. It is similar to a service account within an Active Directory environment. Service Principal authentication does not support multi-factor authentication nor conditional access policies. Adversaries and red teams alike who have obtained administrative access may create a Service Principal to establish Persistence and obtain single-factor access to an Azure AD environment.
@@ -8108,7 +8108,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator may legitimately create Servic
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Created - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Created - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -8122,7 +8122,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Created - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Created - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f8ba49e7-ffd3-4b53-8f61-e73974583c5d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8143,7 +8143,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `azure_monitor_aad`  operationName="Add service principal" properties.initiatedBy.user.id=* | rename properties.* as * | rename targetResources{}.displayName as displayName | rename targetResources{}.type as type | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName by type, user, result, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_service_principal_created_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the addition of new credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure AD. These credentials include both x509 certificates and passwords. With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules. Adversaries and red teams alike who have obtained privileged access to Azure AD may add credentials to Service Principals to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and other instances within the Azure environment. By compromising an account who is an Owner of an application with privileged access, attackers may also escalate their privileges in an Azure AD environment by adding new credentials and logging in as the service principal.
@@ -8155,7 +8155,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Service Principal client credential modifica
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -8169,7 +8169,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence", "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1098.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e3adc0d3-9e4b-4b5d-b662-12cec1adff2a", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8190,7 +8190,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad`  category=AuditLogs operationName="Update application*Certificates and secrets management " | rename properties.* as * | rename  targetResources{}.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName by user, modifiedProperties{}.newValue, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_service_principal_new_client_credentials_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the addition of a new owner for a Service Principal within an Azure AD tenant. An Azure Service Principal is an identity designed to be used with applications, services, and automated tools to access resources. It is similar to a service account within an Active Directory environment. Service Principal authentication does not support multi-factor authentication nor conditional access policies. Adversaries and red teams alike who have obtained administrative access may add a new owner for an existing Service Principal to establish Persistence and obtain single-factor access to an Azure AD environment. Attackers who are looking to escalate their privileges by leveraging a Service Principals permissions may also add a new owner.
@@ -8202,7 +8202,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator may legitimately add new owner
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -8216,7 +8216,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence", "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7ddf2084-6cf3-4a44-be83-474f7b73c701", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8237,7 +8237,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad`  operationName="Add owner to application" | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | rename targetResources{}.userPrincipalName as newOwner | rename targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue as displayName | eval displayName = mvindex(displayName,1) | where initiatedBy!=newOwner | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName by initiatedBy, result, operationName, newOwner | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_service_principal_owner_added_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an Azure AD account successfully authenticating from more than one unique Ip address in the span of 30 minutes. This behavior could represent an adversary who has stolen credentials via a phishing attack or some other method and using them to access corporate online resources around the same time as a legitimate user. As users may behave differently across organizations, security teams should test and customize this detection to fit their environments.
@@ -8249,7 +8249,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A user with successful authentication events
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -8263,7 +8263,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", "Compromised User Account"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110", "T1110.001", "T1110.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "be6d868d-33b6-4aaa-912e-724fb555b11a", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8284,7 +8284,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad`  properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=true category=SignInLogs | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=30m _time | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(src_ip) AS unique_ips values(src_ip) as src_ip values(appDisplayName) as appDisplayName by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where unique_ips  > 1 | `azure_ad_successful_authentication_from_different_ips_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a successful authentication event against an Azure AD tenant using PowerShell commandlets. This behavior is not common for regular, non administrative users. After compromising an account in Azure AD, attackers and red teams  alike will perform enumeration and discovery techniques. One method of executing these techniques is leveraging the native PowerShell modules.
@@ -8296,7 +8296,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrative users will likely use PowerSh
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -8310,7 +8310,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "62f10052-d7b3-4e48-b57b-56f8e3ac7ceb", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8331,7 +8331,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad`  category=SignInLogs properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=true properties.appDisplayName="Microsoft Azure PowerShell" | rename properties.*  as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip, appDisplayName, user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_successful_powershell_authentication_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a successful authentication event against Azure Active Directory for an account without Multi-Factor Authentication enabled. This could be evidence of a missconfiguration, a policy violation or an account take over attempt that should be investigated
@@ -8343,7 +8343,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although not recommended, certain users may
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -8357,7 +8357,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a560e7f6-1711-4353-885b-40be53101fcd", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8378,7 +8378,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad` category=SignInLogs properties.authenticationRequirement=singleFactorAuthentication properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=true | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by src_ip, appDisplayName, authenticationRequirement | `azure_ad_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies instances where admin consent is granted to an application within an Azure AD tenant. It leverages Azure AD audit logs, specifically events related to the admin consent action within the ApplicationManagement category. The admin consent action allows applications to access data across the entire tenant, potentially encompassing a vast amount of organizational data. Given its broad scope and the sensitivity of some permissions that can only be granted via admin consent, it's crucial to monitor this action. Unauthorized or inadvertent granting of admin consent can lead to significant security risks, including data breaches, unauthorized data access, and potential compliance violations. If an attacker successfully tricks an administrator into granting admin consent to a malicious or compromised application, they can gain extensive and persistent access to organizational data. This can lead to data exfiltration, espionage, further malicious activities within the tenant, and potential breaches of compliance regulations
@@ -8390,7 +8390,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may be granted tenan
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -8404,7 +8404,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1098.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dc02c0ee-6ac0-4c7f-87ba-8ce43a4e4418", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8425,7 +8425,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Consent to application" | eval new_field=mvindex('properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue', 4) | rename properties.* as *  | rex field=new_field "ConsentType: (?<ConsentType>[^\,]+)" | rex field=new_field "Scope: (?<Scope>[^\,]+)"  | search  ConsentType = "AllPrincipals"  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by operationName, user, targetResources{}.displayName, targetResources{}.id, ConsentType, Scope | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_tenant_wide_admin_consent_granted_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies one source Ip failing to authenticate with multiple valid users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Azure Active Directory tenant to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Error Code 50126 represents an invalid password.\
@@ -8441,7 +8441,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A source Ip failing to authenticate with mul
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -8455,7 +8455,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1110", "T1110.003", "T1110.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3d8d3a36-93b8-42d7-8d91-c5f24cec223d", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8470,7 +8470,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad`  category=SignInLogs properties.status.errorCode=50126 properties.authenticationDetails{}.succeeded=false | rename properties.* as * | bucket span=5m _time | stats  dc(userPrincipalName) AS unique_accounts values(userPrincipalName) as userPrincipalName by _time, ipAddress | eventstats  avg(unique_accounts) as ip_avg, stdev(unique_accounts) as ip_std by ipAddress | eval  upperBound=(ip_avg+ip_std*3) | eval  isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1,0) | where isOutlier = 1 | `azure_ad_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies instances where Azure AD has blocked a user's attempt to grant consent to an application deemed risky or potentially malicious. This suggests that the application has exhibited behaviors or characteristics that are commonly associated with malicious intent or poses a security risk. This detection leverages the Azure AD audit logs, specifically focusing on events related to user consent actions and system-driven blocks. By filtering for blocked consent actions associated with applications, the analytic highlights instances where Azure's built-in security measures have intervened. Applications that are flagged and blocked by Azure typically exhibit suspicious characteristics or behaviors. Monitoring for these blocked consent attempts helps security teams identify potential threats early on and can provide insights into users who might be targeted or susceptible to such risky applications. It's an essential layer of defense in ensuring that malicious or risky applications don't gain access to organizational data. If the detection is a true positive, it indicates that the built-in security measures of O365 successfully prevented a potentially harmful application from gaining access. However, the attempt itself suggests that either a user might be targeted or that there's a presence of malicious applications trying to infiltrate the organization. Immediate investigation is required to understand the context of the block and to take further preventive measures.
@@ -8482,7 +8482,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = UPDATE_KNOWN_FALSE_POSITIVES
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -8496,7 +8496,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1528"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "06b8ec9a-d3b5-4882-8f16-04b4d10f5eab", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8517,7 +8517,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Consent to application" properties.result=failure | rename properties.* as *  | eval reason_index = if(mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', "ConsentAction.Reason") >= 0, mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', "ConsentAction.Reason"), -1) | eval permissions_index = if(mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', "ConsentAction.Permissions") >= 0, mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', "ConsentAction.Permissions"), -1) | search reason_index >= 0  | eval reason = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',reason_index) | eval permissions = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue',permissions_index) | search reason = "\"Risky application detected\"" | rex field=permissions "Scope: (?<Scope>[^,]+)" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by operationName, user, reason, Scope | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_user_consent_blocked_for_risky_application_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies instances where a user has actively denied consent to an OAuth application seeking permissions within the Azure AD environment. This suggests that the user either recognized something suspicious about the application or chose not to grant it the requested permissions for other reasons. This detection leverages the Azure AD's audit logs, specifically focusing on events related to user consent actions. By filtering for denied consent actions associated with OAuth applications, the analytic captures instances where users have actively rejected permission requests. While user-denied consents can be routine, they can also be indicative of users spotting potentially suspicious or unfamiliar applications. By monitoring these denied consent attempts, security teams can gain insights into applications that might be perceived as risky or untrusted by users. It can also serve as a feedback loop for security awareness training, indicating that users are being cautious about granting permissions. If the detection is a true positive, it indicates that a user has actively prevented an OAuth application from gaining the permissions it requested. While this is a proactive security measure on the user's part, it's essential for security teams to review the context of the denial. Understanding why certain applications are being denied can help in refining application whitelisting policies and ensuring that no malicious applications are attempting to gain access.
@@ -8529,7 +8529,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Users may deny consent for legitimate applic
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -8543,7 +8543,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1528"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bb093c30-d860-4858-a56e-cd0895d5b49c", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8564,7 +8564,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Sign-in activity" properties.status.errorCode=65004 | rename properties.* as * | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by operationName, user, appDisplayName, status.failureReason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_user_consent_denied_for_oauth_application_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Enabled And Password Reset - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD User Enabled And Password Reset - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an Azure AD user enabling a previously disabled account and resetting its password within 2 minutes. This behavior could represent an adversary who has obtained administrative access and is trying to establish a backdoor identity within an Azure AD tenant.
@@ -8576,7 +8576,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While not common, Administrators may enable
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Enabled And Password Reset - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD User Enabled And Password Reset - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -8590,7 +8590,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Enabled And Password Reset - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD User Enabled And Password Reset - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1347b9e8-2daa-4a6f-be73-b421d3d9e268", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8611,7 +8611,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad`  (operationName="Enable account" OR operationName="Reset password (by admin)" OR operationName="Update user") | transaction user startsWith=(operationName="Enable account") endsWith=(operationName="Reset password (by admin)") maxspan=2m | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(operationName) as operationName values(initiatedBy) as initiatedBy by user, result | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_user_enabled_and_password_reset_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure AD User ImmutableId Attribute Updated - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure AD User ImmutableId Attribute Updated - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the modification of the SourceAnchor (also called ImmutableId) attribute for an Azure Active Directory user. Updating this attribute is a step required to set up the Azure Active Directory identity federation backdoor technique discovered by security researcher Nestori Syynimaa. Similar to Active Directory, Azure AD uses the concept of domains to manage directories of identities. A new Azure AD tenant will initially contain a single domain that is commonly called the `cloud-only` onmicrosoft.com domain. Organizations can also add their registered custom domains to Azure AD for email addresses to match the organizations domain name. If the organization intends to use a third-party identity provider such as ADFS for authentication, the added custom domains can be configured as federated. An adversary who has obtained privileged access to an Azure AD tenant may leverage this technique to establish persistence and be able to authenticate to Azure AD impersonating any user and bypassing the requirement to have a valid password and/or perform MFA.
@@ -8623,7 +8623,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The SourceAnchor (also called ImmutableId) A
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure AD User ImmutableId Attribute Updated - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure AD User ImmutableId Attribute Updated - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Azure AD", "Entra ID"]
@@ -8637,7 +8637,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure AD User ImmutableId Attribute Updated - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure AD User ImmutableId Attribute Updated - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0c0badad-4536-4a84-a561-5ff760f3c00e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8658,7 +8658,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_monitor_aad`  operationName="Update user" properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName=SourceAnchor | rename properties.* as * | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy | rename targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue as modifiedProperties | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user values(modifiedProperties) as modifiedProperties by initiatedBy, src_ip, result, operationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_ad_user_immutableid_attribute_updated_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure Automation Account Created - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure Automation Account Created - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the creation of a new Azure Automation account within an Azure tenant. Azure Automation is a cloud-based automation platform that allows administrators to automate Azure management tasks and orchestrate actions across external systems within Azure using PowerShell and Python. Azure Automation can also be configured to automate tasks on on premise infrastructure using a component called a Hybrid Runbook Worker. Automation accounts serve as a container to isolate Automation resources, runbooks, assets, and configurations from the resources of other accounts. They allow administrators to separate resources into logical environments or delegated responsibilities. Adversaries or red teams who have obtained privileged access to an Azure tenant may create an Azure Automation account with elevated privileges to maintain persistence in the Azure tenant. A malicious Automation Runbook can be created to create Global Administrators in Azure AD, execute code on VMs, etc.
@@ -8670,7 +8670,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may legitimately create Azure
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure Automation Account Created - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure Automation Account Created - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -8684,7 +8684,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure Automation Account Created - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure Automation Account Created - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136", "T1136.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "860902fd-2e76-46b3-b050-ba548dab576c", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8705,7 +8705,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_audit` operationName.localizedValue="Create or Update an Azure Automation account" status.value=Succeeded | dedup object | rename claims.ipaddr as src_ip | rename caller as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(object) as object by user, src_ip, resourceGroupName, object_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_automation_account_created_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure Automation Runbook Created - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure Automation Runbook Created - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the creation of a new Azure Automation Runbook within an Azure tenant. Azure Automation is a cloud-based automation platform that allows administrators to automate Azure management tasks and orchestrate actions across external systems within Azure. Azure Automation script files called Runbooks that can be written in PowerShell or Python. Adversaries or red teams who have obtained privileged access to an Azure tenant may create an Azure Automation Runbook that runs with elevated privileges to maintain persistence in the Azure tenant. A malicious Automation Runbook can be created to create Global Administrators in Azure AD, execute code on VMs, etc.
@@ -8717,7 +8717,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may legitimately create Azure
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure Automation Runbook Created - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure Automation Runbook Created - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -8731,7 +8731,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure Automation Runbook Created - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure Automation Runbook Created - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136", "T1136.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "178d696d-6dc6-4ee8-9d25-93fee34eaf5b", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8752,7 +8752,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_audit` operationName.localizedValue="Create or Update an Azure Automation Runbook" object!=AzureAutomationTutorial* status.value=Succeeded | dedup object | rename claims.ipaddr as src_ip | rename caller as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object user, src_ip, resourceGroupName, object_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_automation_runbook_created_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Azure Runbook Webhook Created - Rule]
+[ESCU - Azure Runbook Webhook Created - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the creation of a new Automation Runbook Webhook within an Azure tenant. Azure Automation is a cloud-based automation platform that allows administrators to automate Azure management tasks and orchestrate actions across external systems within Azure. Azure Automation script files called Runbooks that can be written in PowerShell or Python. One of the ways administrators can configure a Runbook to be executed is through HTTP Webhooks. Webhooks leverage custom unauthenticated URLs that are exposed to the Internet. An adversary who has obtained privileged access to an Azure tenant may create a Webhook to trigger the execution of an Automation Runbook with malicious code that can create users or execute code on a VM. This provides a persistent foothold on the environment.
@@ -8764,7 +8764,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may legitimately create Azure
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Azure Runbook Webhook Created - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Azure Runbook Webhook Created - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -8778,7 +8778,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Azure Runbook Webhook Created - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Azure Runbook Webhook Created - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e98944a9-92e4-443c-81b8-a322e33ce75a", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8799,7 +8799,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `azure_audit` operationName.localizedValue="Create or Update an Azure Automation webhook" status.value=Succeeded | dedup object | rename claims.ipaddr as src_ip | rename caller as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object user, src_ip, resourceGroupName, object_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `azure_runbook_webhook_created_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule]
+[ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic searches for a specific behavior in CircleCI pipelines such as the disabling of security jobs. The detection is made by using a Splunk query that renames certain fields and retrieves values for specified job names, workflow IDs and names, user information, commit messages, URLs, and branches. Then, the query identifies mandatory jobs for each workflow and searches for instances where they were run. The search also identifies the phase of the pipeline as "build" and extracts the repository name from the URL using regular expressions. The detection is important because it detects attempts to bypass security measures in CircleCI pipelines, which can potentially lead to malicious code being introduced into the pipeline, data breaches, system downtime, and reputational damage.  False positives might occur since legitimate use cases can require the disabling of security jobs. However, you can proactively monitor and identify any suspicious activity in the pipeline using this analytic and mitigate potential threats through early detection.
@@ -8811,7 +8811,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -8825,7 +8825,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4a2fdd41-c578-4cd4-9ef7-980e352517f2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8840,7 +8840,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `circleci` | rename vcs.committer_name as user vcs.subject as commit_message vcs.url as url workflows.* as *  | stats values(job_name) as job_names by workflow_id workflow_name user commit_message url branch | lookup mandatory_job_for_workflow workflow_name OUTPUTNEW job_name AS mandatory_job | search mandatory_job=* | eval mandatory_job_executed=if(like(job_names, "%".mandatory_job."%"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_job_executed=0 | eval phase="build" | rex field=url "(?<repository>[^\/]*\/[^\/]*)$" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_job_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule]
+[ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects the disablement of security steps in a CircleCI pipeline. Addressing instances of security step disablement in CircleCI pipelines can mitigate the risks associated with potential security vulnerabilities and unauthorized changes. A proactive approach helps protect the organization's infrastructure, data, and overall security posture. The detection is made by a Splunk query that searches for specific criteria within CircleCI logs through a combination of field renaming, joining, and statistical analysis to identify instances where security steps are disabled. It retrieves information such as job IDs, job names, commit details, and user information from the CircleCI logs.  The detection is important because it indicates potential security vulnerabilities or unauthorized changes to the pipeline caused by someone within the organization intentionally or unintentionally disabling security steps in the CircleCI pipeline.Disabling security steps can leave the pipeline and the associated infrastructure exposed to potential attacks, data breaches, or the introduction of malicious code into the pipeline. Investigate by reviewing the job name, commit details, and user information associated with the disablement of security steps. You must also examine any relevant on-disk artifacts and identify concurrent processes that might indicate the source of the attack or unauthorized change. 
@@ -8852,7 +8852,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -8866,7 +8866,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1554"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "72cb9de9-e98b-4ac9-80b2-5331bba6ea97", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8881,7 +8881,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `circleci` | rename workflows.job_id AS job_id | join job_id [ | search `circleci` | stats values(name) as step_names count by job_id job_name ] | stats count by step_names job_id job_name vcs.committer_name vcs.subject vcs.url owners{} | rename vcs.* as * , owners{} as user | lookup mandatory_step_for_job job_name OUTPUTNEW step_name AS mandatory_step | search mandatory_step=* | eval mandatory_step_executed=if(like(step_names, "%".mandatory_step."%"), 1, 0) | where mandatory_step_executed=0 | rex field=url "(?<repository>[^\/]*\/[^\/]*)$" | eval phase="build"  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `circle_ci_disable_security_step_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule]
+[ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects when a new command is run by a user, who typically does not run those commands. The detection is made by a Splunk query to search for these commands in the Change data model. Identifies commands run by users with the user_type of AssumedRole and a status of success. The query retrieves the earliest and latest timestamps of each command run and groups the results by the user and command. Then, it drops the unnecessary data model object name and creates a lookup to verify if the command was seen before. The lookup table contains information about previously seen cloud API calls for each user role, including the first time the command was seen and whether enough data is available for analysis. If the firstTimeSeenUserApiCall field is null or greater than the relative time of 24 hours ago, it indicates that the command is new and was not seen before. The final result table includes the firstTime, user, object, and command fields of the new commands. It also applies the security_content_ctime function to format the timestamps and applies a filter to remove any cloud API calls from previously unseen user roles. The detection is important because it helps to identify new commands run by different user roles. New commands can indicate potential malicious activity or unauthorized actions within the environment. Detecting and investigating these new commands can help identify and mitigate potential security threats earlier, preventing data breaches, unauthorized access, or other damaging outcomes. 
@@ -8893,7 +8893,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -8907,7 +8907,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2181ad1f-1e73-4d0c-9780-e8880482a08f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8922,7 +8922,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command All_Changes.object | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role user as user, command as command OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUserApiCall=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUserApiCall) OR firstTimeSeenUserApiCall > relative_time(now(),"-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, object, command |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `cloud_api_calls_from_previously_unseen_user_roles_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule]
+[ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for cloud compute instances created by users who have not created them before. 
@@ -8934,7 +8934,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to crea
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -8948,7 +8948,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "37a0ec8d-827e-4d6d-8025-cedf31f3a149", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -8963,7 +8963,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.user All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule]
+[ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks at cloud-infrastructure events where an instance is created in any region within the last hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where instances have been created. 
@@ -8975,7 +8975,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly st
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -8989,7 +8989,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fa4089e2-50e3-40f7-8469-d2cc1564ca59", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9004,7 +9004,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_regions vendor_region as vendor_region OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count , vendor_region | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_in_previously_unused_region_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule]
+[ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects potential instances that are created in a cloud computing environment using new or unknown image IDs that have not been seen before. This detection is important because it helps to investigate and take appropriate action to prevent further damage or unauthorized access to the Cloud environment, which can include data breaches, unauthorized access to sensitive information, or the deployment of malicious payloads within the cloud environment. False positives might occur since legitimate instances can also have previously unseen image IDs. Next steps include conducting an extensive triage and investigation to determine the nature of the activity. During triage, review the details of the created instances, including the user responsible for the creation, the image ID used, and any associated metadata. Additionally, consider inspecting any relevant on-disk artifacts and analyzing concurrent processes to identify the source of the attack. 
@@ -9016,7 +9016,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = After a new image is created, the first syst
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -9030,7 +9030,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bc24922d-987c-4645-b288-f8c73ec194c4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9045,7 +9045,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")` | where image_id != "unknown" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images image_id as image_id OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenImage=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenImage) OR firstTimeSeenImage > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, image_id, count, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_image_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule]
+[ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects the creation of EC2 instances with previously unseen instance types. The detection is made by using a Splunk query to identify the EC2 instances. First, the query searches for changes in the EC2 instance creation action and filters for instances with instance types that are not recognized or previously seen. Next, the query uses the Splunk tstats command to gather the necessary information from the Change data model. Then, it filters the instances with unknown instance types and reviews previously seen instance types to determine if they are new or not. The detection is important because it identifies attackers attempting to create instances with unknown or potentially compromised instance types, which can be an attempt to gain unauthorized access to sensitive data, compromise of systems, exfiltrate data, potential disruption of services, or launch other malicious activities within the environment. False positives might occur since there might be legitimate reasons for creating instances with previously unseen instance types. Therefore, you must carefully review and triage all alerts. 
@@ -9057,7 +9057,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a n
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -9071,7 +9071,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c6ddbf53-9715-49f3-bb4c-fb2e8a309cda", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9086,7 +9086,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as dest, count from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")` | where instance_type != "unknown" | lookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types instance_type as instance_type OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenInstanceType=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenInstanceType) OR firstTimeSeenInstanceType > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, user, dest, count, instance_type | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_compute_instance_created_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule]
+[ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for cloud instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. 
@@ -9098,7 +9098,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -9112,7 +9112,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7fb15084-b14e-405a-bd61-a6de15a40722", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9127,7 +9127,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user user as user OUTPUTNEW firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenUser=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenUser) OR firstTimeSeenUser > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime user command object_id count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_instance_modified_by_previously_unseen_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule]
+[ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen cities. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.
@@ -9140,7 +9140,7 @@ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** databas
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -9154,7 +9154,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e7ecc5e0-88df-48b9-91af-51104c68f02f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9169,7 +9169,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(City) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources City as City OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCity=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCity) OR firstTimeSeenCity > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, City, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_city_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule]
+[ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.
@@ -9182,7 +9182,7 @@ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** databas
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -9196,7 +9196,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "94994255-3acf-4213-9b3f-0494df03bb31", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9211,7 +9211,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Country as Country OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenCountry=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenCountry) OR firstTimeSeenCountry > relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") | table firstTime, src, Country, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_country_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule]
+[ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.
@@ -9224,7 +9224,7 @@ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** databas
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -9238,7 +9238,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f86a8ec9-b042-45eb-92f4-e9ed1d781078", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9253,7 +9253,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(All_Changes.object_id) as object_id from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources src as src OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenSrc=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenSrc) OR firstTimeSeenSrc > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, user, object_id, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule]
+[ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for cloud provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that runs or creates something.
@@ -9266,7 +9266,7 @@ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** databas
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -9280,7 +9280,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5aba1860-9617-4af9-b19d-aecac16fe4f2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9295,7 +9295,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Region) | lookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources Region as Region OUTPUT firstTimeSeen, enough_data | eventstats max(enough_data) as enough_data | where enough_data=1 | eval firstTimeSeenRegion=min(firstTimeSeen) | where isnull(firstTimeSeenRegion) OR firstTimeSeenRegion > relative_time(now(), `previously_unseen_cloud_provisioning_activity_window`) | table firstTime, src, Region, user, object, command | `cloud_provisioning_activity_from_previously_unseen_region_filter` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Cloud Security Groups Modifications by User - Rule]
+[ESCU - Cloud Security Groups Modifications by User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies users who are unsually modifying security group in your cloud enriovnment,focusing on actions such as modifications, deletions, or creations performed by users over 30-minute intervals. Analyzing patterns of modifications to security groups can help in identifying anomalous behavior that may indicate a compromised account or an insider threat.\
@@ -9313,7 +9313,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that legitimate user/admin ma
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Cloud Security Groups Modifications by User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Security Groups Modifications by User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -9327,7 +9327,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Cloud Security Groups Modifications by User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cloud Security Groups Modifications by User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Cloud User Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1578.005"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cfe7cca7-2746-4bdf-b712-b01ed819b9de", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9342,7 +9342,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats dc(All_Changes.object) as unique_security_groups values(All_Changes.src) as src values(All_Changes.user_type) as user_type values(All_Changes.object_category) as object_category values(All_Changes.object) as objects values(All_Changes.action) as action  values(All_Changes.user_agent) as user_agent values(All_Changes.command) as command from datamodel=Change WHERE All_Changes.object_category = "security_group" (All_Changes.action = modified OR All_Changes.action = deleted OR All_Changes.action = created)  by All_Changes.user  _time span=30m |  `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eventstats avg(unique_security_groups) as avg_changes , stdev(unique_security_groups) as std_changes by user | eval upperBound=(avg_changes+std_changes*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_security_groups > 2 and unique_security_groups >= upperBound, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1| `cloud_security_groups_modifications_by_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour 
@@ -9354,7 +9354,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the fi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -9363,7 +9363,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1552"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bc91a8cd-35e7-4bb2-6140-e756cc46fd71", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9378,7 +9378,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | join user type=outer [ | inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as earliestseen by user] | eval userStatus=if(earliestseen >= relative_time(now(), "-24h@h") OR isnull(earliestseen), "First Time Logging into AWS Console", "Previously Seen User") | where userStatus="First Time Logging into AWS Console" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_console_login_by_new_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour
@@ -9390,7 +9390,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the fi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -9399,7 +9399,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", "Compromised User Account", "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "121b0b11-f8ac-4ed6-a132-3800ca4fc07a", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9414,7 +9414,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rename City as justSeenCity | table firstTime lastTime user justSeenCity | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | rename City as previouslySeenCity | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user previouslySeenCity | fields earliestseen user previouslySeenCity] | eval userCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-24h@h"), "New City","Previously Seen City") | where userCity = "New City" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user previouslySeenCity justSeenCity userCity | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour
@@ -9426,7 +9426,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the fi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -9435,7 +9435,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", "Compromised User Account", "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "67bd3def-c41c-4bf6-837b-ae196b4257c6", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9450,7 +9450,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rename Country as justSeenCountry | table firstTime lastTime user justSeenCountry | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | rename Country as previouslySeenCountry | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user previouslySeenCountry | fields earliestseen user previouslySeenCountry] | eval userCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-24h@h"), "New Country","Previously Seen Country") | where userCountry = "New Country" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user previouslySeenCountry justSeenCountry userCountry | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour
@@ -9462,7 +9462,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the fi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -9471,7 +9471,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", "Compromised User Account", "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9f31aa8e-e37c-46bc-bce1-8b3be646d026", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9486,7 +9486,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rename Region as justSeenRegion | table firstTime lastTime user justSeenRegion | join user type=outer [| inputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | rename Region as previouslySeenRegion | stats min(firstTime) AS earliestseen by user previouslySeenRegion | fields earliestseen user previouslySeenRegion] | eval userRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-24h@h"), "New Region","Previously Seen Region") | where userRegion= "New Region" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime lastTime user previouslySeenRegion justSeenRegion userRegion | `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks at GCP Storage bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed a GCP Storage bucket. 
@@ -9498,7 +9498,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = GCP Storage buckets can be accessed from any
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -9512,7 +9512,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ccc3246a-daa1-11ea-87d0-0242ac130022", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9527,7 +9527,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` | multikv | rename sc_status_ as status | rename cs_object_ as bucket_name | rename c_ip_ as remote_ip | rename cs_uri_ as request_uri | rename cs_method_ as operation | search status="\"200\"" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | table firstTime, lastTime, bucket_name, remote_ip, operation, request_uri | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | outputlookup previously_seen_gcp_storage_access_from_remote_ip | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(),"-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | eval first_time=strftime(firstTime,"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S") | eval last_time=strftime(lastTime,"%m/%d/%y %H:%M:%S") | table  first_time last_time bucket_name remote_ip operation request_uri | `detect_gcp_storage_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for GCP PubSub events where a user has created an open/public GCP Storage bucket. 
@@ -9539,7 +9539,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -9553,7 +9553,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious GCP Storage Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f6ea3466-d6bb-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9574,7 +9574,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.resource.type=gcs_bucket data.protoPayload.methodName=storage.setIamPermissions | spath output=action path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.action | spath output=user path=data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail | spath output=location path=data.protoPayload.resourceLocation.currentLocations{} | spath output=src path=data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp | spath output=bucketName path=data.protoPayload.resourceName | spath output=role path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.role | spath output=member path=data.protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.bindingDeltas{}.member | search (member=allUsers AND action=ADD) | table  _time, bucketName, src, user, location, action, role, member | search `detect_new_open_gcp_storage_buckets_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket.
@@ -9586,7 +9586,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -9600,7 +9600,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf3d0dac4", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9621,7 +9621,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventSource=s3.amazonaws.com eventName=PutBucketAcl | rex field=_raw "(?<json_field>{.+})" | spath input=json_field output=grantees path=requestParameters.AccessControlPolicy.AccessControlList.Grant{} | search grantees=* | mvexpand grantees | spath input=grantees output=uri path=Grantee.URI | spath input=grantees output=permission path=Permission | search uri IN ("http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AllUsers","http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers") | search permission IN ("READ","READ_ACP","WRITE","WRITE_ACP","FULL_CONTROL") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_arn userIdentity.principalId userAgent uri permission bucketName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user has created an open/public S3 bucket over the aws cli.
@@ -9633,7 +9633,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While this search has no known false positiv
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -9647,7 +9647,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "39c61d09-8b30-4154-922b-2d0a694ecc22", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9668,7 +9668,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventSource="s3.amazonaws.com" (userAgent="[aws-cli*" OR userAgent=aws-cli* ) eventName=PutBucketAcl OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") OR requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control IN ("*AuthenticatedUsers","*AllUsers") | rename requestParameters.bucketName AS bucketName | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.userName userIdentity.principalId userAgent bucketName requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-read-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-write-acp requestParameters.accessControlList.x-amz-grant-full-control | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_open_s3_buckets_over_aws_cli_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks at S3 bucket-access logs and detects new or previously unseen remote IP addresses that have successfully accessed an S3 bucket. 
@@ -9680,7 +9680,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = S3 buckets can be accessed from any IP, as l
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -9694,7 +9694,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e6f1bb1b-f441-492b-9126-902acda217da", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9709,7 +9709,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200  [search `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200 | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip| eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table bucket_name remote_ip]| iplocation remote_ip |rename remote_ip as src_ip | table _time bucket_name src_ip City Country operation request_uri | `detect_s3_access_from_a_new_ip_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an EC2 instance in 4 hours intervals
@@ -9721,7 +9721,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -9735,7 +9735,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9750,7 +9750,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_securityhub_finding` "Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts values(Title) as Title values(Types{}) as Types values(vendor_account) as vendor_account values(vendor_region) as vendor_region values(severity) as severity by _time dest | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_alerts_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_alerts_stdev | eval threshold_value = 3 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_alerts_avg+(total_alerts_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time dest alerts Title Types vendor_account vendor_region severity isOutlier total_alerts_avg | `detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_ec2_instance_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for a spike in number of of AWS security Hub alerts for an AWS IAM User in 4 hours intervals. 
@@ -9762,7 +9762,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -9776,7 +9776,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Security Hub Alerts"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2a9b80d3-6220-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0d222", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9791,7 +9791,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_securityhub_finding` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"= AwsIamUser | rename findings{}.Resources{}.Id as user | bucket span=4h _time | stats count AS alerts by _time user | eventstats avg(alerts) as total_launched_avg, stdev(alerts) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 2 | eval isOutlier=if(alerts > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table _time user alerts |`detect_spike_in_aws_security_hub_alerts_for_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect spike in blocked outbound network connections originating from within your AWS environment.  It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. 
@@ -9803,7 +9803,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -9817,7 +9817,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity", "Command And Control", "Suspicious AWS Traffic"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d3fffa37-492f-487b-a35d-c60fcb2acf01", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9832,7 +9832,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16)  [search  `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16)  | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by src_ip | inputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by src_ip | rename numberOfBlockedConnections as latestCount | eval newAvgBlockedConnections=avgBlockedConnections + (latestCount-avgBlockedConnections)/720 | eval newStdevBlockedConnections=sqrt(((pow(stdevBlockedConnections, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgBlockedConnections)*(latestCount-avgBlockedConnections))/720)) | eval avgBlockedConnections=coalesce(newAvgBlockedConnections, avgBlockedConnections), stdevBlockedConnections=coalesce(newStdevBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | eval dataPointThreshold = 5, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgBlockedConnections+deviationThreshold*stdevBlockedConnections) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | table src_ip] | stats values(dest_ip) as dest_ip, values(interface_id) as "resourceId" count as numberOfBlockedConnections, dc(dest_ip) as uniqueDestConnections by src_ip | `detect_spike_in_blocked_outbound_traffic_from_your_aws_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects users creating spikes in API activity related to deletion of S3 buckets in your AWS environment. It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. 
@@ -9844,7 +9844,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-11-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-11-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -9858,7 +9858,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS S3 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e733a326-59d2-446d-b8db-14a17151aa68", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9873,7 +9873,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket [search `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup s3_deletion_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | spath output=bucketName path=requestParameters.bucketName | stats values(bucketName) as bucketName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_s3_bucket_deletion_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule]
+[ESCU - GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an authentication attempt event against a Google Cloud Platform tenant that fails during the Multi Factor Authentication challenge. This behavior may represent an adversary trying to authenticate with compromised credentials for an account that has multi-factor authentication enabled. 
@@ -9885,7 +9885,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate users may miss to reply the MFA c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -9899,7 +9899,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1078", "T1078.004", "T1621"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "345f7e1d-a3fe-4158-abd8-e630f9878323", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9920,7 +9920,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `gws_reports_login` event.name=login_failure `gws_login_mfa_methods` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip, login_challenge_method | `gcp_authentication_failed_during_mfa_challenge_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule]
+[ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of GCPloit exploitation framework. This framework can be used to escalate privileges and move laterally from compromised high privilege accounts. 
@@ -9932,7 +9932,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Payload.request.function.timeout value can p
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -9946,7 +9946,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a1c5a85e-a162-410c-a5d9-99ff639e5a52", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -9967,7 +9967,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.function.timeout=539s | table src src_user data.resource.labels.project_id data.protoPayload.request.function.serviceAccountEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.request.location http_user_agent | `gcp_detect_gcploit_framework_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule]
+[ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster's pods 
@@ -9979,7 +9979,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicio
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -9988,7 +9988,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "19b53215-4a16-405b-8087-9e6acf619842", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10003,7 +10003,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` category=kube-audit |spath input=properties.log |search responseStatus.code=401 |table sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_pod_scan_detection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an attempt to disable multi-factor authentication for a GCP user. An adversary who has obtained access to an GCP tenant may disable multi-factor authentication as a way to plant a backdoor and maintain persistence using a valid account. This way the attackers can keep persistance in the environment without adding new users.
@@ -10015,7 +10015,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate use case may require for users to
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -10029,7 +10029,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1556", "T1556.006"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b9bc5513-6fc1-4821-85a3-e1d81e451c83", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10050,7 +10050,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `gws_reports_admin` command=UNENROLL_USER_FROM_STRONG_AUTH | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, command, actor.email, status, id.applicationName, event.name, vendor_account, action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `gcp_multi_factor_authentication_disabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
+[ESCU - GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies multiple failed multi-factor authentication requests for a single user within a Google Cloud Platform tenant. Specifically, the analytic triggers when 10 or more MFA user prompts fail within 5 minutes. Google CLoud tenants can be very different depending on the organization, Security teams should test this detection and customize these arbitrary thresholds. The detected behavior may represent an adversary who has obtained legitimate credentials for a user and continuously repeats login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request. Threat actors like the Lapsus team and APT29 have leveraged this technique to bypass multi-factor authentication controls as reported by Mandiant and others.
@@ -10062,7 +10062,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Multiple Failed MFA requests may also be a s
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -10076,7 +10076,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1621", "T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cbb3cb84-c06f-4393-adcc-5cb6195621f1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10097,7 +10097,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `gws_reports_login` event.name=login_failure `gws_login_mfa_methods` | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS mfa_prompts values(user) AS user by src_ip, login_challenge_method,  _time | where mfa_prompts >= 10 | `gcp_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
+[ESCU - GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies one source Ip failing to authenticate into the Google Workspace user accounts with more than 20 unique valid users within 5 minutes. These user accounts may have other privileges with respect to access to other sensitive resources in the Google Cloud Platform. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Google Workspace environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges.
@@ -10109,7 +10109,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = No known false postives for this detection.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -10123,7 +10123,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1110", "T1110.003", "T1110.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "da20828e-d6fb-4ee5-afb7-d0ac200923d5", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10138,7 +10138,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `gws_reports_login` event.type = login event.name = login_failure | bucket span=5m _time | stats count dc(user) AS unique_accounts values(user) as tried_accounts values(authentication_method) AS authentication_method earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by _time event.name src app id.applicationName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |  where unique_accounts > 20 | `gcp_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule]
+[ESCU - GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a successful authentication event against Google Cloud Platform for an account without Multi-Factor Authentication enabled. This could be evidence of a missconfiguration, a policy violation or an account take over attempt that should be investigated
@@ -10150,7 +10150,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although not recommended, certain users may
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -10164,7 +10164,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "40e17d88-87da-414e-b253-8dc1e4f9555b", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10185,7 +10185,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `gws_reports_login` event.name=login_success NOT `gws_login_mfa_methods` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, src_ip,  login_challenge_method, app, event.name, vendor_account, action |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `gcp_successful_single_factor_authentication_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
+[ESCU - GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies one source IP failing to authenticate into the Google Workspace with multiple valid users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against a Google Workspace enviroment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. The detection calculates the standard deviation for source IP and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of failed authentication attempts. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the bucket span time and the calculation of the upperBound field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.  While looking for anomalies using statistical methods like the standard deviation can have benefits, we also recommend using threshold-based detections to complement coverage. A similar analytic following the threshold model is `GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip`
@@ -10197,7 +10197,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = No known false positives for this detection.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -10211,7 +10211,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1110", "T1110.003", "T1110.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bd8097ed-958a-4873-87d9-44f2b4d85705", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10226,7 +10226,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `gws_reports_login` event.type = login event.name = login_failure| bucket span=5m _time | stats  dc(user_name) AS unique_accounts values(user_name) as tried_accounts values(authentication_method) AS authentication_method by _time, src | eventstats  avg(unique_accounts) as ip_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as ip_std by _time | eval  upperBound=(ip_avg+ip_std*3) | eval  isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | where isOutlier =1| `gcp_unusual_number_of_failed_authentications_from_ip_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule]
+[ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sharing potentially malicious/classified documents with users outside your organization via GSuite file sharing . 
@@ -10238,7 +10238,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This is an anomaly search, you must specify
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -10247,7 +10247,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a7131dae-34e3-11ec-a2de-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10262,7 +10262,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `gsuite_drive` name=change_user_access | rename parameters.* as * | search email = "*@yourdomain.com" target_user != "*@yourdomain.com" | stats count values(owner) as owner values(target_user) as target values(doc_type) as doc_type values(doc_title) as doc_title dc(target_user) as distinct_target by src_ip email | where distinct_target > 50 | `gdrive_suspicious_file_sharing_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GitHub Actions Disable Security Workflow - Rule]
+[ESCU - GitHub Actions Disable Security Workflow - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search detects a disabled security workflow in GitHub Actions. An attacker can disable a security workflow in GitHub actions to hide malicious code in it.
@@ -10274,7 +10274,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GitHub Actions Disable Security Workflow - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GitHub Actions Disable Security Workflow - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -10288,7 +10288,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GitHub Actions Disable Security Workflow - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GitHub Actions Disable Security Workflow - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.002", "T1195"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0459f1a5-c0ac-4987-82d6-65081209f854", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10303,7 +10303,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `github` workflow_run.event=push OR workflow_run.event=pull_request | stats values(workflow_run.name) as workflow_run.name by workflow_run.head_commit.id workflow_run.event workflow_run.head_branch workflow_run.head_commit.author.email workflow_run.head_commit.author.name workflow_run.head_commit.message workflow_run.head_commit.timestamp workflow_run.head_repository.full_name workflow_run.head_repository.owner.id workflow_run.head_repository.owner.login workflow_run.head_repository.owner.type | rename workflow_run.head_commit.author.name as user, workflow_run.head_commit.author.email as user_email, workflow_run.head_repository.full_name as repository, workflow_run.head_branch as branch | search NOT workflow_run.name=*security-testing* | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_actions_disable_security_workflow_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule]
+[ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to master or main branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to master without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch
@@ -10315,7 +10315,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Admin can do changes directly to master bran
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -10329,7 +10329,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c9d2bfe2-019f-11ec-a8eb-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10344,7 +10344,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = master |  stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date repository.full_name | rename commit.author.login as user, repository.full_name as repository | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_changes_in_master_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Github Commit In Develop - Rule]
+[ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a pushed or commit to develop branch. This is to avoid unwanted modification to develop without a review to the changes. Ideally in terms of devsecops the changes made in a branch and do a PR for review. of course in some cases admin of the project may did a changes directly to master branch
@@ -10356,7 +10356,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin can do changes directly to develop bra
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Github Commit In Develop - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -10370,7 +10370,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Github Commit In Develop - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1199"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f3030cb6-0b02-11ec-8f22-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10385,7 +10385,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `github` branches{}.name = main OR branches{}.name = develop |  stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  by commit.author.html_url commit.commit.author.email commit.author.login commit.commit.message repository.pushed_at commit.commit.committer.date | eval phase="code" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_commit_in_develop_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule]
+[ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is made by first searching for logs that contain the action "create" and renames certain fields for easier analysis. Then, this analytic uses the "stats" command to calculate the first and last occurrence of the alert based on the timestamp. The fields included in the output are the action, affected package name, affected range, created date, external identifier, external reference, fixed version, severity, repository, repository URL, and user. The "phase" field is set to "code" to indicate that the alert pertains to code-related issues. The detection is important because dependabot Alerts can indicate vulnerabilities in the codebase that can be exploited by attackers. Detecting and investigating these alerts can help a SOC to proactively address security risks and prevent potential breaches or unauthorized access to sensitive information. False positives might occur since there are legitimate actions that trigger the "create" action or if other factors exist that can generate similar log entries. Next steps include reviewing the details of the alert, such as the affected package, severity, and fixed version to determine the appropriate response and mitigation steps.
@@ -10397,7 +10397,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -10411,7 +10411,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "05032b04-4469-4034-9df7-05f607d75cba", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10426,7 +10426,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `github` alert.id=* action=create | rename repository.full_name as repository, repository.html_url as repository_url sender.login as user | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action alert.affected_package_name alert.affected_range alert.created_at alert.external_identifier alert.external_reference alert.fixed_in alert.severity repository repository_url user | eval phase="code" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_dependabot_alert_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule]
+[ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects pull requests from unknown users on GitHub. The detection is made by using a Splunk query to search for pull requests in the `check_suite.pull_requests` field where the `id` is not specified. Next, the analytic retrieves information such as the author's name, the repository's full name, the head reference of the pull request, and the commit message from the `check_suite.head_commit` field. The analytic also includes a step to exclude known users by using the `github_known_users` lookup table, which helps to filter out pull requests from known users and focus on the pull requests from unknown users. The detection is important because it locates potential malicious activity or unauthorized access since unknown users can introduce malicious code or gain unauthorized access to repositories leading to unauthorized code changes, data breaches, or other security incidents. Next steps include reviewing the author's name, the repository involved, the head reference of the pull request, and the commit message upon triage of a potential pull request from an unknown user. You must also analyze any relevant on-disk artifacts and investigate any concurrent processes to determine the source and intent of the pull request."
@@ -10438,7 +10438,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -10452,7 +10452,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.001", "T1195"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9d7b9100-8878-4404-914e-ca5e551a641e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10467,7 +10467,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `github` check_suite.pull_requests{}.id=* | stats count by check_suite.head_commit.author.name repository.full_name check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref check_suite.head_commit.message | rename check_suite.head_commit.author.name as user repository.full_name as repository check_suite.pull_requests{}.head.ref as ref_head check_suite.head_commit.message as commit_message | search NOT `github_known_users` | eval phase="code" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `github_pull_request_from_unknown_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule]
+[ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is to detect suspicious google drive or google docs files shared outside or externally. This behavior might be a good hunting query to monitor exfitration of data made by an attacker or insider to a targetted machine. 
@@ -10479,7 +10479,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin or normal user may share files
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -10493,7 +10493,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops", "Insider Threat"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1567.002", "T1567"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f6ee02d6-fea0-11eb-b2c2-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10508,7 +10508,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `gsuite_drive` NOT (email IN("", "null")) | rex field=parameters.owner "[^@]+@(?<src_domain>[^@]+)" | rex field=email "[^@]+@(?<dest_domain>[^@]+)" | where src_domain = "internal_test_email.com" and not dest_domain = "internal_test_email.com" | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="low" | stats values(parameters.doc_title) as doc_title, values(parameters.doc_type) as doc_types, values(email) as dst_email_list, values(parameters.visibility) as visibility, values(parameters.doc_id) as doc_id, count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by parameters.owner ip_address phase severity  | rename parameters.owner as user ip_address as src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_drive_share_in_external_email_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule]
+[ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious attachment file extension in Gsuite email that may related to spear phishing attack. This file type is commonly used by malware to lure user to click on it to execute malicious code to compromised targetted machine. But this search can also catch some normal files related to this file type that maybe send by employee or network admin.
@@ -10520,7 +10520,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -10534,7 +10534,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6d663014-fe92-11eb-ab07-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10549,7 +10549,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `gsuite_gmail` "attachment{}.file_extension_type" IN ("pl", "py", "rb", "sh", "bat", "exe", "dll", "cpl", "com", "js", "vbs", "ps1", "reg","swf", "cmd", "go") | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="medium" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments  subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_attachment_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule]
+[ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a gsuite email contains suspicious subject having known file type used in spear phishing. This technique is a common and effective entry vector of attacker to compromise a network by luring the user to click or execute the suspicious attachment send from external email account because of the effective social engineering of subject related to delivery, bank and so on. On the other hand this detection may catch a normal email traffic related to legitimate transaction so better to check the email sender, spelling and etc. avoid click link or opening the attachment if you are not expecting this type of e-mail.
@@ -10561,7 +10561,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contai
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -10575,7 +10575,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8ef3971e-00f2-11ec-b54f-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10590,7 +10590,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 subject IN ("*dhl*", "* ups *", "*delivery*", "*parcel*", "*label*", "*invoice*", "*postal*", "* fedex *", "* usps *", "* express *", "*shipment*", "*Banking/Tax*","*shipment*", "*new order*") attachment{}.file_extension_type IN ("doc", "docx", "xls", "xlsx", "ppt", "pptx", "pdf", "zip", "rar", "html","htm","hta") | rex field=source.from_header_address "[^@]+@(?<source_domain>[^@]+)" | rex field=destination{}.address "[^@]+@(?<dest_domain>[^@]+)" | where not source_domain="internal_test_email.com" and dest_domain="internal_test_email.com" | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="medium" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(attachment{}.file_extension_type) as email_attachments, values(attachment{}.sha256) as attachment_sha256, values(payload_size) as payload_size by destination{}.service num_message_attachments  subject destination{}.address source.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_suspicious_subject_with_attachment_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule]
+[ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytics is to detect a gmail containing a link that are known to be abused by malware or attacker like pastebin, telegram and discord to deliver malicious payload. This event can encounter some normal email traffic within organization and external email that normally using this application and services.
@@ -10602,7 +10602,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = normal email contains this link that are kno
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -10616,7 +10616,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8630aa22-042b-11ec-af39-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10631,7 +10631,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `gsuite_gmail` "link_domain{}" IN ("*pastebin.com*", "*discord*", "*telegram*","t.me") | rex field=source.from_header_address "[^@]+@(?<source_domain>[^@]+)" | rex field=destination{}.address "[^@]+@(?<dest_domain>[^@]+)" | where not source_domain="internal_test_email.com" and dest_domain="internal_test_email.com" | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="low" |stats values(link_domain{}) as link_domains min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by is_spam source.address source.from_header_address subject destination{}.address phase severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_email_with_known_abuse_web_service_link_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule]
+[ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious outbound e-mail from internal email to external email domain. This can be a good hunting query to monitor insider or outbound email traffic for not common domain e-mail. The idea is to parse the domain of destination email check if there is a minimum outbound traffic < 20 with attachment.
@@ -10643,7 +10643,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin and normal user may send this
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -10652,7 +10652,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops", "Insider Threat"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dc4dc3a8-ff54-11eb-8bf7-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10667,7 +10667,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `gsuite_gmail` num_message_attachments > 0 | rex field=source.from_header_address "[^@]+@(?<source_domain>[^@]+)" | rex field=destination{}.address "[^@]+@(?<dest_domain>[^@]+)" | where source_domain="internal_test_email.com" and not dest_domain="internal_test_email.com" | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="low" | stats values(subject) as subject, values(source.from_header_address) as src_domain_list, count as numEvents, dc(source.from_header_address) as numSrcAddresses, min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest_domain phase severity | where numSrcAddresses < 20 |sort - numSrcAddresses | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_outbound_email_with_attachment_to_external_domain_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule]
+[ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search can help the detection of compromised accounts or internal users sending suspcious calendar invites via GSuite calendar. These invites may contain malicious links or attachments. 
@@ -10679,7 +10679,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search will also produce normal activit
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -10688,7 +10688,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "03cdd68a-34fb-11ec-9bd3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10703,7 +10703,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `gsuite_calendar` |bin span=5m _time |rename parameters.* as * |search target_calendar_id!=null email="*yourdomain.com"| stats  count values(target_calendar_id) values(event_title) values(event_guest) by email _time | where count >100| `gsuite_suspicious_calendar_invite_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule]
+[ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a shared file in google drive with suspicious file name that are commonly used by spear phishing campaign. This technique is very popular to lure the user by running a malicious document or click a malicious link within the shared file that will redirected to malicious website. This detection can also catch some normal email communication between organization and its external customer.
@@ -10715,7 +10715,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = normal user or normal transaction may contai
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -10729,7 +10729,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "07eed200-03f5-11ec-98fb-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10744,7 +10744,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `gsuite_drive` parameters.owner_is_team_drive=false "parameters.doc_title" IN ("*dhl*", "* ups *", "*delivery*", "*parcel*", "*label*", "*invoice*", "*postal*", "*fedex*", "* usps *", "* express *", "*shipment*", "*Banking/Tax*","*shipment*", "*new order*") parameters.doc_type IN ("document","pdf", "msexcel", "msword", "spreadsheet", "presentation") | rex field=parameters.owner "[^@]+@(?<source_domain>[^@]+)" | rex field=parameters.target_user "[^@]+@(?<dest_domain>[^@]+)" | where not source_domain="internal_test_email.com" and dest_domain="internal_test_email.com" | eval phase="plan" | eval severity="low" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by email parameters.owner parameters.target_user parameters.doc_title parameters.doc_type phase severity | rename parameters.target_user AS user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `gsuite_suspicious_shared_file_name_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule]
+[ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic detects multiple failed login attempts in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Specifically, it identifies scenarios where there are more than 10 unsuccessful login attempts within a short time frame. The detection leverages Office365 management activity logs, specifically the AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon records from the AzureActiveDirectory workload. It aggregates these logs in 5-minute intervals to count the number of failed login attempts and associates them with the originating source IP address. Multiple failed login attempts from a single source can be indicative of brute-force attacks, password spraying, or other malicious authentication attempts. Identifying and responding to these patterns promptly can prevent unauthorized access and potential breaches. If this detection represents a true positive, an attacker might be attempting to gain unauthorized access to an Office365 account. Successful compromise could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, potential lateral movement within the organization, or further malicious activities using the compromised account.
@@ -10756,7 +10756,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = An Ip address with more than 10 failed authe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -10770,7 +10770,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.001", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02222", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10785,7 +10785,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoginFailed record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(_raw) AS failed_attempts values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by _time, src_ip | where failed_attempts > 10 | `high_number_of_login_failures_from_a_single_source_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual Location - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual Location - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects unauthorized access or misuse of Kubernetes Secrets from unusual locations. It identifies anomalies in access patterns by segmenting and analyzing the source of requests by country. Kubernetes Secrets, which store sensitive information like passwords, OAuth tokens, and SSH keys, are critical assets, and their misuse can lead to significant security breaches. This behavior is worth identifying for a SOC as it could indicate an attacker attempting to exfiltrate or misuse these secrets. The impact of such an attack could be severe, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data.
@@ -10797,7 +10797,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual Location - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual Location - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -10811,7 +10811,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual Location - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual Location - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "40a064c1-4ec1-4381-9e35-61192ba8ef82", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10826,7 +10826,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kube_audit` objectRef.resource=secrets verb=get | iplocation sourceIPs{} | fillnull | search NOT `kube_allowed_locations` | stats count by objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestReceivedTimestamp requestURI responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.groups{} user.uid user.username userAgent verb City Country | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_abuse_of_secret_by_unusual_location_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Agent - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Agent - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects unauthorized access or misuse of Kubernetes Secrets by unusual user agents. It identifies anomalies in access patterns by segmenting and analyzing the source of requests by user agent. Kubernetes Secrets, which store sensitive information like passwords, OAuth tokens, and SSH keys, are critical assets, and their misuse can lead to significant security breaches. This behavior is worth identifying for a SOC as it could indicate an attacker attempting to exfiltrate or misuse these secrets. The impact of such an attack could be severe, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data.
@@ -10838,7 +10838,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Agent - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Agent - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -10852,7 +10852,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Agent - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Agent - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "096ab390-05ca-462c-884e-343acd5b9240", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10867,7 +10867,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kube_audit` objectRef.resource=secrets verb=get | search NOT `kube_allowed_user_agents` | fillnull | stats count by objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestReceivedTimestamp requestURI responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.groups{} user.uid user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_abuse_of_secret_by_unusual_user_agent_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Group - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Group - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects unauthorized access or misuse of Kubernetes Secrets by unusual user groups. It identifies anomalies in access patterns by segmenting and analyzing the source of requests by user group. Kubernetes Secrets, which store sensitive information like passwords, OAuth tokens, and SSH keys, are critical assets, and their misuse can lead to significant security breaches. This behavior is worth identifying for a SOC as it could indicate an attacker attempting to exfiltrate or misuse these secrets. The impact of such an attack could be severe, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data.
@@ -10879,7 +10879,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Group - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Group - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -10893,7 +10893,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Group - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Group - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b6f45bbc-4ea9-4068-b3bc-0477f6997ae2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10908,7 +10908,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kube_audit` objectRef.resource=secrets verb=get | search NOT `kube_allowed_user_groups` | fillnull | stats count by objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestReceivedTimestamp requestURI responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.groups{} user.uid user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_abuse_of_secret_by_unusual_user_group_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Name - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Name - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects unauthorized access or misuse of Kubernetes Secrets by unusual user names. It identifies anomalies in access patterns by segmenting and analyzing the source of requests by user name. Kubernetes Secrets, which store sensitive information like passwords, OAuth tokens, and SSH keys, are critical assets, and their misuse can lead to significant security breaches. This behavior is worth identifying for a SOC as it could indicate an attacker attempting to exfiltrate or misuse these secrets. The impact of such an attack could be severe, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data.
@@ -10920,7 +10920,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Name - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Name - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -10934,7 +10934,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Name - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Name - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "df6e9cae-5257-4a34-8f3a-df49fa0f5c46", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10949,7 +10949,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kube_audit` objectRef.resource=secrets verb=get | search NOT `kube_allowed_user_names` | fillnull | stats count by objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestReceivedTimestamp requestURI responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.groups{} user.uid user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_abuse_of_secret_by_unusual_user_name_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Access Scanning - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Access Scanning - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects potential scanning activities within a Kubernetes environment. It identifies unauthorized access attempts, probing of public APIs, or attempts to exploit known vulnerabilities. The analytic detects this behavior by monitoring Kubernetes audit logs for patterns indicative of scanning, such as repeated failed access attempts or unusual API requests. This behavior is worth identifying for a SOC as it could indicate an attackers preliminary step in an attack, aiming to gather information about the system to find potential vulnerabilities. The impact of such an attack could be severe, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data.
@@ -10961,7 +10961,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Access Scanning - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Access Scanning - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -10975,7 +10975,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Access Scanning - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Access Scanning - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1046"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2f4abe6d-5991-464d-8216-f90f42999764", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -10990,7 +10990,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kube_audit` "user.groups{}"="system:unauthenticated" "responseStatus.code"=403 | iplocation sourceIPs{} | stats count values(userAgent) as userAgent values(user.username) as user.username values(user.groups{}) as user.groups{} values(verb) as verb values(requestURI) as requestURI values(responseStatus.code) as responseStatus.code values(responseStatus.message) as responseStatus.message values(responseStatus.reason) as responseStatus.reason values(responseStatus.status) as responseStatus.status by sourceIPs{} Country City | where count > 5 | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_access_scanning_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Network Activity from Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Network Activity from Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection detects inbound network traffic volume anomalies from processes running within containerised workloads. Anomalies are provided with context identifying the Kubernetes cluster, the workload name, and the type of anomaly.This detection leverages Network performance Monitoring metrics harvested using an OTEL collector, and is pulled from Splunk Observability cloud using the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5247). This detection compares the tcp.bytes, tcp.new_sockets, tcp.packets, udp.bytes, udp.packets metrics for destination (receiving) workload process pairs over the last 1 hour, with the average of those metrics for those pairs over the last 30 days in order to detect any anonymously high inbound network activity. Anomalies in inbound network traffic may suggest that the container is receiving unexpected or unauthorized data, potentially indicative of a breach, a vulnerability exploitation attempt, an attempt to overload the service, or propagation of malware. Successful compromise of a containerised application resulting in the ability to upload data, can result in installation of command and control software or other malware, data integrity damage, container escape, and further compromise of the environment. Additionally this kind of activity may result in resource contention, performance degradation and disruption to the normal operation of the environment. 
@@ -11006,7 +11006,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Network Activity from Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Network Activity from Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11020,7 +11020,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Network Activity from Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Network Activity from Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "10442d8b-0701-4c25-911d-d67b906e713c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11035,7 +11035,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats avg(tcp.*) as tcp.* avg(udp.*) as udp.* where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-1h by k8s.cluster.name dest.workload.name dest.process.name  span=10s | eval key='dest.workload.name' + ":" + 'dest.process.name' | join type=left key [ mstats avg(tcp.*) as avg_tcp.* avg(udp.*) as avg_udp.* stdev(tcp.*) as stdev_tcp.* avg(udp.*) as stdev_udp.* where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-30d latest=-1h by dest.workload.name dest.process.name | eval key='dest.workload.name' + ":" + 'dest.process.name' ] | eval anomalies = "" | foreach stdev_* [ eval anomalies =if( '<<MATCHSTR>>' > ('avg_<<MATCHSTR>>' + 3 * 'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>'), anomalies + "<<MATCHSTR>> higher than average by " + tostring(round(('<<MATCHSTR>>' - 'avg_<<MATCHSTR>>')/'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>' ,2)) + " Standard Deviations. <<MATCHSTR>>=" + tostring('<<MATCHSTR>>') + " avg_<<MATCHSTR>>=" + tostring('avg_<<MATCHSTR>>') + " 'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>'=" + tostring('stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>') + ", " , anomalies) ] | fillnull | eval anomalies = split(replace(anomalies, ",\s$$$$", "") ,", ") | where anomalies!="" | stats count(anomalies) as count values(anomalies) as anomalies by k8s.cluster.name dest.workload.name dest.process.name | where count > 5 | rename k8s.cluster.name as host | `kubernetes_anomalous_inbound_network_activity_from_process_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Outbound Network IO - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Outbound Network IO - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This analytic identifies high Inbound or Outbound Network IO anomalies in a Kubernetes container. It uses process metrics from an OTEL collector and Kubelet Stats Receiver, and data from Splunk Observability cloud via the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. A lookup table containing average and standard deviation for network IO is used to evaluate anomalies for each container. An event is generated if the anomaly persists over a 1 hour period. These anomalies may indicate security threats such as data exfiltration, command and control communication, service disruptions, or unauthorized data transfers. They can compromise the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of applications and data, necessitating rapid detection and response. Anomalous network utilization may suggest a compromised container, potentially leading to data breaches, service outages, financial losses, and reputational damage. 
@@ -11058,7 +11058,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Outbound Network IO - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Outbound Network IO - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11072,7 +11072,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Outbound Network IO - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Outbound Network IO - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4f3b0c97-657e-4547-a89a-9a50c656e3cd", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11087,7 +11087,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats avg(k8s.pod.network.io) as io where `kubernetes_metrics` by k8s.cluster.name k8s.pod.name k8s.node.name direction span=10s | eval service = replace('k8s.pod.name', "-\w{5}$$|-[abcdef0-9]{8,10}-\w{5}$$", "") | stats avg(eval(if(direction="transmit", io,null()))) as outbound_network_io avg(eval(if(direction="receive", io,null()))) as inbound_network_io by k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name k8s.pod.name service _time | eval key = 'k8s.cluster.name' + ":" + 'service' | lookup k8s_container_network_io_baseline key | eval anomalies = "" | foreach stdev_* [ eval anomalies =if( '<<MATCHSTR>>' > ('avg_<<MATCHSTR>>' + 4 * 'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>'), anomalies + "<<MATCHSTR>> higher than average by " + tostring(round(('<<MATCHSTR>>' - 'avg_<<MATCHSTR>>')/'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>' ,2)) + " Standard Deviations. <<MATCHSTR>>=" + tostring('<<MATCHSTR>>') + " avg_<<MATCHSTR>>=" + tostring('avg_<<MATCHSTR>>') + " 'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>'=" + tostring('stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>') + ", " , anomalies) ] | eval anomalies = replace(anomalies, ",\s$$", "") | where anomalies!="" | stats count values(anomalies) as anomalies by k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name k8s.pod.name service | rename service as k8s.service | where count > 5 | rename k8s.node.name as host | `kubernetes_anomalous_inbound_outbound_network_traffic_io_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound to Outbound Network IO Ratio - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound to Outbound Network IO Ratio - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This analytic identifies changes in network communication behavior in a Kubernetes container by examining inbound to outbound network IO ratios. It uses process metrics from an OTEL collector and Kubelet Stats Receiver, and data from Splunk Observability cloud via the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. A lookup table containing average and standard deviation for network IO is used to evaluate anomalies for each container. An event is generated if the anomaly persists over a 1 hour period. These anomalies may indicate security threats such as data exfiltration, command and control communication, or compromised container behavior. They can compromise the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of applications and data, necessitating rapid detection and response. Anomalous network utilization may suggest a compromised container, potentially leading to data breaches, service outages, and unauthorized access within the Kubernetes cluster. 
@@ -11110,7 +11110,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound to Outbound Network IO Ratio - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound to Outbound Network IO Ratio - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11124,7 +11124,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound to Outbound Network IO Ratio - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound to Outbound Network IO Ratio - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9d8f6e3f-39df-46d8-a9d4-96173edc501f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11139,7 +11139,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats avg(k8s.pod.network.io) as io where `kubernetes_metrics` by k8s.cluster.name k8s.pod.name k8s.node.name direction span=10s | eval service = replace('k8s.pod.name', "-\w{5}$|-[abcdef0-9]{8,10}-\w{5}$", "") | eval key = 'k8s.cluster.name' + ":" + 'service' | stats avg(eval(if(direction="transmit", io,null()))) as outbound_network_io avg(eval(if(direction="receive", io,null()))) as inbound_network_io by key service k8s.cluster.name k8s.pod.name k8s.node.name _time | eval inbound:outbound = inbound_network_io/outbound_network_io | eval outbound:inbound = outbound_network_io/inbound_network_io | fields - *network_io | lookup k8s_container_network_io_ratio_baseline key | eval anomalies = "" | foreach stdev_* [ eval anomalies =if( '<<MATCHSTR>>' > ('avg_<<MATCHSTR>>' + 4 * 'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>'), anomalies + "<<MATCHSTR>> ratio higher than average by " + tostring(round(('<<MATCHSTR>>' - 'avg_<<MATCHSTR>>')/'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>' ,2)) + " Standard Deviations. <<MATCHSTR>>=" + tostring('<<MATCHSTR>>') + " avg_<<MATCHSTR>>=" + tostring('avg_<<MATCHSTR>>') + " 'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>'=" + tostring('stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>') + ", " , anomalies) ] | eval anomalies = replace(anomalies, ",\s$", "") | where anomalies!="" | stats count values(anomalies) as anomalies by k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name k8s.pod.name service | rename service as k8s.service | where count > 5 | rename k8s.node.name as host | `kubernetes_anomalous_inbound_to_outbound_network_io_ratio_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Outbound Network Activity from Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Outbound Network Activity from Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection detects outbound network traffic volume anomalies from processes running within containerised workloads. Anomalies are provided with context identifying the Kubernetes cluster, the workload name, and the type of anomaly. This detection leverages Network performance Monitoring metrics harvested using an OTEL collector, and is pulled from Splunk Observability cloud using the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5247). This detection compares the tcp.bytes, tcp.new_sockets, tcp.packets, udp.bytes, udp.packets metrics for source (transmitting) workload process pairs over the last 1 hout, with the average of those metrics for those pairs over the last 30 days in order to detect any anonymously high outbound network activity. Anonymously high outbound network traffic from a process running in a container is a potential indication of data exfiltration, or an indication that the process has been modified. Anomalously high outbound network activity from a process running within a container suggests the potential compromise, which may lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, communication with malicious entities, or the propagation of malware to external systems. The compromised container could also serve as a pivot point for further attacks within the containerized environment. 
@@ -11155,7 +11155,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Outbound Network Activity from Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Outbound Network Activity from Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11169,7 +11169,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Kubernetes Anomalous Outbound Network Activity from Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Kubernetes Anomalous Outbound Network Activity from Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dd6afee6-e0a3-4028-a089-f47dd2842c22", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11184,7 +11184,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats avg(tcp.*) as tcp.* avg(udp.*) as udp.* where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-1h by k8s.cluster.name source.workload.name source.process.name  span=10s | eval key='source.workload.name' + ":" + 'source.process.name' | join type=left key [ mstats avg(tcp.*) as avg_tcp.* avg(udp.*) as avg_udp.* stdev(tcp.*) as stdev_tcp.* avg(udp.*) as stdev_udp.* where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-30d latest=-1h by source.workload.name source.process.name | eval key='source.workload.name' + ":" + 'source.process.name' ] | eval anomalies = "" | foreach stdev_* [ eval anomalies =if( '<<MATCHSTR>>' > ('avg_<<MATCHSTR>>' + 3 * 'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>'), anomalies + "<<MATCHSTR>> higher than average by " + tostring(round(('<<MATCHSTR>>' - 'avg_<<MATCHSTR>>')/'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>' ,2)) + " Standard Deviations. <<MATCHSTR>>=" + tostring('<<MATCHSTR>>') + " avg_<<MATCHSTR>>=" + tostring('avg_<<MATCHSTR>>') + " 'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>'=" + tostring('stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>') + ", " , anomalies) ] | fillnull | eval anomalies = split(replace(anomalies, ",\s$$$$", "") ,", ") | where anomalies!="" | stats count(anomalies) as count values(anomalies) as anomalies by k8s.cluster.name source.workload.name source.process.name | where count > 5 | rename k8s.cluster.name as host | `kubernetes_anomalous_outbound_network_activity_from_process_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Traffic on Network Edge - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Traffic on Network Edge - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection detects network traffic volume anomalies between workloads in a microservices hosted application, or between a workload and the outside world if the workload is shown as (unknown). This detection leverages Network performance Monitoring metrics harvested using an OTEL collector, and is pulled from Splunk Observability cloud using the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5247). This detection compares the tcp.bytes, tcp.new_sockets, tcp.packets, udp.bytes, udp.packets metrics between workloads over the last 1 hour, with the average of those metrics over the last 30 days in order to detect any anonymously high inbound or outbound network activity. Unexpected spikes in network traffic may signify unauthorized data transfers, or abnormal behavior within the microservices ecosystem. Such activity might signify data exfiltration, unauthorized lateral movement, within the microservices environment. If a bad actor is responsible for this traffic they could compromise additional services or extract sensitive data, potentially leading to data breaches. 
@@ -11200,7 +11200,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Traffic on Network Edge - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Traffic on Network Edge - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11214,7 +11214,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Kubernetes Anomalous Traffic on Network Edge - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Kubernetes Anomalous Traffic on Network Edge - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "886c7e51-2ea1-425d-8705-faaca5a64cc6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11229,7 +11229,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats avg(tcp.*) as tcp.* avg(udp.*) as udp.* where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-1h by k8s.cluster.name source.workload.name dest.workload.name span=10s | eval key='source.workload.name' + ":" + 'dest.workload.name' | join type=left key [ mstats avg(tcp.*) as avg_tcp.* avg(udp.*) as avg_udp.* stdev(tcp.*) as stdev_tcp.* avg(udp.*) as stdev_udp.* where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-30d latest=-1h by source.workload.name dest.workload.name | eval key='source.workload.name' + ":" + 'dest.workload.name' ] | eval anomalies = "" | foreach stdev_* [ eval anomalies =if( '<<MATCHSTR>>' > ('avg_<<MATCHSTR>>' + 3 * 'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>'), anomalies + "<<MATCHSTR>> higher than average by " + tostring(round(('<<MATCHSTR>>' - 'avg_<<MATCHSTR>>')/'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>' ,2)) + " Standard Deviations. <<MATCHSTR>>=" + tostring('<<MATCHSTR>>') + " avg_<<MATCHSTR>>=" + tostring('avg_<<MATCHSTR>>') + " 'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>'=" + tostring('stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>') + ", " , anomalies) ] | fillnull | eval anomalies = split(replace(anomalies, ",\s$$$$", "") ,", ") | where anomalies!="" | stats count(anomalies) as count values(anomalies) as anomalies by k8s.cluster.name source.workload.name dest.workload.name | rename service as k8s.service | where count > 5 | rename k8s.cluster.name as host | `kubernetes_anomalous_traffic_on_network_edge_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects anonymous and unauthenticated requests to a Kubernetes cluster. It identifies this behavior by monitoring for API calls from users who have not provided any token or password in their request. This is a significant behavior to identify for a SOC as it indicates a severe misconfiguration that allows unfettered access to a cluster with no traceability to a user or service. The impact of such an attack could be substantial, potentially granting an attacker access to sensitive data or control over the cluster. This detection rule is crucial for maintaining the security and integrity of your Kubernetes infrastructure. 
@@ -11241,7 +11241,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. H
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11255,7 +11255,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "042a3d32-8318-4763-9679-09db2644a8f2", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11270,7 +11270,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kube_audit` user.username="system:anonymous" user.groups{} IN ("system:unauthenticated") | fillnull | stats count by objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestReceivedTimestamp requestURI responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.groups{} user.uid user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user |`kubernetes_aws_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Create or Update Privileged Pod - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Create or Update Privileged Pod - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation of privileged pods in Kubernetes. It identifies this behavior by monitoring Kubernetes Audit logs for the creation of pods with root privileges. This behavior is worth identifying for a SOC as it could potentially allow an attacker to escalate privileges, exploit the kernel, and gain full access to the host's namespace and devices. The impact of such an attack could be severe, leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information, data breaches, and service disruptions.
@@ -11282,7 +11282,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Create or Update Privileged Pod - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Create or Update Privileged Pod - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11296,7 +11296,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Create or Update Privileged Pod - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Create or Update Privileged Pod - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3c6bd734-334d-4818-ae7c-5234313fc5da", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11311,7 +11311,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kube_audit` objectRef.resource=pods verb=create OR verb=update requestObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration=*\"privileged\":true* | fillnull | stats count values(user.groups{}) as user_groups by kind objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestObject.kind responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.username userAgent verb requestObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_create_or_update_privileged_pod_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Cron Job Creation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Cron Job Creation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation of a Kubernetes cron job, a task scheduled to run automatically at specified intervals. It identifies this behavior by monitoring Kubernetes Audit logs for creation of a cron job. This behavior is worth identifying for a SOC as it could potentially allow an attacker to execute malicious tasks repeatedly and automatically, posing a significant threat to the integrity and security of the Kubernetes infrastructure. The impact of such an attack could be severe, leading to persistent attacks, service disruptions, or unauthorized access to sensitive information.
@@ -11323,7 +11323,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Cron Job Creation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Cron Job Creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11337,7 +11337,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Cron Job Creation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Cron Job Creation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5984dbe8-572f-47d7-9251-3dff6c3f0c0d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11352,7 +11352,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kube_audit` verb=create "objectRef.resource"=cronjobs | fillnull | stats count values(user.groups{}) as user_groups by kind objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestObject.kind requestObject.spec.schedule requestObject.spec.jobTemplate.spec.template.spec.containers{}.image responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_cron_job_creation_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes DaemonSet Deployed - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes DaemonSet Deployed - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation of a DaemonSet in a Kubernetes cluster. A DaemonSet ensures the presence of a specific pod on every node in the cluster, making it an ideal avenue for persistent access. This behavior is identified by monitoring Kubernetes Audit logs for the creation of a DaemonSet. The identified behavior is worth noting for a SOC as it could potentially allow an attacker to maintain persistent access to the Kubernetes infrastructure. The impact of such an attack could be severe, leading to persistent attacks, service disruptions, or unauthorized access to sensitive information.
@@ -11364,7 +11364,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes DaemonSet Deployed - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes DaemonSet Deployed - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11378,7 +11378,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes DaemonSet Deployed - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes DaemonSet Deployed - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bf39c3a3-b191-4d42-8738-9d9797bd0c3a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11393,7 +11393,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kube_audit` "objectRef.resource"=daemonsets verb=create | fillnull | stats count values(user.groups{}) as user_groups by kind objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestObject.kind responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_daemonset_deployed_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Falco Shell Spawned - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Falco Shell Spawned - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects instances where a shell is spawned within a Kubernetes container, a behavior often indicative of an attacker gaining unauthorized access. Leveraging Falco, a cloud-native runtime security tool, this analytic monitors system calls within the Kubernetes environment, flagging when a shell is spawned in a container. This behavior is worth identifying for a SOC as it could potentially allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands, manipulate container processes, or escalate privileges, posing a significant threat to the integrity and security of the Kubernetes infrastructure. The impact of such an attack could be severe, leading to data breaches, service disruptions, or unauthorized access to sensitive information.
@@ -11405,7 +11405,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Falco Shell Spawned - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Falco Shell Spawned - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11419,7 +11419,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Falco Shell Spawned - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Falco Shell Spawned - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d2feef92-d54a-4a19-8306-b47c6ceba5b2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11434,7 +11434,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kube_container_falco` "A shell was spawned in a container" |  fillnull | stats count by container_image container_image_tag container_name parent proc_exepath process user | `kubernetes_falco_shell_spawned_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes newly seen TCP edge - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes newly seen TCP edge - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This analytic detects TCP communication between a newly seen source and destination workload pair. This is done to identify changes in network behavior between workloads in a kubernetes cluster. This detection leverages Network performance Monitoring metrics harvested using an OTEL collector, and is pulled from Splunk Observability cloud using the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5247). This detection compares network activity between workloads over the last 1 hour, with those over the last 30 days in order to detect newly seen inter workload communication. Newly seen network connections in a microservices based app indicate a change in behavior which could indicate potential security threats or anomalies. Distributed applications typically have common established network connection topologies, and new connections are often either an indication of a change in the application or an active threat. Unauthorized connections may enable the attacker to infiltrate the applications ecosystem, potentially leading to data breaches, manipulation of sensitive information, or disruption of critical services. Bad actors may exploit these connections to gain access, escalate privileges, move laterally within the microservices, or introduce malicious code or payloads, putting the applications integrity, availability, and confidentiality at risk. 
@@ -11450,7 +11450,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes newly seen TCP edge - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes newly seen TCP edge - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11464,7 +11464,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Kubernetes newly seen TCP edge - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Kubernetes newly seen TCP edge - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "13f081d6-7052-428a-bbb0-892c79ca7c65", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11479,7 +11479,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats count(tcp.packets) as tcp.packets_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-1h by k8s.cluster.name source.workload.name dest.workload.name | eval current="True" | append [ mstats count(tcp.packets) as tcp.packets_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-30d latest=-1h by source.workload.name dest.workload.name | eval current="false" ] | eventstats values(current) as current by source.workload.name dest.workload.name | search current="true" current!="false" | rename k8s.cluster.name as host | `kubernetes_newly_seen_tcp_edge_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes newly seen UDP edge - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes newly seen UDP edge - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This analytic detects UDP communication between a newly seen source and destination workload pair. This is done to identify changes in network behavior between workloads in a kubernetes cluster. This detection leverages Network performance Monitoring metrics harvested using an OTEL collector, and is pulled from Splunk Observability cloud using the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5247). This detection compares network activity between workloads over the last 1 hour, with those over the last 30 days in order to detect newly seen inter workload communication. Newly seen network connections in a microservices based app indicate a change in behavior which could indicate potential security threats or anomalies. Distributed applications typically have common established network connection topologies, and new connections are often either an indication of a change in the application or an active threat. Unauthorized connections may enable the attacker to infiltrate the applications ecosystem, potentially leading to data breaches, manipulation of sensitive information, or disruption of critical services. Bad actors may exploit these connections to gain access, escalate privileges, move laterally within the microservices, or introduce malicious code or payloads, putting the applications integrity, availability, and confidentiality at risk. 
@@ -11495,7 +11495,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes newly seen UDP edge - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes newly seen UDP edge - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11509,7 +11509,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Kubernetes newly seen UDP edge - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Kubernetes newly seen UDP edge - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "49b7daca-4e3c-4899-ba15-9a175e056fa9", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11524,7 +11524,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats count(udp.packets) as udp.packets_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-1h by k8s.cluster.name source.workload.name dest.workload.name | eval current="True" | append [ mstats count(udp.packets) as udp.packets_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-30d latest=-1h by source.workload.name dest.workload.name | eval current="false" ] | eventstats values(current) as current by source.workload.name dest.workload.name | search current="true" current!="false" | rename k8s.cluster.name as host | `kubernetes_newly_seen_udp_edge_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect local file inclusion attacks.
@@ -11536,7 +11536,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11550,7 +11550,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0f83244b-425b-4528-83db-7a88c5f66e48", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11571,7 +11571,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw "^(?<remote_addr>\S+)\s+-\s+-\s+\[(?<time_local>[^\]]*)\]\s\"(?<request>[^\"]*)\"\s(?<status>\S*)\s(?<body_bytes_sent>\S*)\s\"(?<http_referer>[^\"]*)\"\s\"(?<http_user_agent>[^\"]*)\"\s(?<request_length>\S*)\s(?<request_time>\S*)\s\[(?<proxy_upstream_name>[^\]]*)\]\s\[(?<proxy_alternative_upstream_name>[^\]]*)\]\s(?<upstream_addr>\S*)\s(?<upstream_response_length>\S*)\s(?<upstream_response_time>\S*)\s(?<upstream_status>\S*)\s(?<req_id>\S*)" | lookup local_file_inclusion_paths local_file_inclusion_paths AS request OUTPUT lfi_path | search lfi_path=yes | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | rex field=request "^(?<http_method>\S+)\s(?<url>\S+)\s" | eval phase="operate" | eval severity="high" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_lfi_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from a nginx ingress controller to detect remote file inclusion attacks.
@@ -11583,7 +11583,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11597,7 +11597,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1212"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fc5531ae-62fd-4de6-9c36-b4afdae8ca95", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11618,7 +11618,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kubernetes_container_controller` | rex field=_raw "^(?<remote_addr>\S+)\s+-\s+-\s+\[(?<time_local>[^\]]*)\]\s\"(?<request>[^\"]*)\"\s(?<status>\S*)\s(?<body_bytes_sent>\S*)\s\"(?<http_referer>[^\"]*)\"\s\"(?<http_user_agent>[^\"]*)\"\s(?<request_length>\S*)\s(?<request_time>\S*)\s\[(?<proxy_upstream_name>[^\]]*)\]\s\[(?<proxy_alternative_upstream_name>[^\]]*)\]\s(?<upstream_addr>\S*)\s(?<upstream_response_length>\S*)\s(?<upstream_response_time>\S*)\s(?<upstream_status>\S*)\s(?<req_id>\S*)" | rex field=request "^(?<http_method>\S+)?\s(?<url>\S+)\s" | rex field=url "(?<dest_ip>\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})" | search dest_ip=* | rename remote_addr AS src_ip, upstream_status as status, proxy_upstream_name as proxy | eval phase="operate" | eval severity="medium" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src_ip, dest_ip status, url, http_method, host, http_user_agent, proxy, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_nginx_ingress_rfi_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Node Port Creation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Node Port Creation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation of a Kubernetes node port service, an action that exposes a service to the external network. It identifies this behavior by monitoring Kubernetes Audit logs for creation of a Node Port service. This behavior is worth identifying for a SOC as it could potentially allow an attacker to access internal services, posing a significant threat to the integrity and security of the Kubernetes infrastructure. The impact of such an attack could be severe, leading to data breaches, service disruptions, or unauthorized access to sensitive information.
@@ -11630,7 +11630,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Node Port Creation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Node Port Creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11644,7 +11644,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Node Port Creation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Node Port Creation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d7fc865e-b8a1-4029-a960-cf4403b821b6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11659,7 +11659,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kube_audit` "objectRef.resource"=services verb=create requestObject.spec.type=NodePort | fillnull | stats count values(user.groups{}) as user_groups by kind objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestObject.kind requestObject.spec.type responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_node_port_creation_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation of pods in the default, kube-system, or kube-public namespaces. It identifies this behavior by monitoring Kubernetes audit logs for pod creation events in these namespaces. This behavior is worth identifying for a SOC as it may indicate an attacker attempting to hide their presence or evade defenses. Only administrators should typically create pods in the kube-system namespace, and the default and kube-public namespaces should not be used in production. The impact of the attack could be significant, as it may indicate a successful cluster breach and ongoing malicious activity.
@@ -11671,7 +11671,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11685,7 +11685,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3d6b1a81-367b-42d5-a925-6ef90b6b9f1e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11700,7 +11700,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kube_audit` objectRef.resource=pods verb=create objectRef.namespace IN ("default", "kube-system", "kube-public") | fillnull | stats count by objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestReceivedTimestamp requestURI responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.groups{} user.uid user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_pod_created_in_default_namespace_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Pod With Host Network Attachment - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Pod With Host Network Attachment - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation of a pod with host network attachment in Kubernetes. It identifies this behavior by monitoring Kubernetes Audit logs for the creation or update of pods with host network configuration. This behavior is worth identifying for a SOC as it could potentially allow an attacker to listen to all network traffic on the node and other compute on the network namespace, capturing secrets passed in arguments or connections to escalate their privileges. The impact of such an attack could be severe, leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information, data breaches, and service disruptions.
@@ -11712,7 +11712,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Pod With Host Network Attachment - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Pod With Host Network Attachment - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11726,7 +11726,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Pod With Host Network Attachment - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Pod With Host Network Attachment - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cce357cf-43a4-494a-814b-67cea90fe990", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11741,7 +11741,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kube_audit` objectRef.resource=pods verb=create OR verb=update requestObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration=*\"hostNetwork\":true* | fillnull | stats count values(user.groups{}) as user_groups by kind objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestObject.kind responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.username userAgent verb requestObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_pod_with_host_network_attachment_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Container Image Name - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Container Image Name - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic identifies containerised workloads that have been created using a previously unseen image. This detection leverages process metrics harvested using an OTEL collector and kubernetes cluster receiver, and is pulled from Splunk Observability cloud using the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5247). This detection uses the k8s.container.ready metric to compare the container image names seen in the last 1 hour with those seen in the 30 days prior to those 1 hour, and alerts if a new container image is detected. When a container in a Kubernetes cluster created using a previously unseen image it raises potential security risks and unknown variables. Unfamiliar container images could contain vulnerabilities, malware, or misconfigurations that pose threats to the cluster's integrity and the applications it hosts. The absence of prior knowledge about the image makes it difficult to assess its trustworthiness, track its lineage, or verify its compliance with security policies. The potential security impact of a container created using a compromised image is significant. Compromised containers can potentially introduce malware, backdoors, or other malicious code into the containerized application, leading to data breaches, service disruptions, and unauthorized access within the Kubernetes cluster. A compromised image can serve as a foothold for lateral movement and privilege escalation, potentially compromising other containers, pods, or nodes in the cluster. Additionally, it may enable the actor to exfiltrate sensitive data, manipulate configurations, or execute arbitrary code, posing risks to the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of applications and data hosted within the cluster 
@@ -11764,7 +11764,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Container Image Name - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Container Image Name - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11778,7 +11778,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Container Image Name - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Container Image Name - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fea515a4-b1d8-4cd6-80d6-e0d71397b891", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11793,7 +11793,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats  count(k8s.container.ready) as k8s.container.ready_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-24h by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name container.image.name | eval current="True" | append [mstats  count(k8s.container.ready) as k8s.container.ready_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-30d latest=-1h  by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name container.image.name | eval current="false" ] | stats values(current) as current by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name container.image.name | search current="true" AND current!="false" | rename host.name as host | `kubernetes_previously_unseen_container_image_name_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This analytic detects newly seen process within the Kubernetes scope on a master or worker node. This detection leverages process metrics harvested using an OTEL collector and hostmetrics receiever, and is pulled from Splunk Observability cloud using the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5247). This detection compares the processes seen for each node over the previous 1 hour with those over the previous 30 days up until the previous 1 hour. The specific metric used by this detection is process.memory.utilization. Newly seen processes on a Kubernetes worker node are concerning as they may represent security risks and anomalies that could be related to unauthorized activity. New processes may be introduced  in an attempt to compromise the node or gain control of the Kubernetes cluster. By detecting these processes, they can be investigated, and correlated with other anomalous activity for that host. Newly seen processes may be part of an attacker's strategy to compromise the node, gain unauthorized access, and subsequently extend their control to the entire Kubernetes cluster. These processes could facilitate activities such as data exfiltration, privilege escalation, denial-of-service attacks, or the introduction of malware and backdoors, putting sensitive data, applications, and the entire infrastructure at risk. The consequences may include data breaches, service disruptions, financial losses, and reputational damage, underscoring the need to identify anomalous process and associate them with any concurrent risk activity. 
@@ -11816,7 +11816,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11830,7 +11830,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c8119b2f-d7f7-40be-940a-1c582870e8e2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11845,7 +11845,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats  count(process.memory.utilization) as process.memory.utilization_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-1h by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.executable.name | eval current="True" | append [mstats  count(process.memory.utilization) as process.memory.utilization_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-30d latest=-1h by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.executable.name ] | stats count values(current) as current by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.executable.name | where count=1 and current="True" | rename host.name as host | `kubernetes_previously_unseen_process_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Process Running From New Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Process Running From New Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This analytic detects processes running within the same scope as Kubernetes that have been run from a newly seen path. This detection leverages process metrics harvested using an OTEL collector and hostmetrics receiever, and is pulled from Splunk Observability cloud using the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5247). This detection compares the processes seen for each node over the previous 1 hour with those over the previous 30 days up until the previous 1 hour, and alerts if the path for that process was not seen over the previous 30 days. The specific metric used by this detection is process.memory.utilization. Processes running from a newly seen path can signify potential security risks and anomalies. A process executing from an unfamiliar file path may indicate unauthorized changes to the file system, a compromised node, or the introduction of malicious software. If the presence of a process running from a newly seen file path on a Kubernetes node indicates malicious activity, the security implications could be severe. It suggests that an attacker has potentially compromised the node, allowing them to execute unauthorized processes and potentially gain control over critical resources. This could lead to further exploitation, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or the introduction of malware and backdoors within the Kubernetes cluster. 
@@ -11868,7 +11868,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Process Running From New Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Process Running From New Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11882,7 +11882,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Kubernetes Process Running From New Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Kubernetes Process Running From New Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "454076fb-0e9e-4adf-b93a-da132621c5e6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11897,7 +11897,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats count(process.memory.utilization) as process.memory.utilization_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-1h by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.pid process.executable.path process.executable.name | eval current="True" | append [ mstats count(process.memory.utilization) as process.memory.utilization_count where `kubernetes_metrics` AND earliest=-30d latest=-1h by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.pid process.executable.path process.executable.name ] | stats count values(current) as current by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.pid process.executable.name process.executable.path | where count=1 and current="True" | rename host.name as host | `kubernetes_process_running_from_new_path_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Process with Anomalous Resource Utilisation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Process with Anomalous Resource Utilisation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This analytic identifies high resource utilization anomalies in Kubernetes processes. It uses process metrics from an OTEL collector and hostmetrics receiver, fetched from Splunk Observability cloud via the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. The detection uses a lookup table with average and standard deviation values for various process metrics to identify anomalies. High resource utilization can indicate security threats or operational issues, such as cryptojacking, unauthorized data exfiltration, or compromised containers. These anomalies can disrupt services, exhaust resources, increase costs, and allow attackers to evade detection or maintain access. 
@@ -11920,7 +11920,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Process with Anomalous Resource Utilisation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Process with Anomalous Resource Utilisation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11934,7 +11934,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Kubernetes Process with Anomalous Resource Utilisation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Kubernetes Process with Anomalous Resource Utilisation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "25ca9594-7a0d-4a95-a5e5-3228d7398ec8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -11949,7 +11949,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats avg(process.*) as process.* where `kubernetes_metrics` by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.executable.name span=10s | eval key = 'k8s.cluster.name' + ":" + 'host.name' + ":" + 'process.executable.name' | lookup k8s_process_resource_baseline key | fillnull | eval anomalies = "" | foreach stdev_* [ eval anomalies =if( '<<MATCHSTR>>' > ('avg_<<MATCHSTR>>' + 4 * 'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>'), anomalies + "<<MATCHSTR>> higher than average by " + tostring(round(('<<MATCHSTR>>' - 'avg_<<MATCHSTR>>')/'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>' ,2)) + " Standard Deviations. <<MATCHSTR>>=" + tostring('<<MATCHSTR>>') + " avg_<<MATCHSTR>>=" + tostring('avg_<<MATCHSTR>>') + " 'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>'=" + tostring('stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>') + ", " , anomalies) ] | eval anomalies = replace(anomalies, ",\s$", "") | where anomalies!="" | stats count values(anomalies) as anomalies by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.executable.name | sort - count | where count > 5 | rename host.name as host | `kubernetes_process_with_anomalous_resource_utilisation_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Process with Resource Ratio Anomalies - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Process with Resource Ratio Anomalies - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This analytic detects anomalously changes in the ratio between specific process resources on a Kubernetes node, based on the past behavior for each process running in the Kubernetes scope on that node. This detection leverages process metrics harvested using an OTEL collector and hostmetrics receiver, and is pulled from Splunk Observability cloud using the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5247). This detection also leverages a lookup table that contains average and standard deviation for the cpu:disk operations, cpu:mem, cpu:thread count, disk operations:thread count, and mem:disk operations ratios. This is used to indicate an anomalous change in resource ratios that indicate the workload has changed behavior irrespective of load. Changes in the relationship between utilization of different resources can indicate a change in behavior of the monitored process, which can indicate a potentially compromised application. Deviations in resource ratios, such as memory-to-CPU or CPU-to-disk utilization, may signify compromised processes, malicious activity, or misconfigurations that could pose risks. A change in process behavior could signify a potential security breach within the Kubernetes environment, where an attacker may have compromised a process either on the node or running within a container. 
@@ -11972,7 +11972,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Process with Resource Ratio Anomalies - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Process with Resource Ratio Anomalies - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -11986,7 +11986,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Kubernetes Process with Resource Ratio Anomalies - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Kubernetes Process with Resource Ratio Anomalies - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0d42b295-0f1f-4183-b75e-377975f47c65", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12001,7 +12001,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats avg(process.*) as process.* where `kubernetes_metrics` by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.executable.name span=10s | eval cpu:mem = 'process.cpu.utilization'/'process.memory.utilization' | eval cpu:disk = 'process.cpu.utilization'/'process.disk.operations' | eval mem:disk = 'process.memory.utilization'/'process.disk.operations' | eval cpu:threads = 'process.cpu.utilization'/'process.threads' | eval disk:threads = 'process.disk.operations'/'process.threads' | eval key = 'k8s.cluster.name' + ":" + 'host.name' + ":" + 'process.executable.name' | lookup k8s_process_resource_ratio_baseline key | fillnull | eval anomalies = "" | foreach stdev_* [ eval anomalies =if( '<<MATCHSTR>>' > ('avg_<<MATCHSTR>>' + 4 * 'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>'), anomalies + "<<MATCHSTR>> ratio higher than average by " + tostring(round(('<<MATCHSTR>>' - 'avg_<<MATCHSTR>>')/'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>' ,2)) + " Standard Deviations. <<MATCHSTR>>=" + tostring('<<MATCHSTR>>') + " avg_<<MATCHSTR>>=" + tostring('avg_<<MATCHSTR>>') + " 'stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>'=" + tostring('stdev_<<MATCHSTR>>') + ", " , anomalies) ] | eval anomalies = replace(anomalies, ",\s$", "") | where anomalies!="" | stats count values(anomalies) as anomalies by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.executable.name | where count > 5 | rename host.name as host | `kubernetes_process_with_resource_ratio_anomalies_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search uses the Kubernetes logs from Splunk Connect from Kubernetes to detect Kubernetes Security Scanner.
@@ -12013,7 +12013,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -12027,7 +12027,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4890cd6b-0112-4974-a272-c5c153aee551", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12048,7 +12048,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kube_objects_events` object.message IN ("Pulling image *kube-hunter*", "Pulling image *kube-bench*", "Pulling image *kube-recon*", "Pulling image *kube-recon*") | rename object.* AS * | rename involvedObject.* AS * | rename source.host AS host | eval phase="operate" | eval severity="high" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by host, name, namespace, kind, reason, message, phase, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kubernetes_scanner_image_pulling_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Scanning by Unauthenticated IP Address - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Scanning by Unauthenticated IP Address - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection rule is designed to identify potential scanning activities within a Kubernetes environment. Scanning is a common preliminary step in an attack, where the attacker tries to gather information about the system to find potential vulnerabilities. In the context of Kubernetes, scanning could involve activities like unauthorized access attempts, probing public APIs, or trying to exploit known vulnerabilities. This rule triggers an alert when such suspicious activities are detected, helping to ensure the security of your Kubernetes infrastructure.
@@ -12060,7 +12060,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Scanning by Unauthenticated IP Address - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Scanning by Unauthenticated IP Address - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -12074,7 +12074,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Scanning by Unauthenticated IP Address - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Scanning by Unauthenticated IP Address - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1046"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f9cadf4e-df22-4f4e-a08f-9d3344c2165d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12089,7 +12089,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kube_audit` "user.groups{}"="system:unauthenticated" "responseStatus.code"=403 | iplocation sourceIPs{} | stats count values(userAgent) as userAgent values(user.username) as user.username values(user.groups{}) as user.groups{} values(verb) as verb values(requestURI) as requestURI values(responseStatus.code) as responseStatus.code values(responseStatus.message) as responseStatus.message values(responseStatus.reason) as responseStatus.reason values(responseStatus.status) as responseStatus.status by sourceIPs{} Country City | where count > 5 | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_scanning_by_unauthenticated_ip_address_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This analytic identifies shell activity within the Kubernetes privilege scope on a worker node, returning a list of shell processes regardless of CPU resource consumption. It uses process metrics from an OTEL collector hostmetrics receiver, pulled from Splunk Observability cloud via the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. Metrics used are process.cpu.utilization and process.memory.utilization. Shell processes can indicate unauthorized or suspicious activity, posing a security threat. Shell access to worker nodes can provide attackers an entry point to compromise the node and the entire Kubernetes cluster. Monitoring and detecting shell processes is crucial for anomaly identification, security policy enforcement, and breach mitigation. Unauthorized shell processes on a Kubernetes worker node can severely compromise the cluster's security and integrity. Such access can lead to data theft, service disruption, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and further attacks within the cluster. It may also enable attackers to manipulate configurations, deploy malicious containers, and execute arbitrary code, posing a severe risk to the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of applications and sensitive data. 
@@ -12112,7 +12112,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -12126,7 +12126,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "efebf0c4-dcf4-496f-85a2-5ab7ad8fa876", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12141,7 +12141,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats avg(process.cpu.utilization) as process.cpu.utilization avg(process.memory.utilization) as process.memory.utilization where `kubernetes_metrics` AND process.executable.name IN ("sh","bash","csh", "tcsh") by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.pid process.executable.name span=10s | search process.cpu.utilization>0 OR process.memory.utilization>0 | stats avg(process.cpu.utilization) as process.cpu.utilization avg(process.memory.utilization) as process.memory.utilization by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.pid process.executable.name | rename host.name as host | `kubernetes_shell_running_on_worker_node_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node with CPU Activity - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node with CPU Activity - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This analytic identifies shell activity within the Kubernetes privilege scope on a worker node. It returns shell processes only if they're consuming CPU resources. The detection uses process metrics from an OTEL collector hostmetrics receiver, pulled from Splunk Observability cloud via the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. The metrics used are process.cpu.utilization and process.memory.utilization. Shell processes can indicate unauthorized activity, posing a security threat. Attackers could compromise the node and the entire Kubernetes cluster via shell access to worker nodes. Monitoring shell processes is crucial for anomaly detection, policy enforcement, and breach mitigation. Unauthorized shell processes on a Kubernetes worker node could severely impact the cluster's security and integrity. Attackers could gain full control over the host's resources and file system, compromising all hosted workloads and data. This access could lead to data theft, service disruption, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and further attacks within the cluster. Attackers could also manipulate configurations, deploy malicious containers, and execute arbitrary code, severely risking the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of applications and sensitive data. A rapid and comprehensive incident response is required to mitigate and recover from such a breach. 
@@ -12164,7 +12164,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node with CPU Activity - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node with CPU Activity - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -12178,7 +12178,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node with CPU Activity - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node with CPU Activity - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cc1448e3-cc7a-4518-bc9f-2fa48f61a22b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12193,7 +12193,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats avg(process.cpu.utilization) as process.cpu.utilization avg(process.memory.utilization) as process.memory.utilization where `kubernetes_metrics` AND process.executable.name IN ("sh","bash","csh", "tcsh") by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.pid process.executable.name span=10s | search process.cpu.utilization>0 | stats avg(process.cpu.utilization) as process.cpu.utilization avg(process.memory.utilization) as process.memory.utilization by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.pid process.executable.name | rename host.name as host | `kubernetes_shell_running_on_worker_node_with_cpu_activity_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Suspicious Image Pulling - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Suspicious Image Pulling - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects instances of suspicious image pulling in Kubernetes. It identifies this behavior by monitoring Kubernetes audit logs for image pull requests that do not match a predefined list of allowed images. This behavior is worth identifying for a SOC as it could indicate an attacker attempting to deploy malicious software or infiltrate the system. The impact of such an attack could be severe, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data.
@@ -12205,7 +12205,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Suspicious Image Pulling - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Suspicious Image Pulling - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -12219,7 +12219,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Suspicious Image Pulling - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Suspicious Image Pulling - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4d3a17b3-0a6d-4ae0-9421-46623a69c122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12234,7 +12234,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kube_audit` requestObject.message="Pulling image*" | search NOT `kube_allowed_images` | fillnull | stats count by objectRef.name objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestReceivedTimestamp requestURI responseStatus.code sourceIPs{} stage user.groups{} user.uid user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_suspicious_image_pulling_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Unauthorized Access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Unauthorized Access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects unauthorized access to Kubernetes by monitoring Kubernetes audit logs. It identifies anomalies in access patterns by segmenting and analyzing the source of requests. Unauthorized access is worth identifying for a SOC as it could indicate an attacker attempting to infiltrate the system. The impact of such an attack could be severe, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data.
@@ -12246,7 +12246,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Unauthorized Access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Unauthorized Access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -12260,7 +12260,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Unauthorized Access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kubernetes Unauthorized Access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9b5f1832-e8b9-453f-93df-07a3d6a72a45", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12275,7 +12275,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kube_audit` verb=create responseStatus.reason=Forbidden | fillnull | stats count by objectRef.namespace objectRef.resource requestReceivedTimestamp requestURI responseStatus.code responseStatus.message sourceIPs{} stage user.groups{} user.uid user.username userAgent verb | rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip, user.username as user | `kubernetes_unauthorized_access_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is designed to detect the creation of a new Federation setting by alerting on a specific event associated with its creation. By monitoring for this event, the search can identify any instances where a Federation setting is being created within the system. This can help in detecting and monitoring any unauthorized or suspicious changes to the Federation settings, providing an additional layer of security for your environment.
@@ -12287,7 +12287,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not nece
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -12301,7 +12301,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b2c81cc6-6040-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12322,7 +12322,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Add app role assignment grant to user." | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Actor{}.ID) as Actor.ID values(Actor{}.Type) as Actor.Type values(ModifiedProperties{}.Name) as modified_properties_name by user dest ResultStatus Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_add_app_role_assignment_grant_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects addition of new service principal accounts added to O365 tenants. Attackers can abuse service principals in Office 365 (now known as Microsoft 365) to gain unauthorized access and perform malicious actions within an organization's environment. Service principals are essentially non-human accounts used by applications, services, or scripts to access resources and interact with APIs on behalf of the organization.
@@ -12334,7 +12334,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federation is not nece
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -12348,7 +12348,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "NOBELIUM Group", "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1668812a-6047-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12369,7 +12369,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="*Add service principal*" OR (Operation = "*principal*" AND action = "created") | stats count values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as new_value by src_user src_user_type action Operation authentication_service Workload | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_added_service_principal_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection targets situations where a service principal in Office 365 Azure Active Directory assigns app roles without the standard admin consent, a potential security breach. Using o365_management_activity logs, it examines the 'Add app role assignment to service principal' operation, focusing on service principals and extracting details like role ID and description. This is critical for SOCs to detect potential bypassing of crucial administrative controls, which could lead to unauthorized access or privilege escalation. A true positive implies a service principal might be misusing automated processes to assign sensitive permissions.
@@ -12381,7 +12381,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Service Principals are sometimes configured
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -12395,7 +12395,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8a1b22eb-50ce-4e26-a691-97ff52349569", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12416,7 +12416,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Add app role assignment to service principal." | eval len=mvcount('Actor{}.ID') | eval userType = mvindex('Actor{}.ID',len-1) | eval roleId = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 0) | eval roleValue = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 1) | eval roleDescription = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 2) | eval dest_user = mvindex('Target{}.ID', 0) | search userType = "ServicePrincipal" | eval src_user = user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by src_user dest_user roleId roleValue roleDescription | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`  | `o365_admin_consent_bypassed_by_service_principal_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Advanced Audit Disabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Advanced Audit Disabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies instances where the O365 advanced audit is disabled for a specific user within the Office 365 tenant. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically events related to audit license changes or modifications within the AzureActiveDirectory workloads. The O365 advanced audit provides granular logging and insights into user and administrator activities, making it a crucial tool for security monitoring and incident response. Disabling this audit for a user can blind security teams to potential malicious or unauthorized activities related to that user's mailbox or account. Attackers may disable these audits to obscure their actions and reduce the chances of detection. If an attacker successfully disables the O365 advanced audit for a user, they can operate within that user's mailbox or account with reduced risk of detection. This can lead to unauthorized data access, data exfiltration, account compromise, or other malicious activities without leaving a detailed audit trail.
@@ -12428,7 +12428,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators might temporarily disable the
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Advanced Audit Disabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Advanced Audit Disabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -12442,7 +12442,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Advanced Audit Disabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Advanced Audit Disabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562", "T1562.008"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "49862dd4-9cb2-4c48-a542-8c8a588d9361", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12463,7 +12463,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Operation="Change user license."  | eval property_name = mvindex ('ExtendedProperties{}.Name', 1) | search property_name = "extendedAuditEventCategory" | eval additionalDetails = mvindex('ExtendedProperties{}.Value',0) | eval split_value=split(additionalDetails, "NewValue") | eval possible_plan=mvindex(split_value, 1)  | rex field="possible_plan" "DisabledPlans=\[(?P<DisabledPlans>[^\]]+)\]" | search DisabledPlans IN ("*M365_ADVANCED_AUDITING*") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Operation user object DisabledPlans | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_advanced_audit_disabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Application Registration Owner Added - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Application Registration Owner Added - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies instances where a new owner is assigned to an application registration within an Azure AD and Office 365 tenant. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically events related to changes in owner assignments within the AzureActiveDirectory workload for application registrations. Assigning a new owner to an application registration can grant significant control over the application's configuration, permissions, and behavior. An unauthorized or inadvertent change in ownership can lead to misuse of the application, potentially affecting data access, user permissions, or the application's interactions within the tenant. Monitoring for such changes ensures that only legitimate and authorized personnel have control over application registrations. If an attacker successfully assigns themselves or a compromised account as an owner to an application registration, they can modify the application's settings, permissions, and behavior. This can lead to unauthorized data access, escalation of privileges, or the introduction of malicious behavior within the application's operations
@@ -12475,7 +12475,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Application owners may be added for legitima
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Application Registration Owner Added - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Application Registration Owner Added - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -12489,7 +12489,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Application Registration Owner Added - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Application Registration Owner Added - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c068d53f-6aaa-4558-8011-3734df878266", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12510,7 +12510,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Add owner to application." | eval app_id=mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 0) | eval app_displayName=mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 1) | stats max(_time) as lastTime values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) by Operation, user, app_displayName, object | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_application_registration_owner_added_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the assignment of the ApplicationImpersonation role in Office 365, either to a user or an application. This analytic leverages the Office 365 Management Activity API, specifically monitoring for events related to role assignments and changes within the Azure Active Directory audit logs. The ApplicationImpersonation role allows a security principal to impersonate any user within the organization and perform actions on their behalf, such as accessing or modifying their mailbox. This role, if misused or granted inappropriately, can pose a significant security risk. Monitoring the assignment of this role is crucial as it can be an indicator of potential malicious activity or misconfigurations. If an attacker successfully assigns the ApplicationImpersonation role to a malicious user or application, they can gain the ability to impersonate any user within the organization. This can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, manipulation of mailbox data, and other malicious actions. The attacker can effectively masquerade as a legitimate user, making their actions harder to detect and potentially causing significant harm to the organization.
@@ -12522,7 +12522,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While infrequent, the ApplicationImpersonati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -12536,7 +12536,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Office 365 Collection Techniques", "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1098.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "49cdce75-f814-4d56-a7a4-c64ec3a481f2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12557,7 +12557,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation="New-ManagementRoleAssignment"  Role=ApplicationImpersonation |  rename User as target_user | stats  max(_time) as lastTime by Operation, user, object, ObjectId, Role, target_user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_applicationimpersonation_role_assigned_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic detects when the "risk-based step-up consent" security setting in Microsoft 365 is disabled. This setting, when enabled, prevents regular users from granting consent to potentially malicious OAuth applications, requiring an administrative "step-up" for consent instead. Disabling this feature could expose the organization to OAuth phishing threats.The detection operates by monitoring Azure Active Directory logs for events where the "Update authorization policy" operation is performed. It specifically looks for changes to the "AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps" setting, identifying instances where this setting is switched to "true," effectively disabling the risk-based step-up consent. Monitoring for changes to critical security settings like the "risk-based step-up consent" is vital for maintaining the integrity of an organization's security posture. Disabling this feature can make the environment more susceptible to OAuth phishing attacks, where attackers trick users into granting permissions to malicious applications. Identifying when this setting is disabled can help blue teams to quickly respond, investigate, and potentially uncover targeted phishing campaigns against their users. If an attacker successfully disables the "risk-based step-up consent" and subsequently launches an OAuth phishing campaign, they could gain unauthorized access to user data and other sensitive information within the M365 environment. This could lead to data breaches, unauthorized access to emails, and potentially further compromise within the organization.
@@ -12569,7 +12569,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate changes to the 'risk-based step-u
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -12583,7 +12583,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "12a23592-e3da-4344-8545-205d3290647c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12604,7 +12604,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Update authorization policy." | eval index_number = if(mvfind('ModifiedProperties{}.Name', "AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps") >= 0, mvfind('ModifiedProperties{}.Name', "AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps"), -1) | search index_number >= 0  | eval AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',index_number) | where AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps like "%true%" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user, Operation, AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps, user_agent | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_block_user_consent_for_risky_apps_disabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies instances where new IP addresses are added to the trusted IPs list in Office 365, potentially allowing users from these IPs to bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) during login. The detection leverages O365 audit logs, specifically focusing on events related to the modification of trusted IP settings. By monitoring these logs, the analytic captures and alerts on any addition of new trusted IPs. Adding trusted IPs to bypass MFA is a significant security concern. While there might be legitimate reasons to add trusted IPs, such as for a new office location, there's also a risk of attackers or malicious insiders using this to facilitate unauthorized access. Monitoring for changes to the trusted IP list helps ensure that any attempt to bypass MFA is legitimate and authorized. If the detection is a true positive, it suggests that users logging in from the newly added trusted IP can bypass MFA, potentially weakening the security posture of the organization. This could lead to unauthorized access, especially if the IP was added maliciously. Immediate investigation is required to validate the legitimacy of the IP addition and to assess potential security implications.
@@ -12616,7 +12616,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -12630,7 +12630,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f66949e", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12651,7 +12651,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Operation="Set Company Information." ModifiedProperties{}.Name=StrongAuthenticationPolicy | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue "(?<ip_addresses_new_added>\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\/\d{1,2})" | rex max_match=100 field=ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue "(?<ip_addresses_old>\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\/\d{1,2})" | eval ip_addresses_old=if(isnotnull(ip_addresses_old),ip_addresses_old,"0") | mvexpand ip_addresses_new_added | where isnull(mvfind(ip_addresses_old,ip_addresses_new_added)) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ip_addresses_old) as ip_addresses_old by user ip_addresses_new_added Operation Workload vendor_account status user_id action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `o365_bypass_mfa_via_trusted_ip_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Compliance Content Search Exported - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Compliance Content Search Exported - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection  targets activities where the results of a content search within the Office 365 Security and Compliance Center are exported, a crucial phase in the compliance and investigative workflows. By focusing on the SearchExported operation logged under the SecurityComplianceCenter workload in the o365_management_activity, this analytic flags instances that potentially move sensitive or critical organizational data outside its original storage locations.
@@ -12663,7 +12663,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Compliance content searche exports may be ex
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Compliance Content Search Exported - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Compliance Content Search Exported - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -12677,7 +12677,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Compliance Content Search Exported - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Compliance Content Search Exported - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Collection Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2ce9f31d-ab4f-4179-b2b7-c77a9652e1d8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12698,7 +12698,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `o365_management_activity`  Workload=SecurityComplianceCenter Operation="SearchExported" | rename user_id as user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Operation, ObjectId, ExchangeLocations, user, Query  |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_compliance_content_search_exported_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Compliance Content Search Started - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Compliance Content Search Started - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection will trigger when a content search is initiated within the Office 365 Security and Compliance Center, a critical component in the suite's governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC) capabilities. By monitoring the SearchCreated operation within the o365_management_activity logs, specifically under the SecurityComplianceCenter workload, this analytic flags the commencement of searches across the organization's data, including emails, documents, and more, that reside in ExchangeLocations.
@@ -12710,7 +12710,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Compliance content searches may be executed
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Compliance Content Search Started - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Compliance Content Search Started - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -12724,7 +12724,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Compliance Content Search Started - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Compliance Content Search Started - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Collection Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f4cabbc7-c19a-4e41-8be5-98daeaccbb50", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12745,7 +12745,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `o365_management_activity` Workload=SecurityComplianceCenter Operation=SearchCreated | rename user_id as user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Operation, ObjectId, ExchangeLocations, user, Query  |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_compliance_content_search_started_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identies scenarios where the same user session is accessed from multiple IP addresses. This situation typically arises in an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing attack, where attackers compromise user sessions. The detection method involves analyzing Azure Active Directory logs for 'UserLoggedIn' operations. It focuses on identifying sessions where the number of associated IP addresses exceeds one for the same SessionId. This pattern suggests potential unauthorized concurrent access, which is atypical under normal usage scenarios. If a true positive is identified, it implies that an adversary has gained unauthorized access to a user's Office 365 account. The ramifications of this can be significant, including data theft, account takeover, and launching of internal phishing campaigns.
@@ -12757,7 +12757,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -12771,7 +12771,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1185"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "58e034de-1f87-4812-9dc3-a4f68c7db930", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12792,7 +12792,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory  Operation=UserLoggedIn | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(src_ip) as ips values(user_agent) as user_agents by Operation, user, SessionId | where mvcount(ips) > 1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_concurrent_sessions_from_different_ips_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Disable MFA - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies instances where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) is disabled for a user within the Office 365 environment. Disabling MFA removes a critical security layer, making accounts more vulnerable to unauthorized access. The detection leverages O365 audit logs, specifically focusing on events related to MFA settings. By monitoring these logs, the analytic captures and alerts on any actions that result in the deactivation or disabling of MFA for a user. MFA is a cornerstone of modern security practices, providing an additional layer of protection beyond just a password. Disabling MFA, especially without a valid reason, poses a significant security risk. Attackers, after gaining initial access to an account, might disable MFA to ensure easier re-entry and persistence. Monitoring for such changes is crucial to detect potential security breaches and to ensure that security best practices are consistently applied. If the detection is a true positive, it indicates that a user's account is now at increased risk of unauthorized access, as the added security layer of MFA has been removed. This could be a sign of an attacker trying to maintain persistence or an insider threat. Immediate investigation is required to validate the reason for disabling MFA, potentially re-enable it, and assess any other suspicious activities related to the affected account.
@@ -12804,7 +12804,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unless it is a special case, it is uncommon
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Disable MFA - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -12818,7 +12818,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Disable MFA - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f5c949e", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12839,7 +12839,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Operation="Disable Strong Authentication." | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by UserType Operation UserId ResultStatus object | rename UserType AS user_type, Operation AS action, UserId AS src_user, object AS user, ResultStatus AS result | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_disable_mfa_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection triggers on the assignment of elevated mailbox permissions within an Office 365 environment, specifically through the Add-MailboxPermission operation, as logged under the Exchange workload in the o365_management_activity. It is meticulously designed to spotlight instances where critical permissions such as FullAccess, ChangePermission, or ChangeOwner are granted, marking significant alterations in mailbox access controls.
@@ -12851,7 +12851,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = FullAccess mailbox delegation may be assigne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -12865,7 +12865,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Collection Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1098.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2246c142-a678-45f8-8546-aaed7e0efd30", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12886,7 +12886,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | search (AccessRights=FullAccess OR AccessRights=ChangePermission OR AccessRights=ChangeOwner) | rename Identity AS dest_user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_elevated_mailbox_permission_assigned_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search detects when an excessive number of authentication failures occur this search also includes attempts against MFA prompt codes
@@ -12898,7 +12898,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The threshold for alert is above 10 attempts
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -12912,7 +12912,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d441364c-349c-453b-b55f-12eccab67cf9", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12927,7 +12927,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory UserAuthenticationMethod=* status=failure | stats count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime values(UserAuthenticationMethod) AS UserAuthenticationMethod values(UserAgent) AS UserAgent values(status) AS status values(src_ip) AS src_ip by user | where count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_authentication_failures_alert_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects accounts with high number of Single Sign ON (SSO) logon errors. Excessive logon errors may indicate attempts to bruteforce of password or single sign on token hijack or reuse.
@@ -12939,7 +12939,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Logon errors may not be malicious in nature
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -12953,7 +12953,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "Office 365 Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8158ccc4-6038-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -12968,7 +12968,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory LogonError=*Sso* Operation=UserLoginFailed | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by  src_ip signature user_agent authentication_service action| where count >= 5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_excessive_sso_logon_errors_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 File Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 File Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies instances where a user in the Office 365 environment grants consent to an application that requests file permissions, specifically targeting OneDrive or SharePoint. Such permissions mean the application could potentially access, modify, or delete files stored within these services. The detection process leverages O365 audit logs, particularly focusing on events related to OAuth application consents. By examining these logs, the analytic is designed to capture and alert on any actions where users grant consent to applications requesting file-related permissions for OneDrive or SharePoint. The sensitivity of file permissions, especially in platforms as widely utilized as OneDrive and SharePoint, cannot be overstated. While many legitimate applications might require such permissions to operate, there's an inherent risk with malicious or overly permissive applications. Attackers could craft or exploit applications to gain file permissions, aiming to access, exfiltrate, or manipulate sensitive data housed in OneDrive or SharePoint. It's crucial for security operations centers to monitor these consents to ensure that only trustworthy applications gain access and that users aren't inadvertently granting permissions to potentially harmful applications. If this detection flags a true positive, it indicates that an application has been granted permissions that could allow it to interact with OneDrive or SharePoint files in potentially malicious ways. Such actions could lead to data breaches, data loss, or unauthorized data manipulation. Immediate investigation would be required to validate the application's legitimacy, understand the nature of its requested permissions, and assess the potential risks associated with the access it's been granted.
@@ -12980,7 +12980,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = OAuth applications that require file permiss
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 File Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 File Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -12994,7 +12994,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 File Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 File Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1528"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6c382336-22b8-4023-9b80-1689e799f21f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13015,7 +13015,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Consent to application." ResultStatus=Success | eval admin_consent =mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 0) | search admin_consent=False | eval permissions =mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 4) | rex field=permissions "Scope: (?<Scope>[^,]+)" | makemv delim=" " Scope | search Scope IN ("Files.Read", "Files.Read.All", "Files.ReadWrite", "Files.ReadWrite.All", "Files.ReadWrite.AppFolder") | stats max(_time) as lastTime values(Scope) by Operation, user, object, ObjectId | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_file_permissioned_application_consent_granted_by_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic triggers on the assignment of the 'full_access_as_app' permission to an application registration in Office 365, specifically within Exchange Online. The 'full_access_as_app' permission, identified by its GUID 'dc890d15-9560-4a4c-9b7f-a736ec74ec40', allows an application extensive control over Office 365 operations, including access to all mailboxes and the ability to send mail as any user. The analytic focuses on the ResourceAppId '00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000', pinpointing permissions granted to the Office 365 Exchange Online resource. By analyzing Office 365 management activity logs and filtering Azure Active Directory workload events, the query detects when this specific permission is assigned. Monitoring this assignment is vital due to the broad access it provides, which can lead to unauthorized data access or exfiltration if misused. A true positive detection requires immediate attention to prevent potential security risks like account compromise or data loss.
@@ -13027,7 +13027,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The full_access_as_app API permission may be
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13041,7 +13041,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.002", "T1098.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "01a510b3-a6ac-4d50-8812-7e8a3cde3d79", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13062,7 +13062,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Update application." | eval newvalue = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',0) | spath input=newvalue  | search "{}.ResourceAppId"="00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000"  "{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId"="dc890d15-9560-4a4c-9b7f-a736ec74ec40" | eval Permissions = '{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId' | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(Permissions) by user, object, user_agent, Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_fullaccessasapp_permission_assigned_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 High Number Of Failed Authentications for User - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 High Number Of Failed Authentications for User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies an O365 account that has experienced more than 20 failed authentication events within a span of 5 minutes. This could be indicative of an attacker attempting to brute force or guess the password for that particular user account. It leverages the O365 Unified Audit Logs, specifically the "UserLoginFailed" events. By monitoring the frequency and volume of these events for individual users, the analytic can flag accounts that exceed the set threshold of failed attempts within the defined timeframe. Multiple failed login attempts in a short period can be a strong indicator of malicious activity. While there could be benign reasons, such as a user forgetting their password, the rapid succession of failed attempts is often a sign of an attacker trying to gain unauthorized access. By detecting and alerting on this behavior, the SOC can quickly investigate and take appropriate action, potentially stopping an attack in its early stages. Given that environments differ across organizations, security teams should consider customizing the threshold of this detection to better suit their specific needs and risk profile. If an attacker successfully guesses or brute-forces a user's password after numerous attempts, they can gain unauthorized access to the O365 environment. This unauthorized access could allow them to view sensitive emails, documents, and other data.
@@ -13074,7 +13074,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unusual, users who have lost their
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 High Number Of Failed Authentications for User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 High Number Of Failed Authentications for User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13088,7 +13088,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 High Number Of Failed Authentications for User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 High Number Of Failed Authentications for User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110", "T1110.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "31641378-2fa9-42b1-948e-25e281cb98f7", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13109,7 +13109,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `o365_management_activity` Operation=UserLoginFailed  record_type=AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon Workload=AzureActiveDirectory | bucket span=5m _time | stats  dc(_raw) AS failed_attempts  values(src_ip) as src_ip by user, _time | where failed_attempts > 10 | `o365_high_number_of_failed_authentications_for_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 High Privilege Role Granted - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 High Privilege Role Granted - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic detects when high-privilege roles, specifically "Exchange Administrator", "SharePoint Administrator", or "Global Administrator", are granted within Office 365. By monitoring O365 audit logs for events where these administrative roles are assigned to any user or service account, the analytic provides insight into critical role changes. The assignment of these roles is of paramount importance to Security Operations Centers (SOCs) as they grant extensive permissions, allowing for broad access and control over critical organizational resources and data. An unexpected or unauthorized role assignment could indicate potential malicious activity, insider threats, or misconfigurations. If an attacker or unauthorized individual is granted one of these roles, the potential impact includes gaining significant control over O365 resources, accessing, modifying, or deleting critical data, making configuration changes, and potentially compromising the overall security and functionality of the O365 environment.
@@ -13121,7 +13121,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Privilege roles may be assigned for legitima
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 High Privilege Role Granted - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 High Privilege Role Granted - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13135,7 +13135,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 High Privilege Role Granted - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 High Privilege Role Granted - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1098.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e78a1037-4548-4072-bb1b-ad99ae416426", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13156,7 +13156,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Operation="Add member to role." Workload=AzureActiveDirectory | eval role_id = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',2) | eval role_name = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',1) | where role_id IN ("29232cdf-9323-42fd-ade2-1d097af3e4de", "f28a1f50-f6e7-4571-818b-6a12f2af6b6c", "62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10")  | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user Operation ObjectId role_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_high_privilege_role_granted_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Mail Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Mail Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies instances where a user grants consent to an application that requests mail related permissions within the Office 365 environment. This could involve permissions to read, send, or manage mail settings. It leverages the O365 audit logs, specifically events related to application permissions and user consent actions. By filtering for mail-related permissions and user-granted consents, the analytic pinpoints potential security concerns. While many legitimate applications request mail permissions for valid reasons, malicious actors can exploit these permissions for data exfiltration, spear phishing, or other malicious activities. By monitoring for user-granted mail permissions, security teams can identify and review potentially risky consents, ensuring that only trusted applications have access to sensitive email data. If the detection is a true positive, it indicates that an application now has access to the users mail data as permitted. In the hands of a malicious actor, this could lead to unauthorized data access, email forwarding, or even the sending of malicious emails from the compromised account. Its crucial to validate the legitimacy of the application and the context of the consent to prevent potential data breaches or further malicious activities.
@@ -13168,7 +13168,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = OAuth applications that require mail permiss
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Mail Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Mail Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13182,7 +13182,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Mail Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Mail Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1528"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fddad083-cdf5-419d-83c6-baa85e329595", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13203,7 +13203,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Consent to application." ResultStatus=Success | eval admin_consent =mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 0) | search admin_consent=False | eval permissions =mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 4) | rex field=permissions "Scope: (?<Scope>[^,]+)" | makemv delim=" " Scope | search Scope IN ("Mail.Read", "Mail.ReadBasic", "Mail.ReadWrite", "Mail.Read.Shared", "Mail.ReadWrite.Shared", "Mail.Send", "Mail.Send.Shared") | stats max(_time) as lastTime values(Scope) by Operation, user, object, ObjectId | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mail_permissioned_application_consent_granted_by_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection is designed to identify instances where email forwarding has been enabled on mailboxes within an Office 365 environment. By monitoring for the specific operation Set-Mailbox within the o365_management_activity logs, this analytic hones in on changes made to mailbox configurations that initiate the forwarding of emails. It specifically looks for the activation of ForwardingAddress or ForwardingSmtpAddress parameters, indicating that emails are being automatically sent to another email address from the user's mailbox.
@@ -13215,7 +13215,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Email forwarding may be configured for legit
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13229,7 +13229,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Collection Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0b6bc75c-05d1-4101-9fc3-97e706168f24", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13250,7 +13250,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox  | eval match1=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', "ForwardingAddress") | eval match2=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', "ForwardingSmtpAddress") | where match1>= 0 OR match2>= 0 | eval ForwardTo=coalesce(ForwardingAddress, ForwardingSmtpAddress) | search ForwardTo!=""  | rename user_id as user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(ForwardTo) as ForwardTo by user ObjectId |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mailbox_email_forwarding_enabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Assigned - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Assigned - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection is tailored to capture instances where read permissions are assigned to mailbox folders within an Office 365 environment, utilizing the operations ModifyFolderPermissions and AddFolderPermissions as captured in the o365_management_activity. Unlike other permission modifications, this detection excludes actions related to the Calendar, Contacts, and PersonMetadata objects, focusing on core mailbox folders.
@@ -13262,7 +13262,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Mailbox folder permissions may be configured
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Assigned - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Assigned - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13276,7 +13276,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Assigned - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Assigned - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Collection Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1098.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1435475e-2128-4417-a34f-59770733b0d5", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13297,7 +13297,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange (Operation=ModifyFolderPermissions OR Operation=AddFolderPermissions) Workload=Exchange object!=Calendar object!=Contacts object!=PersonMetadata | eval isReadRole=if(match('Item.ParentFolder.MemberRights', "(ReadAny)"), "true", "false")  | rename UserId as user  | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Operation, user, object, Item.ParentFolder.MemberUpn, Item.ParentFolder.MemberRights | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mailbox_folder_read_permission_assigned_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Granted - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Granted - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection focuses on identifying changes in mailbox folder permissions within an Office 365 environment, specifically pinpointing instances where read permissions are granted. It monitors for two key operations Set-MailboxFolderPermission and Add-MailboxFolderPermission, as logged in the o365_management_activity. These operations are indicative of modifications or additions to the permissions of mailbox folders, potentially altering who can view or interact with the folder contents.
@@ -13309,7 +13309,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Mailbox folder permissions may be configured
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Granted - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Granted - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13323,7 +13323,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Granted - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Granted - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Collection Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1098.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cd15c0a8-470e-4b12-9517-046e4927db30", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13344,7 +13344,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange (Operation="Set-MailboxFolderPermission" OR Operation="Add-MailboxFolderPermission" ) | eval isReadRole=if(match(AccessRights, "^(ReadItems|Author|NonEditingAuthor|Owner|PublishingAuthor|Reviewer)$"), "true", "false") | search isReadRole="true" | rename UserId as user | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Operation, user, Identity, AccessRights | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mailbox_folder_read_permission_granted_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Inbox Folder Shared with All Users - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Mailbox Inbox Folder Shared with All Users - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies instances where the inbox folder of a mailbox in Office 365 is shared with all users within the tenant. Sharing the inbox folder with all users is an unusual and risky configuration. Attackers have been known to exploit this setting to surreptitiously read a target user's emails from another account. Such unauthorized access can lead to data breaches, leakage of confidential information, or further compromise based on the information gathered from the emails. Monitoring for this configuration change ensures that inadvertent or malicious sharing is promptly identified and addressed. If an attacker successfully configures the inbox to be shared with all users, they can access and read all emails in the affected mailbox from any account within the tenant. This can lead to data exfiltration, spear-phishing attacks based on the information in the emails, or further malicious activities using sensitive information gathered from the mailbox.
@@ -13356,7 +13356,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators might temporarily share a mai
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Inbox Folder Shared with All Users - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Mailbox Inbox Folder Shared with All Users - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13370,7 +13370,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Inbox Folder Shared with All Users - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Mailbox Inbox Folder Shared with All Users - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "21421896-a692-4594-9888-5faeb8a53106", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13391,7 +13391,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Operation=ModifyFolderPermissions Workload=Exchange object=Inbox Item.ParentFolder.MemberUpn=Everyone | eval isReadRole=if(match('Item.ParentFolder.MemberRights', "(ReadAny)"), "true", "false")  | search isReadRole = "true" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Operation, UserId, object, MailboxOwnerUPN, Item.ParentFolder.MemberUpn, Item.ParentFolder.MemberRights | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mailbox_inbox_folder_shared_with_all_users_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies instances where the Mail.Read Graph API permissions are granted to an application registration within an Office 365 tenant. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically events related to changes in application permissions within the AzureActiveDirectory workload. The Mail.Read permission allows applications to access and read all emails within a user's mailbox. Emails often contain sensitive or confidential information, and unauthorized access can lead to data breaches or leakage. Monitoring the assignment of this permission ensures that only legitimate applications have such access and that any inadvertent or malicious assignments are promptly identified. If an attacker successfully grants this permission to a malicious or compromised application, they can read all emails in the affected mailboxes. This can lead to data exfiltration, spear-phishing attacks, or further compromise based on the information gathered from the emails.
@@ -13403,7 +13403,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There are legitimate scenarios in wich an Ap
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13417,7 +13417,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002", "T1114", "T1098", "T1098.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "27ab61c5-f08a-438a-b4d3-325e666490b3", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13438,7 +13438,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Operation="Update application." | eval json_data=mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 0) | eval json_data=replace(json_data, "^\[\s*", "") | eval json_data=replace(json_data, "\s*\]$", "") | spath input=json_data path=RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId output=EntitlementIds | eval match_found=mvfind(EntitlementIds, "810c84a8-4a9e-49e6-bf7d-12d183f40d01") | where isnotnull(match_found) | stats max(_time) as lastTime values(EntitlementIds) as EntitlementIds by Operation, user, object | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_mailbox_read_access_granted_to_application_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic detects potential distributed password spraying attacks within an Office 365 environment. It identifies a significant increase in failed authentication attempts characterized by diverse user-and-IP address combinations, originating from multiple source IP addresses, and utilizing various user agents. These patterns may indicate an adversary's attempt to circumvent security controls by employing a spectrum of IP addresses to test commonly used passwords against a wide range of user accounts. The detection examines UserLoginFailed events from O365 Management Activity logs, with a particular focus on events with ErrorNumber 50126, which indicates a failed authentication due to incorrect credentials. By aggregating data over a five-minute interval, the analytic calculates the distinct counts of user-and-IP combinations and unique users and source IPs. It then applies a set of thresholds to these metrics to identify abnormal activities that could suggest a coordinated attack. The predefined thresholds within the analytic (such as unique IPs, unique users, etc.) serve as initial benchmarks and should be tailored to align with the organization's typical user behavior and risk tolerance. Early detection of such distributed activities is crucial for security operations centers (SOCs) to intercept unauthorized access attempts, avert account takeovers, and reduce the risk of subsequent malevolent actions within the organization's systems. A true positive alert from this analytic would indicate an ongoing distributed password spraying campaign targeting the organization's Office 365 tenant. If such an attack is successful, it could lead to unauthorized access, especially to accounts with administrative privileges, resulting in data breaches, privilege escalation, persistent threats, and lateral movement within the organization's digital environment.
@@ -13450,7 +13450,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection may yield false positives in
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13459,7 +13459,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Office 365 Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1110", "T1110.003", "T1110.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ea4e2c41-dbfb-4f5f-a7b6-9ac1b7f104aa", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13474,7 +13474,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoginFailed ErrorNumber=50126 | bucket span=5m _time | eval uniqueIPUserCombo = src_ip . "-" . user | stats dc(uniqueIPUserCombo) as uniqueIpUserCombinations, dc(user) as uniqueUsers, dc(src_ip) as uniqueIPs, values(user) as user, values(src_ip) as ips, values(user_agent) as user_agents by _time | where uniqueIpUserCombinations > 20 AND uniqueUsers > 20 AND uniqueIPs > 20 | `o365_multi_source_failed_authentications_spike_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is crafted to identify unusual and potentially malicious authentication activity within an O365 environment. It triggers when a single user account is involved in more than 8 authentication attempts, using 3 or more unique application IDs and more than 5 unique user agents within a short timeframe. This pattern is atypical for regular user behavior and may indicate an adversary's attempt to probe the environment, testing for multi-factor authentication requirements across different applications and platforms. The detection is based on analysis of O365 audit logs, specifically focusing on authentication events. It employs statistical thresholds to highlight instances where the volume of authentication attempts and the diversity of application IDs and user agents associated with a single user account exceed normal parameters. Identifying this behavior is crucial as it provides an early indication of potential account compromise. Adversaries, once in possession of user credentials, often conduct reconnaissance to understand the security controls in place, including multi-factor authentication configurations. Tools like Invoke-MFASweep are commonly used for this purpose, automating the process of testing different user agents and application IDs to bypass MFA. By detecting these initial probing attempts, security teams can swiftly respond, potentially stopping an attack in its early stages and preventing further unauthorized access. This proactive stance is vital for maintaining the integrity of the organization's security posture. If validated as a true positive, this detection points to a compromised account, signaling that an attacker is actively attempting to navigate security controls to maintain access and potentially escalate privileges. This could lead to further exploitation, lateral movement within the network, and eventual data exfiltration. Recognizing and responding to this early stage of an attack is vital for preventing substantial harm and safeguarding sensitive organizational data and systems.
@@ -13486,7 +13486,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Rapid authentication from the same user usin
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13500,7 +13500,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "66adc486-224d-45c1-8e4d-9e7eeaba988f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13515,7 +13515,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory (Operation=UserLoggedIn OR Operation=UserLoginFailed) | bucket span=5m _time | stats  dc(_raw) as failed_attempts dc(ApplicationId) as unique_app_ids dc(UserAgent) as unique_user_agents values(ApplicationId) values(OS) by _time user src_ip | where failed_attempts > 5 and unique_user_agents > 5 and unique_app_ids > 2 | `o365_multiple_appids_and_useragents_authentication_spike_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies potential "MFA fatigue" attacks targeting Office 365 users. Specifically, it detects scenarios where a user experiences more than nine Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) prompts within a 10-minute timeframe. Attackers may exploit MFA fatigue by repeatedly triggering MFA requests, hoping that the user, out of frustration or oversight, will approve a malicious authentication attempt. The detection leverages O365 management activity logs, focusing on Azure Active Directory events. It looks for the UserLoginFailed operation combined with a Success ResultStatus and an ErrorNumber of 500121, which indicates MFA prompts. By monitoring these specific events and conditions, the analytic captures and alerts on potential MFA fatigue scenarios. With MFA being a cornerstone of modern cybersecurity defenses, attackers are constantly seeking ways to bypass or exploit it. MFA fatigue is one such tactic, where attackers rely on user frustration or confusion caused by frequent MFA prompts. Detecting potential MFA fatigue scenarios allows security teams to proactively investigate and ensure that users aren't inadvertently granting access to malicious actors. If this detection flags a true positive, it suggests a potential attempt by an attacker to exploit MFA mechanisms to gain unauthorized access to an O365 account. Successful exploitation could lead to data breaches, unauthorized data access, or further compromise within the O365 environment. Immediate investigation and response would be crucial to safeguard the affected account and assess the full scope of the potential breach.
@@ -13527,7 +13527,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Multiple Failed MFA requests may also be a s
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13541,7 +13541,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1621"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fd22124e-dbac-4744-a8ce-be10d8ec3e26", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13562,7 +13562,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoginFailed ResultStatus=Success  ErrorNumber=500121 | bucket span=10m _time | stats  dc(_raw) as mfa_prompts values(LogonError) as LogonError values(signature) as signature by user, _time | where  mfa_prompts  > 9 | `o365_multiple_failed_mfa_requests_for_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is designed to trigger when a high number of Office 365 Exchange mailboxes are accessed via API (Microsoft Graph API or Exchange Web Services) in a short time, hinting at possible unauthorized mass email access. It tracks 'MailItemsAccessed' operations in Exchange, using AppId and regex to identify API interactions. Crucial for SOC teams, this analytic focuses on spotting abnormal access patterns, often signaling data exfiltration or account compromise. Security teams should tailor the threshold - set here to flag over five unique mailboxes accessed within 10 minutes - to align with their environment's norms, ensuring effective detection of potential security incidents while maintaining operational efficiency.
@@ -13574,7 +13574,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may access multiple
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13588,7 +13588,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Office 365 Collection Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7cd853e9-d370-412f-965d-a2bcff2a2908", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13609,7 +13609,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=MailItemsAccessed AppId=* ClientAppId=* | bucket span=10m _time | eval matchRegex=if(match(ClientInfoString, "^Client=WebServices;ExchangeWebServices"), 1, 0) | search (AppId="00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000" OR matchRegex=1) | stats values(ClientIPAddress) as src_ip dc(user) as unique_mailboxes values(user) as user by _time ClientAppId ClientInfoString | where unique_mailboxes > 5 | `o365_multiple_mailboxes_accessed_via_api_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection aims to identify instances where a single service principal creates more than three unique OAuth applications within a 10-minute timeframe, using O365 logs from the Unified Audit Log. The focus is on tracking the 'Add service principal' operation within the Office 365 Azure Active Directory environment. The query effectively buckets events in 10-minute intervals, specifically scrutinizing the actions of service principals. By quantifying the number of distinct OAuth applications each service principal establishes, the analytic provides critical insights for SOC teams into potentially anomalous or malicious activities. These activities could include a compromised or malicious service principal being used to create multiple service principals, which might be indicative of an attempt to expand control or access within the network. Security teams are advised to adapt the threshold of three applications to align with their typical operational baseline
@@ -13621,7 +13621,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Certain users or applications may create mul
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13635,7 +13635,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ef4c3f20-d1ad-4ad1-a3f4-d5f391c005fe", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13650,7 +13650,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Add service principal."  | bucket span=10m _time | eval len=mvcount('Actor{}.ID') | eval userType = mvindex('Actor{}.ID',len-1) | search userType = "ServicePrincipal" | eval displayName = object | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName dc(displayName) as unique_apps by src_user | where unique_apps > 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_multiple_service_principals_created_by_sp_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection is tailored to spot occurrences where a single user, rather than a service principal, creates more than three unique OAuth applications within a 10-minute window in the Office 365 environment. Utilizing O365 logs from the Unified Audit Log, it focuses on the 'Add service principal' operation in Azure Active Directory. The query segments events into 10-minute intervals, exclusively monitoring user activities. It calculates the number of distinct OAuth applications initiated by each user, providing SOC teams with essential data for identifying potential security threats. Such activity could suggest that a user account is either compromised or engaged in unauthorized activities, potentially setting the stage for broader network infiltration or privilege escalation. It's important for security teams to adjust the threshold of three applications to fit their operational context.
@@ -13662,7 +13662,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Certain users or applications may create mul
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13676,7 +13676,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a34e65d0-54de-4b02-9db8-5a04522067f6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13691,7 +13691,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity`  Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Add service principal."  | bucket span=10m _time | eval len=mvcount('Actor{}.ID') | eval userType = mvindex('Actor{}.ID',len-1) | search userType = "User" | eval displayName = object | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName dc(displayName) as unique_apps by src_user | where unique_apps > 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_multiple_service_principals_created_by_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies instances where multiple users (more than 10 unique accounts) have failed to authenticate from a single IP address within a short time span (5 minutes). Such a pattern can be indicative of malicious activities, such as brute-force attacks or password spraying attempts. The detection leverages O365 audit logs, specifically focusing on Azure Active Directory login failures (AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon). By aggregating these failures based on the source IP address and time, the analytic captures patterns where multiple unique user accounts have authentication failures from the same IP within a 5-minute window. Multiple authentication failures from a single IP address targeting various accounts can be a strong indicator of an attacker trying to gain unauthorized access. It could represent a brute-force attack, password spraying, or other malicious login attempts. Identifying and responding to such patterns promptly is crucial to prevent potential account compromises and unauthorized access to organizational resources. If the detection is a true positive, it suggests that an external entity is actively trying to breach the security by targeting multiple user accounts. While the attempts have been unsuccessful (as indicated by the login failures), it's a clear sign of malicious intent. Immediate action is required to block or monitor the suspicious IP, investigate the nature of the attempts, and potentially notify affected users to take precautionary measures like password changes or enabling multi-factor authentication.
@@ -13703,7 +13703,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A source Ip failing to authenticate with mul
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13717,7 +13717,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Office 365 Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1586", "T1586.003", "T1110", "T1110.003", "T1110.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8d486e2e-3235-4cfe-ac35-0d042e24ecb4", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13738,7 +13738,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation=UserLoginFailed ErrorNumber=50126 |  bucket span=5m _time |  stats dc(user) as unique_accounts values(user) as user values(LogonError) as LogonError values(signature) as signature values(UserAgent) as UserAgent by _time, src_ip |  where unique_accounts > 10 | `o365_multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_ip_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Created - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Created - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection is crafted to monitor and identify the creation of new email forwarding rules in an Office 365 environment. It specifically targets events logged under New-InboxRule and Set-InboxRule operations within o365_management_activity, indicating the establishment or modification of inbox rules that forward emails. The detection checks for the presence of parameters such as ForwardTo, ForwardAsAttachmentTo, and RedirectTo, which are key indicators of email forwarding behavior.
@@ -13750,7 +13750,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Users may create email forwarding rules for
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Created - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Created - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13764,7 +13764,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Created - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Created - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Collection Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "68469fd0-1315-44ba-b7e4-e92847bb76d6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13785,7 +13785,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` (Operation=New-InboxRule OR Operation=set-InboxRule) | eval match1=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', "ForwardTo") | eval match2=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', "ForwardAsAttachmentTo") | eval match3=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', "RedirectTo") | where match1>= 0 OR match2>= 0 OR match3>= 0 | eval ForwardTo=coalesce(ForwardTo, ForwardAsAttachmentTo, RedirectTo) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Name) as Name by user Operation ForwardTo | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_email_forwarding_rule_created_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Enabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Enabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection aims to identify instances where new email forwarding rules are created through the UpdateInboxRules operation within an Office 365 environment. Despite the operation name suggesting an update, this specific scenario involves the addition of new rules that direct emails to external recipients, captured under the ForwardToRecipientsAction. The analytic examines the OperationProperties to extract and validate forwarding addresses, ensuring they adhere to the expected email format.
@@ -13797,7 +13797,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Users may create email forwarding rules for
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Enabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Enabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13811,7 +13811,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Enabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Enabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Collection Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ac7c4d0a-06a3-4278-aa59-88a5e537f981", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13832,7 +13832,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=UpdateInboxRules  | eval match1=mvfind('OperationProperties{}.Value', "ForwardToRecipientsAction") | eval match2=mvfind('OperationProperties{}.Value', "ForwardAsAttachmentToRecipientsAction") | eval match3=mvfind('OperationProperties{}.Value', "RedirectToRecipientsAction") | eval index = mvfind('OperationProperties{}.Name', "ServerRule") | where match1>= 0 OR match2>= 0 OR match3>= 0 | eval ServerRule = mvindex('OperationProperties{}.Value', index-1) | spath input=ServerRule path=Actions{}.Recipients{}.Values{}.Value output=valueExtracted | mvexpand valueExtracted | search valueExtracted="*@*.*" | eval ForwardTo=if(match(valueExtracted, "^[^@]+@[^@]+\\.[^@]+$"), valueExtracted, null) | dedup ForwardTo | where isnotnull(ForwardTo) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Name) as Name by user Operation ForwardTo | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_email_forwarding_rule_enabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the addition of a new federated domain in an organization's Office 365 environment. This behavior is detected by analyzing the Office 365 management activity logs using the Splunk query o365_management_activity, specifically filtering for the Workload=Exchange and Operation="Add-FederatedDomain" parameters. The addition of a new federated domain can be a significant security concern, as it might indicate unauthorized changes or potential compromises within the Office 365 setup. Attackers, upon gaining sufficient privileges, could add a federated domain to establish a backdoor, bypass security measures, or exfiltrate data. Such unauthorized changes can lead to data breaches, unauthorized access to sensitive data, and potential compromise of organizational infrastructure. When this analytic is triggered, immediate steps should include reviewing the details of the added federated domain, such as the organization name, originating server, user ID, and user key. Concurrent processes or other indicators of compromise should also be investigated to pinpoint the source of the potential breach.
@@ -13844,7 +13844,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The creation of a new Federated domain is no
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13858,7 +13858,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.003", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13879,7 +13879,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Operation IN ("*add*", "*new*") AND Operation="*domain*" | stats count values(ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue) as new_value by  user user_agent authentication_service action Workload Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_federated_domain_added_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 New Forwarding Mailflow Rule Created - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 New Forwarding Mailflow Rule Created - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic monitors for the creation of new mail flow rules in Office 365 that could potentially redirect or copy emails to unauthorized or external addresses. This analytic works by querying the Office 365 Management Activity logs for any operation tagged as "New-TransportRule". It specifically looks for parameters indicative of mail forwarding actions, such as "BlindCopyTo", "CopyTo", and "RedirectMessageTo". If any of these parameters are present, indicating that a forwarding rule has been set up, the detection then captures the details of this rule, including the user ID responsible for the creation, the name of the rule, the forwarding target, and the timestamps of the rule's creation and last modification.
@@ -13891,7 +13891,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Forwarding mail flow rules may be created fo
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 New Forwarding Mailflow Rule Created - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 New Forwarding Mailflow Rule Created - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13905,7 +13905,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 New Forwarding Mailflow Rule Created - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 New Forwarding Mailflow Rule Created - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Collection Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "289ed0a1-4c78-4a43-9321-44ea2e089c14", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13926,7 +13926,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation="New-TransportRule" | eval match1=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', "BlindCopyTo") | eval match2=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', "CopyTo") | eval match3=mvfind('Parameters{}.Name', "RedirectMessageTo") | where match1>= 0 OR match2>= 0 OR match3>=0 | eval ForwardTo=coalesce(BlindCopyTo, CopyTo, RedirectMessageTo) | search ForwardTo!=""  | rename UserId as user  | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Operation, user, Name, ForwardTo  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`   | `o365_new_forwarding_mailflow_rule_created_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 New MFA Method Registered - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 New MFA Method Registered - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic detects the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method associated with a user account within Office 365 by monitoring O365 audit logs and configurations. While adding a new MFA method can be a routine and legitimate action, it can also be indicative of an attacker's attempt to maintain persistence on a compromised account. By registering a new MFA method, attackers can potentially bypass existing security measures, allowing them to authenticate using stolen credentials without raising alarms. Monitoring for such changes is crucial, especially if the addition is not preceded by a user request or if it deviates from typical user behavior. If an attacker successfully registers a new MFA method on a compromised account, they can solidify their access, making it harder for legitimate users to regain control. The attacker can then operate with the privileges of the compromised account, potentially accessing sensitive data, making unauthorized changes, or even escalating their privileges further. Immediate action would be required to verify the legitimacy of the MFA change and, if malicious, to remediate and secure the affected account.
@@ -13938,7 +13938,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Users may register MFA methods legitimally,
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 New MFA Method Registered - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 New MFA Method Registered - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13952,7 +13952,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 New MFA Method Registered - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 New MFA Method Registered - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1098.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4e12db1f-f7c7-486d-8152-a221cad6ac2b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -13973,7 +13973,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory  Operation="Update user."  | eval propertyName = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.Name', 0) | search propertyName = StrongAuthenticationMethod | eval oldvalue = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.OldValue',0) | eval newvalue = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',0) | rex field=newvalue max_match=0 "(?i)(?<new_method_type>\"MethodType\")" | rex field=oldvalue max_match=0 "(?i)(?<old_method_type>\"MethodType\")" | eval count_new_method_type = coalesce(mvcount(new_method_type), 0) | eval count_old_method_type = coalesce(mvcount(old_method_type), 0) |  where count_new_method_type > count_old_method_type |  stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(propertyName) by user newvalue oldvalue | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_new_mfa_method_registered_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects when emails are accessed in Office 365 Exchange via Exchange Web Services (EWS), as indicated by the ClientInfoString field starting with "Client=WebServices;ExchangeWebServices". It monitors mailbox activities, focusing on OAuth-authenticated applications that interact with EWS. The query aggregates key metrics such as access counts, timing, and client IP addresses, categorized by user, ClientAppId, OperationCount, and AppId. For defenders, it is critical to keep track of OAuth applications using EWS to access emails, as this information is instrumental in identifying and preventing potential abuse or unauthorized data access.
@@ -13985,7 +13985,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = OAuth applications may access mailboxes for
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -13999,7 +13999,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Office 365 Collection Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e600cf1a-0bef-4426-b42e-00176d610a4d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14020,7 +14020,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=MailItemsAccessed AppId=* ClientAppId=* | regex ClientInfoString="^Client=WebServices;ExchangeWebServices" |  stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(ClientIPAddress) as src_ip by user ClientAppId OperationCount AppId ClientInfoString | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_oauth_app_mailbox_access_via_ews_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This Splunk analytic detects when emails are accessed in Office 365 Exchange via the Microsoft Graph API, identified by the client ID '00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000'. It tracks the 'MailItemsAccessed' operation within the Exchange workload, focusing on OAuth-authenticated applications. The query compiles statistics on access frequency, timing, and client IP addresses, organized by user, client application ID, and AppId. For defenders, it's crucial to maintain an inventory of all OAuth applications that read emails, using this data to scrutinize and identify any potential abusive access patterns.
@@ -14032,7 +14032,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = OAuth applications may access mailboxes for
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -14046,7 +14046,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Office 365 Collection Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9db0d5b0-4058-4cb7-baaf-77d8143539a2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14067,7 +14067,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `o365_management_activity` Workload=Exchange Operation=MailItemsAccessed AppId=* AppId=00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000 |  stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(ClientIPAddress) by user ClientAppId OperationCount AppId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_oauth_app_mailbox_access_via_graph_api_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This Splunk analytic detects the assignment of critical Graph API permissions in Azure AD using O365 Unified Audit Log as its data source. It focuses on three permissions, Application.ReadWrite.All (Entitlement ID 1bfefb4e-e0b5-418b-a88f-73c46d2cc8e9), AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All (06b708a9-e830-4db3-a914-8e69da51d44f), and RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory (9e3f62cf-ca93-4989-b6ce-bf83c28f9fe8). These permissions, crucial for controlling Azure AD settings, pose a high risk if misused. The query monitors Azure Active Directory workload events in the Office 365 Management Activity, specifically 'Update application' operations. It extracts and analyzes data to spot when these permissions are granted, gathering details about the user, object, and user agent involved. Due to the significant control these permissions provide, immediate investigation is crucial upon detection to prevent unauthorized modifications.
@@ -14079,7 +14079,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Privileged Graph API permissions may be assi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -14093,7 +14093,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "868f3131-d5e1-4bf1-af5b-9b0fbaaaedbb", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14114,7 +14114,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Update application." | eval newvalue = mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue',0) | spath input=newvalue  | search "{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId"="1bfefb4e-e0b5-418b-a88f-73c46d2cc8e9" OR "{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId"="06b708a9-e830-4db3-a914-8e69da51d44f" OR "{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId"="9e3f62cf-ca93-4989-b6ce-bf83c28f9fe8"  | eval Permissions = '{}.RequiredAppPermissions{}.EntitlementId' | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(Permissions) by user, object, user_agent, Operation | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_privileged_graph_api_permission_assigned_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 PST export alert - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic detects instances where a user has initiated an eDiscovery search or exported a PST file from the search results in an Office 365 environment. The detection leverages the Office 365 management activity logs, specifically filtering for events categorized under ThreatManagement with the name eDiscovery search started or exported. The initiation of an eDiscovery search or the export of a PST file can be indicative of data exfiltration attempts or unauthorized access to sensitive information. PST files often contain a wealth of sensitive data, including the content of emails. Monitoring for such activities is crucial as they can expose sensitive organizational communications and data. If confirmed as a malicious activity, it suggests that an attacker or insider threat is attempting to gather or exfiltrate data. This can lead to data breaches, loss of intellectual property, or unauthorized access to confidential communications. Immediate investigation is required to determine the scope and intent of the activity and to take appropriate remedial actions.
@@ -14126,7 +14126,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = PST export can be done for legitimate purpos
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 PST export alert - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -14140,7 +14140,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 PST export alert - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration", "Office 365 Collection Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5f694cc4-a678-4a60-9410-bffca1b647dc", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14161,7 +14161,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Category=ThreatManagement Name="eDiscovery search started or exported" | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by Source Severity AlertEntityId Operation Name |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_pst_export_alert_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Security And Compliance Alert Triggered - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Security And Compliance Alert Triggered - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection is tailored to identify and act upon alerts generated by the Office 365 Security and Compliance Center, encompassing a broad spectrum of security and compliance issues indicative of potential threats or policy violations within the O365 workspace.
@@ -14173,7 +14173,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = O365 Security and Compliance may also genera
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Security And Compliance Alert Triggered - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Security And Compliance Alert Triggered - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -14187,7 +14187,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Security And Compliance Alert Triggered - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Security And Compliance Alert Triggered - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5b367cdd-8dfc-49ac-a9b7-6406cf27f33e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14208,7 +14208,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `o365_management_activity` Workload=SecurityComplianceCenter Category=ThreatManagement Operation=AlertTriggered | spath input=Data path=f3u output=user | spath input=Data path=op output=operation | spath input=_raw path=wl | spath input=Data path=rid output=rule_id | spath input=Data path=ad output=alert_description | spath input=Data path=lon output=operation_name | spath input=Data path=an output=alert_name | spath input=Data path=sev output=severity |  stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user, Name, operation, rule_id, alert_description, alert_name, severity | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_security_and_compliance_alert_triggered_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the addition of new credentials for Service Principals in addition to existing legitimate credentials within a Office 365 tenant. These credentials include both x509 certificates and passwords. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically events related to credential modifications or additions within the AzureActiveDirectory workload for service principals. Service principals represent application identities in Office 365 / AzureAD, and their credentials allow applications to authenticate and access resources. Adding new credentials or modifying existing ones can be an indication of configuration changes, but it can also be a sign of malicious intent If an attacker successfully adds or modifies credentials for a service principal, they can potentially use those credentials to authenticate as the application, gaining access to resources and data the application is permitted to access. This can lead to unauthorized data access, data exfiltration, or malicious operations performed under the guise of the application
@@ -14220,7 +14220,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Service Principal client credential modifica
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -14234,7 +14234,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1098.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a1b229e9-d962-4222-8c62-905a8a010453", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14255,7 +14255,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Update application*Certificates and secrets management " |  stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue object ObjectId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_service_principal_new_client_credentials_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies instances where admin consent is granted to an application within an Azure AD and Office 365 tenant. It leverages O365 audit logs, specifically events related to the admin consent action within the AzureActiveDirectory workload. The admin consent action allows applications to access data across the entire tenant, potentially encompassing a vast amount of organizational data. Given its broad scope and the sensitivity of some permissions that can only be granted via admin consent, it's crucial to monitor this action. Unauthorized or inadvertent granting of admin consent can lead to significant security risks, including data breaches, unauthorized data access, and potential compliance violations. If an attacker successfully tricks an administrator into granting admin consent to a malicious or compromised application, they can gain extensive and persistent access to organizational data. This can lead to data exfiltration, espionage, further malicious activities within the tenant, and potential breaches of compliance regulations
@@ -14267,7 +14267,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may be granted tenan
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -14281,7 +14281,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1098.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "50eaabf8-5180-4e86-bfb2-011472c359fc", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14302,7 +14302,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Operation="Consent to application."  | eval new_field=mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 4) | rex field=new_field "ConsentType: (?<ConsentType>[^\,]+)" | rex field=new_field "Scope: (?<Scope>[^\,]+)"  | search  ConsentType = "AllPrincipals"  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Operation, user, object, ObjectId, ConsentType, Scope | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_tenant_wide_admin_consent_granted_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies instances where Office 365 has blocked a user's attempt to grant consent to an application deemed risky or potentially malicious. This suggests that the application has exhibited behaviors or characteristics that are commonly associated with malicious intent or poses a security risk. This detection leverages the O365 audit logs, specifically focusing on events related to user consent actions and system-driven blocks. By filtering for blocked consent actions associated with applications, the analytic highlights instances where O365's built-in security measures have intervened. Applications that are flagged and blocked by O365 typically exhibit suspicious characteristics or behaviors. Monitoring for these blocked consent attempts helps security teams identify potential threats early on and can provide insights into users who might be targeted or susceptible to such risky applications. It's an essential layer of defense in ensuring that malicious or risky applications don't gain access to organizational data. If the detection is a true positive, it indicates that the built-in security measures of O365 successfully prevented a potentially harmful application from gaining access. However, the attempt itself suggests that either a user might be targeted or that there's a presence of malicious applications trying to infiltrate the organization. Immediate investigation is required to understand the context of the block and to take further preventive measures.
@@ -14314,7 +14314,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Microsofts algorithm to identify risky appli
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -14328,7 +14328,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1528"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "242e4d30-cb59-4051-b0cf-58895e218f40", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14349,7 +14349,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Workload=AzureActiveDirectory Operation="Consent to application." ResultStatus=Failure | eval permissions =mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 4) | eval reason =mvindex('ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue', 5) |  search reason = "Risky application detected" | rex field=permissions "Scope: (?<Scope>[^,]+)" |  stats max(_time) as lastTime by Operation, user, reason, object, Scope | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_user_consent_blocked_for_risky_application_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies instances where a user has actively denied consent to an OAuth application seeking permissions within the Office 365 environment. This suggests that the user either recognized something suspicious about the application or chose not to grant it the requested permissions for other reasons. This detection leverages the O365 audit logs, specifically focusing on events related to user consent actions. By filtering for denied consent actions associated with OAuth applications, the analytic captures instances where users have actively rejected permission requests. While user-denied consents can be routine, they can also be indicative of users spotting potentially suspicious or unfamiliar applications. By monitoring these denied consent attempts, security teams can gain insights into applications that might be perceived as risky or untrusted by users. It can also serve as a feedback loop for security awareness training, indicating that users are being cautious about granting permissions. If the detection is a true positive, it indicates that a user has actively prevented an OAuth application from gaining the permissions it requested. While this is a proactive security measure on the user's part, it's essential for security teams to review the context of the denial. Understanding why certain applications are being denied can help in refining application whitelisting policies and ensuring that no malicious applications are attempting to gain access.
@@ -14361,7 +14361,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = OAuth applications that require mail permiss
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -14375,7 +14375,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - O365 User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - O365 User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Account Takeover"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1528"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2d8679ef-b075-46be-8059-c25116cb1072", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14396,7 +14396,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `o365_graph` status.errorCode=65004 | rename userPrincipalName as user | rename ipAddress as src_ip | stats max(_time) as lastTime by user src_ip appDisplayName status.failureReason | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `o365_user_consent_denied_for_oauth_application_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository - Rule]
+[ESCU - Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects by correlating repository and risk score to identify patterns and trends in the data based on the level of risk associated. The analytic adds any null values and calculates the sum of the risk scores for each detection. Then, the analytic captures the source and user information for each detection and sorts the results in ascending order based on the risk score. Finally, the analytic filters the detections with a risk score below 80 and focuses only on high-risk detections.This detection is important because it provides valuable insights into the distribution of high-risk activities across different repositories. It also identifies the most vulnerable repositories that are frequently targeted by potential threats. Additionally, it proactively detects and responds to potential threats, thereby minimizing the impact of attacks and safeguarding critical assets. Finally, it provides a comprehensive view of the risk landscape and helps to make informed decisions to protect the organization's data and infrastructure. False positives might occur so it is important to identify the impact of the attack and prioritize response and mitigation efforts.
@@ -14408,7 +14408,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -14417,7 +14417,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - RIR - Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - RIR - Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Correlation"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "161bc0ca-4651-4c13-9c27-27770660cf67", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14438,7 +14438,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as sum_risk_score, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories="Dev Sec Ops" All_Risk.risk_object_type = "other" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count > 3 and sum_risk_score > 100 | `risk_rule_for_dev_sec_ops_by_repository_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule]
+[ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel 
@@ -14450,7 +14450,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an A
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -14464,7 +14464,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "2a9b80d3-6340-4345-b5ad-290bf5d0dac4", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14479,7 +14479,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count AS instances_launched by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_launched) as total_launched_avg, stdev(instances_launched) as total_launched_stdev | eval threshold_value = 4 | eval isOutlier=if(instances_launched > total_launched_avg+(total_launched_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 AND _time >= relative_time(now(), "-10m@m") | eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_launched - total_launched_avg) / total_launched_stdev, 2) | table _time, userName, instances_launched, num_standard_deviations_away, total_launched_avg, total_launched_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule]
+[ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully launches an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. 
@@ -14491,7 +14491,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an A
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -14505,7 +14505,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "dec41ad5-d579-42cb-b4c6-f5dbb778bbe5", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14520,7 +14520,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_launched_by_user___mltk_filter` | bucket span=10m _time  | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user  | apply ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1  | rename "IsOutlier(instances_launched)" as isOutlier  | where isOutlier=1
 
-[ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule]
+[ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an abnormally high number of instances were successfully terminated by a user in a 10-minute window. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. 
@@ -14532,7 +14532,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured with your A
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -14546,7 +14546,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "8d301246-fccf-45e2-a8e7-3655fd14379c", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14561,7 +14561,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count AS instances_terminated by _time userName | eventstats avg(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_avg, stdev(instances_terminated) as total_terminations_stdev | eval threshold_value = 4 | eval isOutlier=if(instances_terminated > total_terminations_avg+(total_terminations_stdev * threshold_value), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 AND _time >= relative_time(now(), "-10m@m")| eval num_standard_deviations_away = round(abs(instances_terminated - total_terminations_avg) / total_terminations_stdev, 2) |table _time, userName, instances_terminated, num_standard_deviations_away, total_terminations_avg, total_terminations_stdev | `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule]
+[ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user successfully terminates an abnormally high number of instances. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. 
@@ -14573,7 +14573,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an A
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -14587,7 +14587,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "1c02b86a-cd85-473e-a50b-014a9ac8fe3e", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14602,7 +14602,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `abnormally_high_aws_instances_terminated_by_user___mltk_filter` | bucket span=10m _time  | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user  | apply ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1  | rename "IsOutlier(instances_terminated)" as isOutlier  | where isOutlier=1
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen cities.  Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.  
@@ -14615,7 +14615,7 @@ This search will fire any time a new city is seen in the **GeoIP** database for
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -14629,7 +14629,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "344a1778-0b25-490c-adb1-de8beddf59cd", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14644,7 +14644,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by City | eval newCity=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCity=1 | table City] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, City, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_city_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen countries. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.  
@@ -14657,7 +14657,7 @@ This search will fire any time a new country is seen in the **GeoIP** database f
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -14671,7 +14671,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "ceb8d3d8-06cb-49eb-beaf-829526e33ff0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14686,7 +14686,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Country | eval newCountry=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCountry=1 | table Country] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Country, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_country_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen IP addresses. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel.  
@@ -14699,7 +14699,7 @@ This search will fire any time a new IP address is seen in the **GeoIP** databas
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -14713,7 +14713,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "42e15012-ac14-4801-94f4-f1acbe64880b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14728,7 +14728,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress | eval newIP=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newIP=1 | table sourceIPAddress] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_ip_address_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS provisioning activities from previously unseen regions. Region in this context is similar to a state in the United States. Provisioning activities are defined broadly as any event that begins with "Run" or "Create." This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. 
@@ -14741,7 +14741,7 @@ This search will fire any time a new region is seen in the **GeoIP** database fo
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -14755,7 +14755,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "7971d3df-da82-4648-a6e5-b5637bea5253", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14770,7 +14770,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=* [search `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=* | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by Region | eval newRegion=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newRegion=1 | table Region] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, Region, eventName, errorCode | `aws_cloud_provisioning_from_previously_unseen_region_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule]
+[ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets 
@@ -14782,7 +14782,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily m
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -14791,7 +14791,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "7f227943-2196-4d4d-8d6a-ac8cb308e61c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14806,7 +14806,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1  |table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`aws_eks_kubernetes_cluster_sensitive_object_access_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule]
+[ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to identify the endpoints that have connected to more than five DNS servers and made DNS Queries over the time frame of the search. 
@@ -14821,7 +14821,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that an enterprise has more th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -14835,7 +14835,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "DNS Hijacking", "Host Redirection", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "74ec6f18-604b-4202-a567-86b2066be3ce", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14856,7 +14856,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, values(DNS.dest) AS dest dc(DNS.dest) as dest_count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=QUERY by DNS.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Resolution")` |where dest_count > 5 | `clients_connecting_to_multiple_dns_servers_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule]
+[ESCU - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Enforcing network-access controls is one of the defensive mechanisms used by cloud administrators to restrict access to a cloud instance. After the attacker has gained control of the console by compromising an admin account, they can delete a network ACL and gain access to the instance from anywhere. This search will query the Change datamodel to detect users deleting network ACLs. Deprecated because it's a duplicate 
@@ -14868,7 +14868,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has legitimately d
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -14882,7 +14882,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "021abc51-1862-41dd-ad43-43c739c0a983", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14897,7 +14897,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteNetworkAcl|rename userIdentity.arn as arn  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(errorMessage) values(errorCode) values(userAgent) values(userIdentity.*) by src userName arn eventName | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `cloud_network_access_control_list_deleted_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule]
+[ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search has been deprecated and updated with Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository detection. The following analytic detects by correlating repository and risk score to identify patterns and trends in the data based on the level of risk associated. The analytic adds any null values and calculates the sum of the risk scores for each detection. Then, the analytic captures the source and user information for each detection and sorts the results in ascending order based on the risk score. Finally, the analytic filters the detections with a risk score below 80 and focuses only on high-risk detections.This detection is important because it provides valuable insights into the distribution of high-risk activities across different repositories. It also identifies the most vulnerable repositories that are frequently targeted by potential threats. Additionally, it proactively detects and responds to potential threats, thereby minimizing the impact of attacks and safeguarding critical assets. Finally, it provides a comprehensive view of the risk landscape and helps to make informed decisions to protect the organization's data and infrastructure. False positives might occur so it is important to identify the impact of the attack and prioritize response and mitigation efforts. 
@@ -14909,7 +14909,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -14918,7 +14918,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Correlation"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "8da9fdd9-6a1b-4ae0-8a34-8c25e6be9687", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14939,7 +14939,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `risk_index` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(user) as user by repository | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_repository_and_risk_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule]
+[ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects the correlation between the user and risk score and identifies users with a high risk score that pose a significant security risk such as unauthorized access attempts, suspicious behavior, or potential insider threats. Next, the analytic calculates the sum of the risk scores and groups the results by user, the corresponding signals, and the repository. The results are sorted in descending order based on the risk score and filtered to include records with a risk score greater than 80. Finally, the results are passed through a correlation filter specific to the user and risk. This detection is important because it identifies users who have a high risk score and helps to prioritize investigations and allocate resources. False positives might occur but the impact of such an attack can vary depending on the specific scenario such as data exfiltration, system compromise, or the disruption of critical services. Please investigate this notable event. 
@@ -14951,7 +14951,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -14960,7 +14960,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dev Sec Ops"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.003", "T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Correlation"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "610e12dc-b6fa-4541-825e-4a0b3b6f6773", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -14981,7 +14981,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `risk_index` | fillnull | stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(source) as signals values(repository) as repository by user | sort - risk_score | where risk_score > 80 | `correlation_by_user_and_risk_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for specific authentication events from the Windows Security Event logs to detect potential attempts at using the Pass-the-Hash technique. This search is DEPRECATED as it is possible for event code 4624 to generate a high level of noise, as legitimate logon events may also trigger this event code. This can be especially true in environments with high levels of user activity, such as those with many concurrent logons or frequent logon attempts. 
@@ -14993,7 +14993,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate logon activity by authorized NTLM
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -15002,7 +15002,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4b", "detection_version": "6"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15017,7 +15017,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=3 Logon_Process=NtLmSsp NOT AccountName="ANONYMOUS LOGON") OR (Logon_Type=9 Logon_Process=seclogo) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode, Logon_Type, WorkstationName, user, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_activity_related_to_pass_the_hash_attacks_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user logged into the AWS account, is making API calls and has not enabled Multi Factor authentication. Multi factor authentication adds a layer of security by forcing the users to type a unique authentication code from an approved authentication device when they access AWS websites or services. AWS Best Practices recommend that you enable MFA for privileged IAM users. 
@@ -15034,7 +15034,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Many service accounts configured within an A
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -15043,7 +15043,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "4d46e8bd-4072-48e4-92db-0325889ef894", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15058,7 +15058,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` userIdentity.sessionContext.attributes.mfaAuthenticated=false | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity | rename identity as user]| stats  count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by userIdentity.arn userIdentity.type user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_api_activity_from_users_without_mfa_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for successful AWS CloudTrail activity by user accounts that are not listed in the identity table or `aws_service_accounts.csv`. It returns event names and count, as well as the first and last time a specific user or service is detected, grouped by users. Deprecated because managing this list can be quite hard. 
@@ -15075,7 +15075,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's likely that you'll find activity detect
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -15084,7 +15084,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d4bd55", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15099,7 +15099,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT [| inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | search NOT [| inputlookup aws_service_accounts | fields identity] | rename identity as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(eventName) as eventName by user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_aws_api_activities_from_unapproved_accounts_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for DNS requests for phishing domains that are leveraging EvilGinx tools to mimic websites. 
@@ -15114,7 +15114,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = If a known good domain is not listed in the
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -15128,7 +15128,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Common Phishing Frameworks"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f226595bfa", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15149,7 +15149,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS by DNS.dest DNS.src DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`| rex field=query ".*?(?<domain>[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$" | stats count values(query) as query by domain dest src answer| search `evilginx_phishlets_amazon` OR `evilginx_phishlets_facebook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_github` OR `evilginx_phishlets_0365` OR `evilginx_phishlets_outlook` OR `evilginx_phishlets_aws` OR `evilginx_phishlets_google` | search NOT [ inputlookup legit_domains.csv | fields domain]| join domain type=outer [| tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from datamodel=Web.Web by Web.dest Web.site | rename "Web.*" as * | rex field=site ".*?(?<domain>[^./:]+\.(\S{2,3}|\S{2,3}.\S{2,3}))$" | table dest domain url] | table count src dest query answer domain url | `detect_dns_requests_to_phishing_sites_leveraging_evilginx2_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, Command And Control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses. 
@@ -15161,7 +15161,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that legitimate TXT record res
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -15175,7 +15175,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "05437c07-62f5-452e-afdc-04dd44815bb9", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15196,7 +15196,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=response AND DNS.record_type=TXT by DNS.src DNS.dest DNS.answer DNS.record_type |  `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | eval anslen=len(answer) | search anslen>100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename src as "Source IP", dest as "Destination IP", answer as "DNS Answer" anslen as "Answer Length" record_type as "DNS Record Type" firstTime as "First Time" lastTime as "Last Time" count as Count | table "Source IP" "Destination IP" "DNS Answer" "DNS Record Type"  "Answer Length" Count "First Time" "Last Time" | `detect_long_dns_txt_record_response_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for reading loaded Images unique to credential dumping with Mimikatz. Deprecated because mimikatz libraries changed and very noisy sysmon Event Code. 
@@ -15208,7 +15208,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Other tools can import the same DLLs. These
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-12-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -15222,7 +15222,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-257A", "CISA AA22-264A", "CISA AA22-320A", "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Detect Zerologon Attack", "Sandworm Tools"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "29e307ba-40af-4ab2-91b2-3c6b392bbba0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15243,7 +15243,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 | stats values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(ProcessId) as ProcessId by dest, Image | search ImageLoaded=*WinSCard.dll ImageLoaded=*cryptdll.dll ImageLoaded=*hid.dll ImageLoaded=*samlib.dll ImageLoaded=*vaultcli.dll | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for PowerShell requesting privileges consistent with credential dumping. Deprecated, looks like things changed from a logging perspective. 
@@ -15255,7 +15255,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. PowerShell i
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -15269,7 +15269,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "98917be2-bfc8-475a-8618-a9bb06575188", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15290,7 +15290,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` signature_id=4703 Process_Name=*powershell.exe | rex field=Message "Enabled Privileges:\s+(?<privs>\w+)\s+Disabled Privileges:" | where privs="SeDebugPrivilege" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Process_Name, privs, Process_ID, Message | rename privs as "Enabled Privilege" | rename Process_Name as process |  `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_via_powershell_and_eventcode_4703_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects new API calls that have either never been seen before or that have not been seen in the previous hour, where the identity type is `AssumedRole`. 
@@ -15302,7 +15302,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that there are legitimate use
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -15316,7 +15316,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f335b4f1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15331,7 +15331,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success  userIdentity.type=AssumedRole | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName |  inputlookup append=t previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats min(earliest) as earliest, max(latest) as latest by userName eventName | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles| eval newApiCallfromUserRole=if(earliest>=relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newApiCallfromUserRole=1 | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | table eventName userName]  |rename userName as user| stats values(eventName) earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by user | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | `detect_new_api_calls_from_user_roles_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel. 
@@ -15343,7 +15343,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the fi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -15352,7 +15352,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362dffd75", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15367,7 +15367,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console"  | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes of API activity in your AWS environment.  It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. 
@@ -15384,7 +15384,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -15398,7 +15398,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d32362d4bd55", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15413,7 +15413,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall [search `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventName, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_aws_api_activity_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to network access-control lists (ACLs)in your AWS environment. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. 
@@ -15425,7 +15425,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The false-positive rate may vary based on th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -15439,7 +15439,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Network ACL Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a1f1-e32372d4bd53", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15454,7 +15454,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` [search `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_network_acl_activity_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect users creating spikes in API activity related to security groups in your AWS environment.  It will also update the cache file that factors in the latest data.  This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. 
@@ -15466,7 +15466,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Based on the values of`dataPointThreshold` a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -15480,7 +15480,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS User Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-e32372d4bd53", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15495,7 +15495,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | stats count as apiCalls by arn | inputlookup security_group_activity_baseline append=t | fields - latestCount | stats values(*) as * by arn | rename apiCalls as latestCount | eval newAvgApiCalls=avgApiCalls + (latestCount-avgApiCalls)/720 | eval newStdevApiCalls=sqrt(((pow(stdevApiCalls, 2)*719 + (latestCount-newAvgApiCalls)*(latestCount-avgApiCalls))/720)) | eval avgApiCalls=coalesce(newAvgApiCalls, avgApiCalls), stdevApiCalls=coalesce(newStdevApiCalls, stdevApiCalls), numDataPoints=if(isnull(latestCount), numDataPoints, numDataPoints+1) | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | eval dataPointThreshold = 15, deviationThreshold = 3 | eval isSpike=if((latestCount > avgApiCalls+deviationThreshold*stdevApiCalls) AND numDataPoints > dataPointThreshold, 1, 0) | where isSpike=1 | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | stats values(eventName) as eventNames, count as numberOfApiCalls, dc(eventName) as uniqueApisCalled by user | `detect_spike_in_security_group_activity_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect USB device insertion - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search is used to detect hosts that generate Windows Event ID 4663 for successful attempts to write to or read from a removable storage and Event ID 4656 for failures, which occurs when a USB drive is plugged in. In this scenario we are querying the Change_Analysis data model to look for Windows Event ID 4656 or 4663 where the priority of the affected host is marked as high in the ES Assets and Identity Framework. 
@@ -15507,7 +15507,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate USB activity will also be detecte
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-11-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect USB device insertion - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -15521,7 +15521,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Detect USB device insertion - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect USB device insertion - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Protection"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f5", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15542,7 +15542,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS earliest latest(_time) AS latest from datamodel=Change_Analysis where (nodename = All_Changes) All_Changes.result="Removable Storage device" (All_Changes.result_id=4663 OR All_Changes.result_id=4656) (All_Changes.src_priority=high) by All_Changes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`| `security_content_ctime(earliest)`| `security_content_ctime(latest)`  | `detect_usb_device_insertion_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for web connections to dynamic DNS providers. 
@@ -15557,7 +15557,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that list of dynamic DNS prov
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -15571,7 +15571,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Dynamic DNS"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd01c18f301", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15592,7 +15592,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Web.url) as url min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web where Web.status=200 by Web.src Web.dest Web.status | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_web_traffic` | `detect_web_traffic_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, Command And Control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic.\
@@ -15606,7 +15606,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that normal DNS traffic will e
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -15620,7 +15620,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Data Protection", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "104658f4-afdc-499f-9719-17a43f9826f4", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15642,7 +15642,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.query") as count  from datamodel=Network_Resolution  where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search("DNS.query")`) NOT "DNS.query"="*.in-addr.arpa" NOT ("DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_dns" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_webproxy" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_email*"   ) by "DNS.src","DNS.query" | rename "DNS.src" as src  "DNS.query" as message | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src | append [ tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc("DNS.answer") as count  from datamodel=Network_Resolution  where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" NOT (`cim_corporate_web_domain_search("DNS.query")`) NOT "DNS.query"="*.in-addr.arpa" NOT ("DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_dns" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_webproxy" OR "DNS.src_category"="svc_infra_email*"   ) by "DNS.src","DNS.answer" | rename "DNS.src" as src  "DNS.answer" as message | eval message=if(message=="unknown","", message) | eval length=len(message) | stats sum(length) as length by src ] | stats sum(length) as length by src | where length > 10000 | `detection_of_dns_tunnels_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule]
+[ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search will detect DNS requests resolved by unauthorized DNS servers. Legitimate DNS servers should be identified in the Enterprise Security Assets and Identity Framework. 
@@ -15654,7 +15654,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate DNS activity can be detected in t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -15668,7 +15668,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "DNS Hijacking", "Host Redirection", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f6", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15689,7 +15689,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.dest_category != dns_server AND DNS.src_category != dns_server by DNS.src DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `dns_query_requests_resolved_by_unauthorized_dns_servers_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - DNS record changed - Rule]
+[ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search takes the DNS records and their answers results of the discovered_dns_records lookup and finds if any records have changed by searching DNS response from the Network_Resolution datamodel across the last day. 
@@ -15704,7 +15704,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate DNS changes can be detected in th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - DNS record changed - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -15718,7 +15718,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - DNS record changed - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - DNS record changed - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DNS Hijacking"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "44d3a43e-dcd5-49f7-8356-5209bb369065", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15739,7 +15739,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | inputlookup discovered_dns_records | rename answer as discovered_answer | join domain[|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) as type, values(DNS.answer) as current_answer values(DNS.src) as src from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!="unknown" DNS.answer!="" by DNS.query | rename DNS.query as query | where query!="unknown" | rex field=query "(?<domain>\w+\.\w+?)(?:$|/)"] | makemv delim=" " answer |  makemv delim=" " type | sort -count | table count,src,domain,type,query,current_answer,discovered_answer | makemv current_answer  | mvexpand current_answer | makemv discovered_answer | eval n=mvfind(discovered_answer, current_answer) | where isnull(n) | `dns_record_changed_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule]
+[ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Detect a renamed instance of procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. Modify the query as needed.\
@@ -15753,7 +15753,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-02-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-02-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -15762,7 +15762,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-257A", "Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "21276daa-663d-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15777,7 +15777,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` OriginalFileName=procdump  process_name!=procdump*.exe  EventID=1 (CommandLine=*-ma* OR CommandLine=*-mm*) CommandLine=*lsass* |  stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name, process_name, OriginalFileName, CommandLine | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_rename_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule]
+[ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being modified by users who have not previously modified them. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. 
@@ -15789,7 +15789,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a new user will start to
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -15803,7 +15803,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "56f91724-cf3f-4666-84e1-e3712fb41e76", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15818,7 +15818,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` [search `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | spath output=dest responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | table _time, user, dest | `ec2_instance_modified_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule]
+[ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where an instance is started in a particular region in the last one hour and then compares it to a lookup file of previously seen regions where an instance was started 
@@ -15830,7 +15830,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user has unknowingly st
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-02-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-02-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -15844,7 +15844,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f3-d82362d6fd75", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15859,7 +15859,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` earliest=-1h StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions.csv | eval regionStatus=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(),"-1d@d"), "Instance Started in a New Region","Previously Seen Region") | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where regionStatus="Instance Started in a New Region" | `ec2_instance_started_in_previously_unseen_region_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule]
+[ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen AMIs.  This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. 
@@ -15871,7 +15871,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = After a new AMI is created, the first system
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -15885,7 +15885,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "347ec301-601b-48b9-81aa-9ddf9c829dd3", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15900,7 +15900,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by amiID | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis.csv | eval newAMI=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where newAMI=1 | rename amiID as requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId | table requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId] | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as arn, requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | table firstTime, lastTime, arn, amiID, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_ami_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule]
+[ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created with previously unseen instance types.  This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. 
@@ -15912,7 +15912,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an admin will create a n
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-02-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -15926,7 +15926,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "65541c80-03c7-4e05-83c8-1dcd57a2e1ad", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15941,7 +15941,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | fillnull value="m1.small" requestParameters.instanceType | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by requestParameters.instanceType | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | stats min(earliest) as earliest max(latest) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types.csv | eval newType=if(earliest >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | `security_content_ctime(earliest)` | `security_content_ctime(latest)` | where newType=1 | rename instanceType as requestParameters.instanceType | table requestParameters.instanceType] | spath output=user userIdentity.arn | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_instance_type_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule]
+[ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for EC2 instances being created by users who have not created them before. This search is deprecated and have been translated to use the latest Change Datamodel. 
@@ -15953,7 +15953,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a user will start to crea
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Amazon Web Services - Cloudtrail"]
@@ -15967,7 +15967,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AWS Cryptomining", "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "22773e84-bac0-4595-b086-20d3f735b4f1", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -15982,7 +15982,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances [search `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by userIdentity.arn | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user.csv | eval newUser=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newUser=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename arn as userIdentity.arn | table userIdentity.arn] | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, userIdentity.arn as user | table _time, user, dest, instanceType | `ec2_instance_started_with_previously_unseen_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule]
+[ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes launched from files with at least five spaces in the name before the extension. This is typically done to obfuscate the file extension by pushing it outside of the default view. 
@@ -15994,7 +15994,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -16008,7 +16008,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "ab0353e6-a956-420b-b724-a8b4846d5d5a", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16029,7 +16029,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_path) as process_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*     .*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_spaces_before_extension_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule]
+[ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search returns a list of hosts that have not successfully completed a backup in over a week. Deprecated because it's a infrastructure monitoring. 
@@ -16041,7 +16041,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -16050,7 +16050,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor Backup Solution"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea214444440", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16065,7 +16065,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `netbackup` MESSAGE="Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest | eval isOutlier=if(latestTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | table latestTime, dest | `extended_period_without_successful_netbackup_backups_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - First time seen command line argument - Rule]
+[ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for command-line arguments that use a `/c` parameter to execute a command that has not previously been seen. 
@@ -16077,7 +16077,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate programs can also use command-lin
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - First time seen command line argument - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -16086,7 +16086,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - First time seen command line argument - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - First time seen command line argument - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "a1b6e73f-98d5-470f-99ac-77aacd578473", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16101,7 +16101,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = "* /c *" by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = cmd.exe Processes.process = "* /c *" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime, max(lastTime) as lastTime by process | outputlookup previously_seen_cmd_line_arguments | eval newCmdLineArgument=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), 1, 0) | where newCmdLineArgument=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table process] | `first_time_seen_command_line_argument_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule]
+[ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of accounts with high risk roles by projects. Compromised accounts with high risk roles can move laterally or even scalate privileges at different projects depending on organization schema. 
@@ -16113,7 +16113,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Accounts with high risk roles should be redu
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -16122,7 +16122,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "27af8c15-38b0-4408-b339-920170724adb", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16137,7 +16137,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.request.policy.bindings{}.role=roles/owner OR roles/editor OR roles/iam.serviceAccountUser OR roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin OR roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator OR roles/dataflow.developer OR roles/dataflow.admin OR roles/composer.admin OR roles/dataproc.admin OR roles/dataproc.editor | table data.resource.type data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.role data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} | `gcp_detect_accounts_with_high_risk_roles_by_project_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule]
+[ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of high risk permissions by resource and accounts. These are permissions that can allow attackers with compromised accounts to move laterally and escalate privileges. 
@@ -16149,7 +16149,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = High risk permissions are part of any GCP en
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -16158,7 +16158,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "2e70ef35-2187-431f-aedc-4503dc9b06ba", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16173,7 +16173,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission=iam.serviceAccounts.getaccesstoken OR iam.serviceAccounts.setIamPolicy OR iam.serviceAccounts.actas OR dataflow.jobs.create OR composer.environments.create OR dataproc.clusters.create |table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.permission data.protoPayload.response.bindings{}.members{} data.resource.labels.project_id | `gcp_detect_high_risk_permissions_by_resource_and_account_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule]
+[ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides detection of possible GCP Oauth token abuse. GCP Oauth token without time limit can be exfiltrated and reused for keeping access sessions alive without further control of authentication, allowing attackers to access and move laterally. 
@@ -16185,7 +16185,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = GCP Oauth token abuse detection will only wo
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -16194,7 +16194,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["GCP Cross Account Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "a7e9f7bb-8901-4ad0-8d88-0a4ab07b1972", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16209,7 +16209,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` type.googleapis.com/google.cloud.audit.AuditLog |table protoPayload.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.@type protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.callerIp protoPayload.status.details{}.violations{}.type protoPayload.status.message  | `gcp_detect_oauth_token_abuse_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule]
+[ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via user agent, and authentication data against Kubernetes cluster 
@@ -16221,7 +16221,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicio
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace"]
@@ -16235,7 +16235,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "db5957ec-0144-4c56-b512-9dccbe7a2d26", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16256,7 +16256,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=127.0.0.1 data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp!=::1 "data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision"=forbid "data.protoPayload.status.message"=PERMISSION_DENIED data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail="system:anonymous" | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_name values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name | rename data.resource.labels.cluster_name as cluster_name| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  | `gcp_kubernetes_cluster_scan_detection_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Identify New User Accounts - Rule]
+[ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection search will help profile user accounts in your environment by identifying newly created accounts that have been added to your network in the past week. 
@@ -16268,7 +16268,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = If the Identity_Management data model is not
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Identify New User Accounts - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Identify New User Accounts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -16277,7 +16277,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Identify New User Accounts - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Identify New User Accounts - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": [], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "475b9e27-17e4-46e2-b7e2-648221be3b89", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16292,7 +16292,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Identities  | eval empStatus=case((now()-startDate)<604800, "Accounts created in last week") | search empStatus="Accounts created in last week"| `security_content_ctime(endDate)` | `security_content_ctime(startDate)`| table identity empStatus endDate startDate | `identify_new_user_accounts_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision 
@@ -16304,7 +16304,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are ma
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -16313,7 +16313,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "5b30b25d-7d32-42d8-95ca-64dfcd9076e6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16328,7 +16328,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts  objectRef.resource=pods | table  sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision  | top  sourceIPs{} user.username verb annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision |`kubernetes_aws_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences 
@@ -16340,7 +16340,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. R
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -16349,7 +16349,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "de7264ed-3ed9-4fef-bb01-6eefc87cefe8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16364,7 +16364,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_aws_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets 
@@ -16376,7 +16376,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -16385,7 +16385,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "b6013a7b-85e0-4a45-b051-10b252d69569", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16400,7 +16400,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings sourceIPs{}!=::1 sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1  | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_aws_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI 
@@ -16412,7 +16412,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as ther
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -16421,7 +16421,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "a6959c57-fa8f-4277-bb86-7c32fba579d5", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16436,7 +16436,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts responseStatus.status = Failure | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.status requestURI | `kubernetes_aws_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods and namespaces by IP address and verb 
@@ -16448,7 +16448,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are ma
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -16457,7 +16457,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "55a2264a-b7f0-45e5-addd-1e5ab3415c72", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16472,7 +16472,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts* OR user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow  | table  sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace | top sourceIPs{} user.username verb responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace |`kubernetes_azure_active_service_accounts_by_pod_namespace_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding rare or top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences 
@@ -16484,7 +16484,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. R
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -16493,7 +16493,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "47af7d20-0607-4079-97d7-7a29af58b54e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16508,7 +16508,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason=* | table sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |stats count by user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare user.username annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_azure_detect_rbac_authorization_by_account_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets 
@@ -16520,7 +16520,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily m
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -16529,7 +16529,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "1bba382b-07fd-4ffa-b390-8002739b76e8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16544,7 +16544,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=secrets OR configmaps user.username=system.anonymous OR annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision=allow  |table user.username user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace objectRef.name annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason |dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets 
@@ -16556,7 +16556,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -16565,7 +16565,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "f27349e5-1641-4f6a-9e68-30402be0ad4c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16580,7 +16580,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log| search objectRef.resource=clusterroles OR clusterrolebindings | table sourceIPs{} user.username user.groups{} objectRef.namespace requestURI annotations.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup user.username user.groups{} |`kubernetes_azure_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status 
@@ -16592,7 +16592,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as ther
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -16601,7 +16601,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "019690d7-420f-4da0-b320-f27b09961514", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16616,7 +16616,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search user.groups{}=system:serviceaccounts*  responseStatus.reason=Forbidden | table  sourceIPs{} user.username userAgent verb responseStatus.reason responseStatus.status properties.pod objectRef.namespace  |`kubernetes_azure_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on rare Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context 
@@ -16628,7 +16628,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. H
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -16637,7 +16637,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "4b6d1ba8-0000-4cec-87e6-6cbbd71651b5", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16652,7 +16652,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | spath input=responseObject.metadata.annotations.kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration | search userAgent=kubectl* sourceIPs{}!=127.0.0.1 sourceIPs{}!=::1 | table sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI | rare sourceIPs{} verb userAgent user.groups{} objectRef.resource objectRef.namespace requestURI |`kubernetes_azure_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster pod in Azure 
@@ -16664,7 +16664,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicio
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -16673,7 +16673,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "86aad3e0-732f-4f66-bbbc-70df448e461d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16688,7 +16688,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table  sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason properties.pod |`kubernetes_azure_pod_scan_fingerprint_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information of unauthenticated requests via source IP user agent, request URI and response status data against Kubernetes cluster in Azure 
@@ -16700,7 +16700,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all unauthenticated requests are malicio
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Kubernetes"]
@@ -16709,7 +16709,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Scanning Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "c5e5bd5c-1013-4841-8b23-e7b3253c840a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16724,7 +16724,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `kubernetes_azure` category=kube-audit | spath input=properties.log | search responseStatus.code=401 | table  sourceIPs{} userAgent verb requestURI responseStatus.reason |`kubernetes_azure_scan_fingerprint_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts,accessing pods by IP address, verb and decision 
@@ -16736,7 +16736,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all service accounts interactions are ma
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace", "Kubernetes"]
@@ -16745,7 +16745,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "7f5c2779-88a0-4824-9caa-0f606c8f260f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16760,7 +16760,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message`  data.protoPayload.request.spec.group{}=system:serviceaccounts | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.request.spec.nonResourceAttributes.verb data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource | top src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.resource |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_most_active_service_accounts_by_pod_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes RBAC authorizations by accounts, this search can be modified by adding top to see both extremes of RBAC by accounts occurrences 
@@ -16772,7 +16772,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Not all RBAC Authorications are malicious. R
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace", "Kubernetes"]
@@ -16781,7 +16781,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "99487de3-7192-4b41-939d-fbe9acfb1340", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16796,7 +16796,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole  | table src_ip src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | rare src_user data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_rbac_authorizations_by_account_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmaps or secrets 
@@ -16808,7 +16808,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive object access is not necessarily m
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace", "Kubernetes"]
@@ -16817,7 +16817,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "bdb6d596-86a0-4aba-8369-418ae8b9963a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16832,7 +16832,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.resource=configmaps OR secrets  | table data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.request.metadata.namespace data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp src_user data.resource.labels.cluster_name |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_object_access_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes accounts accessing sensitve objects such as configmpas or secrets 
@@ -16844,7 +16844,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Sensitive role resource access is necessary
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace", "Kubernetes"]
@@ -16853,7 +16853,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "a46923f6-36b9-4806-a681-31f314907c30", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16868,7 +16868,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason=ClusterRoleBinding OR Clusterrole dest=apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 src_ip!=::1  | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/reason | dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_sensitive_role_access_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on Kubernetes service accounts with failure or forbidden access status, this search can be extended by using top or rare operators to find trends or rarities in failure status, user agents, source IPs and request URI 
@@ -16880,7 +16880,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search can give false positives as ther
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace", "Kubernetes"]
@@ -16889,7 +16889,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "7094808d-432a-48e7-bb3c-77e96c894f3b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16904,7 +16904,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` system:serviceaccounts data.protoPayload.response.status.allowed!=* | table src_ip src_user http_user_agent data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.namespace data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.protoPayload.response.spec.resourceAttributes.verb  data.protoPayload.request.status.allowed data.protoPayload.response.status.reason data.labels.authorization.k8s.io/decision | dedup src_ip src_user | `kubernetes_gcp_detect_service_accounts_forbidden_failure_access_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search provides information on anonymous Kubectl calls with IP, verb namespace and object access context 
@@ -16916,7 +16916,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Kubectl calls are not malicious by nature. H
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Google Cloud Platform", "Google Workspace", "Kubernetes"]
@@ -16925,7 +16925,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "a5bed417-070a-41f2-a1e4-82b6aa281557", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16940,7 +16940,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent=kubectl* src_user=system:unsecured OR src_user=system:anonymous | table src_ip src_user data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent data.protoPayload.authorizationInfo{}.granted object_path |dedup src_ip src_user |`kubernetes_gcp_detect_suspicious_kubectl_calls_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule]
+[ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for DNS requests for faux domains similar to the domains that you want to have monitored for abuse. 
@@ -16952,7 +16952,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -16966,7 +16966,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "24dd17b1-e2fb-4c31-878c-d4f746595bfa", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -16987,7 +16987,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `brand_abuse_dns` | `monitor_dns_for_brand_abuse_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule]
+[ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. **DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip`. This analytic identifies multiple failed logon attempts from a single IP in a short period of time. Use this analytic to identify patterns of suspicious logins from a single source and filter as needed or use this to drive tuning for higher fidelity analytics. 
@@ -16999,7 +16999,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A single public IP address servicing multipl
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -17013,7 +17013,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "19cba45f-cad3-4032-8911-0c09e0444552", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17034,7 +17034,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` eventType=user.session.start outcome.result=FAILURE | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(src_user) as distinct_users values(src_user) as users by src_ip, displayMessage, outcome.reason, country, state, city | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search distinct_users > 5| `multiple_okta_users_with_invalid_credentials_from_the_same_ip_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. **DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled`. This search detects when an admin configured a forwarding rule for multiple mailboxes to the same destination. 
@@ -17046,7 +17046,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -17060,7 +17060,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration", "Office 365 Collection Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "7f398cfb-918d-41f4-8db8-2e2474e02c28", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17075,7 +17075,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_admin_email_forwarding_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. **DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned`. This analytic identifies instances where potentially suspicious rights are delegated within the Office 365 environment. Specifically, it detects when a user is granted FullAccess, SendAs, or SendOnBehalf permissions on another users mailbox. Such permissions can allow a user to access, send emails from, or send emails on behalf of the target mailbox. The detection leverages O365 audit logs, focusing on the Add-MailboxPermission operation. By parsing the parameters of this operation, the analytic filters for events where FullAccess, SendAs, or SendOnBehalf rights are granted. It then aggregates this data to capture the source user (who was granted the permissions), the destination user (whose mailbox was affected), the specific operation, and the type of access rights granted. Delegating mailbox rights, especially those as powerful as FullAccess, can pose significant security risks. While there are legitimate scenarios for these permissions, such as an executive assistant needing access to an executives mailbox, there are also malicious scenarios where an attacker or a compromised insider might grant themselves unauthorized access to sensitive mailboxes. Monitoring for these permissions changes is crucial to detect potential insider threats, compromised accounts, or other malicious activities.If the detection is a true positive, it indicates that a user has been granted potentially high-risk permissions on another users mailbox. This could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive emails, impersonation through sending emails as or on behalf of the mailbox owner, or data manipulation by altering or deleting emails. Immediate investigation is required to validate the legitimacy of the permission change and to assess the potential risks associated with the granted access. 
@@ -17087,7 +17087,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While there are legitimate scenarios for the
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -17101,7 +17101,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Office 365 Collection Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002", "T1114", "T1098.002", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "b25d2973-303e-47c8-bacd-52b61604c6a7", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17122,7 +17122,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Operation=Add-MailboxPermission | spath input=Parameters | rename User AS src_user, Identity AS dest_user | search AccessRights=FullAccess OR AccessRights=SendAs OR AccessRights=SendOnBehalf | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src_user dest_user Operation AccessRights |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_rights_delegation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule]
+[ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. **DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled`. The following analytic detects when multiple users have configured a forwarding rule to the same destination to proactively identify and investigate potential security risks related to email forwarding and take appropriate actions to protect the organizations data and prevent unauthorized access or data breaches. This detection is made by a Splunk query to O365 management activity logs with the operation `Set-Mailbox` to gather information about mailbox configurations. Then, the query uses the `spath` function to extract the parameters and rename the "Identity" field as "src_user" and searches for entries where the "ForwardingSmtpAddress" field is not empty, which indicates the presence of a forwarding rule. Next, the analytic uses the `stats` command to group the results by the forwarding email address and count the number of unique source users (`src_user`). Finally, it filters the results and only retains entries where the count of source users (`count_src_user`) is greater than 1, which indicates that multiple users have set up forwarding rules to the same destination. This detection is important because it suggests that multiple users are forwarding emails to the same destination without proper authorization, which can lead to the exposure of sensitive information, loss of data control, or unauthorized access to confidential emails. Investigating and addressing this issue promptly can help prevent data breaches and mitigate potential damage.indicates a potential security risk since multiple users forwarding emails to the same destination can be a sign of unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or a compromised account. Additionally, it also helps to determine if the forwarding rules are legitimate or if they indicate a security incident. False positives can occur if there are legitimate reasons for multiple users to forward emails to the same destination, such as a shared mailbox or a team collaboration scenario. Next steps include further investigation and context analysis to determine the legitimacy of the forwarding rules. 
@@ -17134,7 +17134,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Office 365"]
@@ -17148,7 +17148,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration", "Office 365 Collection Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.003", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "f8dfe015-dbb3-4569-ba75-b13787e06aa4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17163,7 +17163,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `o365_management_activity` Operation=Set-Mailbox | spath input=Parameters | rename Identity AS src_user | search ForwardingSmtpAddress=* | stats dc(src_user) AS count_src_user earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) AS src_user values(user) AS user by ForwardingSmtpAddress | where count_src_user > 1 |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`o365_suspicious_user_email_forwarding_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta Account Locked Out - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta Account Locked Out - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. **DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out`. The following analytic utilizes the user.acount.lock event to identify associates who are locked out of Okta. An adversary attempting to brute force or password spray account names may lock accounts out depending on the threshold. 
@@ -17175,7 +17175,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune Okta an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta Account Locked Out - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Account Locked Out - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -17189,7 +17189,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Okta Account Locked Out - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Okta Account Locked Out - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta MFA Exhaustion", "Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "d650c0ae-bdc5-400e-9f0f-f7aa0a010ef1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17204,7 +17204,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` eventType=user.account.lock | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) values(src_user) as user by src_ip eventType status | where count >=3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `okta_account_locked_out_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. **DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out`. The following anomaly will generate based on account lockout events utilizing Okta eventTypes of user.account.lock.limit or user.account.lock. Per the Okta docs site, this event is fired when a user account has reached the lockout limit. The account will not auto-unlock and a user or client cannot gain access to the account. This event indicates an account that will not be able to log in until remedial action is taken by the account admin. This event can be used to understand the specifics of an account lockout. Often this indicates a client application that is repeatedly attempting to authenticate with invalid credentials such as an old password. 
@@ -17216,7 +17216,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None. Account lockouts should be followed up
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -17230,7 +17230,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "62b70968-a0a5-4724-8ac4-67871e6f544d", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17245,7 +17245,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` eventType IN (user.account.lock.limit,user.account.lock) | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(src_user) by displayMessage, country, state, city, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_account_lockout_events_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. **DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with this detection `Okta Unauthorized Access to Application - DM`.  The following anomaly identifies failed Okta SSO events utilizing the legacy Okta event "unauth app access attempt". 
@@ -17257,7 +17257,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There may be a faulty config preventing legi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -17271,7 +17271,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 40, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "371a6545-2618-4032-ad84-93386b8698c5", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17286,7 +17286,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` eventType=app.generic.unauth_app_access_attempt | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(app) as Apps count by src_user, result ,displayMessage, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_failed_sso_attempts_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. **DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected`. The following analytic utilizes Oktas ThreatInsight to identify Login failures with high unknown users count and any included secondary outcome reasons. This event will trigger when a brute force attempt occurs with unknown usernames attempted. 
@@ -17298,7 +17298,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Fidelity of this is high as it is Okta Threa
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -17312,7 +17312,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001", "T1110.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "632663b0-4562-4aad-abe9-9f621a049738", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17333,7 +17333,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` eventType="security.threat.detected" AND outcome.reason="Login failures with high unknown users count*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) by user eventType client.userAgent.rawUserAgent client.userAgent.browser outcome.reason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_threatinsight_login_failure_with_high_unknown_users_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. **DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected`. The following analytic utilizes Oktas ThreatInsight to identify "PasswordSpray" and any included secondary outcome reasons. This event will trigger when a brute force attempt occurs with unknown usernames attempted. 
@@ -17345,7 +17345,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Fidelity of this is high as it is Okta Threa
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -17359,7 +17359,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.001", "T1110.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "25dbad05-6682-4dd5-9ce9-8adecf0d9ae2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17380,7 +17380,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` eventType="security.threat.detected" AND outcome.reason="Password Spray" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayMessage) by eventType client.userAgent.rawUserAgent client.userAgent.browser outcome.reason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `okta_threatinsight_suspected_passwordspray_attack_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes - Rule]
+[ESCU - Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. **DEPRECATION NOTE** - This search has been deprecated and replaced with `Okta Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User`. The following analytic identifies an account that has rejected more than 2 Push notifications in a 10 minute window. Modify this query for your environment by upping the count or time window. 
@@ -17392,7 +17392,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune Okta an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Okta"]
@@ -17406,7 +17406,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Okta MFA Exhaustion", "Suspicious Okta Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "d93f785e-4c2c-4262-b8c7-12b77a13fd39", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17427,7 +17427,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` outcome.reason="User rejected Okta push verify" OR (debugContext.debugData.factor="OKTA_VERIFY_PUSH" outcome.result=FAILURE legacyEventType="core.user.factor.attempt_fail" "target{}.detailEntry.methodTypeUsed"="Get a push notification") | bin _time as bin_time span=10m | eval user=coalesce(actor.alternateId,user), user=mvindex(split(user, "@"), 0), event_time = _time | stats earliest(event_time) as event_time, min(_time) as firsttime max(_time) as lasttime values(client.ipAddress) as client.ipAddress, values(outcome.reason) as outcome, values(src_ip) AS src_ip, values(client.userAgent.rawUserAgent) as user_agent, values(eventType) as eventType, values(outcome.result) as action, values(legacyEventType) as legacyEventType values(index) as idx, values(sourcetype) as st count by bin_time user host | rename bin_time as timeWindow | convert ctime(*timeWindow) ctime(firsttime) ctime(lasttime) | where count >= 2 | `okta_two_or_more_rejected_okta_pushes_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule]
+[ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2016-4859, the Splunk Open Redirect Vulnerability. 
@@ -17439,7 +17439,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -17453,7 +17453,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2016-4859"], "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "d199fb99-2312-451a-9daa-e5efa6ed76a7", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17474,7 +17474,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = index=_internal sourcetype=splunk_web_access return_to="/%09/*" | `open_redirect_in_splunk_web_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for ColdRoot events from the osx-attacks osquery pack. 
@@ -17486,7 +17486,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There are no known false positives.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-01-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-01-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -17500,7 +17500,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "a6fffe5e-05c3-4c04-badc-887607fbb8dc", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17521,7 +17521,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results (name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Launchd OR name=pack_osx-attacks_OSX_ColdRoot_RAT_Files) | rename columns.path as path | bucket _time span=30s | stats count(path) by _time, host, user, path | `osquery_pack___coldroot_detection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Processes created by netsh - Rule]
+[ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe to execute various commands via the netsh command-line utility. Netsh.exe is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper .dll when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe that are executing commands via the command line. Deprecated because we have another detection of the same type. 
@@ -17533,7 +17533,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual for netsh.exe to have any chil
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Processes created by netsh - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -17547,7 +17547,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Processes created by netsh - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Processes created by netsh - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Netsh Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162041e", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17568,7 +17568,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=netsh.exe by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `processes_created_by_netsh_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule]
+[ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as prohibited. 
@@ -17580,7 +17580,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-10-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-10-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -17589,7 +17589,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-b6ae50145893", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17604,7 +17604,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `prohibited_processes` | `prohibited_software_on_endpoint_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule]
+[ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for command-line arguments used to hide a file or directory using the reg add command. 
@@ -17616,7 +17616,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at the moment
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -17630,7 +17630,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "61a7d1e6-f5d4-41d9-a9be-39a1ffe69459", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17651,7 +17651,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = reg.exe Processes.process="*add*" Processes.process="*Hidden*" Processes.process="*REG_DWORD*" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| regex process = "(/d\s+2)" | `reg_exe_used_to_hide_files_directories_via_registry_keys_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys. 
@@ -17663,7 +17663,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This technique may be legitimately used by a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -17677,7 +17677,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5dcbc5e", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17698,7 +17698,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where  Registry.registry_path="\\\\*"  by Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule]
+[ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for flags passed to schtasks.exe on the command-line that indicate that task names related to the execution of Bad Rabbit ransomware were created or deleted. Deprecated because we already have a similar detection 
@@ -17710,7 +17710,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = No known false positives
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -17724,7 +17724,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8b-78c066437cf6", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17745,7 +17745,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process= "*create*"  OR Processes.process= "*delete*") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search (process=*rhaegal* OR process=*drogon* OR *viserion_*) | `scheduled_tasks_used_in_badrabbit_ransomware_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule]
+[ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search is used to detect systems that are still vulnerable to the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities. 
@@ -17757,7 +17757,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that your vulnerability scann
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-01-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-01-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -17771,7 +17771,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2017-5753"], "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "354be8e0-32cd-4da0-8c47-796de13b60ea", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17792,7 +17792,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Vulnerabilities where Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5753" OR Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5715" OR Vulnerabilities.cve ="CVE-2017-5754" by Vulnerabilities.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Vulnerabilities)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spectre_and_meltdown_vulnerable_systems_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to look for evidence of exploitation for CVE-2018-11409, a Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure Bug. 
@@ -17804,7 +17804,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Retrieving server information may be a legit
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -17818,7 +17818,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2018-11409"], "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "f6a26b7b-7e80-4963-a9a8-d836e7534ebd", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17839,7 +17839,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = index=_internal sourcetype=splunkd_ui_access server-info | search clientip!=127.0.0.1 uri_path="*raw/services/server/info/server-info" | rename clientip as src_ip, splunk_server as dest | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime, values(uri) as uri, values(useragent) as http_user_agent, values(user) as user by src_ip, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `splunk_enterprise_information_disclosure_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area. 
@@ -17851,7 +17851,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There may be other processes in your environ
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -17865,7 +17865,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "1b989a0e-0129-4446-a695-f193a5b746fc", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17886,7 +17886,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=Explorer.exe AND Processes.process_name!=OpenWith.exe by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*\\Explorer\\FileExts* by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")` | table process_id dest registry_path]| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA). 
@@ -17898,7 +17898,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection model will alert on any sende
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -17912,7 +17912,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Emails"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "56e877a6-1455-4479-ad16-0550dc1e33f8", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17927,7 +17927,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_UEBA_Events.category) as category from datamodel=UEBA where nodename=All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model = "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel" by All_UEBA_Events.description All_UEBA_Events.severity All_UEBA_Events.user All_UEBA_Events.uba_event_type All_UEBA_Events.link All_UEBA_Events.signature All_UEBA_Events.url All_UEBA_Events.UEBA_Anomalies.uba_model | `drop_dm_object_name(All_UEBA_Events)` | `drop_dm_object_name(UEBA_Anomalies)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_email___uba_anomaly_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious File Write - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for files created with names that have been linked to malicious activity. 
@@ -17939,7 +17939,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible for a legitimate file to be cr
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious File Write - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -17948,7 +17948,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Suspicious File Write - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Suspicious File Write - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hidden Cobra Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "57f76b8a-32f0-42ed-b358-d9fa3ca7bac8", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -17963,7 +17963,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) as action values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `suspicious_writes` | `suspicious_file_write_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command 
@@ -17975,7 +17975,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -17989,7 +17989,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-320A", "Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "2cdb91d2-542c-497f-b252-be495e71f38c", "detection_version": "6"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18010,7 +18010,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search (process=*-EncodedCommand* OR process=*-enc*) process=*-Exec* | `suspicious_powershell_command_line_arguments_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics. 
@@ -18022,7 +18022,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -18031,7 +18031,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1036", "T1218.011", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "7360137f-abad-473e-8189-acbdaa34d114", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18046,7 +18046,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rundll32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects writes to the 'System Volume Information' folder by something other than the System process. 
@@ -18058,7 +18058,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that other utilities or syste
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -18067,7 +18067,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "cd6297cd-2bdd-4aa1-84aa-5d2f84228fac", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18082,7 +18082,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = (`sysmon` OR tag=process) EventCode=11 process_id!=4 file_path=*System\ Volume Information* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Image, file_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_writes_to_system_volume_information_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule]
+[ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for applications on the endpoint that you have marked as uncommon. 
@@ -18094,7 +18094,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -18103,7 +18103,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Hermetic Wiper", "Unusual Processes", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "29ccce64-a10c-4389-a45f-337cb29ba1f7", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18118,7 +18118,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `uncommon_processes` |`uncommon_processes_on_endpoint_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule]
+[ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS. Deprecated because too noisy. 
@@ -18130,7 +18130,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Other tools could load images into LSASS for
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-12-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -18144,7 +18144,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "56ef054c-76ef-45f9-af4a-a634695dcd65", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18165,7 +18165,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule]
+[ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search gives you the hosts where a backup was attempted and then failed. 
@@ -18177,7 +18177,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -18186,7 +18186,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Monitor Backup Solution"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aaa-952c-3ea21444444f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18201,7 +18201,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `netbackup` | stats latest(_time) as latestTime by COMPUTERNAME, MESSAGE | search MESSAGE="An error occurred, failed to backup." | `security_content_ctime(latestTime)` | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table latestTime, dest, signature | `unsuccessful_netbackup_backups_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule]
+[ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to identify the creation of multiple user accounts using the same email domain name. 
@@ -18213,7 +18213,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searche
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -18227,7 +18227,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Web Fraud Detection"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "bf1d7b5c-df2f-4249-a401-c09fdc221ddf", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18248,7 +18248,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri="/magento2/customer/account/loginPost/" | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?<SessionID>\w+)" | rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?<Username>[^&|^$]+)" | search Username=* | rex field=Username "@(?<email_domain>.*)" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames list(Username) as src_user by email_domain | where UniqueUsernames> 25 | `web_fraud___account_harvesting_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule]
+[ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to examine web sessions to identify those where the clicks are occurring too quickly for a human or are occurring with a near-perfect cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), resembling a script driven session. 
@@ -18260,7 +18260,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searche
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -18274,7 +18274,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Web Fraud Detection"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "31337bbb-bc22-4752-b599-ef192df2dc7a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18289,7 +18289,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `stream_http` http_content_type=text* | rex field=cookie "form_key=(?<session_id>\w+)" | streamstats window=2 current=1 range(_time) as TimeDelta by session_id | where TimeDelta>0 |stats count stdev(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedStdDev avg(TimeDelta) as ClickSpeedAvg by session_id | where count>5 AND (ClickSpeedStdDev<.5 OR ClickSpeedAvg<.5) | `web_fraud___anomalous_user_clickspeed_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule]
+[ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to identify user accounts that share a common password. 
@@ -18301,7 +18301,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = As is common with many fraud-related searche
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -18315,7 +18315,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Web Fraud Detection"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "31337a1a-53b9-4e05-96e9-55c934cb71d3", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18330,7 +18330,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `stream_http` http_content_type=text* uri=/magento2/customer/account/loginPost*  | rex field=form_data "login\[username\]=(?<Username>[^&|^$]+)" | rex field=form_data "login\[password\]=(?<Password>[^&|^$]+)" | stats dc(Username) as UniqueUsernames values(Username) as user list(src_ip) as src_ip by Password|where UniqueUsernames>5 | `web_fraud___password_sharing_across_accounts_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for the Console Window Host process (connhost.exe) executed using the force flag -ForceV1. This is not regular behavior in the Windows OS and is often seen executed by the Ryuk Ransomware. DEPRECATED This event is actually seen in the windows 10 client of attack_range_local. After further testing we realized this is not specific to Ryuk.  
@@ -18342,7 +18342,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This process should not be ran forcefully, w
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -18356,7 +18356,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "c114aaca-68ee-41c2-ad8c-32bf21db8769", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18377,7 +18377,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process="*C:\\Windows\\system32\\conhost.exe* 0xffffffff *-ForceV1*" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_connhost_exe_started_forcefully_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following hunting analytic is an experimental query built against a accidental feature using the latest Sysmon TA 3.0 (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709/) which maps the module load (ImageLoaded) to process_name. This analytic will deprecate once this is fixed. This hunting analytic identifies known libraries in Windows that may be used in a DLL search order hijack or DLL Sideloading setting. This may require recompiling the DLL, moving the DLL or moving the vulnerable process. The query looks for any running out of system32 or syswow64. Some libraries natively run out of other application paths and will need to be added to the exclusion as needed. The lookup is comprised of Microsoft native libraries identified within the Hijacklibs.net project. 
@@ -18389,7 +18389,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on pat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -18398,7 +18398,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 10, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.001", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "79c7d0fc-60c7-41be-a616-ccda752efe89", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18413,7 +18413,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown NOT (Processes.process_path IN ("*\\system32\\*", "*\\syswow64\\*","*\\winsxs\\*","*\\wbem\\*"))  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process_path | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup hijacklibs library AS process_name OUTPUT islibrary | search islibrary = True | rename parent_process_name as process_name , process_name AS ImageLoaded, process_path AS Module_Path | `windows_dll_search_order_hijacking_hunt_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows hosts file modification - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection has been marked **DEPRECATED** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for modifications to the hosts file on all Windows endpoints across your environment. 
@@ -18425,7 +18425,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons for system a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-11-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-11-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows hosts file modification - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -18439,7 +18439,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deprecated - Windows hosts file modification - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deprecated - Windows hosts file modification - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Host Redirection"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "1", "detection_id": "06a6fc63-a72d-41dc-8736-7e3dd9612116", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18460,7 +18460,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem  by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | search Filesystem.file_name=hosts AND Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\System32\\* | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `windows_hosts_file_modification_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - 3CX Supply Chain Attack Network Indicators - Rule]
+[ESCU - 3CX Supply Chain Attack Network Indicators - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The analytic provided below employs the Network_Resolution datamodel to detect domain indicators associated with the 3CX supply chain attack. By leveraging this query, you can efficiently conduct retrospective analysis of your data to uncover potential compromises. 
@@ -18472,7 +18472,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present for accessin
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - 3CX Supply Chain Attack Network Indicators - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - 3CX Supply Chain Attack Network Indicators - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -18486,7 +18486,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - 3CX Supply Chain Attack Network Indicators - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - 3CX Supply Chain Attack Network Indicators - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["3CX Supply Chain Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2023-29059"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "791b727c-deec-4fbe-a732-756131b3c5a1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18507,7 +18507,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | lookup 3cx_ioc_domains domain as query OUTPUT Description isIOC | search isIOC=true | `3cx_supply_chain_attack_network_indicators_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious 7z process with commandline pointing to SMB network share. This technique was seen in CONTI LEAK tools where it use 7z to archive a sensitive files and place it in network share tmp folder. This search is a good hunting query that may give analyst a hint why specific user try to archive a file pointing to SMB user which is un usual.
@@ -18519,7 +18519,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -18528,7 +18528,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "01d29b48-ff6f-11eb-b81e-acde48001123", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18543,7 +18543,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name ="7z.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "7za.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name = "7z.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name =  "7za.exe") AND (Processes.process="*\\C$\\*" OR Processes.process="*\\Admin$\\*" OR Processes.process="*\\IPC$\\*") by Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id  Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `7zip_commandline_to_smb_share_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the dumping of the LSASS process memory, which occurs during credential dumping attacks.The detection is made by using Sysmon logs, specifically EventCode 10, which is related to lsass.exe. This helps to search for indicators of LSASS memory dumping such as specific call traces to dbgcore.dll and dbghelp.dll. This detection is important because it prevents credential dumping attacks and the theft of sensitive information such as login credentials, which can be used to gain unauthorized access to systems and data. False positives might occur due to legitimate administrative tasks. Next steps include reviewing and investigating each case, given the high risk associated with potential credential dumping attacks.
@@ -18555,7 +18555,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators can create memory dumps for d
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -18569,7 +18569,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fb4c31b0-13e8-4155-8aa5-24de4b8d6717", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18590,7 +18590,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe CallTrace=*dbgcore.dll* OR CallTrace=*dbghelp.dll* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceImage, SourceProcessId  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_lsass_memory_for_dump_creation_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule]
+[ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a potential account discovery series of command used by several malware or attack to recon the target machine. This technique is also seen in some note worthy malware like trickbot where it runs a cmd process, or even drop its module that will execute the said series of net command. This series of command are good correlation search and indicator of attacker recon if seen in the machines within a none technical user or department (HR, finance, ceo and etc) network.
@@ -18602,7 +18602,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Admin or power user may used this series of
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -18616,7 +18616,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Trickbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "339805ce-ac30-11eb-b87d-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18637,7 +18637,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND (Processes.process="* user *" OR  Processes.process="*config*" OR Processes.process="*view /all*") by  Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | where count >=4 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Active Directory Lateral Movement Identified - Rule]
+[ESCU - Active Directory Lateral Movement Identified - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The primary objective of this correlation rule is to detect and alert on potential lateral movement activities within an organization's Active Directory (AD) environment. By identifying multiple analytics associated with the Active Directory Lateral Movement analytic story, security analysts can gain better insight into possible threats and respond accordingly to mitigate risks. The correlation rule will trigger an alert when multiple analytics from the Active Directory Lateral Movement analytic story are detected within a specified time frame. The rule will generate an alert if a predetermined threshold of correlated analytics is reached within the specified time frame. This threshold can be customized to suit the needs and risk appetite of the organization.
@@ -18649,7 +18649,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will most likely be present
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Active Directory Lateral Movement Identified - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Active Directory Lateral Movement Identified - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -18658,7 +18658,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - RIR - Active Directory Lateral Movement Identified - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - RIR - Active Directory Lateral Movement Identified - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Correlation"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6aa6f9dd-adfe-45a8-8f74-c4c7a0d7d037", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18679,7 +18679,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories="Active Directory Lateral Movement" All_Risk.risk_object_type="system" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `active_directory_lateral_movement_identified_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Active Directory Privilege Escalation Identified - Rule]
+[ESCU - Active Directory Privilege Escalation Identified - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The primary objective of this correlation rule is to detect and alert on potential privilege escalation activities within an organization's Active Directory (AD) environment. By identifying multiple analytics associated with the Active Directory Privilege Escalation analytic story, security analysts can gain better insight into possible threats and respond accordingly to mitigate risks. The correlation rule will trigger an alert when multiple analytics from the Active Directory Privilege Escalation analytic story are detected within a specified time frame. The rule will generate an alert if a predetermined threshold of correlated analytics is reached within the specified time frame. This threshold can be customized to suit the needs and risk appetite of the organization.
@@ -18691,7 +18691,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will most likely be present
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Active Directory Privilege Escalation Identified - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Active Directory Privilege Escalation Identified - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -18700,7 +18700,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - RIR - Active Directory Privilege Escalation Identified - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - RIR - Active Directory Privilege Escalation Identified - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1484"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Correlation"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "583e8a68-f2f7-45be-8fc9-bf725f0e22fd", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18721,7 +18721,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories="Active Directory Privilege Escalation" All_Risk.risk_object_type="system" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `active_directory_privilege_escalation_identified_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule]
+[ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of the active setup registry for persistence and privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several malware (poisonIvy), adware and APT to gain persistence to the compromised machine upon boot up. This TTP is a good indicator to further check the process id that do the modification since modification of this registry is not commonly done. check the legitimacy of the file and process involve in this rules to check if it is a valid setup installer that creating or modifying this registry.
@@ -18733,7 +18733,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Active setup installer may add or modify thi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -18747,7 +18747,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.014", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f64579c0-203f-11ec-abcc-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18768,7 +18768,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_value_name= "StubPath" Registry.registry_path = "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components*") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `active_setup_registry_autostart_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after  triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise.
@@ -18780,7 +18780,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -18794,7 +18794,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.002", "T1552"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d4a3eb62-0f1e-11ec-a971-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18809,7 +18809,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon*" AND Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultPassword OR Registry.registry_value_name= DefaultUserName) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `add_defaultuser_and_password_in_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule]
+[ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic will identify a suspicious process command-line related to Windows Defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware authors and red teams to bypass Windows Defender Antivirus products by excluding folder path, file path, process and extensions. From its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.
@@ -18821,7 +18821,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Admin or user may choose to use this windows
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -18835,7 +18835,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "CISA AA22-320A", "Data Destruction", "Remcos", "WhisperGate", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "773b66fe-4dd9-11ec-8289-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18856,7 +18856,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = "*Add-MpPreference *" OR Processes.process = "*Set-MpPreference *") AND Processes.process="*-exclusion*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `add_or_set_windows_defender_exclusion_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -18868,7 +18868,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -18882,7 +18882,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "CISA AA23-347A", "Data Destruction", "Industroyer2"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "de7fcadc-04f3-11ec-a241-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18903,7 +18903,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*[adsisearcher]*" ScriptBlockText = "*objectcategory=user*" ScriptBlockText = "*.findAll()*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Computer ScriptBlockText UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `adsisearcher_account_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule]
+[ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files
@@ -18915,7 +18915,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall featu
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -18929,7 +18929,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ce27646e-d411-11eb-8a00-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18950,7 +18950,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= "*firewall*" Processes.process= "*group=\"File and Printer Sharing\"*"  Processes.process="*enable=Yes*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule registry allowing inbound traffic in specific port with public profile. This technique was identified when an adversary wants to grant remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in a firewall rule.
@@ -18962,7 +18962,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin may add/remove/modify public i
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -18976,7 +18976,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "NjRAT", "PlugX", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0a46537c-be02-11eb-92ca-acde48001122", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -18997,7 +18997,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SharedAccess\\Parameters\\FirewallPolicy\\FirewallRules\\*" Registry.registry_value_data = "*|Action=Allow|*" Registry.registry_value_data = "*|Dir=In|*"  Registry.registry_value_data = "*|LPort=*") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid  Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_inbound_traffic_by_firewall_rule_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule]
+[ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell command to allow inbound traffic inbound to a specific local port within the public profile. This technique was seen in some attacker want to have a remote access to a machine by allowing the traffic in firewall rule.
@@ -19009,7 +19009,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrator may allow inbound traffic in c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -19023,7 +19023,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a5d85486-b89c-11eb-8267-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19044,7 +19044,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*firewall*" ScriptBlockText = "*Inbound*" ScriptBlockText = "*Allow*"  ScriptBlockText = "*-LocalPort*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_inbound_traffic_in_firewall_rule_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule]
+[ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files.
@@ -19056,7 +19056,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall featu
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19070,7 +19070,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "NjRAT", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ccd6a38c-d40b-11eb-85a5-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19091,7 +19091,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= "*firewall*" Processes.process= "*group=\"Network Discovery\"*"  Processes.process="*enable*" Processes.process="*Yes*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule]
+[ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform malicious task. This registry modification is designed to allow the `Consent Admin` to perform an operation that requires elevation without consent or credentials. We also found this in some attacker to gain privilege escalation to the compromise machine.
@@ -19103,7 +19103,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19117,7 +19117,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7de17d7a-c9d8-11eb-a812-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19138,7 +19138,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System*" Registry.registry_value_name = ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000000") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule]
+[ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in `7z.exe` and `7z.dll`. It has been observed where an adversary will rename `7z.exe`. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of `7z.exe`. During triage, identify the source of injection into `Rundll32.exe` or `Dllhost.exe`. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration.
@@ -19150,7 +19150,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this be
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19164,7 +19164,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Cobalt Strike", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9364ee8e-a39a-11eb-8f1d-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19179,7 +19179,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("rundll32.exe", "dllhost.exe") Processes.process_name=*7z* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule]
+[ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadFile` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.
@@ -19191,7 +19191,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19205,7 +19205,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkCrystal RAT", "Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "Malicious PowerShell", "Phemedrone Stealer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001", "T1105"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1a93b7ea-7af7-11eb-adb5-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19226,7 +19226,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*DownloadFile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadfile_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule]
+[ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell downloading a file using `DownloadString` method. This particular method is utilized in many different PowerShell frameworks to download files and output to disk. Identify the source (IP/domain) and destination file and triage appropriately. If AMSI logging or PowerShell transaction logs are available, review for further details of the implant.
@@ -19238,7 +19238,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19252,7 +19252,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "HAFNIUM Group", "Hermetic Wiper", "IcedID", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Malicious PowerShell", "Phemedrone Stealer", "SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability", "Winter Vivern"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001", "T1105"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4d015ef2-7adf-11eb-95da-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19273,7 +19273,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*.DownloadString*  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `any_powershell_downloadstring_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule]
+[ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the use of tools that are commonly exploited by cybercriminals since these tools are usually associated with malicious activities such as unauthorized access, network scanning, or data exfiltration and pose a significant threat to an organization's security infrastructure. It also provides enhanced visibility into potential security threats and helps to proactively detect and respond to mitigate the risks associated with cybercriminal activities. This detection is made by examining the process activity on the host, specifically focusing on processes that are known to be associated with attacker tool names. This detection is important because it acts as an early warning system for potential security incidents that allows you to respond to security incidents promptly. False positives might occur due to legitimate administrative activities that can resemble malicious actions. You must develop a comprehensive understanding of typical endpoint activities and behaviors within the organization to accurately interpret and respond to the alerts generated by this analytic. This ensures a proper balance between precision and minimizing false positives.
@@ -19285,7 +19285,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some administrator activity can be potential
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19299,7 +19299,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-264A", "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "SamSam Ransomware", "Unusual Processes", "XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.005", "T1036", "T1003", "T1595"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b4e4-16a110145893", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19320,7 +19320,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup attacker_tools attacker_tool_names AS process_name OUTPUT description | search description !=false| `attacker_tools_on_endpoint_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule]
+[ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects whether a process is attempting to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store, which might result in security tools being disabled. The detection is made by focusing on process activities and command-line arguments that are related to the 'certutil -addstore' command. This detection is important because it helps to identify attackers who might add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store to disable security tools and gain unauthorized access to a system. False positives might occur since legitimate reasons might exist for a process to add a certificate to the untrusted certificate store, such as system administration tasks. Next steps include conducting an extensive triage and investigation prior to taking any action. Additionally, you must understand the importance of trust and its subversion in system security.
@@ -19332,7 +19332,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons for administ
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19346,7 +19346,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Disabling Security Tools"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1553.004", "T1553"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6bc5243e-ef36-45dc-9b12-f4a6be131159", "detection_version": "7"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19367,7 +19367,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*-addstore*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempt_to_add_certificate_to_untrusted_store_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule]
+[ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects attempts to stop security-related services on the endpoint and helps to mitigate potential threats earlier, thereby minimizing the impact on the organization's security. The detection is made by using a Splunk query that searches for processes that involve the "sc.exe" command and include the phrase "stop" in their command. The query collects information such as the process name, process ID, parent process, user, destination, and timestamps. The detection is important because attempts to stop security-related services can indicate malicious activity or an attacker's attempt to disable security measures. This can impact the organization's security posture and can lead to the compromise of the endpoint and potentially the entire network. Disabling security services can allow attackers to gain unauthorized access, exfiltrate sensitive data, or launch further attacks, such as malware installation or privilege escalation. False positives might occur since there might be legitimate reasons for stopping these services in certain situations. Therefore, you must exercise caution and consider the context of the activity before taking any action. Next steps include reviewing the identified process and its associated details. You must also investigate any on-disk artifacts related to the process and review concurrent processes to determine the source of the attack.
@@ -19379,7 +19379,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified. Attempts to disable securit
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19393,7 +19393,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "Data Destruction", "Disabling Security Tools", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Trickbot", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c8e349c6-b97c-486e-8949-bd7bcd1f3910", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19414,7 +19414,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR  Processes.process_name = sc.exe Processes.process="* stop *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |lookup security_services_lookup service as process OUTPUTNEW category, description | search category=security | `attempt_to_stop_security_service_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule]
+[ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Monitor for execution of reg.exe with parameters specifying an export of keys that contain hashed credentials that attackers may try to crack offline.
@@ -19426,7 +19426,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19440,7 +19440,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Data Destruction", "Industroyer2", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e9fb4a59-c5fb-440a-9f24-191fbc6b2911", "detection_version": "7"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19461,7 +19461,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=reg* OR Processes.process_name=cmd* Processes.process=*save* (Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SAM* OR Processes.process=*HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\Security* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\System* OR Processes.process=*HKLM\\SAM*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name  Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to implement auto admin logon to a host. This technique was seen in BlackMatter ransomware to automatically logon to the compromise host after  triggering a safemode boot to continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network premise.
@@ -19473,7 +19473,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19487,7 +19487,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.002", "T1552"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1379d2b8-0f18-11ec-8ca3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19508,7 +19508,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon*" AND Registry.registry_value_name=AutoAdminLogon AND Registry.registry_value_data=1) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The search looks for a batch file (.bat) written to the Windows system directory tree.
@@ -19520,7 +19520,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible for this search to generate a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19534,7 +19534,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "503d17cb-9eab-4cf8-a20e-01d5c6987ae3", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19555,7 +19555,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\system32\\*", "*\\syswow64\\*") Filesystem.file_name="*.bat" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`] | table dest user file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name, firstTime, lastTime | dedup file_create_time | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `batch_file_write_to_system32_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule]
+[ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host from safe mode back to normal boot configuration. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal.
@@ -19567,7 +19567,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19581,7 +19581,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dc7a8004-0f18-11ec-8c54-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19602,7 +19602,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process="*/deletevalue*" Processes.process="*{current}*"  Processes.process="*safeboot*" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_command_back_to_normal_mode_boot_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule]
+[ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for flags passed to bcdedit.exe modifications to the built-in Windows error recovery boot configurations. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.
@@ -19614,7 +19614,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configura
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19628,7 +19628,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "809b31d2-5462-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19649,7 +19649,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process="*recoveryenabled*" (Processes.process="* no*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - BITS Job Persistence - Rule]
+[ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` scheduling a BITS job to persist on an endpoint. The query identifies the parameters used to create, resume or add a file to a BITS job. Typically seen combined in a oneliner or ran in sequence. If identified, review the BITS job created and capture any files written to disk. It is possible for BITS to be used to upload files and this may require further network data analysis to identify. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.
@@ -19661,7 +19661,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present. Typ
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - BITS Job Persistence - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19675,7 +19675,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - BITS Job Persistence - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs", "Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e97a5ffe-90bf-11eb-928a-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19696,7 +19696,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process IN (*create*, *addfile*, *setnotifyflags*, *setnotifycmdline*, *setminretrydelay*, *setcustomheaders*, *resume* ) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bits_job_persistence_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule]
+[ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following query identifies Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service utility `bitsadmin.exe` using the `transfer` parameter to download a remote object. In addition, look for `download` or `upload` on the command-line, the switches are not required to perform a transfer. Capture any files downloaded. Review the reputation of the IP or domain used. Typically once executed, a follow on command will be used to execute the dropped file. Note that the network connection or file modification events related will not spawn or create from `bitsadmin.exe`, but the artifacts will appear in a parallel process of `svchost.exe` with a command-line similar to `svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS`. It's important to review all parallel and child processes to capture any behaviors and artifacts. In some suspicious and malicious instances, BITS jobs will be created. You can use `bitsadmin /list /verbose` to list out the jobs during investigation.
@@ -19708,7 +19708,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however it may be r
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19722,7 +19722,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Flax Typhoon", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197", "T1105"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "80630ff4-8e4c-11eb-aab5-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19743,7 +19743,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_bitsadmin` Processes.process IN ("*transfer*", "*addfile*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `bitsadmin_download_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule]
+[ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-urlcache`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. However, it is uncommon for `certutil.exe` to write files to world writeable paths. During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question.
@@ -19755,7 +19755,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives in most environments
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19769,7 +19769,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-277A", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Flax Typhoon", "Forest Blizzard", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Living Off The Land", "ProxyNotShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "415b4306-8bfb-11eb-85c4-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19790,7 +19790,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*urlcache* Processes.process=*split*) OR Processes.process=*urlcache* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule]
+[ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Certutil.exe may download a file from a remote destination using `-VerifyCtl`. This behavior does require a URL to be passed on the command-line. In addition, `-f` (force) and `-split` (Split embedded ASN.1 elements, and save to files) will be used. It is not entirely common for `certutil.exe` to contact public IP space. \ During triage, capture any files on disk and review. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain in question. Using `-VerifyCtl`, the file will either be written to the current working directory or `%APPDATA%\..\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\<hash>`. 
@@ -19802,7 +19802,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives in most environments
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19816,7 +19816,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "801ad9e4-8bfb-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19837,7 +19837,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*verifyctl* Processes.process=*split*) OR Processes.process=*verifyctl* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule]
+[ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for arguments to certutil.exe indicating the manipulation or extraction of Certificate. This certificate can then be used to sign new authentication tokens specially inside Federated environments such as Windows ADFS.
@@ -19849,7 +19849,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unless there are specific use cases, manipul
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19863,7 +19863,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "Living Off The Land", "Windows Certificate Services", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 90, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "337a46be-600f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19884,7 +19884,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=certutil.exe Processes.process = "*-exportPFX*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_exe_certificate_extraction_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule]
+[ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = CertUtil.exe may be used to `encode` and `decode` a file, including PE and script code. Encoding will convert a file to base64 with `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` and `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` tags. Malicious usage will include decoding a encoded file that was downloaded. Once decoded, it will be loaded by a parallel process. Note that there are two additional command switches that may be used - `encodehex` and `decodehex`. Similarly, the file will be encoded in HEX and later decoded for further execution. During triage, identify the source of the file being decoded. Review its contents or execution behavior for further analysis.
@@ -19896,7 +19896,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Typically seen used to `encode` files, but i
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19910,7 +19910,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["APT29 Diplomatic Deceptions with WINELOADER", "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information", "Forest Blizzard", "Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1140"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bfe94226-8c10-11eb-a4b3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19931,7 +19931,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process=*decode* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `certutil_with_decode_argument_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Change Default File Association - Rule]
+[ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change the default file association of windows to malicious payload. This technique was seen in some APT where it modify the default process to run file association, like .txt to notepad.exe. Instead notepad.exe it will point to a Script or other payload that will load malicious commands to the compromised host.
@@ -19943,7 +19943,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Change Default File Association - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -19957,7 +19957,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Change Default File Association - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "462d17d8-1f71-11ec-ad07-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -19978,7 +19978,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path ="*\\shell\\open\\command\\*" Registry.registry_path = "*HKCR\\*" by Registry.dest  Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `change_default_file_association_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule]
+[ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit commandline to configure the host to boot in safe mode with network config. This technique was seen in blackMatter ransomware where it force the compromised host to boot in safe mode to continue its encryption and bring back to normal boot using bcdedit deletevalue command. This TTP can be a good alert for host that booted from safe mode forcefully since it need to modify the boot configuration to bring it back to normal.
@@ -19990,7 +19990,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -20004,7 +20004,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "81f1dce0-0f18-11ec-a5d7-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20025,7 +20025,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = bcdedit.exe Processes.process="*/set*" Processes.process="*{current}*"  Processes.process="*safeboot*" Processes.process="*network*" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `change_to_safe_mode_with_network_config_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - CHCP Command Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect execution of chcp.exe application. this utility is used to change the active code page of the console. This technique was seen in icedid malware to know the locale region/language/country of the compromise host.
@@ -20037,7 +20037,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = other tools or script may used this to chang
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - CHCP Command Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -20051,7 +20051,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - CHCP Command Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "Forest Blizzard", "IcedID"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "21d236ec-eec1-11eb-b23e-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20072,7 +20072,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=chcp.com Processes.parent_process_name = cmd.exe (Processes.parent_process=*/c* OR Processes.parent_process=*/k*) by  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `chcp_command_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule]
+[ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious whoami execution to check if the cmd or shell instance process is with elevated privileges. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant where it execute this as part of its data collection to the infected machine to check if the running shell cmd process is elevated or not. This TTP is really a good alert for known attacker that recon on the targetted host. This command is not so commonly executed by a normal user or even an admin to check if a process is elevated.
@@ -20084,7 +20084,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -20098,7 +20098,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a9079b18-1633-11ec-859c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20119,7 +20119,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where  Processes.process = "*whoami*" Processes.process = "*/group*" Processes.process = "* find *" Processes.process = "*12288*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `check_elevated_cmd_using_whoami_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule]
+[ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for child processes of spoolsv.exe. This activity is associated with a POC privilege-escalation exploit associated with CVE-2018-8440. Spoolsv.exe is the process associated with the Print Spooler service in Windows and typically runs as SYSTEM. 
@@ -20131,7 +20131,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate printer-related processes ma
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -20145,7 +20145,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2018-8440"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "aa0c4aeb-5b18-41c4-8c07-f1442d7599df", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20166,7 +20166,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe AND Processes.process_name!=regsvr32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `child_processes_of_spoolsv_exe_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule]
+[ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = this search is to detect execution of `cipher.exe` to clear the unallocated sectors of a specific disk. This technique was seen in some ransomware to make it impossible to forensically recover deleted files.
@@ -20178,7 +20178,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrator may execute this app to manage
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -20192,7 +20192,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cd80a6ac-c9d9-11eb-8839-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20213,7 +20213,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "cipher.exe" Processes.process = "*/w:*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clear_unallocated_sector_using_cipher_app_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule]
+[ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytics are designed to identifies some CLOP ransomware variant that using arguments to execute its main code or feature of its code. In this variant if the parameter is "runrun", CLOP ransomware will try to encrypt files in network shares and if it is "temp.dat", it will try to read from some stream pipe or file start encrypting files within the infected local machines. This technique can be also identified as an anti-sandbox technique to make its code non-responsive since it is waiting for some parameter to execute properly.
@@ -20225,7 +20225,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Operators can execute third party tools usin
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -20239,7 +20239,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5a8a2a72-8322-11eb-9ee9-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20260,7 +20260,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != "*temp.dat*" Processes.process = "*runrun*" OR Processes.process = "*temp.dat*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_common_exec_parameter_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule]
+[ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection is to identify the common service name created by the CLOP ransomware as part of its persistence and high privilege code execution in the infected machine. Ussually CLOP ransomware use StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW API in creating this service entry.
@@ -20272,7 +20272,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -20286,7 +20286,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "07e08a12-870c-11eb-b5f9-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20307,7 +20307,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceName IN ("SecurityCenterIBM", "WinCheckDRVs") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ServiceName StartType ServiceType | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `clop_ransomware_known_service_name_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule]
+[ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program. `cmd /c` is used to run commands in MS-DOS and terminate after command or process completion. This technique is commonly seen in adversaries and malware to execute batch command using different shell like PowerShell or different process other than `cmd.exe`. This is a good hunting query for suspicious command-line made by a script or relative process execute it.
@@ -20319,7 +20319,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be high based on legitim
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -20328,7 +20328,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AsyncRAT", "Azorult", "CISA AA23-347A", "Chaos Ransomware", "DarkCrystal RAT", "DarkGate Malware", "Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "IcedID", "Living Off The Land", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "NjRAT", "PlugX", "ProxyNotShell", "Qakbot", "RedLine Stealer", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Warzone RAT", "WhisperGate", "Winter Vivern"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "54a6ed00-3256-11ec-b031-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20343,7 +20343,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` AND Processes.process="* /c*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_carry_out_string_command_parameter_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via `jump` (Cobalt Strike PTH) or `getsystem`, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\.\Pipe\5erg53`.
@@ -20355,7 +20355,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible filtering may be req
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -20369,7 +20369,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Cobalt Strike", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1543"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "eb277ba0-b96b-11eb-b00e-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20390,7 +20390,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` OR Processes.process=*%comspec%* (Processes.process=*echo* AND Processes.process=*pipe*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a non-standard parent process (not matching CMD, PowerShell, or Explorer) spawning `ipconfig.exe` or `systeminfo.exe`. This particular behavior was seen in FIN7's JSSLoader .NET payload. This is also typically seen when an adversary is injected into another process performing different discovery techniques. This event stands out as a TTP since these tools are commonly executed with a shell application or Explorer parent, and not by another application. This TTP is a good indicator for an adversary gathering host information, but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator.
@@ -20402,7 +20402,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -20416,7 +20416,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-277A", "CISA AA23-347A", "DarkGate Malware", "FIN7", "Qakbot", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6c3f7dd8-153c-11ec-ac2d-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20437,7 +20437,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = "ipconfig.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "systeminfo.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "net.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "net1.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "arp.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "nslookup.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "route.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "netstat.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "whoami.exe") AND NOT (Processes.parent_process_name = "cmd.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powershell*" OR Processes.parent_process_name="pwsh.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "explorer.exe") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmdline_tool_not_executed_in_cmd_shell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypass UAC. This technique has been used by ransomware adversaries to gain administrative privileges to its running process.
@@ -20449,7 +20449,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate windows application that are not
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -20463,7 +20463,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "LockBit Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f87b5062-b405-11eb-a889-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20484,7 +20484,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7  ImageLoaded IN ("*\\CMLUA.dll", "*\\CMSTPLUA.dll", "*\\CMLUAUTIL.dll") NOT(process_name IN("CMSTP.exe", "CMMGR32.exe")) NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\*", "*\\program files*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest Image ImageLoaded process_name EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule]
+[ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used with Cobalt Strike. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. Cobalt Strike uses named pipes in many ways and has default values used with the Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. The following query assists with identifying these default named pipes. Each EDR product presents named pipes a little different. Consider taking the values and generating a query based on the product of choice.\
@@ -20498,7 +20498,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The idea of using named pipes with Cobalt St
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -20512,7 +20512,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Cobalt Strike", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "LockBit Ransomware", "Trickbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5876d429-0240-4709-8b93-ea8330b411b5", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20534,7 +20534,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventID=17 OR EventID=18 PipeName IN (\\msagent_*, \\DserNamePipe*, \\srvsvc_*, \\postex_*, \\status_*, \\MSSE-*, \\spoolss_*, \\win_svc*, \\ntsvcs*, \\winsock*, \\UIA_PIPE*)  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name, process_id process_path, PipeName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cobalt_strike_named_pipes_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule]
+[ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects Searches for file modifications that commonly occur with Ransomware to detect modifications to files with extensions that are commonly used by Ransomware. The detection is made by searches for changes in the datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem, specifically modifications to file extensions that match those commonly used by Ransomware. The detection is important because it suggests that an attacker is attempting to encrypt or otherwise modify files in the environment using malware, potentially leading to data loss that can cause significant damage to an organization's data and systems. False positives might occur so the SOC must investigate the affected system to determine the source of the modification and take appropriate action to contain and remediate the attack.
@@ -20546,7 +20546,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible for a legitimate file with th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -20555,7 +20555,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "LockBit Ransomware", "Prestige Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a9e5c5db-db11-43ca-86a8-c852d1b2c0ec", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20570,7 +20570,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count latest(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rex field=file_name "(?<file_extension>\.[^\.]+)$" | rex field=file_path "(?<true_file_path>([^\\\]*\\\)*).*" | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime latest(user) as user dc(true_file_path) as path_count dc(file_name) as file_count latest(file_name) as file_name latest(true_file_path) as file_path by dest file_extension | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_extensions` | where path_count > 1 OR file_count > 20 | `common_ransomware_extensions_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule]
+[ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The search looks for files created with names matching those typically used in ransomware notes that tell the victim how to get their data back.
@@ -20582,7 +20582,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a legitimate file could b
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -20591,7 +20591,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Chaos Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware", "LockBit Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ada0f478-84a8-4641-a3f1-d82362d6bd71", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20606,7 +20606,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ransomware_notes` | `common_ransomware_notes_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal - Rule]
+[ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic detects attempts to exploit the ConnectWise ScreenConnect CVE-2024-1708 vulnerability, which allows an attacker to perform path traversal attacks by manipulating the file_path and file_name parameters in the URL. The vulnerability, identified as critical with a CVSS score of 9.8, enables unauthorized users to access sensitive files and directories on the host system, potentially leading to the exfiltration of sensitive data or the execution of arbitrary code. The search query provided looks for file system events that could indicate exploitation attempts. This detection is crucial for identifying and responding to active exploitation of this vulnerability in environments running affected versions of ScreenConnect (23.9.7 and prior). It is recommended to update to version 23.9.8 or above immediately to remediate the issue, as detailed in the ConnectWise security advisory and further analyzed by Huntress researchers.
@@ -20618,7 +20618,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are not expected, as the det
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -20632,7 +20632,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ConnectWise ScreenConnect Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2024-1708", "CVE-2024-1709"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "56a3ac65-e747-41f7-b014-dff7423c1dda", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20653,7 +20653,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\ScreenConnect\\App_Extensions\\*") Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.aspx","*.ashx") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `connectwise_screenconnect_path_traversal_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Windows SACL - Rule]
+[ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Windows SACL - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic detects attempts to exploit the ConnectWise ScreenConnect CVE-2024-1708 vulnerability utilizing Windows SACL EventCode 4663, which allows an attacker to perform path traversal attacks by manipulating the file_path and file_name parameters in the URL. The vulnerability, identified as critical with a CVSS score of 9.8, enables unauthorized users to access sensitive files and directories on the host system, potentially leading to the exfiltration of sensitive data or the execution of arbitrary code. The search query provided looks for file system events that could indicate exploitation attempts. This detection is crucial for identifying and responding to active exploitation of this vulnerability in environments running affected versions of ScreenConnect (23.9.7 and prior). It is recommended to update to version 23.9.8 or above immediately to remediate the issue, as detailed in the ConnectWise security advisory and further analyzed by Huntress researchers.
@@ -20665,7 +20665,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the ana
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Windows SACL - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Windows SACL - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -20679,7 +20679,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Windows SACL - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Windows SACL - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ConnectWise ScreenConnect Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2024-1708", "CVE-2024-1709"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4e127857-1fc9-4c95-9d69-ba24c91d52d7", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20700,7 +20700,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663  ProcessName=*\\ScreenConnect.Service.exe file_path IN ("*\\ScreenConnect\\App_Extensions\\*") file_name IN ("*.aspx","*.ashx") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by  ObjectName ObjectType ProcessName AccessMask process_id EventCode Computer Caller_User_Name | rename Computer as dest Caller_User_Name as user ProcessName as process_name |  `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `connectwise_screenconnect_path_traversal_windows_sacl_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule]
+[ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search detects the suspicious commandline argument of revil ransomware to encrypt specific or all local drive and network shares of the compromised machine or host.
@@ -20712,7 +20712,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = 3rd party tool may have commandline paramete
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -20726,7 +20726,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "624919bc-c382-11eb-adcc-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20747,7 +20747,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*-m local*" OR Processes.process = "*-m net*" OR Processes.process = "*-m all*" OR Processes.process = "*-nomutex*" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `conti_common_exec_parameter_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule]
+[ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies control.exe loading either a .cpl or .inf from a writable directory. This is related to CVE-2021-40444. During triage, review parallel processes, parent and child, for further suspicious behaviors. In addition, capture file modifications and analyze.
@@ -20759,7 +20759,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present as c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -20773,7 +20773,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "10423ac4-10c9-11ec-8dc4-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20794,7 +20794,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=control.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=CONTROL.EXE) AND Processes.process IN ("*\\appdata\\*", "*\\windows\\temp\\*", "*\\programdata\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `control_loading_from_world_writable_directory_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule]
+[ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation of local administrator accounts using the net.exe command to mitigate the risks associated with unauthorized access and prevent further damage to the environment by responding to potential threats earlier and taking appropriate actions to protect the organization's systems and data. This detection is made by a Splunk query to search for processes with the name net.exe or net1.exe that include the "/add" parameter and have specific keywords related to administrator accounts in their process name. This detection is important because the creation of unauthorized local administrator accounts might indicate that an attacker has successfully created a new administrator account and is trying to gain persistent access to a system or escalate their privileges for data theft, or other malicious activities. False positives might occur since there might be legitimate uses of the net.exe command and the creation of administrator accounts in certain circumstances. You must consider the context of the activity and other indicators of compromise before taking any action. For next steps, review the details of the identified process, including the user, parent process, and parent process name. Examine any relevant on-disk artifacts and look for concurrent processes to determine the source of the attack.
@@ -20806,7 +20806,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators often leverage net.exe to cre
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -20820,7 +20820,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "CISA AA22-257A", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "DarkGate Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-151bb162040e", "detection_version": "9"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20841,7 +20841,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(parent_process_name) as parent_process_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe) AND Processes.process=*/add* AND (Processes.process=*administrators* OR Processes.process=*administratoren* OR Processes.process=*administrateurs* OR Processes.process=*administrador* OR Processes.process=*amministratori* OR Processes.process=*administratorer*) by Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_local_admin_accounts_using_net_exe_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule]
+[ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation or deletion of hidden shares using the net.exe command for prompt response and mitigation to enhance the overall security posture of the organization and protect against potential data breaches, malware infections, and other damaging outcomes. This detection is made by searching for processes that involve the use of net.exe and filters for actions related to creation or deletion of shares. This detection is important because it suggests that an attacker is attempting to manipulate or exploit the network by creating or deleting hidden shares. The creation or deletion of hidden shares can indicate malicious activity since attackers might use hidden shares to exfiltrate data, distribute malware, or establish persistence within a network. The impact of such an attack can vary, but it often involves unauthorized access to sensitive information, disruption of services, or the introduction of malware. False positives might occur since legitimate actions can also involve the use of net.exe. An extensive triage and investigation is necessary to determine the intent and nature of the detected activity. Next steps include reviewing the details of the process involving the net.exe command, including the user, parent process, and timestamps during the triage. Additionally, capture and inspect any relevant on-disk artifacts and review concurrent processes to identify the source of the attack.
@@ -20853,7 +20853,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators often leverage net.exe to cre
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -20867,7 +20867,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-277A", "DarkGate Malware", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "743a322c-9a68-4a0f-9c17-85d9cce2a27c", "detection_version": "6"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20888,7 +20888,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process Processes.process_name  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process=*share* | `create_or_delete_windows_shares_using_net_exe_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule]
+[ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect suspicious process injection in command shell. This technique was seen in IcedID where it execute cmd.exe process to inject its shellcode as part of its execution as banking trojan. It is really uncommon to have a create remote thread execution in the following application.
@@ -20900,7 +20900,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -20914,7 +20914,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Qakbot", "Warzone RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "10399c1e-f51e-11eb-b920-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20935,7 +20935,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=8 TargetImage IN ("*\\cmd.exe", "*\\powershell*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by  TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId  EventCode StartAddress SourceImage dest |rename SourceImage as process_name| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_in_shell_application_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule]
+[ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation of a remote thread in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS), which is a common tactic used by adversaries to steal user authentication credentials, known as credential dumping. The detection is made by leveraging Sysmon Event ID 8 logs and searches for processes that create remote threads in lsass.exe. This is an unusual activity that is generally linked to credential theft or credential dumping, which is a significant threat to network security. The detection is important because it helps to detect potential credential dumping attacks, which can result in significant damage to an organization's security. False positives might occur though the confidence level of this alert is high. There might be cases where legitimate tools can access LSASS and generate similar logs. Therefore, you must understand the broader context of such events and differentiate between legitimate activities and possible threats.
@@ -20947,7 +20947,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Other tools can access LSASS for legitimate
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-12-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -20961,7 +20961,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "67d4dbef-9564-4699-8da8-03a151529edc", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -20982,7 +20982,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventID=8 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, EventCode, TargetImage, TargetProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `create_remote_thread_into_lsass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule]
+[ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Detect the hands on keyboard behavior of Windows Task Manager creating a process dump of lsass.exe. Upon this behavior occurring, a file write/modification will occur in the users profile under \AppData\Local\Temp. The dump file, lsass.dmp, cannot be renamed, however if the dump occurs more than once, it will be named lsass (2).dmp.
@@ -20994,7 +20994,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators can create memory dumps for d
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-02-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -21008,7 +21008,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-257A", "Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b2fbe95a-9c62-4c12-8a29-24b97e84c0cd", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21029,7 +21029,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=taskmgr.exe TargetFilename=*lsass*.dmp | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, object_category, process_name, TargetFilename  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_lsass_dump_with_taskmgr_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule]
+[ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Monitor for signs that Vssadmin or Wmic has been used to create a shadow copy.
@@ -21041,7 +21041,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate administrator usage of Vssadmin o
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -21055,7 +21055,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "eb120f5f-b879-4a63-97c1-93352b5df844", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21076,7 +21076,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe Processes.process=*create* Processes.process=*shadow*) OR (Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the use of two specific tools, wmic and Powershell, to create a shadow copy to identify potential threats earlier and take appropriate actions to mitigate the risks. This detection is made by a Splunk query that searches for processes in the Endpoint.Processes data model where either the process name contains "wmic" or "Powershell" and the process command contains "shadowcopy" and "create". This detection is important because it suggests that an attacker is attempting to manipulate or access data in an unauthorized manner, which can lead to data theft, data manipulation, or other malicious activities. Attackers might use shadow copies to backup and exfiltrate sensitive data or to hide their tracks by restoring files to a previous state after an attack. Next steps include reviewing the user associated with the process, the process name, the original file name, the process command, and the destination of the process. Additionally, examine any relevant on-disk artifacts and review other concurrent processes to determine the source of the attack.
@@ -21088,7 +21088,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legtimate administrator usage of wmic to cre
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -21102,7 +21102,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Living Off The Land", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2ed8b538-d284-449a-be1d-82ad1dbd186b", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21123,7 +21123,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` OR `process_powershell` Processes.process=*shadowcopy* Processes.process=*create* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `creation_of_shadow_copy_with_wmic_and_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule]
+[ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the use of the copy command to dump credentials from a shadow copy so that you can detect potential threats earlier and mitigate the risks associated with credential dumping. The detection is made by using a Splunk query to search for specific processes that indicate credential dumping activity. The query looks for processes with command lines that include references to certain files, such as "sam", "security", "system", and "ntds.dit", located in system directories like "system32" or "windows". The detection is important because it suggests that an attacker is attempting to extract credentials from a shadow copy. Credential dumping is a common technique used by attackers to obtain sensitive login information and gain unauthorized access to systems to escalate privileges, move laterally within the network, or gain unauthorized access to sensitive data. False positives might occur since legitimate processes might also reference these files. During triage, it is crucial to review the process details, including the source and the command that is run. Additionally, you must capture and analyze any relevant on-disk artifacts and investigate concurrent processes to determine the source of the attack
@@ -21135,7 +21135,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -21149,7 +21149,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d8c406fe-23d2-45f3-a983-1abe7b83ff3b", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21170,7 +21170,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` (Processes.process=*\\system32\\config\\sam* OR Processes.process=*\\system32\\config\\security* OR Processes.process=*\\system32\\config\\system* OR Processes.process=*\\windows\\ntds\\ntds.dit*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process  Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id  Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_copy_command_from_shadow_copy_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule]
+[ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation of a symlink to a shadow copy to identify potential threats earlier and mitigate the risks associated with symlink creation to shadow copies.  The detection is made by using a Splunk query that searches for processes with commands containing "mklink" and "HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy". This analytic retrieves information such as the destination, user, process name, process ID, parent process, original file name, and parent process ID from the Endpoint.Processes data model.  The detection is important because it indicates potential malicious activity since attackers might use this technique to manipulate or delete shadow copies, which are used for system backup and recovery. This detection helps to determine if an attacker is attempting to cover their tracks or prevent data recovery in the event of an incident. The impact of such an attack can be significant since it can hinder incident response efforts, prevent data restoration, and potentially lead to data loss or compromise. Next steps include reviewing the details of the process, such as the destination and the user responsible for creating the symlink. Additionally, you must examine the parent process, any relevant on-disk artifacts, and concurrent processes to identify the source of the attack.
@@ -21182,7 +21182,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -21196,7 +21196,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c5eac648-fae0-4263-91a6-773df1f4c903", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21217,7 +21217,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*mklink* Processes.process=*HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process  Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `credential_dumping_via_symlink_to_shadow_copy_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule]
+[ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = this analytic is to detect a suspicious compile before delivery approach of .net compiler csc.exe. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware and even in red teams to take advantage the csc.exe .net compiler tool to compile on the fly a malicious .net code to evade detection from security product. This is a good hunting query to check further the file or process created after this event and check the file path that passed to csc.exe which is the .net code. Aside from that, powershell is capable of using this compiler in executing .net code in a powershell script so filter on that case is needed.
@@ -21229,7 +21229,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -21238,7 +21238,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.004", "T1027"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ea73128a-43ab-11ec-9753-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21253,7 +21253,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_csc` Processes.process = "*/noconfig*" Processes.process = "*/fullpaths*" Processes.process = "*@*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `csc_net_on_the_fly_compilation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of curl on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.
@@ -21265,7 +21265,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however f
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -21279,7 +21279,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Linux Living Off The Land", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "900bc324-59f3-11ec-9fb4-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21300,7 +21300,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl (Processes.process="*-s *") OR (Processes.process="*|*" AND Processes.process="*bash*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `curl_download_and_bash_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow copy using the WMIC PowerShell module. This technique was seen used by a recent adversary to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was able to be decrypted by PowerShell log.
@@ -21312,7 +21312,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -21326,7 +21326,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5ee2bcd0-b2ff-11eb-bb34-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21347,7 +21347,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText= "*ShadowCopy*" (ScriptBlockText = "*Delete*" OR ScriptBlockText = "*Remove*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText |rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule]
+[ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-line to delete a user on a system. This technique may be use by an administrator for legitimate purposes, however this behavior has been used in the wild to impair some user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify any other user accounts created before or after.
@@ -21359,7 +21359,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = System administrators or scripts may delete
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -21373,7 +21373,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1c8c6f66-acce-11eb-aafb-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21394,7 +21394,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process="*user*" AND  Processes.process="*/delete*" by  Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_of_net_users_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule]
+[ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service.  Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation.  This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies.
@@ -21406,7 +21406,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = vssadmin.exe and wmic.exe are standard appli
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -21420,7 +21420,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-264A", "Chaos Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware", "DarkGate Malware", "LockBit Ransomware", "Prestige Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Rhysida Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Windows Log Manipulation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b89919ed-ee5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21441,7 +21441,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=vssadmin.exe OR Processes.process_name=wmic.exe) Processes.process=*delete* Processes.process=*shadow* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `deleting_shadow_copies_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the common command-line argument used by AzureHound `Invoke-AzureHound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives.
@@ -21453,7 +21453,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -21467,7 +21467,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Discovery Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "26f02e96-c300-11eb-b611-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21488,7 +21488,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN ("*invoke-azurehound*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_command_line_arguments_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect AzureHound File Modifications - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect AzureHound File Modifications - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is similar to SharpHound file modifications, but this instance covers the use of Invoke-AzureHound. AzureHound is the SharpHound equivilent but for Azure. It's possible this may never be seen in an environment as most attackers may execute this tool remotely. Once execution is complete, a zip file with a similar name will drop `20210601090751-azurecollection.zip`. In addition to the zip, multiple .json files will be written to disk, which are in the zip.
@@ -21500,7 +21500,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the ana
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect AzureHound File Modifications - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect AzureHound File Modifications - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -21514,7 +21514,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect AzureHound File Modifications - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect AzureHound File Modifications - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Discovery Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1c34549e-c31b-11eb-996b-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21535,7 +21535,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*-azurecollection.zip", "*-azprivroleadminrights.json", "*-azglobaladminrights.json", "*-azcloudappadmins.json", "*-azapplicationadmins.json") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id  Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_azurehound_file_modifications_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects a specific type of vulnerability known as a heap-based buffer overflow in the sudoedit command, commonly referred to as Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156. The detection is made by a Splunk query that searches for instances of the sudoedit command with the "-s" flag followed by a double quote. This combination of parameters is indicative of the vulnerability being exploited. The detection is important because it suggests that an attacker is attempting to exploit the Baron Samedit vulnerability. The Baron Samedit vulnerability allows an attacker to gain elevated privileges on a Linux system and run arbitrary code with root privileges, potentially leading to complete control over the affected system. The impact of a successful attack can be severe since it allows the attacker to bypass security measures and gain unauthorized access to sensitive data or systems. This can result in data breaches, unauthorized modifications, or even complete system compromise. Next steps include being aware of this vulnerability and actively monitoring any attempts to exploit it. By detecting and responding to such attacks in a timely manner, you can prevent or minimize the potential damage caused by the heap-based buffer overflow of sudoedit. 
@@ -21547,7 +21547,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -21561,7 +21561,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "93fbec4e-0375-440c-8db3-4508eca470c4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21582,7 +21582,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `linux_hosts` "sudoedit -s \\" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects the occurrence of a heap-based buffer overflow in sudoedit.The detection is made by using a Splunk query to identify Linux hosts where the terms "sudoedit" and "segfault" appear in the logs. The detection is important because the heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in sudoedit can be exploited by attackers to gain elevated root privileges on a vulnerable system, which might lead to the compromise of sensitive data, unauthorized access, and other malicious activities. False positives might occur. Therefore, you must review the logs and investigate further before taking any action. 
@@ -21594,7 +21594,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = If sudoedit is throwing segfaults for other
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -21608,7 +21608,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "10f2bae0-bbe6-4984-808c-37dc1c67980d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21629,7 +21629,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `linux_hosts` TERM(sudoedit) TERM(segfault) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host | where count > 5 | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_segfault_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects the heap-based buffer overflow for the sudoedit command and identifies instances where the command "sudoedit -s *" is run using the osquery_process data source. This indicates that the sudoedit command is used with the "-s" flag, which is associated with the heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability. The detection is important because it indicates a potential security vulnerability, specifically Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156, which helps to identify and respond to potential heap-based buffer overflow attacks to enhance the security posture of the organization. This vulnerability allows an attacker to escalate privileges and potentially gain unauthorized access to the system. If the attack is successful, the attacker can gain full control of the system, run arbitrary code, or access sensitive data. Such attacks can lead to data breaches, unauthorized access, and potential disruption of critical systems. False positives might occur since the legitimate use of the sudoedit command with the "-s" flag can also trigger this detection. You must carefully review and validate the findings before taking any action. Next steps include investigating all true positive detections promptly, reviewing the associated processes, gather relevant artifacts, identifying the source of the attack to contain the threat, mitigate the risks, and prevent further damage to the environment. 
@@ -21641,7 +21641,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -21655,7 +21655,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2021-3156"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1de31d5d-8fa6-4ee0-af89-17069134118a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21676,7 +21676,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `osquery_process` | search "columns.cmdline"="sudoedit -s \\*" | `detect_baron_samedit_cve_2021_3156_via_osquery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Certify Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Certify Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies when the attacker tool Certify or Certipy are used to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments. The default command line arguments of these tools are similar and perform near identical enumeration or exploitation functions.
@@ -21688,7 +21688,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Certify Command Line Arguments - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Certify Command Line Arguments - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -21702,7 +21702,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Certify Command Line Arguments - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Certify Command Line Arguments - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Windows Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1649", "T1105"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e6d2dc61-a8b9-4b03-906c-da0ca75d71b8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21723,7 +21723,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN ("* find *","* auth *","* request *","* req *","* download *",) AND Processes.process IN ("* /vulnerable*","* /enrolleeSuppliesSubject *","* /json /outfile*","* /ca*", "* -username *","* -u *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_certify_command_line_arguments_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies when the attacker tool  Certify is used through an in-memory PowerShell function to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments. The default command line arguments for the binary version of this tools are similar to PowerShell calls and perform near identical enumeration or exploitation functions.
@@ -21735,7 +21735,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown, partial script block matches.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -21749,7 +21749,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Windows Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1649", "T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f533ca6c-9440-4686-80cb-7f294c07812a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21770,7 +21770,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText IN ("*find *") AND ScriptBlockText IN ("* /vulnerable*","* -vulnerable*","* /enrolleeSuppliesSubject *","* /json /outfile*")) OR (ScriptBlockText IN (,"*auth *","*req *",) AND ScriptBlockText IN ("* -ca *","* -username *","* -u *")) OR (ScriptBlockText IN ("*request *","*download *") AND ScriptBlockText IN ("* /ca:*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime list(ScriptBlockText) as command Values(OpCode) as reason values(Path) as file_name values(UserID) as user by _time Computer EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval file_name = case(isnotnull(file_name),file_name,true(),"unknown") | eval signature = substr(command,0,256) | rename Computer as dest,EventCode as signature_id | `detect_certify_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies when the attacker tool Certipy is used to enumerate Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environments. The default behavior of this toolkit drops a number of file uniquely named files or file extensions related to it's information gathering and exfiltration process.
@@ -21782,7 +21782,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -21796,7 +21796,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Windows Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1649", "T1560"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7e3df743-b1d8-4631-8fa8-bd5819688876", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21817,7 +21817,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(Processes.process_current_directory) as process_current_directory FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.action="allowed" BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid Processes.action |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join max=0 dest process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*_certipy.zip", "*_certipy.txt", "*_certipy.json", "*.ccache") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` ] | fields firstTime lastTime user dest file_create_time file_name file_path parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process_current_directory process process_guid process_id | where isnotnull(file_name) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_certipy_file_modifications_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for Event Code 4742 (Computer Change) or EventCode 4624 (An account was successfully logged on) with an anonymous account. 
@@ -21829,7 +21829,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None thus far found
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -21838,7 +21838,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Detect Zerologon Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2020-1472"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1400624a-d42d-484d-8843-e6753e6e3645", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21853,7 +21853,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4742 TargetUserName="ANONYMOUS LOGON" LogonType=3 | stats count values(host) as host, values(TargetDomainName) as Domain, values(user) as user | `detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all.\
@@ -21871,7 +21871,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives as the scope is limi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -21885,7 +21885,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2021-36934"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9251299c-ea5b-11eb-a8de-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21909,7 +21909,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN ("*copy*","*[System.IO.File]::Copy*") AND ScriptBlockText IN ("*System32\\config\\SAM*", "*System32\\config\\SYSTEM*","*System32\\config\\SECURITY*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_copy_of_shadowcopy_with_script_block_logging_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the reading of lsass memory, which is consistent with credential dumping. Reading lsass memory is a common technique used by attackers to steal credentials from the Windows operating system. The detection is made by monitoring the sysmon events and filtering for specific access permissions (0x1010 and 0x1410) on the lsass.exe process helps identify potential instances of credential dumping.The detection is important because it suggests that an attacker is attempting to extract credentials from the lsass memory, which can lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, and compromise of sensitive information. Credential dumping is often a precursor to further attacks, such as lateral movement, privilege escalation, or data exfiltration. False positives can occur due to legitimate actions that involve accessing lsass memory. Therefore, extensive triage and investigation are necessary to differentiate between malicious and benign activities.
@@ -21921,7 +21921,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. Other tools
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -21935,7 +21935,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Credential Dumping", "Detect Zerologon Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2c365e57-4414-4540-8dc0-73ab10729996", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -21956,7 +21956,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1010 OR GrantedAccess=0x1410) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_credential_dumping_through_lsass_access_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all.\
@@ -21974,7 +21974,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may only pertain to it not b
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -21988,7 +21988,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bc1dc6b8-c954-11eb-bade-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22012,7 +22012,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104  (ScriptBlockText=*system.net.webclient* AND ScriptBlockText=*frombase64string*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_empire_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search identifies endpoints that have caused a relatively high number of account lockouts in a short period.
@@ -22026,7 +22026,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that a widely used system, suc
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -22040,7 +22040,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c026e3dd-7e18-4abb-8f41-929e836efe74", "detection_version": "8"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22055,7 +22055,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where All_Changes.result="*lock*" by All_Changes.dest All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` |`drop_dm_object_name("Account_Management")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_account_lockouts_from_endpoint_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search detects user accounts that have been locked out a relatively high number of times in a short period.
@@ -22067,7 +22067,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that a legitimate user is exp
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -22081,7 +22081,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "95a7f9a5-6096-437e-a19e-86f42ac609bd", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22096,7 +22096,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where  All_Changes.result="*lock*" by All_Changes.user All_Changes.result |`drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` |`drop_dm_object_name("Account_Management")`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search count > 5 | `detect_excessive_user_account_lockouts_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell and ProxyNotShell. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant.
@@ -22108,7 +22108,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `actio
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -22122,7 +22122,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "CISA AA22-257A", "HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyNotShell", "ProxyShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003", "T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8c14eeee-2af1-4a4b-bda8-228da0f4862a", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22143,7 +22143,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=System  by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\*", "*\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\*", "*\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\*") Filesystem.file_name IN( "*.aspx", "*.ashx") by _time span=1h Filesystem.user Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest user file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest user file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `detect_exchange_web_shell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of hh.exe (HTML Help) executing a Compiled HTML Help (CHM). This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Validate it is the legitimate version of hh.exe by reviewing the PE metadata. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
@@ -22155,7 +22155,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely a renamed instance of hh.e
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -22164,7 +22164,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "62fed254-513b-460e-953d-79771493a9f3", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22179,7 +22179,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=hh.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=HH.EXE by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_renamed_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) that spawns a child process. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review child process events and investigate further. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
@@ -22191,7 +22191,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -22205,7 +22205,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "Living Off The Land", "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "723716de-ee55-4cd4-9759-c44e7e55ba4b", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22226,7 +22226,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=hh.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_spawn_child_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote url. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file. CHM files may  contain nearly any file type embedded, but only execute html/htm. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. Review reputation of remote IP and domain. Some instances, it is worth decompiling the .chm file to review its original contents. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
@@ -22238,7 +22238,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -22252,7 +22252,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8c5835b9-39d9-438b-817c-95f14c69a31e", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22273,7 +22273,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process=*http* by Processes.dest Processes.user  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_url_in_command_line_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies hh.exe (HTML Help) execution of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file using InfoTech Storage Handlers. This particular technique will load Windows script code from a compiled help file, using InfoTech Storage Handlers. itss.dll will load upon execution. Three InfoTech Storage handlers are supported - ms-its, its, mk:@MSITStore. ITSS may be used to launch a specific html/htm file from within a CHM file. CHM files may contain nearly any file type embedded. Upon a successful execution, the following script engines may be used for execution - JScript, VBScript, VBScript.Encode, JScript.Encode, JScript.Compact. Analyst may identify vbscript.dll or jscript.dll loading into hh.exe upon execution. The "htm" and "html" file extensions were the only extensions observed to be supported for the execution of Shortcut commands or WSH script code. During investigation, identify script content origination. hh.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
@@ -22285,7 +22285,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is rare to see instances of InfoTech Stor
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -22299,7 +22299,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0b2eefa5-5508-450d-b970-3dd2fb761aec", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22320,7 +22320,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process IN ("*its:*", "*mk:@MSITStore:*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all.\
@@ -22338,7 +22338,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the com
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -22352,7 +22352,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-264A", "CISA AA22-320A", "CISA AA23-347A", "Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "Sandworm Tools"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8148c29c-c952-11eb-9255-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22376,7 +22376,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (*mimikatz*, *-dumpcr*, *sekurlsa::pth*, *kerberos::ptt*, *kerberos::golden*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mimikatz_with_powershell_script_block_logging_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies "mshta.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "mshta.exe" and its parent process.
@@ -22388,7 +22388,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -22402,7 +22402,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a0873b32-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "6"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22423,7 +22423,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect mshta renamed - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of mshta.exe executing. Mshta.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. This analytic utilizes the internal name of the PE to identify if is the legitimate mshta binary. Further analysis should be performed to review the executed content and validation it is the real mshta.
@@ -22435,7 +22435,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect mshta renamed - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -22444,7 +22444,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect mshta renamed - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8f45fcf0-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22459,7 +22459,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=mshta.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=MSHTA.EXE by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_renamed_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies when Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) utility is used to make remote http connections. Adversaries may use mshta.exe to proxy the download and execution of remote .hta files. The analytic identifies command line arguments of http and https being used. This technique is commonly used by malicious software to bypass preventative controls. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process.
@@ -22471,7 +22471,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate applications may p
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -22485,7 +22485,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9b3af1e6-5b68-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22506,7 +22506,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_mshta` (Processes.process="*http://*" OR Processes.process="*https://*") by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_mshta_url_in_command_line_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation of new accounts that have been elevated to local administrators so that you can take immediate action to mitigate the risks and prevent further unauthorized access or malicious activities. This detection is made by using the Splunk query `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) to search for relevant security events in the Windows event log. When a new account is created or an existing account is added to the Administrators group, this analytic identifies this behavior by looking for EventCode 4720 (A user account was created) or EventCode 4732 (A member was added to a security-enabled global group). This analytic specifically focuses on events where the Group_Name is set to Administrators. This detection is important because it suggests that an attacker has gained elevated privileges and can perform malicious actions with administrative access. This can lead to significant impact, such as unauthorized access to sensitive data, unauthorized modifications to systems or configurations, and potential disruption of critical services. identifying this behavior is crucial for a Security Operations Center (SOC). Next steps include reviewing the details of the security event, including the user account that was created or added to the Administrators group. Also, examine the time span between the first and last occurrence of the event to determine if the behavior is ongoing. Additionally, consider any contextual information, such as the destination where the account was created or added to understand the scope and potential impact of the attack.
@@ -22518,7 +22518,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The activity may be legitimate. For this rea
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -22532,7 +22532,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-257A", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b25f6f62-0712-43c1-b203-083231ffd97d", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22553,7 +22553,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4720 OR (EventCode=4732 Group_Name=Administrators) | transaction src_user connected=false maxspan=180m | rename src_user as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_new_local_admin_account_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for execution of process `outlook.exe` where the process is writing a `.zip` file to the disk. 
@@ -22565,7 +22565,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is not uncommon for outlook to write legi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -22579,7 +22579,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Amadey", "Remcos", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-4822-b1e4-16ae10145893", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22600,7 +22600,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe by _time span=5m Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| rename parent_process_id as outlook_id| join malicious_id type=inner[| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name  FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*.zip*   OR Filesystem.file_name=*.lnk ) AND (Filesystem.file_path=C:\\Users* OR Filesystem.file_path=*Local\\Temp*) by  _time span=5m Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.dest  | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename process_id as malicious_id| fields malicious_id outlook_id dest file_path file_name file_hash count file_id] | table firstTime lastTime user malicious_id outlook_id process_name parent_process_name file_name  file_path | where file_name != "" | `detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The detection Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe is detecting the abuse of unquoted service paths, which is a popular technique for privilege escalation. 
@@ -22612,7 +22612,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -22626,7 +22626,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.009", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cbef820c-e1ff-407f-887f-0a9240a2d477", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22647,7 +22647,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rex field=process "^.*?\\\\(?<service_process>[^\\\\]*\.(?:exe|bat|com|ps1))" | eval process_name = lower(process_name) | eval service_process = lower(service_process) | where process_name != service_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for fast execution of processes used for system network configuration discovery on the endpoint.
@@ -22659,7 +22659,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is uncommon for normal users to execute a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -22673,7 +22673,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a51bfe1a-94f0-48cc-b1e4-16ae10145893", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22694,7 +22694,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT Processes.user IN ("","unknown") by Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.user _time | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search `system_network_configuration_discovery_tools` | transaction dest connected=false maxpause=5m |where eventcount>=5 | table firstTime lastTime dest user process_name process parent_process parent_process_name eventcount | `detect_processes_used_for_system_network_configuration_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for executions of cmd.exe spawned by a process that is often abused by attackers and that does not typically launch cmd.exe.
@@ -22706,7 +22706,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There are circumstances where an application
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -22715,7 +22715,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7486664", "detection_version": "6"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22730,7 +22730,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |search [`prohibited_apps_launching_cmd_macro`] | `detect_prohibited_applications_spawning_cmd_exe_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for events where `PsExec.exe` is run with the `accepteula` flag in the command line. PsExec is a built-in Windows utility that enables you to execute processes on other systems. It is fully interactive for console applications. This tool is widely used for launching interactive command prompts on remote systems. Threat actors leverage this extensively for executing code on compromised systems. If an attacker is running PsExec for the first time, they will be prompted to accept the end-user license agreement (EULA), which can be passed as the argument `accepteula` within the command line.
@@ -22742,7 +22742,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators can leverage PsExec for acces
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -22756,7 +22756,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "BlackByte Ransomware", "CISA AA22-320A", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "DarkGate Malware", "DarkSide Ransomware", "HAFNIUM Group", "IcedID", "Rhysida Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Sandworm Tools", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "27c3a83d-cada-47c6-9042-67baf19d2574", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22777,7 +22777,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_psexec` Processes.process=*accepteula* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_psexec_with_accepteula_flag_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Rare Executables - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the occurrence of rare processes that appear only once across the network within a specified timeframe. It operates by compiling a list of process executions. This detection is crucial for a Security Operations Center (SOC) as it helps in identifying potentially malicious activities or unauthorized software that could indicate a security breach or an ongoing attack. Identifying such rare processes allows for early detection of threats, minimizing the potential impact of an attack which could range from data theft to complete system compromise.
@@ -22789,7 +22789,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate processes may be only rarely
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Rare Executables - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -22803,7 +22803,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Rare Executables - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Rhysida Ransomware", "Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "44fddcb2-8d3b-454c-874e-7c6de5a4f7ac", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22818,7 +22818,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Processes.dest) as dc_dest values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search dc_dest < 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rare_executables_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by `rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes.
@@ -22830,7 +22830,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this is
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -22844,7 +22844,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "32e0baea-b3f1-11eb-a2ce-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22865,7 +22865,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rclone` Processes.process IN ("*copy*", "*mega*", "*pcloud*", "*ftp*", "*--config*", "*--progress*", "*--no-check-certificate*", "*--ignore-existing*", "*--auto-confirm*", "*--transfers*", "*--multi-thread-streams*")  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |  `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies regasm.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe.
@@ -22877,7 +22877,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of rega
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -22891,7 +22891,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware", "Living Off The Land", "Snake Keylogger", "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "72170ec5-f7d2-42f5-aefb-2b8be6aad15f", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22912,7 +22912,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regasm.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote Command And Control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe.
@@ -22924,7 +22924,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of rega
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -22938,7 +22938,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "07921114-6db4-4e2e-ae58-3ea8a52ae93f", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -22959,7 +22959,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regasm.exe  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, process_name, src_ip, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_with_network_connection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies regasm.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regasm.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in `C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe` and `C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe`.
@@ -22971,7 +22971,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of rega
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -22985,7 +22985,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c3bc1430-04e7-4178-835f-047d8e6e97df", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23006,7 +23006,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regasm` by _time span=1h  Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process  Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(?i)(regasm\.exe.{0,4}$)" | `detect_regasm_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe spawning a process. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe.
@@ -23018,7 +23018,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of rega
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23032,7 +23032,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bc477b57-5c21-4ab6-9c33-668772e7f114", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23053,7 +23053,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regsvcs.exe by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_spawning_a_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote Command And Control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe.
@@ -23065,7 +23065,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regs
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -23079,7 +23079,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e3e7a1c0-f2b9-445c-8493-f30a63522d1a", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23100,7 +23100,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regsvcs.exe  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, process_name, src_ip, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies regsvcs.exe with no command line arguments. This particular behavior occurs when another process injects into regsvcs.exe, no command line arguments will be present. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe.
@@ -23112,7 +23112,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances of regs
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23126,7 +23126,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.009"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6b74d578-a02e-4e94-a0d1-39440d0bf254", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23147,7 +23147,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvcs` by _time span=1h  Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process  Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(?i)(regsvcs\.exe.{0,4}$)"| `detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack.\
@@ -23161,7 +23161,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives related to third par
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23175,7 +23175,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Cobalt Strike", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Living Off The Land", "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "070e9b80-6252-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23197,7 +23197,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process=*scrobj* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvr32_application_control_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects when a file from a known remote access software is written to disk within the environment. Adversaries use these utilities to retain remote access capabilities to the environment. Utilities in the lookup include AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, TeamViewer and much more. Review the lookup for the entire list and add any others.
@@ -23209,7 +23209,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Known or approved applications used by the o
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23223,7 +23223,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Insider Threat", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1219"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3bf5541a-6a45-4fdc-b01d-59b899fff961", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23238,7 +23238,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime, values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.file_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | lookup remote_access_software remote_utility AS file_name OUTPUT isutility, description as signature, comment_reference as desc, category | search isutility = TRUE | `detect_remote_access_software_usage_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects when process with file or code signing attributes from a known remote access software is executed with the environment. Adversaries use these utilities to retain remote access capabilities to the environment. Utilities in the lookup include AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, TeamViewer and much more. Review the lookup for the entire list and add any others.
@@ -23250,7 +23250,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Known or approved applications used by the o
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -23264,7 +23264,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Insider Threat", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1219"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ccad96d7-a48c-4f13-8b9c-9f6a31cba454", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23279,7 +23279,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=1 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime, values(Company) as Company values(Product) as Product by dest, user, parent_process_name, process_name, process | lookup remote_access_software remote_utility_fileinfo AS Product OUTPUT isutility, description as signature, comment_reference as desc, category | search isutility = True | `detect_remote_access_software_usage_fileinfo_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects when a known remote access software is executed within the environment. Adversaries use these utilities to retain remote access capabilities to the environment. Utilities in the lookup include AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, TeamViewer and much more. Review the lookup for the entire list and add any others.
@@ -23291,7 +23291,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that legitimate remote access
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23305,7 +23305,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Insider Threat", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1219"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ffd5e001-2e34-48f4-97a2-26dc4bb08178", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23320,7 +23320,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.process!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup remote_access_software remote_utility AS process_name OUTPUT isutility, description as signature, comment_reference as desc, category | search isutility = True | `detect_remote_access_software_usage_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies renamed 7-Zip usage using Sysmon. At this stage of an attack, review parallel processes and file modifications for data that is staged or potentially have been exfiltrated. This analytic utilizes the OriginalFileName to capture the renamed process. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `7zip` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.
@@ -23332,7 +23332,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however this analyt
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23341,7 +23341,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4057291a-b8cf-11eb-95fe-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23356,7 +23356,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=7z*.exe AND Processes.process_name!=7z*.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_7_zip_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of `PsExec.exe` being utilized on an endpoint. Most instances, it is highly probable to capture `Psexec.exe` or other SysInternal utility usage with the command-line argument of `-accepteula`. During triage, validate this is the legitimate version of `PsExec` by reviewing the PE metadata. In addition, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior.
@@ -23368,7 +23368,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present. I
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23377,7 +23377,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "BlackByte Ransomware", "CISA AA22-320A", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "DarkGate Malware", "DarkSide Ransomware", "HAFNIUM Group", "Rhysida Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware", "Sandworm Tools"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "683e6196-b8e8-11eb-9a79-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23392,7 +23392,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name!=psexec.exe OR Processes.process_name!=psexec64.exe) AND Processes.original_file_name=psexec.c by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_psexec_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the usage of `rclone.exe`, renamed, being used to exfiltrate data to a remote destination. RClone has been used by multiple ransomware groups to exfiltrate data. In many instances, it will be downloaded from the legitimate site and executed accordingly. During triage, isolate the endpoint and begin to review parallel processes for additional behavior. At this stage, the adversary may have staged data to be exfiltrated.
@@ -23404,7 +23404,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23413,7 +23413,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6dca1124-b3ec-11eb-9328-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23428,7 +23428,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.original_file_name=rclone.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rclone.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_rclone_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analtyic identifies renamed instances of `WinRAR.exe`. In most cases, it is not common for WinRAR to be used renamed, however it is common to be installed by a third party application and executed from a non-standard path. During triage, validate additional metadata from the binary that this is `WinRAR`. Review parallel processes and file modifications.
@@ -23440,7 +23440,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible third party applicat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23449,7 +23449,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-277A", "Collection and Staging"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1b7bfb2c-b8e6-11eb-99ac-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23464,7 +23464,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=WinRAR.exe (Processes.process_name!=rar.exe OR Processes.process_name!=winrar.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_renamed_winrar_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect RTLO In File Name - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect RTLO In File Name - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is used to detect the abuse of the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) RTLO. This technique is used by adversaries to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. The RTLO character is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.
@@ -23476,7 +23476,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Implementation in regions that use right to
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect RTLO In File Name - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect RTLO In File Name - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23490,7 +23490,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect RTLO In File Name - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect RTLO In File Name - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.002", "T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "468b7e11-d362-43b8-b6ec-7a2d3b246678", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23511,7 +23511,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_create_time) as file_create_time from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name!=unknown by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex file_name =  "\\x{202E}" | rex field=file_name "(?<RTLO_file_1>.+)(?<RTLO_exist_file>\\x{202E})(?<RTLO_file_2>.+)" | eval file_name_with_RTLO=file_name | eval file_name=RTLO_file_1.RTLO_file_2 | fields - RTLO* | `detect_rtlo_in_file_name_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect RTLO In Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect RTLO In Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is used to detect the abuse of the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) RTLO. This technique is used by adversaries to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. The RTLO character is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.
@@ -23523,7 +23523,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Implementation in regions that use right to
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect RTLO In Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect RTLO In Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23537,7 +23537,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect RTLO In Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect RTLO In Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.002", "T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "22ac27b4-7189-4a4f-9375-b9017c9620d7", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23558,7 +23558,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process!=unknown AND Processes.action=allowed by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | regex process="\\x{202E}" | rex field=process "(?<RTLO_command_1>.+)(?<RTLO_exist_process>\\x{202E})(?<RTLO_command_2>.+)" | eval process_with_RTLO=process | eval process=RTLO_command_1.RTLO_command_2 | fields - RTLO* | `detect_rtlo_in_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading advpack.dll and ieadvpack.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.
@@ -23570,7 +23570,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-02-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-02-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23584,7 +23584,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4aefadfe-9abd-4bf8-b3fd-867e9ef95bf8", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23605,7 +23605,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*advpack* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___advpack_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.
@@ -23617,7 +23617,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-02-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-02-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23631,7 +23631,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "61e7b44a-6088-4f26-b788-9a96ba13b37a", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23652,7 +23652,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*setupapi* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.
@@ -23664,7 +23664,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-02-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-02-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23678,7 +23678,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "71b9bf37-cde1-45fb-b899-1b0aa6fa1183", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23699,7 +23699,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*syssetup* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior is commonly observed with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques. The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process "rundll32.exe" and its parent process.
@@ -23711,7 +23711,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23725,7 +23725,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "NOBELIUM Group", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "91c79f14-5b41-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23746,7 +23746,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` (Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies common command-line arguments used by SharpHound `-collectionMethod` and `invoke-bloodhound`. Being the script is FOSS, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. This analytic works to identify the common command-line attributes used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives.
@@ -23758,7 +23758,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the arg
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23772,7 +23772,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Discovery Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a0bdd2f6-c2ff-11eb-b918-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23793,7 +23793,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN ("*-collectionMethod*","*invoke-bloodhound*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_command_line_arguments_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = SharpHound is used as a reconnaissance collector, ingestor, for BloodHound. SharpHound will query the domain controller and begin gathering all the data related to the domain and trusts. For output, it will drop a .zip file upon completion following a typical pattern that is often not changed. This analytic focuses on the default file name scheme. Note that this may be evaded with different parameters within SharpHound, but that depends on the operator. `-randomizefilenames` and `-encryptzip` are two examples. In addition, executing SharpHound via .exe or .ps1 without any command-line arguments will still perform activity and dump output to the default filename. Example default filename `20210601181553_BloodHound.zip`. SharpHound creates multiple temp files following the same pattern `20210601182121_computers.json`, `domains.json`, `gpos.json`, `ous.json` and `users.json`. Tuning may be required, or remove these json's entirely if it is too noisy. During traige, review parallel processes for further suspicious behavior. Typically, the process executing the `.ps1` ingestor will be PowerShell.
@@ -23805,7 +23805,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the ana
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23819,7 +23819,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Discovery Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "42b4b438-beed-11eb-ba1d-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23840,7 +23840,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*bloodhound.zip", "*_computers.json", "*_gpos.json", "*_domains.json", "*_users.json", "*_groups.json", "*_ous.json", "*_containers.json") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id  Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_file_modifications_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies SharpHound binary usage by using the original filena,e. In addition to renaming the PE, other coverage is available to detect command-line arguments. This particular analytic looks for the original_file_name of `SharpHound.exe` and the process name. It is possible older instances of SharpHound.exe have different original filenames. Dependent upon the operator, the code may be re-compiled and the attributes removed or changed to anything else. During triage, review the metadata of the binary in question. Review parallel processes for suspicious behavior. Identify the source of this binary.
@@ -23852,7 +23852,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this is
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23866,7 +23866,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Discovery Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dd04b29a-beed-11eb-87bc-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23887,7 +23887,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sharphound.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=SharpHound.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_sharphound_usage_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect suspicious processnames using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect suspicious processnames using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic uses a pre-trained Deep Learning model to predict whether a processname is suspicious or not. Malwares and malicious programs such as ransomware often use tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) such as copying malicious files to the local machine to propagate themselves across the network. A key indicator of compromise is that after a successful execution of the malware, it copies itself as an executable file with a randomly generated filename and places this file in one of the directories. Such techniques are seen in several malwares such as TrickBot. We develop machine learning model that uses a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) to distinguish between malicious and benign processnames. The model is trained independently and is then made available for download. We use a character level RNN to classify malicious vs. benign processnames. The higher is_malicious_prob, the more likely is the processname to be suspicious (between [0,1]). The threshold for flagging a processname as suspicious is set as 0.5. 
@@ -23899,7 +23899,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if a suspicio
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect suspicious processnames using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect suspicious processnames using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23913,7 +23913,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect suspicious processnames using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect suspicious processnames using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a15f8977-ad7d-4669-92ef-b59b97219bf5", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23928,7 +23928,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename process_name as text | fields text, parent_process_name, process, user, dest | apply detect_suspicious_processnames_using_pretrained_model_in_dsdl | rename predicted_label as is_suspicious_score | rename text as process_name | where is_suspicious_score > 0.5 | `detect_suspicious_processnames_using_pretrained_model_in_dsdl_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for the execution of the cscript.exe or wscript.exe processes, with a parent of cmd.exe. The search will return the count, the first and last time this execution was seen on a machine, the user, and the destination of the machine
@@ -23940,7 +23940,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection may also be triggered by legi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -23954,7 +23954,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162039e", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -23975,7 +23975,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="cmd.exe" (Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name =wscript.exe) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_use_of_cmd_exe_to_launch_script_interpreters_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is used to detect the abuse of web applications by adversaries. Adversaries may install a backdoor or script onto web servers by exploiting known vulnerabilities or misconfigruations. Web shells are used to establish persistent access to systems and provide a set of executable functions or a command-line interface on the system hosting the Web server.
@@ -23987,7 +23987,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate OS functions called by vendor app
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24001,7 +24001,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "CISA AA22-257A", "CISA AA22-264A", "Citrix ShareFile RCE CVE-2023-24489", "Flax Typhoon", "HAFNIUM Group", "ProxyNotShell", "ProxyShell", "SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability", "WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "22597426-6dbd-49bd-bcdc-4ec19857192f", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24022,7 +24022,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN ("arp.exe","at.exe","bash.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","cmd.exe","cscript.exe", "dsget.exe","dsquery.exe","find.exe","findstr.exe","fsutil.exe","hostname.exe","ipconfig.exe","ksh.exe","nbstat.exe", "net.exe","net1.exe","netdom.exe","netsh.exe","netstat.exe","nltest.exe","nslookup.exe","ntdsutil.exe","pathping.exe", "ping.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","qprocess.exe","query.exe","qwinsta.exe","reg.exe","rundll32.exe","sc.exe", "scrcons.exe","schtasks.exe","sh.exe","systeminfo.exe","tasklist.exe","tracert.exe","ver.exe","vssadmin.exe", "wevtutil.exe","whoami.exe","wmic.exe","wscript.exe","wusa.exe","zsh.exe") AND Processes.parent_process_name IN ("w3wp.exe", "http*.exe", "nginx*.exe", "php*.exe", "php-cgi*.exe","tomcat*.exe")) by Processes.dest,Processes.user,Processes.parent_process,Processes.parent_process_name,Processes.process,Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_webshell_exploit_behavior_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation.  WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\
@@ -24044,7 +24044,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible some applications will create
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -24058,7 +24058,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "01d9a0c2-cece-11eb-ab46-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24084,7 +24084,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventID=20 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer User Destination | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_wmi_event_subscription_persistence_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for specific command-line arguments that may indicate the execution of tools made by Nirsoft, which are legitimate, but may be abused by attackers. 
@@ -24096,7 +24096,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are pr
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24110,7 +24110,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1072"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3d8d201c-aa03-422d-b0ee-2e5ecf9718c0", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24131,7 +24131,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="* /stext *" OR Processes.process="* /scomma *" ) by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detection_of_tools_built_by_nirsoft_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable AMSI windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.
@@ -24143,7 +24143,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network operator may disable this feature of
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24157,7 +24157,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9c27ec42-d338-11eb-9044-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24178,7 +24178,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Script\\Settings\\AmsiEnable" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000000") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_amsi_through_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversary or malware gains access to an endpoint and begins to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) file will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.
@@ -24190,7 +24190,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable windows
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24204,7 +24204,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "aa4f695a-3024-11ec-9987-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24225,7 +24225,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = "*\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender*" Registry.registry_value_name IN ("DisableAntiSpyware","DisableAntiVirus") Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_antivirus_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is intended to detect a suspicious modification of the Windows registry to disable a Windows Defender feature. This technique is intended to bypass or evade detection from Windows Defender AV, specifically the BlockAtFirstSeen feature where it blocks suspicious files the first time seen on the host.
@@ -24237,7 +24237,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable windows
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24251,7 +24251,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "CISA AA23-347A", "IcedID", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2dd719ac-3021-11ec-97b4-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24272,7 +24272,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet*" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableBlockAtFirstSeen Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_blockatfirstseen_feature_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is intended to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable windows defender features. This technique attempts to bypass or evade detection from Windows Defender AV, specifically the Enhanced Notification feature where a user or admin would receive alerts.
@@ -24284,7 +24284,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = user may choose to disable windows defender
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24298,7 +24298,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "CISA AA23-347A", "IcedID", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dc65678c-301f-11ec-8e30-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24319,7 +24319,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = "*Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Reporting*" Registry.registry_value_name = DisableEnhancedNotifications Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_antivirus_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversary or malware gains access to an endpoint and begins to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) file will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.
@@ -24331,7 +24331,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable windows
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24345,7 +24345,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cc391750-3024-11ec-955a-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24366,7 +24366,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = "*\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\MpEngine*" Registry.registry_value_name = MpEnablePus Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_mpengine_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is intended to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable Windows Defender feature. This technique is intended to bypass or evade detection from Windows Defender AV product, specifically the spynet reporting for Defender telemetry.
@@ -24378,7 +24378,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable windows
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24392,7 +24392,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "CISA AA23-347A", "IcedID", "Qakbot", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "898debf4-3021-11ec-ba7c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24413,7 +24413,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet*" Registry.registry_value_name = SpynetReporting Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.user Registry.dest  | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_spynet_reporting_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is intended to detect a suspicious modification of the Windows registry to disable a Windows Defender feature. This technique is intended to bypass or evade detection from Windows Defender AV, specifically the feature that submits samples for further analysis.
@@ -24425,7 +24425,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable windows
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24439,7 +24439,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "CISA AA23-347A", "IcedID", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "73922ff8-3022-11ec-bf5e-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24460,7 +24460,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SpyNet*" Registry.registry_value_name = SubmitSamplesConsent Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000) BY _time span=1h Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_defender_submit_samples_consent_feature_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to identify modification in registry to disable ETW windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.
@@ -24472,7 +24472,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network operator may disable this feature of
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24486,7 +24486,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f0eacfa4-d33f-11eb-8f9d-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24507,7 +24507,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\.NETFramework\\ETWEnabled" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000000") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_etw_through_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect execution of wevtutil.exe to disable logs. This technique was seen in several ransomware to disable the event logs to evade alerts and detections.
@@ -24519,7 +24519,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network operator may disable audit event log
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24533,7 +24533,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Ransomware", "Rhysida Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "236e7c8e-c9d9-11eb-a824-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24554,7 +24554,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "wevtutil.exe" Processes.process = "*sl*" Processes.process = "*/e:false*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_logs_using_wevtutil_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disable Registry Tool - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search identifies modification of registry to disable the regedit or registry tools of the windows operating system. Since registry tool is a swiss knife in analyzing registry, malware such as RAT or trojan Spy disable this application to prevent the removal of their registry entry such as persistence, file less components and defense evasion.
@@ -24566,7 +24566,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disable Registry Tool - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24580,7 +24580,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disable Registry Tool - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NjRAT", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562", "T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cd2cf33c-9201-11eb-a10a-acde48001122", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24601,7 +24601,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\DisableRegistryTools" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") BY _time span=1h  Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_registry_tool_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disable Schedule Task - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious commandline to disable existing schedule task. This technique is used by adversaries or commodity malware like IcedID to disable security application (AV products) in the targetted host to evade detections. This TTP is a good pivot to check further why and what other process run before and after this detection. check which process execute the commandline and what task is disabled. parent child process is quite valuable in this scenario too.
@@ -24613,7 +24613,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin may disable problematic schedule task
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disable Schedule Task - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24627,7 +24627,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disable Schedule Task - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "db596056-3019-11ec-a9ff-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24648,7 +24648,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=*/change*  Processes.process=*/disable* by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_schedule_task_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable security audit logs. This technique was shared by a researcher to disable Security logs of windows by adding this registry. The Windows will think it is WinPE and will not log any event to the Security Log
@@ -24660,7 +24660,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24674,7 +24674,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "39ebdc68-25b9-11ec-aec7-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24695,7 +24695,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*\\Control\\MiniNt\\*") BY _time span=1h  Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_security_logs_using_minint_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows registry to prevent users from seeing all the files with hidden attributes. This event or techniques are known on some worm and trojan spy malware that will drop hidden files on the infected machine.
@@ -24707,7 +24707,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24721,7 +24721,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.001", "T1562.001", "T1564", "T1562", "T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6f3ccfa2-91fe-11eb-8f9b-acde48001122", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24736,7 +24736,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Advanced\\Hidden" OR (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Advanced\\HideFileExt" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") OR (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Advanced\\ShowSuperHidden" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000000" )) BY _time span=1h Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_show_hidden_files_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable UAC remote restriction. This technique was well documented in Microsoft page where attacker may modify this registry value to bypassed UAC feature of windows host. This is a good indicator that some tries to bypassed UAC to suspicious process or gain privilege escalation.
@@ -24748,7 +24748,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin may set this policy for non-critical m
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24762,7 +24762,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9928b732-210e-11ec-b65e-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24783,7 +24783,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System*" Registry.registry_value_name="LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001"  ) BY _time span=1h Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification to disable Windows hotkey (shortcut keys) for native Windows applications. This technique is commonly used to disable certain or several Windows applications like `taskmgr.exe` and `cmd.exe`. This technique is used to impair the analyst in analyzing and removing the attacker implant in compromised systems.
@@ -24795,7 +24795,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24809,7 +24809,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Registry Abuse", "XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562", "T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1490f224-ad8b-11eb-8c4f-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24830,7 +24830,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\*" AND Registry.registry_value_data= "HotKey Disabled" AND Registry.registry_value_name = "Debugger") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_app_hotkeys_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.
@@ -24842,7 +24842,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable this win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24856,7 +24856,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "CISA AA23-347A", "Ransomware", "RedLine Stealer", "Revil Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "79439cae-9200-11eb-a4d3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24877,7 +24877,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableOnAccessProtection" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableIOAVProtection" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableScriptScanning" AND Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the smartscreen protection of windows machine. This is windows feature provide an early warning system against website that might engage in phishing attack or malware distribution. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload.
@@ -24889,7 +24889,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable this win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -24903,7 +24903,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "664f0fd0-91ff-11eb-a56f-acde48001122", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24924,7 +24924,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\SmartScreenEnabled", "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\EnableSmartScreen") Registry.registry_value_data  IN ("Off", "0") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_smartscreen_protection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-ADUser` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-ADUser` is used to query for domain users. With the appropiate parameters, Get-ADUser allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\ Red Teams and adversaries alike use may abuse Get-ADUSer to enumerate these accounts and attempt to crack their passwords offline.
@@ -24936,7 +24936,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use search
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -24950,7 +24950,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "114c6bfe-9406-11ec-bcce-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -24971,7 +24971,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Get-ADUser*" AND ScriptBlockText="*4194304*") | stats count min(_time)  as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_get_aduser_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet with specific parameters. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainUser` is used to identify domain users and combining it with `-PreauthNotRequired` allows adversaries to discover domain accounts with Kerberos Pre Authentication disabled.\
@@ -24985,7 +24985,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerV
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -24999,7 +24999,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b0b34e2c-90de-11ec-baeb-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25021,7 +25021,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Get-DomainUser*" AND ScriptBlockText="*PreauthNotRequired*") | stats count min(_time)  as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `disabled_kerberos_pre_authentication_discovery_with_powerview_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disabling CMD Application - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to identify modification in registry to disable cmd prompt application. This technique is commonly seen in RAT, Trojan or WORM to prevent triaging or deleting there samples through cmd application which is one of the tool of analyst to traverse on directory and files.
@@ -25033,7 +25033,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disabling CMD Application - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25047,7 +25047,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disabling CMD Application - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NjRAT", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562", "T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ff86077c-9212-11eb-a1e6-acde48001122", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25068,7 +25068,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\DisableCMD" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_cmd_application_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = this search is to identify registry modification to disable control panel window. This technique is commonly seen in malware to prevent their artifacts , persistence removed on the infected machine.
@@ -25080,7 +25080,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25094,7 +25094,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562", "T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6ae0148e-9215-11eb-a94a-acde48001122", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25115,7 +25115,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\NoControlPanel" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_controlpanel_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disabling Defender Services - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disabling Defender Services - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversaries or malware gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution and to evade detections. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.
@@ -25127,7 +25127,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable windows
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disabling Defender Services - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling Defender Services - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25141,7 +25141,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disabling Defender Services - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling Defender Services - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "RedLine Stealer", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "911eacdc-317f-11ec-ad30-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25162,7 +25162,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = "*\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\*" AND (Registry.registry_path IN("*WdBoot*", "*WdFilter*", "*WdNisDrv*", "*WdNisSvc*","*WinDefend*", "*SecurityHealthService*")) AND Registry.registry_value_name = Start Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000004) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_defender_services_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to identifies suspicious firewall disabling using netsh application. this technique is commonly seen in malware that tries to communicate or download its component or other payload to its C2 server.
@@ -25174,7 +25174,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin may disable firewall during testing or
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25188,7 +25188,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6860a62c-9203-11eb-9e05-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25203,7 +25203,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process= "*firewall*" (Processes.process= "*off*" OR  Processes.process= "*disable*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_firewall_with_netsh_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to identify registry modification to disable folder options feature of windows to show hidden files, file extension and etc. This technique used by malware in combination if disabling show hidden files feature to hide their files and also to hide the file extension to lure the user base on file icons or fake file extensions.
@@ -25215,7 +25215,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25229,7 +25229,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "83776de4-921a-11eb-868a-acde48001122", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25250,7 +25250,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\NoFolderOptions" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_folderoptions_windows_feature_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disabling Net User Account - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disabling Net User Account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables a user account using the `net.exe` utility native to Windows. This technique may used by the adversaries to interrupt availability of such users to do their malicious act.
@@ -25262,7 +25262,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disabling Net User Account - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling Net User Account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25276,7 +25276,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disabling Net User Account - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling Net User Account - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c0325326-acd6-11eb-98c2-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25297,7 +25297,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process="*user*" AND Processes.process="*/active:no*" by  Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_net_user_account_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to identify modification of registry to disable run application in window start menu. this application is known to be a helpful shortcut to windows OS user to run known application and also to execute some reg or batch script. This technique is used malware to make cleaning of its infection more harder by preventing known application run easily through run shortcut.
@@ -25309,7 +25309,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25323,7 +25323,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562", "T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "de81bc46-9213-11eb-adc9-acde48001122", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25344,7 +25344,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\NoRun" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_norun_windows_app_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The search looks for modifications to registry keys that control the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC).
@@ -25356,7 +25356,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This registry key may be modified via admini
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25370,7 +25370,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "Azorult", "Remcos", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bbc644bc-37df-4e1a-9c88-ec9a53e2038c", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25391,7 +25391,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA* Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `disabling_remote_user_account_control_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following search identifies the modification of registry related in disabling the system restore of a machine. This event or behavior are seen in some RAT malware to make the restore of the infected machine  difficult and keep their infection on the box.
@@ -25403,7 +25403,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = in some cases admin can disable systemrestor
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25417,7 +25417,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NjRAT", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f4f837e2-91fb-11eb-8bf6-acde48001122", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25438,7 +25438,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SystemRestore\\DisableSR" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SystemRestore\\DisableConfig" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\SystemRestore\\DisableSR" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\SystemRestore\\DisableConfig" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") BY _time span=1h  Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_systemrestore_in_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disabling Task Manager - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to identifies modification of registry to disable the task manager of windows operating system. this event or technique are commonly seen in malware such as RAT, Trojan, TrojanSpy or worm to prevent the user to terminate their process.
@@ -25450,7 +25450,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin may disable this application for non t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disabling Task Manager - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25464,7 +25464,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disabling Task Manager - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NjRAT", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dac279bc-9202-11eb-b7fb-acde48001122", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25485,7 +25485,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\DisableTaskMgr" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disabling_task_manager_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection looks for the deletion of registry keys which disable LSA protection and MS Defender Device Guard.
@@ -25497,7 +25497,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Potential to be triggered by an administrato
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25511,7 +25511,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1556"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "45cd08f8-a2c9-4f4e-baab-e1a0c624b0ab", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25532,7 +25532,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as _time from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\LsaCfgFlags", "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\DeviceGuard\\*", "*\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL") Registry.action IN (deleted, unknown) by Registry.action Registry.registry_path Registry.process_guid Registry.dest Registry.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | join type=outer process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | table _time action dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process process_guid registry_path | `disabling_windows_local_security_authority_defences_via_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule]
+[ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments with a network connection. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. 
@@ -25544,7 +25544,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate third par
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25558,7 +25558,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Cobalt Strike", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f1c07594-a141-11eb-8407-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25579,7 +25579,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dllhost.exe Processes.action!="blocked" by host _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(?i)(dllhost\.exe.{0,4}$)" | rename dest as src | join host process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count latest(All_Traffic.dest) as dest latest(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip latest(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by host All_Traffic.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`] | `dllhost_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule]
+[ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = this search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type, TXT, A, AAAA, that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.
@@ -25591,7 +25591,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin nslookup usage
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25605,7 +25605,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Data Exfiltration", "Dynamic DNS", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2452e632-9e0d-11eb-bacd-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25626,7 +25626,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "nslookup.exe" Processes.process = "*-querytype=*" OR Processes.process="*-qt=*" OR Processes.process="*-q=*" OR Processes.process="-type=*" OR Processes.process="*-retry=*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dns_exfiltration_using_nslookup_app_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover  domain users. The `user` argument returns a list of all users registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -25638,7 +25638,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25647,7 +25647,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b1a8ce04-04c2-11ec-bea7-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25662,7 +25662,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="dsquery.exe" AND Processes.process = "*user*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule]
+[ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -25674,7 +25674,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25688,7 +25688,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Rhysida Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "98f6a534-04c2-11ec-96b2-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25709,7 +25709,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process = "* user*" AND Processes.process = "*/do*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_net_app_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule]
+[ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -25721,7 +25721,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25735,7 +25735,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "383572e0-04c5-11ec-bdcc-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25756,7 +25756,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="wmic.exe" AND Processes.process = "*/NAMESPACE:\\\\root\\directory\\ldap*" AND Processes.process = "*ds_user*" AND Processes.process = "*GET*" AND Processes.process = "*ds_samaccountname*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule]
+[ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments `/dclist:` and '/dsgetdc:', can be used to return a list of all domain controllers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use nltest.exe to identify domain controllers in a Windows Domain for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -25768,7 +25768,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25782,7 +25782,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "CISA AA23-347A", "Rhysida Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "41243735-89a7-4c83-bcdd-570aa78f00a1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25803,7 +25803,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="nltest.exe") (Processes.process="*/dclist:*" OR Processes.process="*/dsgetdc:*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_nltest_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule]
+[ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command line return a list of all domain controllers in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike use *.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -25815,7 +25815,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25824,7 +25824,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "64c7adaa-48ee-483c-b0d6-7175bc65e6cc", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25839,7 +25839,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe") (Processes.process="" OR Processes.process="*DomainControllerAddress*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_controller_discovery_with_wmic_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule]
+[ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -25851,7 +25851,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use Adsise
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -25865,7 +25865,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "089c862f-5f83-49b5-b1c8-7e4ff66560c7", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25886,7 +25886,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` (ScriptBlockText = "*[adsisearcher]*" AND ScriptBlockText = "*(objectcategory=group)*" AND ScriptBlockText = "*findAll()*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use may leverage dsquery.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -25898,7 +25898,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25907,7 +25907,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f0c9d62f-a232-4edd-b17e-bc409fb133d4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25922,7 +25922,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="dsquery.exe") (Processes.process="*group*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule]
+[ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The argument `group /domain`, returns a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -25934,7 +25934,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25943,7 +25943,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Prestige Ransomware", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f2f14ac7-fa81-471a-80d5-7eb65c3c7349", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25958,7 +25958,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="net.exe" OR Processes.process_name="net1.exe") (Processes.process=*group* AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_net_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule]
+[ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use wmic.exe to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -25970,7 +25970,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -25979,7 +25979,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a87736a6-95cd-4728-8689-3c64d5026b3e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -25994,7 +25994,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\root\\directory\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_group* AND Processes.process="*GET ds_samaccountname*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `domain_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule]
+[ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic will identify a suspicious download by the Telegram application on a Windows system. This behavior was identified on a honeypot where the adversary gained access, installed Telegram and followed through with downloading different network scanners (port, bruteforcer, masscan) to the system and later used to mapped the whole network and further move laterally.
@@ -26006,7 +26006,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = normal download of file in telegram app. (if
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -26020,7 +26020,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Phemedrone Stealer", "Snake Keylogger", "XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "58194e28-ae5e-11eb-8912-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26041,7 +26041,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode= 15 process_name = "telegram.exe" TargetFilename = "*:Zone.Identifier" |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest EventCode process_name process_id TargetFilename Hash | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `download_files_using_telegram_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule]
+[ESCU - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect dropping a suspicious file named as "license.dat" in %appdata%. This behavior seen in latest IcedID malware that contain the actual core bot that will be injected in other process to do banking stealing.
@@ -26053,7 +26053,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -26062,7 +26062,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b7a045fc-f14a-11eb-8e79-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26077,7 +26077,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode= 11  TargetFilename = "*\\license.dat" AND (TargetFilename="*\\appdata\\*" OR TargetFilename="*\\programdata\\*") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id  process_name dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_icedid_license_dat_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies "dsquery.exe" execution with arguments looking for `TrustedDomain` query directly on the command-line. This is typically indicative of an Administrator or adversary perform domain trust discovery. Note that this query does not identify any other variations of "Dsquery.exe" usage.\
@@ -26099,7 +26099,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. If there is a true
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -26113,7 +26113,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Domain Trust Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cc316032-924a-11eb-91a2-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26139,7 +26139,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe Processes.process=*trustedDomain* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dsquery_domain_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule]
+[ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the behavior of dumping credentials from memory, a tactic commonly used by adversaries to exploit the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) in Windows, which manages system-level authentication. The detection is made by monitoring logs with process information from endpoints and identifying instances where the rundll32 process is used in conjunction with the comsvcs.dll and MiniDump. This indicates potential LSASS dumping attempts used by threat actors to obtain valuable credentials. The detection is important because credential theft can lead to broader system compromise, persistence, lateral movement, and escalated privileges. No legitimate use of this technique has been identified yet. This behavior is often part of more extensive attack campaigns and is associated with numerous threat groups that use the stolen credentials to access sensitive information or systems, leading to data theft, ransomware attacks, or other damaging outcomes. False positives can occur since legitimate uses of the LSASS process can cause benign activities to be flagged. Next steps include reviewing the processes involved in the LSASS dumping attempt after triage and inspecting any relevant on-disk artifacts and concurrent processes to identify the attack source.
@@ -26151,7 +26151,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -26165,7 +26165,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-257A", "CISA AA22-264A", "Credential Dumping", "Data Destruction", "Flax Typhoon", "HAFNIUM Group", "Industroyer2", "Living Off The Land", "Prestige Ransomware", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8943b567-f14d-4ee8-a0bb-2121d4ce3184", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26186,7 +26186,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*comsvcs.dll* Processes.process=*MiniDump* by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_comsvcs_dll_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule]
+[ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Detect procdump.exe dumping the lsass process. This query looks for both -mm and -ma usage. -mm will produce a mini dump file and -ma will write a dump file with all process memory. Both are highly suspect and should be reviewed. This query does not monitor for the internal name (original_file_name=procdump) of the PE or look for procdump64.exe. Modify the query as needed.\
@@ -26200,7 +26200,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -26214,7 +26214,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-257A", "Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3742ebfe-64c2-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26236,7 +26236,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_procdump` (Processes.process=*-ma* OR Processes.process=*-mm*) Processes.process=*lsass* by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `dump_lsass_via_procdump_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule]
+[ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe`  with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific elevated domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.
@@ -26248,7 +26248,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -26262,7 +26262,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a23a0e20-0b1b-4a07-82e5-ec5f70811e7a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26283,7 +26283,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="net.exe" OR Processes.process_name="net1.exe") (Processes.process="*group*" AND Processes.process="*/do*") (Processes.process="*Domain Admins*" OR Processes.process="*Enterprise Admins*" OR Processes.process="*Schema Admins*" OR Processes.process="*Account Operators*" OR Processes.process="*Server Operators*" OR Processes.process="*Protected Users*" OR Processes.process="*Dns Admins*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_net_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule]
+[ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroupMember` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroupMember` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroupMember` is used to list the members of an specific domain group. Red Teams and adversaries alike use PowerView to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.
@@ -26295,7 +26295,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -26304,7 +26304,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "10d62950-0de5-4199-a710-cff9ea79b413", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26319,7 +26319,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (Message = "*Get-DomainGroupMember*") AND Message IN ("*Domain Admins*","*Enterprise Admins*", "*Schema Admins*", "*Account Operators*" , "*Server Operators*", "*Protected Users*",  "*Dns Admins*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message ComputerName User | rename ComputerName as dest, User as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_powerview_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule]
+[ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for specific domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate elevated domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery to identify high privileged users.
@@ -26331,7 +26331,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -26345,7 +26345,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3f6bbf22-093e-4cb4-9641-83f47b8444b6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26366,7 +26366,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\root\\directory\\ldap*) (Processes.process="*Domain Admins*" OR Processes.process="*Enterprise Admins*" OR Processes.process="*Schema Admins*" OR Processes.process="*Account Operators*" OR Processes.process="*Server Operators*" OR Processes.process="*Protected Users*" OR Processes.process="*Dns Admins*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `elevated_group_discovery_with_wmic_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule]
+[ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a modification to registry to enable rdp to a machine with different port number. This technique was seen in some atttacker tries to do lateral movement and remote access to a compromised machine to gain control of it.
@@ -26378,7 +26378,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -26392,7 +26392,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "99495452-b899-11eb-96dc-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26413,7 +26413,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\\WinStations\\RDP-Tcp*" Registry.registry_value_name = "PortNumber") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `enable_rdp_in_other_port_number_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to enable plain text credential feature of windows. This technique was used by several malware and also by mimikatz to be able to dumpe the a plain text credential to the compromised or target host. This TTP is really a good indicator that someone wants to dump the crendential of the host so it must be a good pivot for credential dumping techniques.
@@ -26425,7 +26425,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -26439,7 +26439,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-320A", "Credential Dumping", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0c7d8ffe-25b1-11ec-9f39-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26460,7 +26460,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest\\*" Registry.registry_value_name = "UseLogonCredential" Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000001) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule]
+[ESCU - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic will detect a suspicious Telegram process enumerating all network users in a local group. This technique was seen in a Monero infected honeypot to mapped all the users on the compromised system. EventCode 4798 is generated when a process enumerates a user's security-enabled local groups on a computer or device.
@@ -26472,7 +26472,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -26486,7 +26486,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fcd74532-ae54-11eb-a5ab-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26507,7 +26507,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4798  CallerProcessName = "*\\telegram.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user Computer EventCode CallerProcessName  ProcessID SubjectUserSid SubjectDomainName  SubjectLogonId | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `enumerate_users_local_group_using_telegram_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule]
+[ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the process - `esentutl.exe` - being used to capture credentials stored in ntds.dit or the SAM file on disk. During triage, review parallel processes and determine if legitimate activity. Upon determination of illegitimate activity, take further action to isolate and contain the threat.
@@ -26519,7 +26519,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -26528,7 +26528,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d372f928-ce4f-11eb-a762-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26543,7 +26543,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_esentutl` Processes.process IN ("*ntds*", "*SAM*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `esentutl_sam_copy_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide its execution from audit logs.
@@ -26555,7 +26555,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -26569,7 +26569,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.006", "T1127", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8ed523ac-276b-11ec-ac39-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26590,7 +26590,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\.NETFramework*" Registry.registry_value_name = ETWEnabled Registry.registry_value_data=0x00000000) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `etw_registry_disabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following search identifies Eventvwr bypass by identifying the registry modification into a specific path that eventvwr.msc looks to (but is not valid) upon execution. A successful attack will include a suspicious command to be executed upon eventvwr.msc loading. Upon triage, review the parallel processes that have executed. Identify any additional registry modifications on the endpoint that may look suspicious. Remediate as necessary.
@@ -26602,7 +26602,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some false positives may be present and will
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -26616,7 +26616,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9cf8fe08-7ad8-11eb-9819-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26637,7 +26637,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*mscfile\\shell\\open\\command\\*") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `eventvwr_uac_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written.
@@ -26649,7 +26649,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -26663,7 +26663,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "42d40a22-9be3-11eb-8f08-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26684,7 +26684,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="excel.exe" `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule]
+[ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly.
@@ -26696,7 +26696,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -26710,7 +26710,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "57fe880a-9be3-11eb-9bf3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26731,7 +26731,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="excel.exe" Processes.process_name IN ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe")  by Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule]
+[ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic will identify suspicious series of command-line to disable several services. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services or other malware services to complete the objective on the compromised system.
@@ -26743,7 +26743,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -26757,7 +26757,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8fa2a0f0-acd9-11eb-8994-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26772,7 +26772,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where   Processes.process_name = "sc.exe" AND Processes.process="*config*" OR Processes.process="*Disabled*" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=4 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_attempt_to_disable_services_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp - Rule]
+[ESCU - Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic will identify suspicious series of process executions.  We have observed that post exploit framework tools like Koadic and Meterpreter will launch an excessive number of processes with distinct file paths from Windows\Temp to execute actions on objective.  This behavior is extremely anomalous compared to typical application behaviors that use Windows\Temp.
@@ -26784,7 +26784,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Many benign applications will create process
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -26798,7 +26798,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Meterpreter"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "23587b6a-c479-11eb-b671-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26813,7 +26813,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_process_count  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = "*\\Windows\\Temp\\*" by Processes.dest Processes.user  _time span=20m | where distinct_process_count > 37 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_distinct_processes_from_windows_temp_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule]
+[ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies excessive file deletion events in the Windows Defender folder. This technique was observed in the WhisperGate malware campaign, where adversaries exploited Nirsoft's advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privileges and then executed PowerShell commands to delete files within the Windows Defender application folder. Such behavior is a strong indicator that the offending process is attempting to corrupt a Windows Defender installation.
@@ -26825,7 +26825,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Windows Defender AV updates may trigger this
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -26839,7 +26839,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Data Destruction", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b5baa09a-7a05-11ec-8da4-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26860,7 +26860,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode IN ("23","26") TargetFilename = "*\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\*" | stats count, values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime by user, dest, signature, signature_id, Image, process_name, process_guid | rename Image as process | where count >=50 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_file_deletion_in_windefender_folder_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection targets behaviors observed when threat actors have used sc.exe to modify services. We observed malware in a honey pot spawning numerous sc.exe processes in a short period of time, presumably to impair defenses, possibly to block others from compromising the same machine.  This detection will alert when we see both an excessive number of sc.exe processes launched with specific commandline arguments to disable the start of certain services.
@@ -26872,7 +26872,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate programs and administrators will
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -26886,7 +26886,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "77592bec-d5cc-11eb-9e60-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26901,7 +26901,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` distinct_count(Processes.process) as distinct_cmdlines values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = "sc.exe" AND Processes.process="*start= disabled*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_id, _time span=30m | where distinct_cmdlines >= 8 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_service_control_start_as_disabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule]
+[ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection targets behaviors observed in post exploit kits like Meterpreter and Koadic that are run in memory.  We have observed that these tools must invoke an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes to complete various actions (discovery, lateral movement, etc.).  It is extremely uncommon in the course of normal operations to see so many distinct taskhost and taskhostex processes running concurrently in a short time frame.
@@ -26913,7 +26913,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators, administrative actions or ce
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -26927,7 +26927,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Meterpreter"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f443dac2-c7cf-11eb-ab51-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26942,7 +26942,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = "taskhost.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "taskhostex.exe" BY Processes.dest Processes.process_name _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval pid_count=mvcount(process_ids) | eval taskhost_count_=if(process_name == "taskhost.exe", pid_count, 0) | eval taskhostex_count_=if(process_name == "taskhostex.exe", pid_count, 0) | stats sum(taskhost_count_) as taskhost_count, sum(taskhostex_count_) as taskhostex_count by _time, dest, firstTime, lastTime | where taskhost_count > 10 or taskhostex_count > 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule]
+[ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multiple services on a system using either `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. This technique is use by adversaries to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections.
@@ -26954,7 +26954,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -26968,7 +26968,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Ransomware", "XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ae8d3f4a-acd7-11eb-8846-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -26983,7 +26983,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR  Processes.process_name = "sc.exe" OR  Processes.process_name = "net1.exe" AND Processes.process="*stop*" OR Processes.process="*delete*" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=5 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_service_stop_attempt_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule]
+[ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `cacls.exe`, `xcacls.exe` or `icacls.exe` application to change file or folder permission. This behavior is commonly seen where the adversary attempts to impair some users from deleting or accessing its malware components or artifact from the compromised system.
@@ -26995,7 +26995,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or administrative scripts may
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -27009,7 +27009,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation", "XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0bdf6092-af17-11eb-939a-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27024,7 +27024,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id  values(Processes.process_name) as process_name count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "cacls.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "icacls.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "XCACLS.exe" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_cacls_app_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule]
+[ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a bucket of time (1 minute). This behavior was seen in a Monero incident where the adversary attempts to create many users, delete and disable users as part of its malicious behavior.
@@ -27036,7 +27036,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown. Filter as needed. Modify the time s
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -27050,7 +27050,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Prestige Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation", "XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "45e52536-ae42-11eb-b5c6-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27065,7 +27065,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_net_app_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule]
+[ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect potential DNS exfiltration using nslookup application. This technique are seen in couple of malware and APT group to exfiltrated collected data in a infected machine or infected network. This detection is looking for unique use of nslookup where it tries to use specific record type (TXT, A, AAAA) that are commonly used by attacker and also the retry parameter which is designed to query C2 DNS multiple tries.
@@ -27077,7 +27077,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -27091,7 +27091,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Data Exfiltration", "Dynamic DNS", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0a69fdaa-a2b8-11eb-b16d-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27106,7 +27106,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = "nslookup.exe" | bucket _time span=1m | stats count as numNsLookup by dest, _time | eventstats avg(numNsLookup) as avgNsLookup, stdev(numNsLookup) as stdNsLookup, count as numSlots by dest | eval upperThreshold=(avgNsLookup + stdNsLookup *3) | eval isOutlier=if(numNsLookup > 20 and numNsLookup >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_nslookup_app_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule]
+[ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation.
@@ -27118,7 +27118,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = excessive execution of sc.exe is quite suspi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -27132,7 +27132,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cb6b339e-d4c6-11eb-a026-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27147,7 +27147,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode = 1 process_name = "sc.exe" |  bucket _time span=15m | stats values(process) as process count as numScExe by dest, _time |  eventstats avg(numScExe) as avgScExe, stdev(numScExe) as stdScExe, count as numSlots by dest |  eval upperThreshold=(avgScExe + stdScExe *3) |  eval isOutlier=if(avgScExe > 5 and avgScExe >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) |  search isOutlier=1 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule]
+[ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies excessive usage of `taskkill.exe` application. This application is commonly used by adversaries to evade detections by killing security product processes or even other processes to evade detection.
@@ -27159,7 +27159,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -27173,7 +27173,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "Azorult", "CISA AA22-264A", "CISA AA22-277A", "NjRAT", "XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fe5bca48-accb-11eb-a67c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27188,7 +27188,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "taskkill.exe"  by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `excessive_usage_of_taskkill_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule]
+[ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This analytic identifies suspicious behavior related to ProxyShell against on-premise Microsoft Exchange servers. This analytic has been replaced by GUID d436f9e7-0ee7-4a47-864b-6dea2c4e2752 which utilizes the Web Datamodel.\
@@ -27212,7 +27212,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives, however, tune as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -27226,7 +27226,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "ProxyNotShell", "ProxyShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "29228ab4-0762-11ec-94aa-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27253,7 +27253,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `exchange` c_uri="*//autodiscover*" cs_uri_query="*PowerShell*" cs_method="POST" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, cs_uri_query, cs_method, c_uri | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_abuse_via_ssrf_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule]
+[ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the usage of Exchange PowerShell modules that were recently used for a proof of concept related to ProxyShell. Adversaries may abuse a limited set of PwSh Modules related to Exchange once gained access via ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell.\
@@ -27273,7 +27273,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -27287,7 +27287,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "CISA AA22-264A", "CISA AA22-277A", "ProxyNotShell", "ProxyShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2d10095e-05ae-11ec-8fdf-acde48001122", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27312,7 +27312,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN ("*New-MailboxExportRequest*", "*New-ManagementRoleAssignment*", "*New-MailboxSearch*", "*Get-Recipient*", "Search-Mailbox") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exchange_powershell_module_usage_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule]
+[ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies executable files (.exe or .dll) being written to Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The Trickbot malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network.
@@ -27324,7 +27324,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = System Administrators may use looks like PsE
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -27338,7 +27338,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Data Destruction", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Hermetic Wiper", "IcedID", "Industroyer2", "Prestige Ransomware", "Trickbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f63c34fe-a435-11eb-935a-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27359,7 +27359,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 RelativeTargetName IN ("*.exe","*.dll") ObjectType=File ShareName IN ("\\\\*\\C$","\\\\*\\IPC$","\\\\*\\admin$") AccessMask= "0x2" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by EventCode ShareName RelativeTargetName ObjectType AccessMask src_user src_port IpAddress | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  | `executable_file_written_in_administrative_smb_share_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies potentially malicious executables or scripts by examining a list of suspicious file paths on Windows Operating System. The purpose of this technique is to uncover files with known file extensions that could be used by adversaries to evade detection and persistence. The suspicious file paths selected for investigation are typically uncommon and uncommonly associated with executable or script files. By scrutinizing these paths, we can proactively identify potential security threats and enhance overall system security.
@@ -27371,7 +27371,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may allow creation of script
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -27385,7 +27385,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "Amadey", "AsyncRAT", "Azorult", "BlackByte Ransomware", "Brute Ratel C4", "CISA AA23-347A", "Chaos Ransomware", "DarkCrystal RAT", "DarkGate Malware", "Data Destruction", "Double Zero Destructor", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Hermetic Wiper", "IcedID", "Industroyer2", "LockBit Ransomware", "NjRAT", "PlugX", "Qakbot", "RedLine Stealer", "Remcos", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Snake Keylogger", "Swift Slicer", "Trickbot", "Volt Typhoon", "Warzone RAT", "WhisperGate", "XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a7e3f0f0-ae42-11eb-b245-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27400,7 +27400,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js OR Filesystem.file_name = *.ps1 OR Filesystem.file_name = *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) AND ( Filesystem.file_path = *\\windows\\fonts\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\windows\\temp\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\users\\public\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\windows\\debug\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Windows\\servicing\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Users\\Default\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *Recycle.bin* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Windows\\Media\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\Windows\\repair\\* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\AppData\\Local\\Temp* OR Filesystem.file_path = *\\PerfLogs\\*) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id  Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `executables_or_script_creation_in_suspicious_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule]
+[ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique.
@@ -27412,7 +27412,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -27426,7 +27426,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dc64d064-d346-11eb-8588-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27447,7 +27447,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "cscript.exe" Processes.process="*-e:{F414C262-6AC0-11CF-B6D1-00AA00BBBB58}*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule]
+[ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for processes launched from files that have double extensions in the file name. This is typically done to obscure the "real" file extension and make it appear as though the file being accessed is a data file, as opposed to executable content.
@@ -27459,7 +27459,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -27473,7 +27473,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AsyncRAT", "DarkGate Malware", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b06a555e-dce0-417d-a2eb-28a5d8d66ef7", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27494,7 +27494,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN ("*.doc.exe", "*.xls.exe","*.ppt.exe", "*.htm.exe", "*.html.exe", "*.txt.exe", "*.pdf.exe", "*.docx.exe", "*.xlsx.exe", "*.pptx.exe","*.one.exe", "*.bat.exe", "*rtf.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `execution_of_file_with_multiple_extensions_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule]
+[ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk.
@@ -27506,7 +27506,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible some agent based products wil
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -27520,7 +27520,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-257A", "CISA AA23-347A", "Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8bbb7d58-b360-11eb-ba21-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27541,7 +27541,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` (Processes.process=*save* OR Processes.process=*export*) AND (Processes.process="*\sam *" OR Processes.process="*\system *" OR Processes.process="*\security *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `extraction_of_registry_hives_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - File with Samsam Extension - Rule]
+[ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects file writes with extensions that are consistent with a SamSam ransomware attack to proactively detect and respond to potential SamSam ransomware attacks, minimizing the impact and reducing the likelihood of successful ransomware infections. This detection is made by a Splunk query to search for specific file extensions that are commonly associated with SamSam ransomware, such as .stubbin, .berkshire, .satoshi, .sophos, and .keyxml. This identifies file extensions in the file names of the written files. If any file write events with these extensions are found, it suggests a potential SamSam ransomware attack. This detection is important because SamSam ransomware is a highly destructive and financially motivated attack and suggests that the organization is at risk of having its files encrypted and held for ransom, which can lead to significant financial losses, operational disruptions, and reputational damage. False positives might occur since legitimate files with these extensions can exist in the environment. Therefore, next steps include conducting a careful analysis and triage to confirm the presence of a SamSam ransomware attack. Next steps include taking immediate action to contain the attack, mitigate the impact, and prevent further spread of the ransomware. This might involve isolating affected systems, restoring encrypted files from backups, and conducting a thorough investigation to identify the attack source and prevent future incidents.
@@ -27553,7 +27553,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Because these extensions are not typically u
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - File with Samsam Extension - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -27567,7 +27567,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - File with Samsam Extension - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "02c6cfc2-ae66-4735-bfc7-6291da834cbf", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27588,7 +27588,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rex field=file_name "(?<file_extension>\.[^\.]+)$" | search file_extension=.stubbin OR file_extension=.berkshire OR file_extension=.satoshi OR file_extension=.sophos OR file_extension=.keyxml | `file_with_samsam_extension_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule]
+[ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule allowing to execute specific application. This technique was identified when an adversary and red teams to bypassed firewall file execution restriction in a targetted host. Take note that this event or command can run by administrator during testing or allowing legitimate tool or application.
@@ -27600,7 +27600,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -27614,7 +27614,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "BlackByte Ransomware", "NjRAT", "PlugX", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9a8f63a8-43ac-11ec-904c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27629,7 +27629,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*firewall*" Processes.process = "*allow*" Processes.process = "*add*" Processes.process = "*ENABLE*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `firewall_allowed_program_enable_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule]
+[ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for child processes spawned by zoom.exe or zoom.us that has not previously been seen. 
@@ -27641,7 +27641,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A new child process of zoom isn't malicious
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -27655,7 +27655,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Zoom Child Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e91bd102-d630-4e76-ab73-7e3ba22c5961", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27670,7 +27670,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup zoom_first_time_child_process dest as dest process_name as process_name OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_window`") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | table firstTime dest, process_id, process_name, parent_process_id, parent_process_name |`first_time_seen_child_process_of_zoom_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule]
+[ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for the first and last time a Windows service is seen running in your environment. This table is then cached. 
@@ -27682,7 +27682,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A previously unseen service is not necessari
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -27696,7 +27696,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Service Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "823136f2-d755-4b6d-ae04-372b486a5808", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27711,7 +27711,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+) service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" | where state="running" | lookup previously_seen_running_windows_services service as service OUTPUT firstTimeSeen | where isnull(firstTimeSeen) OR firstTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_windows_services_window`) | table _time dest service | `first_time_seen_running_windows_service_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Fodhelper.exe has a known UAC bypass as it attempts to look for specific registry keys upon execution, that do not exist. Therefore, an attacker can write its malicious commands in these registry keys to be executed by fodhelper.exe with the highest privilege.\
@@ -27731,7 +27731,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited to no false positives are expected.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -27745,7 +27745,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1548.002", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "909f8fd8-7ac8-11eb-a1f3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27770,7 +27770,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=fodhelper.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fodhelper_uac_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule]
+[ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host.
@@ -27782,7 +27782,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -27796,7 +27796,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["LockBit Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4e5e024e-fabb-11eb-8b8f-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27817,7 +27817,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe Processes.process="*setzerodata*" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  Processes.process Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fsutil_zeroing_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -27829,7 +27829,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -27838,7 +27838,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "36e46ebe-065a-11ec-b4c7-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27853,7 +27853,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -27865,7 +27865,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -27874,7 +27874,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1ff7ccc8-065a-11ec-91e4-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27889,7 +27889,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText ="*Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user |  `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. The `Get-AdUser' commandlet returns a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -27901,7 +27901,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -27910,7 +27910,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0b6ee3f4-04e3-11ec-a87d-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27925,7 +27925,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*Get-ADUser*" AND Processes.process = "*-filter*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGUser` commandlet. The `Get-AdUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -27937,7 +27937,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -27946,7 +27946,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "21432e40-04f4-11ec-b7e6-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -27961,7 +27961,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*get-aduser*" ScriptBlockText = "*-filter*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -27973,7 +27973,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -27987,7 +27987,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8b5ef342-065a-11ec-b0fc-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28008,7 +28008,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -28020,7 +28020,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -28034,7 +28034,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "737e1eb0-065a-11ec-921a-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28055,7 +28055,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText="*Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_aduserresultantpasswordpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` executing the `Get-DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -28067,7 +28067,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -28081,7 +28081,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b8f9947e-065a-11ec-aafb-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28102,7 +28102,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*Get-DomainPolicy*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get DomainPolicy` commandlet used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerShell to enumerate domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -28114,7 +28114,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -28128,7 +28128,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a360d2b2-065a-11ec-b0bf-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28149,7 +28149,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText ="*Get-DomainPolicy*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainpolicy_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies Get-DomainTrust from PowerView in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity.
@@ -28161,7 +28161,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives as this requires an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -28175,7 +28175,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 40, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4fa7f846-054a-11ec-a836-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28196,7 +28196,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*get-domaintrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all.\
@@ -28214,7 +28214,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible certain system management fra
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -28228,7 +28228,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 40, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "89275e7e-0548-11ec-bf75-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28252,7 +28252,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*get-domaintrust*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domaintrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to enumerate domain users. `Get-DomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -28264,7 +28264,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -28278,7 +28278,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9a5a41d6-04e7-11ec-923c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28299,7 +28299,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*Get-DomainUser*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` commandlet. `GetDomainUser` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -28311,7 +28311,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -28325,7 +28325,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "61994268-04f4-11ec-865c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28346,7 +28346,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Get-DomainUser*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_domainuser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies Get-ForestTrust from PowerSploit in order to gather domain trust information. Typically, this is utilized within a script being executed and used to enumerate the domain trust information. This grants the adversary an understanding of how large or small the domain is. During triage, review parallel processes using an EDR product or 4688 events. It will be important to understand the timeline of events around this activity.
@@ -28358,7 +28358,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives as this requires an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -28372,7 +28372,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 40, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "584f4884-0bf1-11ec-a5ec-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28393,7 +28393,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process=*get-foresttrust* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all.\
@@ -28411,7 +28411,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as need
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -28425,7 +28425,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 40, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "70fac80e-0bf1-11ec-9ba0-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28449,7 +28449,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*get-foresttrust*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_foresttrust_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. \ Typically, by itself, is not malicious but may raise suspicion based on time of day, endpoint and username. \ During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.
@@ -28461,7 +28461,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as need
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -28470,7 +28470,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5434f670-155d-11ec-8cca-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28485,7 +28485,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process="*Get-WMIObject*" AND Processes.process="*Win32_Group*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`  | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule]
+[ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all.\
@@ -28503,7 +28503,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as need
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -28512,7 +28512,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "69df7f7c-155d-11ec-a055-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28527,7 +28527,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Get-WMIObject*" AND ScriptBlockText = "*Win32_Group*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-AdComputer' commandlet returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -28539,7 +28539,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -28548,7 +28548,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c5a31f80-5888-4d81-9f78-1cc65026316e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28563,7 +28563,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-AdComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -28575,7 +28575,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -28584,7 +28584,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "CISA AA22-320A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a9a1da02-8e27-4bf7-a348-f4389c9da487", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28599,7 +28599,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Get-AdComputer*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getadcomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlnet is used to return a list of all groups available in a Windows Domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -28611,7 +28611,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -28620,7 +28620,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "872e3063-0fc4-4e68-b2f3-f2b99184a708", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28635,7 +28635,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-AdGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-AdGroup` commandlet. The `Get-AdGroup` commandlet is used to return a list of all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -28647,7 +28647,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -28656,7 +28656,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e4c73d68-794b-468d-b4d0-dac1772bbae7", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28671,7 +28671,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Get-ADGroup*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getadgroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powerhsell.exe` with command-line arguments that execute the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -28683,7 +28683,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -28692,7 +28692,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7eb9c3d5-c98c-4088-acc5-8240bad15379", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28707,7 +28707,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity* OR Processes.process=*GetCurrent()*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This method returns an object that represents the current Windows user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -28719,7 +28719,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -28728,7 +28728,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "80879283-c30f-44f7-8471-d1381f6d437a", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28743,7 +28743,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]*"  ScriptBlockText = "*GetCurrent()*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getcurrent_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -28755,7 +28755,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerV
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -28769,7 +28769,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ed550c19-712e-43f6-bd19-6f58f61b3a5e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28790,7 +28790,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainComputer*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainComputer` commandlet. `GetDomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -28802,7 +28802,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerV
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -28816,7 +28816,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f64da023-b988-4775-8d57-38e512beb56e", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28837,7 +28837,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Get-DomainComputer*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincomputer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -28849,7 +28849,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use PowerV
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -28858,7 +28858,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "868ee0e4-52ab-484a-833a-6d85b7c028d0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28873,7 +28873,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainController*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainController` commandlet. `Get-DomainController` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use PowerView to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -28885,7 +28885,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -28899,7 +28899,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "676b600a-a94d-4951-b346-11329431e6c1", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28920,7 +28920,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Get-DomainController*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaincontroller_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -28932,7 +28932,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -28946,7 +28946,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "93c94be3-bead-4a60-860f-77ca3fe59903", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -28967,7 +28967,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-DomainGroup*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainGroup` commandlet. `Get-DomainGroup` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration on Windows domains. As the name suggests, `Get-DomainGroup` is used to query domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this function to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -28979,7 +28979,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -28993,7 +28993,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "09725404-a44f-4ed3-9efa-8ed5d69e4c53", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29014,7 +29014,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Get-DomainGroup*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getdomaingroup_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -29026,7 +29026,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -29035,7 +29035,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "85fae8fa-0427-11ec-8b78-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29050,7 +29050,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-LocalUser*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet. The `Get-LocalUser` commandlet is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -29062,7 +29062,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -29071,7 +29071,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2e891cbe-0426-11ec-9c9c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29086,7 +29086,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Get-LocalUser*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getlocaluser_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. The `Get-NetTcpConnection` commandlet lists the current TCP connections. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -29098,7 +29098,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -29107,7 +29107,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e02af35c-1de5-4afe-b4be-f45aba57272b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29122,7 +29122,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-NetTcpConnection*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-NetTcpconnection ` commandlet. This commandlet is used to return a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use this commandlet for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -29134,7 +29134,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -29143,7 +29143,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "091712ff-b02a-4d43-82ed-34765515d95d", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29158,7 +29158,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Get-NetTcpconnection*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getnettcpconnection_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `DS_Computer` parameter can be used to return a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -29170,7 +29170,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -29184,7 +29184,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7141122c-3bc2-4aaa-ab3b-7a85a0bbefc3", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29205,7 +29205,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process="*namespace root\\directory\\ldap*" AND Processes.process="*class ds_computer*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_Computer` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -29217,7 +29217,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -29231,7 +29231,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "29b99201-723c-4118-847a-db2b3d3fb8ea", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29252,7 +29252,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=*Get-WmiObject* AND ScriptBlockText="*namespace root\\directory\\ldap*" AND ScriptBlockText="*class ds_computer*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_computer_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain groups. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_group` parameter can be used to return the full list of groups in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -29264,7 +29264,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -29278,7 +29278,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "df275a44-4527-443b-b884-7600e066e3eb", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29299,7 +29299,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process="*namespace root\\directory\\ldap*" AND Processes.process="*class ds_group*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters . The `DS_Group` parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain groups for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -29311,7 +29311,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -29325,7 +29325,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "67740bd3-1506-469c-b91d-effc322cc6e5", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29346,7 +29346,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText=*Get-WmiObject* AND ScriptBlockText="*namespace root\\directory\\ldap*" AND ScriptBlockText="*class ds_group*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`getwmiobject_ds_group_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for domain users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `-class ds_user` parameter can be used to return the full list of users in a Windows domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI in this case, using PowerShell, to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -29358,7 +29358,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -29372,7 +29372,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "22d3b118-04df-11ec-8fa3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29393,7 +29393,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="cmd.exe" OR Processes.process_name="powershell*") AND Processes.process = "*get-wmiobject*" AND Processes.process = "*ds_user*" AND Processes.process = "*root\\directory\\ldap*" AND Processes.process = "*-namespace*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet. The `DS_User` class parameter leverages WMI to query for all domain users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -29405,7 +29405,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -29419,7 +29419,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fabd364e-04f3-11ec-b34b-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29440,7 +29440,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*get-wmiobject*" ScriptBlockText = "*ds_user*" ScriptBlockText = "*-namespace*" ScriptBlockText = "*root\\directory\\ldap*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_ds_user_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query local users. The `Get-WmiObject` commandlet combined with the `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -29452,7 +29452,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -29461,7 +29461,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Winter Vivern"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b44f6ac6-0429-11ec-87e9-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29476,7 +29476,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process=*Get-WmiObject* AND Processes.process=*Win32_UserAccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` commandlet used with specific parameters. The `Win32_UserAccount` parameter is used to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this commandlet to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -29488,7 +29488,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -29497,7 +29497,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Malicious PowerShell", "Winter Vivern"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "640b0eda-0429-11ec-accd-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29512,7 +29512,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText="*Get-WmiObject*" AND ScriptBlockText="*Win32_UserAccount*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `getwmiobject_user_account_with_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule]
+[ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
@@ -29524,7 +29524,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in sm
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -29538,7 +29538,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Cobalt Strike", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2c853856-a140-11eb-a5b5-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29559,7 +29559,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=gpupdate.exe by _time span=1h  Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(?i)(gpupdate\.exe.{0,4}$)"| join  process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time user dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `gpupdate_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Headless Browser Mockbin or Mocky Request - Rule]
+[ESCU - Headless Browser Mockbin or Mocky Request - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies headless browser activity accessing mockbin.org or mocky.io. Mockbin.org and mocky.io are web services that allow users to mock HTTP requests and responses. The detection is based on the presence of "--headless" and "--disable-gpu" command line arguments which are commonly used in headless browsing and the presence of mockbin.org or mocky.io in the process.
@@ -29571,7 +29571,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are not expected with this d
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Headless Browser Mockbin or Mocky Request - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Headless Browser Mockbin or Mocky Request - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -29585,7 +29585,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Headless Browser Mockbin or Mocky Request - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Headless Browser Mockbin or Mocky Request - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Forest Blizzard"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "94fc85a1-e55b-4265-95e1-4b66730e05c0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29606,7 +29606,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*--headless*" AND Processes.process="*--disable-gpu*" AND (Processes.process="*mockbin.org/*" OR Processes.process="*mocky.io/*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `headless_browser_mockbin_or_mocky_request_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Headless Browser Usage - Rule]
+[ESCU - Headless Browser Usage - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic is designed to detect the usage of headless browsers in an organization. Headless browsers are web browsers without a graphical user interface and are operated via a command line interface or network requests. They are often used for automating tasks but can also be utilized by adversaries for malicious activities such as web scraping, automated testing, and performing actions on web pages without detection. The detection is based on the presence of "--headless" and "--disable-gpu" command line arguments which are commonly used in headless browsing.
@@ -29618,7 +29618,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This hunting analytic is meant to assist wit
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Headless Browser Usage - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Headless Browser Usage - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -29627,7 +29627,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Headless Browser Usage - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Headless Browser Usage - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Forest Blizzard"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "869ba261-c272-47d7-affe-5c0aa85c93d6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29642,7 +29642,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*--headless*" AND Processes.process="*--disable-gpu*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `headless_browser_usage_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule]
+[ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine.
@@ -29654,7 +29654,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -29668,7 +29668,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "Warzone RAT", "Windows Registry Abuse", "XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "834ba832-ad89-11eb-937d-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29689,7 +29689,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccounts\\Userlist*" AND Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000000") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule]
+[ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file.  The search looks for specific command-line arguments to detect the use of attrib.exe to hide files.
@@ -29701,7 +29701,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some applications and users may legitimately
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -29715,7 +29715,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222", "T1222.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6e5a3ae4-90a3-462d-9aa6-0119f638c0f1", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29736,7 +29736,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=attrib.exe (Processes.process=*+h*) by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `hiding_files_and_directories_with_attrib_exe_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule]
+[ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious high frequency copying/moving of files in network share as part of information sabotage. This anomaly event can be a good indicator of insider trying to sabotage data by transfering classified or internal files within network share to exfitrate it after or to lure evidence of insider attack to other user. This behavior may catch several noise if network share is a common place for classified or internal document processing.
@@ -29748,7 +29748,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This behavior may seen in normal transfer of
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -29762,7 +29762,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Information Sabotage", "Insider Threat"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1537"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "40925f12-4709-11ec-bb43-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29777,7 +29777,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5145 RelativeTargetName IN ("*.doc","*.docx","*.xls","*.xlsx","*.ppt","*.pptx","*.log","*.txt","*.db","*.7z","*.zip","*.rar","*.tar","*.gz","*.jpg","*.gif","*.png","*.bmp","*.pdf","*.rtf","*.key") ObjectType=File ShareName IN ("\\\\*\\C$","\\\\*\\IPC$","\\\\*\\admin$") AccessMask= "0x2" |  bucket _time span=5m | stats values(RelativeTargetName) as valRelativeTargetName, values(ShareName) as valShareName, values(ObjectType) as valObjectType, values(AccessMask) as valAccessmask, values(src_port) as valSrcPort, values(SourceAddress) as valSrcAddress count as numShareName by dest, _time, EventCode, src_user, src_ip | eventstats avg(numShareName) as avgShareName, stdev(numShareName) as stdShareName, count as numSlots by dest, _time, EventCode, src_user |  eval upperThreshold=(avgShareName + stdShareName *3) |  eval isOutlier=if(avgShareName > 20 and avgShareName >= upperThreshold, 1, 0) |  search isOutlier=1  | `high_frequency_copy_of_files_in_network_share_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule]
+[ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to identify a high frequency of process termination events on a computer in a short period of time, which is a common behavior of ransomware malware before encrypting files. This technique is designed to avoid an exception error while accessing (docs, images, database and etc..) in the infected machine for encryption.
@@ -29789,7 +29789,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user tool that can terminate multip
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -29803,7 +29803,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware", "LockBit Ransomware", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Snake Keylogger"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "17cd75b2-8666-11eb-9ab4-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29818,7 +29818,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=5 |bin _time span=3s |stats values(Image) as proc_terminated min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  count by _time dest EventCode ProcessID | where count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `high_process_termination_frequency_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Hunting 3CXDesktopApp Software - Rule]
+[ESCU - Hunting 3CXDesktopApp Software - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The hunting analytic outlined below is designed to detect any version of the 3CXDesktopApp, also known as the 3CX Desktop App, operating on either Mac or Windows systems. It is important to note that this particular analytic employs the Endpoint datamodel Processes node, which means that the file version information is not provided. Recently, 3CX has identified a vulnerability specifically in versions 18.12.407 and 18.12.416 of the desktop app.
@@ -29830,7 +29830,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There may be false positives generated due t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Hunting 3CXDesktopApp Software - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Hunting 3CXDesktopApp Software - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -29839,7 +29839,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Hunting 3CXDesktopApp Software - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Hunting 3CXDesktopApp Software - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["3CX Supply Chain Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2023-29059"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "553d0429-1a1c-44bf-b3f5-a8513deb9ee5", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29854,7 +29854,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=3CXDesktopApp.exe OR Processes.process_name="3CX Desktop App" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `hunting_3cxdesktopapp_software_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Icacls Deny Command - Rule]
+[ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies instances where an adversary modifies the security permissions of a particular file or directory. This technique is frequently observed in the tradecraft of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts. The purpose of this behavior is to actively evade detection and impede access to their associated files. By identifying these security permission changes, we can enhance our ability to detect and respond to potential threats, mitigating the impact of malicious activities on the system.
@@ -29866,7 +29866,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible some administrative
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Icacls Deny Command - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -29880,7 +29880,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Icacls Deny Command - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "Sandworm Tools", "XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cf8d753e-a8fe-11eb-8f58-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29901,7 +29901,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN( "icacls.exe", "cacls.exe", "xcacls.exe") AND Processes.process IN ("*/deny*", "*/D*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_deny_command_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule]
+[ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies adversaries who manipulate the security permissions of specific files or directories by granting additional access. This technique is frequently observed in the tradecraft of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts. The objective behind this behavior is to actively evade detection mechanisms and tightly control access to their associated files. By identifying these security permission modifications, we can improve our ability to identify and respond to potential threats, thereby minimizing the impact of malicious activities on the system.
@@ -29913,7 +29913,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -29927,7 +29927,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b1b1e316-accc-11eb-a9b4-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29948,7 +29948,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN( "icacls.exe", "cacls.exe", "xcacls.exe") AND Processes.process IN ("*/grant*", "*/G*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icacls_grant_command_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule]
+[ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation namely passff.tar and cookie.tar. This files are possible archived of stolen browser information like history and cookies in a compromised machine with IcedID.
@@ -29960,7 +29960,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -29969,7 +29969,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0db4da70-f14b-11eb-8043-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -29984,7 +29984,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode= 11  (TargetFilename = "*\\passff.tar" OR TargetFilename = "*\\cookie.tar") |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TargetFilename EventCode process_id  process_name dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule]
+[ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typically present when using Impacket tools. Impacket is a collection of python classes meant to be used with Microsoft network protocols. There are multiple scripts that leverage impacket libraries like `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py` and `atexec.py` used to execute commands on remote endpoints. By default, these scripts leverage administrative shares and hardcoded parameters that can be used as a signature to detect its use. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage Impackets tools for lateral movement and remote code execution.
@@ -29996,7 +29996,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although uncommon, Administrators may levera
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -30010,7 +30010,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "CISA AA22-277A", "Data Destruction", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Industroyer2", "Prestige Ransomware", "Volt Typhoon", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002", "T1021.003", "T1047", "T1543.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8ce07472-496f-11ec-ab3b-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30031,7 +30031,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe (Processes.process = "*/Q /c * \\\\127.0.0.1\\*$*" AND Processes.process IN ("*2>&1*","*2&gt;&amp;1*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_commandline_parameters_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule]
+[ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic focuses on identifying suspicious command-line parameters commonly associated with the use of Impacket wmiexec.py. Impacket is a set of Python classes designed for working with Microsoft network protocols, and it includes several scripts like wmiexec.py, smbexec.py, dcomexec.py, and atexec.py that enable command execution on remote endpoints. These scripts typically utilize administrative shares and hardcoded parameters, which can serve as signatures to detect their usage. Both Red Teams and adversaries may employ Impacket tools for lateral movement and remote code execution purposes. By monitoring for these specific command-line indicators, the analytic aims to detect potentially malicious activities related to Impacket tool usage.
@@ -30043,7 +30043,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although uncommon, Administrators may levera
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -30057,7 +30057,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "CISA AA22-277A", "Data Destruction", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Industroyer2", "Prestige Ransomware", "Volt Typhoon", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002", "T1021.003", "T1047", "T1543.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bb3c1bac-6bdf-4aa0-8dc9-068b8b712a76", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30078,7 +30078,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where match(process, "(?i)cmd\.exe\s+\/Q\s+\/c") AND match(process,"(?i)echo\s+cd") AND match(process, "(?i)\\__output") AND  match(process, "(?i)C:\\\\Windows\\\\[a-zA-Z]{1,8}\\.bat")  AND match(process, "\\\\127\.0\.0\.1\\.*") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `impacket_lateral_movement_smbexec_commandline_parameters_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule]
+[ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the presence of suspicious commandline parameters typically present when using Impacket tools. Impacket is a collection of python classes meant to be used with Microsoft network protocols. There are multiple scripts that leverage impacket libraries like `wmiexec.py`, `smbexec.py`, `dcomexec.py` and `atexec.py` used to execute commands on remote endpoints. By default, these scripts leverage administrative shares and hardcoded parameters that can be used as a signature to detect its use. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage Impackets tools for lateral movement and remote code execution.
@@ -30090,7 +30090,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although uncommon, Administrators may levera
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -30104,7 +30104,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "CISA AA22-277A", "Data Destruction", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Industroyer2", "Prestige Ransomware", "Volt Typhoon", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.002", "T1021.003", "T1047", "T1543.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d6e464e4-5c6a-474e-82d2-aed616a3a492", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30125,7 +30125,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where match(process, "(?i)cmd\.exe\s+\/Q\s+\/c") AND match(process, "\\\\127\.0\.0\.1\\.*") AND match(process, "__\\d{1,10}\\.\\d{1,10}") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `impacket_lateral_movement_wmiexec_commandline_parameters_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the usage of the `Enter-PSSession`. This commandlet can be used to open an interactive session on a remote endpoint leveraging the WinRM protocol. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `Enter-PSSession` for lateral movement and remote code execution.
@@ -30137,7 +30137,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Enter
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -30151,7 +30151,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a4e8f3a4-48b2-11ec-bcfc-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30172,7 +30172,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText="*Enter-PSSession*" AND ScriptBlockText="*-ComputerName*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `interactive_session_on_remote_endpoint_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule]
+[ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a Java user agent performing a GET request for a .class file from the remote site. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell).
@@ -30184,7 +30184,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Filtering may be required in some instances,
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -30198,7 +30198,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8281ce42-5c50-11ec-82d2-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30219,7 +30219,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_user_agent="*Java*" Web.http_method="GET" Web.url="*.class*" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_class_file_download_by_java_user_agent_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Java Writing JSP File - Rule]
+[ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the process java writing a .jsp to disk. This is potentially indicative of a web shell being written to disk. Modify and tune the analytic based on data ingested. For instance, it may be worth running a broad query for jsp file writes first before performing a join.
@@ -30231,7 +30231,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible and filtering m
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Java Writing JSP File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -30245,7 +30245,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Java Writing JSP File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2022-26134", "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965", "SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2022-22965"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "eb65619c-4f8d-4383-a975-d352765d344b", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30266,7 +30266,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("java","java.exe", "javaw.exe") by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="*.jsp*" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time process_guid file_path file_name file_create_time user dest process_name] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `java_writing_jsp_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule]
+[ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a execution of jscript using cscript process. Commonly when a user run jscript file it was executed by wscript.exe application. This technique was seen in FIN7 js implant to execute its malicious script using cscript process. This behavior is uncommon and a good artifacts to check further anomalies within the network
@@ -30278,7 +30278,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -30292,7 +30292,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Remcos"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "002f1e24-146e-11ec-a470-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30313,7 +30313,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = "cscript.exe" AND Processes.parent_process = "*//e:jscript*") OR (Processes.process_name = "cscript.exe" AND Processes.process = "*//e:jscript*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jscript_execution_using_cscript_app_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain. This analytic looks for a specific combination of the Ticket_Options field based on common kerberoasting tools. Defenders should be aware that it may be possible for a Kerberoast attack to use different Ticket_Options.
@@ -30325,7 +30325,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Older systems that support kerberos RC4 by d
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -30339,7 +30339,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5cc67381-44fa-4111-8a37-7a230943f027", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30360,7 +30360,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 ServiceName!="*$" (TicketOptions=0x40810000 OR TicketOptions=0x40800000 OR TicketOptions=0x40810010) TicketEncryptionType=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, service_id, service, TicketEncryptionType, TicketOptions | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberoasting_spn_request_with_rc4_encryption_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Windows Security Event 4738, `A user account was changed`, to identify a change performed on a domain user object that disables Kerberos Pre-Authentication. Disabling the Pre Authentication flag in the UserAccountControl property allows an adversary to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges.
@@ -30372,7 +30372,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -30386,7 +30386,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0cb847ee-9423-11ec-b2df-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30407,7 +30407,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4738 MSADChangedAttributes="*Don't Require Preauth' - Enabled*" |rename Account_Name as user | table EventCode, user, dest, Security_ID, MSADChangedAttributes | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_in_useraccountcontrol_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Set-ADAccountControl` commandlet with specific parameters. `Set-ADAccountControl` is part of the Active Directory PowerShell module used to manage Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, `Set-ADAccountControl` is used to modify User Account Control values for an Active Directory domain account. With the appropiate parameters, Set-ADAccountControl allows adversaries to disable Kerberos Pre-Authentication for an account to to easily perform a brute force attack against the user's password offline leveraging the ASP REP Roasting technique. Red Teams and adversaries alike who have obtained privileges in an Active Directory network may use this technique as a backdoor or a way to escalate privileges.
@@ -30419,7 +30419,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, Administrators may need t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -30433,7 +30433,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "59b51620-94c9-11ec-b3d5-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30454,7 +30454,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Set-ADAccountControl*" AND ScriptBlockText="*DoesNotRequirePreAuth:$true*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kerberos_pre_authentication_flag_disabled_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential Kerberos Service Ticket request related to a Golden Ticket attack. Adversaries who have obtained the Krbtgt account NTLM password hash may forge a Kerberos Granting Ticket (TGT) to obtain unrestricted access to an Active Directory environment. Armed with a Golden Ticket, attackers can request service tickets to move laterally and execute code on remote systems. Looking for Kerberos Service Ticket requests using the legacy RC4 encryption mechanism could represent the second stage of a Golden Ticket attack. RC4 usage should be rare on a modern network since Windows Vista & Windows Sever 2008 and newer support AES Kerberos encryption.\ Defenders should note that if an attacker does not leverage the NTLM password hash but rather the AES key to create a golden ticket, this detection may be bypassed.
@@ -30466,7 +30466,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Based on Microsoft documentation, legacy sys
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -30480,7 +30480,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7d90f334-a482-11ec-908c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30501,7 +30501,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 ServiceName="*$" (TicketOptions=0x40810000 OR TicketOptions=0x40800000 OR TicketOptions=0x40810010) TicketEncryptionType=0x17 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, service, service_id, TicketEncryptionType, TicketOptions | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `kerberos_service_ticket_request_using_rc4_encryption_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Event 4768, A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested, to identify a TGT request with encryption type 0x17, or RC4-HMAC. This encryption type is no longer utilized by newer systems and could represent evidence of an OverPass The Hash attack. Similar to Pass The Hash, OverPass The Hash is a form of credential theft that allows adversaries to move laterally or consume resources in a target network. Leveraging this attack, an adversary who has stolen the NTLM hash of a valid domain account is able to authenticate to the Kerberos Distribution Center(KDC) on behalf of the legitimate account and obtain a Kerberos TGT ticket. Depending on the privileges of the compromised account, this ticket may be used to obtain unauthorized access to systems and other network resources.
@@ -30513,7 +30513,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Based on Microsoft documentation, legacy sys
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -30527,7 +30527,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "18916468-9c04-11ec-bdc6-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30548,7 +30548,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TicketEncryptionType=0x17 ServiceName!=*$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ServiceName src_ip dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `kerberos_tgt_request_using_rc4_encryption_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule]
+[ESCU - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Event Id 4768, A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested, to identify one source endpoint trying to obtain an unusual number Kerberos TGT ticket for non existing users. This behavior could represent an adversary abusing the Kerberos protocol to perform a user enumeration attack against an Active Directory environment. When Kerberos is sent a TGT request with no preauthentication for an invalid username, it responds with KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN or 0x6. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Kerberos protocol to validate a list of users use them to perform further attacks.\ The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field.
@@ -30560,7 +30560,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Possible false positive scenarios include bu
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -30574,7 +30574,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1589", "T1589.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d82d4af4-a0bd-11ec-9445-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30589,7 +30589,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Status=0x6 TargetUserName!="*$" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, src_ip | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by src_ip | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1| `kerberos_user_enumeration_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule]
+[ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search detects a suspicioous termination of known services killed by ransomware before encrypting files in a compromised machine. This technique is commonly seen in most of ransomware now a days to avoid exception error while accessing the targetted files it wants to encrypts because of the open handle of those services to the targetted file.
@@ -30601,7 +30601,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Admin activities or installing related updat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -30615,7 +30615,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware", "LockBit Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3070f8e0-c528-11eb-b2a0-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30636,7 +30636,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 param1 IN ("*Volume Shadow Copy*","*VSS*", "*backup*", "*sophos*", "*sql*", "*memtas*", "*mepocs*", "*veeam*", "*svc$*", "DefWatch", "ccEvtMgr", "ccSetMgr", "SavRoam", "RTVscan", "QBFCService", "QBIDPService", "Intuit.QuickBooks.FCS", "QBCFMonitorService" "YooBackup", "YooIT", "*Veeam*", "PDVFSService", "BackupExecVSSProvider", "BackupExecAgentAccelerator", "BackupExec*", "WdBoot", "WdFilter", "WdNisDrv", "WdNisSvc", "WinDefend", "wscsvc", "Sense", "sppsvc", "SecurityHealthService") param2="stopped" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode param1 dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `known_services_killed_by_ransomware_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Account Manipulation Of SSH Config and Keys - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Account Manipulation Of SSH Config and Keys - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a deletion of ssh key in a linux machine. attacker may delete or modify ssh key to impair some security features or act as defense evasion in compromised linux machine. This Anomaly can be also a good indicator of a malware trying to wipe or delete several files in a compromised host as part of its destructive payload like what acidrain malware does in linux or router machines. This detection can be a good pivot to check what process and user tries to delete this type of files which is not so common and need further investigation.
@@ -30648,7 +30648,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Account Manipulation Of SSH Config and Keys - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Account Manipulation Of SSH Config and Keys - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -30662,7 +30662,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Account Manipulation Of SSH Config and Keys - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Account Manipulation Of SSH Config and Keys - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AcidRain"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "73a56508-1cf5-4df7-b8d9-5737fbdc27d2", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30677,7 +30677,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted AND Filesystem.file_path IN ("/etc/ssh/*", "~/.ssh/*") by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_account_manipulation_of_ssh_config_and_keys_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic aims to detect unauthorized activities through suspicious file creation in recognized cron table directories, prevalent Unix-based locations for scheduling tasks. This behavior is often exploited by nefarious entities like malware or threat actors, including red teamers, to establish persistence on a targeted or compromised host. The analogy to Windows-based scheduled tasks helps explain the utility of a crontab or cron job. To enhance clarity and actionable intelligence, the anomaly query flags the anomaly, urging further investigation into the added file's details. A cybersecurity analyst should consider additional data points such as the user identity involved, the file's nature and purpose, file origin, timestamp, and any changes in system behavior post file execution. This comprehensive understanding aids in accurately determining the file's legitimacy, facilitating prompt and effective response actions.
@@ -30689,7 +30689,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -30703,7 +30703,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "023f3452-5f27-11ec-bf00-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30718,7 +30718,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/cron*", "*/var/spool/cron/*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_add_files_in_known_crontab_directories_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Add User Account - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for commands to create user accounts on the linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to persist on the targeted or compromised host by creating new user with an elevated privilege. This Hunting query may catch normal creation of user by administrator so filter is needed.
@@ -30730,7 +30730,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Add User Account - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -30739,7 +30739,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Add User Account - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "51fbcaf2-6259-11ec-b0f3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30754,7 +30754,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("useradd", "adduser") OR Processes.process IN ("*useradd *", "*adduser *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_add_user_account_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies suspicious modifications to cron jobs on Linux systems using the crontab command with list parameters. This command line parameter can be abused by malware like Industroyer2, as well as adversaries and red teamers, to add a crontab entry for executing their malicious code on a schedule of their choice. However, it's important to note that administrators or normal users may also use this command for legitimate automation purposes, so filtering is required to minimize false positives. Identifying the modification of cron jobs using list parameters is valuable for a SOC as it indicates potential malicious activity or an attempt to establish persistence on the system. If a true positive is detected, further investigation should be conducted to analyze the added cron job, its associated command, and the impact it may have on the system. This includes examining the purpose of the job, reviewing any on-disk artifacts, and identifying any related processes or activities occurring concurrently. The impact of a true positive can range from unauthorized execution of malicious code to data destruction or other damaging outcomes.
@@ -30766,7 +30766,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -30775,7 +30775,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Industroyer2", "Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "52f6d751-1fd4-4c74-a4c9-777ecfeb5c58", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30790,7 +30790,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "crontab" Processes.process= "* -l*" by  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_adding_crontab_using_list_parameter_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The apt-get is a command line tool for interacting with the Advanced Package Tool (APT) library (a package management system for Linux distributions). It allows you to search for, install, manage, update, and remove software. The tool does not build software from the source code. If sudo right is given to the tool for user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -30802,7 +30802,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -30816,7 +30816,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d870ce3b-e796-402f-b2af-cab4da1223f2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30831,7 +30831,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*apt-get*" AND Processes.process="*APT::Update::Pre-Invoke::*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_apt_get_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux APT Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux APT Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Advanced Package Tool, more commonly known as APT, is a collection of tools used to install, update, remove, and otherwise manage software packages on Debian and its derivative operating systems, including Ubuntu and Linux Mint. If sudo right is given to the tool for user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -30843,7 +30843,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux APT Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux APT Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -30857,7 +30857,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux APT Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux APT Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4d5a05fa-77d9-4fd0-af9c-05704f9f9a88", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30872,7 +30872,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*apt*" AND Processes.process="*APT::Update::Pre-Invoke::*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_apt_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation of suspicious configuration files, /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny, in Linux. These files are commonly abused by malware, adversaries, or red teamers to establish persistence on compromised hosts. The configuration files determine which users are allowed to execute the "at" application, which is used for scheduling tasks in Linux. Attackers can add their user or a compromised username to these files to execute malicious code using "at." It's important to consider potential false positives as administrators or network operators may create these files for legitimate automation purposes. Adjust the filter macros to minimize false positives.\
@@ -30886,7 +30886,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -30900,7 +30900,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "977b3082-5f3d-11ec-b954-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30915,7 +30915,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/at.allow", "*/etc/at.deny") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_at_allow_config_file_creation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux At Application Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the execution of the "At" application in Linux, which can be used by attackers to create persistence entries on a compromised host. The "At" application can be used for automation purposes by administrators or network operators, so the filter macros should be updated to remove false positives. If a true positive is found, it suggests an attacker is trying to maintain access to the environment or potentially deliver additional malicious payloads, leading to data theft, ransomware, or other damaging outcomes. To implement this analytic, ensure you are ingesting logs with the required fields from your endpoints into the Endpoint datamodel. When a true positive is detected, it suggests that an attacker is attempting to establish persistence or deliver additional malicious payloads by leveraging the "At" application. This behavior can lead to data theft, ransomware attacks, or other damaging outcomes.\
@@ -30931,7 +30931,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux At Application Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -30945,7 +30945,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux At Application Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.002", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bf0a378e-5f3c-11ec-a6de-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -30960,7 +30960,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where  Processes.process_name IN ("at", "atd") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN ("at", "atd") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_at_application_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux AWK Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux AWK Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Awk is mostly used for processing and scanning patterns. It checks one or more files to determine whether any lines fit the specified patterns, and if so, it does the appropriate action. If sudo right is given to AWK binary for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -30972,7 +30972,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are present based on automat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux AWK Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux AWK Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -30986,7 +30986,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux AWK Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux AWK Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4510cae0-96a2-4840-9919-91d262db210a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31001,7 +31001,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*sudo*" AND Processes.process="*awk*"  AND Processes.process="*BEGIN*system*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_awk_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = BusyBox combines tiny versions of many common UNIX utilities into a single small executable. It provides minimalist replacements for most of the utilities you usually find in GNU coreutils, util-linux, etc. If sudo right is given to BusyBox application for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -31013,7 +31013,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31027,7 +31027,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "387c4e78-f4a4-413d-ad44-e9f7bc4642c9", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31042,7 +31042,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*busybox*" AND Processes.process="*sh*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_busybox_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux c89 Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux c89 Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The c89 and cc commands compile, assemble, and link-edit C programs; the cxx or c++ command does the same for C++ programs. The c89 command should be used when compiling C programs that are written according to Standard C. If sudo right is given to c89 application for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -31054,7 +31054,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux c89 Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux c89 Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31068,7 +31068,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux c89 Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux c89 Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "54c95f4d-3e5d-44be-9521-ea19ba62f7a8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31083,7 +31083,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*c89*" AND Processes.process="*-wrapper*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_c89_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux c99 Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux c99 Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The c99 utility is an interface to the standard C compilation system; it shall accept source code conforming to the ISO C standard. The system conceptually consists of a compiler and link editor. If sudo right is given to ruby application for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -31095,7 +31095,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux c99 Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux c99 Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31109,7 +31109,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux c99 Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux c99 Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e1c6dec5-2249-442d-a1f9-99a4bd228183", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31124,7 +31124,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*c99*" AND Processes.process="*-wrapper*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_c99_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for a commandline that change the file owner to root using chown utility tool. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to escalate privilege to the targeted or compromised host by changing the owner of their malicious file to root. This event is not so common in corporate network except from the administrator doing normal task that needs high privilege.
@@ -31136,7 +31136,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31150,7 +31150,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222.002", "T1222"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c1400ea2-6257-11ec-ad49-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31165,7 +31165,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = chown OR Processes.process = "*chown *") AND Processes.process = "* root *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_change_file_owner_to_root_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Clipboard Data Copy - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Clipboard Data Copy - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of Linux Xclip copying data out of the clipboard. Adversaries have utilized this technique to capture passwords, IP addresses, or store payloads.
@@ -31177,7 +31177,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present on Linux desk
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Clipboard Data Copy - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Clipboard Data Copy - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31191,7 +31191,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Clipboard Data Copy - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Clipboard Data Copy - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 40, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1115"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7173b2ad-6146-418f-85ae-c3479e4515fc", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31206,7 +31206,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=xclip Processes.process IN ("*-o *", "*-sel *", "*-selection *", "*clip *","*clipboard*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_clipboard_data_copy_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to look for possible elevation control access using a common known process in linux platform to change the attribute and file ownership. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain persistence or privilege escalation on the target or compromised host. This common process is used to modify file attribute, file ownership or SUID. This tools can be used in legitimate purposes so filter is needed.
@@ -31218,7 +31218,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31227,7 +31227,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "66ab15c0-63d0-11ec-9e70-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31242,7 +31242,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("chmod", "chown", "fchmod", "fchmodat", "fchown", "fchownat", "fremovexattr", "fsetxattr", "lchown", "lremovexattr", "lsetxattr", "removexattr", "setuid", "setgid", "setreuid", "setregid", "chattr") OR Processes.process IN ("*chmod *", "*chown *", "*fchmod *", "*fchmodat *", "*fchown *", "*fchownat *", "*fremovexattr *", "*fsetxattr *", "*lchown *", "*lremovexattr *", "*lsetxattr *", "*removexattr *", "*setuid *", "*setgid *", "*setreuid *", "*setregid *", "*setcap *", "*chattr *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_common_process_for_elevation_control_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Composer Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Composer Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Composer is a tool for dependency management in PHP. It allows you to declare the libraries your project depends on and it will manage (install/update) them for you. If sudo right is given to tool for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -31254,7 +31254,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Composer Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Composer Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31268,7 +31268,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Composer Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Composer Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a3bddf71-6ba3-42ab-a6b2-396929b16d92", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31283,7 +31283,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*composer*" AND Processes.process="*run-script*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_composer_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = cpulimit is a simple program which attempts to limit the cpu usage of a process (expressed in percentage, not in cpu time). This is useful to control batch jobs, when you don't want them to eat too much cpu. If sudo right is given to the program for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -31295,7 +31295,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31309,7 +31309,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d4e40b7e-aad3-4a7d-aac8-550ea5222be5", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31324,7 +31324,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*cpulimit*" AND Processes.process="*-l*" AND Processes.process="*-f*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_cpulimit_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = csvtool is an easy to use command-line tool to work with .CSV files. If sudo right is given to the tool for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -31336,7 +31336,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31350,7 +31350,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f8384f9e-1a5c-4c3a-96d6-8a7e5a38a8b8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31365,7 +31365,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*csvtool*" AND Processes.process="*call*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_csvtool_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies curl being utilized with the -F or --form, --upload-file, -T, -d, --data, --data-raw, -I and --head switches to upload AWS credentials or config to a remote destination. This enables uploading of binary files and so forth. To force the 'content' part to be a file, prefix the file name with an @ sign. To just get the content part from a file, prefix the file name with the symbol <. The difference between @ and < is then that @ makes a file get attached in the post as a file upload, while the < makes a text field and just get the contents for that text field from a file. This technique was utlized by the TeamTNT group to exfiltrate AWS credentials.
@@ -31377,7 +31377,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Filtering may be required. In addition to AW
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31391,7 +31391,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration", "Ingress Tool Transfer", "Linux Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c1de2d9a-0c02-4bb4-a49a-510c6e9cf2bf", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31412,7 +31412,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process IN ("*-F *", "*--form *","*--upload-file *","*-T *","*-d *","*--data *","*--data-raw *", "*-I *", "*--head *") AND Processes.process IN ("*.aws/credentials*". "*.aws/config*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_curl_upload_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Data Destruction Command - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Data Destruction Command - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a unix shell command that can wipe root folders of a linux host. This commandline is being abused by Awfulshred malware that wipes or corrupts files in a targeted Linux host. The shell command uses the rm command with force recursive deletion even in the root folder. This TTP can be a good indicator that a user or a process wants to wipe roots directory files in Linux host.
@@ -31424,7 +31424,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Data Destruction Command - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Data Destruction Command - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31438,7 +31438,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Data Destruction Command - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Data Destruction Command - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AwfulShred", "Data Destruction"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b11d3979-b2f7-411b-bb1a-bd00e642173b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31459,7 +31459,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "rm"  AND Processes.process IN ("* -rf*", "* -fr*") AND Processes.process = "* --no-preserve-root" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_data_destruction_command_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to look for dd command to overwrite file. This technique was abused by adversaries or threat actor to destroy files or data on specific system or in a large number of host within network to interrupt host avilability, services and many more. This is also used to destroy data where it make the file irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files, data or local and remote drives.
@@ -31471,7 +31471,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31485,7 +31485,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Industroyer2"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9b6aae5e-8d85-11ec-b2ae-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31506,7 +31506,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "dd" AND Processes.process = "*of=*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_dd_file_overwrite_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Decode Base64 to Shell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Decode Base64 to Shell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the behavior of decoding base64-encoded data and passing it to a Linux shell. Additionally, it mitigates the potential damage and protects the organization's systems and data.The detection is made by searching for specific commands in the Splunk query, namely "base64 -d" and "base64 --decode", within the Endpoint.Processes data model. The analytic also includes a filter for Linux shells. The detection is important because  it indicates the presence of malicious activity since Base64 encoding is commonly used to obfuscate malicious commands or payloads, and decoding it can be a step in running those commands. It suggests that an attacker is attempting to run malicious commands on a Linux system to gain unauthorized access, for data exfiltration, or perform other malicious actions.
@@ -31518,7 +31518,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on legi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Decode Base64 to Shell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Decode Base64 to Shell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31532,7 +31532,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Decode Base64 to Shell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Decode Base64 to Shell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "637b603e-1799-40fd-bf87-47ecbd551b66", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31553,7 +31553,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN ("*base64 -d*","*base64 --decode*") AND Processes.process="*|*" `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_decode_base64_to_shell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious deletion of a critical folder in Linux machine using rm command. This technique was seen in industroyer2 campaign to wipe or destroy energy facilities of a targeted sector. Deletion in these list of folder is not so common since it need some elevated privileges to access some of it. We recommend to look further events specially in file access or file deletion, process commandline that may related to this technique.
@@ -31565,7 +31565,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31579,7 +31579,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AwfulShred", "Data Destruction", "Industroyer2"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "33f89303-cc6f-49ad-921d-2eaea38a6f7a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31600,7 +31600,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name =rm AND Processes.process= "* -rf *" AND Processes.process IN ("*/boot/*", "*/var/log/*", "*/etc/*", "*/dev/*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_deleting_critical_directory_using_rm_command_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a deletion of cron job in a linux machine. This technique can be related to an attacker, threat actor or malware to disable scheduled cron jobs that might be related to security or to evade some detections. We also saw that this technique can be a good indicator for malware that is trying to wipe or delete several files on the compromised host like the acidrain malware. This anomaly detection can be a good pivot detection to look for process and user doing it why they doing. Take note that this event can be done by administrator so filtering on those possible false positive event is needed.
@@ -31612,7 +31612,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31626,7 +31626,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AcidRain", "Data Destruction"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3b132a71-9335-4f33-9932-00bb4f6ac7e8", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31641,7 +31641,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path="/etc/cron.*" by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_deletion_of_cron_jobs_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a deletion of init daemon script in a linux machine. daemon script that place in /etc/init.d/ is a directory that can start and stop some daemon services in linux machines. attacker may delete or modify daemon script to impair some security features or act as defense evasion in a compromised linux machine. This TTP can be also a good indicator of a malware trying to wipe or delete several files in compromised host as part of its destructive payload like what acidrain malware does in linux or router machines. This detection can be a good pivot to check what process and user tries to delete this type of files which is not so common and need further investigation.
@@ -31653,7 +31653,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31667,7 +31667,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AcidRain", "Data Destruction"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "729aab57-d26f-4156-b97f-ab8dda8f44b1", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31688,7 +31688,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path IN ( "/etc/init.d/*") by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_deletion_of_init_daemon_script_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a deletion of services in a linux machine. attacker may delete or modify services to impair some security features or act as defense evasion in a compromised linux machine. This TTP can be also a good indicator of a malware trying to wipe or delete several files in a compromised host as part of its destructive payload like what acidrain malware does in linux or router machines. This detection can be a good pivot to check what process and user tries to delete this type of files which is not so common and need further investigation.
@@ -31700,7 +31700,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31714,7 +31714,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AcidRain", "AwfulShred", "Data Destruction"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b509bbd3-0331-4aaa-8e4a-d2affe100af6", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31735,7 +31735,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path IN ( "/etc/systemd/*", "*/lib/systemd/*", "*/run/systemd/*") Filesystem.file_path = "*.service" by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_deletion_of_services_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a deletion of ssl certificate in a linux machine. attacker may delete or modify ssl certificate to impair some security features or act as defense evasion in compromised linux machine. This Anomaly can be also a good indicator of a malware trying to wipe or delete several files in a compromised host as part of its destructive payload like what acidrain malware does in linux or router machines. This detection can be a good pivot to check what process and user tries to delete this type of files which is not so common and need further investigation.
@@ -31747,7 +31747,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31761,7 +31761,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AcidRain"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "839ab790-a60a-4f81-bfb3-02567063f615", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31776,7 +31776,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path = "/etc/ssl/certs/*" Filesystem.file_path IN ("*.pem", "*.crt") by _time span=1h Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `linux_deletion_of_ssl_certificate_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Disable Services - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Disable Services - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is to detect events that attempts to disable a service. This is typically identified in parallel with other instances of service enumeration of attempts to stop a service and then delete it. Adversaries utilize this technique like industroyer2 malware to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective as a destructive payload.
@@ -31788,7 +31788,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Disable Services - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Disable Services - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31802,7 +31802,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Disable Services - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Disable Services - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AwfulShred", "Data Destruction", "Industroyer2"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f2e08a38-6689-4df4-ad8c-b51c16262316", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31823,7 +31823,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("systemctl", "service", "svcadm")  Processes.process = "* disable*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_disable_services_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect the creation of doas.conf file in linux host platform. This configuration file can be use by doas utility tool to allow or permit standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed.
@@ -31835,7 +31835,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31849,7 +31849,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f6343e86-6e09-11ec-9376-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31864,7 +31864,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/doas.conf") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_doas_conf_file_creation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect the doas tool execution in linux host platform. This utility tool allow standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does. This tool is developed as a minimalistic alternative to sudo application. This tool can be abused advesaries, attacker or malware to gain elevated privileges to the targeted or compromised host. On the other hand this can also be executed by administrator for a certain task that needs admin rights. In this case filter is needed.
@@ -31876,7 +31876,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31890,7 +31890,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d5a62490-6e09-11ec-884e-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31905,7 +31905,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "doas" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_doas_tool_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Docker Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Docker Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Docker is an open source containerization platform. It helps programmers to bundle applications into containers, which are standardized executable parts that include the application source code along with the OS libraries and dependencies needed to run that code in any setting. The user can add mount the root directory into a container and edit the /etc/password file to add a super user. This requires the user to be privileged enough to run docker, i.e. being in the docker group or being root.
@@ -31917,7 +31917,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are present based on automat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Docker Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Docker Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31931,7 +31931,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Docker Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Docker Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2e7bfb78-85f6-47b5-bc2f-15813a4ef2b3", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31946,7 +31946,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN("*docker*-v*/*:*","*docker*--volume*/*:*") OR Processes.process IN("*docker*exec*sh*","*docker*exec*bash*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_docker_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the suspicious editing of cron jobs in Linux via the crontab command-line parameter. This tactic could be used by adversaries or malware to schedule execution of their malicious code, potentially leading to system compromise or unauthorized persistent access. It pinpoints this activity by monitoring command-line executions involving 'crontab' and the edit parameter (-e).\
@@ -31964,7 +31964,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -31973,7 +31973,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0d370304-5f26-11ec-a4bb-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -31988,7 +31988,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = crontab Processes.process = "*crontab *" Processes.process = "* -e*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_edit_cron_table_parameter_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = EMACS is a family of text editors that are characterized by their extensibility. The manual for the most widely used variant, GNU Emacs, describes it as "the extensible, customizable, self-documenting, real-time display editor". If sudo right is given to EMACS tool for the user, then the user can run special commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -32000,7 +32000,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32014,7 +32014,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "92033cab-1871-483d-a03b-a7ce98665cfc", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32029,7 +32029,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*emacs*" AND Processes.process="*--eval*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_emacs_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in kernel/driver directory in linux platform. This directory is known folder for all linux kernel module available within the system. so creation of file in this directory is a good indicator that there is a possible rootkit installation in the host machine. This technique was abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain high privileges to their malicious code such us in kernel level. Even this event is not so common administrator or legitimate 3rd party tool may install driver or linux kernel module as part of its installation.
@@ -32041,7 +32041,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32055,7 +32055,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Rootkit"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b85bbeec-6326-11ec-9311-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32070,7 +32070,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/kernel/drivers/*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_created_in_kernel_driver_directory_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation on init system directories for automatic execution of script or file upon boot up. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamer to persist on the targeted or compromised host. This behavior can be executed or use by an administrator or network operator to add script files or binary files as part of a task or automation. filter is needed.
@@ -32082,7 +32082,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32096,7 +32096,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1037.004", "T1037"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "97d9cfb2-61ad-11ec-bb2d-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32111,7 +32111,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/init.d/*", "*/etc/rc.d/*", "*/sbin/init.d/*", "*/etc/rc.local*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_init_boot_directory_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for suspicious file creation in /etc/profile.d directory to automatically execute scripts by shell upon boot up of a linux machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as a persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run a code after boot up which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes.
@@ -32123,7 +32123,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32137,7 +32137,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.004", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "46ba0082-61af-11ec-9826-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32152,7 +32152,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/profile.d/*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_file_creation_in_profile_directory_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Find Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Find Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Find is a command-line utility that locates files based on some user-specified criteria and either prints the pathname of each matched object or, if another action is requested, performs that action on each matched object. If sudo right is given to find utility for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -32164,7 +32164,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are present based on automat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Find Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Find Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32178,7 +32178,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Find Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Find Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2ff4e0c2-8256-4143-9c07-1e39c7231111", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32193,7 +32193,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*find*" AND Processes.process="*-exec*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_find_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux GDB Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux GDB Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = GDB is the acronym for GNU Debugger. This tool helps to debug the programs written in C, C++, Ada, Fortran, etc. The console can be opened using the gdb command on terminal. If sudo right is given to GDB tool for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -32205,7 +32205,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux GDB Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux GDB Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32219,7 +32219,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux GDB Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux GDB Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "310b7da2-ab52-437f-b1bf-0bd458674308", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32234,7 +32234,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*gdb*" AND Processes.process="*-nx*" AND Processes.process="*-ex*!*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_gdb_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Gem Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Gem Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = RubyGems is a package manager for the Ruby programming language that provides a standard format for distributing Ruby programs and libraries (in a self-contained format called a "gem"), a tool designed to easily manage the installation of gems, and a server for distributing them. If sudo right is given to GEM utility for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -32246,7 +32246,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Gem Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Gem Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32260,7 +32260,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Gem Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Gem Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0115482a-5dcb-4bb0-bcca-5d095d224236", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32275,7 +32275,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*gem*open*-e*" AND Processes.process="*-c*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_gem_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = gawk command in Linux is used for pattern scanning and processing language. The awk command requires no compiling and allows the user to use variables, numeric functions, string functions, and logical operators. It is a utility that enables programmers to write tiny and effective programs in the form of statements that define text patterns that are to be searched for, in a text document and the action that is to be taken when a match is found within a line. If sudo right is given to gawk tool for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -32287,7 +32287,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32301,7 +32301,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0dcf43b9-50d8-42a6-acd9-d1c9201fe6ae", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32316,7 +32316,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*gawk*" AND Processes.process="*BEGIN*{system*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_gnu_awk_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for process execution to disable the swapping of paging devices. This technique was seen in Awfulshred malware that disables the swapping of the specified devices and files. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator that a process or a user tries to disable this Linux feature in a targeted host.
@@ -32328,7 +32328,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrator may disable swapping of device
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32342,7 +32342,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AwfulShred", "Data Destruction"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c1eea697-99ed-44c2-9b70-d8935464c499", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32357,7 +32357,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "swapoff" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_hardware_addition_swapoff_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id /boot/ folder. These events was seen in industroyer2 wiper malware where it tries to delete all files in a critical directory in linux directory. This detection already contains some filter that might cause false positive during our testing.
@@ -32369,7 +32369,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = linux package installer/uninstaller may caus
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32383,7 +32383,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Industroyer2"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e27fbc5d-0445-4c4a-bc39-87f060d5c602", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32404,7 +32404,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as deletedFileNames values(Filesystem.file_path) as deletedFilePath dc(Filesystem.file_path) as numOfDelFilePath count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path = "/boot/*" by _time span=1h  Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | where  numOfDelFilePath >= 200 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_high_frequency_of_file_deletion_in_boot_folder_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a high frequency of file deletion relative to process name and process id /etc/ folder. These events was seen in acidrain wiper malware where it tries to delete all files in a non-standard directory in linux directory. This detection already contains some filter that might cause false positive during our testing. But we recommend to add more filter if needed.
@@ -32416,7 +32416,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = linux package installer/uninstaller may caus
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32430,7 +32430,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AcidRain", "Data Destruction"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9d867448-2aff-4d07-876c-89409a752ff8", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32445,7 +32445,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as deletedFileNames values(Filesystem.file_path) as deletedFilePath dc(Filesystem.file_path) as numOfDelFilePath count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=deleted Filesystem.file_path = "/etc/*" by _time span=1h  Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`  | where  numOfDelFilePath >= 200 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_high_frequency_of_file_deletion_in_etc_folder_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for PKILL process execution for possible termination of process. This technique is being used by several Threat actors, adversaries and red teamers to terminate processes in a targeted linux machine. This Hunting detection can be a good pivot to check a possible defense evasion technique or termination of security application in a linux host or wiper like Awfulshred that corrupt all files.
@@ -32457,7 +32457,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin can terminate a process using
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32466,7 +32466,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AwfulShred", "Data Destruction"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "435c6b33-adf9-47fe-be87-8e29fd6654f5", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32481,7 +32481,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ( "pgrep", "pkill") Processes.process = "*pkill *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_impair_defenses_process_kill_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for processes that clear or free page cache in Linux system host. This technique was seen in Awfulshred malware wiper that tries to clear the cache using kernel system request drop_caches while wiping all files in the targeted host. This TTP detection can be a good indicator of user or process tries to clear page cache to delete tracks or might be a wiper like Awfulshred.
@@ -32493,7 +32493,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32507,7 +32507,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AwfulShred", "Data Destruction"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e0940505-0b73-4719-84e6-cb94c44a5245", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32528,7 +32528,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("dash", "sudo", "bash")  AND Processes.process  IN("* echo 3 &gt; *", "* echo 2 &gt; *","* echo 1 &gt; *") AND Processes.process = "*/proc/sys/vm/drop_caches" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_indicator_removal_clear_cache_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for suspicious linux processes that delete service unit configuration files. This technique was seen in several malware to delete service configuration files to corrupt a services or security product as part of its defense evasion. This TTP detection can be a good indicator of possible malware try to kill several services or a wiper like AwfulShred shell script that wipes the targeted linux host
@@ -32540,7 +32540,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin can delete services unit confi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32554,7 +32554,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AwfulShred", "Data Destruction"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6c077f81-2a83-4537-afbc-0e62e3215d55", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32569,7 +32569,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "rm"  AND Processes.process = "*rm *"  AND Processes.process = "*.service" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_indicator_removal_service_file_deletion_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic hunts for curl and wget being utilized in the environment. This is meant to help with identifying normal usage and potentially malicious. Utilize this query to tune other curl and wget analytics.
@@ -32581,7 +32581,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present. This query
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32590,7 +32590,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Linux Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 10, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "52fd468b-cb6d-48f5-b16a-92f1c9bb10cf", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32605,7 +32605,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=curl OR Processes.process_name=wget) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_ingress_tool_transfer_hunting_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies curl with the command-line switches that are commonly used to download, output, a remote script or binary. MetaSploit Framework will combine the -sO switch with | chmod +x to enable a simple one liner to download and set the execute bit to run the file immediately. During triage, review the remote domain and file being downloaded for legitimacy.
@@ -32617,7 +32617,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present. Tune and th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32631,7 +32631,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Linux Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8c1de57d-abc1-4b41-a727-a7a8fc5e0857", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32646,7 +32646,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process, "(?i)(-O|-sO|-ksO|--output)") | `linux_ingress_tool_transfer_with_curl_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for inserting of linux kernel module using insmod utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario
@@ -32658,7 +32658,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32672,7 +32672,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Rootkit"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "18b5a1a0-6326-11ec-943a-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32687,7 +32687,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN("kmod", "sudo") AND Processes.process = *insmod* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_insert_kernel_module_using_insmod_utility_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for possible installing a linux kernel module using modprobe utility function. This event can detect a installation of rootkit or malicious kernel module to gain elevated privileges to their malicious code and bypassed detections. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone installing kernel module in a linux host either admin or adversaries. filter is needed in this scenario
@@ -32699,7 +32699,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32713,7 +32713,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Rootkit"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "387b278a-6326-11ec-aa2c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32728,7 +32728,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN("kmod", "sudo") AND Processes.process = *modprobe* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_install_kernel_module_using_modprobe_utility_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that modify the iptables firewall setting of a linux machine. This technique was seen in cyclopsblink malware where it modifies the firewall setting of the compromised machine to allow traffic to its tcp port that will be used to communicate with its C2 server.
@@ -32740,7 +32740,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrator may do this commandline for au
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32754,7 +32754,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cyclops Blink", "Sandworm Tools"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "309d59dc-1e1b-49b2-9800-7cf18d12f7b7", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32769,7 +32769,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*iptables *" AND Processes.process = "* --dport *" AND Processes.process = "* ACCEPT*" AND Processes.process = "*&amp;&gt;/dev/null*" AND Processes.process = "* tcp *" AND NOT(Processes.parent_process_path IN("/bin/*", "/lib/*", "/usr/bin/*", "/sbin/*")) by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest _time span=10s Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_path | rex field=Processes.process "--dport (?<port>3269|636|989|994|995|8443)" | stats values(Processes.process) as processes_exec values(port) as ports values(Processes.process_guid) as guids values(Processes.process_id) as pids dc(port) as port_count count by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_path | where port_count >=3 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_iptables_firewall_modification_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the process name of Java, Apache, or Tomcat spawning a Linux shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are "sh", "ksh", "zsh", "bash", "dash", "rbash", "fish", "csh', "tcsh', "ion", "eshell". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy.
@@ -32781,7 +32781,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Filtering may be required on internal develo
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32795,7 +32795,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7b09db8a-5c20-11ec-9945-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32816,7 +32816,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java OR Processes.parent_process_name=apache OR Processes.parent_process_name=tomcat `linux_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_java_spawning_shell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Kernel Module Enumeration - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Kernel Module Enumeration - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the process kmod being utilized to list kernel modules in use. Typically, this is not seen as malicious, however it may be a precurser to the use of insmod to install a module.
@@ -32828,7 +32828,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are present based on automat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Kernel Module Enumeration - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Kernel Module Enumeration - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32842,7 +32842,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Kernel Module Enumeration - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Kernel Module Enumeration - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Rootkit"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082", "T1014"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6df99886-0e04-4c11-8b88-325747419278", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32857,7 +32857,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=kmod Processes.process IN ("*lsmod*", "*list*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_kernel_module_enumeration_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for suspicious process kworker commandline in a linux machine. kworker process name or thread are common names of kernel threads in linux process. This hunting detections can lead to investigate process contains process path in writable directory in linux like /home/, /var/log and /tmp/. This technique was seen in cyclopsblink malware to blend its core and other of its child process as normal kworker on the compromised machine. This detection might be a good pivot to look for other IOC related to cyclopsblink malware or attacks.
@@ -32869,7 +32869,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32878,7 +32878,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cyclops Blink", "Sandworm Tools"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.004", "T1036"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1cefb270-74a5-4e27-aa0c-2b6fa7c5b4ed", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32893,7 +32893,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where  Processes.parent_process = "*[kworker/*" Processes.parent_process_path IN ("/home/*", "/tmp/*", "/var/log/*") Processes.process="*iptables*" by  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_kworker_process_in_writable_process_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Make Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Make Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The Linux make command is used to build and maintain groups of programs and files from the source code. In Linux, it is one of the most frequently used commands by the developers. It assists developers to install and compile many utilities from the terminal. If sudo right is given to make utility for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -32905,7 +32905,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Make Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Make Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32919,7 +32919,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Make Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Make Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "80b22836-5091-4944-80ee-f733ac443f4f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32934,7 +32934,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*make*-s*" AND Processes.process="*--eval*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_make_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = MySQL is an open-source relational database management system. Its name is a combination of "My", the name of co-founder Michael Widenius's daughter My, and "SQL", the abbreviation for Structured Query Language. If sudo right is given to mysql utility for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -32946,7 +32946,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are present based on automat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -32960,7 +32960,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c0d810f4-230c-44ea-b703-989da02ff145", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -32975,7 +32975,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*mysql*-e*" AND Processes.process="*\!**" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_mysql_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of Ngrok being utilized on the Linux operating system. Unfortunately, there is no original file name for Ngrok, so it may be worth an additional hunt to identify any command-line arguments. The sign of someone using Ngrok is not malicious, however, more recently it has become an adversary tool.
@@ -32987,7 +32987,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if Ngrok is a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33001,7 +33001,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Reverse Network Proxy"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1572", "T1090", "T1102"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bc84d574-708c-467d-b78a-4c1e20171f97", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33016,7 +33016,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=ngrok Processes.process IN ("*start*", "*--config*","*http*","*authtoken*", "*http*", "*tcp*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_ngrok_reverse_proxy_usage_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Node Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Node Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Node.js is a back-end JavaScript runtime environment that is open-source, cross-platform, runs on the V8 engine, and executes JavaScript code outside of a web browser. It was created to help create scalable network applications. If the binary is allowed to run as superuser by sudo, it does not drop the elevated privileges and may be used to access the file system, escalate or maintain privileged access.
@@ -33028,7 +33028,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are present based on automat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Node Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Node Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33042,7 +33042,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Node Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Node Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2e58a4ff-398f-42f4-8fd0-e01ebfe2a8ce", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33057,7 +33057,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*sudo*node*" AND Processes.process="*-e*" AND Processes.process="*child_process.spawn*" AND Processes.process="*stdio*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_node_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to look for suspicious command lines that may add entry to /etc/sudoers with NOPASSWD attribute in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to the targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands users can execute on the machines and can also control whether user need a password to execute particular commands. This file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications.
@@ -33069,7 +33069,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33083,7 +33083,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ab1e0d52-624a-11ec-8e0b-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33098,7 +33098,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*NOPASSWD:*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_nopasswd_entry_in_sudoers_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Obfuscated Files or Information Base64 Decode - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Obfuscated Files or Information Base64 Decode - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of base64 decode on Linux being utilized to deobfuscate a file. Identify the source of the file and determine if legitimate. Review parallel processes for further behavior before and after.
@@ -33110,7 +33110,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and will requ
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Obfuscated Files or Information Base64 Decode - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Obfuscated Files or Information Base64 Decode - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33124,7 +33124,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Obfuscated Files or Information Base64 Decode - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Obfuscated Files or Information Base64 Decode - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "303b38b2-c03f-44e2-8f41-4594606fcfc7", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33139,7 +33139,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN ("*base64 -d*","*base64 --decode*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_obfuscated_files_or_information_base64_decode_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Octave Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Octave Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = GNU Octave is a high-level programming language primarily intended for scientific computing and numerical computation. Octave helps in solving linear and nonlinear problems numerically, and for performing other numerical experiments using a language that is mostly compatible with MATLAB. If sudo right is given to the application for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -33151,7 +33151,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Octave Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Octave Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33165,7 +33165,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Octave Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Octave Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "78f7487d-42ce-4f7f-8685-2159b25fb477", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33180,7 +33180,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*octave-cli*" AND Processes.process="*--eval*" AND Processes.process="*system*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_octave_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = OpenVPN is a virtual private network system that implements techniques to create secure point-to-point or site-to-site connections in routed or bridged configurations and remote access facilities. It implements both client and server applications. If sudo right is given to the OpenVPN application for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -33192,7 +33192,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33206,7 +33206,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d25feebe-fa1c-4754-8a1e-afb03bedc0f2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33221,7 +33221,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*openvpn*" AND Processes.process="*--dev*" AND Processes.process="*--script-security*" AND Processes.process="*--up*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_openvpn_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following correlation is specific to Linux persistence and privilege escalation tactics and is tied to two analytic stories and any Linux analytic tied to persistence and privilege escalation. These techniques often overlap with Persistence techniques, as OS features that let an adversary persist can execute in an elevated context.
@@ -33233,7 +33233,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on man
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -33242,7 +33242,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - RIR - Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - RIR - Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Correlation"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ad5ac21b-3b1e-492c-8e19-ea5d5e8e5cf1", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33263,7 +33263,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where (All_Risk.analyticstories IN ("Linux Privilege Escalation", "Linux Persistence Techniques") OR source = "*Linux*") All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic IN ("persistence", "privilege-escalation") All_Risk.risk_object_type="system" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `linux_persistence_and_privilege_escalation_risk_behavior_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux PHP Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux PHP Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = PHP is a general-purpose scripting language geared toward web development. It was originally created by Danish-Canadian programmer Rasmus Lerdorf in 1994. The PHP reference implementation is now produced by The PHP Group. If sudo right is given to php application for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -33275,7 +33275,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux PHP Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux PHP Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33289,7 +33289,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux PHP Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux PHP Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4fc4c031-e5be-4cc0-8cf9-49f9f507bcb5", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33304,7 +33304,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*php*-r*" AND Processes.process="*system*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_php_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies `pkexec` spawning with no command-line arguments. A vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec component identified as CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) which is present in the default configuration of all major Linux distributions and can be exploited to gain full root privileges on the system.
@@ -33316,7 +33316,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33330,7 +33330,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2021-4034"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "03e22c1c-8086-11ec-ac2e-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33351,7 +33351,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=pkexec by _time Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(^.{1}$)" | `linux_pkexec_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to look for suspicious process command-line that might be accessing or modifying sshd_config. This file is the ssh configuration file that might be modify by threat actors or adversaries to redirect port connection, allow user using authorized key generated during attack. This anomaly detection might catch noise from administrator auditing or modifying ssh configuration file. In this scenario filter is needed
@@ -33363,7 +33363,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33377,7 +33377,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.004", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7a85eb24-72da-11ec-ac76-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33392,7 +33392,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN("cat", "nano*","vim*", "vi*")  AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/ssh/sshd_config") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a possible attempt to dump or access the content of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline credential cracking. "etc/passwd" store user information within linux OS while "etc/shadow" contain the user passwords hash. Adversaries and threat actors may attempt to access this to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator of possible credential dumping technique but it might catch some normal administrator automation scripts or during credential auditing. In this scenario filter is needed.
@@ -33404,7 +33404,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33418,7 +33418,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.008", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "16107e0e-71fc-11ec-b862-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33433,7 +33433,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN("cat", "nano*","vim*", "vi*")  AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/shadow*", "*/etc/passwd*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a possible access or modification of /etc/sudoers file. "/etc/sudoers" file controls who can run what command as what users on what machine and can also control whether a specific user need a password for particular commands.  adversaries and threat actors abuse this file to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation during attack on targeted host.
@@ -33445,7 +33445,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33459,7 +33459,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4479539c-71fc-11ec-b2e2-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33474,7 +33474,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN("cat", "nano*","vim*", "vi*")  AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/sudoers*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_access_to_sudoers_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is designed to identify suspicious command lines that may append user entries to either /etc/at.allow or /etc/at.deny. These files can be exploited by malicious actors for persistence on a compromised Linux host by altering permissions for scheduled tasks using the at command.\
@@ -33488,7 +33488,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33502,7 +33502,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.002", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7bc20606-5f40-11ec-a586-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33517,7 +33517,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*echo*" AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/at.allow", "*/etc/at.deny") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_at_allow_config_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for suspicious command-lines that can be possibly used to modify user profile files to automatically execute scripts/executables by shell upon reboot of the machine. This technique is commonly abused by adversaries, malware and red teamers as persistence mechanism to the targeted or compromised host. This Anomaly detection is a good indicator that someone wants to run code after reboot which can be done also by the administrator or network operator for automation purposes.
@@ -33529,7 +33529,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33543,7 +33543,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.004", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9c94732a-61af-11ec-91e3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33558,7 +33558,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*echo*" AND Processes.process IN("*~/.bashrc", "*~/.bash_profile", "*/etc/profile", "~/.bash_login", "*~/.profile", "~/.bash_logout") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_command_to_profile_config_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is designed to detect potential tampering with cronjob files on a Linux system. It specifically searches for command lines that may be used to append code to existing cronjob files, a technique often employed by adversaries, malware, and red teamers for persistence or privilege escalation. Altering existing or sometimes normal cronjob script files allows malicious code to be executed automatically.\
@@ -33574,7 +33574,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may arise from legitimate ac
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33583,7 +33583,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b5b91200-5f27-11ec-bb4e-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33598,7 +33598,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*echo*" AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/cron*", "*/var/spool/cron/*", "*/etc/anacrontab*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_append_cronjob_entry_on_existing_cronjob_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects potential unauthorized modifications to Linux cronjobs using text editors like "nano", "vi" or "vim". It identifies this behavior by tracking command-line executions that interact with paths related to cronjob configuration, a common Linux scheduling utility. Cronjob files may be manipulated by attackers for privilege escalation or persistent access, making such changes critical to monitor.\ The identified behavior is significant for a Security Operations Center (SOC) as it could indicate an ongoing attempt at establishing persistent access or privilege escalation, leading to data breaches, system compromise, or other malicious activities.\
@@ -33616,7 +33616,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33625,7 +33625,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.003", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dcc89bde-5f24-11ec-87ca-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33640,7 +33640,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN("nano","vim.basic") OR Processes.process IN ("*nano *", "*vi *", "*vim *")) AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/cron*", "*/var/spool/cron/*", "*/etc/anacrontab*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_possible_cronjob_modification_with_editor_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to look for possible ssh key file creation on ~/.ssh/ folder. This technique is commonly abused by threat actors and adversaries to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the targeted host. by creating ssh private and public key and passing the public key to the attacker server. threat actor can access remotely the machine using openssh daemon service.
@@ -33652,7 +33652,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can create
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33666,7 +33666,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.004", "T1098"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c04ef40c-72da-11ec-8eac-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33681,7 +33681,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/.ssh*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_possible_ssh_key_file_creation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious command that may hijack a library function in linux platform. This technique is commonly abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain privileges and persist on the machine. This detection pertains to loading a dll to hijack or hook a library function of specific program using LD_PRELOAD command.
@@ -33693,7 +33693,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33707,7 +33707,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.006", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cbe2ca30-631e-11ec-8670-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33728,7 +33728,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*LD_PRELOAD*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_preload_hijack_library_calls_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Proxy Socks Curl - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Proxy Socks Curl - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies curl being utilized with a proxy based on command-line arguments - -x, socks, --preproxy and --proxy. This behavior is built into the MetaSploit Framework as a auxiliary module. What does socks buy an adversary? SOCKS4a extends the SOCKS4 protocol to allow a client to specify a destination domain name rather than an IP address. The SOCKS5 protocol is defined in RFC 1928. It is an incompatible extension of the SOCKS4 protocol; it offers more choices for authentication and adds support for IPv6 and UDP, the latter of which can be used for DNS lookups. The protocols, and a proxy itself, allow an adversary to evade controls in place monitoring traffic, making it harder for the defender to identify and track activity.
@@ -33740,7 +33740,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on prox
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Proxy Socks Curl - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Proxy Socks Curl - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33754,7 +33754,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Proxy Socks Curl - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Proxy Socks Curl - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Linux Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1090", "T1095"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bd596c22-ad1e-44fc-b242-817253ce8b08", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33775,7 +33775,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process IN ("*-x *", "*socks4a://*", "*socks5h://*", "*socks4://*","*socks5://*", "*--preproxy *", "--proxy*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_proxy_socks_curl_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = In computing, Puppet is a software configuration management tool which includes its own declarative language to describe system configuration. It is a model-driven solution that requires limited programming knowledge to use. If sudo right is given to the tool for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -33787,7 +33787,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33801,7 +33801,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1d19037f-466e-4d56-8d87-36fafd9aa3ce", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33816,7 +33816,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*puppet*" AND Processes.process="*apply*" AND Processes.process="*-e*" AND Processes.process="*exec*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_puppet_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux RPM Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux RPM Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = RPM Package Manager is a free and open-source package management system. The name RPM refers to the .rpm file format and the package manager program itself. RPM was intended primarily for Linux distributions; the file format is the baseline package format of the Linux Standard Base. If sudo right is given to rpm utility for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -33828,7 +33828,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are present based on automat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux RPM Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux RPM Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33842,7 +33842,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux RPM Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux RPM Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f8e58a23-cecd-495f-9c65-6c76b4cb9774", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33857,7 +33857,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*rpm*--eval*" AND Processes.process="*lua:os.execute*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_rpm_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Ruby is one of the most used and easy to use programming languages. Ruby is an open-source, object-oriented interpreter that can be installed on a Linux system. If sudo right is given to ruby application for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -33869,7 +33869,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are present based on automat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33883,7 +33883,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "097b28b5-7004-4d40-a715-7e390501788b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33898,7 +33898,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*ruby*-e*" AND Processes.process="*exec*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_ruby_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is designed to detect suspicious file creation within the systemd timer directory on Linux platforms. Systemd is a system and service manager for Linux, similar to the combination of wininit.exe and services.exe on Windows. This process initializes a Linux system and starts defined services in unit files. Malicious actors, such as adversaries, malware, or red teamers, can exploit this feature by embedding a systemd service file for persistence on the targeted or compromised host.\
@@ -33912,7 +33912,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may arise when administrator
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33926,7 +33926,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c7495048-61b6-11ec-9a37-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33941,7 +33941,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name = *.service Filesystem.file_path IN ("*/etc/systemd/system*", "*/lib/systemd/system*", "*/usr/lib/systemd/system*", "*/run/systemd/system*", "*~/.config/systemd/*", "*~/.local/share/systemd/*","*/etc/systemd/user*", "*/lib/systemd/user*", "*/usr/lib/systemd/user*", "*/run/systemd/user*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_service_file_created_in_systemd_directory_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Service Restarted - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the restarting or re-enabling of services in the Linux platform. It focuses on the use of the systemctl or service tools for executing these actions. Adversaries may leverage this technique to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as a form of persistence. Linux hosts typically start services during boot to perform background system functions. However, administrators may also create legitimate services for specific tools or applications as part of task automation. In such cases, it is recommended to verify the service path of the registered script or executable and identify the creator of the service for further validation.\
@@ -33957,7 +33957,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Service Restarted - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -33971,7 +33971,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Service Restarted - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AwfulShred", "Data Destruction", "Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "084275ba-61b8-11ec-8d64-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -33986,7 +33986,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN ("systemctl", "service") OR Processes.process IN ("*systemctl *", "*service *")) Processes.process IN ("*restart*", "*reload*", "*reenable*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_restarted_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation or enabling of services in Linux platforms, specifically using the systemctl or service tool application. This behavior is worth identifying as adversaries may create or modify services to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Legitimate services created by administrators for automation purposes may also trigger this analytic, so it is important to update the filter macros to remove false positives. If a true positive is found, it suggests an possible attacker is attempting to persist within the environment or deliver additional malicious payloads, leading to data theft, ransomware, or other damaging outcomes. To implement this analytic, ensure you are ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.
@@ -33998,7 +33998,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34012,7 +34012,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.006", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e0428212-61b7-11ec-88a3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34027,7 +34027,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN ("systemctl", "service") OR Processes.process IN ("*systemctl *", "*service *")) Processes.process IN ("* start *", "* enable *") AND NOT (Processes.os="Microsoft Windows" OR Processes.vendor_product="Microsoft Windows") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_service_started_or_enabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for suspicious chmod utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions.
@@ -34039,7 +34039,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34053,7 +34053,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bf0304b6-6250-11ec-9d7c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34068,7 +34068,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE (Processes.process_name = chmod OR Processes.process = "*chmod *") AND Processes.process IN("* g+s *", "* u+s *", "* 4777 *", "* 4577 *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_chmod_utility_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for suspicious setcap utility execution to enable SUID bit. This allows a user to temporarily gain root access, usually in order to run a program. For example, only the root account is allowed to change the password information contained in the password database; If the SUID bit appears as an s, the file's owner also has execute permission to the file; if it appears as an S, the file's owner does not have execute permission. The second specialty permission is the SGID, or set group id bit. It is similar to the SUID bit, except it can temporarily change group membership, usually to execute a program. The SGID bit is set if an s or an S appears in the group section of permissions.
@@ -34080,7 +34080,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34094,7 +34094,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.001", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9d96022e-6250-11ec-9a19-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34109,7 +34109,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = setcap OR Processes.process = "*setcap *") AND Processes.process IN ("* cap_setuid=ep *", "* cap_setuid+ep *", "* cap_net_bind_service+p *", "* cap_net_raw+ep *", "* cap_dac_read_search+ep *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_setuid_using_setcap_utility_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a shred process to overwrite a files in a linux machine. Shred Linux application is designed to overwrite file to hide its contents or make the deleted file un-recoverable. Weve seen this technique in industroyer2 malware that tries to wipe energy facilities of targeted sector as part of its destructive attack. It might be some normal user may use this command for valid purposes but it is recommended to check what files, disk or folder it tries to shred that might be good pivot for incident response in this type of destructive malware.
@@ -34121,7 +34121,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34135,7 +34135,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AwfulShred", "Data Destruction", "Industroyer2", "Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c1952cf1-643c-4965-82de-11c067cbae76", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34156,7 +34156,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name =shred AND Processes.process IN ("*-n*", "*-u*", "*-z*", "*-s*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_shred_overwrite_command_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = sqlite3 is a terminal-based front-end to the SQLite library that can evaluate queries interactively and display the results in multiple formats. sqlite3 can also be used within shell scripts and other applications to provide batch processing features. If sudo right is given to this application for the user, then the user can run system commands as root and possibly get a root shell.
@@ -34168,7 +34168,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34182,7 +34182,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ab75dbb7-c3ba-4689-9c1b-8d2717bdcba1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34197,7 +34197,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*sqlite3*" AND Processes.process="*.shell*" AND Processes.process="*sudo*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_sqlite3_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies based on process execution the modification of SSH Authorized Keys. Adversaries perform this behavior to persist on endpoints. During triage, review parallel processes and capture any additional file modifications for review.
@@ -34209,7 +34209,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Filtering will be required as system adminis
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34223,7 +34223,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f5ab595e-28e5-4327-8077-5008ba97c850", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34238,7 +34238,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where  Processes.process_name IN ("bash","cat") Processes.process IN ("*/authorized_keys*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_ssh_authorized_keys_modification_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux SSH Remote Services Script Execute - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux SSH Remote Services Script Execute - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies SSH being utilized to move laterally and execute a script or file on the remote host.
@@ -34250,7 +34250,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This is not a common command to be executed.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux SSH Remote Services Script Execute - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux SSH Remote Services Script Execute - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34264,7 +34264,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux SSH Remote Services Script Execute - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux SSH Remote Services Script Execute - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "aa1748dd-4a5c-457a-9cf6-ca7b4eb711b3", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34285,7 +34285,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where  Processes.process_name=ssh Processes.process IN ("*oStrictHostKeyChecking*", "*oConnectTimeout*", "*oBatchMode*") AND Processes.process IN ("*http:*","*https:*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_ssh_remote_services_script_execute_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This analytic looks for suspicious commandline that redirect the stdout or possible stderror to dev/null file. This technique was seen in cyclopsblink malware where it redirect the possible output or error while modify the iptables firewall setting of the compromised machine to hide its action from the user. This Anomaly detection is a good pivot to look further why process or user use this un common approach. 
@@ -34297,7 +34297,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34311,7 +34311,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cyclops Blink", "Data Destruction", "Industroyer2"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "de62b809-a04d-46b5-9a15-8298d330f0c8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34326,7 +34326,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where  Processes.process = "*&amp;&gt;/dev/null*" by  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_stdout_redirection_to_dev_null_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Stop Services - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Stop Services - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is to detect events that attempt to stop or clear a service. This is typically identified in parallel with other instances of service enumeration of attempts to stop a service and then delete it. Adversaries utilize this technique like industroyer2 malware to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective as a destructive payload.
@@ -34338,7 +34338,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can use th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Stop Services - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Stop Services - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34352,7 +34352,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Stop Services - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Stop Services - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AwfulShred", "Data Destruction", "Industroyer2"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d05204a5-9f1c-4946-a7f3-4fa58d76d5fd", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34373,7 +34373,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("systemctl", "service", "svcadm")  Processes.process ="*stop*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_stop_services_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect the execution of sudo or su command in linux operating system. The "sudo" command allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments. This command is commonly abused by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to elevate privileges to the targeted host. This command can be executed by administrator for legitimate purposes or to execute process that need admin privileges, In this scenario filter is needed.
@@ -34385,7 +34385,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34394,7 +34394,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4b00f134-6d6a-11ec-a90c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34409,7 +34409,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("sudo", "su") OR Processes.parent_process_name IN ("sudo", "su") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_sudo_or_su_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to looks for file creation of sudoers.tmp file cause by editing /etc/sudoers using visudo or editor in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what).
@@ -34421,7 +34421,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34435,7 +34435,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "be254a5c-63e7-11ec-89da-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34450,7 +34450,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*sudoers.tmp*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_sudoers_tmp_file_creation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to look for possible enumeration of local network configuration. This technique is commonly used as part of recon of adversaries or threat actor to know some network information for its next or further attack. This anomaly detections may capture normal event made by administrator during auditing or testing network connection of specific host or network to network.
@@ -34462,7 +34462,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34476,7 +34476,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Industroyer2", "Network Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "535cb214-8b47-11ec-a2c7-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34491,7 +34491,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name_list values(Processes.process) as process_list values(Processes.process_id) as process_id_list values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id_list values(Processes.process_guid) as process_guid_list dc(Processes.process_name) as process_name_count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("arp", "ifconfig", "ip", "netstat", "firewall-cmd", "ufw", "iptables", "ss", "route") by _time span=30m Processes.dest Processes.user | where process_name_count >=4 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| `linux_system_network_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to look for possible execution of SysReq hack to reboot the Linux system host. This technique was seen in Awfulshred malware wiper to reboot the compromised host by using the linux magic sysreq key. This kernel configuration can trigger reboot by piping out 'b' to /proc/sysrq-trigger after enabling all the functions of sysrq. This TTP detection can be a good indicator of possible suspicious processes running on the Linux host since this command is not a common way to reboot a system.
@@ -34503,7 +34503,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34517,7 +34517,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AwfulShred", "Data Destruction"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1529"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e1912b58-ed9c-422c-bbb0-2dbc70398345", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34538,7 +34538,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("dash", "sudo", "bash")  Processes.process =  "* echo b &gt; *" Processes.process = "*/proc/sysrq-trigger" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_system_reboot_via_system_request_key_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to look for possible execution of SysReq hack to enable all functions of kernel system requests of the Linux system host. This technique was seen in AwfulShred malware wiper to reboot the compromised host by using the linux magic sysreq key. This kernel configuration can be triggered by piping out bitmask '1' to /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq. This TTP detection can be a good indicator of possible suspicious processes running on the Linux host since this command is not so common shell commandline.
@@ -34550,7 +34550,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34564,7 +34564,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AwfulShred", "Data Destruction"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.004", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e7a96937-3b58-4962-8dce-538e4763cf15", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34579,7 +34579,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("dash", "sudo", "bash")  Processes.process =  "* echo 1 &gt; *" Processes.process = "*/proc/sys/kernel/sysrq" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `linux_unix_shell_enable_all_sysrq_functions_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to looks for suspicious commandline that add entry to /etc/sudoers by using visudo utility tool in linux platform. This technique may abuse by adversaries, malware author and red teamers to gain elevated privilege to targeted or compromised host. /etc/sudoers file controls who can run what commands as what users on what machines and can also control special things such as whether you need a password for particular commands. The file is composed of aliases (basically variables) and user specifications (which control who can run what).
@@ -34591,7 +34591,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator can execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34605,7 +34605,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Persistence Techniques", "Linux Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 40, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.003", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "08c41040-624c-11ec-a71f-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34620,7 +34620,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = visudo by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `linux_visudo_utility_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Living Off The Land Detection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Living Off The Land Detection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following correlation identifies a distinct amount of analytics associated with the Living Off The Land analytic story that identify potentially suspicious behavior.
@@ -34632,7 +34632,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There are no known false positive for this s
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Living Off The Land Detection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Living Off The Land Detection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -34641,7 +34641,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - RIR - Living Off The Land Detection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - RIR - Living Off The Land Detection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105", "T1190", "T1059", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Correlation"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1be30d80-3a39-4df9-9102-64a467b24abc", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34662,7 +34662,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories="Living Off The Land" All_Risk.risk_object_type="system" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 5 | `living_off_the_land_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule]
+[ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, registering or loading dynwrapx.dll to a host is highly suspicious. In most instances when it is used maliciously, the best way to triage is to review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This detection will return and identify the processes that invoke vbs/wscript/cscript.
@@ -34674,7 +34674,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however i
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -34688,7 +34688,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AsyncRAT", "Remcos"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1055.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "eac5e8ba-4857-11ec-9371-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34709,7 +34709,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 (ImageLoaded = "*\\dynwrapx.dll" OR OriginalFileName = "dynwrapx.dll" OR  Product = "DynamicWrapperX") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName Product process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule]
+[ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The two arguments `user` and 'users', return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -34721,7 +34721,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34730,7 +34730,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Sandworm Tools"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5d0d4830-0133-11ec-bae3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34745,7 +34745,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` (Processes.process=*user OR Processes.process=*users) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_net_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule]
+[ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for local users. The argument `useraccount` is used to leverage WMI to return a list of all local users. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to enumerate users for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -34757,7 +34757,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34766,7 +34766,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4902d7aa-0134-11ec-9d65-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34781,7 +34781,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process=*useraccount*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_wmic_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This correlation find exploitation of Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 against systems using detections from Splunk Security Content Analytic Story. It does this by calculating the distinct count of MITRE ATT&CK tactics from Log4Shell detections fired. If the count is larger than 2 or more distinct MITRE ATT&CK tactics we assume high problability of exploitation. The Analytic story breaks down into 3 major phases of a Log4Shell exploitation, specifically> Initial Payload delivery eg. `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}` Call back to malicious LDAP server eg. Exploit.class Post Exploitation Activity/Lateral Movement using Powershell or similar T1562.001 Each of these phases fall into different MITRE ATT&CK Tactics (Initial Access, Execution, Command And Control), by looking into 2 or more phases showing up in detections triggerd is how this correlation search finds exploitation. If we get a notable from this correlation search the best way to triage it is by investigating the affected systems against Log4Shell exploitation using Splunk SOAR playbooks.
@@ -34793,7 +34793,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There are no known false positive for this s
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -34802,7 +34802,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - RIR - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - RIR - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-320A", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105", "T1190", "T1059", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Correlation"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9be30d80-3a39-4df9-9102-64a467b24eac", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34823,7 +34823,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories="Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228" All_Risk.risk_object_type="system" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 2 | `log4shell_cve_2021_44228_exploitation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine.
@@ -34835,7 +34835,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34849,7 +34849,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1037", "T1037.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4c38c264-1f74-11ec-b5fa-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34870,7 +34870,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript") by Registry.dest  Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - LOLBAS With Network Traffic - Rule]
+[ESCU - LOLBAS With Network Traffic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies LOLBAS with network traffic. When adversaries abuse LOLBAS they are often used to download malicious code or executables. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like downloading malicious code. Looking for these process can help defenders identify lateral movement, command-and-control, or exfiltration activies.
@@ -34882,7 +34882,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitmate usage of internal automation or sc
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - LOLBAS With Network Traffic - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - LOLBAS With Network Traffic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -34896,7 +34896,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - LOLBAS With Network Traffic - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - LOLBAS With Network Traffic - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105", "T1567", "T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2820f032-19eb-497e-8642-25b04a880359", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34917,7 +34917,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app IN ("*Regsvcs.exe", "*\\Ftp.exe", "*OfflineScannerShell.exe", "*Rasautou.exe", "*Schtasks.exe", "*Xwizard.exe", "*Pnputil.exe", "*Atbroker.exe", "*Pcwrun.exe", "*Ttdinject.exe", "*Mshta.exe", "*Bitsadmin.exe", "*Certoc.exe", "*Ieexec.exe", "*Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "*Runscripthelper.exe", "*Forfiles.exe", "*Msbuild.exe", "*Register-cimprovider.exe", "*Tttracer.exe", "*Ie4uinit.exe", "*Bash.exe", "*Hh.exe", "*SettingSyncHost.exe", "*Cmstp.exe", "*Stordiag.exe", "*Scriptrunner.exe", "*Odbcconf.exe", "*Extexport.exe", "*Msdt.exe", "*WorkFolders.exe", "*Diskshadow.exe", "*Mavinject.exe", "*Regasm.exe", "*Gpscript.exe", "*Regsvr32.exe", "*Msiexec.exe", "*Wuauclt.exe", "*Presentationhost.exe", "*Wmic.exe", "*Runonce.exe", "*Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "*Verclsid.exe", "*Infdefaultinstall.exe", "*Installutil.exe", "*Netsh.exe", "*Wab.exe", "*Dnscmd.exe", "*\\At.exe", "*Pcalua.exe", "*Msconfig.exe", "*makecab.exe", "*cscript.exe", "*notepad.exe", "*\\cmd.exe", "*certutil.exe", "*\\powershell.exe", "*powershell_ise.exe")) by All_Traffic.app,All_Traffic.src,All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.user,All_Traffic.dest,All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rex field=app ".*\\\(?<process_name>.*)$" | rename app as process | `lolbas_with_network_traffic_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule]
+[ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine. 
@@ -34929,7 +34929,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = At this stage, there are no known false posi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-02-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -34943,7 +34943,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "40bb64f9-f619-4e3d-8732-328d40377c4b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -34964,7 +34964,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*com.apple.loginwindow*" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos___re_opened_applications_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - MacOS LOLbin - Rule]
+[ESCU - MacOS LOLbin - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Detect multiple executions of Living off the Land (LOLbin) binaries in a short period of time.
@@ -34976,7 +34976,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - MacOS LOLbin - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MacOS LOLbin - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -34990,7 +34990,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - MacOS LOLbin - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MacOS LOLbin - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.004", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "58d270fb-5b39-418e-a855-4b8ac046805e", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35011,7 +35011,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `osquery` name=es_process_events columns.cmdline IN ("find*", "crontab*", "screencapture*", "openssl*", "curl*", "wget*", "killall*", "funzip*") | rename columns.* as * | stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(cmdline) as cmdline, values(pid) as pid, values(parent) as parent, values(path) as path, values(signing_id) as signing_id,  dc(path) as dc_path by username host | rename username as user, cmdline as process, path as process_path, host as dest | where dc_path > 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos_lolbin_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - MacOS plutil - Rule]
+[ESCU - MacOS plutil - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Detect usage of plutil to modify plist files. Adversaries can modiy plist files to executed binaries or add command line arguments. Plist files in auto-run locations are executed upon user logon or system startup.
@@ -35023,7 +35023,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators using plutil to change plist
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - MacOS plutil - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MacOS plutil - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -35037,7 +35037,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - MacOS plutil - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MacOS plutil - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1647"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c11f2b57-92c1-4cd2-b46c-064eafb833ac", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35058,7 +35058,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `osquery` name=es_process_events columns.path=/usr/bin/plutil | rename columns.* as * | stats count  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by username host cmdline pid path parent signing_id | rename username as user, cmdline as process, path as process_path, host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `macos_plutil_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule]
+[ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect known mailsniper.ps1 functions executed in a machine. This technique was seen in some attacker to harvest some sensitive e-mail in a compromised exchange server.
@@ -35070,7 +35070,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -35084,7 +35084,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114", "T1114.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a36972c8-b894-11eb-9f78-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35105,7 +35105,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN ("*Invoke-GlobalO365MailSearch*", "*Invoke-GlobalMailSearch*", "*Invoke-SelfSearch*", "*Invoke-PasswordSprayOWA*", "*Invoke-PasswordSprayEWS*","*Invoke-DomainHarvestOWA*", "*Invoke-UsernameHarvestOWA*","*Invoke-OpenInboxFinder*","*Invoke-InjectGEventAPI*","*Invoke-InjectGEvent*","*Invoke-SearchGmail*", "*Invoke-MonitorCredSniper*", "*Invoke-AddGmailRule*","*Invoke-PasswordSprayEAS*","*Invoke-UsernameHarvestEAS*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mailsniper_invoke_functions_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule]
+[ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. Most COM classes are registered with the operating system and are identified by a GUID that represents the Class Identifier (CLSID) within the registry (usually under HKLM\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID or HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID).  Behind the implementation of a COM class is the server (some binary) that is referenced within registry keys under the CLSID.  The LocalServer32 key represents a path to an executable (exe) implementation, and the InprocServer32 key represents a path to a dynamic link library (DLL) implementation (Bohops). During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious activity. Pivot on the process GUID to see the full timeline of events. Analyze the value and look for file modifications. Being this is looking for inprocserver32, a DLL found in the value will most likely be loaded by a parallel process.
@@ -35117,7 +35117,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, filter as
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -35131,7 +35131,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.010", "T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "127c8d08-25ff-11ec-9223-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35152,7 +35152,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\CLSID\\{89565275-A714-4a43-912E-978B935EDCCC}\\InProcServer32\\(Default)" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | fields _time dest registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name process_name process_path process process_guid user] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule]
+[ESCU - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection is to identify the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious commands or payloads via PowerShell.
@@ -35164,7 +35164,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Creating a hidden powershell service is rare
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -35178,7 +35178,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell", "Rhysida Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8e204dfd-cae0-4ea8-a61d-e972a1ff2ff8", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35199,7 +35199,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | eval l_ImagePath=lower(ImagePath) | regex l_ImagePath="powershell[.\s]|powershell_ise[.\s]|pwsh[.\s]|psexec[.\s]" | regex l_ImagePath="-nop[rofile\s]+|-w[indowstyle]*\s+hid[den]*|-noe[xit\s]+|-enc[odedcommand\s]+" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ImagePath ServiceName StartType ServiceType AccountName UserID dest | rename UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule]
+[ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of the EncodedCommand PowerShell parameter. This is typically used by Administrators to run complex scripts, but commonly used by adversaries to hide their code.\
@@ -35217,7 +35217,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = System administrators may use this option, b
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -35226,7 +35226,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-320A", "DarkCrystal RAT", "Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "NOBELIUM Group", "Qakbot", "Sandworm Tools", "Volt Typhoon", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19", "detection_version": "7"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35241,7 +35241,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"(?i)[\-|\/|– |—|―]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\s+[^-]") | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with parameters used to bypass the local execution policy for scripts. These parameters are often observed in attacks leveraging PowerShell scripts as they override the default PowerShell execution policy.
@@ -35253,7 +35253,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There may be legitimate reasons to bypass th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -35267,7 +35267,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AsyncRAT", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "DarkCrystal RAT", "HAFNIUM Group", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-d138afaaca39", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35288,7 +35288,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process="* -ex*" OR Processes.process="* bypass *") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule]
+[ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line.
@@ -35300,7 +35300,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = These characters might be legitimately on th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -35314,7 +35314,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cde75cf6-3c7a-4dd6-af01-27cdb4511fd4", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35335,7 +35335,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,"`"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "^"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "'"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation > 10 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule]
+[ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic looks for the use of Mimikatz command line parameters leveraged to execute pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Mimikatz and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic.
@@ -35347,7 +35347,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although highly unlikely, legitimate applica
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -35361,7 +35361,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "CISA AA22-320A", "CISA AA23-347A", "Sandworm Tools"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "13bbd574-83ac-11ec-99d4-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35382,7 +35382,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = "*sekurlsa::tickets /export*" OR Processes.process = "*kerberos::ptt*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mimikatz_passtheticket_commandline_parameters_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
+[ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the DCOM protocol and the MMC20 COM object, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `mmc.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of mmc.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.
@@ -35394,7 +35394,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this beh
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -35408,7 +35408,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003", "T1218.014"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f6601940-4c74-11ec-b9b7-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35429,7 +35429,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule]
+[ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of registry to deface or change the wallpaper of a compromised machines as part of its payload. This technique was commonly seen in ransomware like REVIL where it create a bitmap file contain a note that the machine was compromised and make it as a wallpaper.
@@ -35441,7 +35441,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = 3rd party tool may used to changed the wallp
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -35455,7 +35455,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware", "Brute Ratel C4", "LockBit Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1491"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "accb0712-c381-11eb-8e5b-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35476,7 +35476,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode =13  (TargetObject IN ("*\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\Wallpaper","*\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\WallpaperStyle") AND Image != "*\\explorer.exe") OR (TargetObject IN ("*\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\Wallpaper","*\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\WallpaperStyle") AND Details IN ("*\\temp\\*", "*\\users\\public\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Image TargetObject Details Computer process_guid process_id user_id | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modification_of_wallpaper_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule]
+[ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies suspicious modification of ACL permission to a files or folder to make it available to everyone. This technique may be used by the adversary to evade ACLs or protected files access. This changes is commonly configured by the file or directory owner with appropriate permission. This behavior is a good indicator if this command seen on a machine utilized by an account with no permission to do so.
@@ -35488,7 +35488,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators may use this command. Filter
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -35502,7 +35502,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7e8458cc-acca-11eb-9e3f-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35517,7 +35517,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = "cacls.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "icacls.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "xcacls.exe") AND Processes.process = "*/G*" AND (Processes.process = "* everyone:*"  OR Processes.process = "* SYSTEM:*" OR Processes.process = "* S-1-1-0:*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `modify_acl_permission_to_files_or_folder_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule]
+[ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot.
@@ -35529,7 +35529,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = You will encounter noise from legitimate pri
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -35543,7 +35543,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.010", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35564,7 +35564,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.action=modified AND Registry.registry_path="*CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors*") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule]
+[ESCU - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following query identifies suspicious .aspx created in 3 paths identified by Microsoft as known drop locations for Exchange exploitation related to HAFNIUM group and recently disclosed vulnerablity named ProxyShell. Paths include: `\HttpProxy\owa\auth\`, `\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\`, and `\HttpProxy\OAB\`. The analytic is limited to process name MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe, which typically does not write .aspx files to disk. Upon triage, the suspicious .aspx file will likely look obvious on the surface. inspect the contents for script code inside. Identify additional log sources, IIS included, to review source and other potential exploitation. It is often the case that a particular threat is only applicable to a specific subset of systems in your environment. Typically analytics to detect those threats are written without the benefit of being able to only target those systems as well. Writing analytics against all systems when those behaviors are limited to identifiable subsets of those systems is suboptimal. Consider the case ProxyShell vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Servers. With asset information, a hunter can limit their analytics to systems that have been identified as Exchange servers. A hunter may start with the theory that the exchange server is communicating with new systems that it has not previously. If this theory is run against all publicly facing systems, the amount of noise it will generate will likely render this theory untenable. However, using the asset information to limit this analytic to just the Exchange servers will reduce the noise allowing the hunter to focus only on the systems where this behavioral change is relevant. 
@@ -35576,7 +35576,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `actio
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -35590,7 +35590,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "ProxyShell", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003", "T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "985f322c-57a5-11ec-b9ac-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35611,7 +35611,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=MSExchangeMailboxReplication.exe  by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process_guid Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\*", "*\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\*", "*\\HttpProxy\\OAB\\*") Filesystem.file_name="*.aspx" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process process_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `ms_exchange_mailbox_replication_service_writing_active_server_pages_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule]
+[ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading ldap module to process ldap query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute ldap query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious ldap query or ldap related events to the host that may give you good information regarding ldap or AD information processing or might be a attacker.
@@ -35623,7 +35623,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = automation scripting language may used by ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -35637,7 +35637,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0b0c40dc-14a6-11ec-b267-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35652,7 +35652,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN ("*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\Wldap32.dll", "*\\adsldp.dll", "*\\adsldpc.dll") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_ldap_module_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule]
+[ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious MS scripting process such as wscript.exe or cscript.exe that loading wmi module to process wmi query. This behavior was seen in FIN7 implant where it uses javascript to execute wmi query to parse host information that will send to its C2 server. this anomaly detections is a good initial step to hunt further a suspicious wmi query or wmi related events to the host that may give you good information regarding process that are commonly using wmi query or modules or might be an attacker using this technique.
@@ -35664,7 +35664,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = automation scripting language may used by ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -35678,7 +35678,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2eba3d36-14a6-11ec-a682-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35693,7 +35693,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode =7 Image IN ("*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\fastprox.dll", "*\\wbemdisp.dll", "*\\wbemprox.dll", "*\\wbemsvc.dll" , "*\\wmiutils.dll", "*\\wbemcomn.dll") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventCode process_name ProcessId ProcessGuid Computer ImageLoaded | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ms_scripting_process_loading_wmi_module_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious child process of MSBuild spawned by Windows Script Host - cscript or wscript. This behavior or event are commonly seen and used by malware or adversaries to execute malicious msbuild process using malicious script in the compromised host. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any file modifications. MSBuild may load a script from the same path without having command-line arguments.
@@ -35705,7 +35705,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as develop
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -35719,7 +35719,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127.001", "T1127"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "213b3148-24ea-11ec-93a2-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35740,7 +35740,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe") AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msbuild_suspicious_spawned_by_script_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious mshta.exe process that spawn rundll32 or regsvr32 child process. This technique was seen in several malware nowadays like trickbot to load its initial .dll stage loader to execute and download the the actual trickbot payload.
@@ -35752,7 +35752,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = limitted. this anomaly behavior is not commo
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -35766,7 +35766,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land", "Trickbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4aa5d062-e893-11eb-9eb2-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35787,7 +35787,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = "mshta.exe"  `process_rundll32` OR `process_regsvr32` by  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule]
+[ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection identifies the loading of the mshtml.dll module into an Office product. This behavior is associated with CVE-2021-40444, where a malicious document loads ActiveX, thereby activating the MSHTML component. The vulnerability is found within the MSHTML component itself. During triage, it is important to identify concurrent processes and document any file modifications for further analysis.
@@ -35799,7 +35799,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present, how
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -35813,7 +35813,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5f1c168e-118b-11ec-84ff-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35834,7 +35834,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventID=7 process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe","onenote.exe","onenotem.exe","onenoteviewer.exe","onenoteim.exe", "msaccess.exe","Graph.exe","winproj.exe") loaded_file_path IN ("*\\mshtml.dll", "*\\Microsoft.mshtml.dll","*\\IE.Interop.MSHTML.dll","*\\MshtmlDac.dll","*\\MshtmlDed.dll","*\\MshtmlDer.dll") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_id, dest, process_name, loaded_file, loaded_file_path, original_file_name, process_guid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `mshtml_module_load_in_office_product_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule]
+[ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic identifies `msi.dll` being loaded by a binary not located in `system32`, `syswow64`, `winsxs` or `windows` paths. This behavior is most recently related to InstallerFileTakeOver, or CVE-2021-41379, and DLL side-loading. CVE-2021-41379 requires a binary to be dropped and `msi.dll` to be loaded by it. To Successful exploitation of this issue happens in four parts\
@@ -35858,7 +35858,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible some Administrative utilities
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -35867,7 +35867,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2021-41379"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ccb98a66-5851-11ec-b91c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35882,7 +35882,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\msi.dll" NOT (Image IN ("*\\System32\\*","*\\syswow64\\*","*\\windows\\*", "*\\winsxs\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msi_module_loaded_by_non_system_binary_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule]
+[ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine
@@ -35894,7 +35894,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = quite minimal false positive expected.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -35908,7 +35908,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8bb3f280-dd9b-11eb-84d5-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35929,7 +35929,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = "msmpeng.exe" OR Filesystem.file_name = "mpsvc.dll")  AND NOT (Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\Program Files\\windows defender\\*","*\\WinSxS\\*defender-service*","*\\WinSxS\\Temp\\*defender-service*")) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id  Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic will identify the use of localgroup discovery using `net localgroup`. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.
@@ -35941,7 +35941,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as need
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -35950,7 +35950,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Azorult", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "IcedID", "Prestige Ransomware", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Volt Typhoon", "Windows Discovery Techniques", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "54f5201e-155b-11ec-a6e2-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -35965,7 +35965,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=net.exe OR Processes.process_name=net1.exe (Processes.process="*localgroup*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_localgroup_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect modification of registry to bypass UAC windows feature. This technique is to add a payload dll path on .NET COR file path that will be loaded by mmc.exe as soon it was executed. This detection rely on monitoring the registry key and values in the detection area. It may happened that windows update some dll related to mmc.exe and add dll path in this registry. In this case filtering is needed.
@@ -35977,7 +35977,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = limited false positive. It may trigger by so
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -35991,7 +35991,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0252ca80-e30d-11eb-8aa3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36012,7 +36012,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Environment\\COR_PROFILER_PATH" Registry.registry_value_data = "*.dll" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule]
+[ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `arp.exe` utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use arp.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -36024,7 +36024,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -36033,7 +36033,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "IcedID", "Prestige Ransomware", "Qakbot", "Volt Typhoon", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ae008c0f-83bd-4ed4-9350-98d4328e15d2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36048,7 +36048,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="arp.exe") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_arp_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule]
+[ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use net.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -36060,7 +36060,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -36069,7 +36069,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Azorult", "Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "640337e5-6e41-4b7f-af06-9d9eab5e1e2d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36084,7 +36084,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="net.exe" OR Processes.process_name="net1.exe") (Processes.process=*use*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_net_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule]
+[ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to get a listing of network connections on a compromised system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may use netstat.exe for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -36096,7 +36096,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -36105,7 +36105,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "CISA AA22-277A", "CISA AA23-347A", "PlugX", "Prestige Ransomware", "Qakbot", "Volt Typhoon", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2cf5cc25-f39a-436d-a790-4857e5995ede", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36120,7 +36120,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="netstat.exe") (Processes.process=*-a*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_connection_discovery_with_netstat_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule]
+[ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic look for a spawned process of route.exe windows application. Adversaries and red teams alike abuse this application the recon or do a network discovery on a target host. but one possible false positive might be an automated tool used by a system administator or a powershell script in amazon ec2 config services.
@@ -36132,7 +36132,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -36141,7 +36141,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "CISA AA22-277A", "Prestige Ransomware", "Qakbot", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1016.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dd83407e-439f-11ec-ab8e-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36156,7 +36156,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_route` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_discovery_using_route_windows_app_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Network Share Discovery Via Dir Command - Rule]
+[ESCU - Network Share Discovery Via Dir Command - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies object access on Windows administrative SMB shares (Admin$, IPC$, C$). This represents suspicious behavior as its commonly used by tools like PsExec/PaExec and others to stage service binaries before creating and starting a Windows service on remote endpoints. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse administrative shares for lateral movement and remote code execution. The IcedID malware family also implements this behavior to try to infect other machines in the infected network.
@@ -36168,7 +36168,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = System Administrators may use looks like net
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Network Share Discovery Via Dir Command - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Network Share Discovery Via Dir Command - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["13daa2cf-195a-43df-a8bd-7dd5ffb607b5"]
@@ -36178,7 +36178,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Network Share Discovery Via Dir Command - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Network Share Discovery Via Dir Command - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1135"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dc1457d0-1d9b-422e-b5a7-db46c184d9aa", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36193,7 +36193,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5140 ShareName IN("\\\\*\\ADMIN$","\\\\*\\C$","*\\\\*\\IPC$") AccessMask= 0x1 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by ShareName IpAddress ObjectType SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName IpPort AccessMask Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `network_share_discovery_via_dir_command_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol - Rule]
+[ESCU - Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies network traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol. This protocol is used to manage Active Directory. The analytic is meant to be tuned and filtered to the specific environment. It will assist defenders in identifying suspicious processes accessing port 9389.
@@ -36205,7 +36205,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the des
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -36214,7 +36214,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Discovery Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "68a0056c-34cb-455f-b03d-df935ea62c4f", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36229,7 +36229,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=9389 by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.user, All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `network_traffic_to_active_directory_web_services_protocol_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule]
+[ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This query detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility that spawns a call back to a remote Command And Control server. This is a powershell oneliner. In addition, this will capture on the command-line additional utilities used by Nishang. Triage the endpoint and identify any parallel processes that look suspicious. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain contacted by the powershell process.
@@ -36241,7 +36241,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present. Filt
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -36255,7 +36255,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["HAFNIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1a382c6c-7c2e-11eb-ac69-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36276,7 +36276,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process=*Net.Sockets.TCPClient* AND Processes.process=*System.Text.ASCIIEncoding*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `nishang_powershelltcponeline_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to query for Domain Trust information. Two arguments `/domain trusts`, returns a list of trusted domains, and `/all_trusts`, returns all trusted domains. Red Teams and adversaries alike use NLTest.exe to enumerate the current domain to assist with further understanding where to pivot next.
@@ -36288,7 +36288,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may use nltest for troublesho
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -36302,7 +36302,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Domain Trust Discovery", "IcedID", "Qakbot", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1482"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c3e05466-5f22-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36323,7 +36323,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_nltest` (Processes.process=*/domain_trusts* OR Processes.process=*/all_trusts*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nltest_domain_trust_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule]
+[ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect an anomaly event of a non-chrome process accessing the files in chrome user default folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the chrome browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) need to be enabled to tthe firefox profile directory to be eable to use this. Since you monitoring this access to the folder,  we observed noise that needs to be filter out and hence added sqlite db browser and explorer .exe to make this detection more stable.
@@ -36335,7 +36335,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = other browser not listed related to firefox
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -36349,7 +36349,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["3CX Supply Chain Attack", "AgentTesla", "CISA AA23-347A", "DarkGate Malware", "FIN7", "NjRAT", "Phemedrone Stealer", "RedLine Stealer", "Remcos", "Snake Keylogger", "Warzone RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555", "T1555.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "81263de4-160a-11ec-944f-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36364,7 +36364,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (ProcessName IN ("*\\chrome.exe", "*\\explorer.exe", "*sql*")) ObjectName="*\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ObjectName ObjectType ProcessName AccessMask EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_chrome_process_accessing_chrome_default_dir_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule]
+[ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect an anomaly event of a non-firefox process accessing the files in the profile folder. This folder contains all the sqlite database of the firefox browser related to users login, history, cookies and etc. Most of the RAT, trojan spy as well as FIN7 jssloader try to parse the those sqlite database to collect information on the compromised host. This SACL Event (4663) needs to be enabled to the firefox profile directory to use this. Since this is monitoring the access to the folder, we have obsevered noise and hence added `sqlite db browser` and `explorer.exe` to make this detection more stable.
@@ -36376,7 +36376,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = other browser not listed related to firefox
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -36390,7 +36390,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["3CX Supply Chain Attack", "AgentTesla", "Azorult", "CISA AA23-347A", "DarkGate Malware", "FIN7", "NjRAT", "Phemedrone Stealer", "RedLine Stealer", "Remcos", "Snake Keylogger", "Warzone RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555", "T1555.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e6fc13b0-1609-11ec-b533-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36405,7 +36405,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (ProcessName IN ("*\\firefox.exe", "*\\explorer.exe", "*sql*")) ObjectName="*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ObjectName ObjectType ProcessName AccessMask EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Notepad with no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+[ESCU - Notepad with no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies behavior related to default SliverC2 framework where it will inject into Notepad.exe and spawn Notepad.exe with no command line arguments. In testing, this is a common procedure for SliverC2 usage, however may be modified or changed. From Microsoft, "The Sideload, SpawnDll, and Execute-Assembly commands spawn and inject into notepad.exe by default. The following query finds process creation events where the same process creates and injects into notepad.exe within 10 seconds."
@@ -36417,7 +36417,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Notepad with no Command Line Arguments - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Notepad with no Command Line Arguments - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -36431,7 +36431,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Notepad with no Command Line Arguments - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Notepad with no Command Line Arguments - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BishopFox Sliver Adversary Emulation Framework"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5adbc5f1-9a2f-41c1-a810-f37e015f8179", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36452,7 +36452,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=notepad.exe AND Processes.action!="blocked" by host _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(?i)(notepad\.exe.{0,4}$)" | `notepad_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule]
+[ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Monitor for signs that Ntdsutil is being used to Extract Active Directory database - NTDS.dit, typically used for offline password cracking. It may be used in normal circumstances with no command line arguments or shorthand variations of more common arguments. Ntdsutil.exe is typically seen run on a Windows Server. Typical command used to dump ntds.dit\
@@ -36468,7 +36468,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Highly possible Server Administrators will t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -36482,7 +36482,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "HAFNIUM Group", "Living Off The Land", "Prestige Ransomware", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "da63bc76-61ae-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36505,7 +36505,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=ntdsutil.exe Processes.process=*ntds* Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ntdsutil_export_ntds_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule]
+[ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious MS office application that drops or creates executables or scripts in a Windows Operating System. This behavior is commonly seen in spear phishing office attachment where it drop malicious files or script to compromised the host. It might be some normal macro may drop script or tools as part of automation but still this behavior is reallly suspicious and not commonly seen in normal office application
@@ -36517,7 +36517,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = office macro for automation may do this beha
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -36531,7 +36531,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption", "FIN7", "PlugX", "Warzone RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "73ce70c4-146d-11ec-9184-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36552,7 +36552,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe","onenote.exe","onenotem.exe","onenoteviewer.exe","onenoteim.exe","msaccess.exe") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.exe","*.dll","*.pif","*.scr","*.js","*.vbs","*.vbe","*.ps1") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process process_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_guid | `office_application_drop_executable_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious spawned process of known MS office application due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like IcedID that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.
@@ -36564,7 +36564,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -36578,7 +36578,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Qakbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2d9fc90c-f11f-11eb-9300-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36599,7 +36599,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = "winword.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "excel.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powerpnt.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "outlook.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "onenote.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "onenotem.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "onenoteviewer.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "onenoteim.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name="msaccess.exe") `process_regsvr32` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_regsvr32_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection was designed to identify suspicious spawned processes of known MS office applications due to macro or malicious code. this technique can be seen in so many malware like trickbot that used MS office as its weapon or attack vector to initially infect the machines.
@@ -36611,7 +36611,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -36625,7 +36625,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "IcedID", "NjRAT", "Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "958751e4-9c5f-11eb-b103-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36646,7 +36646,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = "winword.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "excel.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powerpnt.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name= "onenote.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "onenotem.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "onenoteviewer.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "onenoteim.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "msaccess.exe") AND `process_rundll32` by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_application_spawn_rundll32_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule]
+[ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects a potentially malicious office document that creates a scheduled task entry either through a macro VBA API or by loading taskschd.dll. This technique has been observed in numerous instances of malicious macro malware aiming to establish persistence or beaconing through task schedule entries. The analytic will return the first and last time the task was registered, as well as details such as the `Command` to be executed, `Task Name`, `Author`, `Enabled` status, and whether it is `Hidden`. schtasks.exe is natively located in `C:\Windows\system32` and `C:\Windows\syswow64`. The DLL(s) `taskschd.dll` are loaded when schtasks.exe or TaskService is initiated. If this DLL is found loaded by another process, it may indicate that a scheduled task is being registered within that process's context in memory. During triage, determine the source of the scheduled task. Was it schtasks.exe or via TaskService? Review the job created and the command to be executed. Capture any artifacts on disk for further review. Identify any parallel processes within the same timeframe to pinpoint the source.'
@@ -36658,7 +36658,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may occur if legitimate offi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -36672,7 +36672,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cc8b7b74-9d0f-11eb-8342-acde48001122", "detection_version": "6"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36693,7 +36693,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE","onenote.exe","onenotem.exe","onenoteviewer.exe","onenoteim.exe", "msaccess.exe") loaded_file_path = "*\\taskschd.dll" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by user_id, dest, process_name,loaded_file, loaded_file_path, original_file_name, process_guid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_creating_schedule_task_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule]
+[ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection is designed to identify suspicious office documents that utilize macro code. Macro code is known to be a prevalent weaponization or attack vector for threat actors. This malicious macro code can be embedded in an office document as an attachment, potentially executing a malicious payload, downloading malware, or other malicious components. It is a good practice to disable macros by default to prevent the automatic execution of macro code when opening or closing office document files.
@@ -36705,7 +36705,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may occur if legitimate offi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -36719,7 +36719,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "Azorult", "DarkCrystal RAT", "IcedID", "NjRAT", "PlugX", "Qakbot", "Remcos", "Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b12c89bc-9d06-11eb-a592-acde48001122", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36740,7 +36740,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name IN ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE","onenote.exe","onenotem.exe","onenoteviewer.exe","onenoteim.exe","msaccess.exe") loaded_file_path IN ("*\\VBE7INTL.DLL","*\\VBE7.DLL", "*\\VBEUI.DLL") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(loaded_file) as loaded_file count by dest EventCode process_name process_guid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_executing_macro_code_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule]
+[ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect potential malicious office document executing lolbin child process to download payload or other malware. Since most of the attacker abused the capability of office document to execute living on land application to blend it to the normal noise in the infected machine to cover its track.
@@ -36752,7 +36752,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Default browser not in the filter list.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -36766,7 +36766,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", "NjRAT", "PlugX", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6fed27d2-9ec7-11eb-8fe4-aa665a019aa3", "detection_version": "6"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36787,7 +36787,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","onenote.exe","onenotem.exe","onenoteviewer.exe","onenoteim.exe","msaccess.exe", "Graph.exe","winproj.exe") Processes.process IN ("*http:*","*https:*") NOT (Processes.original_file_name IN("firefox.exe", "chrome.exe","iexplore.exe","msedge.exe"))  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_document_spawned_child_process_to_download_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = this search is to detect a suspicious office product process that spawn cmd child process. This is commonly seen in a ms office product having macro to execute shell command to download or execute malicious lolbin relative to its malicious code. This is seen in trickbot spear phishing doc where it execute shell cmd to run mshta payload.
@@ -36799,7 +36799,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = IT or network admin may create an document a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -36813,7 +36813,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "Azorult", "CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption", "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", "DarkCrystal RAT", "NjRAT", "PlugX", "Qakbot", "Remcos", "Trickbot", "Warzone RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b8b19420-e892-11eb-9244-acde48001122", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36834,7 +36834,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = "winword.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name= "excel.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powerpnt.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name= "onenote.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "onenotem.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "onenoteviewer.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "onenoteim.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "msaccess.exe" OR  Processes.parent_process_name="Graph.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name="winproj.exe") `process_cmd` by  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawn_cmd_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule]
+[ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `bitsadmin.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `bitsadmin.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination or similar command-line arguments as transfer, Download, priority, Foreground. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `bitsadmin.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `bitsadmin.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.
@@ -36846,7 +36846,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -36860,7 +36860,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e8c591f4-a6d7-11eb-8cf7-acde48001122", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36881,7 +36881,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","onenote.exe","onenotem.exe","onenoteviewer.exe","onenoteim.exe", "msaccess.exe", "Graph.exe","winproj.exe") `process_bitsadmin` by Processes.dest Processes.user  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_bitsadmin_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule]
+[ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `certutil.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `certutil.exe` will contain a URL to a remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `certutil.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `certutil.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.
@@ -36893,7 +36893,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -36907,7 +36907,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", "Spearphishing Attachments", "Trickbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6925fe72-a6d5-11eb-9e17-acde48001122", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36928,7 +36928,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","onenote.exe","onenotem.exe","onenoteviewer.exe","onenoteim.exe","msaccess.exe", "Graph.exe","winproj.exe") `process_certutil` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_certutil_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule]
+[ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, IcedID). This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.
@@ -36940,7 +36940,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -36954,7 +36954,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", "IcedID", "NjRAT", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6078fa20-a6d2-11eb-b662-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -36975,7 +36975,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe", "onenote.exe","onenotem.exe", "msaccess.exe","Graph.exe","winproj.exe") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_mshta_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule]
+[ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by IcedID malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `rundll32.exe` without a `.dll` file extension. In malicious instances, the command-line of `rundll32.exe` will look like `rundll32 ..\oepddl.igk2,DllRegisterServer`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `DllRegisterServer` on the command-line of `rundll32.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze the `DLL` that was dropped to disk. The Office Product will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.
@@ -36987,7 +36987,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -37001,7 +37001,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c661f6be-a38c-11eb-be57-acde48001122", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37022,7 +37022,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","onenote.exe","onenotem.exe","onenoteviewer.exe","onenoteim.exe", "msaccess.exe", "Graph.exe","winproj.exe") `process_rundll32` (Processes.process!=*.dll*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_rundll32_with_no_dll_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule]
+[ESCU - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic will identify a Windows Office Product spawning WScript.exe or CScript.exe. Tuning may be required based on legitimate application usage that may spawn scripts from an Office product.
@@ -37034,7 +37034,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on macr
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -37048,7 +37048,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", "Remcos", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b3628a5b-8d02-42fa-a891-eebf2351cbe1", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37069,7 +37069,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","onenote.exe","onenotem.exe","onenoteviewer.exe","onenoteim.exe", "msaccess.exe","Graph.exe","winproj.exe") Processes.process_name IN ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe") by  Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule]
+[ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by Ursnif malware family. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `wmic.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `wmic.exe` will contain `wmic process call create`. In addition, Threat Research has released a detection identifying the use of `wmic process call create` on the command-line of `wmic.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `wmic.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.
@@ -37081,7 +37081,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -37095,7 +37095,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", "FIN7", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ffc236d6-a6c9-11eb-95f1-acde48001122", "detection_version": "6"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37116,7 +37116,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","onenote.exe","onenotem.exe","onenoteviewer.exe","onenoteim.exe","msaccess.exe", "Graph.exe","winproj.exe") `process_wmic` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `office_product_spawning_wmic_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule]
+[ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies behavior related to CVE-2021-40444. Whereas the malicious document will load ActiveX and download the remote payload (.inf, .cab). During triage, review parallel processes and further activity on endpoint to identify additional patterns. Retrieve the file modifications and analyze further.
@@ -37128,7 +37128,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `actio
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -37142,7 +37142,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f48cd1d4-125a-11ec-a447-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37163,7 +37163,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe","onenote.exe","onenotem.exe","onenoteviewer.exe","onenoteim.exe","msaccess.exe") by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | join proc_guid, _time [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.inf","*.cab") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process proc_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process, file_create_time, file_name, file_path, proc_guid | `office_product_writing_cab_or_inf_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Office Spawning Control - Rule]
+[ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies control.exe spawning from an office product. This detection identifies any Windows Office Product spawning `control.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `control.exe` will contain a file path to a .cpl or .inf, related to CVE-2021-40444. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. review parallel and child processes to identify further suspicious behavior
@@ -37175,7 +37175,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Office Spawning Control - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -37189,7 +37189,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Office Spawning Control - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "053e027c-10c7-11ec-8437-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37210,7 +37210,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe","onenote.exe","onenotem.exe","onenoteviewer.exe","onenoteim.exe","msaccess.exe") Processes.process_name=control.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `office_spawning_control_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule]
+[ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = A required step while exploiting the CVE-2021-44228-Log4j vulnerability is that the victim server will perform outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This is required as part of the JNDI lookup as well as for retrieving the second stage .class payload. The following analytic identifies the Java process reaching out to default ports used by the LDAP and RMI protocols. This behavior could represent successfull exploitation. Note that adversaries can easily decide to use arbitrary ports for these protocols and potentially bypass this detection.
@@ -37222,7 +37222,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate Java applications may use perform
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -37236,7 +37236,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d2c14d28-5c47-11ec-9892-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37257,7 +37257,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="java.exe" OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe OR Processes.process_name=javaw.exe) by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.dest_port= 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port= 636 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 1389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 1099 ) by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as connection_to_CNC] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process connection_to_CNC dest_port| `outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule]
+[ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Microsoft Windows contains accessibility features that can be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in. An adversary can modify or replace these programs so they can get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. This search looks for modifications to these binaries.
@@ -37269,7 +37269,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Microsoft may provide updates to these binar
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -37283,7 +37283,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Flax Typhoon", "Hermetic Wiper", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546", "T1546.008"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "13c2f6c3-10c5-4deb-9ba1-7c4460ebe4ae", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37304,7 +37304,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe* OR Filesystem.file_path=*\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe*) by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `overwriting_accessibility_binaries_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PaperCut NG Suspicious Behavior Debug Log - Rule]
+[ESCU - PaperCut NG Suspicious Behavior Debug Log - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following hunting analytic is designed to monitor and detect potential exploitation attempts targeting a PaperCut NG server by analyzing its debug log data. By focusing on public IP addresses accessing the PaperCut NG instance, this analytic aims to identify unauthorized or suspicious access attempts. Furthermore, it searches for specific URIs that have been discovered in the proof of concept code, which are associated with known exploits or vulnerabilities. The analytic is focused on the user admin. Regex is used mainly because the log is not parsed by Splunk and there is no TA for this debug log. 
@@ -37316,7 +37316,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, as this is b
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PaperCut NG Suspicious Behavior Debug Log - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PaperCut NG Suspicious Behavior Debug Log - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -37325,7 +37325,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - PaperCut NG Suspicious Behavior Debug Log - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - PaperCut NG Suspicious Behavior Debug Log - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PaperCut MF NG Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "395163b8-689b-444b-86c7-9fe9ad624734", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37340,7 +37340,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `papercutng` (loginType=Admin OR userName=admin) | eval uri_match=if(match(_raw, "(?i)(\/app\?service=page\/SetupCompleted|\/app|\/app\?service=page\/PrinterList|\/app\?service=direct\/1\/PrinterList\/selectPrinter&sp=l1001|\/app\?service=direct\/1\/PrinterDetails\/printerOptionsTab\.tab)"), "URI matches", null()) | eval ip_match=if(match(_raw, "(?i)((25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?))") AND NOT match(_raw, "(?i)(10\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?))|(172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?))|(192\.168\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?))"), "IP matches", null()) | where  (isnotnull(uri_match) OR isnotnull(ip_match)) | stats sparkline, count, values(uri_match) AS uri_match, values(ip_match) AS ip_match latest(_raw) BY host, index, sourcetype | `papercut_ng_suspicious_behavior_debug_log_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule]
+[ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command line arguments used to obtain the domain password policy. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `net.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -37352,7 +37352,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -37361,7 +37361,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1201"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "09336538-065a-11ec-8665-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37376,7 +37376,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="net.exe" OR Processes.process_name="net1.exe") AND Processes.process = "*accounts*" AND Processes.process = "*/domain*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `password_policy_discovery_with_net_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule]
+[ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a modification of file or directory permission using takeown.exe windows app. This technique was seen in some ransomware that take the ownership of a folder or files to encrypt or delete it.
@@ -37388,7 +37388,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = takeown.exe is a normal windows application
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -37402,7 +37402,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Sandworm Tools"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fa7ca5c6-c9d8-11eb-bce9-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37423,7 +37423,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "takeown.exe" Processes.process = "*/f*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `permission_modification_using_takeown_app_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule]
+[ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event Code 5145, "A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access". During our research into PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942, we identified the ocurrence of this event on the target host with specific values.\
@@ -37443,7 +37443,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives have been limited when the A
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -37457,7 +37457,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2021-36942"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1187"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "95b8061a-0a67-11ec-85ec-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37482,7 +37482,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` SubjectUserName="ANONYMOUS LOGON" EventCode=5145 RelativeTargetName=lsarpc | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, SubjectUserSid, ShareName, src, AccessMask, AccessReason | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_network_share_access_request_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule]
+[ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifes Event Code 4768, A `Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested`, successfull occurs. This behavior has been identified to assist with detecting PetitPotam, CVE-2021-36942. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to Domain Controllers for your environment.
@@ -37494,7 +37494,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible if the environm
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -37508,7 +37508,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2021-36942"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e3ef244e-0a67-11ec-abf2-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37529,7 +37529,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 src!="::1" TargetUserName=*$ CertThumbprint!="" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, TargetUserName, src, action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule]
+[ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic will identify the possible execution of ping sleep batch commands. This technique was seen in several malware samples and is used to trigger sleep times without explicitly calling sleep functions or commandlets. The goal is to delay the execution of malicious code and bypass detection or sandbox analysis. This  detection can be a good indicator of a process delaying its execution for malicious purposes.
@@ -37541,7 +37541,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator or network operator may execut
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -37555,7 +37555,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Data Destruction", "Warzone RAT", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1497", "T1497.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ce058d6c-79f2-11ec-b476-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37570,7 +37570,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_ping` (Processes.parent_process = "*ping*" Processes.parent_process = *-n* Processes.parent_process="* Nul*"Processes.parent_process="*&gt;*") OR (Processes.process = "*ping*" Processes.process = *-n* Processes.process="* Nul*"Processes.process="*&gt;*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ping_sleep_batch_command_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule]
+[ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic will detect if a suspicious process contains a commandline parameter related to a web browser credential dumper. This technique is used by Remcos RAT malware which uses the Nirsoft webbrowserpassview.exe application to dump web browser credentials. Remcos uses the "/stext" command line to dump the credentials in text format. This Hunting query is a good indicator of hosts suffering from possible Remcos RAT infection. Since the hunting query is based on the parameter command and the possible path where it will save the text credential information, it may catch normal tools that are using the same command and behavior.
@@ -37582,7 +37582,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positive is quite limited. Filter is n
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -37591,7 +37591,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 40, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555.003", "T1555"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8ba484e8-4b97-11ec-b19a-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37606,7 +37606,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process  IN ("*/stext *", "*/shtml *", "*/LoadPasswordsIE*", "*/LoadPasswordsFirefox*", "*/LoadPasswordsChrome*", "*/LoadPasswordsOpera*", "*/LoadPasswordsSafari*" , "*/UseOperaPasswordFile*", "*/OperaPasswordFile*","*/stab*", "*/scomma*", "*/stabular*", "*/shtml*", "*/sverhtml*", "*/sxml*", "*/skeepass*" ) AND Processes.process IN ("*\\temp\\*", "*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\programdata\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_browser_pass_view_parameter_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule]
+[ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is designed to identify possible lateral movement attacks that involve the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild process of commonly abused processes. These processes include services.exe, wmiprsve.exe, svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe.\
@@ -37620,7 +37620,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -37634,7 +37634,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003", "T1021.006", "T1047", "T1053.005", "T1543.003", "T1059.001", "T1218.014"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cb909b3e-512b-11ec-aa31-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37656,7 +37656,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Potential password in username - Rule]
+[ESCU - Potential password in username - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search identifies users who have entered their passwords in username fields. This is done by looking for failed authentication attempts using usernames with a length longer than 7 characters and a high Shannon entropy, and looks for the next successful authentication attempt from the same source system to the same destination system as the failed attempt.
@@ -37668,7 +37668,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Valid usernames with high entropy or source/
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Potential password in username - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Potential password in username - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -37677,7 +37677,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Potential password in username - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Potential password in username - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Insider Threat"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.003", "T1552.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5ced34b4-ab32-4bb0-8f22-3b8f186f0a38", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37692,7 +37692,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS starttime latest(_time) AS endtime latest(sourcetype) AS sourcetype values(Authentication.src) AS src values(Authentication.dest) AS dest count FROM datamodel=Authentication WHERE nodename=Authentication.Failed_Authentication BY "Authentication.user" | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word AS user | where ut_shannon>3 AND len(user)>=8 AND mvcount(src) == 1 | sort count, - ut_shannon | eval incorrect_cred=user | eval endtime=endtime+1000 | map maxsearches=70 search="| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS starttime latest(_time) AS endtime latest(sourcetype) AS sourcetype values(Authentication.src) AS src values(Authentication.dest) AS dest count FROM datamodel=Authentication WHERE nodename=Authentication.Successful_Authentication Authentication.src=\"$src$\" Authentication.dest=\"$dest$\" sourcetype IN (\"$sourcetype$\") earliest=\"$starttime$\" latest=\"$endtime$\" BY \"Authentication.user\" | `drop_dm_object_name(\"Authentication\")` | `potential_password_in_username_false_positive_reduction` | eval incorrect_cred=\"$incorrect_cred$\" | eval ut_shannon=\"$ut_shannon$\" | sort count" | where user!=incorrect_cred | outlier action=RM count | `potential_password_in_username_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule]
+[ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic uses a pretrained machine learning text classifier to detect potentially malicious commandlines.  The model identifies unusual combinations of keywords found in samples of commandlines where adversaries executed powershell code, primarily for C2 communication.  For example, adversaries will leverage IO capabilities such as "streamreader" and "webclient", threading capabilties such as "mutex" locks, programmatic constructs like "function" and "catch", and cryptographic operations like "computehash".  Although observing one of these keywords in a commandline script is possible, combinations of keywords observed in attack data are not typically found in normal usage of the commandline.  The model will output a score where all values above zero are suspicious, anything greater than one particularly so.
@@ -37704,7 +37704,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This model is an anomaly detector that ident
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-01-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-01-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -37718,7 +37718,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Command-Line Executions"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 20, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9c53c446-757e-11ec-871d-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37733,7 +37733,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel="Endpoint.Processes" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`  | where len(process) > 200 | `potentially_malicious_code_on_cmdline_tokenize_score` | apply unusual_commandline_detection | eval score='predicted(unusual_cmdline_logits)', process=orig_process | fields - unusual_cmdline* predicted(unusual_cmdline_logits) orig_process | where score > 0.5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `potentially_malicious_code_on_commandline_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule]
+[ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following Hunting analytic assists with identifying suspicious PowerShell execution using Script Block Logging, or EventCode 4104. This analytic is not meant to be ran hourly, but occasionally to identify malicious or suspicious PowerShell. This analytic is a combination of work completed by Alex Teixeira and Splunk Threat Research Team.
@@ -37745,7 +37745,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. May filter as neede
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -37754,7 +37754,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "DarkGate Malware", "Data Destruction", "Flax Typhoon", "Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "Rhysida Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d6f2b006-0041-11ec-8885-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37769,7 +37769,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 | eval DoIt = if(match(ScriptBlockText,"(?i)(\$doit)"), "4", 0) | eval enccom=if(match(ScriptBlockText,"[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{44,}([A-Za-z0-9+\/]{4}|[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{3}=|[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{2}==)") OR match(ScriptBlockText, "(?i)[-]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\s+[^-]"),4,0) | eval suspcmdlet=if(match(ScriptBlockText, "(?i)Add-Exfiltration|Add-Persistence|Add-RegBackdoor|Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor|Check-VM|Do-Exfiltration|Enabled-DuplicateToken|Exploit-Jboss|Find-Fruit|Find-GPOLocation|Find-TrustedDocuments|Get-ApplicationHost|Get-ChromeDump|Get-ClipboardContents|Get-FoxDump|Get-GPPPassword|Get-IndexedItem|Get-Keystrokes|LSASecret|Get-PassHash|Get-RegAlwaysInstallElevated|Get-RegAutoLogon|Get-RickAstley|Get-Screenshot|Get-SecurityPackages|Get-ServiceFilePermission|Get-ServicePermission|Get-ServiceUnquoted|Get-SiteListPassword|Get-System|Get-TimedScreenshot|Get-UnattendedInstallFile|Get-Unconstrained|Get-VaultCredential|Get-VulnAutoRun|Get-VulnSchTask|Gupt-Backdoor|HTTP-Login|Install-SSP|Install-ServiceBinary|Invoke-ACLScanner|Invoke-ADSBackdoor|Invoke-ARPScan|Invoke-AllChecks|Invoke-BackdoorLNK|Invoke-BypassUAC|Invoke-CredentialInjection|Invoke-DCSync|Invoke-DllInjection|Invoke-DowngradeAccount|Invoke-EgressCheck|Invoke-Inveigh|Invoke-InveighRelay|Invoke-Mimikittenz|Invoke-NetRipper|Invoke-NinjaCopy|Invoke-PSInject|Invoke-Paranoia|Invoke-PortScan|Invoke-PoshRat|Invoke-PostExfil|Invoke-PowerDump|Invoke-PowerShellTCP|Invoke-PsExec|Invoke-PsUaCme|Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection|Invoke-ReverseDNSLookup|Invoke-RunAs|Invoke-SMBScanner|Invoke-SSHCommand|Invoke-Service|Invoke-Shellcode|Invoke-Tater|Invoke-ThunderStruck|Invoke-Token|Invoke-UserHunter|Invoke-VoiceTroll|Invoke-WScriptBypassUAC|Invoke-WinEnum|MailRaider|New-HoneyHash|Out-Minidump|Port-Scan|PowerBreach|PowerUp|PowerView|Remove-Update|Set-MacAttribute|Set-Wallpaper|Show-TargetScreen|Start-CaptureServer|VolumeShadowCopyTools|NEEEEWWW|(Computer|User)Property|CachedRDPConnection|get-net\S+|invoke-\S+hunter|Install-Service|get-\S+(credent|password)|remoteps|Kerberos.*(policy|ticket)|netfirewall|Uninstall-Windows|Verb\s+Runas|AmsiBypass|nishang|Invoke-Interceptor|EXEonRemote|NetworkRelay|PowerShelludp|PowerShellIcmp|CreateShortcut|copy-vss|invoke-dll|invoke-mass|out-shortcut|Invoke-ShellCommand"),1,0) | eval base64 = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),"frombase64"), "4", 0) | eval empire=if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),"system.net.webclient") AND match(lower(ScriptBlockText), "frombase64string") ,5,0) | eval mimikatz=if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),"mimikatz") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText), "-dumpcr") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText), "SEKURLSA::Pth") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText), "kerberos::ptt") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText), "kerberos::golden") ,5,0) | eval iex=if(match(ScriptBlockText, "(?i)iex|invoke-expression"),2,0) | eval webclient=if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),"http") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),"web(client|request)") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),"socket") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),"download(file|string)") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),"bitstransfer") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),"internetexplorer.application") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),"xmlhttp"),5,0) | eval get = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),"get-"), "1", 0) | eval rundll32 = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),"rundll32"), "4", 0) | eval suspkeywrd=if(match(ScriptBlockText, "(?i)(bitstransfer|mimik|metasp|AssemblyBuilderAccess|Reflection\.Assembly|shellcode|injection|cnvert|shell\.application|start-process|Rc4ByteStream|System\.Security\.Cryptography|lsass\.exe|localadmin|LastLoggedOn|hijack|BackupPrivilege|ngrok|comsvcs|backdoor|brute.?force|Port.?Scan|Exfiltration|exploit|DisableRealtimeMonitoring|beacon)"),1,0) | eval syswow64 = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),"syswow64"), "3", 0) | eval httplocal = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),"http://127.0.0.1"), "4", 0) | eval reflection = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),"reflection"), "1", 0) | eval invokewmi=if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText), "(?i)(wmiobject|WMIMethod|RemoteWMI|PowerShellWmi|wmicommand)"),5,0) | eval downgrade=if(match(ScriptBlockText, "(?i)([-]ve*r*s*i*o*n*\s+2)") OR match(lower(ScriptBlockText),"powershell -version"),3,0) | eval compressed=if(match(ScriptBlockText, "(?i)GZipStream|::Decompress|IO.Compression|write-zip|(expand|compress)-Archive"),5,0) | eval invokecmd = if(match(lower(ScriptBlockText),"invoke-command"), "4", 0) | addtotals fieldname=Score DoIt, enccom, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd, compressed, downgrade, mimikatz, iex, empire, rundll32, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get | stats values(Score) by UserID, Computer, DoIt, enccom, compressed, downgrade, iex, mimikatz, rundll32, empire, webclient, syswow64, httplocal, reflection, invokewmi, invokecmd, base64, get, suspcmdlet, suspkeywrd | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `powershell_4104_hunting_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule]
+[ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic identifies PowerShell commands utilizing the WindowStyle parameter to hide the window on the compromised endpoint. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it is overriding the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide its activity from the user, and connects to the Internet. Removed in this version of the query is New-Object. The analytic identifies all variations of WindowStyle, as PowerShell allows the ability to shorten the parameter. For example w, win, windowsty and so forth. In addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash, horizontal bar, and forward slash.
@@ -37781,7 +37781,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -37790,7 +37790,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "Data Destruction", "HAFNIUM Group", "Hermetic Wiper", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "Malicious PowerShell", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ee18ed37-0802-4268-9435-b3b91aaa18db", "detection_version": "8"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37805,7 +37805,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"(?i)[\-|\/|– |—|―]w(in*d*o*w*s*t*y*l*e*)*\s+[^-]") | `powershell___connect_to_internet_with_hidden_window_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule]
+[ESCU - Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging to identify a script that is attempting to modify or add a component object model to inprocserver32 path within the registry.
@@ -37817,7 +37817,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present if any scrip
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -37831,7 +37831,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.015", "T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ea61e291-af05-4716-932a-67faddb6ae6f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37852,7 +37852,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\*\\InProcServer32*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_com_hijacking_inprocserver32_modification_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule]
+[ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using the `mutex` function. This function is commonly seen in some obfuscated PowerShell scripts to make sure that only one instance of there process is running on a compromise machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.
@@ -37864,7 +37864,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = powershell developer may used this function
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -37878,7 +37878,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1027.005", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "637557ec-ca08-11eb-bd0a-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37899,7 +37899,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Threading.Mutex*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_creating_thread_mutex_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule]
+[ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows defender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RATs, bots, or Trojans to disable AV to evade detections.
@@ -37911,7 +37911,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. However, tune based
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -37925,7 +37925,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c148a894-dd93-11eb-bf2a-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -37946,7 +37946,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process="*set-mppreference*" AND Processes.process IN ("*disablerealtimemonitoring*","*disableioavprotection*","*disableintrusionpreventionsystem*","*disablescriptscanning*","*disableblockatfirstseen*","*DisableBehaviorMonitoring*","*drtm *","*dioavp *","*dscrptsc *","*dbaf *","*dbm *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_disable_security_monitoring_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule]
+[ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all.\
@@ -37964,7 +37964,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible there will be false positives
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -37978,7 +37978,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e1866ce2-ca22-11eb-8e44-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38002,7 +38002,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN (*get-netdomaintrust*, *get-netforesttrust*, *get-addomain*, *get-adgroupmember*, *get-domainuser*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ScriptBlockText UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_domain_enumeration_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PowerShell Enable PowerShell Remoting - Rule]
+[ESCU - PowerShell Enable PowerShell Remoting - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify the use of Enable-PSRemoting cmdlet. This cmdlet allows users to enable PowerShell remoting on a local or remote computer, which allows other computers to run commands on the target computer. The ability to remotely execute commands can be abused by attackers to take control of compromised systems and pivot to other systems on the network. By detecting the use of Enable-PSRemoting cmdlet via script block logging, this analytic can help organizations identify potential malicious activity related to attackers attempting to gain remote control of compromised systems.
@@ -38014,7 +38014,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Note that false positives may occur due to t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Enable PowerShell Remoting - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Enable PowerShell Remoting - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38028,7 +38028,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Enable PowerShell Remoting - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Enable PowerShell Remoting - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "40e3b299-19a5-4460-96e9-e1467f714f8e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38043,7 +38043,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText="*Enable-PSRemoting*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `powershell_enable_powershell_remoting_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule]
+[ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through `powershell.exe`. This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system.
@@ -38055,7 +38055,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network operator may enable or disable this
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38069,7 +38069,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1027.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "afed80b2-d34b-11eb-a952-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38090,7 +38090,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature*" ScriptBlockText = "*SMB1Protocol*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule]
+[ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a COM CLSID execution through powershell. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like ransomware conti where it has a feature to execute command using COM Object. This technique may use by network operator at some cases but a good indicator if some application want to gain privilege escalation or bypass uac.
@@ -38102,7 +38102,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network operrator may use this command.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38116,7 +38116,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.015", "T1546", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "65711630-f9bf-11eb-8d72-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38137,7 +38137,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_execute_com_object_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule]
+[ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all.\
@@ -38157,7 +38157,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. Filter as needed.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38171,7 +38171,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1055", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a26d9db4-c883-11eb-9d75-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38196,7 +38196,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=*getprocaddress* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule]
+[ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all.\
@@ -38218,7 +38218,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38232,7 +38232,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AsyncRAT", "Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "IcedID", "Malicious PowerShell", "NjRAT", "Winter Vivern"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1027", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8acbc04c-c882-11eb-b060-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38258,7 +38258,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*frombase64string*" OR ScriptBlockText = "*gnirtS46esaBmorF*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `get-localgroup` being used with PowerShell to identify local groups on the endpoint. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further suspicious behavior.
@@ -38270,7 +38270,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as need
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -38279,7 +38279,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b71adfcc-155b-11ec-9413-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38294,7 +38294,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process="*get-localgroup*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule]
+[ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all.\
@@ -38312,7 +38312,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Tune as need
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38321,7 +38321,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d7c6ad22-155c-11ec-bb64-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38336,7 +38336,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*get-localgroup*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText  | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_get_localgroup_discovery_with_script_block_logging_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession - Rule]
+[ESCU - PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies the use of the New-CIMSession cmdlet being created along with the Invoke-CIMMethod cmdlet being used within PowerShell. This particular behavior is similar to the usage of the Invoke-WMIMethod cmdlet, which is known for executing WMI commands on targets using NTLMv2 pass-the-hash authentication. The New-CIMSession cmdlet allows users to create a new CIM session object for a specified computer system, which can then be used to execute CIM operations remotely. Similarly, the Invoke-CIMMethod cmdlet is used to invoke a specified method on one or more CIM objects. Therefore, the combination of New-CIMSession and Invoke-CIMMethod cmdlets in PowerShell can potentially indicate malicious behavior, and this analytic can help detect such activity.
@@ -38348,7 +38348,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on thir
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38362,7 +38362,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "651ee958-a433-471c-b264-39725b788b83", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38377,7 +38377,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN ("*invoke-CIMMethod*", "*New-CimSession*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_invoke_cimmethod_cimsession_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PowerShell Invoke WmiExec Usage - Rule]
+[ESCU - PowerShell Invoke WmiExec Usage - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the usage of the Invoke-WMIExec utility within PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104). The utility is used for executing WMI commands on targets using NTLMv2 pass-the-hash authentication.
@@ -38389,7 +38389,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Invoke WmiExec Usage - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Invoke WmiExec Usage - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38403,7 +38403,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Invoke WmiExec Usage - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Invoke WmiExec Usage - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0734bd21-2769-4972-a5f1-78bb1e011224", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38424,7 +38424,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN ("*invoke-wmiexec*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_invoke_wmiexec_usage_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Powershell Load Module in Meterpreter - Rule]
+[ESCU - Powershell Load Module in Meterpreter - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all.\
@@ -38442,7 +38442,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be very limited as th
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Powershell Load Module in Meterpreter - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Load Module in Meterpreter - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38456,7 +38456,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Powershell Load Module in Meterpreter - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Load Module in Meterpreter - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["MetaSploit"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d5905da5-d050-48db-9259-018d8f034fcf", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38480,7 +38480,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN ("*MSF.Powershell*","*MSF.Powershell.Meterpreter*","*MSF.Powershell.Meterpreter.Kiwi*","*MSF.Powershell.Meterpreter.Transport*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_load_module_in_meterpreter_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule]
+[ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable no critical endpoints or all.\
@@ -38498,7 +38498,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as day to
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38512,7 +38512,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "AsyncRAT", "Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "Winter Vivern"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "85bc3f30-ca28-11eb-bd21-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38536,7 +38536,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN ("*[system.reflection.assembly]::load(*","*[reflection.assembly]*", "*reflection.assembly*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule]
+[ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing compressed stream data. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are stream flattened and will be deflated durnig execution. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.
@@ -38548,7 +38548,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = powershell may used this function to process
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38562,7 +38562,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AsyncRAT", "Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "IcedID", "Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0d718b52-c9f1-11eb-bc61-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38583,7 +38583,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*IO.Compression.*" OR ScriptBlockText = "*IO.StreamReader*" OR ScriptBlockText = "*]::Decompress*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Powershell Remote Services Add TrustedHost - Rule]
+[ESCU - Powershell Remote Services Add TrustedHost - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that contains command to add or modify the trustedhost configuration in Windows OS. This behavior raises concerns due to the nature of modifications made to the 'TrustedHost' configuration, which typically involves adjusting settings crucial for remote connections and security protocols. Alterations in this area could potentially indicate attempts to manipulate trusted hosts or systems for unauthorized remote access, a tactic commonly observed in various unauthorized access or compromise attempts.
@@ -38595,7 +38595,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = user and network administrator may used this
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Powershell Remote Services Add TrustedHost - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Remote Services Add TrustedHost - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38609,7 +38609,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Powershell Remote Services Add TrustedHost - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Remote Services Add TrustedHost - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.006", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bef21d24-297e-45e3-9b9a-c6ac45450474", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38630,7 +38630,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104  ScriptBlockText = "*WSMan:\\localhost\\Client\\TrustedHosts*" ScriptBlockText IN ("* -Value *", "* -Concatenate *") | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remote_services_add_trustedhost_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = this search is designed to detect suspicious powershell process that tries to inject code and to known/critical windows process and execute it using CreateRemoteThread. This technique is seen in several malware like trickbot and offensive tooling like cobaltstrike where it load a shellcode to svchost.exe to execute reverse shell to c2 and download another payload
@@ -38642,7 +38642,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -38656,7 +38656,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ec102cb2-a0f5-11eb-9b38-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38677,7 +38677,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode = 8 parent_process_name IN ("powershell_ise.exe", "powershell.exe") TargetImage IN ("*\\svchost.exe","*\\csrss.exe" "*\\gpupdate.exe", "*\\explorer.exe","*\\services.exe","*\\winlogon.exe","*\\smss.exe","*\\wininit.exe","*\\userinit.exe","*\\spoolsv.exe","*\\taskhost.exe") | stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by SourceImage process_name SourceProcessId SourceProcessGuid TargetImage TargetProcessId NewThreadId StartAddress dest EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remote_thread_to_known_windows_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule]
+[ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic will identify a suspicious PowerShell command used to delete the Windows Defender folder. This technique was seen used by the WhisperGate malware campaign where it used Nirsofts advancedrun.exe to gain administrative privileges to then execute a PowerShell command to delete the Windows Defender folder. This is a good indicator the offending process is trying corrupt a Windows Defender installation.
@@ -38689,7 +38689,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38703,7 +38703,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "adf47620-79fa-11ec-b248-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38724,7 +38724,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*rmdir *" AND ScriptBlockText = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_remove_windows_defender_directory_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - PowerShell Script Block With URL Chain - Rule]
+[ESCU - PowerShell Script Block With URL Chain - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that contains multiple URLs within a function or array. This is typically found in obfuscated PowerShell or PowerShell executing embedded .NET or binary files that are attempting to download 2nd stage payloads. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.
@@ -38736,7 +38736,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown, possible custom scripting.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Script Block With URL Chain - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Script Block With URL Chain - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38750,7 +38750,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Script Block With URL Chain - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Script Block With URL Chain - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1105"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4a3f2a7d-6402-4e64-a76a-869588ec3b57", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38771,7 +38771,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN ("*http:*","*https:*") | regex ScriptBlockText="(\"?(https?:\/\/(?:www\.)?[-a-zA-Z0-9@:%._\+~#=]{1,256}\.[a-zA-Z0-9()]{1,6}\b(?:[-a-zA-Z0-9()@:%_\+.~#?&\/=]*))\"?(?:,|\))?){2,}" | rex max_match=20 field=ScriptBlockText "(?<url>https?:\/\/(?:www\.)?[-a-zA-Z0-9@:%._\+~#=]{1,256}\.[a-zA-Z0-9()]{1,6}\b(?:[-a-zA-Z0-9()@:%_\+.~#?&\/=]*))" | eval Path = case(isnotnull(Path),Path,true(),"unknown") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime list(ScriptBlockText) as command values(Path) as file_name values(UserID) as user values(url) as url dc(url) as url_count by ActivityID, Computer, EventCode | rename Computer as dest, EventCode as signature_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_script_block_with_url_chain_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule]
+[ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Start-BitsTransfer is the PowerShell "version" of BitsAdmin.exe. Similar functionality is present. This technique variation is not as commonly used by adversaries, but has been abused in the past. Lesser known uses include the ability to set the `-TransferType` to `Upload` for exfiltration of files. In an instance where `Upload` is used, it is highly possible files will be archived. During triage, review parallel processes and process lineage. Capture any files on disk and review. For the remote domain or IP, what is the reputation?
@@ -38783,7 +38783,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. It is possible admi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -38797,7 +38797,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BITS Jobs"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1197"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "39e2605a-90d8-11eb-899e-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38818,7 +38818,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process=*start-bitstransfer* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PowerShell Start or Stop Service - Rule]
+[ESCU - PowerShell Start or Stop Service - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies the use of PowerShell's Start-Service or Stop-Service cmdlets on an endpoint. These cmdlets allow users to start or stop a specified Windows service. The ability to manipulate services can be leveraged by attackers to disable or stop critical services, which can cause system instability or disrupt business operations. By detecting the use of Start-Service or Stop-Service cmdlets via PowerShell, this analytic can help organizations identify potential malicious activity related to attackers attempting to manipulate services on compromised systems. However, note that this behavior may be noisy, as these cmdlets are commonly used by system administrators or other legitimate users to manage services. Therefore, it is recommended not to enable this analytic as a direct notable or TTP. Instead, it should be used as part of a broader set of security controls to detect and investigate potential threats.
@@ -38830,7 +38830,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This behavior may be noisy, as these cmdlets
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Start or Stop Service - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell Start or Stop Service - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38844,7 +38844,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PowerShell Start or Stop Service - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell Start or Stop Service - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 20, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "04207f8a-e08d-4ee6-be26-1e0c4488b04a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38859,7 +38859,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN ("*start-service*", "*stop-service*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_start_or_stop_service_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule]
+[ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is using memory stream as new object backstore. The malicious PowerShell script will contain stream flate data and will be decompressed in memory to run or drop the actual payload. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.
@@ -38871,7 +38871,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = powershell may used this function to store o
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38885,7 +38885,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "IcedID", "Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c396a0c4-c9f2-11eb-b4f5-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38906,7 +38906,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = *New-Object* ScriptBlockText = *IO.MemoryStream* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PowerShell WebRequest Using Memory Stream - Rule]
+[ESCU - PowerShell WebRequest Using Memory Stream - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies a common fileless malware staging technique of using .NET classes to directly download a URL payload into memory. The analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution.
@@ -38918,7 +38918,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown, possible custom scripting.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PowerShell WebRequest Using Memory Stream - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PowerShell WebRequest Using Memory Stream - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38932,7 +38932,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PowerShell WebRequest Using Memory Stream - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PowerShell WebRequest Using Memory Stream - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1105", "T1027.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "103affa6-924a-4b53-aff4-1d5075342aab", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -38953,7 +38953,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104  ScriptBlockText IN ("*system.net.webclient*","*system.net.webrequest*") AND ScriptBlockText="*IO.MemoryStream*" | eval Path = case(isnotnull(Path),Path,true(),"unknown") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime list(ScriptBlockText) as command values(Path) as file_name values(UserID) as user by ActivityID, Computer, EventCode | rename Computer as dest, EventCode as signature_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_webrequest_using_memory_stream_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule]
+[ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic will detect a suspicious process commandline related to windows defender exclusion feature. This command is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding  folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.
@@ -38965,7 +38965,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to use this windows
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -38979,7 +38979,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "CISA AA22-320A", "Data Destruction", "Remcos", "Warzone RAT", "WhisperGate", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "907ac95c-4dd9-11ec-ba2c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39000,7 +39000,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Add-MpPreference *" OR ScriptBlockText = "*Set-MpPreference *") AND ScriptBlockText = "*-exclusion*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `powershell_windows_defender_exclusion_commands_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule]
+[ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious bcdedit.exe execution to ignore all failures. This technique was used by ransomware to prevent the compromise machine automatically boot in repair mode.
@@ -39012,7 +39012,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configura
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -39026,7 +39026,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Chaos Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7742aa92-c9d9-11eb-bbfc-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39047,7 +39047,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "bcdedit.exe" Processes.process = "*bootstatuspolicy*"  Processes.process = "*ignoreallfailures*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule]
+[ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification or new registry entry regarding print processor. This registry is known to be abuse by turla or other APT to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the compromised machine. This is done by adding the malicious dll payload on the new created key in this registry that will be executed as it restarted the spoolsv.exe process and services. 
@@ -39059,7 +39059,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = possible new printer installation may add dr
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -39073,7 +39073,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1f5b68aa-2037-11ec-898e-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39094,7 +39094,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path ="*\\Control\\Print\\Environments\\Windows x64\\Print Processors*" by Registry.dest  Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `print_processor_registry_autostart_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule]
+[ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies new printer drivers being load by utilizing the Windows PrintService operational logs, EventCode 316. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare.\
@@ -39112,7 +39112,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. This may require filtering.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -39126,7 +39126,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-1675"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "313681a2-da8e-11eb-adad-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39150,7 +39150,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `printservice` EventCode=316 category = "Adding a printer driver" Message = "*kernelbase.dll,*" Message = "*UNIDRV.DLL,*" Message = "*.DLL.*" | stats  count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_adding_a_printer_driver_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule]
+[ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies driver load errors utilizing the Windows PrintService Admin logs. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare.\
@@ -39168,7 +39168,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are unknown and filtering ma
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -39182,7 +39182,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-1675"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1adc9548-da7c-11eb-8f13-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39206,7 +39206,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `printservice` ((ErrorCode="0x45A" (EventCode="808" OR EventCode="4909")) OR ("The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module" OR "\\drivers\\x64\\")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `print_spooler_failed_to_load_a_plug_in_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule]
+[ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for a process launching an `*.lnk` file under `C:\User*` or `*\Local\Temp\*`. This is common behavior used by various spear phishing tools.
@@ -39218,7 +39218,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection should yield little or no fal
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -39232,7 +39232,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Amadey", "IcedID", "Qakbot", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5d814af1-1041-47b5-a9ac-d754e82e9a26", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39253,7 +39253,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="*.lnk" AND (Filesystem.file_path="C:\\User\\*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\\Temp\\*") by _time span=1h Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rename process_guid as lnk_guid | join lnk_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=* by _time span=1h Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as lnk_guid | fields _time lnk_guid process_id dest process_name process_path process] | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table firstTime, lastTime, lnk_guid, process_id, user, dest, file_name, file_path, process_name, process, process_path, file_hash | `process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection is to identify a suspicious process that tries to delete the process file path related to its process. This technique is known to be defense evasion once a certain condition of malware is satisfied or not. Clop ransomware use this technique where it will try to delete its process file path using a .bat command if the keyboard layout is not the layout it tries to infect.
@@ -39265,7 +39265,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -39279,7 +39279,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Data Destruction", "Remcos", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f7eda4bc-871c-11eb-b110-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39300,7 +39300,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=1 CommandLine = "* /c *" CommandLine = "* del*" Image = "*\\cmd.exe" | eval result = if(like(process,"%".parent_process."%"), "Found", "Not Found") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by dest user ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image CommandLine EventCode ProcessID result | where result = "Found" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Process Execution via WMI - Rule]
+[ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies `WmiPrvSE.exe` spawning a process. This typically occurs when a process is instantiated from a local or remote process using `wmic.exe`. During triage, review parallel processes for suspicious behavior or commands executed. Review the process and command-line spawning from `wmiprvse.exe`. Contain and remediate the endpoint as necessary.
@@ -39312,7 +39312,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use wm
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Process Execution via WMI - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -39326,7 +39326,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Process Execution via WMI - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "24869767-8579-485d-9a4f-d9ddfd8f0cac", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39347,7 +39347,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=WmiPrvSE.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_execution_via_wmi_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` using `delete` to remove a executable path. This is typically ran via a batch file during beginning stages of an adversary setting up for mining on an endpoint.
@@ -39359,7 +39359,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -39373,7 +39373,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5ffaa42c-acdb-11eb-9ad3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39394,7 +39394,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` AND Processes.process="*process*" AND Processes.process="*executablepath*" AND Processes.process="*delete*" by  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_kill_base_on_file_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule]
+[ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component that can be used in a script to call Windows API functions, but it requires the dynwrapx.dll to be installed and registered. With that, a binary writing dynwrapx.dll to disk and registering it into the registry is highly suspect. Why is it needed? In most malicious instances, it will be written to disk at a non-standard location. During triage, review parallel processes and pivot on the process_guid. Review the registry for any suspicious modifications meant to load dynwrapx.dll. Identify any suspicious module loads of dynwrapx.dll. This will identify the process that will invoke vbs/wscript/cscript.
@@ -39406,7 +39406,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however i
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -39415,7 +39415,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1559.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b0a078e4-2601-11ec-9aec-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39430,7 +39430,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="dynwrapx.dll" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time process_guid file_path file_name file_create_time user dest process_name] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Processes launching netsh - Rule]
+[ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line.
@@ -39442,7 +39442,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some VPN applications are known to launch ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Processes launching netsh - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -39456,7 +39456,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Processes launching netsh - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Netsh Abuse", "Snake Keylogger", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b89919ed-fe5f-492c-b139-95dbb162040e", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39471,7 +39471,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) AS Processes.process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`processes_launching_netsh_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule]
+[ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for processes in an MacOS system that is tapping keyboard events in MacOS, and essentially monitoring all keystrokes made by a user. This is a common technique used by RATs to log keystrokes from a victim, although it can also be used by legitimate processes like Siri to react on human input 
@@ -39483,7 +39483,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There might be some false positives as keybo
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-01-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-01-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -39497,7 +39497,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ColdRoot MacOS RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2a371608-331d-4034-ae2c-21dda8f1d0ec", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39518,7 +39518,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | from datamodel Alerts.Alerts | search app=osquery:results name=pack_osx-attacks_Keyboard_Event_Taps | rename columns.cmdline as cmd, columns.name as process_name, columns.pid as process_id| dedup host,process_name | table host,process_name, cmd, process_id | `processes_tapping_keyboard_events_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule]
+[ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4698, `A scheduled task was created`, to identify the creation of a Scheduled Task with a suspicious, high entropy, Task Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Task Scheduler to create and start a remote Scheduled Task and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, tools like Impacket or Crapmapexec, typically create a Scheduled Task with a random task name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Scheduled Tasks created as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Command field can be used to determine if the task has malicious intent or not. 
@@ -39530,7 +39530,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may use random Sched
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -39539,7 +39539,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "CISA AA22-257A", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9d22a780-5165-11ec-ad4f-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39554,7 +39554,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Task_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table  _time, dest, Task_Name, ut_shannon, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden | `randomly_generated_scheduled_task_name_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule]
+[ESCU - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 7045, `A new service was installed in the system`, to identify the installation of a Windows Service with a suspicious, high entropy, Service Name. To achieve this, this analytic also leverages the `ut_shannon` function from the URL ToolBox Splunk application. Red teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager to create and start a remote Windows Service and obtain remote code execution. To achieve this goal, some tools like Metasploit, Cobalt Strike and Impacket, typically create a Windows Service with a random service name on the victim host. This hunting analytic may help defenders identify Windows Services installed as part of a lateral movement attack. The entropy threshold `ut_shannon > 3` should be customized by users. The Service_File_Name field can be used to determine if the Windows Service has malicious intent or not. 
@@ -39566,7 +39566,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may use random Windo
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -39575,7 +39575,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2032a95a-5165-11ec-a2c3-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39590,7 +39590,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 | lookup ut_shannon_lookup word as Service_Name | where ut_shannon > 3 | table EventCode ComputerName Service_Name ut_shannon Service_Start_Type Service_Type Service_File_Name | `randomly_generated_windows_service_name_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytics identifies a big number of instance of ransomware notes (filetype e.g .txt, .html, .hta) file creation to the infected machine. This behavior is a good sensor if the ransomware note filename is quite new for security industry or the ransomware note filename is not in your ransomware lookup table list for monitoring.
@@ -39602,7 +39602,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -39616,7 +39616,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware", "Chaos Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware", "DarkSide Ransomware", "LockBit Ransomware", "Rhysida Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "eff7919a-8330-11eb-83f8-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39631,7 +39631,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=11 file_name IN ("*\.txt","*\.html","*\.hta") |bin _time span=10s | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(TargetFilename) as unique_readme_path_count values(TargetFilename) as list_of_readme_path by Computer Image file_name | rename Computer as dest | where unique_readme_path_count >= 15 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ransomware_notes_bulk_creation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule]
+[ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 performing checks to identify anti-virus products installed on the endpoint. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.
@@ -39643,7 +39643,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -39657,7 +39657,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell", "Prestige Ransomware", "Qakbot", "Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "28077620-c9f6-11eb-8785-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39678,7 +39678,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*SELECT*" OR ScriptBlockText = "*WMIC*") AND (ScriptBlockText = "*AntiVirusProduct*" OR ScriptBlockText = "*AntiSpywareProduct*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule]
+[ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.
@@ -39690,7 +39690,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -39704,7 +39704,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AsyncRAT", "Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Industroyer2", "LockBit Ransomware", "Malicious PowerShell", "Qakbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 75, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "018c1972-ca07-11eb-9473-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39719,7 +39719,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText= "*SELECT*" OR ScriptBlockText= "*Get-WmiObject*") AND (ScriptBlockText= "*Win32_Bios*" OR ScriptBlockText= "*Win32_OperatingSystem*" OR ScriptBlockText= "*Win32_Processor*" OR ScriptBlockText= "*Win32_ComputerSystem*" OR ScriptBlockText= "*Win32_PnPEntity*" OR ScriptBlockText= "*Win32_ShadowCopy*" OR ScriptBlockText= "*Win32_DiskDrive*" OR ScriptBlockText= "*Win32_PhysicalMemory*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recon_using_wmi_class_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule]
+[ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files.
@@ -39731,7 +39731,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network operator may use this batch command
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -39745,7 +39745,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ba570b3a-d356-11eb-8358-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39766,7 +39766,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` Processes.process=*/c*  Processes.process="* rd *"  Processes.process="*/s*" Processes.process="*/q*" by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule]
+[ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The search looks for reg.exe modifying registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations.
@@ -39778,7 +39778,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual for a service to be created or
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -39792,7 +39792,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Service Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 75, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.011", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8470d755-0c13-45b3-bd63-387a373c10cf", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39813,7 +39813,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.user) as user FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=reg.exe Processes.process=*reg* Processes.process=*add* Processes.process=*Services* by Processes.process_id Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `reg_exe_manipulating_windows_services_registry_keys_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule]
+[ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes.
@@ -39825,7 +39825,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -39839,7 +39839,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb", "detection_version": "6"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39860,7 +39860,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\InstalledSDB*) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule]
+[ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The search looks for modifications or alterations made to registry keys that have the potential to initiate the launch of an application or service during system startup. By monitoring and detecting modifications in these registry keys, we can identify suspicious or unauthorized changes that could be indicative of malicious activity. This proactive approach helps in safeguarding the system's integrity and security by promptly identifying and mitigating potential threats that aim to gain persistence or execute malicious actions during the startup process.
@@ -39872,7 +39872,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -39886,7 +39886,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Amadey", "AsyncRAT", "Azorult", "BlackByte Ransomware", "CISA AA23-347A", "Chaos Ransomware", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "DarkGate Malware", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", "IcedID", "NjRAT", "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Qakbot", "Ransomware", "RedLine Stealer", "Remcos", "Snake Keylogger", "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Warzone RAT", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 95, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01a4b", "detection_version": "9"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39907,7 +39907,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path=*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce OR Registry.registry_path=*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\StartupApproved\\Run OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\*" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\*" OR Registry.registry_path=*\\currentversion\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\currentVersion\\Windows\\Appinit_Dlls* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Notify* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Userinit* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\VmApplet* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\currentversion\\policies\\explorer\\run* OR Registry.registry_path=*\\currentversion\\runservices* OR Registry.registry_path=HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh\\* OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Common Startup" OR Registry.registry_path= *\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\SharedTaskScheduler OR Registry.registry_path= *\\Classes\\htmlfile\\shell\\open\\command OR (Registry.registry_path="*Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options*" AND Registry.registry_key_name=Debugger) OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa" AND Registry.registry_key_name="Security Packages") OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig" AND Registry.registry_key_name="Security Packages") OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\*") OR (Registry.registry_path="*currentVersion\\Windows" AND Registry.registry_key_name="Load") OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentVersion" AND Registry.registry_key_name="Svchost") OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager"AND Registry.registry_key_name="BootExecute") OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\Software\\Run" AND Registry.registry_key_name="auto_update")) by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `registry_keys_used_for_persistence_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for modifications to registry keys that can be used to elevate privileges. The registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" are used to intercept calls to an executable and can be used to attach malicious binaries to benign system binaries.
@@ -39919,7 +39919,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There are many legitimate applications that
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -39933,7 +39933,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 95, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.012", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e", "detection_version": "7"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39954,7 +39954,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE ((Registry.registry_path="*Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options*") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger)) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule]
+[ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a loading of dll using regsvr32 application with silent parameter and dllinstall execution. This technique was seen in several RAT malware similar to remcos, njrat and adversaries to load their malicious DLL on the compromised machine. This TTP may executed by normal 3rd party application so it is better to pivot by the parent process, parent command-line and command-line of the file that execute this regsvr32.
@@ -39966,7 +39966,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Other third part application may used this p
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -39980,7 +39980,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AsyncRAT", "Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Living Off The Land", "Remcos", "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f421c250-24e7-11ec-bc43-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -39995,7 +39995,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` AND Processes.process="*/i*" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"(?i)[\-|\/][Ss]{1}") | `regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule]
+[ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies Regsvr32.exe utilizing the silent switch to load DLLs. This technique has most recently been seen in IcedID campaigns to load its initial dll that will download the 2nd stage loader that will download and decrypt the config payload. The switch type may be either a hyphen `-` or forward slash `/`. This behavior is typically found with `-s`, and it is possible there are more switch types that may be used. \ During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts that may have landed on disk. Isolate and contain the endpoint as necessary.
@@ -40007,7 +40007,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = minimal. but network operator can use this a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -40021,7 +40021,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AsyncRAT", "IcedID", "Living Off The Land", "Qakbot", "Remcos", "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c9ef7dc4-eeaf-11eb-b2b6-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40036,7 +40036,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"(?i)[\-|\/][Ss]{1}") | `regsvr32_with_known_silent_switch_cmdline_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the presence of a registry key related to the Remcos RAT agent on a host. This detection is made by a Splunk query to search for instances where the registry key "license" is found in the "Software\Remcos" path. This analytic combines information from two data models: Endpoint.Processes and Endpoint.Registry and retrieves process information such as user, process ID, process name, process path, destination, parent process name, parent process, and process GUID. This analytic also retrieves registry information such as registry path, registry key name, registry value name, registry value data, and process GUID. By joining the process GUID from the Endpoint.Processes data model with the process GUID from the Endpoint.Registry data model, the analytic identifies instances where the "license" registry key is found in the "Software\Remcos" path. This detection is important because it suggests that the host has been compromised by the Remcos RAT agent. Remcos is a well-known remote access Trojan that can be used by attackers to gain unauthorized access to systems and exfiltrate sensitive data. Identifying this behavior allows the SOC to take immediate action to remove the RAT agent and prevent further compromise. The impact of this attack can be severe, as the attacker can gain unauthorized access to the system, steal sensitive information, or use the compromised system as a launching point for further attacks. Next steps include using this analytic in conjunction with other security measures and threat intelligence to ensure accurate detection and response.
@@ -40048,7 +40048,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -40062,7 +40062,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f2a1615a-1d63-11ec-97d2-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40083,7 +40083,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_key_name=*\\Software\\Remcos*) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`remcos_client_registry_install_entry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect file creation in remcos folder in appdata which is the keylog and clipboard logs that will be send to its c2 server. This is really a good TTP indicator that there is a remcos rat in the system that do keylogging, clipboard grabbing and audio recording.
@@ -40095,7 +40095,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -40109,7 +40109,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "25ae862a-1ac3-11ec-94a1-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40130,7 +40130,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.dat") Filesystem.file_path = "*\\remcos\\*" by _time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remcos_rat_file_creation_in_remcos_folder_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for the remote desktop process mstsc.exe running on systems upon which it doesn't typically run. This is accomplished by filtering out all systems that are noted in the `common_rdp_source category` in the Assets and Identity framework. 
@@ -40142,7 +40142,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by u
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -40151,7 +40151,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Hidden Cobra Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f5939373-8054-40ad-8c64-cec478a22a4a", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40166,7 +40166,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process=*mstsc.exe AND Processes.dest_category!=common_rdp_source by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `remote_desktop_process_running_on_system_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.
@@ -40178,7 +40178,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -40192,7 +40192,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d4f42098-4680-11ec-ad07-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40213,7 +40213,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process="*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*" OR Processes.process="*Document.Application.ShellExecute*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse DCOM for lateral movement and remote code execution.
@@ -40225,7 +40225,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage DCOM to start a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -40239,7 +40239,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fa1c3040-4680-11ec-a618-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40260,7 +40260,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText="*Document.Application.ShellExecute*" OR ScriptBlockText="*Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_dcom_and_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.
@@ -40272,7 +40272,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invok
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -40286,7 +40286,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ba24cda8-4716-11ec-8009-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40307,7 +40307,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process="*Invoke-Command*" AND Processes.process="*-ComputerName*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of PowerShell with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the WinRM protocol. Specifically, this search looks for the abuse of the `Invoke-Command` commandlet. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WinRM for lateral movement and remote code execution.
@@ -40319,7 +40319,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and `Invok
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -40333,7 +40333,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7d4c618e-4716-11ec-951c-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40354,7 +40354,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText="*Invoke-Command*" AND ScriptBlockText="*-ComputerName*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `winrs.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the WinRM protocol and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.
@@ -40366,7 +40366,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WinRM and WinRs
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -40380,7 +40380,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0dd296a2-4338-11ec-ba02-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40401,7 +40401,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=winrs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=winrs.exe) (Processes.process="*-r:*" OR Processes.process="*-remote:*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_winrm_and_winrs_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies wmic.exe being launched with parameters to spawn a process on a remote system. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this binary for lateral movement and remote code execution.
@@ -40413,7 +40413,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The wmic.exe utility is a benign Windows app
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -40427,7 +40427,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "CISA AA23-347A", "Ransomware", "Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d25d2c3d-d9d8-40ec-8fdf-e86fe155a3da", "detection_version": "7"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40448,7 +40448,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` (Processes.process="*/node:*" AND Processes.process="*process*" AND Processes.process="*call*" AND  Processes.process="*create*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` leveraging the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet complemented with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and `powershell.exe` for lateral movement and remote code execution.
@@ -40460,7 +40460,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WWMI and powersh
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -40474,7 +40474,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "112638b4-4634-11ec-b9ab-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40495,7 +40495,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` (Processes.process="*Invoke-WmiMethod*" AND Processes.process="*-CN*" AND Processes.process="*-Class Win32_Process*" AND  Processes.process="*-Name create*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Invoke-WmiMethod` commandlet with arguments utilized to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing WMI. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse WMI and this commandlet for lateral movement and remote code execution.
@@ -40507,7 +40507,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage WWMI and powersh
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -40521,7 +40521,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2a048c14-4634-11ec-a618-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40542,7 +40542,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText="*Invoke-WmiMethod*" AND (ScriptBlockText="*-CN*" OR ScriptBlockText="*-ComputerName*") AND ScriptBlockText="*-Class Win32_Process*" AND ScriptBlockText="*-Name create*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID|  `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi_and_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain computers for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -40554,7 +40554,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use Adsise
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -40568,7 +40568,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "70803451-0047-4e12-9d63-77fa7eb8649c", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40589,7 +40589,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*adsisearcher*" AND ScriptBlockText = "*objectcategory=computer*" AND ScriptBlockText IN ("*findAll()*","*findOne()*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest |rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_adsisearcher_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `dsquery.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The `computer` argument returns a list of all computers registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike engage in remote system discovery for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -40601,7 +40601,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -40610,7 +40610,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9fb562f4-42f8-4139-8e11-a82edf7ed718", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40625,7 +40625,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="dsquery.exe") (Processes.process="*computer*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_dsquery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The argument `domain computers /domain` returns a list of all domain computers. Red Teams and adversaries alike use net.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -40637,7 +40637,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -40646,7 +40646,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "IcedID"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9df16706-04a2-41e2-bbfe-9b38b34409d3", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40661,7 +40661,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="net.exe" OR Processes.process_name="net1.exe") (Processes.process="*domain computers*" AND Processes.process=*/do*) OR (Processes.process="*view*" AND Processes.process=*/do*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_net_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover remote systems. The arguments utilized in this command return a list of all the systems registered in the domain. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage WMI and wmic.exe to identify remote systems for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -40673,7 +40673,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -40687,7 +40687,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d82eced3-b1dc-42ab-859e-a2fc98827359", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40708,7 +40708,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe") (Processes.process=*/NAMESPACE:\\\\root\\directory\\ldap* AND Processes.process=*ds_computer* AND Processes.process="*GET ds_samaccountname*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_system_discovery_with_wmic_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies usage of `wmic.exe` spawning a local or remote process, identified by the `node` switch. During triage, review parallel processes for additional commands executed. Look for any file modifications before and after `wmic.exe` execution. In addition, identify the remote endpoint and confirm execution or file modifications. Contain and isolate the endpoint as needed.
@@ -40720,7 +40720,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may use this legitimately to
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -40734,7 +40734,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "IcedID", "Living Off The Land", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "272df6de-61f1-4784-877c-1fbc3e2d0838", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40755,7 +40755,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process=*node* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_wmi_command_attempt_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule]
+[ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by ransomware malware to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. this technique is an alternative by ransomware attacker than deleting the shadowstorage which is known alert in defensive team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much as possible
@@ -40767,7 +40767,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network admin can resize the shadowstorage f
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -40781,7 +40781,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Clop Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bc760ca6-8336-11eb-bcbb-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40802,7 +40802,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) as process_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = "cmd.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powershell.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powershell_ise.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name =  "wmic.exe" Processes.process_name = "vssadmin.exe" Processes.process="*resize*" Processes.process="*shadowstorage*" Processes.process="*/maxsize*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `resize_shadowstorage_volume_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule]
+[ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies suspicious commandline parameter that are commonly used by REVIL ransomware to encrypts the compromise machine.
@@ -40814,7 +40814,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = third party tool may have same command line
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -40828,7 +40828,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "85facebe-c382-11eb-9c3e-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40849,7 +40849,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "* -nolan *" OR Processes.process = "* -nolocal *" OR Processes.process = "* -fast *" OR Processes.process = "* -full *" by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `revil_common_exec_parameter_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Revil Registry Entry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry to keep some malware data during its infection. This technique seen in several apt implant, malware and ransomware like REVIL where it keep some information like the random generated file extension it uses for all the encrypted files and ransomware notes file name in the compromised host.
@@ -40861,7 +40861,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Revil Registry Entry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -40875,7 +40875,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Revil Registry Entry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e3d3f57a-c381-11eb-9e35-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40896,7 +40896,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Facebook_Assistant\\*" OR Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\BlackLivesMatter*") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `revil_registry_entry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule]
+[ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. It is heavily adapted from Benjamin Delpys Kekeo project and Vincent LE TOUXs MakeMeEnterpriseAdmin project. This analytic looks for the use of Rubeus command line arguments utilized in common Kerberos attacks like exporting and importing tickets, forging silver and golden tickets, requesting a TGT or TGS, kerberoasting, password spraying, etc. Red teams and adversaries alike use Rubeus for Kerberos attacks within Active Directory networks. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus and modify the command line parameters. This would effectively bypass this analytic.
@@ -40908,7 +40908,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, legitimate applications m
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -40922,7 +40922,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003", "T1558", "T1558.003", "T1558.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cca37478-8377-11ec-b59a-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40943,7 +40943,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process = "*ptt /ticket*" OR Processes.process = "* monitor /interval*" OR Processes.process ="* asktgt* /user:*" OR Processes.process ="* asktgs* /service:*" OR Processes.process ="* golden* /user:*" OR Processes.process ="* silver* /service:*" OR Processes.process ="* kerberoast*" OR Processes.process ="* asreproast*" OR Processes.process = "* renew* /ticket:*" OR Processes.process = "* brute* /password:*" OR Processes.process = "* brute* /passwords:*" OR Processes.process ="* harvest*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_command_line_parameters_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic looks for a process accessing the winlogon.exe system process. The Splunk Threat Research team identified this behavior when using the Rubeus tool to monitor for and export kerberos tickets from memory. Before being able to export tickets. Rubeus will try to escalate privileges to SYSTEM by obtaining a handle to winlogon.exe before trying to monitor for kerberos tickets. Exporting tickets from memory is typically the first step for pass the ticket attacks. Red teams and adversaries alike may use the pass the ticket technique using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Defenders should be aware that adversaries may customize the source code of Rubeus to potentially bypass this analytic.
@@ -40955,7 +40955,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may obtain a handle
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -40969,7 +40969,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550", "T1550.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5ed8c50a-8869-11ec-876f-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -40990,7 +40990,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=C:\\Windows\\system32\\winlogon.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1f3fff) (SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\lsass.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\LogonUI.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\smss.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, EventCode, GrantedAccess  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule]
+[ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic look for a spawned runas.exe process with a administrator user option parameter. This parameter was abused by adversaries, malware author or even red teams to gain elevated privileges in target host. This is a good hunting query to figure out privilege escalation tactics that may used for different stages like lateral movement but take note that administrator may use this command in purpose so its better to see other event context before and after this analytic.
@@ -41002,7 +41002,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -41011,7 +41011,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134", "T1134.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4807e716-43a4-11ec-a0e7-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41026,7 +41026,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_runas` AND Processes.process = "*/user:*" AND Processes.process = "*admin*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `runas_execution_in_commandline_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule]
+[ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \ This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. \ During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.
@@ -41038,7 +41038,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This is a hunting detection, meant to provid
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -41047,7 +41047,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c8e7ced0-10c5-11ec-8b03-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41062,7 +41062,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL*  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_hunt_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule]
+[ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies rundll32.exe with `control_rundll` within the command-line, loading a .cpl or another file type from windows\temp, programdata, or appdata. Developed in relation to CVE-2021-40444. Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. This is written to be a bit more broad by not including .cpl. The paths are specified, add more as needed. During triage, review parallel processes to identify any further suspicious behavior.
@@ -41074,7 +41074,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This may be tuned, or a new one related, by
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -41088,7 +41088,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2021-40444"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1adffe86-10c3-11ec-8ce6-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41109,7 +41109,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*Control_RunDLL* AND Processes.process IN ("*\\appdata\\*", "*\\windows\\temp\\*", "*\\programdata\\*")  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_control_rundll_world_writable_directory_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe to any process. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to execute its malicious code in normal process for defense evasion and to steal sensitive information in the compromised host.
@@ -41121,7 +41121,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -41135,7 +41135,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2dbeee3a-f067-11eb-96c0-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41156,7 +41156,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = "*\\rundll32.exe" TargetImage = "*.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_create_remote_thread_to_a_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule]
+[ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of rundll32.exe process to "firefox.exe" and "chrome.exe" browser. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where it hooks the browser to parse banking information as user used the targetted browser process.
@@ -41168,7 +41168,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -41182,7 +41182,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f8a22586-ee2d-11eb-a193-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41203,7 +41203,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = "*\\rundll32.exe" TargetImage IN ("*\\firefox.exe", "*\\chrome.exe", "*\\iexplore.exe","*\\microsoftedgecp.exe") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_createremotethread_in_browser_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component.
@@ -41215,7 +41215,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -41229,7 +41229,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f1483f5e-ee29-11eb-9d23-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41250,7 +41250,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=22 process_name="rundll32.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(query) as query values(answer) as answer values(QueryResults) as query_results values(QueryStatus) as query_status by process_name process_guid Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_dnsquery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to lock the workstation through command line. This technique was seen in CONTI leak tooling and script as part of its defense evasion. This technique is not a common practice to lock a screen and maybe a good indicator of compromise.
@@ -41262,7 +41262,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -41276,7 +41276,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fa90f372-f91d-11eb-816c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41291,7 +41291,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe Processes.process= "*user32.dll,LockWorkStation*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_lockworkstation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule]
+[ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 process that drops executable (.exe or .dll) files. This behavior seen in rundll32 process of IcedID that tries to drop copy of itself in temp folder or download executable drop it either appdata or programdata as part of its execution.
@@ -41303,7 +41303,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -41317,7 +41317,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6338266a-ee2a-11eb-bf68-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41338,7 +41338,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=11 Image="*rundll32.exe" TargetFilename IN ("*.exe", "*.dll") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename Computer | rename Computer as dest | rename TargetFilename as file_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule]
+[ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to clear shim cache. This technique is a anti-forensic technique to clear the cache taht are one important artifacts in terms of digital forensic during attacks or incident. This TTP is a good indicator that someone tries to evade some tools and clear foothold on the machine.
@@ -41350,7 +41350,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -41364,7 +41364,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a913718a-25b6-11ec-96d3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41385,7 +41385,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where  `process_rundll32` AND Processes.process = "*apphelp.dll,ShimFlushCache*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_shimcache_flush_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule]
+[ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments and performing a network connection. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, triage any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
@@ -41397,7 +41397,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -41411,7 +41411,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Cobalt Strike", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "35307032-a12d-11eb-835f-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41432,7 +41432,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` AND Processes.action!="blocked" by host _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(?i)(rundll32\.exe.{0,4}$)" | rename dest as src | join host process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count latest(All_Traffic.dest) as dest latest(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip latest(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by host All_Traffic.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`] | `rundll32_with_no_command_line_arguments_with_network_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule]
+[ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading an export function by ordinal value. Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Utilizing ordinal values makes it a bit more complicated for analysts to understand the behavior until the DLL is reviewed.
@@ -41444,7 +41444,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible with native uti
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -41458,7 +41458,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6c135f8d-5e60-454e-80b7-c56eed739833", "detection_version": "6"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41479,7 +41479,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,"rundll32.+\#\d+") | `rundll_loading_dll_by_ordinal_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule]
+[ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The search looks for files that contain the key word *Ryuk* under any folder in the C drive, which is consistent with Ryuk propagation.
@@ -41491,7 +41491,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = If there are files with this keywoord as fil
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -41505,7 +41505,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "57d44d70-28d9-4ed1-acf5-1c80ae2bbce3", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41526,7 +41526,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem WHERE "Filesystem.file_path"=C:\\*Ryuk* BY "Filesystem.dest", "Filesystem.user", "Filesystem.file_path" | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `ryuk_test_files_detected_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule]
+[ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This Splunk query identifies the use of Wake-on-LAN utilized by Ryuk ransomware. The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them. This is a high fidelity indicator of Ryuk ransomware executing on an endpoint. Upon triage, isolate the endpoint. Additional file modification events will be within the users profile (\appdata\roaming) and in public directories (users\public\). Review all Scheduled Tasks on the isolated endpoint and across the fleet. Suspicious Scheduled Tasks will include a path to a unknown binary and those endpoints should be isolated until triaged.
@@ -41538,7 +41538,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited to no known false positives.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-03-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-03-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -41552,7 +41552,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "538d0152-7aaa-11eb-beaa-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41573,7 +41573,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*8 LAN*" OR Processes.process="*9 REP*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ryuk_wake_on_lan_command_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule]
+[ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies access to SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY databases' within the file path of `windows\system32\config` using Windows Security EventCode 4663. This particular behavior is related to credential access, an attempt to either use a Shadow Copy or recent CVE-2021-36934 to access the SAM database. The Security Account Manager (SAM) is a database file in Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, 8.1 and 10 that stores users' passwords.
@@ -41585,7 +41585,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Natively, `dllhost.exe` will access the file
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -41594,7 +41594,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Rhysida Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2021-36934"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "57551656-ebdb-11eb-afdf-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41609,7 +41609,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4663)  ProcessName!=*\\dllhost.exe ObjectName IN ("*\\Windows\\System32\\config\\SAM*","*\\Windows\\System32\\config\\SYSTEM*","*\\Windows\\System32\\config\\SECURITY*") | stats values(AccessList) count by ProcessName ObjectName dest src_user | rename ProcessName as process_name | `sam_database_file_access_attempt_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Samsam Test File Write - Rule]
+[ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The search looks for a file named "test.txt" written to the windows system directory tree, which is consistent with Samsam propagation.
@@ -41621,7 +41621,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = No false positives have been identified.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Samsam Test File Write - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -41635,7 +41635,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Samsam Test File Write - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 20, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "493a879d-519d-428f-8f57-a06a0fdc107e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41656,7 +41656,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.dest) as dest values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*\\windows\\system32\\test.txt by Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `samsam_test_file_write_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule]
+[ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for arguments to sc.exe indicating the creation or modification of a Windows service.
@@ -41668,7 +41668,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Using sc.exe to manipulate Windows services
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -41682,7 +41682,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "NOBELIUM Group", "Orangeworm Attack Group", "Windows Drivers", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Service Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f0c693d8-2a89-4ce7-80b4-98fea4c3ea6d", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41703,7 +41703,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sc.exe (Processes.process="* create *" OR Processes.process="* config *") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sc_exe_manipulating_windows_services_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule]
+[ESCU - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect an application try to connect and create ADSI Object to do LDAP query. Every time an application connects to the directory and attempts to create an ADSI object, the Active Directory Schema is checked for changes. If it has changed since the last connection, the schema is downloaded and stored in a cache on the local computer either in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\SchCache or %systemroot%\SchCache. We found this a good anomaly use case to detect suspicious application like blackmatter ransomware that use ADS object api to execute ldap query. having a good list of ldap or normal AD query tool used within the network is a good start to reduce the noise.
@@ -41715,7 +41715,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = normal application like mmc.exe and other ld
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -41729,7 +41729,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackMatter Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "991eb510-0fc6-11ec-82d3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41744,7 +41744,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=11  TargetFilename = "*\\Windows\\SchCache\\*" TargetFilename = "*.sch*" NOT (Image IN ("*\\Windows\\system32\\mmc.exe")) |stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image TargetFilename EventCode process_id  process_name dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schcache_change_by_app_connect_and_create_adsi_object_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule]
+[ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the registration of suspicious tasks on Windows using the Windows Security EventCode 4698, "A scheduled task was created." It specifically looks for tasks registered through schtasks.exe or TaskService that have command arguments containing the string "HTTP." This behavior is often associated with malware or attacks that utilize Living off the Land binaries (lolbins) to download additional files or payloads to the compromised machine.\
@@ -41762,7 +41762,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -41776,7 +41776,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Scheduled Tasks", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Winter Vivern"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "523c2684-a101-11eb-916b-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41800,7 +41800,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message| search Arguments IN ("*http*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_http_command_arguments_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule]
+[ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation of suspicious tasks in Windows, specifically tasks using the rundll32 command. It's implemented using Windows Security EventCode 4698 for A scheduled task was created, and looks for tasks executed either via schtasks.exe or TaskService. This behavior is worth identifying as it is commonly used by malware, such as TrickBot, that leverages rundll32 to execute its downloader.\
@@ -41818,7 +41818,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -41832,7 +41832,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land", "Scheduled Tasks", "Trickbot", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "75b00fd8-a0ff-11eb-8b31-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41856,7 +41856,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Command IN ("*rundll32*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, Task_Name, Command, Author, Enabled, Hidden, Arguments | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule]
+[ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation of suspicious tasks on a remote Windows endpoint using the at.exe command with command-line arguments. This technique is commonly used by red teams and adversaries for lateral movement and remote code execution. The at.exe binary leverages the deprecated AT protocol, which may still work on previous versions of Windows. Attackers can enable this protocol on demand by modifying a system registry key. It is important to consider potential false positives. While administrators may create scheduled tasks on remote systems, this activity is typically limited to a small set of hosts or users.\
@@ -41870,7 +41870,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may create scheduled tasks on
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -41884,7 +41884,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Living Off The Land", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4be54858-432f-11ec-8209-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41906,7 +41906,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=at.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=at.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_creation_on_remote_endpoint_using_at_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule]
+[ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic focuses on identifying the creation or deletion of scheduled tasks using the schtasks.exe utility with the corresponding command-line flags (-create or -delete). This technique has been notably associated with threat actors like Dragonfly and the SUNBURST attack against SolarWinds. The purpose of this analytic is to detect suspicious activity related to scheduled tasks that could indicate malicious intent or unauthorized system manipulation. By monitoring for these specific command-line flags, we can enhance our ability to identify potential threats and prevent attacks similar to the use of scheduled tasks in the BadRabbit Ransomware incident.
@@ -41918,7 +41918,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While it is possible for legitimate scripts
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -41932,7 +41932,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "Amadey", "AsyncRAT", "Azorult", "CISA AA22-257A", "CISA AA23-347A", "DHS Report TA18-074A", "DarkCrystal RAT", "Living Off The Land", "NOBELIUM Group", "NjRAT", "Phemedrone Stealer", "Prestige Ransomware", "Qakbot", "RedLine Stealer", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Sandworm Tools", "Scheduled Tasks", "Trickbot", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Winter Vivern"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d5af132c-7c17-439c-9d31-13d55340f36c", "detection_version": "6"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -41953,7 +41953,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*delete* OR Processes.process=*create*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule]
+[ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects instances of 'schtasks.exe' being used to start a Scheduled Task on a remote endpoint. Adversaries often abuse the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution. The search parameters include process details such as the process  name, parent process, and command-line executions. Although legitimate administrators may start scheduled tasks on remote systems, this activity is usually limited to a small set of hosts or users. The findings from this analytic provide valuable insight into potentially malicious activities on an endpoint.
@@ -41965,7 +41965,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may start scheduled tasks on
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -41979,7 +41979,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Living Off The Land", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "95cf4608-4302-11ec-8194-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42000,7 +42000,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process=*/s* AND Processes.process=*/run*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `scheduled_task_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule]
+[ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is designed to detect when a Windows Scheduled Task is executed on demand via shell or command line. Adversaries often force the execution of their created Scheduled Tasks for persistent access or lateral movement within a compromised machine. This analytic is driven by process-related data, specifically process name, parent process, and command-line executions, sourced from endpoint logs. The search criteria focus on 'schtasks.exe' with an associated 'run' command.
@@ -42012,7 +42012,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Bear in mind, administrators debugging Sched
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -42026,7 +42026,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-257A", "Data Destruction", "Industroyer2", "Qakbot", "Scheduled Tasks", "XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bb37061e-af1f-11eb-a159-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42047,7 +42047,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "schtasks.exe" Processes.process = "*/run*" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_run_task_on_demand_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule]
+[ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is designed to detect suspicious command-line arguments executed through 'schtasks.exe' to create a scheduled task on a remote endpoint. The analytic scans process data, checking for instances where 'schtasks.exe' has been used with specific command-line flags that suggest an attempt at lateral movement or remote code execution, common techniques employed by adversaries and red teams. Key data points include the process name, the specific command line used, the parent process name, the target destination, and the user involved. Also, timestamp data gives context to when these activities occurred.
@@ -42059,7 +42059,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = While it is possible to have false positives
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -42073,7 +42073,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Living Off The Land", "NOBELIUM Group", "Phemedrone Stealer", "Prestige Ransomware", "RedLine Stealer", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066237cf6", "detection_version": "6"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42094,7 +42094,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = schtasks.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=schtasks.exe) (Processes.process="*/create*" AND Processes.process="*/s*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_scheduling_job_on_remote_system_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule]
+[ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes a Splunk query to pinpoint potential threats by monitoring the 'schtasks.exe' command-line usage. This particular command, especially when used in tandem with 'shutdown' and '/create' flags, can suggest an adversarial force intending to schedule unwarranted system reboots. The query focuses on endpoint process data and retrieves details such as the process name, the parent process name, the destination, and the user involved. Essential to the investigation are the earliest and latest timestamps of these events, providing an activity timeline. Data such as the targeted host and initiating user offer valuable context for analyst.
@@ -42106,7 +42106,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This analytic may also capture legitimate ad
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -42120,7 +42120,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Scheduled Tasks", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066437cf6", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42141,7 +42141,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process="*shutdown*" Processes.process="*/create *" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is developed to detect possible event trigger execution through screensaver registry entry modification for persistence or privilege escalation. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where they put the malicious payload path to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry key to redirect the execution to their malicious payload path. This TTP is a good indicator that some attacker may modify this entry for their persistence and privilege escalation.
@@ -42153,7 +42153,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -42167,7 +42167,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546", "T1546.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "58cea3ec-1f6d-11ec-8560-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42188,7 +42188,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\SCRNSAVE.EXE*") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Script Execution via WMI - Rule]
+[ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects any potential misuse of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for malicious purposes since adversaries often use WMI to run scripts which allows them to carry out malicious activities without raising suspicion. The detection is made by monitoring the process 'scrcons.exe', which is essential to run WMI scripts. The detection is important because it proactively identifies and responds to potential threats that leverage WMI for malicious purposes that can lead to system compromise, data exfiltration, or the establishment of persistence within the environment. False positives might occur since administrators might occasionally use WMI to launch scripts for legitimate purposes. Therefore, you must distinguish between malicious and benign activities.
@@ -42200,7 +42200,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use wm
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Script Execution via WMI - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -42214,7 +42214,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Script Execution via WMI - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "aa73f80d-d728-4077-b226-81ea0c8be589", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42235,7 +42235,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `script_execution_via_wmi_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modification. This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with payload file path on it to be executed.
@@ -42247,7 +42247,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited to no false positives are expected.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -42261,7 +42261,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d71efbf6-da63-11eb-8c6e-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42282,7 +42282,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE ((Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths\\control.exe*" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\exefile\\shell\\runas\\command\\*") (Registry.registry_value_name = "(Default)" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "IsolatedCommand")) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdclt_uac_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect the execution of sdelete.exe application sysinternal tools. This tool is one of the most use tool of malware and adversaries to remove or clear their tracks and artifact in the targetted host. This tool is designed to delete securely a file in file system that remove the forensic evidence on the machine. A good TTP query to check why user execute this application which is not a common practice.
@@ -42294,7 +42294,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = user may execute and use this application
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -42308,7 +42308,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Masquerading - Rename System Utilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485", "T1070.004", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "31702fc0-2682-11ec-85c3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42329,7 +42329,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_sdelete` by  Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdelete_application_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule]
+[ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments and with a network connection. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
@@ -42341,7 +42341,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in sm
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -42355,7 +42355,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Cobalt Strike", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b690df8c-a145-11eb-a38b-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42376,7 +42376,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h  Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(?i)(searchprotocolhost\.exe.{0,4}$)" | join  process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `searchprotocolhost_with_no_command_line_with_network_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule]
+[ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive.
@@ -42388,7 +42388,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -42402,7 +42402,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Rhysida Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.003", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5672819c-be09-11eb-bbfb-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42423,7 +42423,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "python*.exe" Processes.process = "*.py*" Processes.process = "*-ntds*" (Processes.process = "*-system*" OR Processes.process = "*-sam*" OR Processes.process = "*-security*" OR Processes.process = "*-bootkey*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack.\
@@ -42443,7 +42443,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however f
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -42457,7 +42457,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "13243068-2d38-11ec-8908-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42482,7 +42482,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText="*KerberosRequestorSecurityToken*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ScriptBlockText Opcode Computer UserID EventCode | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule]
+[ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack.\
@@ -42508,7 +42508,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be caused by Administrat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -42522,7 +42522,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ae8b3efc-2d2e-11ec-8b57-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42550,7 +42550,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_setspn` (Processes.process="*-t*" AND Processes.process="*-f*") OR (Processes.process="*-q*" AND Processes.process="**/**") OR (Processes.process="*-q*") OR (Processes.process="*-s*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Services Escalate Exe - Rule]
+[ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of `svc-exe` with Cobalt Strike. The behavior typically follows after an adversary has already gained initial access and is escalating privileges. Using `svc-exe`, a randomly named binary will be downloaded from the remote Teamserver and placed on disk within `C:\Windows\400619a.exe`. Following, the binary will be added to the registry under key `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\400619a\` with multiple keys and values added to look like a legitimate service. Upon loading, `services.exe` will spawn the randomly named binary from `\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\400619a.exe`. The process lineage is completed with `400619a.exe` spawning rundll32.exe, which is the default `spawnto_` value for Cobalt Strike. The `spawnto_` value is arbitrary and may be any process on disk (typically system32/syswow64 binary). The `spawnto_` process will also contain a network connection. During triage, review parallel procesess and identify any additional file modifications.
@@ -42562,7 +42562,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as `servic
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Services Escalate Exe - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -42576,7 +42576,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Services Escalate Exe - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "CISA AA23-347A", "Cobalt Strike", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 95, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c448488c-b7ec-11eb-8253-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42597,7 +42597,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe Processes.process_path=*admin$* by Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_escalate_exe_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
+[ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Service Control Manager and creating a remote malicious service, the executed command is spawned as a child process of `services.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of services.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.
@@ -42609,7 +42609,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this beh
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -42623,7 +42623,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "CISA AA23-347A", "Living Off The Land", "Qakbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ba9e1954-4c04-11ec-8b74-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42644,7 +42644,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe) (Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Monitor for changes of the ExecutionPolicy in the registry to the values "unrestricted" or "bypass," which allows the execution of malicious scripts.
@@ -42656,7 +42656,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may attempt to change the def
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -42670,7 +42670,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "DarkGate Malware", "Data Destruction", "HAFNIUM Group", "Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c2590137-0b08-4985-9ec5-6ae23d92f63d", "detection_version": "8"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42691,7 +42691,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path=*Software\\Microsoft\\Powershell\\1\\ShellIds\\Microsoft.PowerShell* Registry.registry_value_name=ExecutionPolicy (Registry.registry_value_data=Unrestricted OR Registry.registry_value_data=Bypass)) BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `set_default_powershell_execution_policy_to_unrestricted_or_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Shim Database File Creation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for shim database files being written to default directories. The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). According to Microsoft, a shim is a small library that transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere.
@@ -42703,7 +42703,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Because legitimate shim files are created an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Shim Database File Creation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -42717,7 +42717,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Shim Database File Creation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6e4c4588-ba2f-42fa-97e6-9f6f548eaa33", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42738,7 +42738,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.action) values(Filesystem.file_hash) as file_hash values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path=*Windows\\AppPatch\\Custom* by Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `shim_database_file_creation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule]
+[ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search detects the process execution and arguments required to silently create a shim database.  The sdbinst.exe application is used to install shim database files (.sdb). A shim is a small library which transparently intercepts an API, changes the parameters passed, handles the operation itself, or redirects the operation elsewhere.
@@ -42750,7 +42750,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-11-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-11-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -42764,7 +42764,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.011", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "404620de-46d8-48b6-90cc-8a8d7b0876a3", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42785,7 +42785,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = sdbinst.exe by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `shim_database_installation_with_suspicious_parameters_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule]
+[ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, "A scheduled task was created," and EventCode 4699, "A scheduled task was deleted," to identify scheduled tasks that are created and deleted within a short time frame of less than 30 seconds. This behavior is indicative of a potential lateral movement attack where the Task Scheduler is abused to achieve code execution. Both red teams and adversaries may exploit the Task Scheduler for lateral movement and remote code execution.\
@@ -42803,7 +42803,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although uncommon, legitimate applications m
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -42817,7 +42817,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "CISA AA22-257A", "CISA AA23-347A", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6fa31414-546e-11ec-adfa-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42841,7 +42841,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 OR EventCode=4699 | xmlkv Message | transaction Task_Name  startswith=(EventCode=4698) endswith=(EventCode=4699) | eval short_lived=case((duration<30),"TRUE") | search  short_lived = TRUE | rename ComputerName as dest| table _time, dest, Account_Name, Command, Task_Name, short_lived | `short_lived_scheduled_task_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule]
+[ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation and deletion of accounts in a short time period to identify potential threats earlier and take appropriate actions to mitigate the risks. Helps prevent or minimize the potential damage caused by unauthorized access or malicious activities within the environment. This detection is made by a Splunk query that searches for events with the result IDs 4720 and 4726 in the "Change" data model. The query then groups the results by time, user, and destination. The result is filtered to only include events with the specified result IDs. The "transaction" command is used to group events that occur within a specified time span and have the same user but are not connected. Finally, the relevant information such as the first and last time of the event, the count, user, destination, and result ID are displayed in a table. This detection is important because it suggests that an attacker is attempting to create and delete accounts rapidly, potentially to cover their tracks or gain unauthorized access. The impact of such an attack can include unauthorized access to sensitive data, privilege escalation, or the ability to carry out further malicious activities within the environment. Next steps include investigating the events flagged by the analytic, review the account creation and deletion activities, and analyze any associated logs or artifacts to determine the intent and impact of the attack.
@@ -42853,7 +42853,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an administrator created
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -42867,7 +42867,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b25f6f62-0782-43c1-b403-083231ffd97d", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42888,7 +42888,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as result_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.result_id=4720 OR All_Changes.result_id=4726 by _time span=4h All_Changes.user All_Changes.dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | search result_id = 4720 result_id=4726 | transaction user connected=false maxspan=240m | table firstTime lastTime count user dest result_id | `short_lived_windows_accounts_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account.
@@ -42900,7 +42900,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -42914,7 +42914,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "56d7cfcc-da63-11eb-92d4-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42935,7 +42935,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\Environment\\windir" Registry.registry_value_data = "*.exe*") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule]
+[ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects a behavior where a process name consists only of a single letter that helps to detect potential threats earlier and mitigate the risks. This detection is important because it indicates the presence of malware or an attacker attempting to evade detection by using a process name that is difficult to identify or track so that he can carry out malicious activities such as data theft or ransomware attacks. False positives might occur since there might be legitimate uses of single-letter process names in your environment. Next steps include reviewing the process details and investigating any suspicious activity upon triage.
@@ -42947,7 +42947,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Single-letter executables are not always mal
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -42961,7 +42961,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a4214f0b-e01c-41bc-8cc4-d2b71e3056b4", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -42982,7 +42982,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | eval process_name_length = len(process_name), endExe = if(substr(process_name, -4) == ".exe", 1, 0) | search process_name_length=5 AND endExe=1 | table count, firstTime, lastTime, dest, user, process, process_name | `single_letter_process_on_endpoint_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule]
+[ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, elevating access using the `-verb runas` function. This particular bypass utilizes a registry key/value. Identified by two sources, the registry keys are `HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell` and `HKCU\Software\Classes\launcher.Systemsettings\Shell\open\command`. To simulate this behavior, multiple POC are available. The analytic identifies the use of `runas` by `slui.exe`.
@@ -42994,7 +42994,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -43008,7 +43008,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8d124810-b3e4-11eb-96c7-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43029,7 +43029,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=slui.exe (Processes.process=*-verb* Processes.process=*runas*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_runas_elevated_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool, `slui.exe`, spawning a child process. This behavior is associated with publicly known UAC bypass. `slui.exe` is commonly associated with software updates and is most often spawned by `svchost.exe`. The `slui.exe` process should not have child processes, and any processes spawning from it will be running with elevated privileges. During triage, review the child process and additional parallel processes. Identify any file modifications that may have lead to the bypass.
@@ -43041,7 +43041,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Certain applications may spawn from `slui.ex
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-05-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-05-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -43055,7 +43055,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkSide Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "879c4330-b3e0-11eb-b1b1-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43076,7 +43076,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=slui.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `slui_spawning_a_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Spike in File Writes - Rule]
+[ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search looks for a sharp increase in the number of files written to a particular host 
@@ -43088,7 +43088,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is important to understand that if you ha
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Spike in File Writes - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -43102,7 +43102,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Spike in File Writes - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Spike in File Writes - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fdb0f805-74e4-4539-8c00-618927333aae", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43117,7 +43117,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=created by _time span=1h, Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, "-1d@d"), count, null))) as "count" avg(eval(if(_time<relative_time(maxtime, "-1d@d"), count,null))) as avg stdev(eval(if(_time<relative_time(maxtime, "-1d@d"), count, null))) as stdev by "dest" | eval upperBound=(avg+stdev*4), isOutlier=if((count > upperBound) AND num_data_samples >=20, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `spike_in_file_writes_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious child process, `rundll32.exe`, with no command-line arguments being spawned from `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to spawn a process. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.
@@ -43129,7 +43129,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives have been identified
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -43143,7 +43143,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "15d905f6-da6b-11eb-ab82-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43164,7 +43164,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=spoolsv.exe `process_rundll32` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_spawning_rundll32_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule]
+[ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect suspicious loading of dll in specific path relative to printnightmare exploitation. In this search we try to detect the loaded modules made by spoolsv.exe after the exploitation.
@@ -43176,7 +43176,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -43190,7 +43190,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a5e451f8-da81-11eb-b245-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43211,7 +43211,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 Image ="*\\spoolsv.exe" ImageLoaded="*\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\*" ImageLoaded = "*.dll" | stats dc(ImageLoaded) as countImgloaded values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image Computer ProcessId EventCode | rename Computer as dest | where countImgloaded >= 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_loaded_modules_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies a suspicious behavior related to PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675),  to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine. This exploit attacks a critical Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability to elevate privilege. This detection is to look for suspicious process access made by the spoolsv.exe that may related to the attack.
@@ -43223,7 +43223,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -43237,7 +43237,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "799b606e-da81-11eb-93f8-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43258,7 +43258,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 SourceImage = "*\\spoolsv.exe" CallTrace = "*\\Windows\\system32\\spool\\DRIVERS\\x64\\*" TargetImage IN ("*\\rundll32.exe", "*\\spoolsv.exe") GrantedAccess = 0x1fffff | stats  count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace  EventCode ProcessID| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_suspicious_process_access_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule]
+[ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously (CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.
@@ -43270,7 +43270,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -43284,7 +43284,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d5bf5cf2-da71-11eb-92c2-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43305,7 +43305,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=spoolsv.exe by _time Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path="*\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\*" Filesystem.file_name="*.dll" by _time Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process_guid process] | dedup file_create_time | table  dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name process_guid | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule]
+[ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a `.dll` being written by `spoolsv.exe`. This was identified during our testing of CVE-2021-34527 previously(CVE-2021-1675) or PrintNightmare. Typically, this is not normal behavior for `spoolsv.exe` to write a `.dll`. Current POC code used will write the suspicious DLL to disk within a path of `\spool\drivers\x64\`. During triage, isolate the endpoint and review for source of exploitation. Capture any additional file modification events.
@@ -43317,7 +43317,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives. Filter as needed.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -43331,7 +43331,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.012", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "347fd388-da87-11eb-836d-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43352,7 +43352,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventID=11 process_name=spoolsv.exe file_path="*\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\*" file_name=*.dll | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, UserID, process_name, file_path, file_name, TargetFilename, process_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spoolsv_writing_a_dll___sysmon_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule]
+[ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious file creation of sqlite3.dll in %temp% folder. This behavior was seen in IcedID malware where it download sqlite module to parse browser database like for chrome or firefox to stole browser information related to bank, credit card or credentials.
@@ -43364,7 +43364,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -43378,7 +43378,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0f216a38-f45f-11eb-b09c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43399,7 +43399,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=11 (TargetFilename = "*\\sqlite32.dll" OR TargetFilename = "*\\sqlite64.dll") (TargetFilename = "*\\temp\\*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest signature signature_id process_name file_name file_path action process_guid| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Behavior Identified - Rule]
+[ESCU - Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Behavior Identified - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This correlation rule focuses on detecting potential threats associated with MITRE ATT&CK T1649 (Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates). The rule is designed to identify instances where 5 or more analytics related to Windows Certificate Services analytic story that are triggered within a specified time frame, which may indicate a potential attack in progress. By aggregating these analytics, security teams can swiftly respond to and investigate any suspicious activities, enhancing their ability to protect critical assets and prevent unauthorized access to sensitive information.
@@ -43411,7 +43411,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on auto
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Behavior Identified - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Behavior Identified - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["290df60e-4b5d-4a5e-b0c7-dc5348ea0c86", "78b274f8-acb0-428b-b1f7-7b0d0e73330a", "7617f689-bbd8-44bc-adcd-6f8968897848"]
@@ -43421,7 +43421,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - RIR - Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Behavior Identified - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - RIR - Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Behavior Identified - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1649"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Correlation"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "87ac670e-bbfd-44ca-b566-44e9f835518d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43442,7 +43442,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories="Windows Certificate Services" All_Risk.risk_object_type="system" by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 5 | `steal_or_forge_authentication_certificates_behavior_identified_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule]
+[ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The malware sunburst will load the malicious dll by SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe. After a period of 12-14 days, the malware will attempt to resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud.com. This detections will correlate both events. 
@@ -43454,7 +43454,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -43468,7 +43468,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "701a8740-e8db-40df-9190-5516d3819787", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43489,7 +43489,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = (`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded=*SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll) OR (`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName=*avsvmcloud.com) | eventstats dc(EventCode) AS dc_events | where dc_events=2 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) AS ImageLoaded values(QueryName) AS QueryName by host | rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sunburst_correlation_dll_and_network_event_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries need to create a new computer account name and rename it to match the name of a domain controller account without the ending '$'. In Windows Active Directory environments, computer account names always end with `$`. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed`, to identify a computer account rename event with a suspicious name that does not terminate with `$`. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation.
@@ -43501,7 +43501,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Renaming a computer account name to a name t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -43515,7 +43515,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2021-42287", "CVE-2021-42278"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "35a61ed8-61c4-11ec-bc1e-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43536,7 +43536,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4781 OldTargetUserName="*$" NewTargetUserName!="*$" | table _time, Computer, Caller_User_Name, OldTargetUserName, NewTargetUserName | rename Computer as dest | `suspicious_computer_account_name_change_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious copy of file from systemroot folder of the windows OS. This technique is commonly used by APT or other malware as part of execution (LOLBIN) to run its malicious code using the available legitimate tool in OS. this type of event may seen or may execute of normal user in some instance but this is really a anomaly that needs to be check within the network.
@@ -43548,7 +43548,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = every user may do this event but very un-uss
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -43562,7 +43562,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AsyncRAT", "IcedID", "Qakbot", "Sandworm Tools", "Unusual Processes", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ce633e56-25b2-11ec-9e76-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43583,7 +43583,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN("cmd.exe", "powershell*","pwsh.exe", "sqlps.exe", "sqltoolsps.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") AND `process_copy` AND Processes.process IN("*\\Windows\\System32\\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWow64\\*") AND Processes.process = "*copy*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id temp | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval splitted_commandline=split(process," ") | eval first_cmdline=lower(mvindex(splitted_commandline,0)) | where NOT LIKE(first_cmdline,"%\\windows\\system32\\%") AND NOT LIKE(first_cmdline,"%\\windows\\syswow64\\%") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`suspicious_copy_on_system32_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic identifies the use of a curl contacting suspicious remote domains to checkin to Command And Control servers or download further implants. In the context of Silver Sparrow, curl is identified contacting s3.amazonaws.com. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. 
@@ -43595,7 +43595,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. Filter as needed.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-02-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-02-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -43609,7 +43609,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Linux Living Off The Land", "Silver Sparrow"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3f613dc0-21f2-4063-93b1-5d3c15eef22f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43630,7 +43630,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=curl Processes.process=s3.amazonaws.com by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_curl_network_connection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies DLLHost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for DLLHost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. DLLHost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
@@ -43642,7 +43642,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in sm
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -43656,7 +43656,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Cobalt Strike", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ff61e98c-0337-4593-a78f-72a676c56f26", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43677,7 +43677,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dllhost` by _time span=1h  Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(?i)(dllhost\.exe.{0,4}$)" | `suspicious_dllhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into `ntoskrnl.exe` for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review.
@@ -43689,7 +43689,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives will be present. Som
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -43703,7 +43703,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "BlackByte Ransomware", "CISA AA22-320A", "Snake Keylogger", "XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f880acd4-a8f1-11eb-a53b-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43724,7 +43724,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=6 ImageLoaded = "*.sys" NOT (ImageLoaded IN("*\\WINDOWS\\inf","*\\WINDOWS\\System32\\drivers\\*", "*\\WINDOWS\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\*")) |  stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by dest ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed| rename ImageLoaded as file_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes Windows Event ID 1100 to identify when Windows event log service is shutdown. Note that this is a voluminous analytic that will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. This event generates every time Windows Event Log service has shut down. It also generates during normal system shutdown. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.
@@ -43736,7 +43736,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible the Event Logging service get
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -43745,7 +43745,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Windows Log Manipulation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2b85aa3d-f5f6-4c2e-a081-a09f6e1c2e40", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43760,7 +43760,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = (`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1100) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest name EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_event_log_service_behavior_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies gpupdate.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for gpupdate.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. gpupdate.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
@@ -43772,7 +43772,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in sm
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -43786,7 +43786,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Cobalt Strike", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f308490a-473a-40ef-ae64-dd7a6eba284a", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43807,7 +43807,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_gpupdate` by _time span=1h  Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(?i)(gpupdate\.exe.{0,4}$)" | `suspicious_gpupdate_no_command_line_arguments_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe commandline to execute dll file. This technique was seen in IcedID malware to load its payload dll with the following parameter to load encrypted dll payload which is the license.dat.
@@ -43819,7 +43819,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = limitted. this parameter is not commonly use
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -43833,7 +43833,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bed761f8-ee29-11eb-8bf3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43854,7 +43854,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*/i:* by  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_icedid_rundll32_cmdline_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of image in appdata folder made by process that also has a file reference in appdata folder. This technique was seen in remcos rat that capture screenshot of the compromised machine and place it in the appdata and will be send to its C2 server. This TTP is really a good indicator to check that process because it is in suspicious folder path and image files are not commonly created by user in this folder path.
@@ -43866,7 +43866,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -43880,7 +43880,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f6f904c4-1ac0-11ec-806b-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43901,7 +43901,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path="*\\appdata\\Roaming\\*" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.png","*.jpg","*.bmp","*.gif","*.tiff") Filesystem.file_path= "*\\appdata\\Roaming\\*" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process proc_guid] | `suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will request and obtain a Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) with a domain controller computer account as the Service Name. This Service Ticket can be then used to take control of the domain controller on the final part of the attack. This analytic leverages Event Id 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual TGS request where the Account_Name requesting the ticket matches the Service_Name field. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation.
@@ -43913,7 +43913,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = We have tested this detection logic with ~2
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -43927,7 +43927,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "cve": ["CVE-2021-42287", "CVE-2021-42278"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8b1297bc-6204-11ec-b7c4-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43948,7 +43948,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 | eval isSuspicious = if(lower(ServiceName) = lower(mvindex(split(TargetUserName,"@"),0)),1,0) | where isSuspicious = 1 | rename Computer as dest| rename TargetUserName as user | table _time, dest, src_ip, user, ServiceName, Error_Code, isSuspicious | `suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search, detects execution of suspicious bash commands from various commonly leveraged bash scripts like (AutoSUID, LinEnum, LinPeas) to perform discovery of possible paths of privilege execution, password files, vulnerable directories, executables and file permissions on a Linux host.\
@@ -43962,7 +43962,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unless an administrator is using these comma
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -43976,7 +43976,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Linux Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0edd5112-56c9-11ec-b990-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -43998,7 +43998,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) values(Processes.process_name) values(Processes.parent_process_name) dc(Processes.process) as distinct_commands dc(Processes.process_name) as distinct_process_names min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where [|inputlookup linux_tool_discovery_process.csv | rename process as Processes.process |table Processes.process] by _time span=5m Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where distinct_commands > 40 AND distinct_process_names > 3| `suspicious_linux_discovery_commands_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a renamed instance of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe. Microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. A spawned child process from microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is uncommon. In any instance, microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe spawning from an Office product or any living off the land binary is highly suspect.
@@ -44010,7 +44010,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44019,7 +44019,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Cobalt Strike", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Living Off The Land", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f0db4464-55d9-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44034,7 +44034,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_rename_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe usage. microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 and is rarely utilized. When investigating, identify the executed code on disk and review. It is not a commonly used process by many applications.
@@ -44046,7 +44046,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, limited instances have be
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44060,7 +44060,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9bbc62e8-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44081,7 +44081,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_microsoftworkflowcompiler` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_microsoft_workflow_compiler_usage_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies msbuild.exe executing from a non-standard path. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. Instances of Visual Studio will run a copy of msbuild.exe. A moved instance of MSBuild is suspicious, however there are instances of build applications that will move or use a copy of MSBuild.
@@ -44093,7 +44093,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use a moved
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44107,7 +44107,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Cobalt Strike", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Living Off The Land", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f5198224-551c-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44128,7 +44128,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msbuild` AND (Processes.process_path!=*\\framework*\\v*\\*) by Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_msbuild_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies renamed instances of msbuild.exe executing. Msbuild.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319 and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. During investigation, identify the code executed and what is executing a renamed instance of MSBuild.
@@ -44140,7 +44140,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44149,7 +44149,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Cobalt Strike", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Living Off The Land", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1127", "T1036.003", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44164,7 +44164,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=msbuild.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning msbuild.exe. This behavior is indicative of a COM object being utilized to spawn msbuild from wmiprvse.exe. It is common for MSBuild.exe to be spawned from devenv.exe while using Visual Studio. In this instance, there will be command line arguments and file paths. In a malicious instance, MSBuild.exe will spawn from non-standard processes and have no command line arguments. For example, MSBuild.exe spawning from explorer.exe, powershell.exe is far less common and should be investigated.
@@ -44176,7 +44176,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44190,7 +44190,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1127", "T1127.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a115fba6-5514-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44211,7 +44211,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe AND `process_msbuild` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_msbuild_spawn_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies child processes spawning from  "mshta.exe". The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, parent process "mshta.exe" and its child process.
@@ -44223,7 +44223,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44237,7 +44237,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "60023bb6-5500-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44258,7 +44258,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=mshta.exe AND (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=colorcpl.exe OR Processes.process_name=msbuild.exe OR Processes.process_name=microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe OR Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe OR Processes.process_name=scrcons.exe OR Processes.process_name=cscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=wscript.exe OR Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR Processes.process_name=cmd.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_child_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies wmiprvse.exe spawning mshta.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DCOM object being utilized to spawn mshta from wmiprvse.exe or svchost.exe. In this instance, adversaries may use LethalHTA that will spawn mshta.exe from svchost.exe.
@@ -44270,7 +44270,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44284,7 +44284,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4d33a488-5b5f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44305,7 +44305,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) AND `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.user Processes.original_file_name| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_mshta_spawn_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\
@@ -44331,7 +44331,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use PlistBu
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-02-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-02-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44345,7 +44345,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.001", "T1543"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c3194009-e0eb-4f84-87a9-4070f8688f00", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44373,7 +44373,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=PlistBuddy (Processes.process=*LaunchAgents* OR Processes.process=*RunAtLoad* OR Processes.process=*true*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |  `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic identifies the use of a native MacOS utility, PlistBuddy, creating or modifying a properly list (.plist) file. In the instance of Silver Sparrow, the following commands were executed:\
@@ -44399,7 +44399,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications may use PlistBu
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-02-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-02-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -44413,7 +44413,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.001", "T1543"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "20ba6c32-c733-4a32-b64e-2688cf231399", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44441,7 +44441,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `osquery_process` "columns.cmdline"="*LaunchAgents*" OR "columns.cmdline"="*RunAtLoad*" OR "columns.cmdline"="*true*" |  `suspicious_plistbuddy_usage_via_osquery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms used to download external files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware actors, and red teams to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access techniques. A user will experience false positives if the following instant messaging is allowed or common applications like telegram or discord are allowed in the corporate network.
@@ -44453,7 +44453,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Noise and false positive can be seen if the
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -44467,7 +44467,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Phemedrone Stealer", "Remcos", "Snake Keylogger", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3cf0dc36-484d-11ec-a6bc-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44488,7 +44488,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*pastebin*", "*discord*", "*api.telegram*","*t.me*") process_name IN ("cmd.exe", "*powershell*", "pwsh.exe", "wscript.exe","cscript.exe") OR Image IN ("*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\programdata\\*", "*\\temp\\*", "*\\Windows\\Tasks\\*", "*\\appdata\\*", "*\\perflogs\\*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_dns_query_known_abuse_web_services_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies a suspicious process spawned by another process from within common container/archive file types. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute scripts or evade defenses. This TTP may detect some normal software installation or user behaviors where opening archive files is common.
@@ -44500,7 +44500,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Various business process or userland applica
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44514,7 +44514,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Amadey", "Remcos", "Snake Keylogger", "Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 20, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002", "T1036.008"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d8120352-3b62-411c-8cb6-7b47584dd5e8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44535,7 +44535,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN ("*.ZIP\\*","*.ISO\\*","*.IMG\\*","*.CAB\\*","*.TAR\\*","*.GZ\\*","*.RAR\\*","*.7Z\\*") AND Processes.action="allowed" by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`| regex process="(?i).*(ZIP|ISO|IMG|CAB|TAR|GZ|RAR|7Z)\\\\.+\.(BAT|BIN|CAB|CMD|COM|CPL|EX_|EXE|GADGET|INF1|INS|INX||HTM|HTML|ISU|JAR|JOB|JS|JSE|LNK|MSC|MSI|MSP|MST|PAF|PIF|PS1|REG|RGS|SCR|SCT|SHB|SHS|U3P|VB|VBE|VBS|VBSCRIPT|WS|WSF|WSH)\"?$" | rex field=process "(?i).+\\\\(?<file_name>[^\\\]+\.(ZIP|ISO|IMG|CAB|TAR|GZ|RAR|7Z))\\\\((.+\\\\)+)?(?<process_name>.+\.(BAT|BIN|CAB|CMD|COM|CPL|EX_|EXE|GADGET|INF1|INS|INX||HTM|HTML|ISU|JAR|JOB|JS|JSE|LNK|MSC|MSI|MSP|MST|PAF|PIF|PS1|REG|RGS|SCR|SCT|SHB|SHS|U3P|VB|VBE|VBS|VBSCRIPT|WS|WSF|WSH))\"?$"| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_executed_from_container_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies a suspicious processes running in file paths that are not typically associated with legitimate software. Adversaries often employ this technique to drop and execute malicious executables in accessible locations that do not require administrative privileges. By monitoring for processes running in such unconventional file paths, we can identify potential indicators of compromise and proactively respond to malicious activity. This analytic plays a crucial role in enhancing system security by pinpointing suspicious behaviors commonly associated with malware and unauthorized software execution.
@@ -44547,7 +44547,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may allow execution of specif
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44561,7 +44561,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "Amadey", "AsyncRAT", "Azorult", "BlackByte Ransomware", "Brute Ratel C4", "CISA AA23-347A", "Chaos Ransomware", "DarkCrystal RAT", "DarkGate Malware", "Data Destruction", "Double Zero Destructor", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Hermetic Wiper", "IcedID", "Industroyer2", "LockBit Ransomware", "Phemedrone Stealer", "PlugX", "Prestige Ransomware", "Qakbot", "RedLine Stealer", "Remcos", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Swift Slicer", "Trickbot", "Volt Typhoon", "Warzone RAT", "WhisperGate", "XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9be25988-ad82-11eb-a14f-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44582,7 +44582,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = "*\\windows\\fonts\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\windows\\temp\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\users\\public\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\windows\\debug\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\Windows\\servicing\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\Users\\Default\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*Recycle.bin*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\Windows\\Media\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "\\Windows\\repair\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\temp\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\PerfLogs\\*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_file_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, a well known instant messaging and digital distribution platform. Discord can be abused by adversaries, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign, to host and download malicious. external files. A process resolving a Discord DNS name could be an indicator of malware trying to download files from Discord for further execution.
@@ -44594,7 +44594,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Noise and false positive can be seen if the
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -44608,7 +44608,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4d4332ae-792c-11ec-89c1-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44623,7 +44623,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*discord*") Image != "*\\AppData\\Local\\Discord\\*" AND Image != "*\\Program Files*" AND Image != "discord.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for reg.exe being launched from a command prompt not started by the user. When a user launches cmd.exe, the parent process is usually explorer.exe. This search filters out those instances.
@@ -44635,7 +44635,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible for system administrators to w
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44649,7 +44649,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Disabling Security Tools", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a6b3ab4e-dd77-4213-95fa-fc94701995e0", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44664,7 +44664,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != explorer.exe Processes.process_name =cmd.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=cmd.exe Processes.process_name= reg.exe by Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename parent_process_id as process_id |dedup process_id| table process_id dest] | `suspicious_reg_exe_process_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code by using non-standard file extensions to load DLLs. Upon investigating, look for network connections to remote destinations (internal or external). Review additional parrallel processes and child processes for additional activity.
@@ -44676,7 +44676,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives with the query restr
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44690,7 +44690,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land", "Qakbot", "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.010"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "62732736-6250-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44711,7 +44711,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process IN ("*\\appdata\\*", "*\\programdata\\*","*\\windows\\temp\\*") NOT (Processes.process IN ("*.dll*", "*.ax*", "*.ocx*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe using dllregisterserver on the command line to load a DLL. When a DLL is registered, the DllRegisterServer method entry point in the DLL is invoked. This is typically seen when a DLL is being registered on the system. Not every instance is considered malicious, but it will capture malicious use of it. During investigation, review the parent process and parrellel processes executing. Capture the DLL being loaded and inspect further. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
@@ -44723,7 +44723,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This is likely to produce false positives an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-02-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-02-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44737,7 +44737,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID", "Living Off The Land", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8c00a385-9b86-4ac0-8932-c9ec3713b159", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44758,7 +44758,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*dllregisterserver* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_dllregisterserver_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for rundll32.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
@@ -44770,7 +44770,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44784,7 +44784,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Cobalt Strike", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2021-34527"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44805,7 +44805,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h  Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(?i)(rundll32\.exe.{0,4}$)" | `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process with plugininit parameter. This technique is commonly seen in IcedID malware to execute its initial dll stager to download another payload to the compromised machine.
@@ -44817,7 +44817,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = third party application may used this dll ex
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44831,7 +44831,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IcedID"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "92d51712-ee29-11eb-b1ae-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44852,7 +44852,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*PluginInit* by  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_plugininit_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe executing a DLL function name, Start and StartW, on the command line that is commonly observed with Cobalt Strike x86 and x64 DLL payloads. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. Typically, the DLL will be written and loaded from a world writeable path or user location. In most instances it will not have a valid certificate (Unsigned). During investigation, review the parent process and other parallel application execution. Capture and triage the DLL in question. In the instance of Cobalt Strike, rundll32.exe is the default process it opens and injects shellcode into. This default process can be changed, but typically is not.
@@ -44864,7 +44864,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, some legitimate applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44878,7 +44878,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Cobalt Strike", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "Trickbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9319dda5-73f2-4d43-a85a-67ce961bddb7", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44899,7 +44899,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*start* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_rundll32_startw_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic, "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", detects the registration of scheduled tasks aimed to execute a binary or script from public directories, a behavior often associated with malware deployment. It utilizes the Sysmon Event ID 1 data source, searching for instances where schtasks.exe is connected with the directories users\public, \programdata\, or \windows\temp and involves the /create command.\
@@ -44913,7 +44913,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The main source of false positives could be
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44927,7 +44927,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "CISA AA23-347A", "DarkCrystal RAT", "Living Off The Land", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Scheduled Tasks", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7feb7972-7ac3-11eb-bac8-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44942,7 +44942,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process=*\\users\\public\\* OR Processes.process=*\\programdata\\* OR Processes.process=*windows\\temp*)  Processes.process=*/create* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies searchprotocolhost.exe with no command line arguments. It is unusual for searchprotocolhost.exe to execute with no command line arguments present. This particular behavior is common with malicious software, including Cobalt Strike. During investigation, identify any network connections and parallel processes. Identify any suspicious module loads related to credential dumping or file writes. searchprotocolhost.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64.
@@ -44954,7 +44954,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives may be present in sm
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -44968,7 +44968,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Cobalt Strike", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f52d2db8-31f9-4aa7-a176-25779effe55c", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -44989,7 +44989,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=searchprotocolhost.exe by _time span=1h  Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | regex process="(?i)(searchprotocolhost\.exe.{0,4}$)" | `suspicious_searchprotocolhost_no_command_line_arguments_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic identifies the use of a SQLite3 querying the MacOS preferences to identify the original URL the pkg was downloaded from. This particular behavior is common with MacOS adware-malicious software. Upon triage, review other processes in parallel for suspicious activity. Identify any recent package installations. 
@@ -45001,7 +45001,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-02-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-02-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -45015,7 +45015,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Silver Sparrow"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1074"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e1997b2e-655f-4561-82fd-aeba8e1c1a86", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45036,7 +45036,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sqlite3 Processes.process=*LSQuarantine* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_sqlite3_lsquarantine_behavior_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = As part of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) exploitation chain, adversaries will need to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) on behalf of the newly created and renamed computer account. The TGT request will be preceded by a computer account name event. This analytic leverages Event Id 4781, `The name of an account was changed` and event Id 4768 `A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested` to correlate a sequence of events where the new computer account on event id 4781 matches the request account on event id 4768. This behavior could represent an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 for privilege escalation.
@@ -45048,7 +45048,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A computer account name change event inmedia
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -45057,7 +45057,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d77d349e-6269-11ec-9cfe-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45072,7 +45072,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4781 OldTargetUserName="*$" NewTargetUserName!="*$") OR (EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!="*$") | eval RenamedComputerAccount = coalesce(NewTargetUserName, TargetUserName) | transaction RenamedComputerAccount startswith=(EventCode=4781) endswith=(EventCode=4768) | eval short_lived=case((duration<2),"TRUE") | search short_lived = TRUE | table _time, Computer, EventCode, TargetUserName, RenamedComputerAccount, short_lived | rename Computer as dest | `suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious creation of .wav file in appdata folder. This behavior was seen in Remcos RAT malware where it put the audio recording in the appdata\audio folde as part of data collection. this recording can be send to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration to the compromised machine. creation of wav files in this folder path is not a ussual disk place used by user to save audio format file.
@@ -45084,7 +45084,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -45098,7 +45098,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5be109e6-1ac5-11ec-b421-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45119,7 +45119,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=*.exe Processes.process_path="*\\appdata\\Roaming\\*" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | join proc_guid, _time [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.wav") Filesystem.file_path = "*\\appdata\\Roaming\\*" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields file_name file_path process_name process_path process dest file_create_time _time proc_guid] | `suspicious_wav_file_in_appdata_folder_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The wevtutil.exe application is the windows event log utility. This searches for wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing the application, security, setup, trace or system event logs.
@@ -45131,7 +45131,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -45145,7 +45145,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Clop Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Windows Log Manipulation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.001", "T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45166,7 +45166,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wevtutil.exe Processes.process IN ("* cl *", "*clear-log*") (Processes.process="*System*" OR Processes.process="*Security*" OR Processes.process="*Setup*" OR Processes.process="*Application*" OR Processes.process="*trace*") by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule]
+[ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects when a process other than explorer.exe writes to the Windows Recycle Bin to detect potential threats earlier and mitigate the risks. This detection is made by a Splunk query that utilizes the Endpoint.Filesystem data model and the Endpoint.Processes data model. The query looks for any process writing to the "*$Recycle.Bin*" file path, excluding explorer.exe. This detection is important because it suggests that an attacker is attempting to hide their activities by using the Recycle Bin, which can lead to data theft, ransomware, or other damaging outcomes. Detecting writes to the Recycle Bin by a process other than explorer.exe can help to investigate and determine if the activity is malicious or benign. False positives might occur since there might be legitimate uses of the Recycle Bin by processes other than explorer.exe. Next steps include reviewing the process writing to the Recycle Bin and any relevant on-disk artifacts upon triage.
@@ -45178,7 +45178,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Because the Recycle Bin is a hidden folder i
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -45192,7 +45192,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging", "PlugX"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b5541828-8ffd-4070-9d95-b3da4de924cb", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45213,7 +45213,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = "*$Recycle.Bin*" by Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Filesystem")` | join  process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != "explorer.exe" by Processes.process_id Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | table user process_name process_id dest] | `suspicious_writes_to_windows_recycle_bin_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
+[ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is designed to spot instances of 'svchost.exe' initiating a Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) execution process. Often, adversaries manipulate Task Scheduler to execute code on remote endpoints, resulting in the spawning of a malicious command as a child process of 'svchost.exe'. By tracking child processes of 'svchost.exe' that align with the LOLBAS project, potential lateral movement activity can be detected. The analytic examines process details, including the process name, parent process, and command-line executions. A comprehensive list of LOLBAS processes is included in the search parameters. Although the analytic might catch legitimate applications exhibiting this behavior, these instances should be filtered accordingly. The findings from this analytic offer valuable insight into potentially malicious activities on an endpoint.
@@ -45225,7 +45225,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this beh
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -45239,7 +45239,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Living Off The Land", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "09e5c72a-4c0d-11ec-aa29-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45260,7 +45260,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `svchost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule]
+[ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious dxdiag.exe process command-line execution. Dxdiag is used to collect the system info of the target host. This technique has been used by Remcos RATS, various actors, and other malware to collect information as part of the recon or collection phase of an attack. This behavior should rarely be seen in a corporate network, but this command line can be used by a network administrator to audit host machine specifications. Thus in some rare cases, this detection will contain false positives in its results. To triage further, analyze what commands were passed after it pipes out the result to a file for further processing.
@@ -45272,7 +45272,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This commandline can be used by a network ad
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -45281,7 +45281,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f92d74f2-4921-11ec-b685-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45296,7 +45296,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_dxdiag` AND Processes.process = "* /t *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_info_gathering_using_dxdiag_application_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule]
+[ESCU - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Detect system information discovery techniques used by attackers to understand configurations of the system to further exploit it.
@@ -45308,7 +45308,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators debugging servers
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -45322,7 +45322,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Discovery Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8e99f89e-ae58-4ebc-bf52-ae0b1a277e72", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45343,7 +45343,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="*wmic* qfe*" OR Processes.process=*systeminfo* OR Processes.process=*hostname*) by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eventstats dc(process) as dc_processes_by_dest by dest | where dc_processes_by_dest > 2 | stats values(process) as process min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user, dest parent_process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_information_discovery_detection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule]
+[ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for system processes that typically execute from `C:\Windows\System32\` or `C:\Windows\SysWOW64`.  This may indicate a malicious process that is trying to hide as a legitimate process.\
@@ -45359,7 +45359,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection may require tuning based on t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -45373,7 +45373,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Qakbot", "Ransomware", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes", "Windows Error Reporting Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a34aae96-ccf8-4aef-952c-3ea21444444d", "detection_version": "6"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45388,7 +45388,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !="C:\\Windows\\System32*" Processes.process_path !="C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `is_windows_system_file_macro` | `system_processes_run_from_unexpected_locations_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Query - Rule]
+[ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `query.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to discover the logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `query.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -45400,7 +45400,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Query - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -45409,7 +45409,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Query - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ad03bfcf-8a91-4bc2-a500-112993deba87", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45424,7 +45424,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="query.exe") (Processes.process=*user*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_query_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule]
+[ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` without any arguments. This windows native binary prints out the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage `whoami.exe` to identify system users on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -45436,7 +45436,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -45445,7 +45445,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "CISA AA23-347A", "Qakbot", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Winter Vivern"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "894fc43e-6f50-47d5-a68b-ee9ee23e18f4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45460,7 +45460,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="whoami.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `system_user_discovery_with_whoami_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of time provider registry for persistence and autostart. This technique can allow the attacker to persist on the compromised host and autostart as soon as the machine boot up. This TTP can be a good indicator of suspicious behavior since this registry is not commonly modified by normal user or even an admin.
@@ -45472,7 +45472,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -45486,7 +45486,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Privilege Escalation", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.003", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5ba382c4-2105-11ec-8d8f-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45507,7 +45507,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders*") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `time_provider_persistence_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule]
+[ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = this search is to detect potential trickbot infection through the create/connected named pipe to the system. This technique is used by trickbot to communicate to its c2 to post or get command during infection.
@@ -45519,7 +45519,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -45533,7 +45533,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1804b0a4-a682-11eb-8f68-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45554,7 +45554,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode IN (17,18) PipeName="\\pipe\\*lacesomepipe" | stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by dest user_id EventCode PipeName signature Image process_id | rename Image as process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `trickbot_named_pipe_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule]
+[ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious loaded unsigned dll by MMC.exe application. This technique is commonly seen in attacker that tries to bypassed UAC feature or gain privilege escalation. This is done by modifying some CLSID registry that will trigger the mmc.exe to load the dll path
@@ -45566,7 +45566,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown. all of the dll loaded by mmc.exe is
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-07-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-07-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -45580,7 +45580,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548", "T1218.014"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7f04349c-e30d-11eb-bc7f-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45601,7 +45601,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7  ImageLoaded = "*.dll" Image = "*\\mmc.exe" Signed=false Company != "Microsoft Corporation" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded Signed ProcessId OriginalFileName dest EventCode Company | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule]
+[ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC.
@@ -45613,7 +45613,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = not so common. but 3rd part app may load thi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -45627,7 +45627,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["LockBit Ransomware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2bcccd20-fc2b-11eb-8d22-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45648,7 +45648,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\colorui.dll" process_name != "colorcpl.exe" NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\*", "*\\program files*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest user_id EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule]
+[ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious un-installation of application using msiexec. This technique was seen in conti leak tool and script where it tries to uninstall AV product using this commandline. This commandline to uninstall product is not a common practice in enterprise network.
@@ -45660,7 +45660,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -45674,7 +45674,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007", "T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1fca2b28-f922-11eb-b2dd-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45695,7 +45695,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process= "* /qn *" Processes.process= "*/X*" Processes.process= "*REBOOT=*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uninstall_app_using_msiexec_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule]
+[ESCU - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process performing an outbound connection on port 88 used by default by the network authentication protocol Kerberos. Typically, on a regular Windows endpoint, only the lsass.exe process is the one tasked with connecting to the Kerberos Distribution Center to obtain Kerberos tickets. Identifying an unknown process using this protocol may be evidence of an adversary abusing the Kerberos protocol.
@@ -45707,7 +45707,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Custom applications may leverage the Kerbero
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -45721,7 +45721,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1550"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c91a0852-9fbb-11ec-af44-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45742,7 +45742,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=lsass.exe by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join  process_id dest [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 88 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.process_id  All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as dest ] |  table _time dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port | `unknown_process_using_the_kerberos_protocol_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule]
+[ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Attackers often disable security tools to avoid detection. This search looks for the usage of process `fltMC.exe` to unload a Sysmon Driver that will stop sysmon from collecting the data.
@@ -45754,7 +45754,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown at the moment
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -45768,7 +45768,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Disabling Security Tools"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e5928ff3-23eb-4d8b-b8a4-dcbc844fdfbe", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45789,7 +45789,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime values(Processes.process) as process max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fltMC.exe AND Processes.process=*unload* AND Processes.process=*SysmonDrv*  by Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`unload_sysmon_filter_driver_filter`| table firstTime lastTime dest user count process_name process_id parent_process_name process
 
-[ES Content Updates - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify suspicious PowerShell execution. Script Block Logging captures the command sent to PowerShell, the full command to be executed. Upon enabling, logs will output to Windows event logs. Dependent upon volume, enable on critical endpoints or all.\
@@ -45807,7 +45807,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Potential for some third party applications
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -45821,7 +45821,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562", "T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a21e3484-c94d-11eb-b55b-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45845,7 +45845,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = *system.management.automation.amsi* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `unloading_amsi_via_reflection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule]
+[ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify an unusual number of computer service ticket requests from one source. When a domain joined endpoint connects to a remote endpoint, it first will request a Kerberos Ticket with the computer name as the Service Name. An endpoint requesting a large number of computer service tickets for different endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc. The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of service requests. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time,  the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises. 
@@ -45857,7 +45857,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = An single endpoint requesting a large number
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -45866,7 +45866,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ac3b81c0-52f4-11ec-ac44-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45881,7 +45881,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 Service_Name="*$" Account_Name!="*$*" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Service_Name) AS unique_targets values(Service_Name) as host_targets by _time, Client_Address, Account_Name | eventstats avg(unique_targets) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_targets) as comp_std by Client_Address, Account_Name | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_targets >10 and unique_targets >= upperBound, 1, 0) | `unusual_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule]
+[ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic leverages Kerberos Event 4769, A Kerberos service ticket was requested, to identify a potential kerberoasting attack against Active Directory networks. Kerberoasting allows an adversary to request kerberos tickets for domain accounts typically used as service accounts and attempt to crack them offline allowing them to obtain privileged access to the domain.\
@@ -45895,7 +45895,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = An single endpoint requesting a large number
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -45909,7 +45909,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "eb3e6702-8936-11ec-98fe-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45924,7 +45924,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 ServiceName!="*$" TicketEncryptionType=0x17 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(ServiceName) AS unique_services values(ServiceName) as requested_services by _time, src | eventstats avg(unique_services) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_services) as comp_std by src | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_services > 2 and unique_services >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `unusual_number_of_kerberos_service_tickets_requested_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule]
+[ESCU - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following hunting analytic leverages Event ID 4624, `An account was successfully logged on`, to identify an unusual number of remote authentication attempts coming from one source. An endpoint authenticating to a large number of remote endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc. The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual high number of authentication events.To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time,  the calculation of the `upperBound` field as well as the Outlier calculation.This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises. 
@@ -45936,7 +45936,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = An single endpoint authenticating to a large
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -45945,7 +45945,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "acb5dc74-5324-11ec-a36d-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -45960,7 +45960,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 Account_Name!="*$" | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(ComputerName) AS unique_targets values(ComputerName) as target_hosts by _time, Source_Network_Address, Source_Account | eventstats avg(unique_targets) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_targets) as comp_std by Source_Network_Address, Source_Account | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_targets >10 and unique_targets >= upperBound, 1, 0) | `unusual_number_of_remote_endpoint_authentication_events_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule]
+[ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects command lines that are extremely long, which might be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts because attackers often use obfuscated or complex command lines to hide their actions and evade detection. This helps to mitigate the risks associated with long command lines to enhance your overall security posture and reduce the impact of attacks. This detection is important because it suggests that an attacker might be attempting to execute a malicious command or payload on the host, which can lead to various damaging outcomes such as data theft, ransomware, or further compromise of the system. False positives might occur since legitimate processes or commands can sometimes result in long command lines. Next steps include conducting extensive triage and investigation to differentiate between legitimate and malicious activities. Review the source of the command line and the command itself during the triage. Additionally, capture and inspect any relevant on-disk artifacts and review concurrent processes to identify the source of the attack. 
@@ -45972,7 +45972,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications start with long
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-12-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -45986,7 +45986,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 70, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c77162d3-f93c-45cc-80c8-22f6a4264e7f", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46001,7 +46001,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|  eval processlen=len(process) | eventstats stdev(processlen) as stdev, avg(processlen) as avg by dest | stats max(processlen) as maxlen, values(stdev) as stdevperhost, values(avg) as avgperhost by dest, user, process_name, process | `unusually_long_command_line_filter` |eval threshold = 3 | where maxlen > ((threshold*stdevperhost) + avgperhost)
 
-[ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule]
+[ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Command lines that are extremely long may be indicative of malicious activity on your hosts. This search leverages the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to help identify command lines with lengths that are unusual for a given user. 
@@ -46013,7 +46013,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate applications use long comman
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-05-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-05-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -46027,7 +46027,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "Ransomware", "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "57edaefa-a73b-45e5-bbae-f39c1473f941", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46042,7 +46042,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval processlen=len(process) | search user!=unknown | apply cmdline_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename "IsOutlier(processlen)" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | table firstTime lastTime user dest process_name process processlen count | `unusually_long_command_line___mltk_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that leverage PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -46054,7 +46054,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -46063,7 +46063,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0cdf318b-a0dd-47d7-b257-c621c0247de8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46078,7 +46078,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="powershell.exe") (Processes.process="*$env:UserName*" OR Processes.process="*[System.Environment]::UserName*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
+[ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the use of PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage this method to identify the logged user on a compromised endpoint for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -46090,7 +46090,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -46099,7 +46099,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "77f41d9e-b8be-47e3-ab35-5776f5ec1d20", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46114,7 +46114,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*$env:UserName*" OR ScriptBlockText = "*[System.Environment]::UserName*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | rename Computer as dest, user_id as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `user_discovery_with_env_vars_powershell_script_block_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - USN Journal Deletion - Rule]
+[ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The fsutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows utility used to perform tasks related to the file allocation table (FAT) and NTFS file systems. The update sequence number (USN) change journal provides a log of all changes made to the files on the disk. This search looks for fsutil.exe deleting the USN journal.
@@ -46126,7 +46126,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - USN Journal Deletion - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -46140,7 +46140,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - USN Journal Deletion - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Log Manipulation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b6e0ff70-b122-4227-9368-4cf322ab43c3", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46161,7 +46161,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=fsutil.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search process="*deletejournal*" AND process="*usn*" | `usn_journal_deletion_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule]
+[ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious wscript commandline to execute vbscript. This technique was seen in several malware to execute malicious vbs file using wscript application. commonly vbs script is associated to cscript process and this can be a technique to evade process parent child detections or even some av script emulation system.
@@ -46173,7 +46173,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -46187,7 +46187,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AsyncRAT", "FIN7", "Remcos"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "35159940-228f-11ec-8a49-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46208,7 +46208,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = "wscript.exe" AND Processes.parent_process = "*//e:vbscript*") OR (Processes.process_name = "wscript.exe" AND Processes.process = "*//e:vbscript*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vbscript_execution_using_wscript_app_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a possible abuse of verclsid to execute malicious file through generate CLSID. This process is a normal application of windows to verify the CLSID COM object before it is instantiated by Windows Explorer. This hunting query can be a good pivot point to analyze what is he CLSID or COM object pointing too to check if it is a valid application or not.
@@ -46220,7 +46220,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = windows can used this application for its no
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -46229,7 +46229,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.012", "T1218"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "61e9a56a-20fa-11ec-8ba3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46244,7 +46244,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.process_id) as process_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_verclsid` AND Processes.process="*/S*" Processes.process="*/C*" AND  Processes.process="*{*" AND Processes.process="*}*" by  Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `verclsid_clsid_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule]
+[ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This query identifies a shell, PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe, spawning from W3WP.exe, or IIS. In addition to IIS logs, this behavior with an EDR product will capture potential webshell activity, similar to the HAFNIUM Group abusing CVEs, on publicly available Exchange mail servers. During triage, review the parent process and child process of the shell being spawned. Review the command-line arguments and any file modifications that may occur. Identify additional parallel process, child processes, that may highlight further commands executed. After triaging, work to contain the threat and patch the system that is vulnerable.
@@ -46256,7 +46256,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Baseline your environment before production.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -46270,7 +46270,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "CISA AA22-257A", "CISA AA22-264A", "Data Destruction", "Flax Typhoon", "HAFNIUM Group", "Hermetic Wiper", "ProxyNotShell", "ProxyShell", "WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-31207"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0f03423c-7c6a-11eb-bc47-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46291,7 +46291,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe AND `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `w3wp_spawning_shell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule]
+[ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for flags passed to wbadmin.exe (Windows Backup Administrator Tool) that delete backup files. This is typically used by ransomware to prevent recovery.
@@ -46303,7 +46303,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may modify the boot configura
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -46317,7 +46317,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Chaos Ransomware", "Prestige Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1490"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cd5aed7e-5cea-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46338,7 +46338,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wbadmin.exe Processes.process="*delete*" AND (Processes.process="*catalog*" OR Processes.process="*systemstatebackup*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wbadmin_delete_system_backups_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a potential suspicious process loading a COM object from wbemprox.dll or faskprox.dll. The Microsoft Component Object Model (COM) is a platform-independent, distributed, object-oriented system for creating binary software components that can interact. This feature is being abused by several threat actors, adversaries or even red teamers to gain privilege escalation or even to evade detections. This TTP is a good indicator that a process is loading possible known .dll modules that were known for its COM object.
@@ -46350,7 +46350,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = legitimate process that are not in the excep
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-06-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -46364,7 +46364,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["LockBit Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Revil Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9d911ce0-c3be-11eb-b177-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46385,7 +46385,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7  ImageLoaded IN ("*\\fastprox.dll", "*\\wbemprox.dll", "*\\wbemcomn.dll") NOT (process_name IN ("wmiprvse.exe", "WmiApSrv.exe", "unsecapp.exe")) NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\*","*\\program files*", "*\\wbem\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wbemprox_com_object_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule]
+[ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is designed to detect suspicious wermgr.exe process that tries to connect to known IP web services. This technique is know for trickbot and other trojan spy malware to recon the infected machine and look for its ip address without so much finger print on the commandline process. Since wermgr.exe is designed for error handling process of windows it is really suspicious that this process is trying to connect to this IP web services cause that maybe cause of some malicious code injection.
@@ -46397,7 +46397,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -46411,7 +46411,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1590", "T1590.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ed313326-a0f9-11eb-a89c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46432,7 +46432,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode =22 process_name = wermgr.exe QueryName IN ("*wtfismyip.com", "*checkip.amazonaws.com", "*ipecho.net", "*ipinfo.io", "*api.ipify.org", "*icanhazip.com", "*ip.anysrc.com","*api.ip.sb", "ident.me", "www.myexternalip.com", "*zen.spamhaus.org", "*cbl.abuseat.org", "*b.barracudacentral.org","*dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net", "*spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net") |  stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image process_name ProcessId QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults EventCode Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_connecting_to_ip_check_web_services_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule]
+[ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = this search is designed to detect potential malicious wermgr.exe process that drops or create executable file. Since wermgr.exe is an application trigger when error encountered in a process, it is really un ussual to this process to drop executable file. This technique is commonly seen in trickbot malware where it injects it code to this process to execute it malicious behavior like downloading other payload
@@ -46444,7 +46444,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -46458,7 +46458,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Trickbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ab3bcce0-a105-11eb-973c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46479,7 +46479,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=11 process_name = "wermgr.exe" TargetFilename = "*.exe" | stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by  Image TargetFilename process_name dest EventCode ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_create_executable_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is designed to detect suspicious cmd and powershell process spawned by wermgr.exe process. This suspicious behavior are commonly seen in code injection technique technique like trickbot to execute a shellcode, dll modules to run malicious behavior.
@@ -46491,7 +46491,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -46505,7 +46505,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Qakbot", "Trickbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e8fc95bc-a107-11eb-a978-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46526,7 +46526,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = "wermgr.exe" `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process_name  Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id  Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wermgr_process_spawned_cmd_or_powershell_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of wget on Linux or MacOS attempting to download a file from a remote source and pipe it to bash. This is typically found with coinminers and most recently with CVE-2021-44228, a vulnerability in Log4j.
@@ -46538,7 +46538,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however f
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -46552,7 +46552,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "35682718-5a85-11ec-b8f7-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46573,7 +46573,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wget (Processes.process="*-q *" OR Processes.process="*--quiet*"  AND Processes.process="*-O- *") OR (Processes.process="*|*" AND Processes.process="*bash*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wget_download_and_bash_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Abused Web Services - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Abused Web Services - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects a suspicious process making a DNS query via known, abused text-paste web services, VoIP, internet via secure tunneling,instant messaging, and digital distribution platforms used to download external files. This technique is abused by adversaries, malware actors, and red teams to download a malicious file on the target host. This is a good TTP indicator for possible initial access techniques. A user will experience false positives if the following instant messaging is allowed or common applications like telegram or discord are allowed in the corporate network.
@@ -46585,7 +46585,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Noise and false positive can be seen if the
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Abused Web Services - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Abused Web Services - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -46599,7 +46599,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Abused Web Services - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Abused Web Services - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NjRAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1102"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "01f0aef4-8591-4daa-a53d-0ed49823b681", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46620,7 +46620,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*pastebin*",""*textbin*"", "*ngrok.io*", "*discord*", "*duckdns.org*", "*pasteio.com*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_abused_web_services_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious process enabling the "SeDebugPrivilege" privilege token. SeDebugPrivilege allows a process to inspect and adjust the memory of other processes, and has long been a security concern. SeDebugPrivilege allows the token bearer to access any process or thread, regardless of security descriptors, per Palantir. This technique is abused by adversaries to gain debug privileges with their malicious software to be able to access or debug a process to dump credentials or to inject malicious code.
@@ -46632,7 +46632,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some native binaries and browser application
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -46646,7 +46646,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AsyncRAT", "Brute Ratel C4", "CISA AA23-347A", "DarkGate Malware", "PlugX"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134.002", "T1134"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6ece9ed0-5f92-4315-889d-48560472b188", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46661,7 +46661,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4703 EnabledPrivilegeList = "*SeDebugPrivilege*" AND NOT(ProcessName IN ("*\\Program File*", "*\\System32\\lsass.exe*", "*\\SysWOW64\\lsass.exe*", "*\\SysWOW64\\svchost.exe*", "*\\System32\\svchost.exe*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer ProcessName ProcessId SubjectDomainName SubjectUserName SubjectUserSid TargetUserName TargetLogonId TargetDomainName EnabledPrivilegeList action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_access_token_manipulation_sedebugprivilege_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process requesting access to winlogon.exe attempting to duplicate its handle. This technique was seen in several adversaries to gain privileges for their process. Winlogon.exe is the common targeted process of this technique because it contains high privileges and security tokens.
@@ -46673,7 +46673,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate applications will
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -46682,7 +46682,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brute Ratel C4"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134.001", "T1134"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dda126d7-1d99-4f0b-b72a-4c14031f9398", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46697,7 +46697,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage IN("*\\system32\\winlogon.exe*", "*\\SysWOW64\\winlogon.exe*") GrantedAccess = 0x1040 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage SourceProcessGUID TargetProcessGUID SourceProcessId TargetProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_access_token_manipulation_winlogon_duplicate_token_handle_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process requesting access in winlogon.exe to duplicate its handle with a non-common or public process source path. This technique was seen where adversaries attempt to gain privileges to their process. This duplicate handle access technique, may refer to a malicious process duplicating the process token of winlogon.exe and using it to a new process instance. Winlogon.exe is the common targeted process of this technique because it contains high privileges and security tokens.
@@ -46709,7 +46709,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate applications will
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -46723,7 +46723,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brute Ratel C4"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134.001", "T1134"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b8f7ed6b-0556-4c84-bffd-839c262b0278", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46738,7 +46738,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=10  TargetImage IN("*\\system32\\winlogon.exe*", "*\\SysWOW64\\winlogon.exe*") AND GrantedAccess = 0x1040 AND NOT (SourceImage IN("C:\\Windows\\*", "C:\\Program File*", "%systemroot%\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer SourceImage TargetImage SourceProcessGUID TargetProcessGUID SourceProcessId TargetProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace | rename Computer as dest| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_access_token_winlogon_duplicate_handle_in_uncommon_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify the execution of the PowerView PowerShell commandlet Get-NetUser. In the context of PowerView's Get-NetUser cmdlet as a filter or parameter to query Active Directory user accounts that are not disabled. The full script block text based on the CISA-23-347A advisory is "Get-NetUser -UACFilter NOT_ACCOUNTDISABLE". Utilize this query to identify potential suspicious activity of user account enumeration.
@@ -46750,7 +46750,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerView for le
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -46759,7 +46759,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "eddbf5ba-b89e-47ca-995e-2d259804e55e", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46774,7 +46774,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104  ScriptBlockText = "*Get-NetUser*" ScriptBlockText = "*NOT_ACCOUNTDISABLE*" ScriptBlockText = "*-UACFilter*" | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_account_discovery_for_none_disable_user_account_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery for Sam Account Name - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Account Discovery for Sam Account Name - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Event ID 4104 to identify the execution of the PowerView powershell commandlets Get-NetUser. In the context of PowerView's Get-NetUser cmdlet as a filter or parameter to query Active Directory user account's "samccountname". This hunting query is a good pivot to look for suspicious process or malware that gather user account information in a host or within network system.
@@ -46786,7 +46786,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerView for le
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery for Sam Account Name - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Account Discovery for Sam Account Name - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -46800,7 +46800,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery for Sam Account Name - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Account Discovery for Sam Account Name - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "69934363-e1dd-4c49-8651-9d7663dd4d2f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46815,7 +46815,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104  ScriptBlockText = "*Get-NetUser*" ScriptBlockText IN ("*samaccountname*", "*pwdlastset*") | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_account_discovery_for_sam_account_name_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery With NetUser PreauthNotRequire - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Account Discovery With NetUser PreauthNotRequire - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Event ID 4104 to identify the execution of the PowerView powershell commandlets Get-NetUser. This technique was observed in the context of PowerView's Get-NetUser cmdlet as a filter or parameter to query Active Directory user accounts that do not require preauthentication for Kerberos. This hunting query is a good pivot to look for suspicious process or malware that gather user account information in a host or within network system.
@@ -46827,7 +46827,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerView for le
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery With NetUser PreauthNotRequire - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Account Discovery With NetUser PreauthNotRequire - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -46836,7 +46836,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery With NetUser PreauthNotRequire - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Account Discovery With NetUser PreauthNotRequire - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cf056b65-44b2-4d32-9172-d6b6f081a376", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46851,7 +46851,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104  ScriptBlockText = "*Get-NetUser*" ScriptBlockText = "*-PreauthNotRequire*" | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_account_discovery_with_netuser_preauthnotrequire_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD Abnormal Object Access Activity - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD Abnormal Object Access Activity - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Windows Active Directory contains numerous objects. A statistically significant increase in access to these objects may be evidence of attacker enumeration of Active Directory.
@@ -46863,7 +46863,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Service accounts or applications that routin
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Abnormal Object Access Activity - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD Abnormal Object Access Activity - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -46877,7 +46877,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Abnormal Object Access Activity - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AD Abnormal Object Access Activity - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "71b289db-5f2c-4c43-8256-8bf26ae7324a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46892,7 +46892,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4662 | stats min(_time) AS firstTime, max(_time) AS lastTime, dc(ObjectName) AS ObjectName_count, values(ObjectType) AS ObjectType, latest(Computer) AS dest count BY SubjectUserName | eventstats avg(ObjectName_count) AS average stdev(ObjectName_count) AS standarddev | eval limit = round((average+(standarddev*3)),0), user = SubjectUserName | where ObjectName_count > limit | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_ad_abnormal_object_access_activity_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD AdminSDHolder ACL Modified - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD AdminSDHolder ACL Modified - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the modification of the Access Control List for the AdminSDHolder object within a Windows domain. Specifically, the detection triggers on the addition of a new rule to the existing ACL. AdminSDHolder is an object located in the System Partition in Active Directory and is used as a security template for objects that are members of certain privileged groups. Objects in these groups are enumerated and any objects with security descriptors that dont match the AdminSDHolder ACL are flagged for updating. The Security Descriptor propagator (SDProp) process runs every 60 minutes on the PDC Emulator and re-stamps the object Access Control List (ACL) with the security permissions set on the AdminSDHolder. An adversary who has obtained privileged access to a Windows Domain may modify the AdminSDHolder ACL to establish persistence and allow an unprivileged user to take control of a domain.
@@ -46904,7 +46904,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Adding new users or groups to the AdminSDHol
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD AdminSDHolder ACL Modified - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD AdminSDHolder ACL Modified - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -46918,7 +46918,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AD AdminSDHolder ACL Modified - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AD AdminSDHolder ACL Modified - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "00d877c3-7b7b-443d-9562-6b231e2abab9", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46939,7 +46939,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName=nTSecurityDescriptor OperationType="%%14674" ObjectDN="CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System*" | rex field=AttributeValue max_match=10000 "A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;(?P<added_user_sid>S-1-[0-59]-\d{2}-\d{8,10}-\d{8,10}-\d{8,10}-[1-9]\d{3})\)" | stats values(added_user_sid) by _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, ObjectDN | `windows_ad_adminsdholder_acl_modified_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic looks for changes to the sIDHistory AD attribute of user or computer objects within different domains. The SID history AD attribute allows users to inherit permissions from a separate AD account without group changes. Initially developed for access continuity when migrating user accounts to different domains, this attribute can also be abused by adversaries for inter-domain privilege escalation and persistence.
@@ -46951,7 +46951,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Domain mergers and migrations may generate l
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -46965,7 +46965,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134.005", "T1134"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "41bbb371-28ba-439c-bb5c-d9930c28365d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -46986,7 +46986,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4742 OR EventCode=4738) NOT SidHistory IN ("%%1793", -) | rex field=SidHistory "(^%{|^)(?P<SidHistoryMatch>.*)(\-|\\\)" | rex field=TargetSid "^(?P<TargetSidmatch>.*)(\-|\\\)" | where SidHistoryMatch!=TargetSidmatch AND SidHistoryMatch!=TargetDomainName | rename TargetSid as userSid | table _time action status host user userSid SidHistory Logon_ID src_user | `windows_ad_cross_domain_sid_history_addition_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the disabling of audit policies on a domain controller. The detection is made by identifying changes made to audit policies and checks for the removal of success or failure auditing, which are common indicators of policy tampering. The detection is important because it indicates that an attacker has gained access to the domain controller and is attempting to evade detection and cover up malicious activity. The impact of such an attack can be severe, including data theft, privilege escalation, and compromise of the entire network. False positives might occur since legitimate changes to audit policies might also trigger the analytic. Upon triage, review the audit policy change event and investigate the source of the change. Additionally, you must capture and inspect any relevant on-disk artifacts and review concurrent processes to identify the attack source."
@@ -46998,7 +46998,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -47012,7 +47012,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fc3ccef1-60a4-4239-bd66-b279511b4d14", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47033,7 +47033,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4719 (AuditPolicyChanges IN ("%%8448","%%8450","%%8448, %%8450") OR Changes IN ("Failure removed","Success removed","Success removed, Failure removed")) dest_category="domain_controller"| replace "%%8448" with "Success removed", "%%8450" with "Failure removed", "%%8448, %%8450" with "Success removed, Failure removed" in AuditPolicyChanges | eval AuditPolicyChanges=coalesce(AuditPolicyChanges,Changes), SubcategoryGuid=coalesce(SubcategoryGuid,Subcategory_GUID) | stats min(_time) as _time values(host) as dest by AuditPolicyChanges SubcategoryGuid | lookup advanced_audit_policy_guids GUID as SubcategoryGuid OUTPUT Category SubCategory | `windows_ad_domain_controller_audit_policy_disabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD Domain Controller Promotion - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD Domain Controller Promotion - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies a genuine DC promotion event. Identifying when a computer assigns itself the necessary SPNs to function as a domain controller. Note these events are triggered on the existing domain controllers, not the newly joined domain controller. This detection will serve to identify rogue DCs added to the network. There are 2x detections within this analytic story which identify DCShadow attacks, if you do not currently possess the logging for these detections, remove the where clause within this detection to identify DCShadow activity.
@@ -47045,7 +47045,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Domain Controller Promotion - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD Domain Controller Promotion - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -47059,7 +47059,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Domain Controller Promotion - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AD Domain Controller Promotion - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1207"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e633a0ef-2a6e-4ed7-b925-5ff999e5d1f0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47080,7 +47080,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4742 ServicePrincipalNames IN ("*E3514235-4B06-11D1-AB04-00C04FC2DCD2/*","*GC/*")| stats min(_time) as _time latest(ServicePrincipalNames) as ServicePrincipalNames,values(signature) as signature, values(src_user) as src_user, values(user) as user by Logon_ID, dvc| where src_user=user| rename Logon_ID as TargetLogonId, user as dest | appendpipe [| map search="search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$" | fields - dest, dvc, signature]| stats min(_time) as _time, values(TargetUserSid) as TargetUserSid, values(Target_Domain) as Target_Domain, values(user) as user, values(status) as status, values(src_category) as src_category, values(src_ip) as src_ip values(ServicePrincipalNames) as ServicePrincipalNames values(signature) as signature values(dest) as dest values(dvc) as dvc by TargetLogonId | eval dest=trim(dest,"$") | `windows_ad_domain_controller_promotion_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD Domain Replication ACL Addition - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD Domain Replication ACL Addition - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects the addition of the permissions necessary to perform a DCSync attack. In order to replicate AD objects, the initiating user or computer must have the following permissions on the domain. - DS-Replication-Get-Changes - DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All Certain Sync operations may require the additional permission of DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set. By default, adding DCSync permissions via the Powerview Add-ObjectACL operation adds all 3. This alert identifies where this trifecta has been met, and also where just the base level requirements have been met. 
@@ -47092,7 +47092,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = When there is a change to nTSecurityDescript
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Domain Replication ACL Addition - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD Domain Replication ACL Addition - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -47106,7 +47106,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Windows AD Domain Replication ACL Addition - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Windows AD Domain Replication ACL Addition - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1484"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8c372853-f459-4995-afdc-280c114d33ab", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47127,7 +47127,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security`  | rex field=AttributeValue max_match=10000 \"OA;;CR;89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c;;(?P<DSRGetChangesFiltered_user_sid>S-1-[0-59]-\d{2}-\d{8,10}-\d{8,10}-\d{8,10}-[1-9]\d{3})\)\"| table _time dest src_user DSRGetChanges_user_sid DSRGetChangesAll_user_sid DSRGetChangesFiltered_user_sid| mvexpand DSRGetChanges_user_sid| eval minDCSyncPermissions=if(DSRGetChanges_user_sid=DSRGetChangesAll_user_sid,\"true\",\"false\"), fullSet=if(DSRGetChanges_user_sid=DSRGetChangesAll_user_sid AND DSRGetChanges_user_sid=DSRGetChangesFiltered_user_sid,\"true\",\"false\")| where minDCSyncPermissions=\"true\" | lookup identity_lookup_expanded  objectSid as DSRGetChanges_user_sid OUTPUT sAMAccountName as user | rename DSRGetChanges_user_sid as userSid | stats min(_time) as _time values(user) as user by dest src_user userSid minDCSyncPermissions fullSet| `windows_ad_domain_replication_acl_addition_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Aside from being used to promote genuine domain controllers, the DSRM (Directory Services Restore Mode) account can be used to persist within a Domain. A DC can be configured to allow the DSRM account to logon & be used in the same way as a local administrator account. This detection is looking for alterations to the behaviour of the account via registry.
@@ -47139,7 +47139,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Disaster recovery events.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -47153,7 +47153,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "08cb291e-ea77-48e8-a95a-0799319bf056", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47174,7 +47174,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as _time from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\DSRMAdminLogonBehavior" Registry.registry_value_data IN ("*1","*2") by Registry.action Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_type Registry.process_guid Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | join type=outer process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | table _time action dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process process_guid registry_path registry_value_data registry_value_type | `windows_ad_dsrm_account_changes_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD DSRM Password Reset - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD DSRM Password Reset - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Aside from being used to promote genuine domain controllers, the DSRM (Directory Services Restore Mode) account can be used to persist within a Domain. A DC can be configured to allow the DSRM account to logon & be used in the same way as a local administrator account. This detection is looking for any password reset attempts against that account.
@@ -47186,7 +47186,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Resetting the DSRM password for legitamate r
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD DSRM Password Reset - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD DSRM Password Reset - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -47200,7 +47200,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AD DSRM Password Reset - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AD DSRM Password Reset - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d1ab841c-36a6-46cf-b50f-b2b04b31182a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47221,7 +47221,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as _time from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.result_id="4794" AND All_Changes.result="An attempt was made to set the Directory Services Restore Mode administrator password" by All_Changes.action, All_Changes.dest, All_Changes.src, All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Changes)` | `windows_ad_dsrm_password_reset_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD Privileged Account SID History Addition - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD Privileged Account SID History Addition - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection identifies when the SID of a privileged user is added to the SID History attribute of another user. Useful for tracking SID history abuse across multiple domains. This detection leverages the Asset and Identities framework. See the implementation section for further details on configuration.
@@ -47233,7 +47233,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Migration of privileged accounts.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Privileged Account SID History Addition - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD Privileged Account SID History Addition - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -47247,7 +47247,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Privileged Account SID History Addition - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AD Privileged Account SID History Addition - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134.005", "T1134"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6b521149-b91c-43aa-ba97-c2cac59ec830", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47268,7 +47268,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4742 OR EventCode=4738) NOT SidHistory IN ("%%1793", -) | rex field=SidHistory "(^%{|^)(?P<SidHistory>.*?)(}$|$)" | eval category="privileged" | lookup identity_lookup_expanded category, identity as SidHistory OUTPUT identity_tag as match | where isnotnull(match) | rename TargetSid as userSid | table _time action status host user userSid SidHistory Logon_ID src_user | `windows_ad_privileged_account_sid_history_addition_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD Privileged Object Access Activity - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD Privileged Object Access Activity - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Windows Active Directory contains numerous objects that grant elevated access to the domain they reside in. These objects should be rarely accessed by normal users or processes. Access attempts to one or more of these objects may be evidence of attacker enumeration of Active Directory.
@@ -47280,7 +47280,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Service accounts or applications that routin
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Privileged Object Access Activity - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD Privileged Object Access Activity - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -47294,7 +47294,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Privileged Object Access Activity - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AD Privileged Object Access Activity - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dc2f58bc-8cd2-4e51-962a-694b963acde0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47315,7 +47315,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4662 ObjectName IN ( "CN=Account Operators,*", "CN=Administrators,*", "CN=Backup Operators,*", "CN=Cert Publishers,*", "CN=Certificate Service DCOM Access,*", "CN=Domain Admins,*", "CN=Domain Controllers,*", "CN=Enterprise Admins,*", "CN=Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers,*", "CN=Group Policy Creator Owners,*", "CN=Incoming Forest Trust Builders,*", "CN=Microsoft Exchange Servers,*", "CN=Network Configuration Operators,*", "CN=Power Users,*", "CN=Print Operators,*", "CN=Read-only Domain Controllers,*", "CN=Replicators,*", "CN=Schema Admins,*", "CN=Server Operators,*", "CN=Exchange Trusted Subsystem,*", "CN=Exchange Windows Permission,*", "CN=Organization Management,*") | rex field=ObjectName "CN\=(?<object_name>[^,]+)" | stats values(Computer) as dest, values(object_name) as object_name, dc(ObjectName) as object_count, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime, count by SubjectUserName | rename SubjectUserName as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_ad_privileged_object_access_activity_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This alert was written to detect activity associated with the DCSync attack. When a domain controller receives a replication request, the user account permissions are validated, however no checks are performed to validate the request was initiated by a Domain Controller. Once an attacker gains control of an account with the necessary privileges, they can request password hashes for any or all users within the domain. This alert detects when a user account creates a handle to domainDNS with the necessary replication permissions.
@@ -47327,7 +47327,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Azure AD Connect syncing operations.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -47341,7 +47341,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.006", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "51307514-1236-49f6-8686-d46d93cc2821", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47362,7 +47362,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4662 ObjectType IN ("%{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}", "domainDNS") AND Properties IN ("*Replicating Directory Changes All*", "*{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*", "*{9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2}*","*{1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*") AND AccessMask="0x100" AND NOT (SubjectUserSid="NT AUT*" OR SubjectUserSid="S-1-5-18" OR SubjectDomainName="Window Manager" OR SubjectUserName="*$") | stats min(_time) as _time, count by SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Computer, Logon_ID, ObjectName, ObjectServer, ObjectType, OperationType, status | rename SubjectDomainName as Target_Domain, SubjectUserName as user, Logon_ID as TargetLogonId, _time as attack_time | appendpipe [| map search="search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$"] | table attack_time, AuthenticationPackageName, LogonProcessName, LogonType, TargetUserSid, Target_Domain, user, Computer, TargetLogonId, status, src_ip, src_category, ObjectName, ObjectServer, ObjectType, OperationType | stats min(attack_time) as _time values(TargetUserSid) as TargetUserSid, values(Target_Domain) as Target_Domain, values(user) as user, values(Computer) as Computer, values(status) as status, values(src_category) as src_category, values(src_ip) as src_ip by TargetLogonId | `windows_ad_replication_request_initiated_by_user_account_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This alert was written to detect activity associated with the DCSync attack performed by computer accounts. When a domain controller receives a replication request, the account permissions are validated, however no checks are performed to validate the request was initiated by a Domain Controller. Once an attacker gains control of an account with the necessary privileges, they can request password hashes for any or all users within the domain. This alert detects when a computer account account creates a handle to domainDNS with the necessary replication permissions. These requests are then filtered to exclude where the events originate from a known domain controller IP address.
@@ -47374,7 +47374,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Genuine DC promotion may trigger this alert.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -47388,7 +47388,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping", "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.006", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "50998483-bb15-457b-a870-965080d9e3d3", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47409,7 +47409,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4662 ObjectType IN ("%{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}", "domainDNS") AND Properties IN ("*Replicating Directory Changes All*", "*{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*", "*{9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2}*","*{1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*") AND AccessMask="0x100" AND (SubjectUserSid="NT AUT*" OR SubjectUserSid="S-1-5-18" OR SubjectDomainName="Window Manager" OR SubjectUserName="*$") | stats min(_time) as attack_time, count by SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Computer, Logon_ID, ObjectName, ObjectServer, ObjectType, OperationType, status | rename SubjectDomainName as Target_Domain, SubjectUserName as user, Logon_ID as TargetLogonId | appendpipe [| map search="search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$"] | table attack_time, AuthenticationPackageName, LogonProcessName, LogonType, TargetUserSid, Target_Domain, user, Computer, TargetLogonId, status, src_ip, src_category, ObjectName, ObjectServer, ObjectType, OperationType | stats min(attack_time) as _time, values(TargetUserSid) as TargetUserSid, values(Target_Domain) as Target_Domain, values(user) as user, values(Computer) as Computer, values(status) as status, values(src_category) as src_category, values(src_ip) as src_ip by TargetLogonId | search NOT src_category="domain_controller" | `windows_ad_replication_request_initiated_from_unsanctioned_location_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic looks for changes to the sIDHistory AD attribute of user or computer objects which exist within the same domain. The SID history AD attribute allows users to inherit permissions from a separate AD account without group changes. Initially developed for access continuity when migrating user accounts to different domains, this attribute can also be abused by adversaries to stealthily grant access to a backdoor account within the same domain. This analytic was written to pick up on activity via Mimikatz sid::patch. Please note there are additional avenues to abuse SID history such as DCShadow & Golden / Diamond tickets which won't be detected using these event codes.
@@ -47421,7 +47421,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-09
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -47435,7 +47435,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134.005", "T1134"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5fde0b7c-df7a-40b1-9b3a-294c00f0289d", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47456,7 +47456,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4742 OR EventCode=4738) NOT SidHistory IN ("%%1793", -) | rex field=SidHistory "(^%{|^)(?P<SidHistoryMatch>.*)(\-|\\\)" | rex field=TargetSid "^(?P<TargetSidmatch>.*)(\-|\\\)" | where SidHistoryMatch=TargetSidmatch OR SidHistoryMatch=TargetDomainName | rename TargetSid as userSid, TargetDomainName as userDomainName | table _time action status host user userSid userDomainName SidHistory Logon_ID src_user | `windows_ad_same_domain_sid_history_addition_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD ServicePrincipalName Added To Domain Account - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD ServicePrincipalName Added To Domain Account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the addition of a Service Principal Name to a domain account. While this event may be part of a legitimate action part of certain administrative operations, it may also be evidence of a persistence attack. Domain accounts with Servce Principal Names are vulnerable to a technique called Kerberoasting that enables attackers to potentially obtain the cleartext password of the account by performing offline cracking. An adversary who has obtained privileged access to a domain environment may add an SPN to a privileged account to then leverage the Kerberoasting technique and attempt to obtain its clertext password.
@@ -47468,7 +47468,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A Service Principal Name should only be adde
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD ServicePrincipalName Added To Domain Account - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD ServicePrincipalName Added To Domain Account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -47482,7 +47482,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AD ServicePrincipalName Added To Domain Account - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AD ServicePrincipalName Added To Domain Account - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8a1259cb-0ea7-409c-8bfe-74bad89259f9", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47503,7 +47503,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName=servicePrincipalName OperationType="%%14674" | stats values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN by _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, AttributeValue | rename Computer as dest SubjectUserName as user | `windows_ad_serviceprincipalname_added_to_domain_account_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Account ServicePrincipalName - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Account ServicePrincipalName - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the addition of a Service Principal Name to a domain account that is quickly deleted within 5 minutes or less. While this event may be part of a legitimate action part of certain administrative operations, it may also be evidence of a persistence attack. Domain accounts with Service Principal Names are vulnerable to a technique called Kerberoasting that enables attackers to potentially obtain the cleartext password of the account by performing offline cracking. An adversary who has obtained privileged access to a domain environment may add an SPN to a privileged account to then leverage the Kerberoasting technique and attempt to obtain its clertext password. To clean things up, the adversary may delete the SPN which will trigger this detection.
@@ -47515,7 +47515,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A Service Principal Name should only be adde
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Account ServicePrincipalName - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Account ServicePrincipalName - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -47529,7 +47529,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Account ServicePrincipalName - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Account ServicePrincipalName - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b681977c-d90c-4efc-81a5-c58f945fb541", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47550,7 +47550,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName=servicePrincipalName | transaction ObjectDN AttributeValue startswith=(EventCode=5136 OperationType="%%14674") endswith=(EventCode=5136 OperationType="%%14675") | eval short_lived=case((duration<300),"TRUE") | search short_lived = TRUE | rename ObjectDN as user | `windows_ad_short_lived_domain_account_serviceprincipalname_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Controller SPN Attribute - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Controller SPN Attribute - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies when either a global catalog SPN or a DRS RPC SPN are temporarily added to an Active Directory computer object, both of which can be evidence of a DCShadow attack. DCShadow allows an attacker who has obtained privileged access to register a rogue Domain Controller (DC). Once registered, the rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into the AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys. This technique was initially released in 2018 by security researchers Benjamin Delpy and Vincent Le Toux. No event logs are written for changes to AD attributes, allowing for stealthy backdoors to be implanted in the domain, or metadata such as timestamps overwritten to cover tracks.
@@ -47562,7 +47562,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Controller SPN Attribute - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Controller SPN Attribute - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -47576,7 +47576,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Controller SPN Attribute - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Controller SPN Attribute - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1207"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "57e27f27-369c-4df8-af08-e8c7ee8373d4", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47597,7 +47597,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName=servicePrincipalName (AttributeValue="GC/*" OR AttributeValue="E3514235-4B06-11D1-AB04-00C04FC2DCD2/*") | stats min(_time) as _time range(_time) as duration values(OperationType) as OperationType values(user) as user values(src_ip) as src_ip values(src_nt_domain) as src_nt_domain values(src_user) as src_user values(Computer) as dest, values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN by Logon_ID | eval short_lived=case((duration<30),"TRUE") | where short_lived="TRUE" AND mvcount(OperationType)>1 | replace "%%14674" with "Value Added", "%%14675" with "Value Deleted" in OperationType | rename Logon_ID as TargetLogonId | appendpipe [| map search="search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$"] | stats min(_time) as _time, values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN values(OperationType) as OperationType by TargetLogonId src_user dest | `windows_ad_short_lived_domain_controller_spn_attribute_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Server Object - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Server Object - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a change in an Active Directory environment that could represent evidence of the DCShadow attack. DCShadow allows an attacker who has obtained privileged access to register a rogue Domain Controller (DC). Once registered, the rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes in the AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys. This technique was initially released in 2018 by security researchers Benjamin Delpy and Vincent Le Toux. Specifically, the detection will trigger when a possible rogue Domain Controller computer object is created and quickly deleted within 30 seconds or less in an Active Directory domain. This behavior was identfied by simulating the DCShadow attack with Mimikatz.
@@ -47609,7 +47609,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Creating and deleting a server object within
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Server Object - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Server Object - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -47623,7 +47623,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Server Object - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Server Object - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1207"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "193769d3-1e33-43a9-970e-ad4a88256cdb", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47644,7 +47644,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5137 OR EventCode=5141 ObjectDN="*CN=Servers,CN=Default-First-Site-Name,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration*" | transaction ObjectDN startswith=(EventCode=5137) endswith=(EventCode=5141) | eval short_lived=case((duration<30),"TRUE") | search short_lived = TRUE | stats values(ObjectDN) values(signature) values(EventCode) by _time, Computer, SubjectUserName | `windows_ad_short_lived_server_object_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD SID History Attribute Modified - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD SID History Attribute Modified - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages event code `5136` to identify a modification of the SID History AD attribute. The SID history AD attribute allows users to inherit permissions from a separate AD account without group changes. Initially developed for access continuity when migrating user accounts to different domains, this attribute can also be abused by adversaries to stealthily grant access to a backdoor account within the same domain.
@@ -47656,7 +47656,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Domain mergers and migrations may generate l
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD SID History Attribute Modified - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD SID History Attribute Modified - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -47670,7 +47670,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AD SID History Attribute Modified - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AD SID History Attribute Modified - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134", "T1134.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1155e47d-307f-4247-beab-71071e3a458c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47691,7 +47691,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName=sIDHistory OperationType="%%14674" | stats values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN by _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, AttributeValue | rename Computer as dest | `windows_ad_sid_history_attribute_modified_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for the execution of `adfind.exe` with command-line arguments that it uses by default specifically the filter or search functions. It also considers the arguments necessary like objectcategory, see readme for more details: https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/usage.htm. AdFind.exe is a powerful tool that is commonly used for querying and retrieving information from Active Directory (AD). While it is primarily designed for AD administration and management, it has been seen used before by Wizard Spider, FIN6 and actors whom also launched SUNBURST.
@@ -47703,7 +47703,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = ADfind is a command-line tool for AD adminis
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -47717,7 +47717,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Domain Trust Discovery", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "IcedID", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bd3b0187-189b-46c0-be45-f52da2bae67f", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47738,7 +47738,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process="* -f *" OR Processes.process="* -b *") AND (Processes.process=*objectcategory* OR Processes.process="* -gcb *" OR Processes.process="* -sc *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_adfind_exe_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Admin Permission Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Admin Permission Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is developed to identify suspicious file creation in the root drive (C:\). This tactic was observed in NjRAT as a means to ascertain whether its malware instance running on the compromised host possesses administrative privileges. The methodology involves an attempt to create a 'win.dat' file in the C:\ directory. If this file is successfully created, it serves as an indicator that the process indeed holds administrative privileges. This anomaly detection mechanism serves as a valuable pivot point for detecting NjRAT and other malware strains employing similar techniques to assess the privileges of their running malware instances, without using token privilege API calls or PowerShell commandlets.
@@ -47750,7 +47750,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may occur if there are legit
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Admin Permission Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Admin Permission Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -47764,7 +47764,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Admin Permission Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Admin Permission Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NjRAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e08620cb-9488-4052-832d-97bcc0afd414", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47779,7 +47779,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.exe", "*.dll", "*.sys", "*.com", "*.vbs", "*.vbe", "*.js", "*.bat", "*.cmd", "*.pif", "*.lnk", "*.dat") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eval dropped_file_path = split(file_path, "\\") | eval dropped_file_path_split_count = mvcount(dropped_file_path) | eval root_drive = mvindex(dropped_file_path,0) | where LIKE(root_drive, "C:") AND dropped_file_path_split_count = 2 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_admin_permission_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Event IDs 5140 or 5145 to identify a source computer accessing windows administrative shares (C$, Admin$ and IPC$ ) across a large number remote endpoints. Specifically, the logic will trigger when a source endpoint accesses administrative shares across 30 or more target computers within a 5 minute timespan. This behavior could represent an adversary who is enumerating network shares across an Active Directory environment in the search for sensitive files, a common technique leveraged by red teamers and threat actors. As environments differ across organizations, security teams should customize the thresholds of this detection as needed.
@@ -47791,7 +47791,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = An single endpoint accessing windows adminis
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -47805,7 +47805,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1135"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d92f2d95-05fb-48a7-910f-4d3d61ab8655", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47826,7 +47826,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5140 OR EventCode=5145 (ShareName="\\\\*\\ADMIN$" OR ShareName="\\\\*\\IPC$" OR ShareName="\\\\*\\C$") | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Computer) AS unique_targets values(Computer) as host_targets values(ShareName) as shares by _time, IpAddress, SubjectUserName, EventCode | where unique_targets > 30 | `windows_administrative_shares_accessed_on_multiple_hosts_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Splunks Admon to identify the modification of a default Group Policy Object. A fresh installation of an Active Directory network will typically contain two default group policy objects `Default Domain Controllers Policy` and `Default Domain Policy`. The default domain controllers policy is used to enforce and set policies to all the domain controllers within the domain environment. The default domain policy is linked to all users and computers by default. An adversary who has obtained privileged access to an Active Directory network may modify the default group policy objects to obtain further access, deploy persistence or execute malware across a large number of hosts. Security teams should monitor the modification of the default GPOs.
@@ -47838,7 +47838,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The default Group Policy Objects within an A
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -47852,7 +47852,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1484", "T1484.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "83458004-db60-4170-857d-8572f16f070b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47873,7 +47873,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `admon` admonEventType=Update objectCategory="CN=Group-Policy-Container,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=*" (displayName="Default Domain Policy" OR displayName="Default Domain Controllers Policy") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(gPCFileSysPath) by dcName, displayName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_admon_default_group_policy_object_modified_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Splunks Admon to identify the creation of a new Group Policy Object. With GPOs, system administrators can manage and configure applications, software operations, and user settings throughout an entire organization. GPOs can be abused and leveraged by adversaries to escalate privileges or deploy malware across an Active Directory network. As an example, the Lockbit ransomware malware will create new group policies on the domain controller that are then pushed out to every device on the network. Security teams should monitor the creation of new Group Policy Objects.
@@ -47885,7 +47885,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Group Policy Objects are created as part of
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -47899,7 +47899,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1484", "T1484.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "69201633-30d9-48ef-b1b6-e680805f0582", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47920,7 +47920,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `admon` admonEventType=Update objectCategory="CN=Group-Policy-Container,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=*" versionNumber=0 displayName!="New Group Policy Object" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(gPCFileSysPath) by dcName, displayName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_admon_group_policy_object_created_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Base64 Content - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Base64 Content - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic leverages Sysmon Event ID 15, a critical file creation event, to detect the creation of Alternate Data Streams (ADS) on Windows systems. ADS is a feature of the NTFS file system that allows the storage of data in hidden streams attached to files. These streams are not visible in standard file listings, making them a popular technique for concealing malicious activity. Event ID 15 captures both the hash of the primary file content (unnamed stream) and the content of any additional named streams, which can include executables, scripts, or configuration data. Malware often exploits ADS to hide payloads, leveraging browser downloads to attach a Zone.Identifier stream, marking the file as originating from the Internet (Mark Of The Web, MOTW). This analytic is designed to identify such misuse by analyzing the content and creation patterns of named streams, including those under 1KB which may contain MOTW information. It is essential for detecting sophisticated threats that utilize non-executable file types or conceal malicious scripts within ADS, beyond the traditional focus on PE executables. The detection process involves monitoring for the creation of named streams, which are part of the NTFS structure and can be examined using tools like PowerShell for the presence of additional data streams or MOTW information. This approach helps in uncovering hidden payloads and tracking the origin of suspicious files downloaded via browsers or email clients, providing a comprehensive defense against ADS abuse.
@@ -47932,7 +47932,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Base64 Content - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Base64 Content - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -47946,7 +47946,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Base64 Content - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Base64 Content - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564", "T1564.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "683f48de-982f-4a7e-9aac-9cec550da498", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -47967,7 +47967,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=15 NOT Contents IN ("-","[ZoneTransfer]*") | regex TargetFilename="(?<!\/)\b\w+(\.\w+)?:\w+(\.\w+)?$" | regex Contents="(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{128,})(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{2}==|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{3}=)?$" | eval file_name = replace(TargetFilename,"(.*\\\)",""), process = Image , file_path = TargetFilename , base64 = Contents, file_hash = coalesce(SHA256,SHA1,MD5,Hash) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by dest, process, process_guid, file_name, file_path, file_hash, base64 | `base64decode(base64)` | fields - base64 | rename base64_decode as command | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_alternate_datastream___base64_content_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Executable Content - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Executable Content - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to detect when data, possessing an IMPHASH value, is written to an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) in the NTFS file system. The presence of an IMPHASH value suggests that the written data has a Portable Executable (PE) structure, indicating its potential to be executed. Such behavior could be a sign of a threat actor staging malicious code within hard-to-detect areas of the file system for future use or persistence. It's important to note that for this analytic to function correctly, import hashing/imphash must be enabled within Sysmon. This allows the capture of the IMPHASH value, a unique identifier for the imported functions of a PE, providing a robust mechanism for detecting hidden malicious activity leveraging ADS.
@@ -47979,7 +47979,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Executable Content - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Executable Content - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -47993,7 +47993,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Executable Content - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Executable Content - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564", "T1564.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a258bf2a-34fd-4986-8086-78f506e00206", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48014,7 +48014,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=15 IMPHASH!=00000000000000000000000000000000 | regex TargetFilename="(?<!\/)\b\w+(\.\w+)?:\w+(\.\w+)?$" | eval file_name = replace(TargetFilename,"(.*\\\)",""), process = Image , file_path = TargetFilename, file_hash = coalesce(SHA256,SHA1,MD5,Hash) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user) as user by dest, process, process_guid, file_name, file_path, file_hash, IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_alternate_datastream___executable_content_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Process Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Process Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This following analytic detects when a process attempts to execute a file from within an NTFS file system alternate data stream. This behavior could indicate that a threat actor staged malicious code within a difficult to detect area of the file system and is now attempting to execute it.
@@ -48026,7 +48026,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be generated by process
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Process Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Process Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -48040,7 +48040,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Process Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Process Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564", "T1564.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "30c32c5c-41fe-45db-84fe-275e4320da3f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48061,7 +48061,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_current_directory) as directory from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != "unknown" Processes.process_name IN ("appvlp.exe","bitsadmin.exe","control.exe","cscript.exe","forfiles.exe","ftp.exe","mavinject.exe","mshta.exe","powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe","regini.exe","regscr32.exe","rundll32.exe","sc.exe","wmic.exe","wscript.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | regex process="(\b)\w+(\.\w+)?:\w+(\.\w{2,4})(?!\.)(\b|\s|&)" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_alternate_datastream___process_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Apache Benchmark Binary - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Apache Benchmark Binary - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a default behavior of a MetaSploit payload. MetaSploit uses Apache Benchmark to generate payloads. The payloads contain standard artifacts including "Apache Benchmark" and the original file name is always ab.exe. During triage, review the process and it's path. It is possible network connections spawned from it. Review parallel processes for further behaviors.
@@ -48073,7 +48073,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as there i
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Apache Benchmark Binary - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Apache Benchmark Binary - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -48087,7 +48087,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Apache Benchmark Binary - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Apache Benchmark Binary - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["MetaSploit"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "894f48ea-8d85-4dcd-9132-c66cdb407c9b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48102,7 +48102,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=ab.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_apache_benchmark_binary_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows App Layer Protocol Qakbot NamedPipe - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows App Layer Protocol Qakbot NamedPipe - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious process creating or connecting to a possible Qakbot named pipe . This technique was seen in Qakbot malware that creates named pipe after injecting its code in legitimate process to communicate on other process that also has an injected code to steal information on the compromised host. This Anomaly detection can be a good pivot for possible Qakbot infection. This detection looks for possible random generated named pipe (in GUID form) created by known process being abused by Qakbot.
@@ -48114,7 +48114,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows App Layer Protocol Qakbot NamedPipe - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows App Layer Protocol Qakbot NamedPipe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -48128,7 +48128,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows App Layer Protocol Qakbot NamedPipe - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows App Layer Protocol Qakbot NamedPipe - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Qakbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "63a2c15e-9448-43c5-a4a8-9852266aaada", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48143,7 +48143,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode IN (17, 18) EventType IN ( "CreatePipe", "ConnectPipe") Image IN ("*\\calc.exe", "*\\notepad.exe", "*\\rdpclip.exe", "*\\explorer.exe", "*\\wermgr.exe", "*\\ping.exe", "*\\OneDriveSetup.exe", "*\\dxdiag.exe", "*\\mobsync.exe", "*\\msra.exe", "*\\xwizard.exe") | regex PipeName="^\\\{[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{8}" | stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventType ProcessGuid ProcessId PipeName SecurityID EventCode dest UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_app_layer_protocol_qakbot_namedpipe_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows App Layer Protocol Wermgr Connect To NamedPipe - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows App Layer Protocol Wermgr Connect To NamedPipe - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious wermgr.exe process creating or connecting to a named pipe. Wermgr.exe is part of Windows OS Problem reporting application responsible for reporting problems, fault or error happen on the Windows OS. This file is being abused by several Threat actors and malware such as Trickbot and Qakbot to execute their malicious code. This anomaly detection can be a good pivot on possible wermgr.exe processes having injected malicious code that might be related to qakbot infection that communicates via named pipe.
@@ -48155,7 +48155,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows App Layer Protocol Wermgr Connect To NamedPipe - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows App Layer Protocol Wermgr Connect To NamedPipe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -48169,7 +48169,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows App Layer Protocol Wermgr Connect To NamedPipe - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows App Layer Protocol Wermgr Connect To NamedPipe - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Qakbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2f3a4092-548b-421c-9caa-84918e1787ef", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48184,7 +48184,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode IN (17, 18) Image= "*\\wermgr.exe" EventType IN ( "CreatePipe", "ConnectPipe") | stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventType ProcessGuid ProcessId PipeName SecurityID EventCode dest UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_app_layer_protocol_wermgr_connect_to_namedpipe_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Application Layer Protocol RMS Radmin Tool Namedpipe - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Application Layer Protocol RMS Radmin Tool Namedpipe - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of default or publicly known named pipes used by RMX remote admin tool. A named pipe is a named, one-way or duplex pipe for communication between the pipe server and one or more pipe clients. RMX Tool uses named pipes in many way as part of its communication for its server and client component. This tool was abuse by several adversaries and malware like Azorult to collect data to the targeted host. This TTP is a good indicator that this tool was install in production premise and need to check if the user has a valid reason why it need to install this legitimate application.
@@ -48196,7 +48196,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Filter based
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Application Layer Protocol RMS Radmin Tool Namedpipe - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Application Layer Protocol RMS Radmin Tool Namedpipe - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -48210,7 +48210,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Application Layer Protocol RMS Radmin Tool Namedpipe - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Application Layer Protocol RMS Radmin Tool Namedpipe - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b62a6040-49f4-47c8-b3f6-fc1adb952a33", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48231,7 +48231,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode IN (17, 18) EventType IN ( "CreatePipe", "ConnectPipe") PipeName IN ("\\RManFUSServerNotify32", "\\RManFUSCallbackNotify32", "\\RMSPrint*") | stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Image EventType ProcessId PipeName dest UserID | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_application_layer_protocol_rms_radmin_tool_namedpipe_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Block Events - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AppLocker Block Events - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes Windows AppLocker event logs to generate risk based on blocks related to AppLocker policy violations. The analytic is designed to identify attempts to bypass application restrictions.
@@ -48243,7 +48243,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may legitimately use AppLocke
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Block Events - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AppLocker Block Events - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -48257,7 +48257,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Block Events - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AppLocker Block Events - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows AppLocker"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e369afe8-cd35-47a3-9c1e-d813efc1f7dd", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48272,7 +48272,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `applocker`  EventCode IN (8007, 8004, 8022, 8025, 8029, 8040) | spath input=UserData_Xml | rename RuleAndFileData.* as *, TargetUser as user, Computer as dest | lookup applockereventcodes EventCode OUTPUT Description | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, PolicyName, RuleId, user, TargetProcessId, FilePath, FullFilePath | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_applocker_block_events_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Execution from Uncommon Locations - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AppLocker Execution from Uncommon Locations - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to identify executions of applications or scripts from uncommon or suspicious file paths, which could be indicative of malware or unauthorized activity. By leveraging a simple statistical model, the query analyzes the frequency of application executions across different file paths. It calculates the average (avg) number of executions per file path and uses the standard deviation (stdev) to measure the variation or dispersion of the execution counts from the average. A file path is considered uncommon or suspicious if the number of executions from it is significantly higher than what is expected based on the calculated average and standard deviation. Specifically, the analytic flags any file path from which the number of executions exceeds the upper bound, defined as the average plus two times the standard deviation (avg+stdev*2). This approach helps in pinpointing anomalies in application execution patterns, potentially uncovering malicious activities or policy violations.
@@ -48284,7 +48284,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate u
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Execution from Uncommon Locations - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AppLocker Execution from Uncommon Locations - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -48293,7 +48293,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Execution from Uncommon Locations - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AppLocker Execution from Uncommon Locations - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows AppLocker"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d57ce957-151a-4aec-ada5-5fb1eb555b6b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48308,7 +48308,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `applocker` | spath input=UserData_Xml | rename RuleAndFileData.* as *, Computer as dest, TargetUser AS user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, PolicyName, RuleId, user, TargetProcessId, FilePath, FullFilePath | eventstats avg(count) as avg, stdev(count) as stdev | eval upperBound=(avg+stdev*2), anomaly=if(count > upperBound, "Yes", "No") | where anomaly="Yes" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_applocker_execution_from_uncommon_locations_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Privilege Escalation via Unauthorized Bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AppLocker Privilege Escalation via Unauthorized Bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes Windows AppLocker event logs to identify attempts to bypass application restrictions. AppLocker is a feature that allows administrators to specify which applications are permitted to run on a system. This analytic is designed to identify attempts to bypass these restrictions, which could be indicative of an attacker attempting to escalate privileges. The analytic uses EventCodes 8007, 8004, 8022, 8025, 8029, and 8040 to identify these attempts. The analytic will identify the host, full file path, and target user associated with the bypass attempt. These EventCodes are related to block events and focus on 5 attempts or more.
@@ -48320,7 +48320,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate u
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Privilege Escalation via Unauthorized Bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AppLocker Privilege Escalation via Unauthorized Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -48334,7 +48334,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Privilege Escalation via Unauthorized Bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AppLocker Privilege Escalation via Unauthorized Bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows AppLocker"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bca48629-7fa2-40d3-9e5d-807564504e28", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48355,7 +48355,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `applocker` EventCode IN (8007, 8004, 8022, 8025, 8029, 8040) | spath input=UserData_Xml | rename RuleAndFileData.* as *, Computer as dest, TargetUser AS user | lookup applockereventcodes EventCode OUTPUT Description | stats count AS attempt_count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, PolicyName, RuleId, user, TargetProcessId, FilePath, FullFilePath | where attempt_count > 5 | sort - attempt_count | `windows_applocker_privilege_escalation_via_unauthorized_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Rare Application Launch Detection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AppLocker Rare Application Launch Detection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to detect the launch of applications that occur rarely within the environment, which could indicate the use of potentially malicious software or tools by attackers. It works by aggregating the count of application launches over time, then calculating the average and standard deviation of these counts. Applications whose launch counts significantly deviate from the norm, either by exceeding or falling below three standard deviations from the average, are flagged for further investigation. This approach helps in identifying unusual application activity that could be indicative of a security threat.
@@ -48367,7 +48367,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate u
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Rare Application Launch Detection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AppLocker Rare Application Launch Detection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -48376,7 +48376,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Rare Application Launch Detection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AppLocker Rare Application Launch Detection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows AppLocker"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9556f7b7-285f-4f18-8eeb-963d989f9d27", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48391,7 +48391,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `applocker` | spath input=UserData_Xml | rename RuleAndFileData.* as *, Computer as dest, TargetUser AS user | stats dc(_time) as days, count by FullFilePath dest user | eventstats avg(count) as avg, stdev(count) as stdev | eval upperBound=(avg+stdev*3), lowerBound=(avg-stdev*3) | where count > upperBound OR count < lowerBound | `windows_applocker_rare_application_launch_detection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Archive Collected Data via Powershell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Archive Collected Data via Powershell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script that archive files to a temp folder. This anomaly detection serves as a valuable indicator to uncover threats from adversaries utilizing PowerShell scripts for data archiving purposes. Identifying this method becomes pivotal in flagging and investigating potential threats, enabling proactive measures threat actors leveraging similar PowerShell-based data collection and archiving techniques.
@@ -48403,7 +48403,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = powershell may used this function to archive
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Archive Collected Data via Powershell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Archive Collected Data via Powershell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -48417,7 +48417,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Archive Collected Data via Powershell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Archive Collected Data via Powershell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "74c5a3b0-27a7-463c-9d00-1a5bb12cb7b5", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48432,7 +48432,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Compress-Archive*"  ScriptBlockText = "*\\Temp\\*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_archive_collected_data_via_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Archive Collected Data via Rar - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Archive Collected Data via Rar - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process execute a rar utilities to archive files. This method has been exploited by various threat actors, including red-teamers and malware like DarkGate, to gather and compress collected data on compromised hosts. Subsequently, these archives are transmitted to command and control servers as part of their data exfiltration techniques. These adversaries leverage RAR archiving to consolidate and compress collected data on compromised hosts. Once the data is compiled into these archives, it serves as a means for these entities to effectively exfiltrate sensitive information. This process involves transferring the archived data to command and control servers, facilitating the extraction and retrieval of critical information from compromised systems.
@@ -48444,7 +48444,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = user and network administrator can execute t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Archive Collected Data via Rar - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Archive Collected Data via Rar - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -48458,7 +48458,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Archive Collected Data via Rar - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Archive Collected Data via Rar - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1560.001", "T1560"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2015de95-fe91-413d-9d62-2fe011b67e82", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48473,7 +48473,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="Rar.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name = "Rar.exe" AND Processes.process = "*a*" Processes.process = "* -ep1*" Processes.process = "* -r*" Processes.process = "* -y*" Processes.process = "* -v5m*" Processes.process = "* -m1*" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_archive_collected_data_via_rar_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AutoIt3 Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AutoIt3 Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is designed to detect any execution of AutoIt3, a scripting language designed for automating the Windows GUI and general scripting. This includes instances where AutoIt3 has been renamed or otherwise altered in an attempt to evade detection. The analytic works by searching for process names or original file names that match 'autoit3.exe', which is the default executable for AutoIt scripts. This detection is important as AutoIt3 is often used by attackers to automate malicious activities, such as the execution of malware or other unwanted software. False positives may occur with legitimate uses of AutoIt3.
@@ -48485,7 +48485,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the applic
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AutoIt3 Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AutoIt3 Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -48499,7 +48499,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows AutoIt3 Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows AutoIt3 Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0ecb40d9-492b-4a57-9f87-515dd742794c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48520,7 +48520,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("autoit3.exe", "autoit*.exe") OR Processes.original_file_name IN ("autoit3.exe", "autoit*.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_autoit3_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Autostart Execution LSASS Driver Registry Modification - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Autostart Execution LSASS Driver Registry Modification - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the abuse of two undocumented registry keys that allow for a DLL to load into lsass.exe to potentially capture credentials. Upon successful modification of \CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\DirectoryServiceExtPt or \CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\LsaDbExtPt, a DLL either remote or local will be set as the value and load up into lsass.exe. Based on POC code a text file may be written to disk with credentials.
@@ -48532,7 +48532,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present on recent Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Autostart Execution LSASS Driver Registry Modification - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Autostart Execution LSASS Driver Registry Modification - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -48546,7 +48546,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Autostart Execution LSASS Driver Registry Modification - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Autostart Execution LSASS Driver Registry Modification - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.008"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "57fb8656-141e-4d8a-9f51-62cff4ecb82a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48567,7 +48567,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\NTDS\\DirectoryServiceExtPt","*\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\NTDS\\LsaDbExtPt") by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_autostart_execution_lsass_driver_registry_modification_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Binary Proxy Execution Mavinject DLL Injection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Binary Proxy Execution Mavinject DLL Injection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e. Dynamic-link Library Injection), allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. C:\Windows\system32\mavinject.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL). In addition to Dynamic-link Library Injection, Mavinject.exe can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its /HMODULE command-line parameter (ex. mavinject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER). This command would inject an import table entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base address. During triage, review file modifcations and parallel processes.
@@ -48579,7 +48579,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter on DL
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Binary Proxy Execution Mavinject DLL Injection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Binary Proxy Execution Mavinject DLL Injection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -48593,7 +48593,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Binary Proxy Execution Mavinject DLL Injection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Binary Proxy Execution Mavinject DLL Injection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.013", "T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ccf4b61b-1b26-4f2e-a089-f2009c569c57", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48614,7 +48614,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=mavinject.exe Processes.process IN ("*injectrunning*", "*hmodule=0x*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_binary_proxy_execution_mavinject_dll_injection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic will identify suspicious files dropped or created in the Windows %startup% folder. This technique is a common way to gain persistence on a targeted host. Threat actor, adversaries and red teamer abuse this folder path to automatically execute their malicious sample upon boot or restart of the infected host. This TTP detection is a good indicator that a suspicious process wants to gain persistence on the targeted host. We suggest to verify the process name by using the process guid field, the file created and also the user and the computer name for further investigation.
@@ -48626,7 +48626,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may allow creation of script
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -48640,7 +48640,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Chaos Ransomware", "NjRAT", "RedLine Stealer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "99d157cb-923f-4a00-aee9-1f385412146f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48655,7 +48655,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\*" by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_boot_or_logon_autostart_execution_in_startup_folder_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows BootLoader Inventory - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows BootLoader Inventory - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following hunting query utilizes a PowerShell Scripted input that captures the bootloader paths for each Windows endpoint it is deployed to. The template inputs.conf is located in the references link. By default, it only captures the path, but may be modified to capture everything that BCDedit provides. It can be verbose, but may be worth it. 
@@ -48667,7 +48667,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = No false positives here, only bootloaders. F
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows BootLoader Inventory - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows BootLoader Inventory - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -48676,7 +48676,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Windows BootLoader Inventory - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Windows BootLoader Inventory - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackLotus Campaign", "Windows BootKits"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1542.001", "T1542"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4f7e3913-4db3-4ccd-afe4-31198982305d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48691,7 +48691,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `bootloader_inventory` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(_raw) by host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_bootloader_inventory_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Bypass UAC via Pkgmgr Tool - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Bypass UAC via Pkgmgr Tool - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a potentially suspicious execution of the 'pkgmgr' process involving the use of an XML input file for package management. The 'pkgmgr' process, though deprecated in modern Windows systems, was historically used for managing packages. The presence of an XML input file raises concerns about the nature of the executed command and its potential impact on the system. Due to the deprecated status of 'pkgmgr' and the involvement of an XML file, this activity warrants careful investigation. XML files are commonly used for configuration and data exchange, making it crucial to ascertain the intentions and legitimacy of the command. To ensure system security, it is recommended to use up-to-date package management utilities, such as DISM or PowerShell's PackageManagement module, and exercise caution when executing commands involving potentially sensitive operations or files.
@@ -48703,7 +48703,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present on recent Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Bypass UAC via Pkgmgr Tool - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Bypass UAC via Pkgmgr Tool - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -48717,7 +48717,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Bypass UAC via Pkgmgr Tool - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Bypass UAC via Pkgmgr Tool - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Warzone RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cce58e2c-988a-4319-9390-0daa9eefa3cd", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48732,7 +48732,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where  Processes.process_name = pkgmgr.exe Processes.process = "*.xml*" NOT(Processes.parent_process_path IN("*:\\windows\\system32\\*", "*:\\windows\\syswow64\\*", "*:\\Program Files*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_bypass_uac_via_pkgmgr_tool_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows CAB File on Disk - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows CAB File on Disk - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies .cab files being written to disk. Utilize this analytic as a way to hunt for suspect .cab files being written to non-standard paths and tune as needed. Cab files were recently being utilized to deliver .url files embedded. The .url files were then used to deliver malicious payloads. The search specifically looks for instances where the file name is '*.cab' and the action is 'write'. During the triage process, it is recommended to review the file path for additional artifacts that may provide further insights into the event.
@@ -48744,7 +48744,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will only be present if a pr
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows CAB File on Disk - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows CAB File on Disk - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -48758,7 +48758,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows CAB File on Disk - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows CAB File on Disk - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 10, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "622f08d0-69ef-42c2-8139-66088bc25acd", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48773,7 +48773,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name=*.cab) by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Filesystem")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_cab_file_on_disk_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process command line related to the discovery of cache domain credential logon count in the registry. This Technique was being abused by several post exploitation tool like Winpeas where it query CachedLogonsCount registry value in Winlogon registry. This value can be good information about the login caching setting on the Windows OS target host. A value of 0 means login caching is disable and values > 50 caches only 50 login attempts. By default all versions of Windows 10 save cached logins except Windows Server 2008.
@@ -48785,7 +48785,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -48799,7 +48799,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.005", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "40ccb8e0-1785-466e-901e-6a8b75c04ecd", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48814,7 +48814,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where  `process_reg` AND Processes.process = "* query *" AND Processes.process = "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon*" AND Processes.process = "*CACHEDLOGONSCOUNT*" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_cached_domain_credentials_reg_query_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is developed to detect suspicious process commandline to change or set the default file association of a file without file extension with notepad.exe. This technique was seen in some APT and ransomware Prestige where it set/modify the default process to run file association, like .txt to notepad.exe.
@@ -48826,7 +48826,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -48840,7 +48840,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prestige Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dbdf52ad-d6a1-4b68-975f-0a10939d8e38", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48861,7 +48861,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` AND Processes.process="* add *" AND Processes.process="* HKCR\\*" AND Processes.process="*\\shell\\open\\command*" AND  Processes.process= *Notepad.exe* by  Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rex field=process "Notepad\.exe (?<file_name_association>.*$)" | rex field=file_name_association "\.(?<extension>[^\.]*$)" | where isnull(extension) and isnotnull(file_name_association) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_change_default_file_association_for_no_file_ext_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a powershell script command to retrieve clipboard data. This technique was seen in several post exploitation tools like WINPEAS to steal sensitive information that was saved in clipboard. Using the Get-Clipboard powershell commandlet, adversaries can be able collect data stored in clipboard that might be a copied user name, password or other sensitive information.
@@ -48873,7 +48873,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible there will be false positives
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -48887,7 +48887,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1115"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ab73289e-2246-4de0-a14b-67006c72a893", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48902,7 +48902,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Get-Clipboard*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_clipboard_data_via_get_clipboard_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of reg.exe performing an add to the InProcServer32, which may be related to COM hijacking. Adversaries can use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead.
@@ -48914,7 +48914,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and some filt
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -48928,7 +48928,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.015", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b7bd83c0-92b5-4fc7-b286-23eccfa2c561", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48949,7 +48949,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` Processes.process=*inprocserver32* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_com_hijacking_inprocserver32_modification_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies path traversal command-line execution and should be used to tune and driver other more higher fidelity analytics. This technique was seen in malicious document that execute malicious code using msdt.exe and path traversal technique that serve as defense evasion. This Hunting query is a good pivot to look for possible suspicious process and command-line that runs execute path traversal technique to run malicious code. This may help you to find possible downloaded malware or other lolbin execution.
@@ -48961,7 +48961,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = false positive may vary depends on the score
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -48970,7 +48970,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d0026380-b3c4-4da0-ac8e-02790063ff6b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -48985,7 +48985,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes  by Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval count_of_pattern1 = (mvcount(split(process,"/.."))-1) | eval count_of_pattern2 = (mvcount(split(process,"\.."))-1) | eval count_of_pattern3 = (mvcount(split(process,"\\.."))-1) | eval count_of_pattern4 = (mvcount(split(process,"//.."))-1) | search count_of_pattern1 > 1 OR count_of_pattern2 > 1 OR count_of_pattern3 > 1 OR count_of_pattern4 > 1 | `windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_hunting_path_traversal_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies path traversal command-line execution. This technique was seen in malicious document that execute malicious code using msdt.exe and path traversal technique that serve as defense evasion. This TTP is a good pivot to look for more suspicious process and command-line that runs before and after this execution. This may help you to find possible downloaded malware or other lolbin execution.
@@ -48997,7 +48997,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Not known at this moment.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -49011,7 +49011,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "58fcdeb1-728d-415d-b0d7-3ab18a275ec2", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49032,7 +49032,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where  Processes.process="*\/..\/..\/..\/*" OR Processes.process="*\\..\\..\\..\\*" OR Processes.process="*\/\/..\/\/..\/\/..\/\/*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_path_traversal_exec_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Command Shell DCRat ForkBomb Payload - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Command Shell DCRat ForkBomb Payload - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies DCRat "forkbomb" payload feature. This technique was seen in dark crystal RAT backdoor capabilities where it will execute several cmd child process executing "notepad.exe & pause". The following analytic detects the multiple cmd.exe and child process notepad.exe  execution using batch script in the targeted host within 30s timeframe. this TTP can be a good pivot to check DCRat infection.
@@ -49044,7 +49044,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Command Shell DCRat ForkBomb Payload - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Command Shell DCRat ForkBomb Payload - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -49058,7 +49058,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Command Shell DCRat ForkBomb Payload - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Command Shell DCRat ForkBomb Payload - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkCrystal RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2bb1a362-7aa8-444a-92ed-1987e8da83e1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49079,7 +49079,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process_id) as process_id dc(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id_count dc(Processes.process_id) as process_id_count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name= "cmd.exe" (Processes.process_name = "notepad.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name= "notepad.exe") Processes.parent_process = "*.bat*" by  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user  _time span=30s | where parent_process_id_count>= 10 AND process_id_count >=10 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_command_shell_dcrat_forkbomb_payload_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Command Shell Fetch Env Variables - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Command Shell Fetch Env Variables - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious process command line fetching the environment variables with a non-shell parent process. This technique was seen in qakbot malware where it fetches the environment variable in the target or compromised host. This TTP detection is a good pivot of possible malicious behavior since the command line is executed by a common non-shell process like cmd.exe , powershell.exe and many more. This can also be a good sign that the parent process has a malicious code injected to it to execute this command.
@@ -49091,7 +49091,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = shell process that are not included in this
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Command Shell Fetch Env Variables - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Command Shell Fetch Env Variables - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -49105,7 +49105,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Command Shell Fetch Env Variables - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Command Shell Fetch Env Variables - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Qakbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "048839e4-1eaa-43ff-8a22-86d17f6fcc13", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49126,7 +49126,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*cmd /c set" OR Processes.process = "*cmd.exe /c set" AND NOT (Processes.parent_process_name = "cmd.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powershell*" OR Processes.parent_process_name="pwsh.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "explorer.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_command_shell_fetch_env_variables_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following correlation identifies instances where four or more distinct detection analytics are associated with malicious command line behavior that is known to be exploited by multiple threat actors, adversaries, or red teamers on a specific host. By leveraging the Command Line Interface (CLI), attackers can execute malicious commands, gain access to sensitive data, install backdoors, and engage in various nefarious activities. The impact of such compromise can be severe, as attackers may gain unauthorized control over the compromised system, enabling them to exfiltrate valuable information, escalate privileges, or launch further attacks within the network. If this detection is triggered, there is a high level of confidence in the occurrence of suspicious command line activities on the host.
@@ -49138,7 +49138,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on man
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -49147,7 +49147,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - RIR - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - RIR - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "CISA AA23-347A", "DarkCrystal RAT", "Disabling Security Tools", "FIN7", "Netsh Abuse", "Qakbot", "Sandworm Tools", "Volt Typhoon", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222", "T1049", "T1033", "T1529", "T1016", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Correlation"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e99fcc4f-c6b0-4443-aa2a-e3c85126ec9a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49168,7 +49168,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where source IN ("*Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell*", "*Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS*", "*Local Account Discovery With Wmic*", "*Net Localgroup Discovery*", "*Create local admin accounts using net exe*", "*Local Account Discovery with Net*", "*Icacls Deny Command*", "*ICACLS Grant Command*", "*Windows Proxy Via Netsh*", "*Processes launching netsh*", "*Disabling Firewall with Netsh*", "*Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh*", "*Network Connection Discovery With Arp*", "*Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup*", "*Windows System Shutdown CommandLine*") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `windows_common_abused_cmd_shell_risk_behavior_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifes a Computer Account creating a new Computer Account with specific a Service Principle Name - "RestrictedKrbHost". The RestrictedKrbHost service class allows client applications to use Kerberos authentication when they do not have the identity of the service but have the server name.
@@ -49180,7 +49180,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible third party applications may
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -49194,7 +49194,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "97a8dc5f-8a7c-4fed-9e3e-ec407fd0268a", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49215,7 +49215,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4741 user_type=computer SubjectDomainName!="NT AUTHORITY" ServicePrincipalNames=*RestrictedKrbHost* | stats  count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, subject, action ,src_user, user, user_type, SubjectUserName,SubjectDomainName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_computer_account_created_by_computer_account_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a ComputerAccount requesting a Kerberos Ticket. typically, a user account requests a Kerberos ticket. This behavior was identified with KrbUpRelay, but additional Kerberos attacks have exhibited similar behavior.
@@ -49227,7 +49227,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible false positives will be prese
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -49241,7 +49241,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fb3b2bb3-75a4-4279-848a-165b42624770", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49262,7 +49262,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security`  EventCode=4768 TargetUserName="*$"  src_ip!="::1" | stats  count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, subject, action, user, TargetUserName, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_computer_account_requesting_kerberos_ticket_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies two SPNs, HOST and RestrictedKrbHost, added using the KrbRelayUp behavior. This particular behavior has been found in other Kerberos based attacks.
@@ -49274,7 +49274,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible third party applications may
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -49288,7 +49288,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9a3e57e7-33f4-470e-b25d-165baa6e8357", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49309,7 +49309,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4741 NewUacValue="0x80" ServicePrincipalNames IN ("*HOST/*","*RestrictedKrbHost/*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(EventCode),values(TargetDomainName),values(PrimaryGroupId), values(OldUacValue), values(NewUacValue),values(SamAccountName),values(DnsHostName),values(ServicePrincipalNames) by dest Logon_ID subject | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_computer_account_with_spn_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows ConHost with Headless Argument - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows ConHost with Headless Argument - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the unusual use of the Windows Console Host process (conhost.exe) with the undocumented --headless parameter to spawn a new process. This behavior is highly unusual and indicative of suspicious activity, as the --headless parameter is not commonly used in legitimate operations. The analytic identifies this behavior by looking for instances where conhost.exe is invoked with the --headless argument. This behavior is worth identifying for a Security Operations Center (SOC) as it could indicate an attacker's attempt to execute commands or scripts in a stealthy manner, potentially to establish persistence, perform lateral movement, or carry out other malicious activities. If a true positive is identified, it suggests that an attacker has gained a foothold in the environment and is attempting to further their attack, which could lead to serious consequences such as data exfiltration, system compromise, or deployment of ransomware. Potential false positives could arise from legitimate administrative activity, hence it is important to validate the context of the detected behavior during triage.
@@ -49321,7 +49321,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the applic
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows ConHost with Headless Argument - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows ConHost with Headless Argument - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -49335,7 +49335,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows ConHost with Headless Argument - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows ConHost with Headless Argument - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1564.003", "T1564.006"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d5039508-998d-4cfc-8b5e-9dcd679d9a62", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49356,7 +49356,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=conhost.exe Processes.process="*--headless *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_conhost_with_headless_argument_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Create Local Account - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Create Local Account - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a new local user account added to a computer. Note that, this should be restricted to critical assets.
@@ -49368,7 +49368,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that an administrator created
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Create Local Account - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Create Local Account - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -49382,7 +49382,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Create Local Account - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Create Local Account - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1136.001", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3fb2e8e3-7bc0-4567-9722-c5ab9f8595eb", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49397,7 +49397,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Changes.result_id) as result_id count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.result_id=4720 by All_Changes.user All_Changes.dest All_Changes.result All_Changes.action | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_create_local_account_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Credential Access From Browser Password Store - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Credential Access From Browser Password Store - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a possible non-common browser process accessing its browser user data profile. This tactic/technique has been observed in various Trojan Stealers, such as SnakeKeylogger, which attempt to gather sensitive browser information and credentials as part of their exfiltration strategy. Detecting this anomaly can serve as a valuable pivot for identifying processes that access lists of browser user data profiles unexpectedly. This detection uses a lookup file `browser_app_list` that maintains a list of well known browser applications and the browser paths that are allowed to access the browser user data profiles.
@@ -49409,7 +49409,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The lookup file `browser_app_list` may not c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Credential Access From Browser Password Store - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Credential Access From Browser Password Store - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -49423,7 +49423,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Credential Access From Browser Password Store - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Credential Access From Browser Password Store - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Snake Keylogger"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1012"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "72013a8e-5cea-408a-9d51-5585386b4d69", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49438,7 +49438,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 | lookup browser_app_list browser_object_path as object_file_path OUTPUT browser_process_name isAllowed | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(object_file_name) values(object_file_path)  values(browser_process_name) as browser_process_name by dest process_name process_path process_id EventCode isAllowed | rex field=process_name "(?<extracted_process_name>[^\\\\]+)$" | eval isMalicious=if(match(browser_process_name, extracted_process_name), "0", "1") | where isMalicious=1 and isAllowed="false" | `windows_credential_access_from_browser_password_store_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Createdump - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Createdump - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of CreateDump.exe being used to perform a process dump. This particular binary is not native to Windows, but is found to be brought in my many different third party applications including PowerShell 7.
@@ -49450,7 +49450,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if an applica
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Createdump - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Createdump - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -49464,7 +49464,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Createdump - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Createdump - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b3b7ce35-fce5-4c73-85f4-700aeada81a9", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49485,7 +49485,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=createdump.exe OR Processes.original_file_name="FX_VER_INTERNALNAME_STR" Processes.process="*-u *" AND Processes.process="*-f *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credential_dumping_lsass_memory_createdump_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic focuses on identifying non-chrome processes that attempt to access the Chrome extensions file. This file contains crucial settings and information related to the browser's extensions installed on the computer. Adversaries and malware authors have been known to exploit this file to extract sensitive information from the Chrome browser on targeted hosts. Detecting such anomalous behavior provides valuable insights for analyzing suspicious processes beyond the commonly observed chrome.exe and explorer.exe executables. By monitoring for access to the Chrome extensions file by non-chrome processes, we can enhance our ability to detect potential threats and protect sensitive information stored within the browser.
@@ -49497,7 +49497,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Uninstall chrome browser extension applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -49511,7 +49511,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Amadey", "CISA AA23-347A", "DarkGate Malware", "Phemedrone Stealer", "RedLine Stealer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1012"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2e65afe0-9a75-4487-bd87-ada9a9f1b9af", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49526,7 +49526,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path="*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\*" AND NOT (process_path IN ("*:\\Windows\\explorer.exe", "*\\chrome.exe")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path  process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_extension_access_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to detect non-chrome processes accessing the Chrome user data file called "local state." This file contains important settings and information related to the browser's operations on the computer. Threat actors, adversaries, and malware authors have been known to exploit this file in attempts to extract the encrypted master key used for decrypting passwords saved in the Chrome browser. Detecting access to the "local state" file by non-chrome processes serves as a valuable pivot for analyzing suspicious processes beyond the commonly observed chrome.exe and explorer.exe executables. By monitoring for this anomaly, we can improve our ability to identify potential threats and safeguard sensitive information stored within the browser.
@@ -49538,7 +49538,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Uninstall chrome application may access this
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -49552,7 +49552,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Amadey", "DarkGate Malware", "NjRAT", "Phemedrone Stealer", "RedLine Stealer", "Snake Keylogger", "Warzone RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1012"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3b1d09a8-a26f-473e-a510-6c6613573657", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49567,7 +49567,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path="*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Local State" NOT (process_name IN ("*\\chrome.exe","*:\\Windows\\explorer.exe")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path  process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_localstate_access_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to identify non-chrome processes accessing the Chrome user data file called "login data." This SQLite database file contains important information related to the browser's operations on the computer. Threat actors, adversaries, and malware authors have been known to exploit this file in attempts to extract and decrypt passwords saved in the Chrome browser. Detecting access to the "login data" file by non-chrome processes serves as a valuable pivot for analyzing suspicious processes beyond the commonly observed chrome.exe and explorer.exe executables. By monitoring for this anomaly, we can enhance our ability to detect potential threats and protect sensitive information stored within the browser.
@@ -49579,7 +49579,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Uninstall application may access this regist
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -49593,7 +49593,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Amadey", "DarkGate Malware", "NjRAT", "Phemedrone Stealer", "RedLine Stealer", "Snake Keylogger", "Warzone RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1012"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0d32ba37-80fc-4429-809c-0ba15801aeaf", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49608,7 +49608,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path="*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Login Data" AND NOT (process_path IN ("*:\\Windows\\explorer.exe", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\dllhost.exe", "*\\chrome.exe")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path  process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_login_data_access_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process execution of Windows OS cmdkey.exe tool. This tool is being abused or used by several post exploitation tool and malware such as Darkgate malware to create stored user names, passwords or credentials in the targeted Windows OS host. This information can be used by the attacker to gain privilege escalation and persistence in the targeted hosts for further attacks.
@@ -49620,7 +49620,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network administrator can use this tool for
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -49634,7 +49634,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c0c5a479-bf57-4ca0-af3a-4c7081e5ba05", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49655,7 +49655,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="cmdkey.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name = "cmdkey.exe" AND Processes.process = "*/generic*" Processes.process IN ("*/user*", "*/password*") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_creation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process execution of Windows OS cmdkey.exe tool. This tool is being abused or used by several post exploitation tool and malware such as Darkgate malware to delete stored user names, passwords or credentials in the targeted Windows OS host. This information can be used by the attacker to gain privilege escalation and persistence in the targeted hosts for further attacks.
@@ -49667,7 +49667,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network administrator can use this tool for
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -49681,7 +49681,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "46d676aa-40c6-4fe6-b917-d23b621f0f89", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49702,7 +49702,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="cmdkey.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name = "cmdkey.exe" AND Processes.process = "*/delete*" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_deletion_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process execution of Windows OS cmdkey.exe tool. This tool is being abused or used by several post exploitation tool such as winpeas that being used by ransomware prestige to list stored user names, passwords or credentials in the targeted Windows OS host. This information can be used by the attacker to gain privilege escalation and persistence in the targeted hosts for further attacks.
@@ -49714,7 +49714,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network administrator can use this tool for
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -49728,7 +49728,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware", "Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "db02d6b4-5d5b-4c33-8d8f-f0577516a8c7", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49743,7 +49743,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="cmdkey.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name = "cmdkey.exe" AND Processes.process = "*/list*" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_query_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process command line related to the discovery of possible password or credentials in the registry. This technique is being abused by adversaries or post exploitation tools like winpeas to steal credentials in the registry in the targeted host. Registry can contain several sensitive information like username and credentials that can be used for privilege escalation, persistence or even in lateral movement. This Anomaly detection can be a good pivot to detect a suspicious process querying a registry related to password or private keys.
@@ -49755,7 +49755,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -49769,7 +49769,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.002", "T1552"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a8b3124e-2278-4b73-ae9c-585117079fb2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49784,7 +49784,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` AND Processes.process = "* query *" AND Processes.process IN ("*\\Software\\ORL\\WinVNC3\\Password*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\RealVNC\\WinVNC4 /v password*", "*\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\SNMP*", "*\\Software\\TightVNC\\Server*", "*\\Software\\SimonTatham\\PuTTY\\Sessions*", "*\\Software\\OpenSSH\\Agent\\Keys*", "*password*") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_in_registry_reg_query_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe downloading a file to a suspicious location.\
@@ -49800,7 +49800,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible Administrators or super users
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -49814,7 +49814,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Forest Blizzard", "IcedID", "Ingress Tool Transfer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c32f091e-30db-11ec-8738-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49837,7 +49837,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN ("*-O *","*--output*") Processes.process IN ("*\\appdata\\*","*\\programdata\\*","*\\public\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of Windows Curl.exe uploading a file to a remote destination.\
@@ -49863,7 +49863,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be limited to source con
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -49877,7 +49877,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ingress Tool Transfer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "42f8f1a2-4228-11ec-aade-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49905,7 +49905,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_curl` Processes.process IN ("*-T *","*--upload-file *", "*-d *", "*--data *", "*-F *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_curl_upload_to_remote_destination_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies a suspicious process that is recursively deleting files on a compromised host. This behavior has been observed in several types of destructive malware, such as CaddyWiper, DoubleZero, and SwiftSlicer, which delete or overwrite files with randomly generated strings to make recovery impossible. Additionally, this analytic can detect potential recursive file writes across multiple files using Sysmon Event 23 or 26. Sysmon considers a file as deleted as soon as it is overwritten. This analytic serves as a strong indicator of potential destructive malware activity on a host machine or the uninstallation of a large software application.
@@ -49917,7 +49917,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The uninstallation of a large software appli
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -49931,7 +49931,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Swift Slicer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3596a799-6320-4a2f-8772-a9e98ddb2960", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49952,7 +49952,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode IN ("23","26") TargetFilename IN ("*.exe", "*.sys", "*.dll") | bin _time span=2m | stats count, values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime by user, dest, signature, signature_id, Image, process_name, process_guid | rename Image as process | where count >=500 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_data_destruction_recursive_exec_files_deletion_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Defacement Modify Transcodedwallpaper File - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Defacement Modify Transcodedwallpaper File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification to the Transcodedwallpaper file in the wallpaper theme directory to change the wallpaper of the host machine. This technique was seen in adversaries attempting to deface or change the desktop wallpaper of the targeted host. During our testing, the common process that affects or changes the wallpaper if a user changes it via desktop personalized setting is explorer.exe.
@@ -49964,7 +49964,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = 3rd part software application can change the
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Defacement Modify Transcodedwallpaper File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Defacement Modify Transcodedwallpaper File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -49978,7 +49978,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Defacement Modify Transcodedwallpaper File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Defacement Modify Transcodedwallpaper File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brute Ratel C4"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1491"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e11c3d90-5bc7-42ad-94cd-ba75db10d897", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -49993,7 +49993,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path !="*\\Windows\\Explorer.EXE" by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid  Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | join proc_guid, _time [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path = "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Themes\\TranscodedWallpaper" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields file_name file_path process_name process_path process dest file_create_time _time proc_guid] | `windows_defacement_modify_transcodedwallpaper_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Event ID 5136 to identify the modification of a default Group Policy Object. A fresh installation of an Active Directory network will typically contain two default group policy objects `Default Domain Controllers Policy` and `Default Domain Policy`. The default domain controllers policy is used to enforce and set policies to all the domain controllers within the domain environment. The default domain policy is linked to all users and computers by default. An adversary who has obtained privileged access to an Active Directory network may modify the default group policy objects to obtain further access, deploy persistence or execute malware across a large number of hosts. Security teams should monitor the modification of the default GPOs.
@@ -50005,7 +50005,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The default Group Policy Objects within an A
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -50019,7 +50019,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1484", "T1484.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fe6a6cc4-9e0d-4d66-bcf4-2c7f44860876", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50040,7 +50040,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 ObjectClass=groupPolicyContainer AttributeLDAPDisplayName=versionNumber (ObjectDN="CN={31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9},CN=POLICIES,CN=SYSTEM,DC=*" OR ObjectDN="CN={6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9},CN=POLICIES,CN=SYSTEM,DC=*") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ObjectDN SubjectUserSid AttributeValue Computer DSName | rename AttributeValue as versionNumber | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_default_group_policy_object_modified_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages the Endpoint datamodel to identify the potential edition of a default Group Policy Object. A fresh installation of an Active Directory network will typically contain two default group policy objects `Default Domain Controllers Policy` and `Default Domain Policy`. The default domain controllers policy is used to enforce and set policies to all the domain controllers within the domain environment. The default domain policy is linked to all users and computers by default. An adversary who has obtained privileged access to an Active Directory network may modify the default group policy objects to obtain further access, deploy persistence or execute malware across a large number of hosts. Security teams should monitor the edition of the default GPOs.
@@ -50052,7 +50052,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The default Group Policy Objects within an A
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -50066,7 +50066,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1484", "T1484.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "eaf688b3-bb8f-454d-b105-920a862cd8cb", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50087,7 +50087,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=mmc.exe (Processes.process =*gpme.msc*) AND (Processes.process = "*31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9*" OR Processes.process = "*6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9*"  ) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_default_group_policy_object_modified_with_gpme_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Audit Events - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Audit Events - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection searches for Windows Defender ASR audit events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This detection searches for ASR audit events that are generated when a process or application attempts to perform an action that would be blocked by an ASR rule, but is allowed to proceed for auditing purposes.
@@ -50099,7 +50099,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are expected from legitimate
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Audit Events - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Audit Events - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Defender"]
@@ -50113,7 +50113,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Audit Events - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Audit Events - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Attack Surface Reduction"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1566.001", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0e4d46b1-22bd-4f0e-8337-ca6f60ad4bea", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50128,7 +50128,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `ms_defender` EventCode IN (1122, 1125, 1126, 1132, 1134) | lookup asr_rules ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule | fillnull value=NULL | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host, Process_Name, Target_Commandline, Path, ID, EventCode, ASR_Rule | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| rename host as dest | `windows_defender_asr_audit_events_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Block Events - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Block Events - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection searches for Windows Defender ASR block events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This detection searches for ASR block events that are generated when a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule. Typically, these will be enabled in block most after auditing and tuning the ASR rules themselves. Set to TTP once tuned.
@@ -50140,7 +50140,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are expected from legitimate
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Block Events - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Block Events - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Defender"]
@@ -50154,7 +50154,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Block Events - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Block Events - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Attack Surface Reduction"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1566.001", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "026f5f4e-e99f-4155-9e63-911ba587300b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50169,7 +50169,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `ms_defender` EventCode IN (1121, 1126, 1129, 1131, 1133) | lookup asr_rules ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule | fillnull value=NULL | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host, Path, Parent_Commandline, Process_Name, ID, EventCode, ASR_Rule | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| rename host as dest | `windows_defender_asr_block_events_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Registry Modification - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Registry Modification - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection searches for Windows Defender ASR registry modification events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This detection searches for ASR registry modification events that are generated when a process or application attempts to modify a registry key that is blocked by an ASR rule. Typically, these will be enabled in block most after auditing and tuning the ASR rules themselves. Set to TTP once tuned.
@@ -50181,7 +50181,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are expected from legitimate
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Registry Modification - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Registry Modification - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Defender"]
@@ -50190,7 +50190,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Registry Modification - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Registry Modification - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Attack Surface Reduction"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6a1b6cbe-6612-44c3-92b9-1a1bd77412eb", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50205,7 +50205,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `ms_defender` EventCode IN (5007) | rex field=New_Value "0x(?<New_Registry_Value>\\d+)$" | rex field=Old_Value "0x(?<Old_Registry_Value>\\d+)$" | rex field=New_Value "Rules\\\\(?<ASR_ID>[A-Fa-f0-9\\-]+)\\s*=" | lookup asr_rules ID AS ASR_ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule | eval New_Registry_Value=case(New_Registry_Value=="0", "Disabled", New_Registry_Value=="1", "Block", New_Registry_Value=="2", "Audit", New_Registry_Value=="6", "Warn") | eval Old_Registry_Value=case(Old_Registry_Value=="0", "Disabled", Old_Registry_Value=="1", "Block", Old_Registry_Value=="2", "Audit", Old_Registry_Value=="6", "Warn") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host, New_Value, Old_Value, Old_Registry_Value, New_Registry_Value, ASR_Rule | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_defender_asr_registry_modification_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Rule Disabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Rule Disabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies when a Windows Defender ASR rule disabled events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This detection searches for ASR rule disabled events that are generated when an ASR rule is disabled.
@@ -50217,7 +50217,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may occur if applications ar
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Rule Disabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Rule Disabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Defender"]
@@ -50231,7 +50231,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Rule Disabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Rule Disabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Attack Surface Reduction"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "429d611b-3183-49a7-b235-fc4203c4e1cb", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50252,7 +50252,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `ms_defender` EventCode IN (5007) | rex field=New_Value "0x(?<New_Registry_Value>\\d+)$" | rex field=Old_Value "0x(?<Old_Registry_Value>\\d+)$" | rex field=New_Value "Rules\\\\(?<ASR_ID>[A-Fa-f0-9\\-]+)\\s*=" | lookup asr_rules ID AS ASR_ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule | eval New_Registry_Value=case(New_Registry_Value=="0", "Disabled", New_Registry_Value=="1", "Block", New_Registry_Value=="2", "Audit", New_Registry_Value=="6", "Warn") | eval Old_Registry_Value=case(Old_Registry_Value=="0", "Disabled", Old_Registry_Value=="1", "Block", Old_Registry_Value=="2", "Audit", Old_Registry_Value=="6", "Warn") | search New_Registry_Value="Disabled" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host, New_Value, Old_Value, Old_Registry_Value, New_Registry_Value, ASR_Rule | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| rename host as dest | `windows_defender_asr_rule_disabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Rules Stacking - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Rules Stacking - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This hunting analytic targets a range of security events from Microsoft Defender, focusing on the Exploit Guard and Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) features. It monitors specific Event IDs - Event IDs 1121 and 1126 indicate active blocking of unauthorized operations or dangerous network connections, whereas Event IDs 1122 and 1125 represent audit logs for similar activities. Event ID 1129 shows user overrides on blocked operations. For ASR-related activities, Event IDs 1131 and 1133 signal blocked operations, while 1132 and 1134 are audit logs. Event ID 5007 alerts on configuration changes, possibly indicating security breaches.\
@@ -50266,7 +50266,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are not expected with this a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Rules Stacking - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Rules Stacking - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Defender"]
@@ -50275,7 +50275,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Rules Stacking - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Rules Stacking - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Attack Surface Reduction"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566.002", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "425a6657-c5e4-4cbb-909e-fc9e5d326f01", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50290,7 +50290,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `ms_defender` EventCode IN (1121, 1122, 1125, 1126, 1129, 1131, 1132, 1133, 1134, 5007) | lookup asr_rules ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule | fillnull value=NULL | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host Parent_Commandline, Process_Name, Path, ID, EventCode, ASR_Rule | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| rename host as dest | `windows_defender_asr_rules_stacking_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic will detect a suspicious process that modify a registry related to windows defender exclusion feature. This registry is abused by adversaries, malware author and red teams to bypassed Windows Defender Anti-Virus product by excluding folder path, file path, process, extensions and etc. from its real time or schedule scan to execute their malicious code. This is a good indicator for a defense evasion and to look further for events after this behavior.
@@ -50302,7 +50302,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to use this windows
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -50316,7 +50316,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "Qakbot", "Remcos", "Warzone RAT", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "13395a44-4dd9-11ec-9df7-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50337,7 +50337,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\*") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Delete or Modify System Firewall - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Delete or Modify System Firewall - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies potentially malicious 'netsh' processes that manipulate firewall configurations. This behavior has been observed in the NJRAT malware, which deletes its added firewall rules as part of its cleanup process. Leveraging this anomaly detection can be a valuable approach for detecting malware, such as NJRAT, that makes alterations to firewall configurations as a component of its malicious activities.
@@ -50349,7 +50349,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator may modify or delete firewall
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Delete or Modify System Firewall - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Delete or Modify System Firewall - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -50363,7 +50363,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Delete or Modify System Firewall - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Delete or Modify System Firewall - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NjRAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b188d11a-eba7-419d-b8b6-cc265b4f2c4f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50378,7 +50378,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process = "* firewall *" Processes.process = "* delete *" by Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_delete_or_modify_system_firewall_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect deletion of registry with suspicious process file path. This technique was seen in Double Zero wiper malware where it will delete all the subkey in HKLM, HKCU and HKU registry hive as part of its destructive payload to the targeted hosts. This anomaly detections can catch possible malware or advesaries deleting registry as part of defense evasion or even payload impact but can also catch for third party application updates or installation. In this scenario false positive filter is needed.
@@ -50390,7 +50390,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection can catch for third party app
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -50404,7 +50404,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Double Zero Destructor"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "15e70689-f55b-489e-8a80-6d0cd6d8aad2", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50419,7 +50419,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.action=deleted BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE NOT (Processes.process_path IN ("*\\windows\\*", "*\\program files*")) by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | fields _time parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process process_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name action dest user | `windows_deleted_registry_by_a_non_critical_process_file_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable change password feature of the windows host. This registry modification may disables the Change Password button on the Windows Security dialog box (which appears when you press Ctrl+Alt+Del). As a result, users cannot change their Windows password on demand. This technique was seen in some malware family like ransomware to prevent the user to change the password after ownning the network or a system during attack. This windows feature may implemented by administrator to prevent normal user to change the password of a critical host or server, In this type of scenario filter is needed to minimized false positive.
@@ -50431,7 +50431,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This windows feature may implemented by admi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -50445,7 +50445,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0df33e1a-9ef6-11ec-a1ad-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50460,7 +50460,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\DisableChangePassword" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_change_password_through_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable Lock Computer windows features. This registry modification prevent the user from locking its screen or computer that are being abused by several malware for example ransomware. This technique was used by threat actor to make its payload more impactful to the compromised host.
@@ -50472,7 +50472,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -50486,7 +50486,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c82adbc6-9f00-11ec-a81f-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50501,7 +50501,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\DisableLockWorkstation" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_lock_workstation_feature_through_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable logoff feature in windows host. This registry when enable will prevent users to log off of the system by using any method, including programs run from the command line, such as scripts. It also disables or removes all menu items and buttons that log the user off of the system. This technique was seen abused by ransomware malware to make the compromised host un-useful and hard to remove other registry modification made on the machine that needs restart to take effect. This windows feature may implement by administrator in some server where shutdown is critical. In that scenario filter of machine and users that can modify this registry is needed.
@@ -50513,7 +50513,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This windows feature may implement by admini
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -50527,7 +50527,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b2fb6830-9ed1-11ec-9fcb-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50542,7 +50542,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\*" Registry.registry_value_name IN ("NoLogOff", "StartMenuLogOff") Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_logoff_button_through_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process that is attempting to disable the ability on Windows to generate a memory crash dump. This was recently identified being utilized by HermeticWiper. To disable crash dumps, the value must be set to 0. This feature is typically modified to perform a memory crash dump when a computer stops unexpectedly because of a Stop error (also known as a blue screen, system crash, or bug check).
@@ -50554,7 +50554,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -50568,7 +50568,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "59e54602-9680-11ec-a8a6-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50589,7 +50589,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\CrashControl\\CrashDumpEnabled") AND Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name  | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_memory_crash_dump_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following search identifies a modification of registry to disable the windows notification center feature in a windows host machine. This registry modification removes notification and action center from the notification area on the task bar. This modification are seen in RAT malware to cover their tracks upon downloading other of its component or other payload.
@@ -50601,7 +50601,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = admin or user may choose to disable this win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -50615,7 +50615,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1cd983c8-8fd6-11ec-a09d-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50630,7 +50630,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_value_name= "DisableNotificationCenter" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_notification_center_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Disable or Modify Tools Via Taskkill - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Disable or Modify Tools Via Taskkill - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to identify potentially malicious processes that terminate other processes using taskkill.exe. This technique has been observed in various malware instances, employed by adversaries and red teamers alike, to forcibly terminate other processes whether they be security products or other legitimate applications as part of their malicious activities. Detecting this anomaly serves as a valuable alert mechanism to identify suspicious processes or malware attempting to evade detection and disrupt system stability.
@@ -50642,7 +50642,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Network administrator can use this applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable or Modify Tools Via Taskkill - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Disable or Modify Tools Via Taskkill - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -50656,7 +50656,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable or Modify Tools Via Taskkill - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Disable or Modify Tools Via Taskkill - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NjRAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562", "T1562.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a43ae66f-c410-4b3d-8741-9ce1ad17ddb0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50671,7 +50671,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "taskkill.exe" Processes.process IN ("* /f*", "* /t*") Processes.process IN ("* /im*", "* /pid*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid  Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_or_modify_tools_via_taskkill_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable shutdown button on the logon user. This technique was seen in several malware especially in ransomware family like killdisk malware variant to make the compromised host un-useful and hard to remove other registry modification made on the machine that needs restart to take effect. This windows feature may implement by administrator in some server where shutdown is critical. In that scenario filter of machine and users that can modify this registry is needed.
@@ -50683,7 +50683,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This windows feature may implement by admini
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -50697,7 +50697,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "55fb2958-9ecd-11ec-a06a-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50712,7 +50712,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE ((Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\shutdownwithoutlogon" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000000") OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\NoClose" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001")) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_shutdown_button_through_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies AppCmd.exe being utilized to disable HTTP logging on IIS. Adversaries may perform this action to disable logging and delete the logs so remove any trace or events on disk.
@@ -50724,7 +50724,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present only if scrip
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -50738,7 +50738,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "IIS Components", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.002", "T1562", "T1505", "T1505.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "23fb6787-255f-4d5b-9a66-9fd7504032b5", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50759,7 +50759,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.parent_process_name  IN ("msiexec.exe", "iissetup.exe")) Processes.process_name=appcmd.exe Processes.process IN ("*set config*", "*httplogging*","*dontlog:true*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_windows_event_logging_disable_http_logging_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable windows features. These techniques are seen in several ransomware malware to impair the compromised host to make it hard for analyst to mitigate or response from the attack. Disabling these known features make the analysis and forensic response more hard. Disabling these feature is not so common but can still be implemented by the administrator for security purposes. In this scenario filters for users that are allowed doing this is needed.
@@ -50771,7 +50771,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Disabling these features for legitimate purp
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -50785,7 +50785,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "63a449ae-9f04-11ec-945e-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50800,7 +50800,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\*" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\*" Registry.registry_value_name IN ("NoDesktop", "NoFind", "NoControlPanel", "NoFileMenu", "NoSetTaskbar", "NoTrayContextMenu", "TaskbarLockAll", "NoThemesTab","NoPropertiesMyDocuments","NoVisualStyleChoice","NoColorChoice","NoPropertiesMyDocuments") Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_disable_windows_group_policy_features_through_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The search looks for the Registry Key DisableAntiSpyware set to disable. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an ransomware actor gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications. Endpoint should be isolated.
@@ -50812,7 +50812,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -50826,7 +50826,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "CISA AA22-264A", "CISA AA23-347A", "RedLine Stealer", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "23150a40-9301-4195-b802-5bb4f43067fb", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50847,7 +50847,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_name="DisableAntiSpyware" AND Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_disableantispyware_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies DiskCryptor  process name of dcrypt.exe or internal name dcinst.exe. This utility has been utilized by adversaries to encrypt disks manually during an operation. In addition, during install, a dcrypt.sys driver is installed and requires a reboot in order to take effect. There are no command-line arguments used.
@@ -50859,7 +50859,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible false positives may be presen
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -50868,7 +50868,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1486"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d56fe0c8-4650-11ec-a8fa-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50883,7 +50883,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="dcrypt.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name=dcinst.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskcryptor_usage_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = DiskShadow.exe is a Microsoft Signed binary present on Windows Server. It has a scripting mode intended for complex scripted backup operations. This feature also allows for execution of arbitrary unsigned code. This analytic looks for the usage of the scripting mode flags in executions of DiskShadow. During triage, compare to known backup behavior in your environment and then review the scripts called by diskshadow.
@@ -50895,7 +50895,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators using the DiskShadow tool in
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -50909,7 +50909,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "58adae9e-8ea3-11ec-90f6-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50930,7 +50930,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_diskshadow` (Processes.process=*-s* OR Processes.process=*/s*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_diskshadow_proxy_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of the Windows Disk Image Utility, `dism.exe`, to remove Windows Defender. Adversaries may use `dism.exe` to disable Defender before completing their objective.
@@ -50942,7 +50942,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate administrative tools leverag
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -50956,7 +50956,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8567da9e-47f0-11ec-99a9-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -50977,7 +50977,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dism.exe (Processes.process="*/online*" AND Processes.process="*/disable-feature*" AND Processes.process="*Windows-Defender*" AND Processes.process="*/remove*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dism_remove_defender_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This hunting analytic identifies known Windows libraries potentially used in DLL search order hijacking or DLL Sideloading scenarios. Such cases may necessitate recompiling the DLL, relocating the DLL, or moving the vulnerable process. The query searches for any processes running outside of system32 or syswow64 directories. Certain libraries inherently operate from different application paths and must be added to the exclusion list as required. The lookup includes Microsoft native libraries cataloged in the Hijacklibs.net project.
@@ -50989,7 +50989,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on pat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -50998,7 +50998,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Qakbot", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 10, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.001", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "79c7d1fc-64c7-91be-a616-ccda752efe81", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51013,7 +51013,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 NOT (process_path IN ("*\\system32\\*", "*\\syswow64\\*","*\\winsxs\\*","*\\wbem\\*")) | lookup hijacklibs library AS loaded_file OUTPUT islibrary | search islibrary = True | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(process_name) as process_name by _time dest loaded_file | `windows_dll_search_order_hijacking_hunt_with_sysmon_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a recently disclosed search ordler DLL hijack in iscsicpl.exe. The malicious DLL must be in a new path and iscsicpl.exe, upon load, will execute the payload. The analytic is restricted to Windows shells. Two proof of concepts were identified and utilized to determine the behavior. The command-line is an option to go after, but most likely identifying a child process off iscsicpl.exe will be more effective. Monitoring for suspicious DLL loads is also an option.
@@ -51025,7 +51025,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filtering ma
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -51039,7 +51039,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f39ee679-3b1e-4f47-841c-5c3c580acda2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51060,7 +51060,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=iscsicpl.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_dll_search_order_hijacking_with_iscsicpl_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Side-Loading In Calc - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows DLL Side-Loading In Calc - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies suspicious DLL modules loaded by calc.exe that are not in windows %systemroot%\system32 or %systemroot%\sysWoW64 folder. This technique is well used by Qakbot malware to execute its malicious DLL file via dll side loading technique in calc process execution. This TTP detection is a good indicator that a suspicious dll was loaded in a public or non-common installation folder of Windows Operating System that needs further investigation.
@@ -51072,7 +51072,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Side-Loading In Calc - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DLL Side-Loading In Calc - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -51086,7 +51086,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Side-Loading In Calc - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DLL Side-Loading In Calc - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Qakbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "af01f6db-26ac-440e-8d89-2793e303f137", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51107,7 +51107,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 Image = "*\calc.exe" AND NOT (Image IN ("*:\\windows\\system32\\*", "*:\\windows\\sysWow64\\*")) AND NOT(ImageLoaded IN("*:\\windows\\system32\\*", "*:\\windows\\sysWow64\\*", "*:\\windows\\WinSXS\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName Product process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dll_side_loading_in_calc_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Side-Loading Process Child Of Calc - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows DLL Side-Loading Process Child Of Calc - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the suspicious child process of calc.exe due to dll side loading technique to execute another executable. This technique was seen in qakbot malware that uses dll side loading technique to calc applications to load its malicious dll code. The malicious dll that abuses dll side loading technique will load the actual qakbot loader dll using regsvr32.exe application. This TTP is a good indicator of qakbot since the calc.exe will not load other child processes aside from win32calc.exe.
@@ -51119,7 +51119,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Side-Loading Process Child Of Calc - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DLL Side-Loading Process Child Of Calc - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -51133,7 +51133,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Side-Loading Process Child Of Calc - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DLL Side-Loading Process Child Of Calc - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Qakbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "295ca9ed-e97b-4520-90f7-dfb6469902e1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51148,7 +51148,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name = "calc.exe")  AND Processes.process_name != "win32calc.exe" by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dll_side_loading_process_child_of_calc_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows DNS Gather Network Info - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows DNS Gather Network Info - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process command line used to enumerate DNS records. Adversaries, threat actors, or red teamers may employ this technique to gather information about a victim's DNS, which can be utilized during targeting. This method was also observed as part of a tool used by the Sandworm APT group in a geopolitical cyber warfare attack. By using the dnscmd.exe Windows application, an attacker can enumerate DNS records for specific domains within the targeted network, potentially aiding in further attacks. This anomaly detection can serve as a valuable starting point for identifying users and hostnames that may be compromised or targeted by adversaries seeking to collect data information.
@@ -51160,7 +51160,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network administrator can execute this comma
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows DNS Gather Network Info - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DNS Gather Network Info - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -51174,7 +51174,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows DNS Gather Network Info - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DNS Gather Network Info - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Sandworm Tools", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1590.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "347e0892-e8f3-4512-afda-dc0e3fa996f3", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51189,7 +51189,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "dnscmd.exe" Processes.process = "* /enumrecords *" by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dns_gather_network_info_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Event ID 4732 to identify the addition of a new member to the DnsAdmins group within Active Directory. . Members of the DnsAdmin group can manage the DNS service which most of the times runs on the Domain Controller. By abusing legitimate DNS management functionality, a member of the DnsAdmins group can escalate privileges by executing malicious code on a Domain Controller as SYSTEM. Security teams should monitor the modification of the DnsAdmins group and validate the changes are legitimate.
@@ -51201,7 +51201,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = New members can be added to the DnsAdmins gr
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -51215,7 +51215,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "27e600aa-77f8-4614-bc80-2662a67e2f48", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51236,7 +51236,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4732 TargetUserName=DnsAdmins | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(TargetUserName) as target_users_added values(user) as user by  dest src_user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_dnsadmins_new_member_added_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Event ID 4104 to identify the execution of the PowerView powershell commandlets Get-NetComputer. This technique was seen used in the context of PowerView's Get-NetUser cmdlet as a filter or parameter to query Active Directory user account's "samccountname", "accountexpires", "lastlogon" and so on. This hunting query is a good pivot to look for suspicious process or malware that gather user account information in a host or within network system.
@@ -51248,7 +51248,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerView for le
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -51262,7 +51262,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a7fbbc4e-4571-424a-b627-6968e1c939e4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51277,7 +51277,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104  ScriptBlockText = "*Get-NetComputer*" ScriptBlockText IN ("*samaccountname*", "*accountexpires*", "*lastlogon*", "*lastlogoff*", "*pwdlastset*", "*logoncount*") | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_domain_account_discovery_via_get_netcomputer_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies potential Kerberos ticket forging attacks, specifically the Diamond Ticket attack. This is detected when a user logs into a host and the GroupMembership field in event 4627 indicates a privileged group (e.g., Domain Admins), but the user does not actually belong to that group in the directory service. The detection leverages Windows Security Event Log 4627, which logs account logon events. The analytic cross-references the GroupMembership field from the event against a pre-populated lookup of actual group memberships. Its crucial to note that the accuracy and effectiveness of this detection heavily rely on the users diligence in populating and regularly updating this lookup table. Any discrepancies between the events GroupMembership and the lookup indicate potential ticket forging. Kerberos ticket forging, especially the Diamond Ticket attack, allows attackers to impersonate any user and potentially gain unauthorized access to resources. By forging a ticket that indicates membership in a privileged group, an attacker can bypass security controls and gain elevated privileges. Detecting such discrepancies in group memberships during logon events can be a strong indicator of this attack in progress, making it crucial for security teams to monitor and investigate. If validated as a true positive, this indicates that an attacker has successfully forged a Kerberos ticket and may have gained unauthorized access to critical resources, potentially with elevated privileges.
@@ -51289,7 +51289,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may trigger the detections c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -51303,7 +51303,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "10381f93-6d38-470a-9c30-d25478e3bd3f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51324,7 +51324,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security`  EventCode=4627 LogonType=3 NOT TargetUserName IN ("*$", "SYSTEM", "DWM-*","LOCAL SERVICE","NETWORK SERVICE", "ANONYMOUS LOGON", "UMFD-*") | where match(GroupMembership, "Domain Admins") | lookup domain_admins username as TargetUserName OUTPUT username | fillnull value=NotDA username | search username = "NotDA" | stats  count by _time, TargetUserName, GroupMembership, host | `windows_domain_admin_impersonation_indicator_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies native .net binaries within the Windows operating system that may be abused by adversaries by moving it to a new directory. The analytic identifies the .net binary by using a lookup and compares the process name and original file name (internal name). The analytic utilizes a lookup with the is_net_windows_file_macro macro to identify the binary process name and original file name. if one or the other matches an alert will be generated. Adversaries abuse these binaries as they are native to windows and native DotNet. Note that not all SDK (post install of Windows) are captured in the lookup.
@@ -51336,7 +51336,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -51350,7 +51350,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Ransomware", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "Unusual Processes", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003", "T1218", "T1218.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fddf3b56-7933-11ec-98a6-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51371,7 +51371,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.process_path IN ("*\\Windows\\ADWS\\*","*\\Windows\\SysWOW64*", "*\\Windows\\system32*", "*\\Windows\\NetworkController\\*", "*\\Windows\\SystemApps\\*", "*\\WinSxS\\*", "*\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_net_windows_file_macro` | `windows_dotnet_binary_in_non_standard_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Driver Inventory - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Driver Inventory - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following hunting / inventory query assists defenders in identifying Drivers being loaded across the fleet. This query relies upon a PowerShell script input to be deployed to critical systems and beyond. If capturing all via the input, this will provide retrospection into drivers persisting. Note, that this is not perfect across a large fleet. Modify the query as you need to view the data differently. 
@@ -51383,7 +51383,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Filter and modify the analytic as you'd like
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Driver Inventory - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Driver Inventory - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -51392,7 +51392,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Windows Driver Inventory - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Windows Driver Inventory - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Drivers"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 10, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f87aa96b-369b-4a3e-9021-1bbacbfcb8fb", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51407,7 +51407,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `driverinventory` | stats values(Path) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by host DriverType | rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_driver_inventory_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic uses Windows EventCode 7045 to identify new Kernel Mode Drivers being loaded in Windows from a non-standard path. Note that, adversaries may move malicious or vulnerable drivers into these paths and load up. The idea is that this analytic provides visibility into drivers loading in non-standard file paths.
@@ -51419,7 +51419,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on legi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -51433,7 +51433,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "BlackByte Ransomware", "CISA AA22-320A", "Windows Drivers"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1014", "T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9216ef3d-066a-4958-8f27-c84589465e62", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51454,7 +51454,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceType="kernel mode driver" NOT (ImagePath IN ("*\\Windows\\*", "*\\Program File*", "*\\systemroot\\*","%SystemRoot%*", "system32\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_driver_load_non_standard_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic assists with viewing all drivers being loaded by using Sysmon EventCode 6 (Driver Load). Sysmon provides some simple fields to assist with identifying suspicious drivers. Use this analytic to look at prevalence of driver (count), path of driver, signature status and hash. Review these fields with scrutiny until the ability to prove the driver is legitimate and has a purpose in the environment.
@@ -51466,7 +51466,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This analytic is meant to assist with identi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -51475,7 +51475,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "BlackByte Ransomware", "CISA AA22-320A", "Windows Drivers"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1014", "T1068"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d2d4af6a-6c2b-4d79-80c5-fc2cf12a2f68", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51490,7 +51490,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=6 | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) count by dest Signed Signature service_signature_verified service_signature_exists Hashes | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_drivers_loaded_by_signature_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic searches for a registry modification that enables the use of the at.exe or wmi Win32_ScheduledJob command to add scheduled tasks on a Windows endpoint. Specifically, it looks for the creation of a new DWORD value named "EnableAt" in the following registry path: "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\Configuration". If this value is set to 1, it enables the at.exe and wmi Win32_ScheduledJob commands to schedule tasks on the system. Detecting this registry modification is important because it may indicate that an attacker has enabled the ability to add scheduled tasks to the system, which can be used to execute malicious code at specific times or intervals.
@@ -51502,7 +51502,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = In some cases, an automated script or system
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -51516,7 +51516,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "12c80db8-ef62-4456-92df-b23e1b3219f6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51531,7 +51531,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentVersion\\Schedule\\Configuration*" Registry.registry_value_name=EnableAt  by Registry.dest, Registry.user, Registry.registry_value_name, Registry.registry_value_type | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `windows_enable_win32_scheduledjob_via_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic will identify suspicious system event of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services to evade the defense systems on the compromised host
@@ -51543,7 +51543,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Windows service update may cause this event.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -51552,7 +51552,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["RedLine Stealer", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9c2620a8-94a1-11ec-b40c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51567,7 +51567,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040  EventData_Xml="*disabled*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode Name UserID service ServiceName | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_for_service_disabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes Windows Security Event ID 1102 or System log event 104 to identify when a Windows event log is cleared. Note that this analytic will require tuning or restricted to specific endpoints based on criticality. During triage, based on time of day and user, determine if this was planned. If not planned, follow through with reviewing parallel alerts and other data sources to determine what else may have occurred.
@@ -51579,7 +51579,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that these logs may be legiti
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -51593,7 +51593,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-264A", "Clop Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Windows Log Manipulation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ad517544-aff9-4c96-bd99-d6eb43bfbb6a", "detection_version": "7"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51614,7 +51614,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = (`wineventlog_security` EventCode=1102) OR (`wineventlog_system` EventCode=104) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest name EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_log_cleared_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Event Triggered Image File Execution Options Injection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Event Triggered Image File Execution Options Injection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic identifies EventCode 3000 in Application channel indicating a process exit. This behavior is based on process names being added to the Image File Execution Options under HKLM \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\ and \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit. Once these are set for a process, an eventcode 3000 will generate. The example used is from Thinkst Canary where a CanaryToken is setup to monitor for a commonly abused living off the land binary (ex. Klist.exe) and generate an event when it occurs. This can be seen as settings traps to monitor for suspicious behavior. Monitor and tune this hunting analytic and setup traps across your organization and begin monitoring.
@@ -51626,7 +51626,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and tuning wi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Event Triggered Image File Execution Options Injection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Event Triggered Image File Execution Options Injection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -51635,7 +51635,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Event Triggered Image File Execution Options Injection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Event Triggered Image File Execution Options Injection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.012"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f7abfab9-12ea-44e8-8745-475f9ca6e0a4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51650,7 +51650,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_application` EventCode=3000 | rename param1 AS "Process" param2 AS "Exit_Code" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Process Exit_Code dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_event_triggered_image_file_execution_options_injection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic will identify suspicious excessive number of system events of services that was modified from start to disabled. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable security app services, other malware services oer serve as an destructive impact to complete the objective on the compromised system. One good example for this scenario is Olympic destroyer where it disable all active services in the compromised host as part of its destructive impact and defense evasion.
@@ -51662,7 +51662,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -51676,7 +51676,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c3f85976-94a5-11ec-9a58-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51697,7 +51697,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 "disabled" | stats count values(EventData_Xml) as MessageList dc(EventData_Xml) as MessageCount min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode UserID | rename Computer as dest | where count >=10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_excessive_disabled_services_event_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Executable in Loaded Modules - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Executable in Loaded Modules - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies potentially malicious 'ImageLoaded' events, particularly when they involve executable files. This behavior was observed in NjRAT instances, where, during each instance of loading a module from its C2 server onto the compromised host, Sysmon recorded the path of the actual Image or Process as an 'ImageLoaded' event, rather than the typical tracking of dynamically loaded DLL modules in memory. This event holds significance because it tracks processes that load modules and libraries, which are typically in the .dll format rather than .exe. Leveraging this 'Time-To-Perform' (TTP) detection method can prove invaluable for the identification of NjRAT malware or other malicious software instances that introduce executable files as modules within a targeted host.
@@ -51709,7 +51709,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Executable in Loaded Modules - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Executable in Loaded Modules - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -51723,7 +51723,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Executable in Loaded Modules - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Executable in Loaded Modules - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NjRAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1129"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3e27af56-fcf0-4113-988d-24969b062be7", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51744,7 +51744,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded= *.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded Signed SignatureStatus OriginalFileName process_name Computer EventCode ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_executable_in_loaded_modules_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a recently disclosed arbitraty command execution using Windows msdt.exe - a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard. The sample identified will use the ms-msdt:/ protocol handler to load msdt.exe to retrieve a remote payload. During triage, review file modifications for html. Identify parallel process execution that may be related, including an Office Product.
@@ -51756,7 +51756,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -51770,7 +51770,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2022-30190"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e1d5145f-38fe-42b9-a5d5-457796715f97", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51791,7 +51791,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=msdt.exe Processes.process IN ("*msdt*","*ms-msdt:*","*ms-msdt:/id*","*ms-msdt:-id*","*/id*") AND (Processes.process="*IT_BrowseForFile=*" OR Processes.process="*IT_RebrowseForFile=*" OR Processes.process="*.xml*") AND Processes.process="*PCWDiagnostic*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_execute_arbitrary_commands_with_msdt_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Invoke RestMethod - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Invoke RestMethod - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the potential exfiltration of data using PowerShell's Invoke-RestMethod. This technique was observed in the Winter-Vivern malware, which uploads desktop screenshots and files from compromised or targeted hosts. Detecting this TTP can serve as a valuable indicator that a process is attempting to upload files to an external or internal URI link. We recommend examining the process, the files it is trying to upload, and the URL link or C2 destination where the data is being uploaded.
@@ -51803,7 +51803,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Invoke RestMethod - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Invoke RestMethod - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -51817,7 +51817,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Invoke RestMethod - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Invoke RestMethod - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Winter Vivern"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "06ade821-f6fa-40d0-80af-15bc1d45b3ba", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51838,7 +51838,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Invoke-RestMethod *" AND ScriptBlockText = "* -Uri *" AND ScriptBlockText = "* -Method *" AND ScriptBlockText = "* Post *" AND ScriptBlockText = "* -InFile *" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_exfiltration_over_c2_via_invoke_restmethod_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Powershell UploadString - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Powershell UploadString - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies potential data exfiltration using the PowerShell net.webclient command. This technique was observed in the Winter-Vivern malware, which uploads desktop screenshots and files from compromised or targeted hosts. Detecting this TTP can serve as a valuable indicator that a process is attempting to upload files to an external or internal URI link. We recommend examining the process, the files it is trying to upload, and the URL link or C2 destination where the data is being uploaded.
@@ -51850,7 +51850,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Powershell UploadString - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Powershell UploadString - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -51864,7 +51864,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Powershell UploadString - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Powershell UploadString - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Winter Vivern"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "59e8bf41-7472-412a-90d3-00f3afa452e9", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51885,7 +51885,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Net.webclient*" AND ScriptBlockText = "*.UploadString*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_exfiltration_over_c2_via_powershell_uploadstring_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Export Certificate - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Export Certificate - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies when a certificate is exported from the Windows Certificate Store. This analytic utilizes the Certificates Lifecycle log channel event ID 1007. EventID 1007 is focused on the Export of a certificate from the local certificate store. In addition, review the ProcessName field as it will help to determine automation/Admin or adversary extracting the certificate. Depending on the organization, the certificate may be used for authentication to the VPN or private resources.
@@ -51897,7 +51897,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be generated based on an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Export Certificate - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Export Certificate - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -51911,7 +51911,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Export Certificate - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Export Certificate - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.004", "T1552", "T1649"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d8ddfa9b-b724-4df9-9dbe-f34cc0936714", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51926,7 +51926,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `certificateservices_lifecycle` EventCode=1007 | xmlkv UserData_Xml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, SubjectName, UserData_Xml | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_export_certificate_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of the Invoke-ShareFinder PowerShell commandlet part of PowerView. This module obtains the list of all active domain computers and lists the active shares on each computer. Network file shares in Active Directory environments may contain sensitive information like backups, scripts, credentials, etc. Adversaries who have obtained a foothold in an AD network may leverage PowerView to identify secrets and leverage them for Privilege Escalation or Lateral Movement.
@@ -51938,7 +51938,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Security teams may leverage PowerView proact
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -51952,7 +51952,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1135"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a44c0be1-d7ab-41e4-92fd-aa9af4fe232c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -51973,7 +51973,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104  (ScriptBlockText=Invoke-ShareFinder*) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_file_share_discovery_with_powerview_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a possible windows application having a FTP connection in a non common installation path in windows operating system.This network protocol is being used by adversaries, threat actors and malware like AgentTesla as a Command And Control communication to transfer its collected stolen information like the desktop screenshots, browser information and system information of a targeted or compromised host.
@@ -51985,7 +51985,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = third party application may use this network
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -51999,7 +51999,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "Snake Keylogger"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.003", "T1071"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0f43758f-1fe9-470a-a9e4-780acc4d5407", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52014,7 +52014,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=3 NOT(Image IN("*\\program files*", "*\\windows\\system32\\*","*\\windows\\SysWOW64\\*")) (DestinationPortName="ftp" OR DestinationPort=21) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image DestinationPort DestinationPortName DestinationHostname DestinationIp SourcePort SourcePortName Protocol SourceHostname dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_file_transfer_protocol_in_non_common_process_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to look for suspicious file creation in the critical folder like "System32\Drivers" folder without file extension. This artifacts was seen in latest hermeticwiper where it drops its driver component in Driver Directory both the compressed(without file extension) and the actual driver component (with .sys file extension). This TTP is really a good indication that a host might be compromised by this destructive malware that wipes the boot sector of the system.
@@ -52026,7 +52026,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown at this point
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -52040,7 +52040,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0dbcac64-963c-11ec-bf04-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52061,7 +52061,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\System32\\drivers\\*", "*\\syswow64\\drivers\\*") by _time span=5m Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_create_time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | rex field="file_name" "\.(?<extension>[^\.]*$)" | where isnull(extension) | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=5m Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest process_name process_guid file_name file_path file_create_time user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_file_without_extension_in_critical_folder_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Files and Dirs Access Rights Modification Via Icacls - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Files and Dirs Access Rights Modification Via Icacls - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic aims to identify potential adversaries who manipulate the security permissions of specific files or directories. This technique is frequently observed in the tradecraft of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts. By modifying the security permissions, adversaries seek to evade detection and impede access to their component files. Such actions indicate a deliberate effort to maintain control over compromised systems and hinder investigation or remediation efforts. Detecting these security permission changes can serve as a valuable indicator of an ongoing attack and enable timely response to mitigate the impact of the adversary's activities.
@@ -52073,7 +52073,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. It is possible some administrative
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Files and Dirs Access Rights Modification Via Icacls - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Files and Dirs Access Rights Modification Via Icacls - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["3309f53e-b22b-4eb6-8fd2-a6cf58b355a9"]
@@ -52088,7 +52088,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Files and Dirs Access Rights Modification Via Icacls - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Files and Dirs Access Rights Modification Via Icacls - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Amadey"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1222.001", "T1222"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c76b796c-27e1-4520-91c4-4a58695c749e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52109,7 +52109,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN( "icacls.exe", "cacls.exe","xcacls.exe") AND Processes.process IN ("*:R*", "*:W*", "*:F*", "*:C*",, "*:N*","*/P*", "*/E*") by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_files_and_dirs_access_rights_modification_via_icacls_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Find Domain Organizational Units with GetDomainOU - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Find Domain Organizational Units with GetDomainOU - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to detect the execution of the `Get-DomainOU` commandlet. `Get-DomainOU` is a component of PowerView, a PowerShell toolkit designed for Windows domain enumeration. Identifying the use of `Get-DomainOU` is crucial as adversaries and Red Teams might employ it to gain insights into organizational units within Active Directory, potentially aiding in lateral movement or privilege escalation strategies.
@@ -52121,7 +52121,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerSploit tool
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Find Domain Organizational Units with GetDomainOU - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Find Domain Organizational Units with GetDomainOU - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -52135,7 +52135,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Find Domain Organizational Units with GetDomainOU - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Find Domain Organizational Units with GetDomainOU - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0ada2f82-b7af-40cc-b1d7-1e5985afcb4e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52156,7 +52156,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Get-DomainOU*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_find_domain_organizational_units_with_getdomainou_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Find Interesting ACL with FindInterestingDomainAcl - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Find Interesting ACL with FindInterestingDomainAcl - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to detect the execution of the `Find-InterestingDomainAcl` commandlet. `Find-InterestingDomainAcl` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell toolkit designed for Windows domain enumeration. Detecting the use of `Find-InterestingDomainAcl` is crucial as adversaries and Red Teams might employ it to identify unusual or misconfigured Access Control Lists (ACLs) within the domain. Such ACLs can provide attackers with insights into potential privilege escalation opportunities or weak security postures within Active Directory.
@@ -52168,7 +52168,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerSploit tool
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Find Interesting ACL with FindInterestingDomainAcl - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Find Interesting ACL with FindInterestingDomainAcl - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -52182,7 +52182,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Find Interesting ACL with FindInterestingDomainAcl - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Find Interesting ACL with FindInterestingDomainAcl - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e4a96dfd-667a-4487-b942-ccef5a1e81e8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52203,7 +52203,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Find-InterestingDomainAcl*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_find_interesting_acl_with_findinterestingdomainacl_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Findstr GPP Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Findstr GPP Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of the findstr command employed to search for unsecured credentials Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts. These group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that has been made public). While Microsoft released a patch that impedes Administrators to create unsecure credentials, existing Group Policy Preferences files with passwords are not removed from SYSVOL.
@@ -52215,7 +52215,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage findstr to find
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Findstr GPP Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Findstr GPP Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -52229,7 +52229,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Findstr GPP Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Findstr GPP Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552", "T1552.006"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1631ac2d-f2a9-42fa-8a59-d6e210d472f5", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52250,7 +52250,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=findstr.exe AND Processes.process=*sysvol* AND Processes.process=*cpassword*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_findstr_gpp_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Forest Discovery with GetForestDomain - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Forest Discovery with GetForestDomain - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to detect the execution of the `Get-ForestDomain` commandlet. `Get-ForestDomain` is a component of PowerView, a PowerShell toolkit designed for Windows domain enumeration. Detecting the use of `Get-ForestDomain` is essential as adversaries and Red Teams might employ it to gain insights into the forest and domain configurations of an Active Directory environment.  Such information can provide attackers with a broader understanding of the domain structure and potential avenues for lateral movement or privilege escalation.
@@ -52262,7 +52262,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerSploit tool
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Forest Discovery with GetForestDomain - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Forest Discovery with GetForestDomain - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -52276,7 +52276,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Forest Discovery with GetForestDomain - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Forest Discovery with GetForestDomain - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a14803b2-4bd9-4c08-8b57-c37980edebe8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52297,7 +52297,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Get-ForestDomain*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_forest_discovery_with_getforestdomain_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Host Information Camera - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Host Information Camera - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects a powershell script that enumerate camera mounted to the targeted host. This technique was seen in DCRat malware, where it runs a powershell command to look for camera information that will be pass on to its C2 server. This anomaly detection can be a good pivot to check who and why this enumeration is needed and what parent process execute this powershell script command.
@@ -52309,7 +52309,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may execute this powershell c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Host Information Camera - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Host Information Camera - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -52323,7 +52323,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Host Information Camera - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Host Information Camera - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkCrystal RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592.001", "T1592"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e4df4676-ea41-4397-b160-3ee0140dc332", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52338,7 +52338,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText= "* Win32_PnPEntity *" ScriptBlockText= "*SELECT*" ScriptBlockText= "*WHERE*" ScriptBlockText = "*PNPClass*" ScriptBlockText IN ("*Image*", "*Camera*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_gather_victim_host_information_camera_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Identity SAM Info - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Identity SAM Info - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process that loads the samlib.dll module. This module is being abused by adversaries, threat actors and red teamers to access information of SAM objects or access credentials information in DC. This hunting query can be a good indicator that a process is capable of accessing the SAM object.
@@ -52350,7 +52350,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = this module can be loaded by a third party a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Identity SAM Info - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Identity SAM Info - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -52359,7 +52359,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Identity SAM Info - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Identity SAM Info - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brute Ratel C4"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1589.001", "T1589"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a18e85d7-8b98-4399-820c-d46a1ca3516f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52374,7 +52374,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7  (ImageLoaded = "*\\samlib.dll" AND OriginalFileName = "samlib.dll") OR (ImageLoaded = "*\\samcli.dll" AND OriginalFileName = "SAMCLI.DLL") AND NOT (Image IN("C:\\Windows\\*", "C:\\Program File*", "%systemroot%\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_gather_victim_identity_sam_info_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies process that attempts to connect to a known IP web services. This technique is commonly used by trickbot and other malware to perform reconnaissance against the infected machine and look for its IP address.
@@ -52386,7 +52386,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Filter internet browser application to minim
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -52395,7 +52395,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "DarkCrystal RAT", "Phemedrone Stealer", "Snake Keylogger"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1590.005", "T1590"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "70f7c952-0758-46d6-9148-d8969c4481d1", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52410,7 +52410,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=22  QueryName IN ("*wtfismyip.com", "*checkip.*", "*ipecho.net", "*ipinfo.io", "*api.ipify.org", "*icanhazip.com", "*ip.anysrc.com","*api.ip.sb", "ident.me", "www.myexternalip.com", "*zen.spamhaus.org", "*cbl.abuseat.org", "*b.barracudacentral.org", "*dnsbl-1.uceprotect.net", "*spam.dnsbl.sorbs.net", "*iplogger.org*", "*ip-api.com*", "*geoip.*") |  stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by  Image ProcessId QueryName QueryStatus QueryResults EventCode Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_gather_victim_network_info_through_ip_check_web_services_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the Get-ADComputer commandlet used with specific parameters to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -52422,7 +52422,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may leverage P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -52436,7 +52436,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c8640777-469f-4638-ab44-c34a3233ffac", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52457,7 +52457,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Get-ADComputer*" AND ScriptBlockText = "*TrustedForDelegation*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_get_adcomputer_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Get Local Admin with FindLocalAdminAccess - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Get Local Admin with FindLocalAdminAccess - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to detect the execution of the `Find-LocalAdminAccess` commandlet. `Find-LocalAdminAccess` is part of PowerView, a PowerShell toolkit designed for Windows domain enumeration. Detecting the use of `Find-LocalAdminAccess` is vital as adversaries and Red Teams might employ it to identify machines where the current user context has local administrator access. Such information can provide attackers with potential targets for lateral movement or privilege escalation within the network.
@@ -52469,7 +52469,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerSploit tool
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Get Local Admin with FindLocalAdminAccess - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Get Local Admin with FindLocalAdminAccess - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -52483,7 +52483,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Get Local Admin with FindLocalAdminAccess - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Get Local Admin with FindLocalAdminAccess - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d2988160-3ce9-4310-b59d-905334920cdd", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52504,7 +52504,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*Find-LocalAdminAccess*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest, UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_get_local_admin_with_findlocaladminaccess_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Group Policy Object Created - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Group Policy Object Created - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Event IDs 5136 and 51137 to identify the creation of a new Group Policy Object. With GPOs, system administrators can manage and configure applications, software operations, and user settings throughout an entire organization. GPOs can be abused and leveraged by adversaries to escalate privileges or deploy malware across an Active Directory network. As an example, the Lockbit ransomware malware will create new group policies on the domain controller that are then pushed out to every device on the network. Security teams should monitor the creation of new Group Policy Objects.
@@ -52516,7 +52516,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Group Policy Objects are created as part of
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Group Policy Object Created - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Group Policy Object Created - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -52530,7 +52530,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Group Policy Object Created - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Group Policy Object Created - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1484", "T1484.001", "T1078.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "23add2a8-ea22-4fd4-8bc0-8c0b822373a1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52551,7 +52551,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5137 OR (EventCode=5136 AttributeValue!="New Group Policy Object" AND (AttributeLDAPDisplayName=displayName OR AttributeLDAPDisplayName=gPCFileSysPath) ) ObjectClass=groupPolicyContainer | stats values(AttributeValue) as details values(SubjectUserSid) as User values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN by ObjectGUID Computer | eval GPO_Name = mvindex(details, 0) | eval GPO_Path = mvindex(details, 1) | fields - details | `windows_group_policy_object_created_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects creation of hidden scheculed tasks such that it this task is not visible on the UI. Such behavior is indicative of certain malware, such as Industroyer2, or attacks leveraging living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) to download additional payloads to a compromised machine. This analytic relies on the Windows Security EventCode 4698, indicating the creation of a scheduled task. The search focuses on identifying instances where the 'Hidden' setting is enabled, signaling potential nefarious activity. To implement this search, you need to ingest logs with task scheduling details from your endpoints. As false positives are currently unknown, it is advised to tune and filter based on the known use of task scheduling in your environment. This analytic provides crucial visibility into stealthy, potentially harmful scheduled tasks on Windows systems.
@@ -52563,7 +52563,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -52577,7 +52577,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "CISA AA22-257A", "Data Destruction", "Industroyer2", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0b730470-5fe8-4b13-93a7-fe0ad014d0cc", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52598,7 +52598,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 | xmlkv Message | search Hidden = true | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by  Task_Name, Command, Author, Hidden, dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hidden_schedule_task_settings_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to hide common windows notification feature from compromised host. This technique was seen in some ransomware family to add more impact to its payload that are visually seen by user aside from the encrypted files and ransomware notes. Even this a good anomaly detection, administrator may implement this changes for auditing or security reason. In this scenario filter is needed.
@@ -52610,7 +52610,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -52624,7 +52624,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cafa4bce-9f06-11ec-a7b2-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52639,7 +52639,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\*" Registry.registry_value_name IN ("HideClock", "HideSCAHealth", "HideSCANetwork", "HideSCAPower", "HideSCAVolume") Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hide_notification_features_through_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search identifies a high frequency of file deletions relative to the process name and process ID. Such events typically occur when ransomware attempts to encrypt files with specific extensions, leading Sysmon to treat the original files as deleted as soon as they are replaced with encrypted data.
@@ -52651,7 +52651,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Users may delete a large number of pictures
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -52665,7 +52665,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Clop Ransomware", "DarkCrystal RAT", "Data Destruction", "Sandworm Tools", "Swift Slicer", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1485"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "45b125c4-866f-11eb-a95a-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52680,7 +52680,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode IN ("23","26") TargetFilename IN ("*.cmd", "*.ini","*.gif", "*.jpg", "*.jpeg", "*.db", "*.ps1", "*.doc", "*.docx", "*.xls", "*.xlsx", "*.ppt", "*.pptx", "*.bmp","*.zip", "*.rar", "*.7z", "*.chm", "*.png", "*.log", "*.vbs", "*.js", "*.vhd", "*.bak", "*.wbcat", "*.bkf" , "*.backup*", "*.dsk", "*.win") NOT TargetFilename IN ("*\\INetCache\\Content.Outlook\\*") | stats count, values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime by user, dest, signature, signature_id, Image, process_name, process_guid | rename Image as process | where count >=100 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_high_file_deletion_frequency_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Hijack Execution Flow Version Dll Side Load - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Hijack Execution Flow Version Dll Side Load - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a process loading version.dll that is not in %windir%\\system32 or %windir%\\syswow64 dir path. This event is seen in ransomware and APT malware that executes malicious version.dll placed in the same folder of onedrive application that will execute that module. This technique is known to be DLL side loading. This technique was used to execute an agent of Brute Ratel C4 red teaming tools to serve as remote admin tool to collect and compromise target host.
@@ -52692,7 +52692,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Hijack Execution Flow Version Dll Side Load - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Hijack Execution Flow Version Dll Side Load - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -52706,7 +52706,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Hijack Execution Flow Version Dll Side Load - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Hijack Execution Flow Version Dll Side Load - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brute Ratel C4"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.001", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8351340b-ac0e-41ec-8b07-dd01bf32d6ea", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52721,7 +52721,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded = "*\\version.dll" AND (Signed = "false" OR NOT(ImageLoaded IN("*\\windows\\system32*",  "*\\windows\\syswow64\\*"))) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hijack_execution_flow_version_dll_side_load_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic identifies all processes requesting access into Lsass.exe. his behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes.
@@ -52733,7 +52733,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on GrantedA
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -52742,7 +52742,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1c6abb08-73d1-11ec-9ca0-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52757,7 +52757,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_hunting_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Identify Protocol Handlers - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Identify Protocol Handlers - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic will identify any protocol handlers utilized on the command-line. A protocol handler is an application that knows how to handle particular types of links: for example, a mail client is a protocol handler for "mailto:" links. When the user clicks a "mailto:" link, the browser opens the application selected as the handler for the "mailto:" protocol (or offers them a choice of handlers, depending on their settings). To identify protocol handlers we can use NirSoft https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/url_protocol_view.html URLProtocolView or query the registry using PowerShell.
@@ -52769,7 +52769,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be found. https and htt
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Identify Protocol Handlers - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Identify Protocol Handlers - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -52778,7 +52778,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Identify Protocol Handlers - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Identify Protocol Handlers - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 20, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bd5c311e-a6ea-48ae-a289-19a3398e3648", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52793,7 +52793,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes  by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup windows_protocol_handlers handler AS process OUTPUT handler ishandler | where ishandler="TRUE" | `windows_identify_protocol_handlers_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Add New Module - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows IIS Components Add New Module - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the process AppCmd.exe installing a new module into IIS. AppCmd is a utility to manage IIS web sites and App Pools. An adversary may run this command to install a webshell or backdoor. This has been found to be used for credit card scraping, persistence, and further post-exploitation. An administrator may run this to install new modules for a web site or during IIS updates.
@@ -52805,7 +52805,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present until properl
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-12-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-12-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Add New Module - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows IIS Components Add New Module - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -52819,7 +52819,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Add New Module - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows IIS Components Add New Module - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IIS Components"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "38fe731c-1f13-43d4-b878-a5bbe44807e3", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52834,7 +52834,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where NOT (Processes.parent_process_name  IN ("msiexec.exe", "iissetup.exe")) Processes.process_name=appcmd.exe Processes.process IN ("*install *", "*module *") AND Processes.process="*image*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_iis_components_add_new_module_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic requires the use of PowerShell inputs to run Get-WebGlobalModule to list out all the IIS Modules installed. The output is a list of Module names and the Image path of the DLL.
@@ -52846,7 +52846,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This analytic is meant to assist with huntin
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -52855,7 +52855,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IIS Components", "WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 10, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.004", "T1505"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "20db5f70-34b4-4e83-8926-fa26119de173", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52870,7 +52870,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `iis_get_webglobalmodule` | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host name image | rename host as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_iis_components_get_webglobalmodule_module_query_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Module Failed to Load - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows IIS Components Module Failed to Load - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes EventCode 2282 which generates when a Module DLL could not be loaded due to a configuration problem. This typically occurs when a IIS module is installed but is failing to load. This typically results in thousands of events until the issue is resolved. Review the module that is failing and determine if it is legitimate or not.
@@ -52882,7 +52882,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present until all mo
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-12-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-12-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Module Failed to Load - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows IIS Components Module Failed to Load - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -52896,7 +52896,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Module Failed to Load - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows IIS Components Module Failed to Load - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IIS Components"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "40c2ba5b-dd6a-496b-9e6e-c9524d0be167", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52911,7 +52911,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_application` EventCode=2282 | stats  count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by  EventCode dest Name ModuleDll | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_iis_components_module_failed_to_load_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components New Module Added - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows IIS Components New Module Added - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic uses the Windows Event log - Microsoft-IIS-Configuration/Operational - which must be enabled and logged on Windows IIS servers before it can be Splunked. The following analytic identifies newly installed IIS modules. Per Microsoft, IIS modules are not commonly added to a production IIS server, so alerting on this event ID should be enabled.IIS modules can be installed at a global level or at a site level. In detecting malicious IIS modules, it is important to check both the global and site level for unauthorized modules. Regular monitoring of these locations for such modules and comparing against a known good list can help detect and identify malicious IIS modules.
@@ -52923,7 +52923,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present when updates
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-12-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-12-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components New Module Added - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows IIS Components New Module Added - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -52937,7 +52937,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components New Module Added - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows IIS Components New Module Added - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IIS Components"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "55f22929-cfd3-4388-ba5c-4d01fac7ee7e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52958,7 +52958,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `iis_operational_logs` EventCode=29 | stats  count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by OpCode EventCode ComputerName Message | rename ComputerName AS dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_iis_components_new_module_added_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Add Xml Applocker Rules - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Add Xml Applocker Rules - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is to identify a process that imports applocker xml policy using PowerShell commandlet. This technique was seen in Azorult malware where it drop an xml Applocker policy that will deny several AV products and further executed the PowerShell Applocker commandlet.
@@ -52970,7 +52970,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may execute this command that
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Add Xml Applocker Rules - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Add Xml Applocker Rules - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -52979,7 +52979,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Add Xml Applocker Rules - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Add Xml Applocker Rules - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "467ed9d9-8035-470e-ad5e-ae5189283033", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -52994,7 +52994,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` AND Processes.process="*Import-Module Applocker*" AND Processes.process="*Set-AppLockerPolicy *"  AND Processes.process="* -XMLPolicy *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_add_xml_applocker_rules_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to change the health check interval of Windows Defender. Specifically, a value of 1 typically signifies that Windows Defender would perform health checks at a much higher frequency than the default settings. However, it's important to note that modifying this value to 1 might not necessarily conform to the actual behavior, as certain registry settings may have specific accepted values or a defined range that differs from a simple binary representation. Changing registry values, especially those related to system services, should be approached cautiously. Incorrect modifications can potentially impact system stability or performance. Always ensure you understand the implications and have a backup before altering registry settings.
@@ -53006,7 +53006,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53020,7 +53020,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5211c260-820e-4366-b983-84bbfb5c263a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53041,7 +53041,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\ServiceKeepAlive" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_change_win_defender_health_check_intervals_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to change Windows Defender Quick Scan Interval. The "QuickScanInterval" in Windows Defender, specifically within the context of antivirus software, typically refers to the interval or frequency at which the system conducts quick scans for malware or potential threats. This setting dictates how often Windows Defender performs quick scans on the system. Quick scans are less comprehensive than full system scans but provide a faster way to check critical areas for potential threats or malware. This registry setting is being abuse by several threat actors, adversaries and red teamers to bypasses Windows defender detections.
@@ -53053,7 +53053,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53067,7 +53067,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "783f0798-f679-4c17-b3b3-187febf0b9b8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53088,7 +53088,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\Scan\\QuickScanInterval" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_change_win_defender_quick_scan_interval_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to change the ThrottleDetectionEventsRate of Windows Defender. The ThrottleDetectionEventsRate registry setting in Windows Defender is related to controlling the rate at which detection events are logged or reported by Windows Defender Antivirus. This registry setting determines how frequently Windows Defender logs or reports detection events. Adjusting the ThrottleDetectionEventsRate value can impact the logging frequency of detection events such as malware detections, scanning results, or security-related events recorded by Windows Defender. A higher value might mean that detection events are reported less frequently, potentially reducing the volume of recorded events, while a lower value could increase the reporting frequency, resulting in more frequent logs of detection events.
@@ -53100,7 +53100,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53114,7 +53114,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f7da5fca-9261-43de-a4d0-130dad1e4f4d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53135,7 +53135,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\NIS\\Consumers\\IPS\\ThrottleDetectionEventsRate" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_change_win_defender_throttle_rate_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to change the Windows Defender Wpp Tracing levels. The "WppTracingLevel" registry setting is typically related to Windows software tracing and diagnostics, specifically involving Windows Software Trace Preprocessor (WPP) tracing. WPP tracing is a mechanism used by developers to instrument code for diagnostic purposes, allowing for the collection of detailed logs and traces during software execution. It helps in understanding the behavior of the software, identifying issues, and analyzing its performance. Without specific documentation or references to "WppTracingLevel" within Windows Defender settings or its functionalities, it's challenging to provide precise details about its intended use or configuration within Windows Defender. Modifying registry settings without understanding their implications can affect system behavior or security. Always proceed cautiously and ensure changes align with best practices and organizational requirements.
@@ -53147,7 +53147,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53161,7 +53161,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fe9391cd-952a-4c64-8f56-727cb0d4f2d4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53182,7 +53182,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\Reporting\\WppTracingLevel" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_change_win_defender_tracing_level_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to change or disable Windows Defender smartscreen app install control. Microsoft Edge's App Install Control feature helps manage the installation of web-based applications. When attackers modify "ConfigureAppInstallControlEnabled" to 0, they are likely attempting to disable the App Install Control feature in Microsoft Edge. This change might allow users to bypass restrictions imposed by the browser on the installation of web-based applications. Disabling this feature might increase the risk of users being able to install potentially malicious or untrusted web applications without restrictions or controls imposed by the browser. This action could potentially lead to security vulnerabilities or compromise if users inadvertently install harmful applications.
@@ -53194,7 +53194,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53208,7 +53208,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c54b7439-cfb1-44c3-bb35-b0409553077c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53229,7 +53229,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SmartScreen\\ConfigureAppInstallControl" Registry.registry_value_data= "Anywhere") OR (Registry.registry_path= "*\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\SmartScreen\\ConfigureAppInstallControlEnabled" Registry.registry_value_data= "0x00000000") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_configure_app_install_control_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to define the threat action of Windows Defender. The ThreatSeverityDefaultAction registry setting in Windows Defender is used to define the default action taken by Windows Defender when it encounters threats of specific severity levels. A setting like ThreatSeverityDefaultAction is designed to define how Windows Defender responds to threats based on their severity. For example, it might determine whether Windows Defender quarantines, removes, or takes other actions against threats based on their severity levels. In this context, a registry value of 1 typically indicates an action to "clean," aiming to disinfect or resolve the detected threat, while a registry value of 9 signifies "no action," meaning that the antivirus software refrains from taking immediate steps against the identified threat.
@@ -53241,7 +53241,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53255,7 +53255,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7215831c-8252-4ae3-8d43-db588e82f952", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53276,7 +53276,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\Threats\\ThreatSeverityDefaultAction*" Registry.registry_value_data IN ("0x00000001", "9") by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_define_win_defender_threat_action_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The search looks for the deletion of Windows Defender context menu within the registry. This is consistent behavior with RAT malware across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is executed when an adversary gains access to an endpoint and begins to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications.
@@ -53288,7 +53288,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53297,7 +53297,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "395ed5fe-ad13-4366-9405-a228427bdd91", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53312,7 +53312,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\shellex\\ContextMenuHandlers\\EPP" Registry.action = deleted by  Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_context_menu_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The search looks for the deletion of Windows Defender main profile within the registry. This was used by RAT malware across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversary gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications.
@@ -53324,7 +53324,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53338,7 +53338,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "65d4b105-ec52-48ec-ac46-289d0fbf7d96", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53353,7 +53353,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender" Registry.action = deleted by  Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action  Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_delete_win_defender_profile_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Deny Security Software With Applocker - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Deny Security Software With Applocker - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry by the Applocker utility that contains details or registry data values related to denying the execution of several security products. This technique was seen in Azorult malware where it drops an xml Applocker policy that will deny several AV products and then loaded by using PowerShell Applocker commandlet.
@@ -53365,7 +53365,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on orga
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Deny Security Software With Applocker - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Deny Security Software With Applocker - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53379,7 +53379,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Deny Security Software With Applocker - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Deny Security Software With Applocker - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e0b6ca60-9e29-4450-b51a-bba0abae2313", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53400,7 +53400,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Group Policy Objects\\*" AND Registry.registry_path= "*}Machine\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\SrpV2*") OR Registry.registry_path="*\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\SrpV2*" AND Registry.registry_value_data = "*Action\=\"Deny\"*" AND Registry.registry_value_data IN("*O=SYMANTEC*","*O=MCAFEE*","*O=KASPERSKY*","*O=BLEEPING COMPUTER*", "*O=PANDA SECURITY*","*O=SYSTWEAK SOFTWARE*", "*O=TREND MICRO*", "*O=AVAST*", "*O=GRIDINSOFT*", "*O=MICROSOFT*", "*O=NANO SECURITY*", "*O=SUPERANTISPYWARE.COM*", "*O=DOCTOR WEB*", "*O=MALWAREBYTES*", "*O=ESET*", "*O=AVIRA*", "*O=WEBROOT*") by  Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.registry_key_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_deny_security_software_with_applocker_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender Controlled Folder Access feature. The EnableControlledFolderAccess registry setting is associated with the Controlled Folder Access feature in Windows Defender. Controlled Folder Access is a security feature designed to protect certain folders from unauthorized access or modification by malicious applications, including ransomware. When EnableControlledFolderAccess is set to 0, it usually indicates that the Controlled Folder Access feature within Windows Defender is not active. Consequently, the protection mechanism for the specified folders against unauthorized access by potentially malicious applications or ransomware is not enabled.
@@ -53412,7 +53412,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53426,7 +53426,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3032741c-d6fc-4c69-8988-be8043d6478c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53447,7 +53447,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\\Controlled Folder Access\\EnableControlledFolderAccess" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_controlled_folder_access_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable firewall and network protection section settings of windows security. The specific impact of this change depends on the context and the purpose behind modifying this registry value. In general, setting UILockdown to 1 might imply enforcing a restriction or lockdown in the user interface (UI) related to firewall and network protection settings within Windows Defender Security Center. This could potentially restrict users from modifying certain firewall or network protection settings through the UI.
@@ -53459,7 +53459,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53473,7 +53473,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8467d8cd-b0f9-46fa-ac84-a30ad138983e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53494,7 +53494,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender Security Center\\Firewall and network protection\\UILockdown" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_defender_firewall_and_network_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender protocol recognition feature. The DisableProtocolRecognition setting in Windows Defender is not a commonly known or documented registry setting. It's possible that this specific setting might not exist within the standard Windows Defender configurations or that it might be specific to certain environments, versions, or configurations. It might potentially control or influence the antivirus software's ability to recognize and handle specific protocols or communication methods used by malware or suspicious software.
@@ -53506,7 +53506,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53520,7 +53520,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b2215bfb-6171-4137-af17-1a02fdd8d043", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53541,7 +53541,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\NIS\\DisableProtocolRecognition" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_defender_protocol_recognition_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender PUA protection. Setting PUAProtection to 0 typically disables the detection and protection against Potentially Unwanted Applications by Microsoft Defender Antivirus. Potentially Unwanted Applications include software that may not be inherently malicious but could exhibit behaviors that users may find undesirable, such as adware, browser toolbars, or software bundlers. Disabling this feature might be preferred in certain situations, but it's essential to consider potential security implications. Enabling PUA protection provides an additional layer of defense against software that might negatively impact user experience or security.
@@ -53553,7 +53553,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53567,7 +53567,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fbfef407-cfee-4866-88c1-f8de1c16147c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53588,7 +53588,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\PUAProtection" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_pua_protection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable windows defender realtime signature delivery feature. This setting governs how Windows Defender Antivirus receives updated signature definitions for identifying and combating malware threats in real-time. The actual impact and behaviors associated with different values for RealtimeSignatureDelivery can vary based on specific Windows Defender configurations and policies. For instance, setting this value to 0 or 1 might control whether real-time signatures are delivered via different methods such as through Windows Update or directly from Microsoft's cloud-based services.
@@ -53600,7 +53600,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53614,7 +53614,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ffd99aea-542f-448e-b737-091c1b417274", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53635,7 +53635,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\Signature Updates\\RealtimeSignatureDelivery" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_realtime_signature_delivery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender web content evaluation. The "EnableWebContentEvaluation" registry entry typically relates to security settings within Microsoft Edge or Internet Explorer, enabling the evaluation of web content for security purposes. When attackers modify "EnableWebContentEvaluation" to 0, they might attempt to disable the browser's capability to evaluate web content for security purposes. Disabling this feature could potentially impact the browser's ability to assess the security risks associated with web content, such as potentially malicious scripts, active content, or unsafe web elements. By turning off content evaluation, attackers might aim to exploit security vulnerabilities present in web content without triggering security warnings or blocks. This manipulation increases the risk of users accessing or interacting with malicious content, potentially leading to security compromises or system exploitation.
@@ -53647,7 +53647,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53661,7 +53661,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e234970c-dcf5-4f80-b6a9-3a562544ca5b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53682,7 +53682,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\AppHost\\EnableWebContentEvaluation"  Registry.registry_value_data= "0x00000000" BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_web_evaluation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender audit application guard. Microsoft Defender Application Guard provides enhanced security by isolating potentially malicious documents and websites in a containerized environment, protecting the system against various threats. Auditing and logging are essential components of security measures, providing visibility into activities within the isolated environment. Disabling auditing events within Application Guard might not be a standard or recommended practice since auditing is crucial for security monitoring and threat detection within the isolated container. However, there might be settings or configurations related to audit policies in the broader Windows Defender or operating system settings. This registry setting is being abuse by several threat actors, adversaries and red teamers to bypasses Windows defender detections.
@@ -53694,7 +53694,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53708,7 +53708,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8b700d7e-54ad-4d7d-81cc-1456c4703306", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53729,7 +53729,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Policies\\Microsoft\\AppHVSI\\AuditApplicationGuard" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_app_guard_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender file hashes computation. The EnableFileHashComputation registry setting likely pertains to whether Windows Defender's MpEngine (Malware Protection Engine) computes file hashes. Setting this value to 0 might disable the file hash computation feature within Windows Defender, which could affect certain malware detection or scanning functionalities that rely on file hash analysis. This registry setting is being abuse by several threat actors, adversaries and red teamers to bypasses Windows defender detections.
@@ -53741,7 +53741,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53755,7 +53755,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fe52c280-98bd-4596-b6f6-a13bbf8ac7c6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53776,7 +53776,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\MpEngine\\EnableFileHashComputation" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_compute_file_hashes_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender generic ports. This registry can disable the sending of Watson events in Windows Defender. This is by preventing the transmission of generic or non-specific error reports to Microsoft's Windows Error Reporting service, commonly known as Watson. This kind of setting could potentially be employed to limit or control the data sent to Microsoft for error analysis, often in scenarios where privacy or specific reporting requirements are in place. This registry setting is being abuse by several threat actors, adversaries and red teamers to bypasses Windows defender detections.
@@ -53788,7 +53788,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53802,7 +53802,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "93f114f6-cb1e-419b-ac3f-9e11a3045e70", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53823,7 +53823,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\Reporting\\DisableGenericRePorts" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_gen_reports_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender exploit guard network protection. The EnableNetworkProtection registry entry controls the activation or deactivation of Network Protection within Windows Defender Exploit Guard. When set to 1, it typically signifies that Network Protection is enabled, offering additional security measures against network-based threats by analyzing and blocking potentially malicious network activity. This registry setting is being abuse by several threat actors, adversaries and red teamers to bypasses Windows defender detections.
@@ -53835,7 +53835,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53849,7 +53849,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8b6c15c7-5556-463d-83c7-986326c21f12", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53870,7 +53870,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\\Network Protection\\EnableNetworkProtection" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_network_protection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable windows defender report infection information. Setting this registry key to 1, Instructs Windows Defender not to report detailed information about infections or threats detected on the system to Microsoft. Enabling this setting might limit or prevent the transmission of specific data related to infections, such as details about the detected malware, to Microsoft's servers for analysis or logging purposes. This registry is being abused by adversaries, threat actors and red-teamers to bypasses Windows Defender detections.
@@ -53882,7 +53882,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53896,7 +53896,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "201946c6-b1d5-42bb-a7e0-5f7123f47fc4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53917,7 +53917,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Microsoft\\MRT\\DontReportInfectionInformation" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_report_infection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender Scan On Update. The "DisableScanOnUpdate" registry setting in Windows Defender, when set to a value of 1, typically signifies the feature that prevents automatic scans from initiating when updates to Windows Defender or its antivirus definitions are installed. Any modifications to registry settings, it's important to ensure that changes align with security policies and best practices. Incorrect settings might affect the system's security or functionality. Always consider the implications and ensure changes are made based on accurate information and organizational requirements. This registry setting is being abuse by several threat actors, adversaries and red teamers to bypasses Windows defender detections.
@@ -53929,7 +53929,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53943,7 +53943,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0418e72f-e710-4867-b656-0688e1523e09", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -53964,7 +53964,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\Signature Updates\\DisableScanOnUpdate" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_scan_on_update_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable windows defender Signature Retirement. The DisableSignatureRetirement registry setting in Windows Defender controls the retirement or expiration of antivirus signatures used by Windows Defender Antivirus. When DisableSignatureRetirement is set to 1, it usually indicates that Windows Defender won't automatically retire or expire antivirus signatures. Antivirus signatures are files containing information about known malware and are used by Windows Defender to detect and protect against threats. Disabling signature retirement might prevent Windows Defender from automatically removing or retiring older or less relevant antivirus signatures. This can potentially increase the number of signatures in use and might impact system resources or the effectiveness of threat detection.
@@ -53976,7 +53976,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -53990,7 +53990,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7567a72f-bada-489d-aef1-59743fb64a66", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54011,7 +54011,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\NIS\\Consumers\\IPS\\DisableSignatureRetirement" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_disable_win_defender_signature_retirement_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable windows defender phishing filter. This setting controls whether users can manually disable or modify the browser's built-in phishing filter. When attackers modify "PreventOverride" to 0, it might indicate an attempt to disable the prevention of user overrides for the phishing filter within Microsoft Edge. This change allows users to bypass or disable the built-in phishing protection provided by the browser. By allowing users to override the phishing filter, attackers may attempt to deceive users into visiting phishing websites or malicious pages without triggering warnings or protections from the browser's built-in security measures. This manipulation increases the risk of users unknowingly accessing potentially harmful websites, leading to potential security incidents or compromises.
@@ -54023,7 +54023,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54037,7 +54037,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "10ca081c-57b1-4a78-ba56-14a40a7e116a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54058,7 +54058,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_key_name = "*\\MicrosoftEdge\\PhishingFilter" Registry.registry_value_name IN ("EnabledV9", "PreventOverride") Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_overide_win_defender_phishing_filter_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to override windows defender smartscreen prompt. The "PreventSmartScreenPromptOverride" registry setting is associated with the Windows SmartScreen feature, specifically related to controlling whether users can override SmartScreen prompts. When attackers modify "PreventSmartScreenPromptOverride" to 0, it signifies an attempt to disable the prevention of user overrides for SmartScreen prompts. By doing so, attackers aim to allow users to bypass or ignore SmartScreen warnings or prompts. This change increases the risk by permitting users to disregard warnings about potentially unsafe or malicious files or websites that would typically trigger SmartScreen alerts. It could lead to users unintentionally executing or accessing malicious content, potentially resulting in security incidents or system compromises.
@@ -54070,7 +54070,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54084,7 +54084,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "08058866-7987-486f-b042-275715ef6e9d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54105,7 +54105,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path= "*\\Microsoft\\Edge\\PreventSmartScreenPromptOverride" Registry.registry_value_data= "0x00000000" BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_override_smartscreen_prompt_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to set windows defender smart screen level to warn. Setting the ShellSmartScreenLevel to warn implies a SmartScreen configuration where the system displays a warning prompt when users attempt to run or access potentially risky or unrecognized files or applications. This warning serves as a cautionary alert to users, advising them about the potential risks associated with the file or application they are trying to execute. Changing SmartScreen settings to "warn" might be employed by attackers to reduce the likelihood of triggering immediate suspicion from users when running malicious executables. By setting it to "warn," the system prompts a cautionary warning rather than outright blocking the execution, potentially increasing the chances of users proceeding with running the file despite the warning.
@@ -54117,7 +54117,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54131,7 +54131,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cc2a3425-2703-47e7-818f-3dca1b0bc56f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54152,7 +54152,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\System\\ShellSmartScreenLevel" Registry.registry_value_data="Warn" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defense_set_win_defender_smart_screen_level_to_warn_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic refers to a detection mechanism designed to identify when the Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity (HVCI) feature is disabled within the Windows registry. HVCI is a security feature in Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016 that helps protect the kernel and system processes from being tampered with by malicious code. HVCI relies on hardware-assisted virtualization and Microsoft's Hyper-V hypervisor to ensure that only kernel-mode code that has been signed by Microsoft or the system's hardware manufacturer can be executed. This prevents attackers from exploiting vulnerabilities to run unsigned code, like kernel-mode rootkits or other malicious software, at the kernel level. Disabling HVCI may expose the system to security risks and could be an indicator of a potential compromise or unauthorized activity. The analytic aims to detect and report events or configurations that lead to the disabling of HVCI.
@@ -54164,7 +54164,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to administr
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["70bd71e6-eba4-4e00-92f7-617911dbe020"]
@@ -54179,7 +54179,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackLotus Campaign", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b061dfcc-f0aa-42cc-a6d4-a87f172acb79", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54200,7 +54200,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\DeviceGuard\\Scenarios\\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity\\Enabled" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000"  by  Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action  Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defenses_disable_hvci_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The search looks for the Registry Key DefenderApiLogger or DefenderAuditLogger set to disable. This is consistent with RAT malware across a fleet of endpoints. This particular behavior is typically executed when an adversary gains access to an endpoint and beings to perform execution. Usually, a batch (.bat) will be executed and multiple registry and scheduled task modifications will occur. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any further file modifications.
@@ -54212,7 +54212,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is unusual to turn this feature off a Win
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54226,7 +54226,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "76406a0f-f5e0-4167-8e1f-337fdc0f1b0c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54241,7 +54241,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path = "*WMI\\Autologger\\DefenderApiLogger\\Start" OR Registry.registry_path = "*WMI\\Autologger\\DefenderAuditLogger\\Start")  Registry.registry_value_data ="0x00000000" by  Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_impair_defenses_disable_win_defender_auto_logging_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Indicator Removal Via Rmdir - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Indicator Removal Via Rmdir - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process execute rmdir commandline to delete files and directory tree. This technique has been observed in the actions of various malware strains, such as DarkGate, as they attempt to eliminate specific files or components during their cleanup operations within compromised hosts. Notably, this deletion method doesn't exclusively require elevated privileges and can be executed by regular users or network administrators, although it's not the typical approach used for file deletion.
@@ -54253,7 +54253,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = user and network administrator can execute t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Indicator Removal Via Rmdir - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Indicator Removal Via Rmdir - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54267,7 +54267,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Indicator Removal Via Rmdir - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Indicator Removal Via Rmdir - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c4566d2c-b094-48a1-9c59-d66e22065560", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54282,7 +54282,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*rmdir*" Processes.process = "* /s *" Processes.process = "* /q *" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_indicator_removal_via_rmdir_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects programs that have been started by forfiles.exe. According to Microsoft, the 'The forfiles command lets you run a command on or pass arguments to multiple files'. While this tool can be used to start legitimate programs, usually within the context of a batch script, it has been observed being used to evade protections on command line execution.
@@ -54294,7 +54294,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legacy applications may be run using pc
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54308,7 +54308,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1202"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1fdf31c9-ff4d-4c48-b799-0e8666e08787", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54329,7 +54329,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process="*forfiles* /c *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_indirect_command_execution_via_forfiles_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects programs that have been started by pcalua.exe. pcalua.exe is the Microsoft Windows Program Compatability Assistant.  While this tool can be used to start legitimate programs, it has been observed being used to evade protections on command line execution.
@@ -54341,7 +54341,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legacy applications may be run using pc
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54355,7 +54355,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1202"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3428ac18-a410-4823-816c-ce697d26f7a8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54376,7 +54376,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process="*pcalua* -a*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_indirect_command_execution_via_pcalua_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is developed to detect suspicious excessive usage of forfiles.exe process. This event was seen in post exploitation tool WINPEAS that was used by Ransomware Prestige. Forfiles command lets you run a command on or pass arguments to multiple files. This Windows OS built-in tool being abused to list all files in specific directory or drive.
@@ -54388,7 +54388,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54402,7 +54402,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1202"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bfdaabe7-3db8-48c5-80c1-220f9b8f22be", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54417,7 +54417,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_guid) as process_guid  values(Processes.process_name) as process_name count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "forfiles.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name = "forfiles.exe" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user _time span=1m | where count >=20 | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_indirect_command_execution_via_series_of_forfiles_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Information Discovery Fsutil - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Information Discovery Fsutil - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process execution of Windows OS built-in tool FSUTIL to discover file system information. This tool is being abused or used by several adversaries or threat actor to query/list all drives, drive type, volume information or volume statistics by using the FSINFO parameter of this tool. This technique was seen in WINPEAS post exploitation tool that is being used by ransomware prestige to gain privilege and persistence to the targeted host.
@@ -54429,7 +54429,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Information Discovery Fsutil - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Information Discovery Fsutil - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54443,7 +54443,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Information Discovery Fsutil - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Information Discovery Fsutil - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2181f261-93e6-4166-a5a9-47deac58feff", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54458,7 +54458,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="fsutil.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name = "fsutil.exe" AND Processes.process = "*fsinfo*" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_information_discovery_fsutil_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Ingress Tool Transfer Using Explorer - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Ingress Tool Transfer Using Explorer - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the Windows Explorer process with a URL within the command-line. Explorer.exe is known Windows process that handles start menu, taskbar, desktop and file manager. Many adversaries abuse this process, like DCRat malware, where it attempts to open the URL with the default browser application on the target host by putting the URL as a parameter on explorer.exe process. This anomaly detection might be a good pivot to check which user and how this process was executed, what is the parent process and what is the URL link. This technique is not commonly used to open an URL.
@@ -54470,7 +54470,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on legi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Ingress Tool Transfer Using Explorer - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Ingress Tool Transfer Using Explorer - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54484,7 +54484,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Ingress Tool Transfer Using Explorer - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Ingress Tool Transfer Using Explorer - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkCrystal RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "76753bab-f116-4ea3-8fb9-89b638be58a9", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54499,7 +54499,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = explorer.exe OR Processes.original_file_name = explorer.exe) AND NOT (Processes.parent_process_name IN("userinit.exe", "svchost.exe")) Processes.process IN ("* http://*", "* https://*") by  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_ingress_tool_transfer_using_explorer_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows InProcServer32 New Outlook Form - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows InProcServer32 New Outlook Form - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the creation or modification of registry keys associated with new Outlook form installations that could indicate exploitation of CVE-2024-21378. The vulnerability allows for authenticated remote code execution via synced form objects by abusing the InProcServer32 registry key. The attack involves syncing malicious form objects that carry special properties and attachments used to "install" the form on a client, potentially leading to arbitrary file and registry key creation under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT (HKCR), and ultimately, remote code execution. This detection focuses on monitoring for registry modifications involving InProcServer32 keys or equivalent that are linked to Outlook form installations, which are indicative of an attempt to exploit this vulnerability.
@@ -54511,7 +54511,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible if the organiza
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows InProcServer32 New Outlook Form - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InProcServer32 New Outlook Form - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54525,7 +54525,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows InProcServer32 New Outlook Form - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InProcServer32 New Outlook Form - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Outlook RCE CVE-2024-21378"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2024-21378"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fedb49c4-4bd7-4d42-8fd9-f8c8538c73c4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54540,7 +54540,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\InProcServer32\\*" Registry.registry_value_data=*\\FORMS\\* by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_inprocserver32_new_outlook_form_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Input Capture Using Credential UI Dll - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Input Capture Using Credential UI Dll - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process that loads the credui.dll module. This legitimate module is typically abused by adversaries, threat actors and red teamers to create a credential UI prompt dialog box to lure users for possible credential theft or can be used to dump the credentials of a targeted host. This hunting query is a good pivot to check why the process loaded this dll and if it is a legitimate file. This hunting query may hit false positive for a third party application that uses a credential login UI for user login.
@@ -54552,7 +54552,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = this module can be loaded by a third party a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Input Capture Using Credential UI Dll - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Input Capture Using Credential UI Dll - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -54561,7 +54561,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Input Capture Using Credential UI Dll - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Input Capture Using Credential UI Dll - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brute Ratel C4"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1056.002", "T1056"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "406c21d6-6c75-4e9f-9ca9-48049a1dd90e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54576,7 +54576,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7  (ImageLoaded = "*\\credui.dll" AND OriginalFileName = "credui.dll") OR (ImageLoaded = "*\\wincredui.dll" AND OriginalFileName = "wincredui.dll") AND NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\explorer.exe", "*\\windows\\system32\\*", "*\\windows\\sysWow64\\*", "*:\\program files*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName dest EventCode Signed ProcessId ProcessGuid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_input_capture_using_credential_ui_dll_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies instances where the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary loads `vaultcli.dll` and `Samlib.dll`. This technique can be employed to execute code that bypasses application control and captures credentials using tools like Mimikatz.\
@@ -54594,7 +54594,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Typically, this will not trigger because, by
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -54608,7 +54608,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ccfeddec-43ec-11ec-b494-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54632,7 +54632,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 process_name=installutil.exe loaded_file_path IN ("*\\samlib.dll", "*\\vaultcli.dll") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by user_id, dest, process_name, loaded_file, loaded_file_path, original_file_name, process_guid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_credential_theft_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the Windows binary InstallUtil.exe running from a non-standard location. The analytic utilizes a macro for InstallUtil and identifies both the process_name and original_file_name.
@@ -54644,7 +54644,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54658,7 +54658,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Living Off The Land", "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "Ransomware", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "Unusual Processes", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1036.003", "T1218", "T1218.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dcf74b22-7933-11ec-857c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54679,7 +54679,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` NOT (Processes.process_path IN ("*\\Windows\\ADWS\\*","*\\Windows\\SysWOW64*", "*\\Windows\\system32*", "*\\Windows\\NetworkController\\*", "*\\Windows\\SystemApps\\*", "*\\WinSxS\\*", "*\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_in_non_standard_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control.\
@@ -54697,7 +54697,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54711,7 +54711,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4fbf9270-43da-11ec-9486-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54735,7 +54735,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` by _time span=1h  Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join  process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time user dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `windows_installutil_remote_network_connection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary. This will execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch.\
@@ -54755,7 +54755,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present. F
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54769,7 +54769,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cfa7b9ac-43f0-11ec-9b48-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54794,7 +54794,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN ("*/u*", "*uninstall*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary making a remote network connection. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control using the `/u` (uninstall) switch.\
@@ -54814,7 +54814,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54828,7 +54828,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1a52c836-43ef-11ec-a36c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54853,7 +54853,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN ("*/u*", "*uninstall*") by _time span=1h  Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join  process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as C2 ] | table _time user dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port C2 | `windows_installutil_uninstall_option_with_network_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary passing a HTTP request on the command-line. This technique may be used to download and execute code while bypassing application control.\
@@ -54871,7 +54871,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Limited false positives should be present as
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54885,7 +54885,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.004", "T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "28e06670-43df-11ec-a569-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54909,7 +54909,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_installutil` Processes.process IN ("*http://*","*https://*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_installutil_url_in_command_line_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of a delivered ISO file that has been mounted and the afformention lnk or file opened within it. When the ISO file is opened, the files are saved in the %USER%\AppData\Local\Temp\<random folder name>\ path. The analytic identifies .iso.lnk written to the path. The name of the ISO file is prepended.
@@ -54921,7 +54921,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be high depending on the
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54930,7 +54930,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "Amadey", "Azorult", "Brute Ratel C4", "IcedID", "Qakbot", "Remcos", "Spearphishing Attachments", "Warzone RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566", "T1204.001", "T1204"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d7c2c09b-9569-4a9e-a8b6-6a39a99c1d32", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54945,7 +54945,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Recent\\*") Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.iso.lnk", "*.img.lnk", "*.vhd.lnk", "*vhdx.lnk") by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_iso_lnk_file_creation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic identifies the process name of java.exe and w3wp.exe spawning a Windows shell. This is potentially indicative of exploitation of the Java application and may be related to current event CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). The shells included in the macro are "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe". Upon triage, review parallel processes and command-line arguments to determine legitimacy. 
@@ -54957,7 +54957,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Filtering may be required on internal develo
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -54971,7 +54971,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2022-47966"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "28c81306-5c47-11ec-bfea-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -54992,7 +54992,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=java.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_java_spawning_shells_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a local successful authentication event on a Windows endpoint using the Kerberos package. The target user security identified will be set to the built-in local Administrator account, along with the remote address as localhost - 127.0.0.1. This may be indicative of a kerberos relay attack. Upon triage, review for recently ran binaries on disk. In addition, look for new computer accounts added to Active Directory and other anomolous AD events.
@@ -55004,7 +55004,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible, filtering may
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -55018,7 +55018,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8309c3a8-4d34-48ae-ad66-631658214653", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55039,7 +55039,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security`  EventCode=4624 LogonType=3 AuthenticationPackageName=Kerberos action=success src=127.0.0.1 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, subject, action, SubjectLogonId, user, TargetUserName, src | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_kerberos_local_successful_logon_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Known Abused DLL Created - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Known Abused DLL Created - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to identify instances where Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) with a known history of being exploited are created in locations that are not typical for their use. This could indicate that an attacker is attempting to exploit the DLL search order hijacking or sideloading techniques. DLL search order hijacking involves tricking an application into loading a malicious DLL instead of the legitimate one it was intending to load. This is often achieved by placing the malicious DLL in a directory that is searched before the directory containing the legitimate DLL. Sideloading, similarly, involves placing a malicious DLL with the same name as a legitimate DLL that an application is known to load, in a location that the application will search before finding the legitimate version. Both of these techniques can be used by attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence on a system, and potentially elevate their privileges, all while appearing as legitimate operations to the untrained eye. This analytic aims to shed light on such suspicious activities by monitoring for the creation of known abused DLLs in unconventional locations, thereby helping in the early detection of these stealthy attack techniques.
@@ -55051,7 +55051,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This analytic may flag instances where DLLs
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Known Abused DLL Created - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Known Abused DLL Created - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -55065,7 +55065,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Known Abused DLL Created - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Known Abused DLL Created - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 25, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.001", "T1574.002", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ea91651a-772a-4b02-ac3d-985b364a5f07", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55080,7 +55080,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name!="unknown" Processes.process_name=* Processes.process_guid!=null by _time span=1h Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join max=0 process_guid dest [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\users\\*","*\\Windows\Temp\\*","*\\programdata\\*") Filesystem.file_name="*.dll" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | lookup hijacklibs_loaded library AS file_name OUTPUT islibrary, ttp, comment as desc | lookup hijacklibs_loaded library AS file_name excludes as file_path OUTPUT islibrary as excluded | search islibrary = TRUE AND excluded != TRUE | stats latest(*) as * by dest process_guid ] | where isnotnull(file_name) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |  `windows_known_abused_dll_created_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Known GraphicalProton Loaded Modules - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Known GraphicalProton Loaded Modules - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a potential suspicious process loading dll modules related to Graphicalproton backdoor implant of SVR. These DLL modules have been observed in SVR attacks, commonly used to install backdoors on targeted hosts. This anomaly detection highlights the need for thorough investigation and immediate mitigation measures to safeguard the network against potential breaches.
@@ -55092,7 +55092,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Known GraphicalProton Loaded Modules - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Known GraphicalProton Loaded Modules - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -55106,7 +55106,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Known GraphicalProton Loaded Modules - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Known GraphicalProton Loaded Modules - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bf471c94-0324-4b19-a113-d02749b969bc", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55121,7 +55121,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN ("*\\AclNumsInvertHost.dll", "*\\ModeBitmapNumericAnimate.dll", "*\\UnregisterAncestorAppendAuto.dll", "*\\DeregisterSeekUsers.dll", "*\\ScrollbarHandleGet.dll", "*\\PerformanceCaptionApi.dll", "*\\WowIcmpRemoveReg.dll", "*\\BlendMonitorStringBuild.dll", "*\\HandleFrequencyAll.dll", "*\\HardSwapColor.dll", "*\\LengthInMemoryActivate.dll", "*\\ParametersNamesPopup.dll", "*\\ModeFolderSignMove.dll", "*\\ChildPaletteConnected.dll", "*\\AddressResourcesSpec.dll") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_known_graphicalproton_loaded_modules_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the default service name created by KrbRelayUp. Defenders should be aware that attackers could change the hardcoded service name of the KrbRelayUp tool and bypass this detection.
@@ -55133,7 +55133,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this is
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -55147,7 +55147,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e40ef542-8241-4419-9af4-6324582ea60a", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55168,7 +55168,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceName IN ("KrbSCM") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest EventCode ImagePath ServiceName StartType ServiceType | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_krbrelayup_service_creation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Event ID 4769, `A Kerberos service ticket was requested`, to identify more than 30 computer service ticket requests from one source. When a domain joined endpoint connects to other remote endpoint, it will first request a Kerberos Service Ticket with the computer name as the Service Name. A user requesting a large number of computer service tickets for different endpoints could represent malicious behavior like lateral movement, malware staging, reconnaissance, etc.\
@@ -55182,7 +55182,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = An single endpoint requesting a large number
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -55196,7 +55196,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1135", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "386ad394-c9a7-4b4f-b66f-586252de20f0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55211,7 +55211,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769 ServiceName="*$" TargetUserName!="*$" | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(ServiceName) AS unique_targets values(ServiceName) as host_targets by _time, IpAddress, TargetUserName | where unique_targets > 30 | `windows_large_number_of_computer_service_tickets_requested_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Lateral Tool Transfer RemCom - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Lateral Tool Transfer RemCom - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies the use of RemCom.exe - The open source psexec. This utility provides the ability to move laterally and run scripts or commands remotely.
@@ -55223,7 +55223,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on Admi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Lateral Tool Transfer RemCom - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Lateral Tool Transfer RemCom - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -55237,7 +55237,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Lateral Tool Transfer RemCom - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Lateral Tool Transfer RemCom - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1570"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e373a840-5bdc-47ef-b2fd-9cc7aaf387f0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55258,7 +55258,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=remcom.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RemCom.exe) Processes.process="*\\*" Processes.process IN ("*/user:*", "*/pwd:*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_lateral_tool_transfer_remcom_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Ldifde Directory Object Behavior - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Ldifde Directory Object Behavior - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of Ldifde.exe, which provides the ability to create, modify, or delete LDAP directory objects. Natively, the binary is only installed on a domain controller. However, adversaries or administrators may install the Windows Remote Server Admin Tools for ldifde.exe. Ldifde.exe is a Microsoft Windows command-line utility used to import or export LDAP directory entries. LDAP stands for Lightweight Directory Access Protocol, which is a protocol used for accessing and managing directory information services over an IP network. LDIF, on the other hand, stands for LDAP Data Interchange Format, a standard plain-text data interchange format for representing LDAP directory entries. -i This is a flag used with Ldifde.exe to denote import mode. In import mode, Ldifde.exe takes an LDIF file and imports its contents into the LDAP directory. The data in the LDIF file might include new objects to be created, or modifications or deletions to existing objects. -f This flag is used to specify the filename of the LDIF file that Ldifde.exe will import from (in the case of the -i flag) or export to (without the -i flag). For example, if you wanted to import data from a file called data.ldif, you would use the command ldifde -i -f data.ldif. Keep in mind that while the use of Ldifde.exe is legitimate in many contexts, it can also be used maliciously. For instance, an attacker who has gained access to a domain controller could potentially use Ldifde.exe to export sensitive data or make unauthorized changes to the directory. Therefore, it's important to monitor for unusual or unauthorized use of this tool.
@@ -55270,7 +55270,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Ldifde Directory Object Behavior - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Ldifde Directory Object Behavior - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["22cf8cb9-adb1-4e8c-80ca-7c723dfc8784"]
@@ -55285,7 +55285,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Ldifde Directory Object Behavior - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Ldifde Directory Object Behavior - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105", "T1069.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "35cd29ca-f08c-4489-8815-f715c45460d3", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55306,7 +55306,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=ldifde.exe Processes.process IN ("*-i *", "*-f *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_ldifde_directory_object_behavior_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate domain organizational unit for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -55318,7 +55318,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -55332,7 +55332,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Data Destruction", "Industroyer2"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "510ea428-4731-4d2f-8829-a28293e427aa", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55347,7 +55347,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*[adsisearcher]*" ScriptBlockText = "*objectcategory=organizationalunit*" ScriptBlockText = "*findAll()*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | rename Computer as dest, user_id as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_linked_policies_in_adsi_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages events 4625 and 4624 to identify an endpoint using the builtin local Administrator account to authenticate to a large numbers of endpoints. Specifically, the logic will trigger when an endpoints attempts to authenticate to more than 30 target computers within a 5 minute timespan. This behavior could represent an adversary who has obtained access to local credentials and is trying to validate if these credentials work on other hosts to escalate their privileges. As environments differ across organizations, security teams should customize the thresholds of this detection as needed.
@@ -55359,7 +55359,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Vulnerability scanners or system administrat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -55373,7 +55373,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110", "T1110.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "09555511-aca6-484a-b6ab-72cd03d73c34", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55394,7 +55394,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 TargetUserName=Administrator | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Computer) AS unique_targets values(Computer) as host_targets by _time, IpAddress, TargetUserName, EventCode | where unique_targets > 30 | `windows_local_administrator_credential_stuffing_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows LSA Secrets NoLMhash Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows LSA Secrets NoLMhash Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry related to the Local Security Authority (LSA) in Windows. This registry value is used to determine whether the system should store passwords in the weaker Lan Manager (LM) hash format. Setting it to 0 disables this feature, meaning LM hashes will be stored. Modifying these settings should be done carefully and with a clear understanding of the impact it might have on system security and functionality. This command is often used in security configurations to enforce stronger password storage methods and prevent the storage of weaker LM hashes, which are more susceptible to certain types of attacks. This TTP detection can be a good indicator of any process or user that tries to modify the LSA security configuration.
@@ -55406,7 +55406,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator may change this registry setti
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows LSA Secrets NoLMhash Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows LSA Secrets NoLMhash Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -55420,7 +55420,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows LSA Secrets NoLMhash Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows LSA Secrets NoLMhash Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "48cc1605-538c-4223-8382-e36bee5b540d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55441,7 +55441,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\NoLMHash" Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_lsa_secrets_nolmhash_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Mail Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Mail Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a possible windows application having a SMTP connection in a non common installation path in windows operating system.This network protocol is being used by adversaries, threat actors and malware like AgentTesla as a Command And Control communication to transfer its collected stolen information like the desktop screenshots, browser information and system information of a targeted or compromised host.
@@ -55453,7 +55453,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = third party application may use this network
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Mail Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Mail Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -55467,7 +55467,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Mail Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Mail Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.003", "T1071"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ac3311f5-661d-4e99-bd1f-3ec665b05441", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55482,7 +55482,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=3 NOT(Image IN("*\\program files*", "*\\thunderbird.exe","*\\outlook.exe")) (DestinationPortName="smtp" OR DestinationPort=25 OR DestinationPort=587) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image DestinationPort DestinationPortName DestinationHostname SourceHostname SourcePort SourcePortName Protocol DestinationIp dest user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_mail_protocol_in_non_common_process_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Mark Of The Web Bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Mark Of The Web Bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious process that delete mark-of-the-web data stream. This technique has been observed in various instances of malware and adversarial activities aimed at circumventing security restrictions within the Windows Operating System, particularly pertaining to files downloaded from the internet. An example of this scenario is demonstrated by Ave Maria RAT, which attempts to delete this data stream as a means to evade such restrictions.
@@ -55494,7 +55494,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Mark Of The Web Bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Mark Of The Web Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -55508,7 +55508,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Mark Of The Web Bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Mark Of The Web Bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Warzone RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1553.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8ca13343-7405-4916-a2d1-ae34ce0c28ae", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55529,7 +55529,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=23 TargetFilename = "*:Zone.Identifier" | stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by user EventCode Image TargetFilename ProcessID dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_mark_of_the_web_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious parent process of explorer.exe. Explorer is usually executed by userinit.exe that will exit after execution that causes the main explorer.exe no parent process. Some malware like qakbot spawn another explorer.exe to inject its code. This TTP detection is a good indicator that a process spawning explorer.exe might inject code or masquerading its parent child process to evade detections.
@@ -55541,7 +55541,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -55555,7 +55555,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Qakbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1574"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "61490da9-52a1-4855-a0c5-28233c88c481", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55576,7 +55576,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "regsvr32.exe") AND Processes.process_name = "explorer.exe" AND Processes.process IN ("*\\explorer.exe") by Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_masquerading_explorer_as_child_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Masquerading Msdtc Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Masquerading Msdtc Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious msdtc.exe with specific command-line parameters, particularly -a or -b, which are regarded as potential indicators of the presence of the insidious PlugX malware. This malware is notorious for its covert operations and is frequently utilized by threat actors for unauthorized access, data exfiltration, and espionage. The analytic's focus on the -a or -b command-line parameters within msdtc.exe is rooted in the PlugX malware's sophisticated tactic of masquerading its activities. To elude detection, PlugX employs a technique where it injects a concealed, headless PlugX Dynamic Link Library (DLL) module into the legitimate msdtc.exe process. By leveraging these specific command-line parameters, the malware attempts to disguise its presence within a system's legitimate processes, thereby evading immediate suspicion.
@@ -55588,7 +55588,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Masquerading Msdtc Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Masquerading Msdtc Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -55602,7 +55602,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Masquerading Msdtc Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Masquerading Msdtc Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PlugX"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "238f3a07-8440-480b-b26f-462f41d9a47c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55623,7 +55623,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "msdtc.exe" Processes.process = "*msdtc.exe*" Processes.process IN ("* -a*", "* -b*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_masquerading_msdtc_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = As simple as it sounds, this analytic identifies when the native mimikatz.exe binary executes on Windows. It does look for the original file name as well, just in case the binary is renamed. Adversaries sometimes bring in the default binary and run it directly. Benjamin Delpy originally created Mimikatz as a proof of concept to show Microsoft that its authentication protocols were vulnerable to an attack. Instead, he inadvertently created one of the most widely used and downloaded threat actor tools of the past 20 years. Mimikatz is an open-source application that allows users to view and save authentication credentials such as Kerberos tickets.
@@ -55635,7 +55635,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this is
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -55649,7 +55649,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-320A", "CISA AA23-347A", "Credential Dumping", "Flax Typhoon", "Sandworm Tools", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a9e0d6d3-9676-4e26-994d-4e0406bb4467", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55670,7 +55670,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=mimikatz.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=mimikatz.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_mimikatz_binary_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies hardcoded extensions related to the Crypo module within Mimikatz. Moving certificates or downloading them is not malicious, however with Mimikatz having hardcoded names it helps to identify potential usage of certificates being exported.
@@ -55682,7 +55682,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and may need
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -55696,7 +55696,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Sandworm Tools", "Windows Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1649"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3a9a6806-16a8-4cda-8d73-b49d10a05b16", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55711,7 +55711,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.keyx.rsa.pvk","*sign.rsa.pvk","*sign.dsa.pvk","*dsa.ec.p8k","*dh.ec.p8k", "*.pfx", "*.der") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `windows_mimikatz_crypto_export_file_extensions_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry AuthenticationLevelOverride - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry AuthenticationLevelOverride - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry related to authentication level settings. This registry is the configuration for authentication level settings within the Terminal Server Client settings in Windows. AuthenticationLevelOverride might be used to control or override the authentication level used by the Terminal Server Client for remote connections. DarkGate malware modify this registry as part of its malicious installation in a targeted host for its remote desktop capabilities.
@@ -55723,7 +55723,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry AuthenticationLevelOverride - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry AuthenticationLevelOverride - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -55737,7 +55737,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry AuthenticationLevelOverride - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry AuthenticationLevelOverride - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6410a403-36bb-490f-a06a-11c3be7d2a41", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55752,7 +55752,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\Terminal Server Client\\AuthenticationLevelOverride"  Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000 by  Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_authenticationleveloverride_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Auto Minor Updates - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Auto Minor Updates - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification of Windows auto update configuration. This technique was being abused by several adversaries, malware authors and also red-teamers to bypass detection or to be able to compromise the target host with zero day exploit or as an additional defense evasion technique. RedLine Stealer is one of the malware we've seen that uses this technique to evade detection and add more payload on the target host. This detection looks for registry modification that will "Treat minor updates like other updates".
@@ -55764,7 +55764,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Auto Minor Updates - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Auto Minor Updates - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -55773,7 +55773,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Auto Minor Updates - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Auto Minor Updates - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["RedLine Stealer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "be498b9f-d804-4bbf-9fc0-d5448466b313", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55788,7 +55788,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\AU\\AutoInstallMinorUpdates" AND Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_auto_minor_updates_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Auto Update Notif - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Auto Update Notif - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification of Windows auto update notification. This technique was being abused by several adversaries, malware authors and also red-teamers to bypass detection or to be able to compromise the target host with zero day exploit or as an additional defense evasion technique. RedLine Stealer is one of the malware we've seen that uses this technique to evade detection and add more payload on the target host. This detection looks for registry modification that will switch the automatic windows update to "Notify before download".
@@ -55800,7 +55800,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Auto Update Notif - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Auto Update Notif - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["12e03af7-79f9-4f95-af48-d3f12f28a260"]
@@ -55815,7 +55815,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Auto Update Notif - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Auto Update Notif - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["RedLine Stealer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4d1409df-40c7-4b11-aec4-bd0e709dfc12", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55830,7 +55830,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\AU\\AUOptions" AND Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000002" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_auto_update_notif_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Default Icon Setting - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Default Icon Setting - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modification to change the default icon association of windows to ransomware . This technique was seen in Lockbit ransomware where it modified the default icon association of the compromised Windows OS  host with its dropped ransomware icon file as part of its  defacement payload. This registry is not commonly modified by a normal user so having this anomaly detection may help to catch possible lockbit ransomware infection or other malware.
@@ -55842,7 +55842,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Default Icon Setting - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Default Icon Setting - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -55856,7 +55856,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Default Icon Setting - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Default Icon Setting - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["LockBit Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a7a7afdb-3c58-45b6-9bff-63e5acfd9d40", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55871,7 +55871,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path ="*\\defaultIcon\\(Default)*" Registry.registry_path = "*HKCR\\*" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action Registry.dest  Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `windows_modify_registry_default_icon_setting_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Restricted Admin - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Restricted Admin - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry related to DisableRestrictedAdmin. This registry entry is used to control the behavior of Restricted Admin mode, which is a security feature that limits the exposure of sensitive credentials when connecting remotely to another computer. When this registry value is set to 0 it indicates that Restricted Admin mode is enabled (default behavior). As with any modifications to registry settings, changing this entry should be approached cautiously, ensuring a clear understanding of the implications for system security and functionality. Unauthorized changes to these security settings can pose risks and should be monitored closely for any signs of tampering or unauthorized alterations.
@@ -55883,7 +55883,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator may change this registry setti
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Restricted Admin - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Restricted Admin - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -55897,7 +55897,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Restricted Admin - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Restricted Admin - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cee573a0-7587-48e6-ae99-10e8c657e89a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55918,7 +55918,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\DisableRestrictedAdmin" Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000000) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disable_restricted_admin_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Toast Notifications - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Toast Notifications - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows registry to disable toast notifications. This Windows Operating System feature is responsible for alerting or notifying user if application or OS need some updates. Adversaries and malwares like Azorult abuse this technique to disable important update notification in compromised host. This anomaly detection is a good pivot to look for further events related to defense evasion and execution.
@@ -55930,7 +55930,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Toast Notifications - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Toast Notifications - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -55944,7 +55944,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Toast Notifications - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Toast Notifications - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ed4eeacb-8d5a-488e-bc97-1ce6ded63b84", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -55959,7 +55959,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\PushNotifications\\ToastEnabled*" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disable_toast_notifications_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows Defender raw write notification feature. This policy controls whether raw volume write notifications are sent to behavior monitoring or not. This registry was recently identified in Azorult malware to bypass Windows Defender detections or behavior monitoring in terms of volume write.
@@ -55971,7 +55971,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -55985,7 +55985,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0e5e25c3-32f4-46f7-ba4a-5b95c3b90f5b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56000,7 +56000,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableRawWriteNotification*" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disable_win_defender_raw_write_notif_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to disable Windows Defender notification. This technique was being abused by several adversaries, malware authors and also red-teamers to evade detection on the targeted machine. RedLine Stealer is one of the malware we've seen that uses this technique to bypass Windows defender detection.
@@ -56012,7 +56012,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["12e03af7-79f9-4f95-af48-d3f12f28a260"]
@@ -56027,7 +56027,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "RedLine Stealer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8e207707-ad40-4eb3-b865-3a52aec91f26", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56048,7 +56048,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender Security Center\\Notifications\\DisableNotifications" AND Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disable_windefender_notifications_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows registry to disable windows center notifications. This Windows Operating System feature is responsible for alerting or notifying user if application or OS need some updates. Adversaries and malwares like Azorult abuse this technique to disable important update notification in compromised host. This anomaly detection is a good pivot to look for further events related to defense evasion and execution.
@@ -56060,7 +56060,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -56074,7 +56074,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "27ed3e79-6d86-44dd-b9ab-524451c97a7b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56089,7 +56089,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\ImmersiveShell\\UseActionCenterExperience*" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disable_windows_security_center_notif_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias. This registry setting might be intended to manage or control anti-aliasing behavior (smoothing of edges and fonts) within Remote Desktop sessions. DarkGate malware modify this registry as part of its malicious installation in a targeted host for its remote desktop capabilities.
@@ -56101,7 +56101,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -56115,7 +56115,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4927c6f1-4667-42e6-bd7a-f5222116386b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56136,7 +56136,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\Terminal Services\\DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias"  Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by  Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disableremotedesktopantialias_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable security settings of Terminal Services. altering or disabling security settings within Terminal Services. Terminal Services, now known as Remote Desktop Services (RDS) in more recent Windows versions, allows users to access applications, data, and even an entire desktop remotely. DarkGate malware modify this registry as part of its malicious installation in a targeted host for its remote desktop capabilities.
@@ -56148,7 +56148,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -56162,7 +56162,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "DarkGate Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "989019b4-b7aa-418a-9a17-2293e91288b6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56183,7 +56183,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\Terminal Services\\DisableSecuritySettings"  Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by  Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disablesecuritysettings_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to disable Windows error reporting settings. This Windows feature allows the user to report bugs, errors, failure or problems encountered in specific application or processes. Adversaries use this technique to hide any error or failure that some of its malicious components trigger.
@@ -56195,7 +56195,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -56209,7 +56209,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "21cbcaf1-b51f-496d-a0c1-858ff3070452", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56230,7 +56230,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Windows Error Reporting\\disable*" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disabling_wer_settings_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisAllow Windows App - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisAllow Windows App - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies modification in the Windows registry to prevent user running specific computer programs that could aid them in manually removing malware or detecting it using security products. This technique was recently identified in Azorult malware where it uses this registry value to prevent several AV products to execute on the compromised host machine.
@@ -56242,7 +56242,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisAllow Windows App - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisAllow Windows App - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -56256,7 +56256,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisAllow Windows App - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisAllow Windows App - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4bc788d3-c83a-48c5-a4e2-e0c6dba57889", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56277,7 +56277,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\DisallowRun*" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_disallow_windows_app_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Do Not Connect To Win Update - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Do Not Connect To Win Update - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification of Windows auto update configuration. This technique was being abused by several adversaries, malware authors and also red-teamers to bypass detection or to be able to compromise the target host with zero day exploit or as an additional defense evasion technique. RedLine Stealer is one of the malware we've seen that uses this technique to evade detection and add more payload on the target host. This detection looks for registry modification that will disable Windos update functionality, and may cause connection to public services such as the Windows Store to stop working. This policy applies only when this PC is configured to connect to an intranet update service using the "Specify intranet Microsoft update service location" policy.
@@ -56289,7 +56289,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Do Not Connect To Win Update - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Do Not Connect To Win Update - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["12e03af7-79f9-4f95-af48-d3f12f28a260"]
@@ -56304,7 +56304,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Do Not Connect To Win Update - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Do Not Connect To Win Update - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["RedLine Stealer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e09c598e-8dd0-4e73-b740-4b96b689199e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56319,7 +56319,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\DoNotConnectToWindowsUpdateInternetLocations" AND Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_do_not_connect_to_win_update_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DontShowUI - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DontShowUI - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows Error Reporting registry to DontShowUI. DarkGate malware modify this registry as part of its malicious installation in a targeted host for its remote desktop capabilities. When this registry value is present and set to a specific configuration, it can influence the behavior of error reporting dialogs or prompts, suppressing them from being displayed to the user.For instance, setting DontShowUI to a value of 1 often indicates that the Windows Error Reporting UI prompts will be suppressed, meaning users won't see error reporting pop-ups when errors occur.
@@ -56331,7 +56331,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DontShowUI - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DontShowUI - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -56345,7 +56345,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DontShowUI - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DontShowUI - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4ff9767b-fdf2-489c-83a5-c6c34412d72e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56366,7 +56366,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Windows Error Reporting\\DontShowUI"  Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by  Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_dontshowui_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry EnableLinkedConnections - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry EnableLinkedConnections - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification of Windows linked connection configuration. This technique was being abused by several adversaries, malware like BlackByte ransomware to enable the linked connections feature, that allows network shares to be accessed using both standard and administrator-level privileges simultaneously. By default, Windows does not enable this feature to enhance security.
@@ -56378,7 +56378,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry EnableLinkedConnections - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry EnableLinkedConnections - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["4f4e2f9f-6209-4fcf-9b15-3b7455706f5b"]
@@ -56393,7 +56393,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry EnableLinkedConnections - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry EnableLinkedConnections - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "93048164-3358-4af0-8680-aa5f38440516", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56414,7 +56414,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLinkedConnections" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_enablelinkedconnections_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry LongPathsEnabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry LongPathsEnabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification of Windows long path enable configuration. This technique was being abused by several adversaries, malware like BlackByte to enable long file path support in the operating system. By default, Windows has a limitation on the maximum length of a file path, which is set to 260 characters. Enabling the LongPathsEnabled setting allows you to work with file paths longer than 260 characters.
@@ -56426,7 +56426,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry LongPathsEnabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry LongPathsEnabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["4f4e2f9f-6209-4fcf-9b15-3b7455706f5b"]
@@ -56441,7 +56441,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry LongPathsEnabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry LongPathsEnabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 40, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "36f9626c-4272-4808-aadd-267acce681c0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56456,7 +56456,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\FileSystem\\LongPathsEnabled" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_longpathsenabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry MaxConnectionPerServer - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry MaxConnectionPerServer - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification of Windows max connection per server configuration. This particular technique has been observed in various threat actors, adversaries, and even in malware such as the Warzone (Ave Maria) RAT. By altering the max connection per server setting in the Windows registry, attackers can potentially increase the number of concurrent connections allowed to a remote server. This modification could be exploited for various malicious purposes, including facilitating distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks or enabling more effective lateral movement within a compromised network.
@@ -56468,7 +56468,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry MaxConnectionPerServer - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry MaxConnectionPerServer - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -56482,7 +56482,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry MaxConnectionPerServer - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry MaxConnectionPerServer - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Warzone RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "064cd09f-1ff4-4823-97e0-45c2f5b087ec", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56497,7 +56497,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\MaxConnectionsPerServer*" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\MaxConnectionsPer1_0Server*")  Registry.registry_value_data = "0x0000000a" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_maxconnectionperserver_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Reboot With Logon User - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Reboot With Logon User - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification of Windows auto update configuration. This technique was being abused by several adversaries, malware authors and also red-teamers to bypass detection or to be able to compromise the target host with zero day exploit or as an additional defense evasion technique. RedLine Stealer is one of the malware we've seen that uses this technique to evade detection and add more payload on the target host. This detection looks for registry modification that will allow "Logged-on user gets to choose whether or not to restart his or her compute".
@@ -56509,7 +56509,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Reboot With Logon User - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Reboot With Logon User - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["12e03af7-79f9-4f95-af48-d3f12f28a260"]
@@ -56524,7 +56524,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Reboot With Logon User - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Reboot With Logon User - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["RedLine Stealer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6a12fa9f-580d-4627-8c7f-313e359bdc6a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56539,7 +56539,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\AU\\NoAutoRebootWithLoggedOnUsers" AND Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_no_auto_reboot_with_logon_user_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification of Windows auto update configuration. This technique was being abused by several adversaries, malware authors and also red-teamers to bypass detection or to be able to compromise the target host with zero day exploit or as an additional defense evasion technique. RedLine Stealer is one of the malware we've seen that uses this technique to evade detection and add more payload on the target host. This detection looks for registry modification that will "Disable Automatic Updates".
@@ -56551,7 +56551,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["12e03af7-79f9-4f95-af48-d3f12f28a260"]
@@ -56566,7 +56566,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "RedLine Stealer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fbd4f333-17bb-4eab-89cb-860fa2e0600e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56581,7 +56581,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\AU\\NoAutoUpdate" AND Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_no_auto_update_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry NoChangingWallPaper - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry NoChangingWallPaper - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies alterations in the Windows registry aimed at restricting wallpaper modifications. This tactic has been exploited by the Rhysida ransomware as a part of its destructive payload within compromised systems. By making this registry modification, the ransomware seeks to impede users from changing the wallpaper forcibly set by the malware, restricting the user's control over their system's visual settings.
@@ -56593,7 +56593,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry NoChangingWallPaper - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry NoChangingWallPaper - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -56607,7 +56607,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry NoChangingWallPaper - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry NoChangingWallPaper - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Rhysida Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a2276412-e254-4e9a-9082-4d92edb6a3e0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56628,7 +56628,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\ActiveDesktop\\NoChangingWallPaper" Registry.registry_value_data = 1) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_nochangingwallpaper_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry ProxyEnable - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry ProxyEnable - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to enable proxy. This method has been exploited by various malware and adversaries to establish proxy communication on compromised hosts, facilitating connections to malicious Command and Control (C2) servers. Identifying this anomaly serves as a crucial indicator to unveil suspicious processes attempting to activate the proxy feature within the Windows operating system. Detecting such attempts becomes pivotal in flagging potential threats, especially those aiming to leverage proxy configurations for unauthorized communication with malicious entities.
@@ -56640,7 +56640,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry ProxyEnable - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry ProxyEnable - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -56654,7 +56654,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry ProxyEnable - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry ProxyEnable - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b27f20bd-ef20-41d1-a1e9-25dedd5bf2f5", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56669,7 +56669,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\Internet Settings\\ProxyEnable"  Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by  Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_proxyenable_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry ProxyServer - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry ProxyServer - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification in the Windows registry to setup proxy server. This method has been exploited by various malware and adversaries to establish proxy communication on compromised hosts, facilitating connections to malicious Command and Control (C2) servers. Identifying this anomaly serves as a crucial indicator to unveil suspicious processes attempting to activate the proxy feature within the Windows operating system. Detecting such attempts becomes pivotal in flagging potential threats, especially those aiming to leverage proxy configurations for unauthorized communication with malicious entities.
@@ -56681,7 +56681,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry ProxyServer - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry ProxyServer - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -56695,7 +56695,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry ProxyServer - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry ProxyServer - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "12bdaa0b-3c59-4489-aae1-bff6d67746ef", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56710,7 +56710,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path = "*\\Internet Settings\\ProxyServer" by  Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.action Registry.user Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_proxyserver_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Qakbot Binary Data Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Qakbot Binary Data Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry entry created by Qakbot malware as part of its malicious execution. This "Binary Data" Registry  was created by newly spawn explorer.exe where its malicious code is injected to it. The registry consist of 8 random registry value name with encrypted binary data on its registry value data. This anomaly detections can be a good pivot for possible Qakbot malware infection or other malware that uses registry to save or store there config or malicious code on the registry data stream.
@@ -56722,7 +56722,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Qakbot Binary Data Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Qakbot Binary Data Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -56736,7 +56736,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Qakbot Binary Data Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Qakbot Binary Data Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Qakbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2e768497-04e0-4188-b800-70dd2be0e30d", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56751,7 +56751,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count dc(registry_value_name) as registry_value_name_count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\*" AND Registry.registry_value_data = "Binary Data" by _time span=1m Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | eval registry_key_name_len = len(registry_key_name) | eval registry_value_name_len = len(registry_value_name) | regex registry_value_name="^[0-9a-fA-F]{8}" | where registry_key_name_len < 80 AND registry_value_name_len == 8 | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("explorer.exe", "wermgr.exe","dxdiag.exe", "OneDriveSetup.exe", "mobsync.exe", "msra.exe", "xwizard.exe") by _time span=1m Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` ] | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(registry_value_name) as registry_value_name dc(registry_value_name) as registry_value_name_count values(registry_key_name) by dest process_guid process_name parent_process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where registry_value_name_count >= 5 | `windows_modify_registry_qakbot_binary_data_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process execution of reg.exe with "restore" parameter. This reg.exe parameter is commonly used to restore registry backup data in a targeted host. This approach or technique was also seen in post-exploitation tool like winpeas where it uses "reg save" and "reg restore" to check the registry modification restriction in targeted host after gaining access to it.
@@ -56763,7 +56763,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network administrator can use this command t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-12-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-12-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -56772,7 +56772,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1012"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d0072bd2-6d73-4c1b-bc77-ded6d2da3a4e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56787,7 +56787,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where  `process_reg` AND Processes.process = "* restore *" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_reg_restore_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Regedit Silent Reg Import - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Regedit Silent Reg Import - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies modification of Windows registry using regedit.exe application with silent mode parameter. regedit.exe windows application is commonly used as GUI app to check or modify registry. This application is also has undocumented command-line parameter and one of those are silent mode parameter that performs action without stopping for confirmation with dialog box. Importing registry from .reg files need to monitor in a production environment since it can be used adversaries to import RMS registry in compromised host.
@@ -56799,7 +56799,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may execute this command that
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Regedit Silent Reg Import - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Regedit Silent Reg Import - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -56813,7 +56813,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Regedit Silent Reg Import - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Regedit Silent Reg Import - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "824dd598-71be-4203-bc3b-024f4cda340e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56828,7 +56828,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="regedit.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name="regedit.exe") AND Processes.process="* /s *" AND Processes.process="*.reg*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_regedit_silent_reg_import_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Risk Behavior - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Risk Behavior - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to identify instances where three or more distinct analytics associated with Mitre ID T1112 - Modification of registry information are triggered. Such occurrences could indicate the presence of multiple malicious registry modifications on a host. Malicious actors frequently manipulate the Windows Registry to hide important configuration details within specific Registry keys. This technique allows them to obscure their activities, erase any evidence during cleanup operations, and establish continuous access and execution of malicious code.
@@ -56840,7 +56840,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on man
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Risk Behavior - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Risk Behavior - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -56849,7 +56849,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - RIR - Windows Modify Registry Risk Behavior - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - RIR - Windows Modify Registry Risk Behavior - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Correlation"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5eb479b1-a5ea-4e01-8365-780078613776", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56870,7 +56870,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where source IN ("*registry*") All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id IN ("*T1112*") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 3 | `windows_modify_registry_risk_behavior_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows registry to suppress windows defender notification. This technique was abuse by adversaries and threat actor to bypassed windows defender on the targeted host. Azorult malware is one of the malware use this technique that also disable toast notification and other windows features as part of its malicious behavior.
@@ -56882,7 +56882,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -56896,7 +56896,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e3b42daf-fff4-429d-bec8-2a199468cea9", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56911,7 +56911,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows Defender\\UX Configuration\\Notification_Suppress*" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_suppress_win_defender_notif_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Tamper Protection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Tamper Protection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to tamper Windows Defender protection. This technique was being abused by several adversaries, malware authors and also red-teamers to evade detection on the targeted machine. RedLine Stealer is one of the malware we've seen that uses this technique to bypass Windows defender detection.
@@ -56923,7 +56923,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Tamper Protection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Tamper Protection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["12e03af7-79f9-4f95-af48-d3f12f28a260"]
@@ -56938,7 +56938,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Tamper Protection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Tamper Protection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["RedLine Stealer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "12094335-88fc-4c3a-b55f-e62dd8c93c23", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -56959,7 +56959,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Features\\TamperProtection" AND Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_tamper_protection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry UpdateServiceUrlAlternate - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry UpdateServiceUrlAlternate - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification of Windows auto update configuration. This technique was being abused by several adversaries, malware authors and also red-teamers to bypass detection or to be able to compromise the target host with zero day exploit or as an additional defense evasion technique. RedLine Stealer is one of the malware we've seen that uses this technique to evade detection and add more payload on the target host. This detection looks for registry modification that specifies an intranet server to host updates from Microsoft Update.
@@ -56971,7 +56971,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry UpdateServiceUrlAlternate - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry UpdateServiceUrlAlternate - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -56985,7 +56985,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry UpdateServiceUrlAlternate - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry UpdateServiceUrlAlternate - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["RedLine Stealer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ca4e94fb-7969-4d63-8630-3625809a1f70", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57000,7 +57000,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\UpdateServiceUrlAlternate" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_updateserviceurlalternate_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry USeWuServer - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry USeWuServer - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification of Windows auto update configuration. This technique was being abused by several adversaries, malware authors and also red-teamers to bypass detection or to be able to compromise the target host with zero day exploit or as an additional defense evasion technique. RedLine Stealer is one of the malware we've seen that uses this technique to evade detection and add more payload on the target host. This detection looks for registry modification that will use "The WUServer value unless this key is set".
@@ -57012,7 +57012,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry USeWuServer - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry USeWuServer - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -57021,7 +57021,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry USeWuServer - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry USeWuServer - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["RedLine Stealer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c427bafb-0b2c-4b18-ad85-c03c6fed9e75", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57036,7 +57036,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\AU\\UseWUServer" AND Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_usewuserver_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry With MD5 Reg Key Name - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry With MD5 Reg Key Name - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to identify potentially malicious registry modification characterized by MD5-like registry key names. This technique has been notably observed in NjRAT malware, which employs such registries for fileless storage of keylogs and .DLL plugins. Detecting this tactic serves as an effective means of identifying possible NjRAT malware instances that create or modify registries as part of their malicious activities.
@@ -57048,7 +57048,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry With MD5 Reg Key Name - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry With MD5 Reg Key Name - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -57062,7 +57062,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry With MD5 Reg Key Name - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry With MD5 Reg Key Name - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NjRAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4662c6b1-0754-455e-b9ff-3ee730af3ba8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57083,7 +57083,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`  count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where  Registry.registry_path = "*\\SOFTWARE\\*" Registry.registry_value_data = "Binary Data" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | eval dropped_reg_path = split(registry_path, "\\") | eval dropped_reg_path_split_count = mvcount(dropped_reg_path) | eval validation_result= if(match(registry_value_name,"^[0-9a-fA-F]{32}$"),"md5","nonmd5") | where validation_result = "md5" AND dropped_reg_path_split_count <= 5 | table dest user registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name reg_key_name dropped_reg_path_split_count validation_result | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_with_md5_reg_key_name_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry WuServer - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry WuServer - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification of Windows auto update configuration. This technique was being abused by several adversaries, malware authors and also red-teamers to bypass detection or to be able to compromise the target host with zero day exploit or as an additional defense evasion technique. RedLine Stealer is one of the malware we've seen that uses this technique to evade detection and add more payload on the target host. This detection looks for registry modification related to the WSUS server used by Automatic Updates and (by default) API callers. This policy is paired with WUStatusServer; both must be set to the same value in order for them to be valid.
@@ -57095,7 +57095,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry WuServer - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry WuServer - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -57104,7 +57104,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry WuServer - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry WuServer - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["RedLine Stealer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a02ad386-e26d-44ce-aa97-6a46cee31439", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57119,7 +57119,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\WUServer" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_wuserver_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry wuStatusServer - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Registry wuStatusServer - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification of Windows auto update configuration. This technique was being abused by several adversaries, malware authors and also red-teamers to bypass detection or to be able to compromise the target host with zero day exploit or as an additional defense evasion technique. RedLine Stealer is one of the malware we've seen that uses this technique to evade detection and add more payload on the target host. This detection looks for registry modification related to the server to which reporting information will be sent for client computers that use the WSUS server configured by the WUServer key. This policy is paired with WUServer; both must be set to the same value in order for them to be valid.
@@ -57131,7 +57131,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry wuStatusServer - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry wuStatusServer - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -57140,7 +57140,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry wuStatusServer - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Registry wuStatusServer - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["RedLine Stealer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "073e69d0-68b2-4142-aa90-a7ee6f590676", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57155,7 +57155,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\WUStatusServer" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_modify_registry_wustatusserver_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to look for suspicious registry modification related to file compression color and information tips. This IOC was seen in hermetic wiper where it has a thread that will create this registry entry to change the color of compressed or encrypted files in NTFS file system as well as the pop up information tips. This is a good indicator that a process tries to modified one of the registry GlobalFolderOptions related to file compression attribution in terms of color in NTFS file system.
@@ -57167,7 +57167,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -57181,7 +57181,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b7548c2e-9a10-11ec-99e3-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57202,7 +57202,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Advanced*" AND Registry.registry_value_name  IN("ShowCompColor", "ShowInfoTip")) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_show_compress_color_and_info_tip_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Modify System Firewall with Notable Process Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Modify System Firewall with Notable Process Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects a potential suspicious modification of firewall rule allowing to execute specific application in public and suspicious windows process file path. This technique was identified when an adversary and red teams to bypassed firewall file execution restriction in a targetted host. Take note that this event or command can run by administrator during testing or allowing legitimate tool or application.
@@ -57214,7 +57214,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A network operator or systems administrator
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify System Firewall with Notable Process Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Modify System Firewall with Notable Process Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -57228,7 +57228,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Modify System Firewall with Notable Process Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Modify System Firewall with Notable Process Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NjRAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cd6d7410-9146-4471-a418-49edba6dadc4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57249,7 +57249,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*firewall*" Processes.process = "*allow*" Processes.process = "*add*" Processes.process = "*ENABLE*" Processes.process IN ("*\\windows\\fonts\\*", "*\\windows\\temp\\*", "*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\windows\\debug\\*", "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*", "*\\Windows\\servicing\\*", "*\\Users\\Default\\*","*Recycle.bin*", "*\\Windows\\Media\\*", "\\Windows\\repair\\*", "*\\temp\\*", "*\\PerfLogs\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_modify_system_firewall_with_notable_process_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows MOF Event Triggered Execution via WMI - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows MOF Event Triggered Execution via WMI - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following anaytic identifies MOFComp.exe loading a MOF file. The Managed Object Format (MOF) compiler parses a file containing MOF statements and adds the classes and class instances defined in the file to the WMI repository. Typically, MOFComp.exe does not reach out to the public internet or load a MOF file from User Profile paths. A filter and consumer is typically registered in WMI. Review parallel processes and query WMI subscriptions to gather artifacts. The default path of mofcomp.exe is C:\Windows\System32\wbem.
@@ -57261,7 +57261,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present from automati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows MOF Event Triggered Execution via WMI - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows MOF Event Triggered Execution via WMI - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -57275,7 +57275,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows MOF Event Triggered Execution via WMI - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows MOF Event Triggered Execution via WMI - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e59b5a73-32bf-4467-a585-452c36ae10c1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57296,7 +57296,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name IN ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe") Processes.process_name=mofcomp.exe) OR (Processes.process_name=mofcomp.exe Processes.process IN ("*\\AppData\\Local\\*","*\\Users\\Public\\*", "*\\WINDOWS\\Temp\\*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_mof_event_triggered_execution_via_wmi_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows MOVEit Transfer Writing ASPX - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows MOVEit Transfer Writing ASPX - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects the creation of new ASPX files in the MOVEit Transfer application's "wwwroot" directory. This activity is indicative of the recent critical vulnerability found in MOVEit Transfer, where threat actors have been observed exploiting a zero-day vulnerability to install a malicious ASPX file (e.g., "human2.aspx") in the wwwroot directory. The injected file could then be used to exfiltrate sensitive data, including user credentials and file metadata. The vulnerability affects the MOVEit Transfer managed file transfer software developed by Progress, a subsidiary of US-based Progress Software Corporation. This analytic requires endpoint data reflecting process and filesystem activity. The identified process must be responsible for the creation of new ASPX or ASHX files in the specified directory. 
@@ -57308,7 +57308,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The query is structured in a way that `actio
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows MOVEit Transfer Writing ASPX - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows MOVEit Transfer Writing ASPX - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -57322,7 +57322,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Windows MOVEit Transfer Writing ASPX - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Windows MOVEit Transfer Writing ASPX - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["MOVEit Transfer Critical Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c0ed2aca-5666-45b3-813f-ddfac3f3eda0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57343,7 +57343,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=System  by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\MOVEitTransfer\\wwwroot\\*") Filesystem.file_name IN("*.aspx", "*.ashx", "*.asp*") OR Filesystem.file_name IN ("human2.aspx","_human2.aspx") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_name | `windows_moveit_transfer_writing_aspx_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic uses the Exchange Management logs, that are enabled by default, to identify suspicious Cmdlet usage related to ProxyShell and ProxyNotShell abuse.
@@ -57355,7 +57355,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present when an Admin
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -57369,7 +57369,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "ProxyNotShell", "ProxyShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "396de86f-25e7-4b0e-be09-a330be35249d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57384,7 +57384,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `msexchange_management` EventCode=1 Message IN ("*New-MailboxExportRequest*", "*New-ManagementRoleAssignment*", "*New-MailboxSearch*", "*Get-Recipient*", "*Search-Mailbox*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename host AS dest | `windows_msexchange_management_mailbox_cmdlet_usage_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Mshta Execution In Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Mshta Execution In Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the usage of mshta.exe Windows binary in registry to execute malicious script. This technique was seen in kovter malware where it create several registry entry which is a encoded javascript and will be executed by another registry containing mshta and javascript activexobject to execute the encoded script using wscript.shell. This TTP is a good indication of kovter malware or other adversaries or threat actors leveraging fileless detection that survive system reboot.
@@ -57396,7 +57396,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Mshta Execution In Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Mshta Execution In Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -57410,7 +57410,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Mshta Execution In Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Mshta Execution In Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e13ceade-b673-4d34-adc4-4d9c01729753", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57431,7 +57431,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_data = "*mshta*" OR Registry.registry_value_data IN ("*javascript:*", "*vbscript:*","*WScript.Shell*") by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.user| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_mshta_execution_in_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection identifies instances of the Windows utility `mshta.exe` being used to write files to world-writable directories, a technique commonly leveraged by adversaries to execute malicious scripts or payloads. Starting from 26 February 2024, APT29 has been observed distributing phishing attachments that lead to the download and execution of the ROOTSAW dropper via a compromised website. The ROOTSAW payload, utilizing obfuscated JavaScript, downloads a file named `invite.txt` to the `C:\Windows\Tasks` directory. This file is then decoded and decompressed to execute a malicious payload, often leveraging legitimate Windows binaries for malicious purposes, as seen with `SqlDumper.exe` in this campaign. \\
@@ -57447,7 +57447,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may occur if legitimate proc
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -57461,7 +57461,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["APT29 Diplomatic Deceptions with WINELOADER", "Suspicious MSHTA Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "efbcf8ee-bc75-47f1-8985-a5c638c4faf0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57484,7 +57484,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=11 Image="*\\mshta.exe" TargetFilename IN ("*\\Windows\\Tasks\\*", "*\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "*\\Windows\\tracing\\*", "*\\Windows\\PLA\\Reports\\*", "*\\Windows\\PLA\\Rules\\*", "*\\Windows\\PLA\\Templates\\*", "*\\Windows\\PLA\\Reports\\en-US\\*", "*\\Windows\\PLA\\Rules\\en-US\\*", "*\\Windows\\Registration\\CRMLog\\*", "*\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\*", "*\\Windows\\System32\\Com\\dmp\\*", "*\\Windows\\System32\\LogFiles\\WMI\\*", "*\\Windows\\System32\\Microsoft\\Crypto\\RSA\\MachineKeys\\*", "*\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\PRINTERS\\*", "*\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\SERVERS\\*", "*\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\color\\*", "*\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\Microsoft\\Windows\\RemoteApp and Desktop Connections Update\\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Tasks\\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Com\\dmp\\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Tasks\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PLA\\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Tasks\\Microsoft\\Windows\\RemoteApp and Desktop Connections Update\\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Tasks\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PLA\\System\\*") | rename Computer as dest, User as user | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, Image, TargetFilename | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_mshta_writing_to_world_writable_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the usage of msiexec.exe using the /y switch parameter, which grants the ability for msiexec to load DLLRegisterServer. Upon triage, review parent process and capture any artifacts for further review.
@@ -57496,7 +57496,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This analytic will need to be tuned for your
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -57510,7 +57510,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fdb59aef-d88f-4909-8369-ec2afbd2c398", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57531,7 +57531,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msiexec` Processes.process IN ("*/y*", "*-y*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_msiexec_dllregisterserver_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows MsiExec HideWindow Rundll32 Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows MsiExec HideWindow Rundll32 Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a msiexec.exe process with hidewindow rundll32 process commandline. One such tactic involves utilizing system processes like "msiexec," "hidewindow," and "rundll32" through command-line execution. By leveraging these legitimate processes, QakBot masks its malicious operations, hiding behind seemingly normal system activities. This clandestine approach allows the trojan to carry out unauthorized tasks discreetly, such as downloading additional payloads, executing malicious code, or establishing communication with remote servers. This obfuscation through trusted system processes enables QakBot to operate stealthily, evading detection by security mechanisms and perpetuating its harmful actions without raising suspicion.
@@ -57543,7 +57543,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Other possible 3rd party msi software instal
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows MsiExec HideWindow Rundll32 Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows MsiExec HideWindow Rundll32 Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -57557,7 +57557,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows MsiExec HideWindow Rundll32 Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows MsiExec HideWindow Rundll32 Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Qakbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007", "T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9683271d-92e4-43b5-a907-1983bfb9f7fd", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57578,7 +57578,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = msiexec.exe  Processes.process = "* /HideWindow *" Processes.process = "* rundll32*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_msiexec_hidewindow_rundll32_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Remote Download - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows MSIExec Remote Download - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies msiexec.exe with http in the command-line. This procedure will utilize msiexec.exe to download a remote file and load it. During triage, review parallel processes and capture any artifacts on disk for review.
@@ -57590,7 +57590,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter by de
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Remote Download - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows MSIExec Remote Download - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -57604,7 +57604,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Remote Download - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows MSIExec Remote Download - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6aa49ff2-3c92-4586-83e0-d83eb693dfda", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57625,7 +57625,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msiexec` Processes.process IN ("*http://*", "*https://*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_msiexec_remote_download_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies MSIExec spawning multiple discovery commands, including spawning Cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. Typically, child processes are not common from MSIExec other than MSIExec spawning itself.
@@ -57637,7 +57637,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present with MSIExec
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -57651,7 +57651,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e9d05aa2-32f0-411b-930c-5b8ca5c4fcee", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57672,7 +57672,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe", "nltest.exe","ipconfig.exe","systeminfo.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Spawn WinDBG - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows MSIExec Spawn WinDBG - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies the unusual behavior of MSIExec spawning WinDBG. It is designed to detect potential malicious activities. The search specifically looks for instances where the parent process name is 'msiexec.exe' and the process name is 'windbg.exe'. During the triage process, it is recommended to review the file path for additional artifacts that may provide further insights into the event.
@@ -57684,7 +57684,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will only be present if the
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Spawn WinDBG - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows MSIExec Spawn WinDBG - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -57698,7 +57698,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Spawn WinDBG - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows MSIExec Spawn WinDBG - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9a18f7c2-1fe3-47b8-9467-8b3976770a30", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57719,7 +57719,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=msiexec.exe Processes.process_name=windbg.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_msiexec_spawn_windbg_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the usage of msiexec.exe using the /z switch parameter, which grants the ability for msiexec to unload DLLRegisterServer. Upon triage, review parent process and capture any artifacts for further review.
@@ -57731,7 +57731,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This analytic will need to be tuned for your
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -57745,7 +57745,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a27db3c5-1a9a-46df-a577-765d3f1a3c24", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57766,7 +57766,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msiexec` Processes.process IN ("*/z*", "*-z*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_msiexec_unregister_dllregisterserver_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec With Network Connections - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows MSIExec With Network Connections - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies MSIExec with any network connection over port 443 or 80. Typically, MSIExec does not perform network communication to the internet.
@@ -57778,7 +57778,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present and filterin
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec With Network Connections - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows MSIExec With Network Connections - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -57792,7 +57792,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec With Network Connections - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows MSIExec With Network Connections - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.007"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "827409a1-5393-4d8d-8da4-bbb297c262a7", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57813,7 +57813,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_msiexec` by _time Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join  process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port IN ("80","443") by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` ] | table _time user dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port dest_ip | `windows_msiexec_with_network_connections_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a dns query to a known TOR proxy website. This technique was seen in several adversaries, threat actors and malware like AgentTesla to To disguise the source of its malicious traffic. adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. This Anomaly detection might be a good pivot for a process trying to download or use TOR proxies in a compromised host machine.
@@ -57825,7 +57825,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = third party application may use this proxies
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -57839,7 +57839,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.003", "T1071"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4c2d198b-da58-48d7-ba27-9368732d0054", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57854,7 +57854,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*.torproject.org", "www.theonionrouter.com") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus ProcessId  Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_multi_hop_proxy_tor_website_query_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Account Passwords Changed - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Multiple Account Passwords Changed - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This Splunk detection identifies situations where over five unique Windows account passwords are changed within a 10-minute interval, captured by Event Code 4724 in the Windows Security Event Log. The query utilizes the wineventlog_security dataset, organizing data into 10-minute periods to monitor the count and distinct count of TargetUserName, the accounts with altered passwords. Rapid password changes across multiple accounts are atypical and might indicate unauthorized access or an internal actor compromising account security. Teams should calibrate the detection's threshold and timeframe to fit their specific operational context.
@@ -57866,7 +57866,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Service accounts may be responsible for the
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Account Passwords Changed - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Multiple Account Passwords Changed - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -57880,7 +57880,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Account Passwords Changed - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Multiple Account Passwords Changed - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "faefb681-14be-4f0d-9cac-0bc0160c7280", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57901,7 +57901,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4724 status=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count dc(user) as unique_users values(user) as user by EventCode signature _time src_user SubjectDomainName TargetDomainName Logon_ID | where unique_users > 5 | `windows_multiple_account_passwords_changed_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Accounts Deleted - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Multiple Accounts Deleted - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic flags when more than five unique Windows accounts are deleted within a 10-minute period, identified by Event Code 4726 in the Windows Security Event Log. Using the wineventlog_security dataset, it segments data into 10-minute intervals to monitor account deletions, a pattern that could suggest malicious intent like an attacker erasing traces. Teams should adjust the detection's threshold and timeframe to suit their specific environment.
@@ -57913,7 +57913,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Service accounts may be responsible for the
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Accounts Deleted - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Multiple Accounts Deleted - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -57927,7 +57927,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Accounts Deleted - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Multiple Accounts Deleted - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "49c0d4d6-c55d-4d3a-b3d5-7709fafed70d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57948,7 +57948,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4726 status=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count dc(user) as unique_users values(user) as user by EventCode signature _time src_user SubjectDomainName TargetDomainName Logon_ID | where unique_users > 5 | `windows_multiple_accounts_deleted_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Accounts Disabled - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Multiple Accounts Disabled - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This Splunk detection focuses on instances where more than five unique Windows accounts are disabled within a 10-minute window, as indicated by Event Code 4725 in the Windows Security Event Log. The query analyzes the wineventlog_security dataset, grouping data into 10-minute segments, and tracks the count and distinct count of TargetUserName, the accounts being disabled. This pattern of disabling multiple accounts rapidly is unusual and could signal internal policy breaches or an external attacker's attempt to disrupt normal operations. Teams are advised to tailor the threshold and timeframe of this detection to their environment's specifics
@@ -57960,7 +57960,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Service accounts may be responsible for the
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Accounts Disabled - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Multiple Accounts Disabled - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -57974,7 +57974,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Accounts Disabled - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Multiple Accounts Disabled - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azure Active Directory Persistence"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1098", "T1078"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5d93894e-befa-4429-abde-7fc541020b7b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -57995,7 +57995,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4725 status=success | bucket span=10m _time | stats count dc(user) as unique_users values(user) as user by EventCode signature _time src_user SubjectDomainName TargetDomainName Logon_ID | where unique_users > 5 | `windows_multiple_accounts_disabled_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol within 5 minutes. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Active Directory environments can be very different depending on the organization. Users should test this detection and customize the arbitrary threshold when needed. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack against disabled users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code `0x12` stands for `clients credentials have been revoked` (account disabled, expired or locked out).\
@@ -58011,7 +58011,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -58025,7 +58025,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Active Directory Password Spraying", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "98f22d82-9d62-11eb-9fcf-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58048,7 +58048,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0x12 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_disabled_users_failed_to_authenticate_wth_kerberos_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Active Directory environments can be very different depending on the organization. Users should test this detection and customize the arbitrary threshold when needed. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x6 stands for `client not found in Kerberos database` (the attempted user is not a valid domain user).\
@@ -58064,7 +58064,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -58078,7 +58078,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Active Directory Password Spraying", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "001266a6-9d5b-11eb-829b-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58101,7 +58101,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0x6 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_invalid_users_fail_to_authenticate_using_kerberos_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique invalid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Active Directory environments can be very different depending on the organization. Users should test this detection and customize the arbitrary threshold when needed. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC0000064 stands for `The username you typed does not exist` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\
@@ -58117,7 +58117,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -58131,7 +58131,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "57ad5a64-9df7-11eb-a290-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58154,7 +58154,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0xc0000064 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, Workstation | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_invalid_users_failed_to_authenticate_using_ntlm_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with 30 unique users using explicit credentials on a host. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Active Directory environments can be very different depending on the organization. Users should test this detection and customize the arbitrary threshold when needed. Event 4648 is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying that accounts credentials. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.\
@@ -58170,7 +58170,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A source user failing attempting to authenti
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -58184,7 +58184,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Insider Threat", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e61918fa-9ca4-11eb-836c-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58207,7 +58207,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4648 Caller_User_Name!=*$ Target_User_Name!=*$ | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Target_User_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Target_User_Name) as  tried_account by _time, Computer, Caller_User_Name | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_users_fail_to_authenticate_wth_explicitcredentials_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique valid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Active Directory environments can be very different depending on the organization. Users should test this detection and customize the arbitrary threshold when needed. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC000006A means: misspelled or bad password (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\
@@ -58223,7 +58223,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -58237,7 +58237,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7ed272a4-9c77-11eb-af22-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58260,7 +58260,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0xC000006A | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, Workstation | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_users_failed_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a source process name failing to authenticate with 30 uniquer users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Active Directory environments can be very different depending on the organization. Users should test this detection and customize the arbitrary threshold when needed. Event 4625 generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations when an account fails to logon. Logon Type 2 describes an iteractive logon attempt.\
@@ -58276,7 +58276,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A process failing to authenticate with multi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -58290,7 +58290,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Insider Threat", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9015385a-9c84-11eb-bef2-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58313,7 +58313,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 ProcessName!="-" | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, ProcessName, SubjectUserName, Computer | rename Computer as dest | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_users_failed_to_authenticate_from_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Active Directory environments can be very different depending on the organization. Users should test this detection and customize the arbitrary threshold when needed. Event 4771 is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x18 stands for `wrong password provided` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\
@@ -58329,7 +58329,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -58343,7 +58343,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Active Directory Password Spraying", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3a91a212-98a9-11eb-b86a-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58366,7 +58366,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 TargetUserName!="*$" Status=0x18 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_users_failed_to_authenticate_using_kerberos_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with 30 unique users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Active Directory environments can be very different depending on the organization. Users should test this detection and customize the arbitrary threshold when needed. Event 4625 documents each and every failed attempt to logon to the local computer. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. Logon Type 3 describes an remote authentication attempt.\
@@ -58382,7 +58382,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -58396,7 +58396,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "80f9d53e-9ca1-11eb-b0d6-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58419,7 +58419,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3 IpAddress!="-" | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, IpAddress, Computer | rename Computer as dest| where unique_accounts > 30 | `windows_multiple_users_remotely_failed_to_authenticate_from_host_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows New InProcServer32 Added - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows New InProcServer32 Added - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to detect the addition of new InProcServer32 registry keys, which could indicate suspicious or malicious activity on a Windows endpoint. The InProcServer32 registry key specifies the path to a COM object that can be loaded into the process space of calling processes. Malware often abuses this mechanism to achieve persistence or execute code by registering a new InProcServer32 key pointing to a malicious DLL. By monitoring for the creation of new InProcServer32 keys, this analytic helps identify potential threats that leverage COM hijacking or similar techniques for execution and persistence. Understanding the normal behavior of legitimate software in your environment will aid in distinguishing between benign and malicious use of InProcServer32 modifications.
@@ -58431,7 +58431,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are expected. Filtering will
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows New InProcServer32 Added - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows New InProcServer32 Added - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -58440,7 +58440,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows New InProcServer32 Added - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows New InProcServer32 Added - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Outlook RCE CVE-2024-21378"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 20, "cve": ["cve-2024-21378"], "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0fa86e31-0f73-4ec7-9ca3-dc88e117f1db", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58455,7 +58455,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\InProcServer32\\*" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_new_inprocserver32_added_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of ngrok.exe being utilized on the Windows operating system. Unfortunately, there is no original file name for Ngrok, so it may be worth an additional hunt to identify any command-line arguments. The sign of someone using Ngrok is not malicious, however, more recently it has become an adversary tool.
@@ -58467,7 +58467,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on org
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -58481,7 +58481,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-320A", "Reverse Network Proxy"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1572", "T1090", "T1102"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e2549f2c-0aef-408a-b0c1-e0f270623436", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58496,7 +58496,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=ngrok.exe Processes.process IN ("*start*", "*--config*","*http*","*authtoken*", "*http*", "*tcp*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_ngrok_reverse_proxy_usage_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of AdvancedRun.exe. AdvancedRun.exe has similar capabilities as other remote programs like psexec. AdvancedRun may also ingest a configuration file with all settings defined and perform its activity. The analytic is written in a way to identify a renamed binary and also the common command-line arguments.
@@ -58508,7 +58508,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as it is s
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -58522,7 +58522,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Ransomware", "Unusual Processes", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bb4f3090-7ae4-11ec-897f-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58543,7 +58543,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=advancedrun.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=advancedrun.exe) Processes.process IN ("*EXEFilename*","*/cfg*","*RunAs*", "*WindowState*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_nirsoft_advancedrun_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic assists with identifying the proces execution of commonly used utilities from NirSoft. Potentially not adversary behavior, but worth identifying to know if the software is present and being used.
@@ -58555,7 +58555,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Filtering ma
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -58564,7 +58564,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization"], "mitre_attack": ["T1588.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5b2f4596-7d4c-11ec-88a7-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58579,7 +58579,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `is_nirsoft_software_macro` | `windows_nirsoft_utilities_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Njrat Fileless Storage via Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Njrat Fileless Storage via Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification associated with NjRat, a telltale sign of its fileless technique. NjRat employs this method to manage its keylogs and execute downloaded DLL module plugins discreetly on the compromised host. This approach is particularly effective at evading conventional file-based detection systems, as it stores indicators of compromise (IOCs) in the registry. Leveraging this TTP (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) detection can significantly enhance the identification of NjRAT infections.
@@ -58591,7 +58591,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Njrat Fileless Storage via Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Njrat Fileless Storage via Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -58605,7 +58605,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Njrat Fileless Storage via Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Njrat Fileless Storage via Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NjRAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.011", "T1027"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a5fffbbd-271f-4980-94ed-4fbf17f0af1c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58626,7 +58626,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\[kl]" OR  Registry.registry_value_data IN ("*[ENTER]*", "*[TAP]*", "*[Back]*") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_njrat_fileless_storage_via_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Non Discord App Access Discord LevelDB - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Non Discord App Access Discord LevelDB - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects suspicious file access within the Discord LevelDB database. This database contains critical data such as user profiles, messages, guilds, channels, settings, and cached information. Access to this data poses a risk of Discord credential theft or unauthorized access to sensitive information on the compromised system. Detecting such anomalies can serve as an effective pivot to identify non-Discord applications accessing this database, potentially indicating the presence of malware or trojan stealers aimed at data theft.
@@ -58638,7 +58638,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Non Discord App Access Discord LevelDB - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Non Discord App Access Discord LevelDB - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -58652,7 +58652,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Non Discord App Access Discord LevelDB - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Non Discord App Access Discord LevelDB - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Snake Keylogger"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1012"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1166360c-d495-45ac-87a6-8948aac1fa07", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58667,7 +58667,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path IN ("*\\discord\\Local Storage\\leveldb*") AND process_name != *\\discord.exe AND NOT (process_path IN ("*:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "*:\\Windows\\SysWow64\\*", "*:\\Program Files*", "*:\\Windows\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path  process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_non_discord_app_access_discord_leveldb_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies non SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This behavior may be related to credential dumping or applications requiring access to credentials. Triaging this event will require understanding the GrantedAccess from the SourceImage. In addition, whether the account is privileged or not. Review the process requesting permissions and review parallel processes.
@@ -58679,7 +58679,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on legitima
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -58693,7 +58693,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Credential Dumping"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b1ce9a72-73cf-11ec-981b-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58714,7 +58714,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe NOT (SourceUser="NT AUTHORITY\\*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name, parent_process_path ,parent_process_id, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename TargetUser as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_non_system_account_targeting_lsass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Hunting - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Hunting - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies Odbcconf.exe running in the environment to assist with identifying tuning higher fidelity analytics related to Odbcconf.exe.
@@ -58726,7 +58726,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present as this is m
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Hunting - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Hunting - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -58735,7 +58735,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Hunting - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Hunting - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 20, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.008"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0562ad4b-fdaa-4882-b12f-7b8e0034cd72", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58750,7 +58750,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=odbcconf.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_odbcconf_hunting_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Load DLL - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Load DLL - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies odbcconf.exe, Windows Open Database Connectivity utility, utilizing the action function of regsvr to load a DLL. An example will look like - odbcconf.exe /A { REGSVR T1218-2.dll }. During triage, review parent process, parallel procesess and file modifications.
@@ -58762,7 +58762,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Load DLL - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Load DLL - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -58776,7 +58776,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Load DLL - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Load DLL - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.008"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "141e7fca-a9f0-40fd-a539-9aac8be41f1b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58797,7 +58797,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=odbcconf.exe Processes.process IN ("*/a *",  "*-a*") Processes.process="*regsvr*"  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_odbcconf_load_dll_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Load Response File - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Load Response File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the odbcconf.exe, Windows Open Database Connectivity utility, loading up a resource file. The file extension is arbitrary and may be named anything. The resource file itself may have different commands supported by Odbcconf to load up a DLL (REGSVR) on disk or additional commands. During triage, review file modifications and parallel processes.
@@ -58809,7 +58809,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and filtering
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Load Response File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Load Response File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -58823,7 +58823,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Load Response File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Load Response File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.008"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1acafff9-1347-4b40-abae-f35aa4ba85c1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58844,7 +58844,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=odbcconf.exe Processes.process IN ("*-f *","*/f *") Processes.process="*.rsp*"  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_odbcconf_load_response_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a Microsoft Office product spawning the Windows msdt.exe process. MSDT is a Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard native to Windows. This behavior is related to a recently identified sample utilizing protocol handlers to evade preventative controls, including if macros are disabled in the document. During triage, review file modifications for html. In addition, parallel processes including PowerShell and CertUtil.
@@ -58856,7 +58856,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however f
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -58870,7 +58870,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2022-30190"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "127eba64-c981-40bf-8589-1830638864a7", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58891,7 +58891,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","onenote.exe","onenotem.exe","onenoteviewer.exe","onenoteim.exe","msaccess.exe") Processes.process_name=msdt.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_office_product_spawning_msdt_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows PaperCut NG Spawn Shell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows PaperCut NG Spawn Shell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is designed to detect instances where the PaperCut NG application (pc-app.exe) spawns a Windows shell, specifically cmd.exe or PowerShell. This behavior may indicate potential malicious activity, such as an attacker attempting to gain unauthorized access or execute harmful commands on the affected system.
@@ -58903,7 +58903,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, but most lik
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows PaperCut NG Spawn Shell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PaperCut NG Spawn Shell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -58917,7 +58917,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows PaperCut NG Spawn Shell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PaperCut NG Spawn Shell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PaperCut MF NG Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059", "T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a602d9a2-aaea-45f8-bf0f-d851168d61ca", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58938,7 +58938,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=pc-app.exe `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` OR Processes.process_name=java.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_papercut_ng_spawn_shell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Parent PID Spoofing with Explorer - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Parent PID Spoofing with Explorer - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious explorer.exe process that has "/root" process commandline. The presence of this parameter is considered a significant indicator as it could indicate attempts at spoofing the parent process by a specific program or malware. By spoofing the parent process, the malicious entity aims to circumvent detection mechanisms and operate undetected within the system. This technique of manipulating the command-line parameter (/root) of explorer.exe is a form of masquerading utilized by certain malware or suspicious processes. The objective is to obscure the true nature of the activity by imitating a legitimate system process. By doing so, it attempts to evade scrutiny and evade detection by security measures.
@@ -58950,7 +58950,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Parent PID Spoofing with Explorer - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Parent PID Spoofing with Explorer - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -58964,7 +58964,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Parent PID Spoofing with Explorer - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Parent PID Spoofing with Explorer - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1134.004", "T1134"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "17f8f69c-5d00-4c88-9c6f-493bbdef20a1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -58985,7 +58985,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*explorer.exe*" Processes.process="*/root,*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_parent_pid_spoofing_with_explorer_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Password Managers Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Password Managers Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process command line that retrieves information related to password manager software. This technique was seen in several post exploitation tools like winpeas that are being used by Ransomware Prestige to gather this type of information. Password Managers applications are designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk. Due to this password manager software designed adversaries may find or look for keywords related to the Password Manager databases that can be stolen or extracted for further attacks.
@@ -58997,7 +58997,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Password Managers Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Password Managers Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -59011,7 +59011,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Password Managers Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Password Managers Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1555.005"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a3b3bc96-1c4f-4eba-8218-027cac739a48", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59026,7 +59026,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*dir *" OR  Processes.process = "*findstr*" AND Processes.process IN ( "*.kdbx*", "*credential*", "*key3.db*","*pass*", "*cred*", "*key4.db*", "*accessTokens*", "*access_tokens*", "*.htpasswd*", "*Ntds.dit*") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_password_managers_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Outlook Drop Dll In FORM Dir - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Phishing Outlook Drop Dll In FORM Dir - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious outlook.exe process dropped a dll file. This technique was seen in CVE-2024-21378, involves the loading of a custom MAPI form to execute a potentially malicious DLL. Detecting such TTPs serves as a crucial pivot point to identify potential adversaries, malware, or red team activity attempting to leverage this method within phishing campaigns.
@@ -59038,7 +59038,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Outlook Drop Dll In FORM Dir - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Phishing Outlook Drop Dll In FORM Dir - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -59052,7 +59052,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Outlook Drop Dll In FORM Dir - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Phishing Outlook Drop Dll In FORM Dir - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Outlook RCE CVE-2024-21378"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2024-21378"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fca01769-5163-4b3a-ae44-de874adfc9bc", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59073,7 +59073,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=outlook.exe by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name ="*.dll" Filesystem.file_path = "*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\FORMS\\IPM*" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | fields file_name file_path process_name process_path process dest file_create_time _time process_guid] | `windows_phishing_outlook_drop_dll_in_form_dir_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is developed to detect suspicious pdf viewer processes that have a browser application child processes. This event was seen in a pdf spear phishing attachment containing a malicious URL link to download the actual payload. When a user clicks the malicious link the pdf viewer application will execute a process of the host default browser to connect to the malicious site. This anomaly detection can be a good indicator that a possible pdf file has a link executed by a user. The pdf viewer and browser list in this detection is still in progress, add the common browser and pdf viewer you use in opening pdf in your network.
@@ -59085,7 +59085,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives in PDF file opened PDF Viewe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -59099,7 +59099,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Snake Keylogger", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2fa9dec8-9d8e-46d3-96c1-202c06f0e6e1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59114,7 +59114,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name  IN ("AcroRd32.exe", "FoxitPDFReader.exe") Processes.process_name IN ("firefox.exe", "chrome.exe", "iexplore.exe") by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name  Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_phishing_pdf_file_executes_url_link_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic identifies registry artifacts when an ISO container is opened, clicked or mounted on the Windows operating system. As Microsoft makes changes to macro based document execution, adversaries have begun to utilize container based initial access based phishing campaigns to evade preventative controls. Once the ISO is clicked or mounted it will create a registry artifact related to this event as a recent application executed or opened.
@@ -59126,7 +59126,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be high depending on the
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -59135,7 +59135,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AgentTesla", "Azorult", "Brute Ratel C4", "IcedID", "Qakbot", "Remcos", "Warzone RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cb38ee66-8ae5-47de-bd66-231c7bbc0b2c", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59150,7 +59150,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_key_name= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\RecentDocs\\.iso" OR Registry.registry_key_name= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\RecentDocs\\.img" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_phishing_recent_iso_exec_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is an enhanced version of two previous analytics that identifies common GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs in order to detect credential dumping.\
@@ -59172,7 +59172,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will occur based on GrantedA
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -59186,7 +59186,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-257A", "CISA AA22-264A", "CISA AA23-347A", "Credential Dumping", "DarkSide Ransomware", "Detect Zerologon Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e4723b92-7266-11ec-af45-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59212,7 +59212,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*\\lsass.exe granted_access IN ("0x01000", "0x1010", "0x1038", "0x40", "0x1400", "0x1fffff", "0x1410", "0x143a", "0x1438", "0x1000") CallTrace IN ("*dbgcore.dll*", "*dbghelp.dll*", "*ntdll.dll*", "*kernelbase.dll*", "*kernel32.dll*") NOT SourceUser IN ("NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM", "NT AUTHORITY\\NETWORK SERVICE") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, SourceImage, GrantedAccess, TargetImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser | rename SourceUser as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following correlation identifies a four or more number of distinct analytics associated with the Windows Post-Exploitation analytic story, which enables the identification of potentially suspicious behavior. Windows Post-Exploitation refers to the phase that occurs after an attacker successfully compromises a Windows system. During this stage, attackers strive to maintain persistence, gather sensitive information, escalate privileges, and exploit the compromised environment further. Timely detection of post-exploitation activities is crucial for prompt response and effective mitigation. Common post-exploitation detections encompass identifying suspicious processes or services running on the system, detecting unusual network connections or traffic patterns, identifying modifications to system files or registry entries, monitoring abnormal user account activities, and flagging unauthorized privilege escalations. Ensuring the detection of post-exploitation activities is essential to proactively prevent further compromise, minimize damage, and restore the security of the Windows environment.
@@ -59224,7 +59224,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on man
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -59233,7 +59233,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - RIR - Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - RIR - Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1012", "T1049", "T1069", "T1016", "T1003", "T1082", "T1115", "T1552"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Correlation"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "edb930df-64c2-4bb7-9b5c-889ed53fb973", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59254,7 +59254,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories IN ("*Windows Post-Exploitation*") by All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where source_count >= 4 | `windows_post_exploitation_risk_behavior_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Add Module to Global Assembly Cache - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows PowerShell Add Module to Global Assembly Cache - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following PowerShell Script Block analytic identifies the native ability to add a DLL to the Windows Global Assembly Cache. Each computer where the Common Language Runtime is installed has a machine-wide code cache called the Global Assembly Cache. The Global Assembly Cache stores assemblies specifically designated to be shared by several applications on the computer. By adding a DLL to the GAC, this allows an adversary to call it via any other means across the operating systems. This is native and built into Windows. Per the Microsoft blog, the more high fidelity method may be to look for W3WP.exe spawning PowerShell that includes the same CommandLine as identified in this analytic.
@@ -59266,7 +59266,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on deve
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Add Module to Global Assembly Cache - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerShell Add Module to Global Assembly Cache - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -59280,7 +59280,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Add Module to Global Assembly Cache - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerShell Add Module to Global Assembly Cache - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IIS Components"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3fc16961-97e5-4a5b-a079-e4ab0d9763eb", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59301,7 +59301,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN("*system.enterpriseservices.internal.publish*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_add_module_to_global_assembly_cache_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104 that is processing cryptography namespace library. This technique was seen in several powershell malware, loader, downloader and stager that will decrypt or decode the next malicious stager or the actual payload. This Anomaly detection can be a good indicator that a powershell process to decrypt code. We recommend to further check the parent_process_name, the file or data it tries to decrypt, network connection and user who execute the script.
@@ -59313,7 +59313,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited. Filter as
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -59327,7 +59327,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AsyncRAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f8b482f4-6d62-49fa-a905-dfa15698317b", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59342,7 +59342,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*System.Security.Cryptography*" AND NOT(ScriptBlockText IN ("*SHA*", "*MD5*", "*DeriveBytes*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_cryptography_namespace_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analtyic identifies the use of get-WebConfigurationProperty and Set-ItemProperty attempting to disable HTTP logging on windows via PowerShell. Adversaries may perform this action to disable HTTP logging to cover tracks and delete logs on disk.
@@ -59354,7 +59354,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible administrators or scripts may
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-12-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-12-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -59368,7 +59368,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IIS Components", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562", "T1562.002", "T1505", "T1505.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "27958de0-2857-43ca-9d4c-b255cf59dcab", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59389,7 +59389,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN("*get-WebConfigurationProperty*","*Set-ItemProperty*") AND ScriptBlockText IN ("*httpLogging*","*Logfile.enabled*") AND ScriptBlockText IN ("*dontLog*", "*false*")   | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_disable_http_logging_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Export Certificate - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows PowerShell Export Certificate - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the PowerShell Cmdlet export-certificate utilizing Script Block Logging. This particular behavior is related to an adversary attempting to steal certificates local to the Windows endpoint within the Certificate Store.
@@ -59401,7 +59401,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible administrators or scripts may
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Export Certificate - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerShell Export Certificate - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -59415,7 +59415,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Export Certificate - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerShell Export Certificate - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.004", "T1552", "T1649"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5e38ded4-c964-41f4-8cb6-4a1a53c6929f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59430,7 +59430,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN ("*export-certificate*") | rename Computer as dest  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_export_certificate_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Export PfxCertificate - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows PowerShell Export PfxCertificate - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the PowerShell Cmdlet export-pfxcertificate utilizing Script Block Logging. This particular behavior is related to an adversary attempting to steal certificates local to the Windows endpoint within the Certificate Store.
@@ -59442,7 +59442,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible administrators or scripts may
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Export PfxCertificate - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerShell Export PfxCertificate - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -59456,7 +59456,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Export PfxCertificate - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerShell Export PfxCertificate - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.004", "T1552", "T1649"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ed06725f-6da6-439f-9dcc-ab30e891297c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59471,7 +59471,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN ("*export-pfxcertificate*") | rename Computer as dest  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_export_pfxcertificate_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Get CIMInstance Remote Computer - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows PowerShell Get CIMInstance Remote Computer - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies the use of Get-CimInstance cmdlet with the -ComputerName parameter, which indicates that the cmdlet is being used to retrieve information from a remote computer. This can be useful for detecting instances of remote access, such as when an attacker uses PowerShell to connect to a remote system and gather information. By monitoring for this cmdlet with the -ComputerName parameter, security analysts can identify potential malicious activity on remote systems and take appropriate action to mitigate any threats.
@@ -59483,7 +59483,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This is meant to be a low risk RBA anomaly a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Get CIMInstance Remote Computer - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerShell Get CIMInstance Remote Computer - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -59497,7 +59497,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Get CIMInstance Remote Computer - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerShell Get CIMInstance Remote Computer - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d8c972eb-ed84-431a-8869-ca4bd83257d1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59512,7 +59512,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText="*get-ciminstance*" AND ScriptBlockText="*computername*"  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_get_ciminstance_remote_computer_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell IIS Components WebGlobalModule Usage - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows PowerShell IIS Components WebGlobalModule Usage - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the usage of PowerShell Cmdlets - New-WebGlobalModule, Enable-WebGlobalModule and Set-WebGlobalModule being utilized to create (new), enable (start) or modify a current IIS Module. These commands are equivalent to AppCmd.exe parameters. Adversaries may utilize these cmdlets as they are lesser known and perform the same activity as AppCmd.
@@ -59524,7 +59524,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible administrators or scripts may
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-12-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-12-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell IIS Components WebGlobalModule Usage - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerShell IIS Components WebGlobalModule Usage - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -59538,7 +59538,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell IIS Components WebGlobalModule Usage - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerShell IIS Components WebGlobalModule Usage - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IIS Components"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "33fc9f6f-0ce7-4696-924e-a69ec61a3d57", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59553,7 +59553,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN("*New-WebGlobalModule*","*Enable-WebGlobalModule*","*Set-WebGlobalModule*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`  | `windows_powershell_iis_components_webglobalmodule_usage_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is to identify the imports of Windows PowerShell Applocker commandlets. This technique was seen in Azorult malware where it drops an xml Applocker policy that will deny several AV product and then loaded using PowerShell Applocker commandlet.
@@ -59565,7 +59565,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators may execute this command that
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -59579,7 +59579,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059", "T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "102af98d-0ca3-4aa4-98d6-7ab2b98b955a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59600,7 +59600,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText="*Import-Module Applocker*" ScriptBlockText="*Set-AppLockerPolicy *" ScriptBlockText="* -XMLPolicy *" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_import_applocker_policy_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell RemoteSigned File - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Powershell RemoteSigned File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies the use of "remotesigned" execution policy for a file. This security setting determines whether PowerShell scripts can be executed on a computer. When the execution policy is set to "remotesigned," it allows locally created scripts to run without any restrictions, but scripts downloaded from the internet must have a digital signature from a trusted publisher.
@@ -59612,7 +59612,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible administrators or scripts may
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell RemoteSigned File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Powershell RemoteSigned File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -59626,7 +59626,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell RemoteSigned File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Powershell RemoteSigned File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Amadey"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f7f7456b-470d-4a95-9703-698250645ff4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59641,7 +59641,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` Processes.process="* remotesigned *" Processes.process="* -File *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_remotesigned_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell ScheduleTask - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows PowerShell ScheduleTask - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects potential malicious activities related to PowerShell's task scheduling cmdlets. It looks for anomalies in PowerShell logs, specifically EventCode 4104, associated with script block logging. The analytic flags unusual or suspicious use patterns of key task-related cmdlets such as 'New-ScheduledTask', 'Set-ScheduledTask', and others, which are often used by attackers for persistence and remote execution of malicious code. If a true positive is found, it suggests an possible attacker is attempting to persist within the environment or potentially deliver additional malicious payloads, leading to data theft, ransomware, or other damaging outcomes. To implement this analytic, PowerShell Script Block Logging needs to be enabled on some or all endpoints. Analysts should be aware of benign administrative tasks that can trigger alerts and tune the analytic accordingly to reduce false positives. Upon triage, review the PowerShell logs for any unusual or unexpected cmdlet usage, IP addresses, user accounts, or timestamps. If these factors align with known malicious behavior patterns, immediate mitigation steps, such as isolation of the affected systems, user account changes, and relevant threat hunting activities, should be initiated. This proactive analysis significantly enhances an organization's capacity to swiftly respond to, and potentially prevent, the execution of advanced persistent threats in their network.
@@ -59653,7 +59653,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Benign administrative tasks can also trigger
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell ScheduleTask - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerShell ScheduleTask - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["af9fd58f-c4ac-4bf2-a9ba-224b71ff25fd"]
@@ -59668,7 +59668,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell ScheduleTask - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerShell ScheduleTask - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ddf82fcb-e9ee-40e3-8712-a50b5bf323fc", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59683,7 +59683,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText IN ("*New-ScheduledTask*", "*New-ScheduledTaskAction*", "*New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet*", "*New-ScheduledTaskTrigger*", "*Register-ClusteredScheduledTask*", "*Register-ScheduledTask*", "*Set-ClusteredScheduledTask*", "*Set-ScheduledTask*", "*Start-ScheduledTask*", "*Enable-ScheduledTask*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_scheduletask_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell WMI Win32 ScheduledJob - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows PowerShell WMI Win32 ScheduledJob - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell script block logging mechanism to detect the use of the Win32_ScheduledJob WMI class. This class allows the creation and management of scheduled tasks on Windows systems. However, due to security concerns, the class has been disabled by default in Windows systems, and its use must be explicitly enabled by modifying the registry. As a result, the detection of the use of this class may indicate malicious activity, especially if the class was enabled on the system by the attacker. Therefore, it is recommended to monitor the use of Win32_ScheduledJob through PowerShell script block logging and to investigate any suspicious activity.
@@ -59695,7 +59695,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on lega
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell WMI Win32 ScheduledJob - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerShell WMI Win32 ScheduledJob - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -59709,7 +59709,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell WMI Win32 ScheduledJob - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerShell WMI Win32 ScheduledJob - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "47c69803-2c09-408b-b40a-063c064cbb16", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59730,7 +59730,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText="*win32_scheduledjob*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powershell_wmi_win32_scheduledjob_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of the Get-GPPPassword PowerShell commandlet employed to search for unsecured credentials Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts. These group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that has been made public). While Microsoft released a patch that impedes Administrators to create unsecure credentials, existing Group Policy Preferences files with passwords are not removed from SYSVOL.
@@ -59742,7 +59742,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -59756,7 +59756,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552", "T1552.006"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0130a0df-83a1-4647-9011-841e950ff302", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59777,7 +59777,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `powershell` EventCode=4104  (ScriptBlockText=Get-GPPPassword OR ScriptBlockText=Get-CachedGPPPassword) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powersploit_gpp_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Event ID 4104 to identify the execution of the PowerView powershell commandlets `Get-ObjectAcl` or `Get-DomainObjectAcl`. This commandlets are used to enumerate Access Control List permissions given to Active Directory objects. In an active directory environment, an object is an entity that represents an available resource within the organizations network, such as domain controllers, users, groups, computers, shares, etc.  Maintaining Active Directory permissions is complicated and hard to manage, especially in complex and large environments with multiple domains. Weak permissions may allow adversaries and red teamers to escalate their privileges in Active Directory. PowerView is a common tool leveraged by attackers to identify and exploit configuration weaknesses.
@@ -59789,7 +59789,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may leverage PowerView for le
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -59803,7 +59803,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "Rhysida Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.002", "T1069"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "39405650-c364-4e1e-a740-32a63ef042a6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59824,7 +59824,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `powershell` EventCode=4104  (ScriptBlockText=*get-objectacl* OR ScriptBlockText=*Get-DomainObjectAcl* ) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Opcode Computer UserID EventCode ScriptBlockText | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powerview_ad_access_control_list_enumeration_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify commandlets used by the PowerView hacking tool leveraged to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Constrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -59836,7 +59836,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may leverage P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -59850,7 +59850,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "CISA AA23-347A", "Rhysida Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "86dc8176-6e6c-42d6-9684-5444c6557ab3", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59871,7 +59871,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Get-DomainComputer*" OR ScriptBlockText = "*Get-NetComputer*") AND (ScriptBlockText = "*-TrustedToAuth*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainSPNTicket` commandlets with specific parameters. This commandlet is a part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration and discovery on Windows Active Directory networks. As the name suggests, this commandlet is used to request the kerberos ticket for a specified service principal name (SPN). Once the ticket is received, it may be cracked using password cracking tools like hashcat to extract the password of the SPN account. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView and these commandlets to identify accounts that can be attacked with the Kerberoasting technique.
@@ -59883,7 +59883,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positive may include Administrators us
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -59897,7 +59897,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Rhysida Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "970455a1-4ac2-47e1-a9a5-9e75443ddcb9", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59918,7 +59918,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText=*Get-DomainSPNTicket* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powerview_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the execution of the `Get-DomainUser` or `Get-NetUSer` commandlets with specific parameters. These commandlets are part of PowerView, a PowerShell tool used to perform enumeration and discovery on Windows Active Directory networks. As the names suggest, these commandlets are used to identify domain users in a network and combining them with the `-SPN` parameter allows adversaries to discover domain accounts associated with a Service Principal Name (SPN). Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage PowerView and these commandlets to identify accounts that can be attacked with the Kerberoasting technique.
@@ -59930,7 +59930,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positive may include Administrators us
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -59944,7 +59944,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "CISA AA23-347A", "Rhysida Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a7093c28-796c-4ebb-9997-e2c18b870837", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -59965,7 +59965,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText =*Get-NetUser* OR ScriptBlockText=*Get-DomainUser*) ScriptBlockText= *-SPN* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_powerview_spn_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify commandlets used by the PowerView hacking tool leveraged to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. Red Teams and adversaries alike may leverage use this technique for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -59977,7 +59977,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may leverage P
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -59991,7 +59991,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "CISA AA23-347A", "Rhysida Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fbf9e47f-e531-4fea-942d-5c95af7ed4d6", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60012,7 +60012,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Get-DomainComputer*" OR ScriptBlockText = "*Get-NetComputer*") AND (ScriptBlockText = "*-Unconstrained*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Private Keys Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Private Keys Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process command line that retrieves information related to private keys files. This technique was seen in several post exploitation tools like winpeas that are being used by Ransomware Prestige to search for private key certificates on the compromised host for insecurely stored credentials. This files can be used by adversaries to gain privileges, persistence or remote service authentication to collect more sensitive information. Some private keys required password for operation, so in this case adversaries may need to have that passphrase either via keylogging or brute force attack.
@@ -60024,7 +60024,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Private Keys Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Private Keys Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -60038,7 +60038,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Private Keys Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Private Keys Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552.004", "T1552"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5c1c2877-06c0-40ee-a1a2-db71f1372b5b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60053,7 +60053,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*dir *" OR  Processes.process = "*findstr*" AND Processes.process IN ( "*.rdg*", "*.gpg*", "*.pgp*", "*.p12*", "*.der*", "*.csr*", "*.cer*", "*.ovpn*", "*.key*",  "*.ppk*", "*.p12*", "*.pem*", "*.pfx*", "*.p7b*", "*.asc*") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_private_keys_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation Suspicious Process Elevation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation Suspicious Process Elevation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects when any low->high integrity level process running from a user account spawns an elevated (high/system integrity) process in a suspicious location or with system level process integrity. This behavior may indicate when a threat actor has successfully elevated privileges.
@@ -60065,7 +60065,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be generated by administ
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation Suspicious Process Elevation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation Suspicious Process Elevation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -60079,7 +60079,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation Suspicious Process Elevation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation Suspicious Process Elevation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 40, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068", "T1548", "T1134"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6a80300a-9f8a-4f22-bd3e-09ca577cfdfc", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60100,7 +60100,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN ("low","medium","high") NOT Processes.user IN ("*SYSTEM","*LOCAL SERVICE","*NETWORK SERVICE","DWM-*","*$") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.parent_process, Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_guid, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval join_guid = process_guid, integrity_level = CASE(match(process_integrity_level,"low"),1,match(process_integrity_level,"medium"),2,match(process_integrity_level,"high"),3,match(process_integrity_level,"system"),4,true(),0) | rename user as src_user, parent_process* as orig_parent_process*, process* as parent_process* | join max=0 dest join_guid  [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_integrity_level IN ("system") NOT Processes.user IN ("*SYSTEM","*LOCAL SERVICE","*NETWORK SERVICE","DWM-*","*$")) OR (Processes.process_integrity_level IN ("high","system") AND (Processes.parent_process_path IN ("*\\\\*","*\\Users\\*","*\\Temp\\*","*\\ProgramData\\*") OR Processes.process_path IN ("*\\\\*","*\\Users\\*","*\\Temp\\*","*\\ProgramData\\*"))) by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval elevated_integrity_level = CASE(match(process_integrity_level,"low"),1,match(process_integrity_level,"medium"),2,match(process_integrity_level,"high"),3,match(process_integrity_level,"system"),4,true(),0) | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid ] | where elevated_integrity_level > integrity_level OR user != elevated_user | fields dest, user, src_user, parent_process_name, parent_process, parent_process_path, parent_process_guid, parent_process_integrity_level, parent_process_current_directory, process_name, process, process_path, process_guid, process_integrity_level, process_current_directory, orig_parent_process_name, orig_parent_process, orig_parent_process_guid, firstTime, lastTime, count  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |  `windows_privilege_escalation_suspicious_process_elevation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation System Process Without System Parent - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation System Process Without System Parent - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects any system integrity level process that was spawned by a process not running as a system account. This behavior is often seen when attackers successfully escalate privileges to SYSTEM from a user controlled process or service.
@@ -60112,7 +60112,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation System Process Without System Parent - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation System Process Without System Parent - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -60126,7 +60126,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation System Process Without System Parent - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation System Process Without System Parent - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068", "T1548", "T1134"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5a5351cd-ba7e-499e-ad82-2ce160ffa637", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60147,7 +60147,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=1 IntegrityLevel="system" ParentUser=* NOT ParentUser IN ("*SYSTEM","*LOCAL SERVICE","*NETWORK SERVICE","*DWM-*","*$","-") | eval src_user = replace(ParentUser,"^[^\\\]+\\\\","") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(process_name) as process_name values(process) as process, values(process_path) as process_path, values(process_current_directory) as process_current_directory values(parent_process) as parent_process by dest, user, src_user, parent_process_name, parent_process_guid | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_privilege_escalation_system_process_without_system_parent_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects when any process low->high integrity level process spawns a system integrity process from a user controlled location. This behavior is often seen when attackers successfully escalate privileges to SYSTEM from a user controlled process or service.
@@ -60159,7 +60159,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -60173,7 +60173,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068", "T1548", "T1134"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c9687a28-39ad-43c6-8bcf-eaf061ba0cbe", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60194,7 +60194,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN ("low","medium","high") NOT Processes.user IN ("*SYSTEM","*LOCAL SERVICE","*NETWORK SERVICE","DWM-*","*$") AND Processes.process_path IN ("*\\\\*","*\\Users\\*","*\\Temp\\*","*\\ProgramData\\*") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.parent_process, Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_guid, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval join_guid = process_guid | join max=0 dest join_guid  [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN ("system") AND Processes.parent_process_path IN ("*\\\\*","*\\Users\\*","*\\Temp\\*","*\\ProgramData\\*") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid, process* as system_process*, user as system_user ] | fields dest, user, parent_process, parent_process_name, parent_process_guid, process, process_name, process_guid, process_integrity_level,process_path, process_current_directory, system_process_name, system_process, system_process_path, system_process_integrity_level, system_process_current_directory, system_user, firstTime, lastTime, count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_privilege_escalation_user_process_spawn_system_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Process Commandline Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Process Commandline Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) command used to retrieve information about running processes and specifically fetches the command lines used to launch those processes. This Hunting detection can be a good indicator for possible suspicious user or process getting list of process with its command line using wmic application which is not a common practice for a non-technical user.
@@ -60206,7 +60206,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Process Commandline Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Process Commandline Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -60215,7 +60215,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Process Commandline Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Process Commandline Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1057"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "67d2a52e-a7e2-4a5d-ae44-a21212048bc2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60230,7 +60230,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process= "* process *" Processes.process= "* get commandline *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_commandline_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection In Non-Service SearchIndexer - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Process Injection In Non-Service SearchIndexer - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a non-service searchindexer.exe process. QakBot, a notorious banking trojan and information stealer, often deploys a process named "searchindexer.exe" as part of its malicious activities. This legitimate Windows process, "Search Indexer," is manipulated by QakBot to masquerade and evade detection within the system. The malware uses this deceptive tactic to camouflage its presence, remaining inconspicuous while performing unauthorized actions like data exfiltration, keystroke logging, and communication with command and control servers. By adopting the guise of a genuine system process, the malicious "searchindexer.exe" process helps QakBot evade scrutiny and continue its malevolent operations without arousing suspicion.
@@ -60242,7 +60242,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection In Non-Service SearchIndexer - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Process Injection In Non-Service SearchIndexer - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -60256,7 +60256,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection In Non-Service SearchIndexer - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Process Injection In Non-Service SearchIndexer - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Qakbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d131673f-ede1-47f2-93a1-0108d3e7fafd", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60277,7 +60277,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name != services.exe Processes.process_name=searchindexer.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_injection_in_non_service_searchindexer_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection into Notepad - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Process Injection into Notepad - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes Sysmon to identify process injection into Notepad.exe, based on GrantedAccess requests - 0x40 and 0x1fffff. This particular behavior is attributed to the defaults of the SliverC2 framework by BishopFox. By default, the analytic filters out any SourceImage paths of System32, Syswow64 and program files. Add more as needed, or remove and monitor what is consistently injecting into notepad.exe. This particular behavior will occur from a source image that is the initial payload dropped.
@@ -60289,7 +60289,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on Sour
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection into Notepad - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Process Injection into Notepad - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -60303,7 +60303,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection into Notepad - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Process Injection into Notepad - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BishopFox Sliver Adversary Emulation Framework"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1055.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b8340d0f-ba48-4391-bea7-9e793c5aae36", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60318,7 +60318,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage IN (*\\notepad.exe) NOT (SourceImage IN ("*\\system32\\*","*\\syswow64\\*","*\\Program Files\\*")) GrantedAccess IN ("0x40","0x1fffff") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_injection_into_notepad_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Of Wermgr to Known Browser - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Process Injection Of Wermgr to Known Browser - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies the suspicious Remote Thread execution of wermgr.exe process to "firefox.exe", "chrome.exe" and other known browsers. This technique was seen in Qakbot malware that executes its malicious code by injecting its code in legitimate Windows Operating System processes such as wermgr.exe to steal information in the compromised host. This TTP detection can be a good pivot to detect wermgr.exe process injected with qakbot code that tries to remote thread code execution in known browsers like firefox and edge which is not a common behavior of this wermgr.exe application.
@@ -60330,7 +60330,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Of Wermgr to Known Browser - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Process Injection Of Wermgr to Known Browser - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -60344,7 +60344,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Of Wermgr to Known Browser - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Process Injection Of Wermgr to Known Browser - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Qakbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055.001", "T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "aec755a5-3a2c-4be0-ab34-6540e68644e9", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60365,7 +60365,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=8 SourceImage = "*\\wermgr.exe" TargetImage IN ("*\\firefox.exe", "*\\chrome.exe", "*\\iexplore.exe","*\\microsoftedgecp.exe") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage SourceProcessGuid SourceProcessId StartAddress StartFunction TargetProcessGuid TargetProcessId  EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_injection_of_wermgr_to_known_browser_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious remote thread execution in some process being abused by threat actor and malware like qakbot. Qakbot is one of the malware using this technique to load its malicious dll module or malicious code in the targeted host. This TTP can be a good pivot to verify what is the behavior of the targeted Image process after this detection trigger. look for network connection, child process execution, file access and many more that helps to verify the indication of malware infection.
@@ -60377,7 +60377,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -60391,7 +60391,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Qakbot", "Warzone RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1055.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8a618ade-ca8f-4d04-b972-2d526ba59924", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60412,7 +60412,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=8 TargetImage IN ("*\\Taskmgr.exe", "*\\calc.exe", "*\\notepad.exe", "*\\rdpclip.exe", "*\\explorer.exe", "*\\wermgr.exe", "*\\ping.exe", "*\\OneDriveSetup.exe", "*\\dxdiag.exe", "*\\mobsync.exe", "*\\msra.exe", "*\\xwizard.exe","*\\cmd.exe", "*\\powershell.exe") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by  TargetImage TargetProcessId SourceProcessId  EventCode StartAddress SourceImage dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_injection_remote_thread_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious wermgr.exe parent process having a child process not related to error, fault or windows werfault event. This technique was seen in Qakbot malware where it inject its malicious code in wermgr to evade detections and hide from the analyst to execute its recon and its malicious behavior. This Anomaly detection can be a good pivot to start investigating a possible qakbot infection in the network. The Wermgr.exe process is not known to have other child processes aside from itself or werfault.exe
@@ -60424,7 +60424,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -60438,7 +60438,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Qakbot", "Windows Error Reporting Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "360ae6b0-38b5-4328-9e2b-bc9436cddb17", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60453,7 +60453,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = "wermgr.exe" AND NOT (Processes.process_name IN ("WerFaultSecure.exe", "wermgr.exe", "WerFault.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_injection_wermgr_child_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection With Public Source Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Process Injection With Public Source Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process in a non-standard file path on Windows attempting to create a remote thread into a process. This Windows API,CreateRemoteThread, is commonly used by adversaries for process injection to evade detections or gain privilege escalation.
@@ -60465,7 +60465,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some security products or third party applic
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection With Public Source Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Process Injection With Public Source Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -60474,7 +60474,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection With Public Source Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Process Injection With Public Source Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brute Ratel C4"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1055.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "492f09cf-5d60-4d87-99dd-0bc325532dda", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60489,7 +60489,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=8 TargetImage = "*.exe" AND NOT(SourceImage IN("C:\\Windows\\*", "C:\\Program File*", "%systemroot%\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage signature TargetProcessGuid SourceProcessGuid TargetProcessId SourceProcessId StartAddress EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_injection_with_public_source_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to look for process commandline that contains named pipe. This technique was seen in some adversaries, threat actor and malware like olympic destroyer to communicate to its other child processes after process injection that serve as defense evasion and privilege escalation. On the other hand this analytic may catch some normal process that using this technique for example browser application. In that scenario we include common process path we've seen during testing that cause false positive which is the program files. False positive may still be arise if the normal application is in other folder path.
@@ -60501,7 +60501,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Normal browser application may use this tech
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -60515,7 +60515,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e64399d4-94a8-11ec-a9da-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60530,7 +60530,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*\\\\.\\pipe\\*" NOT (Processes.process_path IN ("*\\program files*")) by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Process Writing File to World Writable Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Process Writing File to World Writable Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process writing a file, specifically a .txt, to a world writable path. This technique is used by adversaries to deliver payloads to a system. It is not common for living off the land binaries to write to these paths.
@@ -60542,7 +60542,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may occur if legitimate soft
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Process Writing File to World Writable Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Process Writing File to World Writable Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -60551,7 +60551,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Process Writing File to World Writable Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Process Writing File to World Writable Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["APT29 Diplomatic Deceptions with WINELOADER"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.005"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c051b68c-60f7-4022-b3ad-773bec7a225b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60566,7 +60566,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name=*.txt Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\Windows\\Tasks\\*", "*\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "*\\Windows\\tracing\\*", "*\\Windows\\PLA\\Reports\\*", "*\\Windows\\PLA\\Rules\\*", "*\\Windows\\PLA\\Templates\\*", "*\\Windows\\PLA\\Reports\\en-US\\*", "*\\Windows\\PLA\\Rules\\en-US\\*", "*\\Windows\\Registration\\CRMLog\\*", "*\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\*", "*\\Windows\\System32\\Com\\dmp\\*", "*\\Windows\\System32\\LogFiles\\WMI\\*", "*\\Windows\\System32\\Microsoft\\Crypto\\RSA\\MachineKeys\\*", "*\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\PRINTERS\\*", "*\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\SERVERS\\*", "*\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\color\\*", "*\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\Microsoft\\Windows\\RemoteApp and Desktop Connections Update\\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Tasks\\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Com\\dmp\\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Tasks\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PLA\\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Tasks\\Microsoft\\Windows\\RemoteApp and Desktop Connections Update\\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Tasks\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PLA\\System\\*") by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name("Filesystem")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_writing_file_to_world_writable_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is to look for known processes killed by industroyer2 malware. This technique was seen in the industroyer2 malware attack that tries to kill several processes of windows host machines related to the energy facility network. This anomaly might be a good indicator to check which process kill these processes or why the process was killed.
@@ -60578,7 +60578,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -60592,7 +60592,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Industroyer2"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d8bea5ca-9d4a-4249-8b56-64a619109835", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60607,7 +60607,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=5 process_name IN ("PServiceControl.exe", "PService_PPD.exe") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by process_name process process_path process_guid process_id EventCode dest user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_processes_killed_by_industroyer2_malware_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Protocol Tunneling with Plink - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Protocol Tunneling with Plink - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of Plink being utilized to proxy egress or laterally in an organization. The analytic is limited to specific Plink options on the command-line, including -R -L and -D which will have the remote and local IP address or port and -l for a username. Modify the options as seen fit for your organization.
@@ -60619,7 +60619,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the organi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Protocol Tunneling with Plink - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Protocol Tunneling with Plink - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -60633,7 +60633,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Protocol Tunneling with Plink - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Protocol Tunneling with Plink - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-257A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1572", "T1021.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8aac5e1e-0fab-4437-af0b-c6e60af23eed", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60654,7 +60654,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=plink.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Plink Processes.process IN ("*-R *", "*-L *", "*-D *", "*-l *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_protocol_tunneling_with_plink_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Proxy Via Netsh - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Proxy Via Netsh - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe for connection proxy. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line.
@@ -60666,7 +60666,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some VPN applications are known to launch ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Proxy Via Netsh - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Proxy Via Netsh - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["b8223ea9-4be2-44a6-b50a-9657a3d4e72a"]
@@ -60681,7 +60681,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Proxy Via Netsh - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Proxy Via Netsh - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1090.001", "T1090"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c137bfe8-6036-4cff-b77b-4e327dd0a1cf", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60696,7 +60696,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh` Processes.process = "* portproxy *" Processes.process = "* v4tov4 *" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest |`drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_proxy_via_netsh_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Proxy Via Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Proxy Via Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search looks for processes launching netsh.exe for connection proxy. Netsh is a command-line scripting utility that allows you to, either locally or remotely, display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. Netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed. In this search, we are looking for processes spawned by netsh.exe and executing commands via the command line.
@@ -60708,7 +60708,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Proxy Via Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Proxy Via Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["b8223ea9-4be2-44a6-b50a-9657a3d4e72a"]
@@ -60723,7 +60723,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Proxy Via Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Proxy Via Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1090.001", "T1090"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0270455b-1385-4579-9ac5-e77046c508ae", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60738,7 +60738,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path ="*\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\PortProxy\\v4tov4\\tcp*" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action Registry.dest  Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `windows_proxy_via_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry Browser List Application - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Query Registry Browser List Application - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious process accessing default internet browsers registry entry. This registry is used by Windows to store information about default internet browsers installed on a system. Malware, adversaries or red-teamers can abuse this registry key to collect data about the installed internet browsers and their associated settings. This information can be used to steal sensitive data such as login credentials, browsing history, and saved passwords. We observed noise that needs to be filter out so we add several known path of Windows Application to make this detection more stable.
@@ -60750,7 +60750,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = uninstall application may access this regist
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry Browser List Application - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Query Registry Browser List Application - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -60764,7 +60764,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry Browser List Application - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Query Registry Browser List Application - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["RedLine Stealer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1012"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "45ebd21c-f4bf-4ced-bd49-d25b6526cebb", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60779,7 +60779,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path IN ("*\\SOFTWARE\\Clients\\StartMenuInternet\\*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\Clients\\StartMenuInternet\\*") AND NOT (process_path IN ("*:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "*:\\Windows\\SysWow64\\*", "*:\\Program Files*", "*:\\Windows\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path  process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_query_registry_browser_list_application_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process execution of reg.exe with "save" parameter. This reg.exe parameter is commonly being abused by threat actors, adversaries and red-teamers to dump credentials or to check the registry modification capabilities of certain users or administrators in targeted hosts. This approach was seen in post-exploitation tool like winpeas where it uses "reg save" and "reg restore" to check registry modification restriction in targeted host after gaining access to it.
@@ -60791,7 +60791,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network administrator can use this command t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -60800,7 +60800,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1012"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cbee60c1-b776-456f-83c2-faa56bdbe6c6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60815,7 +60815,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where  `process_reg` AND Processes.process = "* save *" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_query_registry_reg_save_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry UnInstall Program List - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Query Registry UnInstall Program List - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious query on uninstall application list in Windows OS registry. This registry  is commonly used by legitimate software to store information about installed applications on a Windows system, such as their name, version, publisher, and installation path. However, malware, adversaries or even red-teamers can abuse this registry key to retrieve information stored in the "Uninstall" key to gather data about installed applications in the target host. This Anomaly detection can be a good pivot to detect a possible suspicious process accessing this registry which is not commonly accessed by a normal user.
@@ -60827,7 +60827,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Uninstall application may access this regist
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry UnInstall Program List - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Query Registry UnInstall Program List - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -60841,7 +60841,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry UnInstall Program List - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Query Registry UnInstall Program List - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["RedLine Stealer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1012"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "535fd4fc-7151-4062-9d7e-e896bea77bf6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60856,7 +60856,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path="\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path  process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_query_registry_uninstall_program_list_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the Raccine Rules Updater scheduled task being deleted. Adversaries may attempt to remove this task in order to prevent the update of Raccine.  Raccine is a "ransomware vaccine" created by security researcher Florian Roth, designed to intercept and prevent precursors and active ransomware behavior.
@@ -60868,7 +60868,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, however f
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -60882,7 +60882,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c9f010da-57ab-11ec-82bd-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60903,7 +60903,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process="*delete*" AND Processes.process="*Raccine*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raccine_scheduled_task_deletion_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Event ID 4624 to identify a source computer authenticating to a large number of remote endpoints within an Active Directory network. Specifically, the logic will trigger when a source endpoint authenticates to 30 or more target computers within a 5 minute timespan. This behavior could represent an adversary who is moving laterally across the environment or enumerating network shares in the search for sensitive files. As environments differ across organizations, security teams should customize the thresholds of this detection as needed.
@@ -60915,7 +60915,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Vulnerability scanners or system administrat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -60929,7 +60929,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "62606c77-d53d-4182-9371-b02cdbbbcef7", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60950,7 +60950,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =   `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 LogonType=3 TargetUserName!="ANONYMOUS LOGON" TargetUserName!="*$" | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Computer) AS unique_targets values(Computer) as host_targets by _time, IpAddress, TargetUserName | where unique_targets > 30 | `windows_rapid_authentication_on_multiple_hosts_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the Windows Windows Remote Auto Dialer, rasautou.exe executing an arbitrary DLL. This technique is used to execute arbitrary shellcode or DLLs via the rasautou.exe LOLBin capability. During triage, review parent and child process behavior including file and image loads.
@@ -60962,7 +60962,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to applicati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -60976,7 +60976,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055.001", "T1218", "T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6f42b8be-8e96-11ec-ad5a-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -60997,7 +60997,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rasautou.exe Processes.process="* -d *"AND Processes.process="* -p *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_rasautou_dll_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to device disk partition of the host machine. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the boot sector of each partition as part of their impact payload for example the "hermeticwiper" malware. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on boot sector.
@@ -61009,7 +61009,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This event is really notable but we found mi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -61023,7 +61023,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "CISA AA22-264A", "Caddy Wiper", "Data Destruction", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Hermetic Wiper", "NjRAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1561.002", "T1561"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a85aa37e-9647-11ec-90c5-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61038,7 +61038,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\Device\\HarddiskVolume* NOT (Image IN("*\\Windows\\System32\\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest signature signature_id process_guid process_name process_path Device | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_disk_volume_partition_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to look for suspicious raw access read to drive where the master boot record is placed. This technique was seen in several attacks by adversaries or threat actor to wipe, encrypt or overwrite the master boot record code as part of their impact payload. This detection is a good indicator that there is a process try to read or write on MBR sector.
@@ -61050,7 +61050,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This event is really notable but we found mi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -61064,7 +61064,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "CISA AA22-264A", "Caddy Wiper", "Data Destruction", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Hermetic Wiper", "NjRAT", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1561.002", "T1561"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7b83f666-900c-11ec-a2d9-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61085,7 +61085,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=9 Device = \\Device\\Harddisk0\\DR0 NOT (Image IN("*\\Windows\\System32\\*", "*\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer Image Device ProcessGuid ProcessId EventDescription EventCode | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_raw_access_to_master_boot_record_drive_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows RDP Connection Successful - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows RDP Connection Successful - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies successful remote desktop connections. Utilize this analytic to hunt for successful attempts. In addition, the query may be modified for EventCode=1148 to potentially identify failed attempts. In testing, 1148 would not generate based on a failed logon attempt. Note this analytic requires enabling and a stanza in a inputs.conf.
@@ -61097,7 +61097,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present, filter as n
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows RDP Connection Successful - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows RDP Connection Successful - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -61106,7 +61106,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows RDP Connection Successful - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows RDP Connection Successful - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "BlackByte Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1563.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ceaed840-56b3-4a70-b8e1-d762b1c5c08c", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61121,7 +61121,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `remoteconnectionmanager` EventCode=1149 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename Computer as dest | `windows_rdp_connection_successful_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Registry BootExecute Modification - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Registry BootExecute Modification - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic monitors the BootExecute registry key for any modifications from its default value, which could indicate potential malicious activity. The BootExecute registry key, located at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager, manages the list of applications and services that are executed during system boot. By default, the BootExecute value is set to "autocheck autochk *". Attackers might attempt to modify this value to achieve persistence, load malicious code, or tamper with the system's boot process.
@@ -61133,7 +61133,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and will need
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Registry BootExecute Modification - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Registry BootExecute Modification - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61147,7 +61147,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Registry BootExecute Modification - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Registry BootExecute Modification - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows BootKits"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1542", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "eabbac3a-45aa-4659-920f-6b8cff383fb8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61168,7 +61168,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path="HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\BootExecute" BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid, Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_registry_bootexecute_modification_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies installation of a root CA certificate by monitoring the registry. The base paths may be found [here](https://gist.github.com/mattifestation/75d6117707bcf8c26845b3cbb6ad2b6b/raw/ae65ef15c706140ffc2e165615204e20f2903028/RootCAInstallationDetection.xml). In short, there are specific certificate registry paths that will be written to (SetValue) when a new certificate is added. The high-fidelity events to pay attention to are SetValue events where the TargetObject property ends with "<THUMBPRINT_VALUE>\Blob" as this indicates the direct installation or modification of a root certificate binary blob. The other high fidelity reference will be which process is making the registry modifications. There are very few processes that modify these day to day, therefore monitoring for all to start (hunting) provides a great beginning.
@@ -61180,7 +61180,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to a legitim
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61194,7 +61194,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Drivers", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1553.004", "T1553"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5ee98b2f-8b9e-457a-8bdc-dd41aaba9e87", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61209,7 +61209,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\certificates\\*") AND Registry.registry_value_name="Blob" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_registry_certificate_added_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process attempting to delete a scheduled task SD (Security Descriptor) from within the registry path of that task. This may occur from a non-standard process running and may not come from reg.exe. This particular behavior will remove the actual Task Name from the Task Scheduler GUI and from the command-line query - schtasks.exe /query. In addition, in order to perform this action, the user context will need to be SYSTEM.\
@@ -61223,7 +61223,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the act
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61237,7 +61237,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Scheduled Tasks", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ffeb7893-ff06-446f-815b-33ca73224e92", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61252,7 +61252,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\Schedule\\TaskCache\\Tree\\*") Registry.user="SYSTEM" Registry.registry_value_name="SD" (Registry.action=Deleted OR Registry.action=modified) by _time  Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.status Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_registry_delete_task_sd_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a modification or registry add to the safeboot registry as an autostart mechanism. This technique is utilized by adversaries to persist a driver or service into Safe Mode. Two keys are monitored in this analytic,  Minimal and Network. adding values to Minimal will load into Safe Mode and by adding into Network it will provide the service or drive the ability to perform network connections in Safe Mode.
@@ -61264,7 +61264,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = updated windows application needed in safe b
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61278,7 +61278,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ransomware", "Windows Drivers", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.001", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c6149154-c9d8-11eb-9da7-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61299,7 +61299,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SafeBoot\\Minimal\\*","*SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SafeBoot\\Network\\*") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_registry_modification_for_safe_mode_persistence_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Payload Injection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Registry Payload Injection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies when suspiciouly long data is written to the registry. This behavior is often associated with certain fileless malware threats or persistence techniques used by threat actors. Data stored in the registy is considered fileless since it does not get written to disk and is traditionally not well defended since normal users can modify thier own registry.
@@ -61311,7 +61311,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown, possible custom scripting.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Payload Injection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Registry Payload Injection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61325,7 +61325,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Payload Injection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Registry Payload Injection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1027.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c6b2d80f-179a-41a1-b95e-ce5601d7427a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61346,7 +61346,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join max=0 dest process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_data=* by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | eval reg_data_len = len(registry_value_data) | where reg_data_len > 512] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data)| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_registry_payload_injection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Registry SIP Provider. It identifies this behavior by monitoring Sysmon Event ID 7, which logs registry modification events. The analytic specifically looks for changes in registry paths and values associated with Cryptography Providers and OID Encoding Types. This behavior is worth identifying as it may indicate an attempt to subvert trust controls, a technique often used by adversaries to bypass security measures and maintain persistence in an environment. If a true positive is found, it suggests an attacker is trying to manipulate the system's cryptographic functions, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data theft, or other damaging outcomes. Upon triage, review the registry paths and values modified, and look for concurrent processes to identify the attack source. Review the path of the SIP being added. This approach helps analysts detect potential threats earlier and mitigate the risks.
@@ -61358,7 +61358,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Be aware of potential false positives - legi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61372,7 +61372,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Subvert Trust Controls SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1553.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3b4e18cb-497f-4073-85ad-1ada7c2107ab", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61393,7 +61393,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType*") Registry.registry_value_name IN ("Dll","$DLL") by Registry.dest , Registry.user Registry.registry_value_name, Registry.registry_value_data | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`| `windows_registry_sip_provider_modification_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Regsvr32 Renamed Binary - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Regsvr32 Renamed Binary - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of regsv32.exe executing. regsv32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate if it is the legitimate regsv32.exe executing and what dll module content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics.
@@ -61405,7 +61405,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Regsvr32 Renamed Binary - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Regsvr32 Renamed Binary - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61419,7 +61419,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Regsvr32 Renamed Binary - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Regsvr32 Renamed Binary - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Qakbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.010", "T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7349a9e9-3cf6-4171-bb0c-75607a8dcd1a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61440,7 +61440,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name != regsvr32.exe AND Processes.original_file_name=regsvr32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_regsvr32_renamed_binary_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software BRC4 Loaded Dll - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software BRC4 Loaded Dll - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following anomaly detection identifies the behavior related to 4 native Windows DLLs being loaded by a non-standard process. Identified by MDSec during their research into Brute Ratel, MDSec identified a high signal analytic by calling out these 4 DLLs being loaded into a process. LogonCLI.dll is the Net Logon Client DLL and is related to users and other domain services to get authenticated. Credui.dll is Credential Manager User Interface. Credential managers receive notifications when authentication information changes. For example, credential managers are notified when a user logs on or an account password changes. Samcli.dll is the Security Accounts Manager Client DLL. Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. Dbghelp.dll is Windows Image Helper. Windows Image Helper is commonly seen in credential dumping due to native functions. All of these modules are important to monitor and track and combined may lead to credentail access or dumping.
@@ -61452,7 +61452,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This module can be loaded by a third party a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software BRC4 Loaded Dll - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software BRC4 Loaded Dll - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -61466,7 +61466,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software BRC4 Loaded Dll - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software BRC4 Loaded Dll - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brute Ratel C4"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1219", "T1003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "73cf5dcb-cf36-4167-8bbe-384fe5384d05", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61481,7 +61481,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 |bin _time span=30s | eval BRC4_AnomalyLoadedDll=case(OriginalFileName=="credui.dll", 1, OriginalFileName=="DBGHELP.DLL", 1, OriginalFileName=="SAMCLI.DLL", 1, OriginalFileName=="winhttp.dll", 1, 1=1, 0) | eval BRC4_LoadedDllPath=case(match(ImageLoaded, "credui.dll"), 1, match(ImageLoaded, "dbghelp.dll"), 1, match(ImageLoaded, "samcli.dll"), 1, match(ImageLoaded, "winhttp.dll"), 1, 1=1, 0) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoaded values(OriginalFileName) as OriginalFileName dc(ImageLoaded) as ImageLoadedCount by Image  BRC4_LoadedDllPath BRC4_AnomalyLoadedDll dest EventCode Signed | where  ImageLoadedCount == 4 AND (BRC4_LoadedDllPath == 1 OR BRC4_AnomalyLoadedDll == 1) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_access_software_brc4_loaded_dll_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic is meant to help organizations understand what remote access software is being used in the environment. When reviewing this hunt, confirm the software identified is authorized to be utilized. Based on fidelity, create a new analytic for specific utilities banned within the organization. Adversaries use these utilities to retain remote access capabilities to the environment. Utilities in the lookup include AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, TeamViewer and much more. Review the lookup for the entire list and add any others.
@@ -61493,7 +61493,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be found. Filter as nee
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61502,7 +61502,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Insider Threat", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 10, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1219"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8bd22c9f-05a2-4db1-b131-29271f28cb0a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61517,7 +61517,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.user!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup remote_access_software remote_utility AS process_name OUTPUT isutility | search isutility = True | `windows_remote_access_software_hunt_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software RMS Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software RMS Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is to identify a modification or creation of Windows registry related to the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) Remote Admin tool. RMS is a legitimate tool developed by russian organization TektonIT and has been observed being abused by adversaries to gain remote access to the targeted host. Azorult malware utilized RMS to gain remote access.
@@ -61529,7 +61529,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software RMS Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software RMS Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61543,7 +61543,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software RMS Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software RMS Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1219"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e5b7b5a9-e471-4be8-8c5d-4083983ba329", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61564,7 +61564,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SYSTEM\\Remote Manipulator System*" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_access_software_rms_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of Microsoft Remote Assistance, msra.exe, spawning PowerShell.exe or cmd.exe as a child process. Msra.exe by default has no command-line arguments and typically spawns itself. It will generate a network connection to the remote system that is connected. This behavior is indicative of another process injected into msra.exe. Review the parent process or cross process events to identify source.
@@ -61576,7 +61576,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, filter as
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61590,7 +61590,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ced50492-8849-11ec-9f68-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61611,7 +61611,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=msra.exe `windows_shells` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_assistance_spawning_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Create Service - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Remote Create Service - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies an endpoint that remotely connects to another endpoint to create a new service using sc.exe. On the remote endpoint, the new service will be created and this action will trigger the creation of EventCode 7045 along with all the resulting service information.
@@ -61623,7 +61623,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Note that false positives may occur, and fil
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Create Service - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Remote Create Service - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61637,7 +61637,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Create Service - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Remote Create Service - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0dc44d03-8c00-482d-ba7c-796ba7ab18c9", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61652,7 +61652,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sc.exe Processes.process IN ("*create*")  Processes.process="*\\\\*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_create_service_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Service Rdpwinst Tool Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Remote Service Rdpwinst Tool Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies RDPWInst.exe tool, which is a RDP wrapper library tool designed to enable remote desktop host support and concurrent RDP session on reduced functionality system. Unfortunately, this open project was abused by adversaries to enable RDP connection to the targeted host for remote access and potentially be for lateral movement.
@@ -61664,7 +61664,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This tool was designed for home usage and no
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Service Rdpwinst Tool Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Remote Service Rdpwinst Tool Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61678,7 +61678,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Service Rdpwinst Tool Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Remote Service Rdpwinst Tool Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c8127f87-c7c9-4036-89ed-8fe4b30e678c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61699,7 +61699,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="RDPWInst.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name="RDPWInst.exe") AND Processes.process IN ("* -i*", "* -s*", "* -o*", "* -w*", "* -r*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_service_rdpwinst_tool_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Allow Rdp In Firewall - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Remote Services Allow Rdp In Firewall - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows firewall to enable remote desktop protocol on a targeted machine. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware or red teamer to remotely access the compromised or targeted host by allowing this protocol in firewall. Even this protocol might be allowed in some production environment, This TTP behavior is a good pivot to check who and why the user want to enable this feature through firewall which is also common traits of attack to start lateral movement.
@@ -61711,7 +61711,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Allow Rdp In Firewall - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Remote Services Allow Rdp In Firewall - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61725,7 +61725,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Allow Rdp In Firewall - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Remote Services Allow Rdp In Firewall - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9170cb54-ea15-41e1-9dfc-9f3363ce9b02", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61740,7 +61740,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process values(Processes.process_name) count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = "netsh.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name= "netsh.exe") AND Processes.process = "*firewall*" AND Processes.process = "*add*" AND Processes.process = "*protocol=TCP*" AND Processes.process = "*localport=3389*" AND Processes.process = "*action=allow*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_services_allow_rdp_in_firewall_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Allow Remote Assistance - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Remote Services Allow Remote Assistance - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows registry to enable remote desktop assistance on a targeted machine. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware or red teamer like azorult to remotely access the compromised or targeted host by enabling this protocol in registry. Even this protocol might be allowed in some production environment, This Anomaly behavior is a good pivot to check who and why the user want to enable this feature through registry which is un-common. And as per stated in microsoft documentation the default value of this registry is false that makes this a good indicator of suspicious behavior.
@@ -61752,7 +61752,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Allow Remote Assistance - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Remote Services Allow Remote Assistance - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61766,7 +61766,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Allow Remote Assistance - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Remote Services Allow Remote Assistance - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9bce3a97-bc97-4e89-a1aa-ead151c82fbb", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61781,7 +61781,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Control\\Terminal Server\\fAllowToGetHelp*" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_services_allow_remote_assistance_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Rdp Enable - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Remote Services Rdp Enable - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is to identify a modification in the Windows registry to enable remote desktop protocol on a targeted machine. This technique was seen in several adversaries, malware or red teamer to remotely access the compromised or targeted host by enabling this protocol in registry. Even this protocol might be allowed in some production environment, This TTP behavior is a good pivot to check who and why the user want to enable this feature through registry which is un-common.
@@ -61793,7 +61793,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrators may enable or disable this fe
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Rdp Enable - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Remote Services Rdp Enable - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61807,7 +61807,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Rdp Enable - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Remote Services Rdp Enable - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8fbd2e88-4ea5-40b9-9217-fd0855e08cc0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61828,7 +61828,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Control\\Terminal Server\\fDenyTSConnections*" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_remote_services_rdp_enable_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is developed to detect suspicious executable or script files created or dropped in the root drive of a targeted host. This technique is commonly used by threat actors, adversaries or even red teamers to replicate or spread in possible removable drives. Back then, WORM malware was popular for this technique where it would drop a copy of itself in the root drive to be able to spread or to have a lateral movement in other network machines. Nowadays, Ransomware like CHAOS ransomware also use this technique to spread its malicious code in possible removable drives. This TTP detection can be a good indicator that a process might create a persistence technique or lateral movement of a targeted machine. We suggest checking the process name that creates this event, the file created, user type, and the reason why that executable or scripts are dropped in the root drive.
@@ -61840,7 +61840,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may allow creation of script
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61854,7 +61854,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Chaos Ransomware", "NjRAT", "PlugX"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1091"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "60df805d-4605-41c8-bbba-57baa6a4eb97", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61875,7 +61875,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js  OR Filesystem.file_name= *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id  Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.user Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | eval dropped_file_path = split(file_path, "\\") | eval dropped_file_path_split_count = mvcount(dropped_file_path) | eval root_drive = mvindex(dropped_file_path,0) | where LIKE(root_drive, "%:") AND dropped_file_path_split_count = 2  AND root_drive!= "C:" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_replication_through_removable_media_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator being used to query Active Directory for domain groups. Red Teams and adversaries may leverage `[Adsisearcher]` to enumerate root domain linked policies for situational awareness and Active Directory Discovery.
@@ -61887,7 +61887,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -61901,7 +61901,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery", "Data Destruction", "Industroyer2"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1087"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "80ffaede-1f12-49d5-a86e-b4b599b68b3c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61916,7 +61916,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*[adsisearcher]*" ScriptBlockText = "*.SearchRooT*" ScriptBlockText = "*.gplink*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer user_id | rename Computer as dest, user_id as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_root_domain_linked_policies_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Rundll32 Apply User Settings Changes - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Rundll32 Apply User Settings Changes - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to update a user's system parameters related to desktop backgrounds, display settings, and visual themes. Specifically, it triggers the system to refresh and apply changes to the user-specific settings, such as wallpaper modifications or visual theme updates, ensuring that the changes take effect without the need to restart the system or log out and log back in. This technique was seen in Rhysida Ransomware and script as part of its defense evasion. This technique is not a common practice to lock a screen and maybe a good indicator of compromise. This command could also potentially be exploited by malware to disguise its activities or make unauthorized changes to a user's system settings without their knowledge or consent.
@@ -61928,7 +61928,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Rundll32 Apply User Settings Changes - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Rundll32 Apply User Settings Changes - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61942,7 +61942,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Rundll32 Apply User Settings Changes - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Rundll32 Apply User Settings Changes - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Rhysida Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b9fb8d97-dbc9-4a09-804c-ff0e3862bb2d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -61963,7 +61963,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe Processes.process= "*user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_rundll32_apply_user_settings_changes_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Rundll32 WebDAV Request - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Rundll32 WebDAV Request - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with the commandline arguments loading davclnt.dll function - davsetcookie - to be used to access a remote WebDav instance. This particular behavior was recently showcased in CVE-2023-23397.
@@ -61975,7 +61975,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on leg
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Rundll32 WebDAV Request - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Rundll32 WebDAV Request - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -61989,7 +61989,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Rundll32 WebDAV Request - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Rundll32 WebDAV Request - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CVE-2023-23397 Outlook Elevation of Privilege"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "cve": ["CVE-2023-23397"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "320099b7-7eb1-4153-a2b4-decb53267de2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62010,7 +62010,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe Processes.process IN ("*\\windows\\system32\\davclnt.dll,*davsetcookie*","*\\windows\\syswow64\\davclnt.dll,*davsetcookie*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_rundll32_webdav_request_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Rundll32 WebDav With Network Connection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Rundll32 WebDav With Network Connection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe with the commandline arguments loading davclnt.dll function - davsetcookie - to be used to access a remote WebDav instance. The analytic attempts to use join from Processes and All_Traffic to identify the network connection. This particular behavior was recently showcased in CVE-2023-23397. 
@@ -62022,7 +62022,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on leg
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Rundll32 WebDav With Network Connection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Rundll32 WebDav With Network Connection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -62036,7 +62036,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Windows Rundll32 WebDav With Network Connection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Windows Rundll32 WebDav With Network Connection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CVE-2023-23397 Outlook Elevation of Privilege"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "cve": ["CVE-2023-23397"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f03355e0-28b5-4e9b-815a-6adffc63b38c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62057,7 +62057,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe `process_rundll32` Processes.process IN ("*\\windows\\system32\\davclnt.dll,*davsetcookie*", "*\\windows\\syswow64\\davclnt.dll,*davsetcookie*") by host _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest as src | join host process_id [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count latest(All_Traffic.dest) as dest latest(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip latest(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port!=0 NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip IN (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16))  by host All_Traffic.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`] | `windows_rundll32_webdav_with_network_connection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks in Windows, specifically tasks created using schtasks.exe with the -create flag and an XML parameter in the command-line. This technique is commonly employed by threat actors, adversaries, and red teamers to establish persistence or achieve privilege escalation on targeted hosts. Notably, malware like Trickbot and Winter-Vivern have been observed using XML files to create scheduled tasks. Monitoring and investigating this activity is crucial to mitigate potential security risks. It is important to be aware that scripts or administrators may trigger this analytic, leading to potential false positives. To minimize false positives, adjust the filter based on the parent process or application.\
@@ -62071,7 +62071,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible scripts or administrators may
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -62085,7 +62085,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Scheduled Tasks", "Winter Vivern"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7e03b682-3965-4598-8e91-a60a40a3f7e4", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62107,7 +62107,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process=*create* Processes.process="* /xml *" by Processes.user  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_scheduled_task_created_via_xml_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies when the Task Scheduler service "svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule" is the parent process to common command line, scripting, or shell execution binaries. Attackers often abuse the task scheduler service with these binaries as an execution and persistence mechanism in order to blend in with normal Windows operations. This TTP is also commonly seen for legitimate purposes such as business scripts or application updates.
@@ -62119,7 +62119,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown, possible custom scripting.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -62133,7 +62133,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 25, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d8120352-3b62-4e3c-8cb6-7b47584dd5e8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62154,7 +62154,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process="*\\system32\\svchost.exe*" AND Processes.parent_process="*-k*" AND Processes.parent_process= "*netsvcs*" AND Processes.parent_process="*-p*" AND Processes.parent_process="*-s*" AND Processes.parent_process="*Schedule*" Processes.process_name IN("powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "cmd.exe", "sh.exe", "ksh.exe", "zsh.exe", "bash.exe", "scrcons.exe","pwsh.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_scheduled_task_service_spawned_shell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the creation of a new task with the highest execution privilege via Schtasks.exe. This tactic is often observed in AsyncRAT attacks, where the scheduled task is used for persistence and privilege escalation. AsyncRAT sets up a scheduled task with parameters '/rl' and 'highest', triggering this technique. It's a strong indicator of potential malware or adversaries seeking to establish persistence and escalate privileges through scheduled tasks. This is crucial for a Security Operations Center (SOC) as it can prevent unauthorized system access and potential data breaches.\
@@ -62168,7 +62168,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may arise from legitimate ap
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -62182,7 +62182,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AsyncRAT", "CISA AA23-347A", "RedLine Stealer", "Scheduled Tasks"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053", "T1053.005"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2f15e1a4-0fc2-49dd-919e-cbbe60699218", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62204,7 +62204,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "schtasks.exe" Processes.process = "*/rl *" Processes.process = "* highest *" by Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_scheduled_task_with_highest_privileges_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the creation of a new task to start and run as an elevated user - SYSTEM using Schtasks.exe. This behavior is commonly used by adversaries to spawn a process in an elevated state. If a true positive is found, it suggests an attacker is attempting to persist within the environment or potentially deliver additional malicious payloads, leading to data theft, ransomware, or other damaging outcomes. Upon triage, review the scheduled task's source and the command to be executed. Capture and inspect any relevant on-disk artifacts, and look for concurrent processes to identify the attack source. This approach helps analysts detect potential threats earlier and mitigate the risks.
@@ -62216,7 +62216,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be limited to legitimat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-02-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-02-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -62230,7 +62230,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Qakbot", "Scheduled Tasks", "Windows Persistence Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "41a0e58e-884c-11ec-9976-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62251,7 +62251,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_schtasks` Processes.process="*/create *" AND Processes.process="*/ru *" AND Processes.process="*system*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_schtasks_create_run_as_system_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Screen Capture Via Powershell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Screen Capture Via Powershell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a potential PowerShell script that captures screen images on compromised or targeted hosts. This technique was observed in the Winter-Vivern malware, which attempts to capture desktop screens using a PowerShell script and send the images to its C2 server as part of its exfiltration strategy. This TTP serves as a useful indicator that a PowerShell process may be gathering desktop screenshots from a host system, potentially signaling malicious activity.
@@ -62263,7 +62263,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Screen Capture Via Powershell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Screen Capture Via Powershell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -62277,7 +62277,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Screen Capture Via Powershell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Screen Capture Via Powershell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Winter Vivern"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1113"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5e0b1936-8f99-4399-8ee2-9edc5b32e170", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62298,7 +62298,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*[Drawing.Graphics]::FromImage(*" AND ScriptBlockText = "*New-Object Drawing.Bitmap*" AND ScriptBlockText = "*.CopyFromScreen*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_screen_capture_via_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The search looks for a Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) was stopped via command-line. This is consistent with Ryuk infections across a fleet of endpoints.
@@ -62310,7 +62310,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = SAM is a critical windows service, stopping
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -62324,7 +62324,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "69c12d59-d951-431e-ab77-ec426b8d65e6", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62345,7 +62345,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE ("Processes.process_name"="net*.exe" "Processes.process"="*stop \"samss\"*") BY Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_guid Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `windows_security_account_manager_stopped_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process command line related to the discovery of possible Security Support Providers in the registry. This technique is being abused by adversaries or post exploitation tools like winpeas to gather LSA protection and configuration in the registry in the targeted host. This registry entry can contain several information related to LSA that validates users for local and remote sign-ins and enforces local security policies. Understanding LSA protection may give a good information in accessing LSA content in memory which is commonly attack by adversaries and tool like mimikatz to scrape password hashes or clear plain text passwords.
@@ -62357,7 +62357,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -62371,7 +62371,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prestige Ransomware", "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.005", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "31302468-93c9-4eca-9ae3-2d41f53a4e2b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62386,7 +62386,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` AND Processes.process = "* query *" AND Processes.process = "*\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\LSA*" Processes.process IN ("*RunAsPPL*" , "*LsaCfgFlags*") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_security_support_provider_reg_query_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the Windows SDK utility - GACUtil.exe, being utilized to add a DLL into the Global Assembly Cache (GAC). Each computer where the Common Language Runtime is installed has a machine-wide code cache called the Global Assembly Cache. The Global Assembly Cache stores assemblies specifically designated to be shared by several applications on the computer. By adding a DLL to the GAC, this allows an adversary to call it via any other means across the operating systems. As outlined by Microsoft in their blog, it is not common to see this spawning from W3WP.exe, however, in a non-development environment it may not be common at all. Note that in order to utilize GACutil.exe, The Windows SDK must be installed, this is not a native binary.
@@ -62398,7 +62398,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if gacutil.ex
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -62412,7 +62412,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["IIS Components"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1505.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7c025ef0-9e65-4c57-be39-1c13dbb1613e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62433,7 +62433,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=gacutil.exe Processes.process IN ("*-i *","*/i *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_server_software_component_gacutil_install_to_gac_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifes a new kernel driver being added to Windows using sc.exe. Adding a Kernel driver is not common day to day and should be investigated to further understand the source.
@@ -62445,7 +62445,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on comm
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -62459,7 +62459,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-320A", "Windows Drivers"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543", "T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0b4e3b06-1b2b-4885-b752-cf06d12a90cb", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62480,7 +62480,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sc.exe Processes.process="*kernel*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_create_kernel_mode_driver_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create RemComSvc - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Service Create RemComSvc - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies RemComSvc installed on an endpoint. This typically occurs when someone is moving laterally with RemCom.exe.
@@ -62492,7 +62492,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create RemComSvc - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Create RemComSvc - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -62506,7 +62506,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create RemComSvc - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Create RemComSvc - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0be4b5d6-c449-4084-b945-2392b519c33b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62521,7 +62521,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceName="RemCom Service" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType   | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_create_remcomsvc_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create SliverC2 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Service Create SliverC2 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = When an adversary utilizes SliverC2 to laterally move with the Psexec module, it will create a service with the name and description of "Sliver" and "Sliver Implant". Note that these may be easily changed and are specific to only SliverC2. We have also created the same regex as Microsoft has outlined to attempt to capture the suspicious service path (regex101 reference).
@@ -62533,7 +62533,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create SliverC2 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Create SliverC2 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -62547,7 +62547,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create SliverC2 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Create SliverC2 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BishopFox Sliver Adversary Emulation Framework"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "89dad3ee-57ec-43dc-9044-131c4edd663f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62568,7 +62568,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceName="sliver" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_create_sliverc2_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create with Tscon - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Service Create with Tscon - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects potential RDP Hijacking attempts by monitoring a series of actions taken by an attacker to gain unauthorized access to a remote system. The attacker first runs the quser command to query the remote host for disconnected user sessions. Upon identifying a disconnected session, they use the sc.exe command to create a new Windows service with a binary path that launches tscon.exe. By specifying the disconnected session ID and a destination ID, the attacker can transfer the disconnected session to a new RDP session, effectively hijacking the user's session. This analytic allows security teams to detect and respond to RDP Hijacking attempts, mitigating potential risks and impacts on targeted systems.
@@ -62580,7 +62580,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may arise in the RDP Hijacki
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create with Tscon - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Create with Tscon - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -62594,7 +62594,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create with Tscon - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Create with Tscon - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1563.002", "T1563", "T1543.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c13b3d74-6b63-4db5-a841-4206f0370077", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62615,7 +62615,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sc.exe Processes.process="*/dest:rdp-tcp*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_create_with_tscon_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytics uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path path is located in a non-common Service folder in Windows. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution as well as persistence and execution. The Clop ransomware has also been seen in the wild abusing Windows services.
@@ -62627,7 +62627,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may install services
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -62641,7 +62641,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Brute Ratel C4", "CISA AA23-347A", "Clop Ransomware", "Flax Typhoon", "PlugX", "Qakbot", "Snake Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "429141be-8311-11eb-adb6-acde48001122", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62662,7 +62662,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ImagePath = "*.exe" NOT (ImagePath IN ("*:\\Windows\\*", "*:\\Program File*", "*:\\Programdata\\*", "*%systemroot%\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType StartType Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytc uses Windows Event Id 7045, `New Service Was Installed`, to identify the creation of a Windows Service where the service binary path is located in public paths. This behavior could represent the installation of a malicious service. Red Teams and adversaries alike may create malicious Services for lateral movement or remote code execution
@@ -62674,7 +62674,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may install services
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -62688,7 +62688,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Snake Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3abb2eda-4bb8-11ec-9ae4-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62709,7 +62709,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ImagePath = "*.exe" NOT (ImagePath IN ("*:\\Windows\\*", "*:\\Program File*", "*:\\Programdata\\*", "*%systemroot%\\*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType StartType Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_created_within_public_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to create a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution.
@@ -62721,7 +62721,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may create Windows Services o
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -62735,7 +62735,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e0eea4fa-4274-11ec-882b-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62756,7 +62756,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\* AND Processes.process=*create* AND Processes.process=*binpath*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_creation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects when reg.exe modify registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations in Windows to detect potential threats earlier and mitigate the risks. This detection is made by a Splunk query that searches for specific keywords in the process name, parent process name, user, and process ID. This detection is important because it suggests that an attacker has modified the registry keys that define Windows services and their configurations, which can allow them to maintain access to the system and potentially move laterally within the network. It is a common technique used by attackers to gain persistence on a compromised system and its impact can lead to data theft, ransomware, or other damaging outcomes. False positives can occur since legitimate uses of reg.exe to modify registry keys for Windows services can also trigger this alert. Next steps include reviewing the process and user context of the reg.exe activity and identify any other concurrent processes that might be associated with the attack upon triage.
@@ -62768,7 +62768,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Third party tools may used this technique to
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -62782,7 +62782,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Brute Ratel C4", "CISA AA23-347A", "PlugX", "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "25212358-948e-11ec-ad47-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62803,7 +62803,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services*" Registry.registry_value_name = ImagePath) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Service Deletion In Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Service Deletion In Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a service being deleted from the Windows Registry under CurrentControlSet\Services. Adversaries may delete a service as part of defense evasion.
@@ -62815,7 +62815,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This event can be seen when administrator de
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Deletion In Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Deletion In Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -62829,7 +62829,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Deletion In Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Deletion In Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brute Ratel C4", "PlugX"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "daed6823-b51c-4843-a6ad-169708f1323e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62844,7 +62844,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services*" AND (Registry.action = deleted OR (Registry.registry_value_name = DeleteFlag AND Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 AND Registry.action=modified)) by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_deletion_in_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `sc.exe` with command-line arguments utilized to start a Windows Service on a remote endpoint. Red Teams and adversaries alike may abuse the Service Control Manager for lateral movement and remote code execution.
@@ -62856,7 +62856,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may start Windows Services on
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -62870,7 +62870,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543", "T1543.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3f519894-4276-11ec-ab02-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62891,7 +62891,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=sc.exe) (Processes.process=*\\\\* AND Processes.process=*start*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_initiation_on_remote_endpoint_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop By Deletion - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Service Stop By Deletion - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies Windows Service Control, `sc.exe`, attempting to delete a service. This is typically identified in parallel with other instances of service enumeration of attempts to stop a service and then delete it. Adversaries utilize this technique to terminate security services or other related services to continue there objective and evade detections.
@@ -62903,7 +62903,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible administrative scripts may st
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop By Deletion - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Stop By Deletion - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -62917,7 +62917,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop By Deletion - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Stop By Deletion - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "Graceful Wipe Out Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "196ff536-58d9-4d1b-9686-b176b04e430b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62938,7 +62938,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = sc.exe OR Processes.original_file_name = sc.exe) Processes.process="* delete *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_stop_by_deletion_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies suspicious attempts to stop services on a system using either `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. This technique is used by adversaries to terminate security services or other related services to continue their objective and evade detections. This technique is also commonly used by ransomware threat actors to successfully encrypt databases or files being processed or used by Windows OS Services.
@@ -62950,7 +62950,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Windows OS or software may stop and restart
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -62964,7 +62964,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "Prestige Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "827af04b-0d08-479b-9b84-b7d4644e4b80", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -62979,7 +62979,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` OR  Processes.process_name = "sc.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name= "sc.exe" AND Processes.process="*stop*" by  Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_stop_via_net__and_sc_application_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop Win Updates - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Service Stop Win Updates - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a windows update service being disabled in Windows OS. This technique is being abused by adversaries or threat actors to add defense mechanisms to their malware implant in the targeted host. Disabling windows update will put the compromised host vulnerable in some zero day exploit or even some update features against threats. RedLine Stealer kills this service as part of its defense evasion mechanism.
@@ -62991,7 +62991,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Network administrator may disable this servi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop Win Updates - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Service Stop Win Updates - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -63005,7 +63005,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop Win Updates - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Service Stop Win Updates - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "RedLine Stealer"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0dc25c24-6fcf-456f-b08b-dd55a183e4de", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63020,7 +63020,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7040 (service_name IN ("Update Orchestrator Service for Windows Update", "WaaSMedicSvc", "Windows Update") OR param1 IN ("UsoSvc", "WaaSMedicSvc", "wuauserv")) AND (param3=disabled OR start_mode = disabled) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer Error_Code service_name start_mode param1 param2 param3 param4 | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_service_stop_win_updates_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows SIP Provider Inventory - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows SIP Provider Inventory - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following inventory analytic is used with a PowerShell scripted inputs to capture all SIP providers on a Windows system. This analytic is used to identify potential malicious SIP providers that may be used to subvert trust controls. Upon review, look for new and non-standard paths for SIP providers.
@@ -63032,7 +63032,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are limited as this is a hun
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows SIP Provider Inventory - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows SIP Provider Inventory - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -63041,7 +63041,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows SIP Provider Inventory - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows SIP Provider Inventory - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Subvert Trust Controls SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1553.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "21c5af91-1a4a-4511-8603-64fb41df3fad", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63056,7 +63056,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `subjectinterfacepackage` Dll=*\\*.dll | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Dll) by Path host| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_sip_provider_inventory_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows SIP WinVerifyTrust Failed Trust Validation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows SIP WinVerifyTrust Failed Trust Validation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes a Windows Event Log - CAPI2 - or CryptoAPI 2, to identify failed trust validation. Typically, this event log is meant for diagnosing PKI issues, however is a great source to identify failed trust validation. Note that this event log is noisy as it captures common PKI requests from many different processes. EventID 81 is generated anytime a trust validation fails. The description for EventID 81 is "The digital signature of the object did not verify." STRT tested this analytic using Mimikatz binary.
@@ -63068,7 +63068,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present in some insta
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows SIP WinVerifyTrust Failed Trust Validation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows SIP WinVerifyTrust Failed Trust Validation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -63082,7 +63082,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows SIP WinVerifyTrust Failed Trust Validation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows SIP WinVerifyTrust Failed Trust Validation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Subvert Trust Controls SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1553.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6ffc7f88-415b-4278-a80d-b957d6539e1a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63097,7 +63097,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `capi2_operational` EventID=81 "The digital signature of the object did not verify." | xmlkv UserData_Xml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, UserData_Xml | rename Computer as dest | `windows_sip_winverifytrust_failed_trust_validation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware File Modification Crmlog - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Snake Malware File Modification Crmlog - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identfies a .crmlog written to windows\registration. Per the report, typically, this file has been found within the %windows%\Registration directory with the format of <RANDOM_GUID>.<RANDOM_GUID>.crmlog and is decrypted by Snake's kernel driver.
@@ -63109,7 +63109,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present as the file p
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware File Modification Crmlog - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Snake Malware File Modification Crmlog - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["7e47ee60-9dd1-4269-9c4f-97953b183268"]
@@ -63124,7 +63124,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware File Modification Crmlog - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Snake Malware File Modification Crmlog - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Snake Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "27187e0e-c221-471d-a7bd-04f698985ff6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63145,7 +63145,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path="*\\windows\\registration\\*" AND  Filesystem.file_name="*.crmlog"  by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id  Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_snake_malware_file_modification_crmlog_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the comadmin.dat file written to disk, which is related to Snake Malware. From the report, Snakes installer drops the kernel driver and a custom DLL which is used to load the driver into a single AES encrypted file on disk. Typically, this file is named comadmin.dat and is stored in the %windows%\system32\Com directory.
@@ -63157,7 +63157,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["e5cb5564-cc7b-4050-86e8-f2d9eec1941f"]
@@ -63172,7 +63172,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Snake Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "628d9c7c-3242-43b5-9620-7234c080a726", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63193,7 +63193,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path="*\\windows\\system32\\com\\*" AND Filesystem.file_name="comadmin.dat"  by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id  Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_snake_malware_kernel_driver_comadmin_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Registry Modification wav OpenWithProgIds - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Registry Modification wav OpenWithProgIds - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The follow analytic identifies the registry being modified at .wav\\OpenWithProgIds\, which is related to the Snake Malware campaign. Upon execution, Snake's WerFault.exe will attempt to decrypt an encrypted blob within the Windows registry that is typically found at HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Classes\.wav\OpenWithProgIds. The encrypted data includes the AES key, IV, and path that is used to find and decrypt the file containing Snake's kernel driver and kernel driver loader.
@@ -63205,7 +63205,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present and will requ
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Registry Modification wav OpenWithProgIds - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Registry Modification wav OpenWithProgIds - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["8318ad20-0488-4a64-98f4-72525a012f6b"]
@@ -63220,7 +63220,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Registry Modification wav OpenWithProgIds - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Registry Modification wav OpenWithProgIds - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Snake Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "13cf8b79-805d-443c-bf52-f55bd7610dfd", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63241,7 +63241,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\.wav\\OpenWithProgIds\\*"  by Registry.dest  Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `windows_snake_malware_registry_modification_wav_openwithprogids_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Service Create - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Service Create - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a new service WerFaultSvc being created with a binary path located in the windows winsxs path. Per the report, the Snake version primarily discussed in this advisory registers a service to maintain persistence on a system. Typically this service is named WerFaultSvc which we assess was used to blend in with the legitimate Windows service WerSvc. On boot, this service will execute Snakes WerFault.exe, which Snake developers chose to hide among the numerous valid Windows WerFault.exe files in the windows WinSxS directory. Executing WerFault.exe will start the process of decrypting Snakes components and loading them into memory.
@@ -63253,7 +63253,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this is
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Service Create - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Service Create - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.atomic_red_team_guids = ["b8db787e-dbea-493c-96cb-9272296ddc49"]
@@ -63268,7 +63268,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Service Create - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Service Create - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Snake Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1547.006", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "64eb091f-8cab-4b41-9b09-8fb4942377df", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63289,7 +63289,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045  ImagePath="*\\windows\\winSxS\\*" ImagePath="*\Werfault.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode ImagePath ServiceName ServiceType | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_snake_malware_service_create_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the common command-line argument used by SOAPHound `soaphound.exe`. Being the script is publicly available, function names may be modified, but these changes are dependent upon the operator. In most instances the defaults are used. It does not cover the entirety of every argument in order to avoid false positives.
@@ -63301,7 +63301,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as the com
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -63315,7 +63315,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Discovery Techniques"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.002", "T1069.001", "T1482", "T1087.001", "T1087", "T1069.002", "T1069"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8e53f839-e127-4d6d-a54d-a2f67044a57f", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63336,7 +63336,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="soaphound.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name="soaphound.exe" AND Processes.process IN ("*--buildcache *", "*--bhdump *", "*--certdump *", "*--dnsdump *", "*-c *", "*--cachefilename *", "*-o *", "*--outputdirectory *") by Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_soaphound_binary_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = this detection was designed to identifies suspicious office documents that connect to a website aside from Microsoft Office Domain. This technique was seen in several malicious documents that abuses .rels xml properties of MS office to connect or download malicious files. This hunting query can be a good pivot or guide to check what URL link it tries to connect, what domain, where the documents came from and how the connection happens.
@@ -63348,7 +63348,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Windows Office document may contain legitima
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -63357,7 +63357,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AsyncRAT", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1cb40e15-cffa-45cc-abbd-e35884a49766", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63372,7 +63372,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=22 Image IN ("*\\winword.exe","*\\excel.exe","*\\powerpnt.exe","*\\mspub.exe","*\\visio.exe","*\\wordpad.exe","*\\wordview.exe","*\\onenote.exe", "*\\onenotem.exe","*\\onenoteviewer.exe","*\\onenoteim.exe", "*\\msaccess.exe") AND NOT(QueryName IN ("*.office.com", "*.office.net")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryResults QueryStatus Computer | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_spearphishing_attachment_connect_to_none_ms_office_domain_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies the latest behavior utilized by different malware families (including TA551, AsyncRat, Redline and DCRAT). This detection identifies onenote Office Product spawning `mshta.exe`. In malicious instances, the command-line of `mshta.exe` will contain the `hta` file locally, or a URL to the remote destination. In addition, Threat Research has released a detections identifying suspicious use of `mshta.exe`. In this instance, we narrow our detection down to the Office suite as a parent process. During triage, review all file modifications. Capture and analyze any artifacts on disk. The Office Product, or `mshta.exe` will have reached out to a remote destination, capture and block the IPs or domain. Review additional parallel processes for further activity.
@@ -63384,7 +63384,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = No false positives known. Filter as needed.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -63398,7 +63398,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["AsyncRAT", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "35aeb0e7-7de5-444a-ac45-24d6788796ec", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63419,7 +63419,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("onenote.exe", "onenotem.exe") `process_mshta` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_spearphishing_attachment_onenote_spawn_mshta_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Event ID 4672 to identify a source user authenticating with special privileges across a large number remote endpoints. Specifically, the logic will trigger when a source user obtains special privileges across 30 or more target computers within a 5 minute timespan. Special privileges are assigned to a new logon session when sensitive privileges like SeDebugPrivilege and SeImpersonatePrivilege are assigned. This behavior could represent an adversary who is moving laterally and executing remote code across the network. It can also be triggered by other behavior like an adversary enumerating network shares. As environments differ across organizations, security teams should customize the thresholds of this detection as needed.
@@ -63431,7 +63431,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Vulnerability scanners or system administrat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -63445,7 +63445,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Active Directory Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1021.002", "T1135"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4c461f5a-c2cc-4e86-b132-c262fc9edca7", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63466,7 +63466,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4672 AND NOT(Caller_User_Name IN ("DWM-1","DWM-2","DWM-3","LOCAL SERVICE","NETWORK SERVICE","SYSTEM","*$")) | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Computer) AS unique_targets values(Computer) as dest values(PrivilegeList) as privileges by _time, Caller_User_Name | rename Caller_User_Name as user| where unique_targets > 30 | `windows_special_privileged_logon_on_multiple_hosts_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows SQL Spawning CertUtil - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows SQL Spawning CertUtil - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects the use of certutil to download software, a behavior exhibited by the threat actor Flax Typhoon. This actor deploys a VPN connection by downloading an executable file for SoftEther VPN from their network infrastructure using one of several LOLBins, including certutil. The actor then uses the Service Control Manager (SCM) to create a Windows service that launches the VPN connection automatically when the system starts. This behavior allows the actor to monitor the availability of the compromised system and establish an RDP connection. This analytic identifies this behavior by monitoring for the use of certutil in conjunction with the downloading of software. This behavior is worth identifying for a SOC as it indicates a potential compromise of the system and the establishment of a persistent threat. If a true positive is found, it suggests an attacker has gained access to the environment and is attempting to maintain that access, potentially leading to further malicious activities such as data theft or ransomware attacks. Be aware of potential false positives - legitimate uses of certutil in your environment may cause benign activities to be flagged. Upon triage, review the command executed and look for concurrent processes to identify the attack source. This approach helps analysts detect potential threats earlier and mitigate the risks. 
@@ -63478,7 +63478,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The occurrence of false positives should be
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows SQL Spawning CertUtil - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows SQL Spawning CertUtil - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -63492,7 +63492,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Windows SQL Spawning CertUtil - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Windows SQL Spawning CertUtil - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Flax Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dfc18a5a-946e-44ee-a373-c0f60d06e676", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63513,7 +63513,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("sqlservr.exe", "sqlagent.exe", "sqlps.exe", "launchpad.exe", "sqldumper.exe") `process_certutil` (Processes.process=*urlcache* Processes.process=*split*) OR Processes.process=*urlcache* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_sql_spawning_certutil_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows SqlWriter SQLDumper DLL Sideload - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows SqlWriter SQLDumper DLL Sideload - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the abuse of SqlWriter and SQLDumper executables to sideload the vcruntime140.dll library. This technique is commonly used by adversaries to load malicious code into a legitimate process. The analytic searches for EventCode 7 from Sysmon logs where the Image is either SQLDumper.exe or SQLWriter.exe and the ImageLoaded is vcruntime140.dll. The search also filters out the legitimate loading of vcruntime140.dll from the System32 directory to reduce false positives.
@@ -63525,7 +63525,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate p
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows SqlWriter SQLDumper DLL Sideload - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows SqlWriter SQLDumper DLL Sideload - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -63539,7 +63539,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows SqlWriter SQLDumper DLL Sideload - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows SqlWriter SQLDumper DLL Sideload - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["APT29 Diplomatic Deceptions with WINELOADER"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2ed89ba9-c6c7-46aa-9f08-a2a1c2955aa3", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63560,7 +63560,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 (Image="*\\SQLDumper.exe" OR Image="*\\SQLWriter.exe") ImageLoaded="*\\vcruntime140.dll" NOT ImageLoaded="C:\\Windows\\System32\\*" | stats values(ImageLoaded) count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image,ImageLoaded, user, Computer, EventCode | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_sqlwriter_sqldumper_dll_sideload_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Abuse - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Abuse - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies when a new certificate is requested and/or granted against the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) using a Subject Alternative Name (SAN). This action by its self is not malicious, however improperly configured certificate templates can be abused to permit privilege escalation and environment compromise due to over permissive settings (AD CS ESC1)
@@ -63572,7 +63572,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be generated in environm
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Abuse - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Abuse - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -63586,7 +63586,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Abuse - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Abuse - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1649"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cbe761fc-d945-4c8c-a71d-e26d12255d32", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63607,7 +63607,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4886,4887) Attributes="*SAN:*upn*" Attributes="*CertificateTemplate:*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(name) as name values(status) as status values(Subject) as ssl_subject values(SubjectKeyIdentifier) as ssl_hash by Computer, EventCode, Requester, Attributes, RequestId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| fillnull | rex field=Attributes "(?i)CertificateTemplate:(?<object>[^\r\n]+)" | rex field=Attributes "(?i)ccm:(?<req_src>[^\r\n]+)" | rex max_match=10 field=Attributes "(?i)(upn=(?<req_user_1>[^\r\n&]+))" | rex max_match=10 field=Attributes "(?i)(dns=(?<req_dest_1>[^\r\n&]+))" | rex field=Requester "(.+\\\\)?(?<src_user>[^\r\n]+)" | eval flavor_text = case(EventCode=="4886","A suspicious certificate was requested using request ID: ".'RequestId',EventCode=="4887", "A suspicious certificate was issued using request ID: ".'RequestId'.". To revoke this certifacte use this request ID or the SSL fingerprint [".'ssl_hash'."]"), dest = upper(coalesce(req_dest_1,req_dest_2)), src = upper(coalesce(req_src,Computer)) | fields - req_* | rename Attributes as object_attrs, EventCode as signature_id, name as signature, RequestId as ssl_serial, Requester as ssl_subject_common_name| `windows_steal_authentication_certificates___esc1_abuse_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies when a suspicious certificate is granted using Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) with a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) and then immediately used for authentication. This action alone may not be malicious, however improperly configured certificate templates can be abused to permit privilege escalation and environment compromise due to over permissive settings (AD CS ESC1).
@@ -63619,7 +63619,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be generated in environm
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -63633,7 +63633,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1649", "T1550"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f0306acf-a6ab-437a-bbc6-8628f8d5c97e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63654,7 +63654,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4887) Attributes="*SAN:*upn*" Attributes="*CertificateTemplate:*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(name) as name values(status) as status values(Subject) as ssl_subject values(SubjectKeyIdentifier) as ssl_hash by Computer, EventCode, Requester, Attributes, RequestId | rex field=Attributes "(?i)CertificateTemplate:(?<object>[^\r\n]+)" | rex field=Attributes "(?i)ccm:(?<req_src>[^\r\n]+)" | rex max_match=10 field=Attributes "(?i)(upn=(?<req_user_1>[^\r\n&]+))" | rex max_match=10 field=Attributes "(?i)(dns=(?<req_dest_1>[^\r\n&]+))" | rex field=Requester "(.+\\\\)?(?<src_user>[^\r\n]+)" | rename Attributes as object_attrs, EventCode as signature_id, name as signature, RequestId as ssl_serial, Requester as ssl_subject_common_name | eval user = lower(coalesce(req_user_1,req_user_2))  | join user [ | search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 CertThumbprint=* | rename TargetUserName as user, Computer as auth_dest, IpAddress as auth_src | fields auth_src,auth_dest,user ] | eval src = upper(coalesce(auth_src,req_src)), dest = upper(coalesce(auth_dest,req_dest_1,req_dest_2)), risk_score = 90 | eval flavor_text = case(signature_id=="4887", "User account [".'user'."] authenticated after a suspicious certificate was issued for it by [".'src_user'."] using certificate request ID: ".'ssl_serial') | fields - req_* auth_* | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_steal_authentication_certificates___esc1_authentication_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Issued - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Issued - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies when a new certificate is issued against the Certificate Services - AD CS. By its very nature this is not malicious, but should be tracked and correlated with other events related to certificates being issued. When the CA issues the certificate, it creates EID 4887 'Certificate Services approved a certificate request and issued a certificate". The event supplies the requester user context, the DNS hostname of the machine they requested the certificate from, and the time they requested the certificate. The attributes fields in these event commonly has values for CDC, RMD, and CCM which correspond to Client DC, Request Machine DNS name, and Cert Client Machine, respectively.
@@ -63666,7 +63666,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be generated based on n
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Issued - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Issued - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -63680,7 +63680,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Issued - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Issued - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1649"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9b1a5385-0c31-4c39-9753-dc26b8ce64c2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63695,7 +63695,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security`  EventCode=4887 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, name, Requester, action, Attributes, Subject | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_steal_authentication_certificates_certificate_issued_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Request - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Request - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies when a new certificate is requested against the Certificate Services - AD CS. By its very nature this is not malicious, but should be tracked and correlated with other events related to certificate requests. When an account requests a certificate, the CA generates event ID (EID) 4886 "Certificate Services received a certificate request".
@@ -63707,7 +63707,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be generated based on n
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Request - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Request - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -63721,7 +63721,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Request - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Request - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1649"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "747d7800-2eaa-422d-b994-04d8bb9e06d0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63736,7 +63736,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4886 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, name, Requester, action, Attributes | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_steal_authentication_certificates_certificate_request_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CertUtil Backup - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CertUtil Backup - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is focused on CertUtil.exe performing a backup of the Certificate Store. Typically, administrators may perform this task to migrate or perform backups of the store, however it may be found uncommon in most organizations.
@@ -63748,7 +63748,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be generated based on n
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CertUtil Backup - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CertUtil Backup - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -63762,7 +63762,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CertUtil Backup - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CertUtil Backup - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1649"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bac85b56-0b65-4ce5-aad5-d94880df0967", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63777,7 +63777,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process IN ("*-backupdb *", "*-backup *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_steal_authentication_certificates_certutil_backup_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CryptoAPI - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CryptoAPI - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes a Windows Event Log - CAPI2 - or CryptoAPI 2, to identify suspicious certificate extraction. Typically, this event log is meant for diagnosing PKI issues, however is a great source to identify certificate exports. Note that this event log is noisy as it captures common PKI requests from many different processes. EventID 70 is generated anytime a certificate is exported. The description for EventID 70 is "Acquire Certificate Private Key". STRT tested this analytic using Mimikatz binary and the implementation of Mimikatz in Cobalt Strike.
@@ -63789,7 +63789,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present in some insta
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CryptoAPI - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CryptoAPI - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -63803,7 +63803,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CryptoAPI - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CryptoAPI - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1649"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "905d5692-6d7c-432f-bc7e-a6b4f464d40e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63818,7 +63818,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `capi2_operational` EventCode=70 | xmlkv UserData_Xml | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, UserData_Xml | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_steal_authentication_certificates_cryptoapi_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CS Backup - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CS Backup - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies when the Active Directory Certificate Services store is backed up utilizing Event ID 4876. This event triggers whenever the backup occurs in the UI of CertSrv.msc or via CertUtil.exe -BackupDB occurs.
@@ -63830,7 +63830,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be generated based on n
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CS Backup - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CS Backup - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -63844,7 +63844,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CS Backup - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CS Backup - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1649"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a2f4cc7f-6503-4078-b206-f83a29f408a7", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63859,7 +63859,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4876| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, name, action, Caller_Domain ,Caller_User_Name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_steal_authentication_certificates_cs_backup_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export Certificate - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export Certificate - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of export-certificate, the PowerShell cmdlet, being utilized on the command-line in an attempt to export the certifcate from the local Windows Certificate Store.
@@ -63871,7 +63871,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Filtering may be requried based on automated
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export Certificate - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export Certificate - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -63885,7 +63885,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export Certificate - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export Certificate - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1649"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e39dc429-c2a5-4f1f-9c3c-6b211af6b332", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63900,7 +63900,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*export-certificate*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_steal_authentication_certificates_export_certificate_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export PfxCertificate - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export PfxCertificate - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the use of export-pfxcertificate, the PowerShell cmdlet, being utilized on the command-line in an attempt to export the certifcate from the local Windows Certificate Store.
@@ -63912,7 +63912,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Filtering may be requried based on automated
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export PfxCertificate - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export PfxCertificate - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -63926,7 +63926,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export PfxCertificate - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export PfxCertificate - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows Certificate Services"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1649"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "391329f3-c14b-4b8d-8b37-ac5012637360", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63941,7 +63941,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*export-pfxcertificate*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_steal_authentication_certificates_export_pfxcertificate_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process execution of Windows OS klist.exe tool. This tool is being abused or used by several post exploitation tool such as winpeas that being used by ransomware prestige to display or gather list of currently cached kerberos ticket. This cahced data can be used for lateral movement or even privilege escalation on the targeted host. This hunting query can be a good pivot in possible kerberos attack or pass the hash technique.
@@ -63953,7 +63953,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -63962,7 +63962,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1558"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "09d88404-1e29-46cb-806c-1eedbc85ad5d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -63977,7 +63977,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="klist.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name = "klist.exe" Processes.parent_process_name IN ("cmd.exe", "powershell*") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_steal_or_forge_kerberos_tickets_klist_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies executables running from public or temporary locations that are communicating over windows domain authentication ports/protocol. The ports/protocols include LDAP(389), LDAPS(636), and Kerberos(88). Authentications from applications  running from user controlled locations may not be malicious, however actors often attempt to access domain resources after initial  compromise from executables in these locations. Most attacker toolkits offer some degree of interaction with AD/LDAP.
@@ -63989,7 +63989,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Known applications running from these locati
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -64003,7 +64003,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087", "T1087.002", "T1204", "T1204.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "953322db-128a-4ce9-8e89-56e039e33d98", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64018,7 +64018,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.process_id) as process_id  from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port IN ("88","389","636")  AND All_Traffic.app IN ("*\\users\\*", "*\\programdata\\*", "*\\temp\\*", "*\\Windows\\Tasks\\*", "*\\appdata\\*", "*\\perflogs\\*")  by All_Traffic.app,All_Traffic.src,All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.user,All_Traffic.dest,All_Traffic.dest_ip,All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`  | rex field=app ".*\\\(?<process_name>.*)$" | rename app as process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_suspect_process_with_authentication_traffic_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the decompile parameter with the HTML Help application, HH.exe. This is a uncommon command to see ran and behavior. Most recently this was seen in a APT41 campaign where a CHM file was delivered and a script inside used a technique for running an arbitrary command in a CHM file via an ActiveX object. This unpacks an HTML help file to a specified path for launching the next stage.
@@ -64030,7 +64030,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, filter as
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-08-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-08-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -64044,7 +64044,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1218.001", "T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2acf0e19-4149-451c-a3f3-39cd3c77e37d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64065,7 +64065,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_hh` Processes.process=*-decompile* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_binary_proxy_execution_compiled_html_file_decompile_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the execution of nslookup.exe tool to get domain information. Nslookup.exe is a command-line tool that can display information to diagnose domain name systems. This Nslookup feature is being abused by Qakbot malware to gather domain information such as SRV service location records, server name and many more.
@@ -64077,7 +64077,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = dministrator may execute this commandline to
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -64091,7 +64091,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Qakbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 10, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2418780f-7c3e-4c45-b8b4-996ea850cd49", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64106,7 +64106,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = "nslookup.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name = "nslookup.exe") AND Processes.process = "*_ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs*" by Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_discovery_using_ldap_nslookup_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows System Discovery Using Qwinsta - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows System Discovery Using Qwinsta - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the execution of qwinsta.exe executable in Windows Operating System. This Windows executable file can display information about sessions on a remote desktop session host server. The information includes servername, sessionname, username and many more. This tool is being abused of Qakbot malware to gather information to the targeted or compromised host that will be send back to its Command And Control server.
@@ -64118,7 +64118,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator may execute this commandline t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows System Discovery Using Qwinsta - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows System Discovery Using Qwinsta - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -64127,7 +64127,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows System Discovery Using Qwinsta - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows System Discovery Using Qwinsta - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Qakbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2e765c1b-144a-49f0-93d0-1df4287cca04", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64142,7 +64142,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "qwinsta.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name = "qwinsta.exe" by Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_discovery_using_qwinsta_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows System File on Disk - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows System File on Disk - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic will assist with identifying new .sys files introduced in the environment. This query is meant to identify sys file creates on disk. There will be noise, but reducing common process names or applications should help to limit any volume. The idea is to identify new sys files written to disk and identify them before they're added as a new kernel mode driver.
@@ -64154,7 +64154,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present. Filter as n
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows System File on Disk - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows System File on Disk - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -64163,7 +64163,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows System File on Disk - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows System File on Disk - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-264A", "Windows Drivers"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "993ce99d-9cdd-42c7-a2cf-733d5954e5a6", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64178,7 +64178,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="*.sys*" by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_system_file_on_disk_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows System LogOff Commandline - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows System LogOff Commandline - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies Windows commandline to logoff a windows host machine. This technique was seen in several APT, RAT like dcrat and other commodity malware to shutdown the machine to add more impact, interrupt access, aid destruction of the system like wiping disk or inhibit system recovery. This TTP is a good pivot to check why application trigger this commandline which is not so common way to logoff a machine.
@@ -64190,7 +64190,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator may execute this commandline t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows System LogOff Commandline - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows System LogOff Commandline - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -64204,7 +64204,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows System LogOff Commandline - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows System LogOff Commandline - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkCrystal RAT", "NjRAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1529"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "74a8133f-93e7-4b71-9bd3-13a66124fd57", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64219,7 +64219,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = shutdown.exe OR Processes.original_file_name = shutdown.exe) Processes.process="*shutdown*" Processes.process IN ("* /l*", "* -l*") Processes.process IN ("* /t*","* -t*","* /f*","* -f*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_logoff_commandline_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process command line that retrieves dns reply information using Windows OS built-in tool IPConfig. This technique is being abused by threat actors, adversaries and post exploitation tools like WINPEAS to retrieve DNS information for the targeted host. This IPConfig parameter (/displaydns) can show dns server resource record, record name, record type, time to live data length and dns reply. This hunting detection can be a good pivot to check which process is executing this command line in specific host system that may lead to malware or adversaries gathering network information.
@@ -64231,7 +64231,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -64245,7 +64245,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e24f0a0e-41a9-419f-9999-eacab15efc36", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64260,7 +64260,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="ipconfig.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name = "ipconfig.exe" AND Processes.process = "*/displaydns*" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_network_config_discovery_display_dns_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process execution of Windows OS built-in tool netsh.exe to show state, configuration and profile of host firewall. This tool is being used or abused by several adversaries or even post exploitation tool to bypass firewall rules or to discover firewall settings. This hunting detection can help to detect a possible suspicious usage of netsh.exe to retrieve firewall settings or even firewall wlan profile. We recommend checking which parent process and process name execute this command. Also check the process file path for verification that may lead to further TTP's threat behavior.
@@ -64272,7 +64272,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network administrator can use this tool for
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -64286,7 +64286,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prestige Ransomware", "Snake Keylogger", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1049"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "abfb7cc5-c275-4a97-9029-62cd8d4ffeca", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64301,7 +64301,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_netsh`AND Processes.process = "* show *" Processes.process IN ("*state*", "*config*", "*wlan*", "*profile*") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_network_connections_discovery_netsh_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies Windows commandline to reboot a windows host machine. This technique was seen in several APT, RAT like dcrat and other commodity malware to shutdown the machine to add more impact, interrupt access, aid destruction of the system like wiping disk or inhibit system recovery. This TTP is a good pivot to check why application trigger this commandline which is not so common way to reboot a machine. Compare to shutdown and logoff shutdown.exe feature, reboot seen in some automation script like ansible to reboot the machine.
@@ -64313,7 +64313,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator may execute this commandline t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -64327,7 +64327,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkCrystal RAT", "DarkGate Malware", "NjRAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1529"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "97fc2b60-c8eb-4711-93f7-d26fade3686f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64342,7 +64342,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = shutdown.exe OR Processes.original_file_name = shutdown.exe) Processes.process="*shutdown*" Processes.process IN ("* /r*", "* -r*") Processes.process IN ("* /t*","* -t*","* /f*","* -f*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_reboot_commandline_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows System Script Proxy Execution Syncappvpublishingserver - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows System Script Proxy Execution Syncappvpublishingserver - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the abuse of Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs, which is a native script on Windows that may be utilized to download remote files or perform privilege escalation.
@@ -64354,7 +64354,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the vbscri
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows System Script Proxy Execution Syncappvpublishingserver - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows System Script Proxy Execution Syncappvpublishingserver - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -64368,7 +64368,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows System Script Proxy Execution Syncappvpublishingserver - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows System Script Proxy Execution Syncappvpublishingserver - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1216", "T1218"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8dd73f89-682d-444c-8b41-8e679966ad3c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64389,7 +64389,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("wscript.exe","cscript.exe") Processes.process="*syncappvpublishingserver.vbs*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_script_proxy_execution_syncappvpublishingserver_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This detection rule is designed to identify the execution of the Windows shutdown command via command line interface. The shutdown command can be utilized by system administrators to properly halt, power off, or reboot a computer. However, in a security context, attackers who have gained unauthorized access to a system may also use this command in an effort to erase tracks, or to cause disruption and denial of service. In some instances, they might execute the shutdown command after installing a backdoor, to force the system to restart, ensuring that changes take effect or evading detection by security tools. Monitoring for the use of the Windows shutdown command, especially in conjunction with other unusual or unauthorized activities, can be an important part of identifying malicious behavior within a network. It is advised that security professionals analyze the context in which the shutdown command is being executed to differentiate between legitimate administrative functions and potentially malicious activity.
@@ -64401,7 +64401,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrator may execute this commandline t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -64415,7 +64415,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkCrystal RAT", "DarkGate Malware", "NjRAT", "Sandworm Tools"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1529"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4fee57b8-d825-4bf3-9ea8-bf405cdb614c", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64430,7 +64430,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name = shutdown.exe OR Processes.original_file_name = shutdown.exe) Processes.process="*shutdown*" AND Processes.process IN("* /s*", "* -s*") AND Processes.process IN ("* /t*","* -t*","* /f*","* -f*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_shutdown_commandline_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows System Time Discovery W32tm Delay - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows System Time Discovery W32tm Delay - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies DCRat delay time tactics using w32tm. This technique was seen in DCRAT malware where it uses stripchart function of w32tm.exe application to delay the execution of its payload like c2 communication , beaconing and execution. This anomaly detection may help the analyst to check other possible event like the process who execute this command that may lead to DCRat attack.
@@ -64442,7 +64442,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows System Time Discovery W32tm Delay - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows System Time Discovery W32tm Delay - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -64456,7 +64456,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows System Time Discovery W32tm Delay - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows System Time Discovery W32tm Delay - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkCrystal RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1124"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b2cc69e7-11ba-42dc-a269-59c069a48870", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64471,7 +64471,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = w32tm.exe Processes.process= "* /stripchart *" Processes.process= "* /computer:localhost *" Processes.process= "* /period:*" Processes.process= "* /dataonly *" Processes.process= "* /samples:*" by  Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_time_discovery_w32tm_delay_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows System User Discovery Via Quser - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows System User Discovery Via Quser - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a process execution of Windows OS quser.exe tool. This tool is being abused or used by several post exploitation tool such as winpeas that being used by ransomware prestige to display or gather information about user sessions on a Remote Desktop Session Host server. This command can find out if a specific user is logged on to a specific Remote Desktop Session Host server. This tool can retrieve some RDP information that can be use by attacker for further attack like Name of the user , Name of the session on the Remote Desktop Session Host server, Session ID, State of the session (active or disconnected), Idle time (the number of minutes since the last keystroke or mouse movement at the session) and Date and time the user logged on.
@@ -64483,7 +64483,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = network administrator can use this command t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows System User Discovery Via Quser - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows System User Discovery Via Quser - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -64492,7 +64492,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows System User Discovery Via Quser - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows System User Discovery Via Quser - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0c3f3e09-e47a-410e-856f-a02a5c5fafb0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64507,7 +64507,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="quser.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name = "quser.exe" by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_user_discovery_via_quser_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows System User Privilege Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows System User Privilege Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the execution of `whoami.exe` with /priv parameter. This whoami command is used to display or shows the privileges assigned to the current user account. This hunting query can be a good pivot start to look for suspicious usage of whoami application that might related to a malware or adversaries.
@@ -64519,7 +64519,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows System User Privilege Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows System User Privilege Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -64528,7 +64528,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows System User Privilege Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows System User Privilege Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1033"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8c9a06bc-9939-4425-9bb9-be2371f7fb7e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64543,7 +64543,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="whoami.exe" Processes.process= "*/priv*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_system_user_privilege_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to detect a suspicious process terminating Lsass process. Lsass process is known to be a critical process that is responsible for enforcing security policy system. This process was commonly targetted by threat actor or red teamer to gain privilege escalation or persistence in the targeted machine because it handles credentials of the logon users. In this analytic we tried to detect a suspicious process having a granted access PROCESS_TERMINATE to lsass process to modify or delete protected registrys. This technique was seen in doublezero malware that tries to wipe files and registry in compromised hosts. This anomaly detection can be a good pivot of incident response for possible credential dumping or evading security policy in a host or network environment.
@@ -64555,7 +64555,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -64569,7 +64569,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Double Zero Destructor"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7ab3c319-a4e7-4211-9e8c-40a049d0dba6", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64584,7 +64584,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*lsass.exe GrantedAccess = 0x1 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage, TargetImage, TargetProcessId, SourceProcessId, GrantedAccess CallTrace, dest | rename dest as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_terminating_lsass_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Time Based Evasion - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Time Based Evasion - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to detect potentially malicious processes that initiate a ping delay using an invalid IP address. This evasion technique was observed in NJRAT, where the malware employed ping commands as a means to introduce a time delay before self-deletion on the compromised host. Identifying this (TTP) behavior can serve as a valuable indicator for detecting NJRAT infections or other malware that employ time delays as evasion tactics.
@@ -64596,7 +64596,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Time Based Evasion - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Time Based Evasion - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -64610,7 +64610,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Time Based Evasion - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Time Based Evasion - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NjRAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1497", "T1497.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "34502357-deb1-499a-8261-ffe144abf561", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64631,7 +64631,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "ping.exe" Processes.parent_process = "* ping 0 -n *" OR Processes.process = "* ping 0 -n *" by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process Processes.user Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_time_based_evasion_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Time Based Evasion via Choice Exec - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Time Based Evasion via Choice Exec - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to detect potentially suspicious batch files that leverage choice.exe as a delay tactic. This technique, observed in the SnakeKeylogger malware, is utilized for time delays or 'Sleep' commands in its code execution or before the deletion of its copies on compromised hosts. Detecting this anomaly serves as a valuable pivot to uncover suspicious processes attempting to evade detection through time-based evasion techniques.
@@ -64643,7 +64643,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrator may use choice.exe to allow us
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Time Based Evasion via Choice Exec - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Time Based Evasion via Choice Exec - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -64657,7 +64657,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Time Based Evasion via Choice Exec - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Time Based Evasion via Choice Exec - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Snake Keylogger"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1497.003", "T1497"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d5f54b38-10bf-4b3a-b6fc-85949862ed50", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64672,7 +64672,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name =choice.exe  Processes.process = "*/T*"  Processes.process = "*/N*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_time_based_evasion_via_choice_exec_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects when an executable known for User Account Control bypass exploitation, spawns a child process in user controlled location or a command shell executable (cmd, powershell, etc). This behavioral chain may indicate that an attacker has used a UAC Bypass exploit to successfully escalate privileges.
@@ -64684,7 +64684,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Including Werfault.exe may cause some uninte
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -64698,7 +64698,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 75, "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548", "T1548.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "453a6b0f-b0ea-48fa-9cf4-20537ffdd22c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64719,7 +64719,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN ("high","system") AND Processes.parent_process_name IN (`uacbypass_process_name`) AND (Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript","cscript.exe","bash.exe","werfault.exe") OR Processes.process IN ("*\\\\*","*\\Users\\*","*\\ProgramData\\*","*\\Temp\\*")) by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.parent_process, Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where parent_process_name != process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_uac_bypass_suspicious_child_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects when a process spawns an executable known for User Account Control bypass exploitation, and then monitors for any subsequent child processes that are above the integrity level of the original spawning process. This behavioral chain may indicate that an attacker has used a UAC Bypass exploit to successfully escalate privileges.
@@ -64731,7 +64731,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Including Werfault.exe may cause some uninte
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -64745,7 +64745,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548", "T1548.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "00d050d3-a5b4-4565-a6a5-a31f69681dc3", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64766,7 +64766,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN ("low","medium") by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.process_guid, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | eval original_integrity_level = CASE(match(process_integrity_level,"low"),1,match(process_integrity_level,"medium"),2,match(process_integrity_level,"high"),3,match(process_integrity_level,"system"),4,true(),0) | rename process_guid as join_guid_1, process* as parent_process* | join max=0 dest join_guid_1 [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN ("high","system") AND Processes.process_name IN (`uacbypass_process_name`) by Processes.dest, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.process_name, Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid_1, process_guid as join_guid_2, process_name as uac_process_name ] | join max=0 dest join_guid_2 [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN (`uacbypass_process_name`) AND Processes.process_integrity_level IN ("high","system") by Processes.dest, Processes.parent_process_guid, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.process_guid, Processes.process_path, Processes.process_integrity_level, Processes.process_current_directory | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid_2 | eval elevated_integrity_level = CASE(match(process_integrity_level,"low"),1,match(process_integrity_level,"medium"),2,match(process_integrity_level,"high"),3,match(process_integrity_level,"system"),4,true(),0)] | where elevated_integrity_level > original_integrity_level | table dest user parent_process parent_process_name parent_process_integrity_level process_integrity_level process process_name uac_process_name count firstTime lastTime | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_uac_bypass_suspicious_escalation_behavior_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Unsecured Outlook Credentials Access In Registry - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Unsecured Outlook Credentials Access In Registry - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a suspicious query on outlook credentials registry in Windows OS registry. typically refers to user profiles associated with Microsoft Outlook. Within this key, Outlook stores configuration settings, including account information such as email addresses, server details, and authentication credentials. Accessing or modifying this registry key can potentially compromise users' email security, making it a target for attackers seeking to steal sensitive information or execute unauthorized actions within Outlook. This anomaly detection is a good pivot to catch possible Trojan Stealer or RAT that tries to steal sensitive information to its targeted host.
@@ -64778,7 +64778,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = third party software may access this outlook
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Unsecured Outlook Credentials Access In Registry - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Unsecured Outlook Credentials Access In Registry - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -64792,7 +64792,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Unsecured Outlook Credentials Access In Registry - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Unsecured Outlook Credentials Access In Registry - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Snake Keylogger"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1552"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "36334123-077d-47a2-b70c-6c7b3cc85049", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64807,7 +64807,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path IN ("*\\Profiles\\Outlook\\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676*", "*\\Windows Messaging Subsystem\\Profiles\\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676*") AND process_name != *\\outlook.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path  process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_unsecured_outlook_credentials_access_in_registry_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic focuses on detecting potentially malicious unsigned DLLs created in either the c:\windows\system32 or c:\windows\syswow64 folders. This particular technique was observed in the context of the Warzone (Ave Maria) RAT, where it employed a method known as DLL hijacking (dll-side-loading) by dropping the "dismcore.dll" to achieve privilege escalation. DLL hijacking is a stealthy attack technique used by cybercriminals to exploit the way Windows searches and loads DLLs. By placing a malicious DLL with the same name as one that a legitimate application is expected to load, the attacker can gain unauthorized access and execute malicious code. In the case of Warzone RAT (Ave Maria), the dropped "dismcore.dll" was intended to deceive the system into loading the rogue DLL instead of the legitimate version, thereby granting the malware elevated privileges and enabling further compromise of the target system. Detecting such suspicious DLLs is crucial in preventing privilege escalation attacks and other potential security breaches. Regular security assessments, thorough monitoring, and implementing security best practices are essential in safeguarding systems from such threats.
@@ -64819,7 +64819,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible some Administrative utilities
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -64833,7 +64833,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NjRAT", "Warzone RAT"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5a83ce44-8e0f-4786-a775-8249a525c879", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64848,7 +64848,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 Signed=false OriginalFileName = "-" SignatureStatus="unavailable" ImageLoaded IN ("*:\\windows\\system32\\*", "*:\\windows\\syswow64\\*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded Signed SignatureStatus OriginalFileName process_name dest EventCode ProcessId Hashes IMPHASH | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_unsigned_dll_side_loading_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Unsigned MS DLL Side-Loading - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Unsigned MS DLL Side-Loading - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analysis identifies potential DLL side-loading instances involving unsigned DLLs with a company detail signature mimicking Microsoft. This technique is frequently exploited by adversaries to execute malicious code automatically by running a legitimate process. The analytics involves searching Sysmon logs for Event Code 7, where both the `Image` and `ImageLoaded` paths do not match system directories (`system32`, `syswow64`, and `programfiles`). Additionally, it verifies whether the loaded DLL is signed and checks if the folder paths of the `Image` and `ImageLoaded` are identical. This anomaly detection mechanism serves as a valuable indicator for identifying suspicious processes that load unsigned DLLs. Add other paths based on org hunting.
@@ -64860,7 +64860,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate p
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Unsigned MS DLL Side-Loading - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Unsigned MS DLL Side-Loading - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -64874,7 +64874,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Unsigned MS DLL Side-Loading - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Unsigned MS DLL Side-Loading - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["APT29 Diplomatic Deceptions with WINELOADER"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002", "T1547"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8d9e0e06-ba71-4dc5-be16-c1a46d58728c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64889,7 +64889,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=7 Company="Microsoft Corporation" Signed=false SignatureStatus != Valid NOT (Image IN("C:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "C:\\Windows\\SysWow64\\*", "C:\\Program Files*")) NOT (ImageLoaded IN("C:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "C:\\Windows\\SysWow64\\*", "C:\\Program Files*")) | rex field=Image "(?<ImageFolderPath>.+\\\)" | rex field=ImageLoaded "(?<ImageLoadedFolderPath>.+\\\)" | where ImageFolderPath = ImageLoadedFolderPath | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ProcessGuid ImageLoaded user Computer EventCode ImageFolderPath ImageLoadedFolderPath Company Description Product Signed SignatureStatus | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_unsigned_ms_dll_side_loading_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack against disabled users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code `0x12` stands for `clients credentials have been revoked` (account disabled, expired or locked out).\
@@ -64907,7 +64907,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -64921,7 +64921,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Active Directory Password Spraying", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f65aa026-b811-42ab-b4b9-d9088137648f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64936,7 +64936,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0x12 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by IpAddress | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_disabled_users_failed_auth_using_kerberos_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4768 is generated every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x6 stands for `client not found in Kerberos database` (the attempted user is not a valid domain user).\
@@ -64954,7 +64954,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -64968,7 +64968,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Active Directory Password Spraying", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f122cb2e-d773-4f11-8399-62a3572d8dd7", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -64983,7 +64983,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0x6 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by IpAddress | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_invalid_users_fail_to_auth_using_kerberos_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC0000064 stands for `The username you typed does not exist` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\
@@ -65001,7 +65001,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -65015,7 +65015,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "15603165-147d-4a6e-9778-bd0ff39e668f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65030,7 +65030,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0xc0000064 | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | rename Workstation as src |`windows_unusual_count_of_invalid_users_failed_to_auth_using_ntlm_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4648 is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying that accounts credentials. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.\
@@ -65048,7 +65048,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A source user failing attempting to authenti
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -65062,7 +65062,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Insider Threat", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "14f414cf-3080-4b9b-aaf6-55a4ce947b93", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65077,7 +65077,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4648 Caller_User_Name!=*$ Target_User_Name!=*$ | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(Target_User_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Target_User_Name) as  user by _time, Computer, Caller_User_Name | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Computer | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_users_fail_to_auth_wth_explicitcredentials_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4771 is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code 0x18 stands for `wrong password provided` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\
@@ -65095,7 +65095,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -65109,7 +65109,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "Active Directory Password Spraying", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bc9cb715-08ba-40c3-9758-6e2b26e455cb", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65124,7 +65124,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 TargetUserName!="*$" Status=0x18 | bucket span=5m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by IpAddress | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_users_failed_to_auth_using_kerberos_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a source process name failing to authenticate with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations when an account fails to logon. Logon Type 2 describes an iteractive logon attempt.\
@@ -65142,7 +65142,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A process failing to authenticate with multi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -65156,7 +65156,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Insider Threat", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "25bdb6cb-2e49-4d34-a93c-d6c567c122fe", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65171,7 +65171,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security`  EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 ProcessName!="-" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, ProcessName, SubjectUserName, Computer | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by ProcessName, SubjectUserName, Computer | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_users_failed_to_authenticate_from_process_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple valid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC000006A means: misspelled or bad password (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\
@@ -65189,7 +65189,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -65203,7 +65203,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6f6c8fd7-6a6b-4af9-a0e9-57cfc47a58b4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65218,7 +65218,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security`  EventCode=4776 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0xC000006A | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_users_failed_to_authenticate_using_ntlm_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 documents each and every failed attempt to logon to the local computer. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. Logon Type 3 describes an remote authentication attempt.\
@@ -65236,7 +65236,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A host failing to authenticate with multiple
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -65250,7 +65250,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Password Spraying", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.003", "T1110"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cf06a0ee-ffa9-4ed3-be77-0670ed9bab52", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65265,7 +65265,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search =  `wineventlog_security`  EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3 IpAddress!="-" | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, IpAddress, Computer | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by IpAddress, Computer | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `windows_unusual_count_of_users_remotely_failed_to_auth_from_host_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic will identify suspicious creation of URL shortcut link files. This technique was seen in CHAOS ransomware where it will drop this .url link file in %startup% folder that contains the path of its malicious dropped file to execute upon the reboot of the targeted host. The creation of this file can be created by a normal application or software but it is a good practice to verify this type of file specially the resource it tries to execute which is commonly a website.
@@ -65277,7 +65277,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may allow creation of script
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -65291,7 +65291,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Chaos Ransomware", "NjRAT", "Snake Keylogger"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1204.002", "T1204"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5c7ee6ad-baf4-44fb-b2f0-0cfeddf82dbc", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65312,7 +65312,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where NOT(Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\Program Files*")) Filesystem.file_name = *.url by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id  Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_user_execution_malicious_url_shortcut_file_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Valid Account With Never Expires Password - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Valid Account With Never Expires Password - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies net.exe updating user account policies for password requirement with non-expiring password. This technique was seen in several adversaries and malware like Azorult to maintain the foothold (persistence), gaining privilege escalation, defense evasion and possible for lateral movement for specific users or created user account on the targeted host. This TTP detections is a good pivot to see further what other events that users executes on the machines.
@@ -65324,7 +65324,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This behavior is not commonly seen in produc
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Valid Account With Never Expires Password - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Valid Account With Never Expires Password - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -65338,7 +65338,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Valid Account With Never Expires Password - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Valid Account With Never Expires Password - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1489"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "73a931db-1830-48b3-8296-cd9cfa09c3c8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65359,7 +65359,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` AND Processes.process="* accounts *" AND Processes.process="* /maxpwage:unlimited" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_valid_account_with_never_expires_password_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Vulnerable 3CX Software - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Vulnerable 3CX Software - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic leverages Sysmon, a powerful system monitoring and logging tool, to pinpoint instances of the 3CXDesktopApp.exe with a FileVersion of 18.12.x.Recently, 3CX has discovered a vulnerability specifically in versions 18.12.407 and 18.12.416 of the desktop app.
@@ -65371,7 +65371,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on file
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-03-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-03-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Vulnerable 3CX Software - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Vulnerable 3CX Software - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -65385,7 +65385,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Vulnerable 3CX Software - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Vulnerable 3CX Software - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["3CX Supply Chain Attack"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2023-29059"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1195.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f2cc1584-46ee-485b-b905-977c067f36de", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65406,7 +65406,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` (process_name=3CXDesktopApp.exe OR OriginalFileName=3CXDesktopApp.exe)  FileVersion=18.12.* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, parent_process_name,process_name, OriginalFileName, CommandLine | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `windows_vulnerable_3cx_software_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic utilizes a known list of vulnerable Windows drivers to help defenders find potential persistence or privelege escalation via a vulnerable driver. This analytic uses Sysmon EventCode 6, driver loading. A known gap with this lookup is that it does not use the hash or known signer of the vulnerable driver therefore it is up to the defender to identify version and signing info and confirm it is a vulnerable driver. 
@@ -65418,7 +65418,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present. Drill down
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-12-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-12-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -65427,7 +65427,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "Windows Drivers"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a2b1f1ef-221f-4187-b2a4-d4b08ec745f4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65442,7 +65442,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=6 | lookup loldrivers driver_name AS ImageLoaded OUTPUT is_driver driver_description | search is_driver = TRUE | stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by dest ImageLoaded driver_description | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_vulnerable_driver_loaded_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows WinDBG Spawning AutoIt3 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows WinDBG Spawning AutoIt3 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies instances of the WinDBG process spawning AutoIt3. This behavior may indicate malicious activity as AutoIt3 is often used by threat actors for scripting malicious automation. The search specifically looks for instances where the parent process name is 'windbg.exe' and the process name is 'autoit3.exe' or 'autoit*.exe'. During the triage process, it is recommended to review the file path for additional artifacts that may provide further insights into the event.
@@ -65454,7 +65454,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will only be present if the
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows WinDBG Spawning AutoIt3 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows WinDBG Spawning AutoIt3 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -65468,7 +65468,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows WinDBG Spawning AutoIt3 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows WinDBG Spawning AutoIt3 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DarkGate Malware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7aec015b-cd69-46c3-85ed-dac152056aa4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65489,7 +65489,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes  where Processes.parent_process_name=windbg.exe  AND (Processes.process_name IN ("autoit3.exe", "autoit*.exe") OR Processes.original_file_name IN ("autoit3.exe", "autoit*.exe")) by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.original_file_name, Processes.process, Processes.process_id, Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval matches_extension=if(match(process, "\\.(au3|a3x|exe|aut|aup)$"), "Yes", "No") | search matches_extension="Yes" | `windows_windbg_spawning_autoit3_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows WinLogon with Public Network Connection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows WinLogon with Public Network Connection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic is designed to detect anomalous behavior associated with the BlackLotus Campaign, a sophisticated bootkit attack reported by ESET and further investigated in a blog by Microsoft, which provided hunting queries for security analysts. The primary focus of this analytic is to identify instances of Winlogon.exe, a critical Windows process, connecting to public IP space, which is indicative of potential malicious activity.\ The BlackLotus Campaign is a bootkit-based attack that compromises system integrity by infecting the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). This malware variant can bypass traditional security measures, load before the operating system, and maintain persistence on the target system.\
@@ -65505,7 +65505,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present and filterin
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows WinLogon with Public Network Connection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows WinLogon with Public Network Connection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -65514,7 +65514,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Windows WinLogon with Public Network Connection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Windows WinLogon with Public Network Connection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackLotus Campaign"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1542.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "65615b3a-62ea-4d65-bb9f-6f07c17df4ea", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65529,7 +65529,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN (winlogon.exe)  Processes.process!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | join  process_id [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port != 0 NOT (All_Traffic.dest IN (127.0.0.1,10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1)) by All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename dest as publicIp ] | table dest parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port publicIp | `windows_winlogon_with_public_network_connection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Impersonate Token - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows WMI Impersonate Token - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a possible wmi token impersonation activities in a process or command. This technique was seen in Qakbot malware where it will execute a vbscript code contains wmi impersonation object to gain privilege escalation or as defense evasion. This Anomaly detection looks for wmiprvse.exe SourceImage having a duplicate handle or full granted access in a target process.
@@ -65541,7 +65541,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = administrator may execute impersonate wmi ob
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Impersonate Token - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows WMI Impersonate Token - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -65555,7 +65555,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Impersonate Token - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows WMI Impersonate Token - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Qakbot"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cf192860-2d94-40db-9a51-c04a2e8a8f8b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65570,7 +65570,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=10 SourceImage = "*\\wmiprvse.exe"  GrantedAccess IN ("0x1478", "0x1fffff") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage SourceProcessGUID TargetProcessGUID SourceProcessId TargetProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_wmi_impersonate_token_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process And Service List - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows WMI Process And Service List - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies suspicious process command line, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.
@@ -65582,7 +65582,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = netowrk administrator or IT may execute this
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process And Service List - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows WMI Process And Service List - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -65596,7 +65596,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process And Service List - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows WMI Process And Service List - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Prestige Ransomware", "Windows Post-Exploitation"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 20, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ef3c5ef2-3f6d-4087-aa75-49bf746dc907", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65611,7 +65611,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process IN ("*process list*", "*service list*") by Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_wmi_process_and_service_list_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is to look for wmi commandlines to execute or create process. This technique was used by adversaries or threat actor to execute their malicious payload in local or remote host. This hunting query is a good pivot to start to look further which process trigger the wmi or what process it execute locally or remotely.
@@ -65623,7 +65623,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may execute this command for
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -65632,7 +65632,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "IcedID", "Qakbot", "Suspicious WMI Use", "Volt Typhoon"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "0661c2de-93de-11ec-9833-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65647,7 +65647,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = "* process *" Processes.process = "* call *" Processes.process = "* create *" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule]
+[ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following query utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, indicating 'a scheduled task was created', to identify potentially suspicious tasks. These tasks may be registered on Windows through either schtasks.exe or TaskService, and are set up to execute a command with a native Windows shell such as PowerShell, Cmd, Wscript, or Cscript.\
@@ -65665,7 +65665,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -65679,7 +65679,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-257A", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Scheduled Tasks", "Windows Error Reporting Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Winter Vivern"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "203ef0ea-9bd8-11eb-8201-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65703,7 +65703,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 TaskContent IN ("*powershell.exe*", "*wscript.exe*", "*cscript.exe*", "*cmd.exe*", "*sh.exe*", "*ksh.exe*", "*zsh.exe*", "*bash.exe*", "*scrcons.exe*", "*pwsh.exe*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TaskName, TaskContent | rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_to_spawn_shell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule]
+[ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes Windows Security EventCode 4698, which indicates the creation of a scheduled task on a Windows system. The purpose of this query is to identify suspicious tasks that have been registered using either schtasks.exe or TaskService and involve executing a command from a user-writable file path.\
@@ -65721,7 +65721,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are possible if legitimate a
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -65735,7 +65735,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "AsyncRAT", "CISA AA22-257A", "CISA AA23-347A", "Data Destruction", "IcedID", "Industroyer2", "Prestige Ransomware", "Ransomware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "Scheduled Tasks", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Winter Vivern"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1053"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5d9c6eee-988c-11eb-8253-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65759,7 +65759,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698 TaskContent IN ("*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\programdata\\*", "*\\temp\\*", "*\\Windows\\Tasks\\*", "*\\appdata\\*", "*\\perflogs\\*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, TaskName, TaskContent |  rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule]
+[ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic aims to identify suspicious tasks that have been registered and executed in Windows using EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed) from the Windows Task Scheduler logs. This analytic helps detect evasive techniques used to register tasks on Windows systems. It is recommended to filter the results based on the ActionName field by specifying specific paths that are not commonly used in your environment.\
@@ -65779,7 +65779,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present. Filter base
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -65788,7 +65788,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Amadey", "AsyncRAT", "CISA AA22-257A", "DarkCrystal RAT", "Data Destruction", "IcedID", "Industroyer2", "Prestige Ransomware", "Qakbot", "Sandworm Tools", "Scheduled Tasks", "Windows Persistence Techniques", "Winter Vivern", "Winter Vivern"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b3632472-310b-11ec-9aab-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65803,7 +65803,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_task_scheduler` EventCode IN ("200","201")  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TaskName dest EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies winhlp32.exe, found natively in `c:\windows\`, spawning a child process that loads a file out of appdata, programdata, or temp. Winhlp32.exe has a rocky past in that multiple vulnerabilities were found and added to MetaSploit. WinHlp32.exe is required to display 32-bit Help files that have the ".hlp" file name extension. This particular instance is related to a Remcos sample where dynwrapx.dll is added to the registry under inprocserver32, and later module loaded by winhlp32.exe to spawn wscript.exe and load a vbs or file from disk. During triage, review parallel processes to identify further suspicious behavior. Review module loads for unsuspecting unsigned modules. Capture any file modifications and analyze.
@@ -65815,7 +65815,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as winhlp3
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-10-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-10-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -65829,7 +65829,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Remcos"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d17dae9e-2618-11ec-b9f5-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65850,7 +65850,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winhlp32.exe Processes.process IN ("*\\appdata\\*","*\\programdata\\*", "*\\temp\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winhlp32_spawning_a_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - WinRAR Spawning Shell Application - Rule]
+[ESCU - WinRAR Spawning Shell Application - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the execution of Windows shell processes initiated by WinRAR, specifically looking for instances where WinRAR spawns processes like "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "certutil.exe", "mshta.exe", or "bitsadmin.exe". This behavior is worth identifying for a Security Operations Center (SOC) because it is indicative of a spoofing attack exploit, such as the one associated with WinRAR CVE-2023-38831. Cybercriminals exploited this vulnerability to craft ZIP archives with spoofed extensions, hiding the launch of malicious scripts within an archive. When a victim opened the specially crafted archive, it executed the malware, leading to unauthorized access to their broker accounts and enabling the cybercriminals to perform illicit financial transactions and withdraw funds. If a true positive is found, it suggests that an attacker has successfully exploited the vulnerability to execute malicious scripts, leading to unauthorized access, financial loss, and potentially the delivery of additional malicious payloads. The impact of the attack could be severe, involving financial loss, unauthorized access to sensitive accounts, and the potential for further malicious activity such as data theft or ransomware attacks.
@@ -65862,7 +65862,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Be aware of potential false positives - legi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - WinRAR Spawning Shell Application - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WinRAR Spawning Shell Application - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -65876,7 +65876,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - WinRAR Spawning Shell Application - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WinRAR Spawning Shell Application - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["WinRAR Spoofing Attack CVE-2023-38831"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2023-38831"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1105"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d2f36034-37fa-4bd4-8801-26807c15540f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65897,7 +65897,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winrar.exe `windows_shells` OR Processes.process_name IN ("certutil.exe","mshta.exe","bitsadmin.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winrar_spawning_shell_application_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic identifies suspicious processes spawning from WinRM (wsmprovhost.exe). This analytic is related to potential exploitation of CVE-2021-31166. which is a kernel-mode device driver http.sys vulnerability. Current proof of concept code will blue-screen the operating system. However, http.sys used by many different Windows processes, including WinRM. In this case, identifying suspicious process create (child processes) from `wsmprovhost.exe` is what this analytic is identifying. 
@@ -65909,7 +65909,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown. Add new processes or filter as need
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -65923,7 +65923,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "Rhysida Ransomware", "Unusual Processes"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2021-31166"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a081836a-ba4d-11eb-8593-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65944,7 +65944,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","sh.exe","bash.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","schtasks.exe","certutil.exe","whoami.exe","bitsadmin.exe","scp.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winrm_spawning_a_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule]
+[ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning `cmd.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). Cmd.exe spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line will indicate what is being executed. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. It is possible that COM is utilized to trampoline the child process to `explorer.exe` or `wmiprvse.exe`.
@@ -65956,7 +65956,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -65970,7 +65970,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption", "DarkCrystal RAT", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6fcbaedc-a37b-11eb-956b-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -65991,7 +65991,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=winword.exe `process_cmd` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_cmd_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Word spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written.
@@ -66003,7 +66003,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited, but if an
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -66017,7 +66017,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption", "DarkCrystal RAT", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b2c950b8-9be2-11eb-8658-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66038,7 +66038,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="winword.exe" `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_powershell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule]
+[ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following detection identifies Microsoft Winword.exe spawning Windows Script Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Winword.exe. Winword.exe will generally be found in the following path `C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64\`. `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Winword.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation of the remote destination and block accordingly.
@@ -66050,7 +66050,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There will be limited false positives and it
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -66064,7 +66064,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption", "Spearphishing Attachments"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "637e1b5c-9be1-11eb-9c32-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66085,7 +66085,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="winword.exe" Processes.process_name IN ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winword_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule]
+[ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects the creation of permanent event subscriptions using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), which is used by attackers to achieve persistence in a compromised system. By creating a permanent event subscription, an attacker can run malicious scripts or binaries in response to specific system events that enables them to maintain access to the system undetected. The detection is made by using Sysmon Event ID 5 data to detect instances where the consumers of these events are not the expected "NTEventLogEventConsumer." The detection is important because it identifies unusual or unexpected subscription creation, which suggests that an attacker is attempting to achieve persistence within the environment and might be executing malicious scripts or binaries in response to specific system events. The impact of such an attack can be severe, potentially leading to data theft, ransomware, or other damaging outcomes. False positives might occur since False positives might occur since WMI event subscriptions can be used for legitimate purposes by system administrators. You must have a thorough understanding of WMI activity within the context of the monitored environment to effectively differentiate between legitimate and malicious activity.Next steps include investigating the associated scripts or binaries and identifying the source of the attack. 
@@ -66097,7 +66097,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use ev
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -66111,7 +66111,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "71bfdb13-f200-4c6c-b2c9-a2e07adf437d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66132,7 +66132,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message "Consumer =\s+(?<consumer>[^;|^$]+)" | search consumer!="NTEventLogEventConsumer=\"SCM Event Log Consumer\"" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, consumer, Message | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename ComputerName as dest | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule]
+[ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation.  WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\
@@ -66154,7 +66154,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Although unlikely, administrators may use ev
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -66168,7 +66168,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003", "T1546"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ad05aae6-3b2a-4f73-af97-57bd26cee3b9", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66194,7 +66194,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=21 | rename host as dest | table _time, dest, user, Operation, EventType, Query, Consumer, Filter | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription___sysmon_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule]
+[ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found in malware and APT events where the adversary will map all running security applications or services on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.
@@ -66206,7 +66206,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Network administrator may used this command
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Windows"]
@@ -66220,7 +66220,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "Hermetic Wiper", "Malicious PowerShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b5cd5526-cce7-11eb-b3bd-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66235,7 +66235,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText= "*SELECT*" AND (ScriptBlockText="*Win32_Process*" OR ScriptBlockText="*Win32_Service*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID | rename Computer as dest | rename UserID as user | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_recon_running_process_or_services_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule]
+[ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects the creation of WMI temporary event subscriptions. WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) is a management technology that allows administrators to perform various tasks on Windows-based systems. Temporary event subscriptions are created to monitor specific events or changes on a system that help to detect potential threats early and take proactive measures to protect the organization's systems and data. The detection is made by using the Splunk query `wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary to search for events with EventCode 5860, which indicates the creation of a temporary WMI event subscription. To further refine the search results, the query uses regular expressions (rex) to extract the query used in the event subscription. Then, it filters known benign queries related to system processes such as 'wsmprovhost.exe' and 'AntiVirusProduct', 'FirewallProduct', 'AntiSpywareProduct', which helps to focus on potentially malicious or suspicious queries. The detection is important because it indicates malicious activity since attackers use WMI to run commands, gather information, or maintain persistence within a compromised system. False positives might occur since legitimate uses of WMI event subscriptions in the environment might trigger benign activities to be flagged. Therefore, an extensive triage is necessary to review the specific query and assess its intent. Additionally, capturing and inspecting relevant on-disk artifacts and analyzing concurrent processes can help to identify the source of the attack. Detecting the creation of these event subscriptions to identify potential threats early and take appropriate actions to mitigate the risks. 
@@ -66247,7 +66247,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some software may create WMI temporary event
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -66261,7 +66261,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "38cbd42c-1098-41bb-99cf-9d6d2b296d83", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66282,7 +66282,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `wmi` EventCode=5860 Temporary | rex field=Message "NotificationQuery =\s+(?<query>[^;|^$]+)" | search query!="SELECT * FROM Win32_ProcessStartTrace WHERE ProcessName = 'wsmprovhost.exe'" AND query!="SELECT * FROM __InstanceOperationEvent WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'AntiVirusProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'FirewallProduct' OR TargetInstance ISA 'AntiSpywareProduct'" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ComputerName, query  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmi_temporary_event_subscription_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule]
+[ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` enumerating local groups on the endpoint.\
@@ -66298,7 +66298,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators or power users may use this c
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -66307,7 +66307,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Discovery"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1069", "T1069.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "83317b08-155b-11ec-8e00-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66322,7 +66322,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe (Processes.process="*group get name*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_group_discovery_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic indentifies WMIC command-line attempting to uninstall application non-interactively. This technique was seen in IcedID to uninstall AV products on the compromised host to evade detection. This Hunting query maybe a good indicator that some process tries to uninstall application using wmic which is not a common behavior. This approach may seen in some script or third part appication to uninstall their application but it is a good thing to check what it uninstall and why.
@@ -66334,7 +66334,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Third party application may use this approac
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -66343,7 +66343,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Azorult", "IcedID"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001", "T1562"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bff0e7a0-317f-11ec-ab4e-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66358,7 +66358,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=wmic.exe Processes.process="* product *" Processes.process="*where name*" Processes.process="*call uninstall*" Processes.process="*/nointeractive*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_noninteractive_app_uninstallation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule]
+[ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies `wmic.exe` loading a remote XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) script. This originally was identified by Casey Smith, dubbed Squiblytwo, as an application control bypass. Many adversaries will utilize this technique to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32 "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch. Upon identifying a suspicious execution, review for confirmed network connnection and script download.
@@ -66370,7 +66370,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are limited as legitimate ap
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -66384,7 +66384,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1220"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "787e9dd0-4328-11ec-a029-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66405,7 +66405,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process IN ("*http://*", "*https://*") Processes.process="*/format:*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmic_xsl_execution_via_url_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
+[ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies `wmiprsve.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), the executed command is spawned as a child process of `wmiprvse.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of wmiprvse.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.
@@ -66417,7 +66417,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this beh
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -66431,7 +66431,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "95a455f0-4c04-11ec-b8ac-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66452,7 +66452,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe) (Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wmiprsve_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule]
+[ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that using several application tool that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script is may execute suspicious code.
@@ -66464,7 +66464,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Administrators may create vbs or js script t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -66478,7 +66478,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Destruction", "FIN7", "NjRAT", "Remcos", "Unusual Processes", "WhisperGate"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1055", "T1543", "T1134.004", "T1134"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1f35e1da-267b-11ec-90a9-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66499,7 +66499,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe") Processes.process_name IN ("regsvr32.exe", "rundll32.exe","winhlp32.exe","certutil.exe","msbuild.exe","cmd.exe","powershell*","wmic.exe","mshta.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
+[ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies `Wsmprovhost.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. When adversaries execute code on remote endpoints abusing the Windows Remote Management (WinRm) protocol, the executed command is spawned as a child processs of `Wsmprovhost.exe`. The LOLBAS project documents Windows native binaries that can be abused by threat actors to perform tasks like executing malicious code. Looking for child processes of Wsmprovhost.exe that are part of the LOLBAS project can help defenders identify lateral movement activity.
@@ -66511,7 +66511,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate applications may trigger this beh
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-11-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-11-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -66525,7 +66525,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 60, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021", "T1021.006"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2eed004c-4c0d-11ec-93e8-3e22fbd008af", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66546,7 +66546,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe) (Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `wsmprovhost_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry related to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User account Control.
@@ -66558,7 +66558,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -66572,7 +66572,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Living Off The Land", "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "Windows Registry Abuse"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1548.002", "T1548"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8b5901bc-da63-11eb-be43-acde48001122", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66593,7 +66593,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path= "*\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\Shell\\open\\command*" AND (Registry.registry_value_name = "(Default)" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "DelegateExecute") by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] | fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule]
+[ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies XMRIG coinminer driver installation on the system. The XMRIG driver name by default is `WinRing0x64.sys`. This cpu miner is an open source project that is commonly abused by adversaries to infect and mine bitcoin.
@@ -66605,7 +66605,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-04-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-04-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Microsoft Sysmon"]
@@ -66619,7 +66619,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-320A", "XMRig"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1543"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "90080fa6-a8df-11eb-91e4-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66640,7 +66640,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode=6 Signature="Noriyuki MIYAZAKI" OR ImageLoaded= "*\\WinRing0x64.sys" |  stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by  dest ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xmrig_driver_loaded_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule]
+[ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect a suspicious wmic.exe process or renamed wmic process to execute malicious xsl file. This technique was seen in FIN7 to execute its malicous jscript using the .xsl as the loader with the help of wmic.exe process. This TTP is really a good indicator for you to hunt further for FIN7 or other attacker that known to used this technique.
@@ -66652,7 +66652,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-09-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-09-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Carbon Black Response", "CrowdStrike Falcon", "Microsoft Sysmon", "Microsoft Windows", "Symantec Endpoint Protection"]
@@ -66666,7 +66666,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["FIN7", "Suspicious WMI Use"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1220"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "004e32e2-146d-11ec-a83f-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66687,7 +66687,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process = "*os get*" Processes.process="*/format:*" Processes.process = "*.xsl*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process_id Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `xsl_script_execution_with_wmic_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. By enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect ARP Poisoning attacks in the Infrastructure. 
@@ -66699,7 +66699,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false pos
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -66713,7 +66713,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b44bebd6-bd39-467b-9321-73971bcd1aac", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66734,7 +66734,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cisco_networks` facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="arp-inspection" | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_arp_poisoning_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic uses a pre trained deep learning model to detect Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) generated domains. The model is trained independently and is then made available for download. One of the prominent indicators of a domain being DGA generated is if the domain name consists of unusual character sequences or concatenated dictionary words. Adversaries often use clever techniques to obfuscate machine generated domain names as human generated. Predicting DGA generated domain names requires analysis and building a model based on carefully chosen features. The deep learning model we have developed uses the domain name to analyze patterns of character sequences along with carefully chosen custom features to predict if a domain is DGA generated. The model takes a domain name consisting of second-level and top-level domain names as input and outputs a dga_score. Higher the dga_score, the more likely the input domain is a DGA domain. The threshold for flagging a domain as DGA is set at 0.5. 
@@ -66754,7 +66754,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if domain nam
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -66768,7 +66768,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "DNS Hijacking", "Data Exfiltration", "Dynamic DNS", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1568.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "92e24f32-9b9a-4060-bba2-2a0eb31f3493", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66783,7 +66783,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(DNS.answer) as IPs min(_time) as firstTime  max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src, DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | rename query AS domain | fields IPs, src, domain, firstTime, lastTime | apply pretrained_dga_model_dsdl | rename pred_dga_proba AS dga_score | where dga_score>0.5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, domain, IPs, firstTime, lastTime, dga_score | `detect_dga_domains_using_pretrained_model_in_dsdl_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic uses a pre trained deep learning model to detect DNS data exfiltration. The model is trained on the data we collected and is inferred on live data. This detection detects low throughput DNS Tunneling (data exfiltration) using features computed from past events between the same src and domain. The search uses macros from URL ToolBox app to generate features used by the model. The model is a deep learning model that accepts DNS request as input along with a few custom features to generate a pred_is_exfiltration_proba score. The higher the pred_is_exfiltration_proba, the more likely the DNS request is data exfiltration. The threshold for flagging a request as DNS exfiltration is set at 0.5. 
@@ -66803,7 +66803,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if DNS data e
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-04-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -66817,7 +66817,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "92f65c3a-168c-11ed-71eb-0242ac120012", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66832,7 +66832,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src _time DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | sort - _time,src, query | streamstats count as rank by src query | where rank < 10 | table src,query,rank,_time | apply detect_dns_data_exfiltration_using_pretrained_model_in_dsdl | table src,_time,query,rank,pred_is_dns_data_exfiltration_proba,pred_is_dns_data_exfiltration | where rank == 1 | rename pred_is_dns_data_exfiltration_proba as is_exfiltration_score | rename pred_is_dns_data_exfiltration as is_exfiltration | where is_exfiltration_score > 0.5 | `security_content_ctime(_time)` | table src, _time,query,is_exfiltration_score,is_exfiltration | `detect_dns_data_exfiltration_using_pretrained_model_in_dsdl_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive Command And Control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.
@@ -66849,7 +66849,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some users and applications may leverage Dyn
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -66863,7 +66863,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "DNS Hijacking", "Data Protection", "Dynamic DNS", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a1e761ac-1344-4dbd-88b2-3f34c912d359", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66884,7 +66884,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.answer) as answer min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query host | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `dynamic_dns_providers` | `detect_hosts_connecting_to_dynamic_domain_providers_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. By enabling IPv6 First Hop Security as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect various attacks such as packet forging in the Infrastructure. 
@@ -66896,7 +66896,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None currently known
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -66910,7 +66910,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c3be767e-7959-44c5-8976-0e9c12a91ad2", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66931,7 +66931,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cisco_networks` facility="SISF" mnemonic IN ("IP_THEFT","MAC_THEFT","MAC_AND_IP_THEFT","PAK_DROP") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | eval dest_interface=dest_int_prefix_long+dest_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(mnemonic) AS mnemonic values(vendor_explanation) AS vendor_explanation values(src_ip) AS src_ip values(dest_ip) AS dest_ip values(dest_interface) AS dest_interface values(action) AS action count BY host src_interface | table host src_interface dest_interface src_mac src_ip dest_ip src_vlan mnemonic vendor_explanation action count | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_ipv6_network_infrastructure_threats_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity. 
@@ -66943,7 +66943,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -66957,7 +66957,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1095"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e9c102de-4d43-42a7-b1c8-8062ea297419", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -66978,7 +66978,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.action) values(All_Traffic.bytes) from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action !=blocked All_Traffic.dest_category !=internal (All_Traffic.protocol=icmp OR All_Traffic.transport=icmp) All_Traffic.bytes > 1000 by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | search ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = Malicious actors often abuse misconfigured LDAP servers or applications that use the LDAP servers in organizations. Outbound LDAP traffic should not be allowed outbound through your perimeter firewall.  This search will help determine if you have any LDAP connections to IP addresses outside of private (RFC1918) address space.
@@ -66990,7 +66990,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown at this moment. Outbound LDAP traffi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -66999,7 +66999,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5e06e262-d7cd-4216-b2f8-27b437e18458", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67014,7 +67014,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as earliest_time latest(_time) as latest_time values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port = 389 OR All_Traffic.dest_port = 636 AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip = 10.0.0.0/8 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16 OR All_Traffic.dest_ip = 172.16.0.0/12) by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip |`drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | where src_ip != dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(latest_time)`  | `security_content_ctime(earliest_time)` |`detect_outbound_ldap_traffic_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects outbound SMB (Server Message Block) connections from internal hosts to external servers, a method commonly exploited for Windows file-sharing activities. It identifies this behavior by monitoring network traffic for SMB requests directed towards the Internet, which are not typical for standard operations. This detection is crucial for a Security Operations Center (SOC) as it can indicate an attackers attempt to retrieve credential hashes through compromised servers, a key step in lateral movement and privilege escalation. The impact of such an attack includes unauthorized access to sensitive data and potential full system compromise. 
@@ -67026,7 +67026,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is likely that the outbound Server Messag
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67040,7 +67040,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.002", "T1071"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1bed7774-304a-4e8f-9d72-d80e45ff492b", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67061,7 +67061,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as start_time latest(_time) as end_time values(All_Traffic.action) as action values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(sourcetype) as sourcetype count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.action=allowed All_Traffic.direction=outbound All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app="smb") by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eval match=case( cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8" ,dest_ip) ,"1", cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12" ,dest_ip) ,"1", cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16" ,dest_ip) ,"1", cidrmatch("100.64.0.0/10" ,dest_ip) ,"1", 1=1,"0") | search match=0 | fields -  match | `security_content_ctime(start_time)` | `security_content_ctime(end_time)` | `detect_outbound_smb_traffic_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. By enabling Port Security on a Cisco switch you can restrict input to an interface by limiting and identifying MAC addresses of the workstations that are allowed to access the port. When you assign secure MAC addresses to a secure port, the port does not forward packets with source addresses outside the group of defined addresses. If you limit the number of secure MAC addresses to one and assign a single secure MAC address, the workstation attached to that port is assured the full bandwidth of the port. If a port is configured as a secure port and the maximum number of secure MAC addresses is reached, when the MAC address of a workstation attempting to access the port is different from any of the identified secure MAC addresses, a security violation occurs. 
@@ -67073,7 +67073,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false pos
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67087,7 +67087,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2de3d5b8-a4fa-45c5-8540-6d071c194d24", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67108,7 +67108,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cisco_networks` (facility="PM" mnemonic="ERR_DISABLE" disable_cause="psecure-violation") OR (facility="PORT_SECURITY" mnemonic="PSECURE_VIOLATION" OR mnemonic="PSECURE_VIOLATION_VLAN") | eval src_interface=src_int_prefix_long+src_int_suffix | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(disable_cause) AS disable_cause values(src_mac) AS src_mac values(src_vlan) AS src_vlan values(action) AS action count by host src_interface | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_port_security_violation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects when a known remote access software domains are contacted from within the environment. Adversaries use these utilities to retain remote access capabilities to the environment. Utilities in the lookup include AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, TeamViewer and much more. Review the lookup for the entire list and add any others.
@@ -67120,7 +67120,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that legitimate remote access
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67134,7 +67134,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Insider Threat", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1219"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a16b797d-e309-41bd-8ba0-5067dae2e4be", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67149,7 +67149,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.src DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | lookup remote_access_software remote_domain AS query OUTPUT isutility, description as signature, comment_reference as desc, category | eval dest = query | search isutility = True | `detect_remote_access_software_usage_dns_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects when a known remote access software application traffic is detected from within the environment. Adversaries use these utilities to retain remote access capabilities to the environment. Utilities in the lookup include AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, TeamViewer and much more. Review the lookup for the entire list and add any others.
@@ -67161,7 +67161,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that legitimate remote access
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67175,7 +67175,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Insider Threat", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1219"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "885ea672-07ee-475a-879e-60d28aa5dd42", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67190,7 +67190,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port latest(user) as user from datamodel=Network_Traffic by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest, All_Traffic.app | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | lookup remote_access_software remote_appid AS app OUTPUT isutility, description as signature, comment_reference as desc, category | search isutility = True | `detect_remote_access_software_usage_traffic_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. By enabling DHCP Snooping as a Layer 2 Security measure on the organization's network devices, we will be able to detect unauthorized DHCP servers handing out DHCP leases to devices on the network (Man in the Middle attack). 
@@ -67202,7 +67202,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false pos
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-11
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-11
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67216,7 +67216,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1498", "T1557"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6e1ada88-7a0d-4ac1-92c6-03d354686079", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67237,7 +67237,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cisco_networks` facility="DHCP_SNOOPING" mnemonic="DHCP_SNOOPING_UNTRUSTED_PORT" | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count values(message_type) AS message_type values(src_mac) AS src_mac BY host | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `detect_rogue_dhcp_server_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for commands that the SNICat tool uses in the TLS SNI field. 
@@ -67249,7 +67249,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Zeek"]
@@ -67263,7 +67263,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "82d06410-134c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67284,7 +67284,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `zeek_ssl` | rex field=server_name "(?<snicat>(LIST|LS|SIZE|LD|CB|CD|EX|ALIVE|EXIT|WHERE|finito)-[A-Za-z0-9]{16}\.)" | stats count by src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | where count>0 | table src_ip dest_ip server_name snicat | `detect_snicat_sni_exfiltration_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images. 
@@ -67296,7 +67296,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search will also report any legitimate
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67310,7 +67310,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1542.005", "T1542"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "cc590c66-f65f-48f2-986a-4797244762f8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67331,7 +67331,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.transport=udp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=69) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=21) OR (All_Traffic.transport=tcp AND All_Traffic.dest_port=22) AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_software_repo_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category=network OR All_Traffic.src_category=router OR All_Traffic.src_category=switch by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_software_download_to_network_device_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic uses a pre trained deep learning model to detect suspicious DNS TXT records. The model is trained independently and is then made available for download. The DNS TXT records are categorized into commonly identified types like email, verification, http using regular expressions https://www.tide-project.nl/blog/wtmc2020/. The TXT records that do not match regular expressions for well known types are labeled as 1 for "unknown/suspicious" and otherwise 0 for "not suspicious". The deep learning model we have developed uses DNS TXT responses to analyze patterns of character sequences to predict if a DNS TXT is suspicious or not. The higher the pred_is_unknown_proba, the more likely the DNS TXT record is suspicious. The threshold for flagging a domain as suspicious is set at 0.5. 
@@ -67352,7 +67352,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if DNS TXT re
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67366,7 +67366,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1568.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "92f65c3a-968c-11ed-a1eb-0242ac120002", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67381,7 +67381,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=response AND DNS.record_type=TXT by DNS.src DNS.dest DNS.answer DNS.record_type | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | rename answer as text | fields firstTime, lastTime, message_type,record_type,src,dest, text | apply detect_suspicious_dns_txt_records_using_pretrained_model_in_dsdl | rename predicted_is_unknown as is_suspicious_score | where is_suspicious_score > 0.5 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src,dest,text,record_type, firstTime, lastTime,is_suspicious_score | `detect_suspicious_dns_txt_records_using_pretrained_model_in_dsdl_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. 
@@ -67393,7 +67393,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search will return false positives for
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67407,7 +67407,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Router and Infrastructure Security"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1200", "T1020", "T1498", "T1020.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "42b3b753-5925-49c5-9742-36fa40a73990", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67428,7 +67428,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `cisco_networks` (facility="MIRROR" mnemonic="ETH_SPAN_SESSION_UP") OR (facility="SPAN" mnemonic="SESSION_UP") OR (facility="SPAN" mnemonic="PKTCAP_START") OR (mnemonic="CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD" command="monitor session*") | stats min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime count BY host facility mnemonic | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_traffic_mirroring_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. By populating the organization's assets within the assets_by_str.csv, we will be able to detect unauthorized devices that are trying to connect with the organization's network by inspecting DHCP request packets, which are issued by devices when they attempt to obtain an IP address from the DHCP server. The MAC address associated with the source of the DHCP request is checked against the list of known devices, and reports on those that are not found. 
@@ -67440,7 +67440,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search might be prone to high false pos
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67454,7 +67454,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Asset Tracking"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "dcfd6b40-42f9-469d-a433-2e53f7489ff4", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67475,7 +67475,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.tag=dhcp by All_Sessions.dest_ip All_Sessions.dest_mac | dedup All_Sessions.dest_mac| `drop_dm_object_name("Network_Sessions")`|`drop_dm_object_name("All_Sessions")` | search NOT [| inputlookup asset_lookup_by_str |rename mac as dest_mac | fields + dest_mac] | `detect_unauthorized_assets_by_mac_address_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. Ensure that the following prerequisites are met: (i) Both Splunk Stream DNS and TCP data are ingested. (ii) The macros 'stream:dns' and 'stream:tcp' are replaced with the appropriate configurations that are specific to your Splunk environment. The following analytic detects SIGRed exploitation attempts. SIGRed is a critical wormable vulnerability found in Windows DNS servers, known as CVE-2020-1350, which allows remote code execution. The detection is made by using an experimental search that focuses on identifying specific indicators that might suggest the presence of the SIGRed exploit such as DNS SIG records, KEY records, and TCP payloads greater than 65KB. This detection is important because it detects and responds to potential SIGRed exploitation attempts and minimizes the risk of a successful attack and its impact on the organization's infrastructure and data. False positives might occur due to the experimental nature of this analytic. Next steps include reviewing and investigating each case thoroughly given the potential for unauthorized Windows DNS server access, data breaches, and service disruptions. Additionally, you must stay updated with Microsoft's guidance on the SIGRed vulnerability. 
@@ -67487,7 +67487,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67501,7 +67501,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2020-1350"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "babd8d10-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67522,7 +67522,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `stream_dns` | spath "query_type{}" | search "query_type{}" IN (SIG,KEY) | spath protocol_stack | search protocol_stack="ip:tcp:dns" | append [search `stream_tcp` bytes_out>65000] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_splunk_stream_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects the presence of SIGRed, a critical DNS vulnerability, using Zeek DNS and Zeek Conn data. SIGRed vulnerability allows attackers to run remote code on Windows DNS servers. By detecting SIGRed early, you can prevent further damage and protect the organization's network infrastructure. The detection is made by identifying specific DNS query types (SIG and KEY) in the Zeek DNS data and checks for high data transfer in the Zeek Conn data. If multiple instances of these indicators are found within a flow, it suggests the presence of SIGRed. The detection is important because it indicates a potential compromise of Windows DNS servers that suggests that an attacker might have gained unauthorized access to the DNS server and can run arbitrary code. The impact of this attack can be severe, leading to data exfiltration, unauthorized access, or disruption of critical services. Next steps include investigating the affected flow and taking immediate action to mitigate the vulnerability. This can involve patching the affected DNS server, isolating the server from the network, or conducting a forensic analysis to determine the extent of the compromise. 
@@ -67534,7 +67534,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67548,7 +67548,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2020-1350"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c5c622e4-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67569,7 +67569,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query_type IN (SIG,KEY) by DNS.flow_id | rename DNS.flow_id as flow_id | append [| tstats  `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.bytes_in>65000 by All_Traffic.flow_id | rename All_Traffic.flow_id as flow_id] | `detect_windows_dns_sigred_via_zeek_filter` | stats count by flow_id | where count>1 | fields - count 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the Zerologon CVE-2020-1472 vulnerability through Zeek RPC. By detecting attempts to exploit the Zerologon vulnerability through Zeek RPC, SOC analysts can identify potential threats earlier and take appropriate action to mitigate the risks. This detection is made by a Splunk query that looks for specific Zeek RPC operations, including NetrServerPasswordSet2, NetrServerReqChallenge, and NetrServerAuthenticate3, which are aggregated by source and destination IP address and time. This detection is important because it suggests that an attacker is attempting to exploit the Zerologon vulnerability to gain unauthorized access to the domain controller. Zerologon vulnerability is a critical vulnerability that allows attackers to take over domain controllers without authentication, leading to a complete takeover of an organization's IT infrastructure. The impact of such an attack can be severe, potentially leading to data theft, ransomware, or other devastating outcomes. False positives might occur since legitimate Zeek RPC activity can trigger the analytic. Next steps include reviewing the identified source and destination IP addresses and the specific RPC operations used. Capture and inspect any relevant on-disk artifacts, and review concurrent processes to identify the attack source upon triage . 
@@ -67581,7 +67581,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Zeek"]
@@ -67595,7 +67595,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Detect Zerologon Attack", "Rhysida Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2020-1472"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bf7a06ec-f703-11ea-adc1-0242ac120002", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67616,7 +67616,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `zeek_rpc` operation IN (NetrServerPasswordSet2,NetrServerReqChallenge,NetrServerAuthenticate3) | bin span=5m _time | stats values(operation) dc(operation) as opscount count(eval(operation=="NetrServerReqChallenge")) as challenge count(eval(operation=="NetrServerAuthenticate3")) as authcount count(eval(operation=="NetrServerPasswordSet2")) as passcount count as totalcount by _time,src_ip,dest_ip | search opscount=3 authcount>4 passcount>0 | search `detect_zerologon_via_zeek_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule]
+[ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search allows you to identify DNS requests that are unusually large for the record type being requested in your environment. 
@@ -67633,7 +67633,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = If you are seeing more results than desired,
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-01-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-01-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67647,7 +67647,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "85fbcfe8-9718-4911-adf6-7000d077a3a9", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67662,7 +67662,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.dest) as dest from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* |  `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | eval query_length = len(query) | apply dns_query_pdfmodel threshold=0.01 | rename "IsOutlier(query_length)" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -query_length | table start_time end_time query record_type count src dest query_length | `dns_query_length_outliers___mltk_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule]
+[ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search allows you to identify DNS requests and compute the standard deviation on the length of the names being resolved, then filter on two times the standard deviation to show you those queries that are unusually large for your environment.
@@ -67674,7 +67674,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible there can be long domain names
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67688,7 +67688,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1a67f15a-f4ff-4170-84e9-08cf6f75d6f5", "detection_version": "5"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67703,7 +67703,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where NOT DNS.record_type IN("Pointer","PTR") by DNS.query host| `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | eval tlds=split(query,".") | eval tld=mvindex(tlds,-1) | eval tld_len=len(tld) | search tld_len<=24 | eval query_length = len(query) | table host query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule]
+[ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search identifies DNS query failures by counting the number of DNS responses that do not indicate success, and trigger on more than 50 occurrences. 
@@ -67715,7 +67715,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible legitimate traffic can trigge
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-12-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-12-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67729,7 +67729,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Suspicious DNS Traffic"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004", "T1071"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f9826f1", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67744,7 +67744,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.reply_code"!="No Error" "DNS.reply_code"!="NoError" DNS.reply_code!="unknown" NOT "DNS.query"="*.arpa" "DNS.query"="*.*" by "DNS.src" "DNS.query" "DNS.reply_code" | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | lookup cim_corporate_web_domain_lookup domain as query OUTPUT domain | where isnull(domain) | lookup update=true alexa_lookup_by_str domain as query OUTPUT rank | where isnull(rank) | eventstats max(count) as mc by src reply_code | eval mode_query=if(count=mc, query, null()) | stats sum(count) as count values(mode_query) as query values(mc) as max_query_count by src reply_code | where count>50 | `get_asset(src)` | `excessive_dns_failures_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388 - Rule]
+[ESCU - F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a recent unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerablity against the F5 BIG-IP iControl REST API. The analytic identifies the URI path found in the POCs and the HTTP Method of POST. In addition, the request header will have the commands that may be executed in fields utilcmdargs and the auth field of X-F5-Auth-Token, which may have a random base64 encoded value.
@@ -67756,7 +67756,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the activi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67770,7 +67770,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["F5 BIG-IP Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2022-1388"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bb1c2c30-107a-4e56-a4b9-1f7022867bfe", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67791,7 +67791,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.url="*/mgmt/tm/util/bash*" Web.http_method="POST" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `f5_big_ip_icontrol_rest_vulnerability_cve_2022_1388_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - High Volume of Bytes Out to Url - Rule]
+[ESCU - High Volume of Bytes Out to Url - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects high volume of bytes out (greater than 1GB) to a URL within 2 mins of time window. This may be indicative of an attacker attempting to exfiltrate data.  The search applies a fundamental threshold for detecting significant web uploads. This approach aims to identify potential data exfiltration activities by malware or malevolent insiders. View the alert for $dest$ to investigate further.
@@ -67803,7 +67803,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This search may trigger false positives if t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - High Volume of Bytes Out to Url - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - High Volume of Bytes Out to Url - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67817,7 +67817,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - High Volume of Bytes Out to Url - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - High Volume of Bytes Out to Url - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 30, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1567"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c8a6b56d-16dd-4e9c-b4bd-527742ead98d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67832,7 +67832,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats  `security_content_summariesonly` count sum(Web.bytes_out) as sum_bytes_out values(Web.user) as user values(Web.app) as app values(Web.dest) as dest from datamodel=Web by _time span=2m Web.url Web.src sourcetype | search sum_bytes_out > 1070000000 | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")`| `high_volume_of_bytes_out_to_url_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule]
+[ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for an increase of data transfers from your email server to your clients. This could be indicative of a malicious actor collecting data using your email server. 
@@ -67844,7 +67844,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The false-positive rate will vary based on h
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67858,7 +67858,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Collection and Staging"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1114.002", "T1114"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b556368", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67873,7 +67873,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as bytes_in from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_category=email_server by All_Traffic.src_ip _time span=1d | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats avg(bytes_in) as avg_bytes_in stdev(bytes_in) as stdev_bytes_in | eventstats count as num_data_samples avg(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), "@d"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_avg_bytes_in stdev(eval(if(_time < relative_time(now(), "@d"), bytes_in, null))) as per_source_stdev_bytes_in by src_ip | eval minimum_data_samples = 4, deviation_threshold = 3 | where num_data_samples >= minimum_data_samples AND bytes_in > (avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * stdev_bytes_in)) AND bytes_in > (per_source_avg_bytes_in + (deviation_threshold * per_source_stdev_bytes_in)) AND _time >= relative_time(now(), "@d") | eval num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average = round(abs(bytes_in - avg_bytes_in) / stdev_bytes_in, 2), num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average = round(abs(bytes_in - per_source_avg_bytes_in) / per_source_stdev_bytes_in, 2) | table src_ip, _time, bytes_in, avg_bytes_in, per_source_avg_bytes_in, num_standard_deviations_away_from_server_average, num_standard_deviations_away_from_client_average | `hosts_receiving_high_volume_of_network_traffic_from_email_server_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule]
+[ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The search is used to identify attempts to use your DNS Infrastructure for DDoS purposes via a DNS amplification attack leveraging ANY queries. 
@@ -67885,7 +67885,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate ANY requests may trigger this sea
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67899,7 +67899,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DNS Amplification Attacks"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1498", "T1498.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8fa891f7-a533-4b3c-af85-5aa2e7c1f1eb", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67914,7 +67914,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution where nodename=DNS "DNS.message_type"="QUERY" "DNS.record_type"="ANY" by "DNS.dest" | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | where count>200 | `large_volume_of_dns_any_queries_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule]
+[ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is designed to detect high frequency of archive files data exfiltration through HTTP POST method protocol. This are one of the common techniques used by APT or trojan spy after doing the data collection like screenshot, recording, sensitive data to the infected machines. The attacker may execute archiving command to the collected data, save it a temp folder with a hidden attribute then send it to its C2 through HTTP POST. Sometimes adversaries will rename the archive files or encode/encrypt to cover their tracks. This detection can detect a renamed archive files transfer to HTTP POST since it checks the request body header. Unfortunately this detection cannot support archive that was encrypted or encoded before doing the exfiltration.
@@ -67926,7 +67926,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Normal archive transfer via HTTP protocol ma
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67940,7 +67940,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "4477f3ea-a28f-11eb-b762-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -67961,7 +67961,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `stream_http` http_method=POST |eval archive_hdr1=substr(form_data,1,2) | eval archive_hdr2 = substr(form_data,1,4) |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by src_ip dest_ip http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out archive_hdr1 archive_hdr2 |where count >20 AND (archive_hdr1 = "7z" OR archive_hdr1 = "PK" OR archive_hdr2="Rar!") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network - Rule]
+[ESCU - Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the 4 most common Ngrok used domains based on DNS queries under the Network Resolution datamodel. It's possible these domains may be ran against the Web datamodel or ran with a direct query across network/proxy traffic. The sign of someone using Ngrok is not malicious, however, more recenctly it has become an adversary tool.
@@ -67973,7 +67973,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on org
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -67987,7 +67987,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-320A", "Reverse Network Proxy"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1572", "T1090", "T1102"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5790a766-53b8-40d3-a696-3547b978fcf0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68002,7 +68002,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query IN ("*.ngrok.com","*.ngrok.io", "ngrok.*.tunnel.com", "korgn.*.lennut.com") by DNS.src DNS.query DNS.answer |  `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ngrok_reverse_proxy_on_network_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule]
+[ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This search is to detect potential plain HTTP POST method data exfiltration. This network traffic is commonly used by trickbot, trojanspy, keylogger or APT adversary where arguments or commands are sent in plain text to the remote C2 server using HTTP POST method as part of data exfiltration.
@@ -68014,7 +68014,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68028,7 +68028,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Data Exfiltration"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e2b36208-a364-11eb-8909-acde48001122", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68049,7 +68049,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `stream_http` http_method=POST form_data IN ("*wermgr.exe*","*svchost.exe*", "*name=\"proclist\"*","*ipconfig*", "*name=\"sysinfo\"*", "*net view*") |stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by src_ip dest_ip http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule]
+[ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects instances where network traffic, specifically identified by port and transport layer protocol as prohibited in the "lookup_interesting_ports" table, is allowed according to the Network_Traffic data model. It operates by cross-referencing traffic data against predefined security policies to identify discrepancies indicative of potential misconfigurations or policy violations. This detection is crucial for a Security Operations Center (SOC) as it highlights potential security breaches or misconfigured network devices that could allow unauthorized access or data exfiltration, directly impacting the organization's security posture.
@@ -68061,7 +68061,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68075,7 +68075,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ce5a0962-849f-4720-a678-753fe6674479", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68096,7 +68096,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action = allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | lookup update=true interesting_ports_lookup dest_port as All_Traffic.dest_port OUTPUT app is_prohibited note transport | search is_prohibited=true | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `prohibited_network_traffic_allowed_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule]
+[ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for network traffic on common ports where a higher layer protocol does not match the port that is being used. For example, this search should identify cases where protocols other than HTTP are running on TCP port 80. This can be used by attackers to circumvent firewall restrictions, or as an attempt to hide malicious communications over ports and protocols that are typically allowed and not well inspected. 
@@ -68108,7 +68108,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None identified
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68122,7 +68122,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1048"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "54dc1265-2f74-4b6d-b30d-49eb506a31b3", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68137,7 +68137,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.app=dns NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=53) OR ((All_Traffic.app=web-browsing OR All_Traffic.app=http) NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=80 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8080 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8000)) OR (All_Traffic.app=ssl NOT (All_Traffic.dest_port=443 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=8443)) OR (All_Traffic.app=smtp NOT All_Traffic.dest_port=25) by All_Traffic.src_ip, All_Traffic.dest_ip, All_Traffic.app, All_Traffic.dest_port |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `protocol_or_port_mismatch_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule]
+[ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic identifies cleartext protocols at risk of leaking sensitive information. Currently, this consists of legacy protocols such as telnet (port 23), POP3 (port 110), IMAP (port 143), and non-anonymous FTP (port 21) sessions. While some of these protocols may be used over SSL, they typically are found on different assigned ports in those instances. 
@@ -68149,7 +68149,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Some networks may use kerberized FTP or teln
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-08-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-08-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68163,7 +68163,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Use of Cleartext Protocols"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6923cd64-17a0-453c-b945-81ac2d8c6db9", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68184,7 +68184,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.action!=blocked AND All_Traffic.transport="tcp" AND (All_Traffic.dest_port="23" OR All_Traffic.dest_port="143" OR All_Traffic.dest_port="110" OR (All_Traffic.dest_port="21" AND All_Traffic.user != "anonymous")) by All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `protocols_passing_authentication_in_cleartext_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for RDP application network traffic and filters any source/destination pair generating more than twice the standard deviation of the average traffic. 
@@ -68196,7 +68196,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = RDP gateways may have unusually high amounts
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68210,7 +68210,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ryuk Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a98727cc-286b-4ff2-b898-41df64695923", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68231,7 +68231,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=rdp by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | eventstats stdev(count) AS stdev avg(count) AS avg p50(count) AS p50 | where count>(avg + stdev*2) | rename All_Traffic.src AS src All_Traffic.dest AS dest | table firstTime lastTime src dest count avg p50 stdev | `remote_desktop_network_bruteforce_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule]
+[ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects unusual Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) traffic on TCP/3389, the default RDP port. It identifies this activity by filtering out traffic from known RDP sources and destinations, focusing on atypical RDP connections within the network. This detection is crucial for a Security Operations Center (SOC) as unauthorized RDP access can indicate an attacker's attempt to gain control over networked systems, potentially leading to data theft, ransomware deployment, or further network compromise. The impact of such unauthorized access can be significant, ranging from data breaches to complete system and network control loss.
@@ -68243,7 +68243,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by u
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68257,7 +68257,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Active Directory Lateral Movement", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ryuk Ransomware", "SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "272b8407-842d-4b3d-bead-a704584003d3", "detection_version": "4"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68272,7 +68272,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 AND All_Traffic.dest_category!=common_rdp_destination AND All_Traffic.src_category!=common_rdp_source AND All_Traffic.action="allowed" by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `remote_desktop_network_traffic_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule]
+[ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) traffic connections. SMB is a network protocol used for sharing files, printers, and other resources between computers. This detection is made by a Splunk query that looks for SMB traffic connections on ports 139 and 445, as well as connections using the SMB application. The query calculates the average and standard deviation of the number of SMB connections over the past 70 minutes, and identifies any sources that exceed two standard deviations from the average. This helps to filter out false positives caused by normal fluctuations in SMB traffic. This detection is important because it identifies potential SMB-based attacks, such as ransomware or data theft, which often involve a large number of SMB connections. This  suggests that an attacker is attempting to exfiltrate data or spread malware within the network. Next steps include investigating the source of the traffic and determining if it is malicious. This can involve reviewing network logs, capturing and analyzing any relevant network packets, and correlating with other security events to identify the attack source and mitigate the risk. 
@@ -68284,7 +68284,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = A file server may experience high-demand loa
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68298,7 +68298,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "7f5fb3e1-4209-4914-90db-0ec21b936378", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68313,7 +68313,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | eventstats max(_time) as maxtime | stats count as num_data_samples max(eval(if(_time >= relative_time(maxtime, "-70m@m"), count, null))) as count avg(eval(if(_time<relative_time(maxtime, "-70m@m"), count, null))) as avg stdev(eval(if(_time<relative_time(maxtime, "-70m@m"), count, null))) as stdev by src | eval upperBound=(avg+stdev*2), isOutlier=if(count > upperBound AND num_data_samples >=50, 1, 0) | where isOutlier=1 | table src count | `smb_traffic_spike_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule]
+[ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search uses the Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) to identify spikes in the number of Server Message Block (SMB) connections. 
@@ -68328,7 +68328,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = If you are seeing more results than desired,
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68342,7 +68342,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["DHS Report TA18-074A", "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", "Hidden Cobra Malware", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1021"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d25773ba-9ad8-48d1-858e-07ad0bbeb828", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68357,7 +68357,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as port from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | apply smb_pdfmodel threshold=0.001 | rename "IsOutlier(count)" as isOutlier | search isOutlier > 0 | sort -count | table _time src dest port count | `smb_traffic_spike___mltk_filter` 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule]
+[ESCU - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic uses tags of SSL, TLS and certificate to identify the usage of the Splunk default certificates being utilized in the environment. Recommended guidance is to utilize valid TLS certificates which documentation may be found in Splunk Docs - https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/8.2.6/Security/AboutsecuringyourSplunkconfigurationwithSSL.
@@ -68369,7 +68369,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will not be present as it is
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68378,7 +68378,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Splunk Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2022-32151", "CVE-2022-32152"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1040"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "620fbb89-86fd-4e2e-925f-738374277586", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68393,7 +68393,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = tag IN (ssl, tls, certificate) ssl_issuer_common_name=*splunk* | stats values(src) AS "Host(s) with Default Cert" count by ssl_issuer ssl_subject_common_name ssl_subject_organization ssl_subject host sourcetype | `splunk_identified_ssl_tls_certificates_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - SSL Certificates with Punycode - Rule]
+[ESCU - SSL Certificates with Punycode - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic utilizes the Certificates Datamodel to look for punycode domains, starting with xn--, found in the SSL issuer email domain. The presence of punycode here does not equate to evil, therefore we need to decode the punycode to determine what it translates to. Remove the CyberChef recipe as needed and decode manually. Note that this is not the exact location of the malicious punycode to trip CVE-2022-3602, but a method to at least identify fuzzing occurring on these email paths. What does evil look like? it will start with 
@@ -68405,7 +68405,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the organi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - SSL Certificates with Punycode - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SSL Certificates with Punycode - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68414,7 +68414,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - SSL Certificates with Punycode - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - SSL Certificates with Punycode - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["OpenSSL CVE-2022-3602"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1573"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "696694df-5706-495a-81f2-79501fa11b90", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68429,7 +68429,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Certificates.All_Certificates by All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_issuer_email_domain All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_issuer All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_email All_Certificates.SSL.dest All_Certificates.SSL.src All_Certificates.SSL.sourcetype All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_email_domain | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Certificates.SSL")` | eval punycode=if(like(ssl_issuer_email_domain,"%xn--%"),1,0) | where punycode=1 | cyberchef infield="ssl_issuer_email_domain" outfield="convertedPuny" jsonrecipe="[{"op":"From Punycode","args":[true]}]" | table ssl_issuer_email_domain convertedPuny ssl_issuer ssl_subject_email dest src sourcetype ssl_subject_email_domain | `ssl_certificates_with_punycode_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - TOR Traffic - Rule]
+[ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic looks for allowed network traffic to The Onion Router(TOR), a benign anonymity network which can be abused for a variety of nefarious purposes. Detecting Tor traffic is paramount for upholding network security and mitigating potential threats. Tor's capacity to provide users with anonymity has been exploited by cybercriminals for activities like hacking, data breaches, and illicit content dissemination. Additionally, organizations must monitor Tor usage within their networks to ensure compliance with policies and regulations, as it can bypass conventional monitoring and filtering measures. Lastly, the ability to identify Tor traffic empowers security teams to promptly investigate and address potential security incidents, fortifying the protection of sensitive data and preserving the integrity of the network environment.
@@ -68441,7 +68441,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-20
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - TOR Traffic - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68455,7 +68455,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - TOR Traffic - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "NOBELIUM Group", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1090", "T1090.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ea688274-9c06-4473-b951-e4cb7a5d7a45", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68476,7 +68476,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app=tor AND All_Traffic.action=allowed by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.action | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `tor_traffic_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule]
+[ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for unusually long strings in the Content-Type http header that the client sends the server. 
@@ -68488,7 +68488,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Very few legitimate Content-Type fields will
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-10-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-10-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68502,7 +68502,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Apache Struts Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "57a0a2bf-353f-40c1-84dc-29293f3c35b7", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68517,7 +68517,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `stream_http` | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | where cs_content_type_length > 100 | table endtime src_ip dest_ip cs_content_type_length cs_content_type url | `unusually_long_content_type_length_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Service Traffic - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD Replication Service Traffic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for evidence of Active Directory replication traffic [MS-DRSR] from unexpected sources. This traffic is often seen exclusively between Domain Controllers for AD database replication. Any detections from non-domain controller source to a domain controller may indicate the usage of DCSync or DCShadow credential dumping techniques. 
@@ -68529,7 +68529,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = New domain controllers or certian scripts ru
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Service Traffic - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD Replication Service Traffic - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68543,7 +68543,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Windows AD Replication Service Traffic - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Windows AD Replication Service Traffic - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003", "T1003.006", "T1207"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c6e24183-a5f4-4b2a-ad01-2eb456d09b67", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68564,7 +68564,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(All_Traffic.transport) as transport values(All_Traffic.user) as user values(All_Traffic.src_category) as src_category values(All_Traffic.dest_category) as dest_category min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.app IN ("ms-dc-replication","*drsr*","ad drs") by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.app | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | `windows_ad_replication_service_traffic_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This detection is looking at zeek wiredata for specific replication RPC calls being performed from a device which is not a domain controller. If you would like to capture these RPC calls using Splunk Stream, please vote for my idea here https://ideas.splunk.com/ideas/APPSID-I-619 ;) 
@@ -68576,7 +68576,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-09-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-09-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Zeek"]
@@ -68590,7 +68590,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1207"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c4aeeeef-da7f-4338-b3ba-553cbcbe2138", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68611,7 +68611,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `zeek_rpc` DrsReplicaAdd OR DRSGetNCChanges | where NOT (dest_category="Domain Controller") OR NOT (src_category="Domain Controller") | fillnull value="Unknown" src_category, dest_category | table _time endpoint operation src src_category dest dest_category | `windows_ad_rogue_domain_controller_network_activity_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Zeek x509 Certificate with Punycode - Rule]
+[ESCU - Zeek x509 Certificate with Punycode - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic utilizes the Zeek x509 log. Modify the zeek_x509 macro with your index and sourcetype as needed. You will need to ensure the full x509 is logged as the potentially malicious punycode is nested under subject alternative names. In this particular analytic, it will identify punycode within the subject alternative name email and other fields. Note, that OtherFields is meant to be BOOL (true,false), therefore we may never see xn-- in that field. Upon identifying punycode, manually copy and paste, or add CyberChef recipe to query, and decode the punycode manually. 
@@ -68623,7 +68623,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the organi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-11-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-11-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Zeek x509 Certificate with Punycode - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Zeek x509 Certificate with Punycode - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = ["Zeek"]
@@ -68632,7 +68632,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Zeek x509 Certificate with Punycode - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Zeek x509 Certificate with Punycode - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["OpenSSL CVE-2022-3602"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 30, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1573"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "029d6fe4-a5fe-43af-827e-c78c50e81d81", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68647,7 +68647,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `zeek_x509` | rex field=san.email{} "\@(?<domain_detected>xn--.*)" | rex field=san.other_fields{} "\@(?<domain_detected>xn--.*)" | stats values(domain_detected) by  basic_constraints.ca source host | `zeek_x509_certificate_with_punycode_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Access to Vulnerable Ivanti Connect Secure Bookmark Endpoint - Rule]
+[ESCU - Access to Vulnerable Ivanti Connect Secure Bookmark Endpoint - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic monitors access to the /api/v1/configuration/users/user-roles/user-role/rest-userrole1/web/web-bookmarks/bookmark endpoint, a key indicator for both CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 vulnerabilities. It detects potential vulnerabilities by looking for a 403 Forbidden response with an empty body on this endpoint. This detection method is used in both Nmap script and Project Discovery Nuclei, with the latter focusing on systems where XML mitigation for these vulnerabilities has not been applied.
@@ -68659,7 +68659,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This analytic is limited to HTTP Status 403;
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Access to Vulnerable Ivanti Connect Secure Bookmark Endpoint - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Access to Vulnerable Ivanti Connect Secure Bookmark Endpoint - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68673,7 +68673,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Access to Vulnerable Ivanti Connect Secure Bookmark Endpoint - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Access to Vulnerable Ivanti Connect Secure Bookmark Endpoint - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2023-46805", "CVE-2024-21887"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "15838756-f425-43fa-9d88-a7f88063e81a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68694,7 +68694,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url="*/api/v1/configuration/users/user-roles/user-role/rest-userrole1/web/web-bookmarks/bookmark*" Web.http_method=GET Web.status=403 by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.status, Web.url source | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `access_to_vulnerable_ivanti_connect_secure_bookmark_endpoint_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Adobe ColdFusion Access Control Bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - Adobe ColdFusion Access Control Bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects potential exploitation attempts against Adobe ColdFusion vulnerabilities CVE-2023-29298 and CVE-2023-26360. These vulnerabilities pertain to an access control bypass and an arbitrary file read due to deserialization, respectively. By monitoring for requests to specific ColdFusion Administrator endpoints, especially those with an unexpected additional forward slash, the analytic identifies attempts to bypass access controls. Such behavior is crucial for a Security Operations Center (SOC) to identify, as exploitation can grant unauthorized access to ColdFusion administration endpoints, potentially leading to information leakage, brute force attacks, or further exploitation of other vulnerabilities. If a true positive is detected, it indicates a serious security breach where an attacker might have gained privileged access to the ColdFusion environment, potentially leading to data theft or other malicious activities. SOCs must be vigilant in monitoring for these patterns, ensuring timely detection and response to such threats, thus safeguarding the integrity and security of their ColdFusion deployments.
@@ -68706,7 +68706,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This analytic is limited to HTTP Status 200;
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Adobe ColdFusion Access Control Bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Adobe ColdFusion Access Control Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68720,7 +68720,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Adobe ColdFusion Access Control Bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Adobe ColdFusion Access Control Bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Adobe ColdFusion Arbitrary Code Execution CVE-2023-29298 CVE-2023-26360"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2023-29298"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d6821c0b-fcdc-4c95-a77f-e10752fae41a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68741,7 +68741,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("//restplay*", "//CFIDE/restplay*", "//CFIDE/administrator*", "//CFIDE/adminapi*", "//CFIDE/main*", "//CFIDE/componentutils*", "//CFIDE/wizards*", "//CFIDE/servermanager*","/restplay*", "/CFIDE/restplay*", "/CFIDE/administrator*", "/CFIDE/adminapi*", "/CFIDE/main*", "/CFIDE/componentutils*", "/CFIDE/wizards*", "/CFIDE/servermanager*") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status, Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `adobe_coldfusion_access_control_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Adobe ColdFusion Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read - Rule]
+[ESCU - Adobe ColdFusion Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects potential exploitation of the critical Adobe ColdFusion vulnerability, CVE-2023-26360. This flaw, rooted in the deserialization of untrusted data, enables Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read. Exploitation often targets specific ColdFusion paths, especially related to CKEditor's file manager.\
@@ -68757,7 +68757,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = In the wild, we have observed three differen
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Adobe ColdFusion Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Adobe ColdFusion Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68771,7 +68771,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Adobe ColdFusion Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Adobe ColdFusion Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Adobe ColdFusion Arbitrary Code Execution CVE-2023-29298 CVE-2023-26360"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2023-26360"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "695aceae-21db-4e7f-93ac-a52e39d02b93", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68794,7 +68794,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("/cf_scripts/scripts/ajax/ckeditor/*") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `adobe_coldfusion_unauthenticated_arbitrary_file_read_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Cisco IOS XE Implant Access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Cisco IOS XE Implant Access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies potential exploitation of a previously unknown vulnerability in the Web User Interface (Web UI) feature of Cisco IOS XE software (CVE-2023-20198). Successful exploitation allows an attacker to create an account on the affected device with privilege level 15 access, granting them full control of the compromised device. The detection is based on the observation of suspicious account creation and subsequent actions, including the deployment of an implant consisting of a configuration file. The implant is saved under the file path //usr//binos//conf//nginx-conf//cisco_service.conf and is not persistent, meaning a device reboot will remove it, but the newly created local user accounts remain active even after system reboots. The new user accounts have level 15 privileges, meaning they have full administrator access to the device. This privileged access to the devices and subsequent creation of new users is tracked as CVE-2023-20198.
@@ -68806,7 +68806,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, restrict to
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Cisco IOS XE Implant Access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Cisco IOS XE Implant Access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68820,7 +68820,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Cisco IOS XE Implant Access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Cisco IOS XE Implant Access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Cisco IOS XE Software Web Management User Interface vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2023-20198"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "07c36cda-6567-43c3-bc1a-89dff61e2cd9", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68841,7 +68841,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("/webui/logoutconfirm.html?logon_hash=*") Web.http_method=POST Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `cisco_ios_xe_implant_access_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Citrix ADC and Gateway Unauthorized Data Disclosure - Rule]
+[ESCU - Citrix ADC and Gateway Unauthorized Data Disclosure - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects attempts to exploit the Citrix Bleed vulnerability, which can lead to the leaking of session tokens. The vulnerability, identified as CVE-2023-4966, pertains to sensitive information disclosure in NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway when set up as various server configurations. The analytic specifically searches for HTTP requests with a 200 status code targeting the /oauth/idp/.well-known/openid-configuration URL endpoint. By parsing web traffic and filtering based on the aforementioned criteria along with specific user agent details, HTTP method, source and destination IPs, and the sourcetype, the analytic aims to identify potentially malicious requests that fit the profile of this exploit.\
@@ -68859,7 +68859,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on orga
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Citrix ADC and Gateway Unauthorized Data Disclosure - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Citrix ADC and Gateway Unauthorized Data Disclosure - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68873,7 +68873,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Citrix ADC and Gateway Unauthorized Data Disclosure - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Citrix ADC and Gateway Unauthorized Data Disclosure - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway CVE-2023-4966"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b593cac5-dd20-4358-972a-d945fefdaf17", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68897,7 +68897,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("*/oauth/idp/.well-known/openid-configuration*")  Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `citrix_adc_and_gateway_unauthorized_data_disclosure_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Citrix ADC Exploitation CVE-2023-3519 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Citrix ADC Exploitation CVE-2023-3519 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to assist in hunting for potential exploitation attempts against Citrix ADC in relation to CVE-2023-3519. This vulnerability, identified within Citrix ADC and NetScaler Gateway, appears to be linked with SAML processing components, with an overflow issue allowing for possible memory corruption. Preliminary findings indicate that for the exploit to be viable, SAML has to be enabled. The analytic targets POST requests to certain web endpoints which have been associated with the exploitation process.\
@@ -68915,7 +68915,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present based on orga
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Citrix ADC Exploitation CVE-2023-3519 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Citrix ADC Exploitation CVE-2023-3519 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68924,7 +68924,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Citrix ADC Exploitation CVE-2023-3519 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Citrix ADC Exploitation CVE-2023-3519 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Citrix Netscaler ADC CVE-2023-3519"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2023-3519"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "76ac2dcb-333c-4a77-8ae9-2720cfae47a8", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68939,7 +68939,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("*/saml/login","/cgi/samlauth","*/saml/activelogin","/cgi/samlart?samlart=*","*/cgi/logout","/gwtest/formssso?event=start&target=*","/netscaler/ns_gui/vpn/*")  Web.http_method=POST by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `citrix_adc_exploitation_cve_2023_3519_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Citrix ShareFile Exploitation CVE-2023-24489 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Citrix ShareFile Exploitation CVE-2023-24489 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects a potentially malicious file upload attempt to Documentum, an enterprise content management platform, via specific suspicious URLs and the HTTP POST method. This detection occurs through pattern recognition within the datamodel=Web, focusing on URL patterns that follow "/documentum/upload.aspx?parentid=", "/documentum/upload.aspx?filename=", "/documentum/upload.aspx?uploadId=*", combined with the HTTP POST method, indicative of a file upload attempt.\
@@ -68957,7 +68957,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filtering ma
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Citrix ShareFile Exploitation CVE-2023-24489 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Citrix ShareFile Exploitation CVE-2023-24489 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -68966,7 +68966,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Citrix ShareFile Exploitation CVE-2023-24489 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Citrix ShareFile Exploitation CVE-2023-24489 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Citrix ShareFile RCE CVE-2023-24489"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2023-24489"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "172c59f2-5fae-45e5-8e51-94445143e93f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -68981,7 +68981,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url="/documentum/upload.aspx?*" AND Web.url IN ("*parentid=*","*filename=*","*uploadId=*") AND Web.url IN ("*unzip=*", "*raw=*") Web.http_method=POST by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `citrix_sharefile_exploitation_cve_2023_24489_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Confluence CVE-2023-22515 Trigger Vulnerability - Rule]
+[ESCU - Confluence CVE-2023-22515 Trigger Vulnerability - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts on a known vulnerability in Atlassian Confluence, targeting the /server-info.action?bootstrapStatusProvider.applicationConfig.setupComplete=false* and /server-info.action?bootstrapStatusProvider.applicationConfig.setupComplete=0& URLs. By analyzing web logs within the Splunk 'Web' Data Model, it filters for successful accesses (HTTP status 200) to these vulnerable endpoints. Such behavior is crucial for a SOC to monitor, as it suggests attackers might be exploiting a privilege escalation flaw in Confluence. A true positive implies a possible unauthorized access or account creation with escalated privileges. Key details captured include user-agent, HTTP methods, URL length, and source and destination IPs. These insights aid SOCs in swiftly detecting and responding to threats, ensuring vulnerabilities are mitigated before substantial compromise.
@@ -68993,7 +68993,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present with legitima
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Confluence CVE-2023-22515 Trigger Vulnerability - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Confluence CVE-2023-22515 Trigger Vulnerability - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69007,7 +69007,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Confluence CVE-2023-22515 Trigger Vulnerability - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Confluence CVE-2023-22515 Trigger Vulnerability - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CVE-2023-22515 Privilege Escalation Vulnerability Confluence Data Center and Server"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "630ea8b2-2800-4f5d-9cbc-d65c567349b0", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69028,7 +69028,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("*/server-info.action?bootstrapStatusProvider.applicationConfig.setupComplete=false*","*/server-info.action?bootstrapStatusProvider.applicationConfig.setupComplete=0&*") Web.http_method=GET Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `confluence_cve_2023_22515_trigger_vulnerability_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation - Rule]
+[ESCU - Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies potential exploitation attempts on a known vulnerability in Atlassian Confluence, targeting the /setup/*.action* URL pattern. By analyzing web logs within the Splunk 'Web' Data Model, it filters for successful accesses (HTTP status 200) to these vulnerable endpoints. Such behavior is crucial for a SOC to monitor, as it suggests attackers might be exploiting a privilege escalation flaw in Confluence. A true positive implies a possible unauthorized access or account creation with escalated privileges. Key details captured include user-agent, HTTP methods, URL length, and source and destination IPs. These insights aid SOCs in swiftly detecting and responding to threats, ensuring vulnerabilities are mitigated before substantial compromise.
@@ -69040,7 +69040,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present with legitima
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-18
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69054,7 +69054,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CVE-2023-22515 Privilege Escalation Vulnerability Confluence Data Center and Server", "Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2023-22518"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "115bebac-0976-4f7d-a3ec-d1fb45a39a11", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69075,7 +69075,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("*/setup/setupadministrator.action*", "*/setup/finishsetup.action*", "*/json/setup-restore-local.action*", "*/json/setup-restore-progress.action*", "*/json/setup-restore.action*", "*/bootstrap/selectsetupstep.action*") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `confluence_data_center_and_server_privilege_escalation_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Confluence Pre-Auth RCE via OGNL Injection CVE-2023-22527 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Confluence Pre-Auth RCE via OGNL Injection CVE-2023-22527 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies a critical template injection vulnerability (CVE-2023-22527) in outdated versions of Confluence Data Center and Server, which allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code remotely. The vulnerability is exploited by injecting OGNL (Object-Graph Navigation Language) expressions into the application, as evidenced by POST requests to the "/template/aui/text-inline.vm" endpoint with specific content types and payloads. The search looks for POST requests with HTTP status codes 200 or 202, which may indicate successful exploitation attempts. Immediate patching to the latest version of Confluence is strongly recommended, as there are no known workarounds. This detection is crucial for identifying and responding to potential RCE attacks, ensuring that affected Confluence instances are secured against this critical threat.
@@ -69087,7 +69087,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present with legitima
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Confluence Pre-Auth RCE via OGNL Injection CVE-2023-22527 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Confluence Pre-Auth RCE via OGNL Injection CVE-2023-22527 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69101,7 +69101,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Confluence Pre-Auth RCE via OGNL Injection CVE-2023-22527 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Confluence Pre-Auth RCE via OGNL Injection CVE-2023-22527 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2023-22527"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "f56936c0-ae6f-4eeb-91ff-ecc1448c6105", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69122,7 +69122,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url="*/template/aui/text-inline.vm*" Web.http_method=POST Web.status IN (200, 202) by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.url, Web.status | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `confluence_pre_auth_rce_via_ognl_injection_cve_2023_22527_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic assists with identifying CVE-2022-26134 based exploitation utilizing the Web datamodel to cover network and CIM compliant web logs. The parameters were captured from live scanning and the POC provided by Rapid7. This analytic is written against multiple proof of concept codes released and seen in the wild (scanning). During triage, review any endpoint based logs for further activity including writing a jsp file to disk and commands/processes spawning running as root from the Confluence process.
@@ -69134,7 +69134,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Tune based on assets if possible, or restric
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-06-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-06-03
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69148,7 +69148,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2022-26134", "Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2022-26134"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505", "T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fcf4bd3f-a79f-4b7a-83bf-2692d60b859c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69169,7 +69169,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("*${*", "*%2F%7B*") (Web.url="*org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils*" Web.url="*java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec*") OR (Web.url="*java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec*") OR (Web.url="*getEngineByName*" AND Web.url="*nashorn*" AND Web.url="*ProcessBuilder*") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `confluence_unauthenticated_remote_code_execution_cve_2022_26134_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic detects attempts to exploit the ConnectWise ScreenConnect CVE-2024-1709 vulnerability, which allows an attacker to bypass authentication using an alternate path or channel. The vulnerability, identified as critical with a CVSS score of 10, enables unauthorized users to access the SetupWizard.aspx page on already-configured ScreenConnect instances, potentially leading to the creation of administrative users and remote code execution. The search query provided looks for web requests to the SetupWizard.aspx page that could indicate exploitation attempts. This detection is crucial for identifying and responding to active exploitation of this vulnerability in environments running affected versions of ScreenConnect (23.9.7 and prior). It is recommended to update to version 23.9.8 or above immediately to remediate the issue, as detailed in the ConnectWise security advisory and further analyzed by Huntress researchers.
@@ -69181,7 +69181,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are not expected, as the det
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69195,7 +69195,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ConnectWise ScreenConnect Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2024-1708", "CVE-2024-1709"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d3f7a803-e802-448b-8eb2-e796b223bfff", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69216,7 +69216,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("*/SetupWizard.aspx/*","*/SetupWizard/") Web.status=200 Web.http_method=POST by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.url, Web.status, Web.http_method, sourcetype, source | rex field=Web.url "/SetupWizard.aspx/(?<randomPath>.+)" | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `connectwise_screenconnect_authentication_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that are indicative of reconnaissance attempts to identify vulnerable JBoss servers. JexBoss is described as the exploit tool of choice for this malicious activity. 
@@ -69228,7 +69228,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible for legitimate HTTP requests t
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69242,7 +69242,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "104658f4-afdc-499e-9719-17243f982681", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69263,7 +69263,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method="GET" OR Web.http_method="HEAD") AND (Web.url="*/web-console/ServerInfo.jsp*" OR Web.url="*web-console*" OR Web.url="*jmx-console*" OR Web.url = "*invoker*") by Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.src, Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_attackers_scanning_for_vulnerable_jboss_servers_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search detects remote code exploit attempts on F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ, and Traffix SDC devices 
@@ -69275,7 +69275,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69289,7 +69289,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2020-5902"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "810e4dbc-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69310,7 +69310,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `f5_bigip_rogue` | regex _raw="(hsqldb;|.*\\.\\.;.*)" | search `detect_f5_tmui_rce_cve_2020_5902_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search is used to detect malicious HTTP requests crafted to exploit jmx-console in JBoss servers. The malicious requests have a long URL length, as the payload is embedded in the URL. 
@@ -69322,7 +69322,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = No known false positives for this detection.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69336,7 +69336,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["JBoss Vulnerability", "SamSam Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c8bff7a4-11ea-4416-a27d-c5bca472913d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69357,7 +69357,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.http_method="GET" OR Web.http_method="HEAD") by Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest | search Web.url="*jmx-console/HtmlAdaptor?action=invokeOpByName&name=jboss.admin*import*" AND Web.url_length > 200 | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | table src, dest_ip, http_method, url, firstTime, lastTime | `detect_malicious_requests_to_exploit_jboss_servers_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule]
+[ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects when a known remote access software is executed with the environment. Adversaries use these utilities to retain remote access capabilities to the environment. Utilities in the lookup include AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, TeamViewer and much more. Review the lookup for the entire list and add any others.
@@ -69369,7 +69369,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible that legitimate remote access
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69383,7 +69383,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Command And Control", "Insider Threat", "Ransomware"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1219"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9296f515-073c-43a5-88ec-eda5a4626654", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69398,7 +69398,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime latest(Web.http_method) as http_method latest(Web.http_user_agent) as http_user_agent latest(Web.url) as url latest(Web.user) as user latest(Web.dest) as dest from datamodel=Web by Web.action Web.src Web.category Web.url_domain | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | lookup remote_access_software remote_domain AS url_domain OUTPUT isutility, description as signature, comment_reference as desc, category | search isutility = True | `detect_remote_access_software_usage_url_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text - Rule]
+[ESCU - Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies activity related to Text4Shell, or the critical vulnerability CVE-2022-42889 in Apache Commons Text Library. Apache Commons Text versions 1.5 through 1.9 are affected, but it has been patched in version 1.10. The analytic may need to be tuned for your environment before enabling as a TTP, or direct Notable. Apache Commons Text is a Java library described as a library focused on algorithms working on strings. We can see it as a general-purpose text manipulation toolkit. This vulnerability affects the StringSubstitutor interpolator class, which is included in the Commons Text library. A default interpolator allows for string lookups that can lead to Remote Code Execution. This is due to a logic flaw that makes the script, dns, and url lookup keys interpolated by default, as opposed to what it should be, according to the documentation of the StringLookupFactory class. Those keys allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code via lookups.
@@ -69410,7 +69410,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are present when the values
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-01-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-01-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69424,7 +69424,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Text4Shell CVE-2022-42889"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2022-42889"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003", "T1505", "T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "19a481e0-c97c-4d14-b1db-75a708eb592e", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69439,7 +69439,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN (POST, GET) by Web.src Web.status Web.uri_path Web.dest Web.http_method Web.uri_query Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | eval utf=if(like(lower(uri_query),"%:utf-8:http%"),2,0) | eval lookup = if(like(lower(uri_query), "%url%") OR like(lower(uri_query), "%dns%") OR like(lower(uri_query), "%script%"),2,0) | eval other_lookups = if(like(lower(uri_query), "%env%") OR like(lower(uri_query), "%file%") OR like(lower(uri_query), "%getRuntime%") OR like(lower(uri_query), "%java%") OR like(lower(uri_query), "%localhost%") OR like(lower(uri_query), "%properties%") OR like(lower(uri_query), "%resource%") OR like(lower(uri_query), "%sys%") OR like(lower(uri_query), "%xml%") OR like(lower(uri_query), "%base%"),1,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score utf lookup other_lookups | fields Score, src, dest, status, uri_query, uri_path, http_method, http_user_agent firstTime lastTime | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where Score >= 4 | `exploit_public_facing_application_via_apache_commons_text_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Exploit Public-Facing Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Exploit Public-Facing Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies a recent CVE-2022-39952 released publicly where the URI configWizard/keyUpload.jsp recieves a POST with the payload.zip, from there the POC script will schedule a cron to run the payload and contact the remote C2.
@@ -69451,7 +69451,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present. Modify the q
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-02-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-02-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Exploit Public-Facing Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Exploit Public-Facing Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69465,7 +69465,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Exploit Public-Facing Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Exploit Public-Facing Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2022-39952"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2038f5c6-5aba-4221-8ae2-ca76e2ca8b97", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69486,7 +69486,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("*configWizard/keyUpload.jsp*") by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `exploit_public_facing_fortinet_fortinac_cve_2022_39952_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - F5 TMUI Authentication Bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - F5 TMUI Authentication Bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is designed to detect attempts to exploit the CVE-2023-46747 vulnerability, a critical authentication bypass flaw in F5 BIG-IP that can lead to unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE). This vulnerability specifically affects the BIG-IP Configuration utility (TMUI) and has been assigned a high severity CVSSv3 score of 9.8. The analytic identifies this behavior by monitoring for a specific URI path - "*/mgmt/tm/auth/user/*", with the PATCH method and 200 status. Additional URI's will occur around the same time include "*/mgmt/shared/authn/login*" and "*/tmui/login.jsp*", which are associated with the exploitation of this vulnerability. This behavior is significant for a Security Operations Center (SOC) as it indicates an attempt to bypass authentication mechanisms, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over the system. If a true positive is identified, it suggests that an attacker is attempting to exploit a known vulnerability to gain unauthorized access and execute arbitrary code, which could lead to data theft, system disruption, or further malicious activities within the network.
@@ -69498,7 +69498,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited to as this
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - F5 TMUI Authentication Bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - F5 TMUI Authentication Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69512,7 +69512,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - F5 TMUI Authentication Bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - F5 TMUI Authentication Bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["F5 Authentication Bypass with TMUI"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2023-46747"], "impact": 100, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "88bf127c-613e-4579-99e4-c4d4b02f3840", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69533,7 +69533,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("*/mgmt/tm/auth/user/*") Web.http_method=PATCH Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `f5_tmui_authentication_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = CVE-2022-40684 is a Fortinet appliance auth bypass that is actively being exploited and a POC is released publicy. The POC adds a SSH key to the appliance. Note that the exploit can be used with any HTTP method (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, etc). The REST API request failing is not an indication that an attacker was unsuccessful. Horizon3 was able to modify the admin SSH keys though a REST API request that reportedly failed. The collection /api/v2/ endpoints can be used to configure the system and modify the administrator user. Any logs found that meet the above conditions and also have a URL containing /api/v2/ should be cause for concern. Further investigation of any matching log entries can reveal any damage an attack has done. Additionally, an attacker may perform the following actions to further compromise a system Modify the admin SSH key to enable the attacker to login to the compromised system.\
@@ -69553,7 +69553,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = GET requests will be noisy and need to be fi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-10-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-10-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69567,7 +69567,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CVE-2022-40684 Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2022-40684"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a83122f2-fa09-4868-a230-544dbc54bc1c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69592,7 +69592,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("*/api/v2/cmdb/system/admin*")  Web.http_method IN ("GET", "PUT") by Web.http_user_agent, Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `fortinet_appliance_auth_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting query assists with quickly assessing CVE-2021-44228, or Log4Shell, activity mapped to the Web Datamodel. This is a combination query attempting to identify, score and dashboard. Because the Log4Shell vulnerability requires the string to be in the logs, this will work to identify the activity anywhere in the HTTP headers using _raw. Modify the first line to use the same pattern matching against other log sources. Scoring is based on a simple rubric of 0-5. 5 being the best match, and less than 5 meant to identify additional patterns that will equate to a higher total score.\
@@ -69624,7 +69624,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is highly possible you will find false po
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69633,7 +69633,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-320A", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "158b68fa-5d1a-11ec-aac8-acde48001122", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69648,7 +69648,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | from datamodel Web.Web | eval jndi=if(match(_raw, "(\{|%7B)[jJnNdDiI]{4}:"),4,0) | eval jndi_fastmatch=if(match(_raw, "[jJnNdDiI]{4}"),2,0) | eval jndi_proto=if(match(_raw,"(?i)jndi:(ldap[s]?|rmi|dns|nis|iiop|corba|nds|http|https):"),5,0) | eval all_match = if(match(_raw, "(?i)(%(25){0,}20|\s)*(%(25){0,}24|\$)(%(25){0,}20|\s)*(%(25){0,}7B|{)(%(25){0,}20|\s)*(%(25){0,}(6A|4A)|J)(%(25){0,}(6E|4E)|N)(%(25){0,}(64|44)|D)(%(25){0,}(69|49)|I)(%(25){0,}20|\s)*(%(25){0,}3A|:)[\w\%]+(%(25){1,}3A|:)(%(25){1,}2F|\/)[^\n]+"),5,0) | eval env_var = if(match(_raw, "env:") OR match(_raw, "env:AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID") OR match(_raw, "env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"),5,0) | eval uridetect = if(match(_raw, "(?i)Basic\/Command\/Base64|Basic\/ReverseShell|Basic\/TomcatMemshell|Basic\/JBossMemshell|Basic\/WebsphereMemshell|Basic\/SpringMemshell|Basic\/Command|Deserialization\/CommonsCollectionsK|Deserialization\/CommonsBeanutils|Deserialization\/Jre8u20\/TomcatMemshell|Deserialization\/CVE_2020_2555\/WeblogicMemshell|TomcatBypass|GroovyBypass|WebsphereBypass"),4,0) | eval keywords = if(match(_raw,"(?i)\$\{ctx\:loginId\}|\$\{map\:type\}|\$\{filename\}|\$\{date\:MM-dd-yyyy\}|\$\{docker\:containerId\}|\$\{docker\:containerName\}|\$\{docker\:imageName\}|\$\{env\:USER\}|\$\{event\:Marker\}|\$\{mdc\:UserId\}|\$\{java\:runtime\}|\$\{java\:vm\}|\$\{java\:os\}|\$\{jndi\:logging/context-name\}|\$\{hostName\}|\$\{docker\:containerId\}|\$\{k8s\:accountName\}|\$\{k8s\:clusterName\}|\$\{k8s\:containerId\}|\$\{k8s\:containerName\}|\$\{k8s\:host\}|\$\{k8s\:labels.app\}|\$\{k8s\:labels.podTemplateHash\}|\$\{k8s\:masterUrl\}|\$\{k8s\:namespaceId\}|\$\{k8s\:namespaceName\}|\$\{k8s\:podId\}|\$\{k8s\:podIp\}|\$\{k8s\:podName\}|\$\{k8s\:imageId\}|\$\{k8s\:imageName\}|\$\{log4j\:configLocation\}|\$\{log4j\:configParentLocation\}|\$\{spring\:spring.application.name\}|\$\{main\:myString\}|\$\{main\:0\}|\$\{main\:1\}|\$\{main\:2\}|\$\{main\:3\}|\$\{main\:4\}|\$\{main\:bar\}|\$\{name\}|\$\{marker\}|\$\{marker\:name\}|\$\{spring\:profiles.active[0]|\$\{sys\:logPath\}|\$\{web\:rootDir\}|\$\{sys\:user.name\}"),4,0) | eval obf = if(match(_raw, "(\$|%24)[^ /]*({|%7b)[^ /]*(j|%6a)[^ /]*(n|%6e)[^ /]*(d|%64)[^ /]*(i|%69)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(:|%3a)[^ /]*(/|%2f)"),5,0) | eval lookups = if(match(_raw, "(?i)({|%7b)(main|sys|k8s|spring|lower|upper|env|date|sd)"),4,0)  | addtotals fieldname=Score, jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, obf, lookups | where Score > 2 | stats values(Score) by  jndi, jndi_proto, env_var, uridetect, all_match, jndi_fastmatch, keywords, lookups, obf, dest, src, http_method, _raw | `hunting_for_log4shell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure Command Injection Attempts - Rule]
+[ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure Command Injection Attempts - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to identify the exploit phase of the CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 vulnerabilities. During this phase, a POST request is made to the /api/v1/totp/user-backup-code/../../system/maintenance/archiving/cloud-server-test-connection URI. This request exploits the command injection vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands. A successful request, indicated by a 200 OK response, suggests that the system is vulnerable.
@@ -69660,7 +69660,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This analytic is limited to HTTP Status 200;
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-17
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure Command Injection Attempts - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure Command Injection Attempts - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69674,7 +69674,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure Command Injection Attempts - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure Command Injection Attempts - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2023-46805", "CVE-2024-21887"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "1f32a7e0-a060-4545-b7de-73fcf9ad536e", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69695,7 +69695,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN("*/api/v1/totp/user-backup-code/../../system/maintenance/archiving/cloud-server-test-connection*","*/api/v1/totp/user-backup-code/../../license/keys-status/*") Web.http_method IN ("POST", "GET") Web.status=200 by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.url, Web.http_method, Web.status | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ivanti_connect_secure_command_injection_attempts_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure SSRF in SAML Component - Rule]
+[ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure SSRF in SAML Component - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is designed to identify POST request activities targeting specific endpoints known to be vulnerable to the SSRF issue (CVE-2024-21893) in Ivanti's products. It aggregates data from the Web data model, focusing on endpoints /dana-ws/saml20.ws, /dana-ws/saml.ws, /dana-ws/samlecp.ws, and /dana-na/auth/saml-logout.cgi. The query filters for POST requests that received a HTTP 200 OK response, indicating successful request execution.
@@ -69707,7 +69707,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This analytic is limited to HTTP Status 200;
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure SSRF in SAML Component - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure SSRF in SAML Component - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69721,7 +69721,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure SSRF in SAML Component - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure SSRF in SAML Component - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2024-21893"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "8e6ca490-7af3-4299-9a24-39fb69759925", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69742,7 +69742,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("*/dana-ws/saml20.ws*","*/dana-ws/saml.ws*","*/dana-ws/samlecp.ws*","*/dana-na/auth/saml-logout.cgi/*") Web.http_method=POST Web.status=200 by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.url, Web.status, Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ivanti_connect_secure_ssrf_in_saml_component_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure System Information Access via Auth Bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure System Information Access via Auth Bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to identify the "check phase" of the CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 vulnerabilities. During this phase, a GET request is made to the /api/v1/totp/user-backup-code/../../system/system-information URI. This request exploits the authentication bypass vulnerability to gain access to system information. A successful request, indicated by a 200 OK response, suggests that the system is vulnerable.
@@ -69754,7 +69754,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = This analytic is limited to HTTP Status 200;
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure System Information Access via Auth Bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure System Information Access via Auth Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69768,7 +69768,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure System Information Access via Auth Bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure System Information Access via Auth Bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2023-46805", "CVE-2024-21887"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d51c13dd-a232-4c83-a2bb-72ab36233c5d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69783,7 +69783,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url="*/api/v1/totp/user-backup-code/../../system/system-information*" Web.http_method=GET Web.status=200 by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.url | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ivanti_connect_secure_system_information_access_via_auth_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35078 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35078 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The given analytic is designed to detect the exploitation of CVE-2023-35078, a vulnerability in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) affecting versions up to 11.4. Specifically, the query searches web logs for HTTP requests to the potentially vulnerable endpoint "/mifs/aad/api/v2/authorized/users?*" with a successful status code of 200. This analytic is instrumental in detecting unauthorized remote access to restricted functionalities or resources within the application, a behavior worth identifying for a Security Operations Center (SOC). By monitoring specific patterns and successful access indicators, it reveals an active attempt to exploit the vulnerability, potentially leading to data theft, unauthorized modifications, or further system compromise. If successfully executed, the impact can be severe, necessitating immediate action.
@@ -69795,7 +69795,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The Proof of Concept exploit script indicate
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35078 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35078 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69809,7 +69809,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35078 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35078 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated Access"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2023-35078"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "66b9c9ba-7fb2-4e80-a3a2-496e5e078167", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69830,7 +69830,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("/mifs/aad/api/v2/authorized/users?*") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ivanti_epmm_remote_unauthenticated_api_access_cve_2023_35078_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35082 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35082 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects potential unauthorized access attempts exploiting CVE-2023-35082 within Ivantis software products. Initially assessed to affect only MobileIron Core versions up to 11.2, further insights revealed its influence extending to Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) versions 11.10, 11.9, 11.8, and MobileIron Core 11.7 and below. The vulnerability facilitates unauthorized API access via the specific URI path /mifs/asfV3/api/v2/. The analytic identifies this behavior by monitoring web access logs for this URI pattern coupled with a HTTP 200 response code, signifying successful unauthorized access. Such behavior is imperative for a Security Operations Center (SOC) to recognize, as it highlights potential security breaches which, if not addressed, could lead to unauthorized data access, system modifications, or further exploitation. In the event of a true positive, the implications are severe: an attacker might have gained unbridled access to sensitive organizational data or could modify systems maliciously. Be vigilant of potential false positives; benign activities might occasionally match the pattern. During triage, closely scrutinize the source of the access request and its subsequent actions. This analytic aids analysts in early threat detection, allowing for proactive risk mitigation.
@@ -69842,7 +69842,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Similar to CVE-2023-35078, the path for expl
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-08
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35082 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35082 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69856,7 +69856,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35082 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35082 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated Access"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2023-35082"], "impact": 80, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e03edeba-4942-470c-a664-27253f3ad351", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69877,7 +69877,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("/mifs/asfV3/api/v2/*") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ivanti_epmm_remote_unauthenticated_api_access_cve_2023_35082_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic is designed to detect unauthenticated access to the System Manager Portal in Ivanti Sentry, formerly known as MobileIron Sentry. The vulnerability, designated as CVE-2023-38035, affects all supported versions 9.18, 9.17, and 9.16, as well as older versions. The analytic works by monitoring for changes in the configuration of Sentry and the underlying operating system. Such changes could indicate an attacker attempting to execute OS commands as root. This behavior is of significant concern for a Security Operations Center (SOC) as it presents a substantial security risk, particularly if port 8443, the default port for the System Manager Portal, is exposed to the internet. If the analytic returns a true positive, it suggests that an attacker has gained unauthorized access to the Sentry system, potentially leading to a significant system compromise and data breach. It is important to note that while the issue has a high CVSS score, the risk of exploitation is low for customers who do not expose port 8443 to the internet. The search specifically looks for HTTP requests to certain endpoints ("/mics/services/configservice/*", "/mics/services/*","/mics/services/MICSLogService*") and HTTP status code of 200. Unusual or unexpected patterns in these parameters could indicate an attack.
@@ -69889,7 +69889,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It is important to note that false positives
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-24
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-24
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69903,7 +69903,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass CVE-2023-38035"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2023-38035"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b8e0d1cf-e6a8-4d46-a5ae-aebe18ead8f8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69924,7 +69924,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("/mics/services/configservice/*", "/mics/services/*","/mics/services/MICSLogService*") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ivanti_sentry_authentication_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897 - Rule]
+[ESCU - Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analtyic identifies a Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897 exploitation. This attack allows an attacker to read arbitrary files on the Jenkins server. This can be used to obtain sensitive information such as credentials, private keys, and other sensitive information.
@@ -69936,7 +69936,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives should be limited as this de
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-01-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-01-26
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69950,7 +69950,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Jenkins Server Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2024-23897"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c641260d-2b48-4eb1-b1e8-2cc5b8b99ab1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -69971,7 +69971,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url="*/cli?remoting=false*" Web.status=200 Web.http_method=POST by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.url Web.status, Web.http_method | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jenkins_arbitrary_file_read_cve_2024_23897_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass CVE-2024-27198 - Rule]
+[ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass CVE-2024-27198 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The CVE-2024-27198 vulnerability presents a critical security risk for JetBrains TeamCity on-premises servers, allowing attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms and gain unauthorized access. This vulnerability can be exploited in several ways, each leading to the attacker gaining full control over the TeamCity server, including all associated projects, builds, agents, and artifacts. One method of exploitation involves creating a new administrator user. An attacker, without needing to authenticate, can send a specially crafted POST request to the `/app/rest/users` REST API endpoint. This request includes the desired username, password, email, and roles for the new user, effectively granting them administrative privileges upon successful execution. Alternatively, an attacker can generate a new administrator access token by targeting the `/app/rest/users/id:1/tokens` endpoint with a POST request. This method also does not require prior authentication and results in the creation of a token that grants administrative access. Both exploitation methods underscore the severity of the CVE-2024-27198 vulnerability and highlight the importance of securing TeamCity servers against such authentication bypass threats. The manipulation of URI paths `/app/rest/users` and `/app/rest/users/id:1/tokens` through malicious requests enables attackers to gain unauthorized access and control, emphasizing the need for immediate remediation measures.
@@ -69983,7 +69983,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are not expected, as this de
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass CVE-2024-27198 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass CVE-2024-27198 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -69997,7 +69997,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass CVE-2024-27198 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass CVE-2024-27198 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["JetBrains TeamCity Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2024-27198"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fbcc04c7-8a79-453c-b3a9-c232c423bdd4", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70018,7 +70018,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where ((Web.url="*?jsp=*" AND Web.url="*;.jsp*") Web.status=200 Web.http_method=POST) OR (Web.url IN ("*jsp=/app/rest/users;.jsp","*?jsp=/app/rest/users;.jsp","*?jsp=.*/app/rest/users/id:*/tokens;*") Web.status=200 Web.http_method=POST ) by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.url, Web.status, Web.http_method, sourcetype, source | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `jetbrains_teamcity_authentication_bypass_cve_2024_27198_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27198 - Rule]
+[ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27198 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The CVE-2024-27198 vulnerability presents a critical security risk for JetBrains TeamCity on-premises servers, allowing attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms and gain unauthorized access. This vulnerability can be exploited in several ways, each leading to the attacker gaining full control over the TeamCity server, including all associated projects, builds, agents, and artifacts. One method of exploitation involves creating a new administrator user. An attacker, without needing to authenticate, can send a specially crafted POST request to the `/app/rest/users` REST API endpoint. This request includes the desired username, password, email, and roles for the new user, effectively granting them administrative privileges upon successful execution.Alternatively, an attacker can generate a new administrator access token by targeting the `/app/rest/users/id:1/tokens` endpoint with a POST request. This method also does not require prior authentication and results in the creation of a token that grants administrative access. Both exploitation methods underscore the severity of the CVE-2024-27198 vulnerability and highlight the importance of securing TeamCity servers against such authentication bypass threats. The manipulation of URI paths `/app/rest/users` and `/app/rest/users/id:1/tokens` through malicious requests enables attackers to gain unauthorized access and control, emphasizing the need for immediate remediation measures.
@@ -70030,7 +70030,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are not expected, as this de
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27198 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27198 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70044,7 +70044,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27198 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27198 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["JetBrains TeamCity Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2024-27198"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fbcc04c7-8a79-453c-b3a9-c232c423bdd3", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70065,7 +70065,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `suricata` ((http.url="*?jsp=*" AND http.url="*;.jsp*") http.status=200 http_method=POST) OR (http.url IN ("*jsp=/app/rest/users;.jsp","*?jsp=/app/rest/users;.jsp","*?jsp=.*/app/rest/users/id:*/tokens;*") http.status=200 http_method=POST ) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src, dest, http.http_user_agent, http.url, http.status,http_method | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `jetbrains_teamcity_authentication_bypass_suricata_cve_2024_27198_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Limited Auth Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27199 - Rule]
+[ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Limited Auth Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27199 - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = CVE-2024-27199 reveals a critical vulnerability in JetBrains TeamCity web server, allowing unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication for a limited set of endpoints. This vulnerability exploits path traversal issues, enabling attackers to access and potentially modify system settings or disclose sensitive server information without proper authentication. Identified vulnerable paths include /res/, /update/, and /.well-known/acme-challenge/, among others. Attackers can manipulate these paths to reach restricted JSP pages and servlet endpoints, such as /app/https/settings/uploadCertificate, which could allow for the uploading of malicious HTTPS certificates or modification of server settings. This detection aims to identify potential exploitation attempts by monitoring for unusual access patterns to these endpoints, which could indicate an authentication bypass attempt in progress.
@@ -70077,7 +70077,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are not expected, however, m
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-03-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-03-04
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Limited Auth Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27199 - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Limited Auth Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27199 - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70091,7 +70091,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Limited Auth Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27199 - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Limited Auth Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27199 - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["JetBrains TeamCity Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2024-27199"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a1e68dcd-2e24-4434-bd0e-b3d4de139d58", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70112,7 +70112,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `suricata` http.url IN ("*../admin/diagnostic.jsp*", "*../app/https/settings/*", "*../app/pipeline*", "*../app/oauth/space/createBuild.html*", "*../res/*", "*../update/*", "*../.well-known/acme-challenge/*", "*../app/availableRunners*", "*../app/https/settings/setPort*", "*../app/https/settings/certificateInfo*", "*../app/https/settings/defaultHttpsPort*", "*../app/https/settings/fetchFromAcme*", "*../app/https/settings/removeCertificate*", "*../app/https/settings/uploadCertificate*", "*../app/https/settings/termsOfService*", "*../app/https/settings/triggerAcmeChallenge*", "*../app/https/settings/cancelAcmeChallenge*", "*../app/https/settings/getAcmeOrder*", "*../app/https/settings/setRedirectStrategy*") http.status=200 http_method=GET | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src, dest, http_user_agent, http.url, http.status, http_method | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jetbrains_teamcity_limited_auth_bypass_suricata_cve_2024_27199_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule]
+[ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is designed to detect attempts to exploit the CVE-2023-42793 vulnerability in TeamCity On-Premises. It focuses on identifying suspicious POST requests to /app/rest/users/id:1/tokens/RPC2, which is the initial point of exploitation. This could indicate an unauthenticated attacker trying to gain administrative access through Remote Code Execution (RCE).
@@ -70124,7 +70124,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = If TeamCity is not in use, this analytic wil
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70138,7 +70138,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA23-347A", "JetBrains TeamCity Unauthenticated RCE", "JetBrains TeamCity Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "cve": ["CVE-2023-42793"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "89a58e5f-1365-4793-b45c-770abbb32b6c", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70159,7 +70159,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("/app/rest/users/id:1/tokens/RPC2*") Web.status=200 Web.http_method=POST by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `jetbrains_teamcity_rce_attempt_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Juniper Networks Remote Code Execution Exploit Detection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Juniper Networks Remote Code Execution Exploit Detection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects the exploitation of a remote code execution vulnerability in Juniper Networks devices. The vulnerability involves multiple steps, including uploading a malicious PHP file and an INI file to the target server, and then executing the PHP code by manipulating the PHP configuration via the uploaded INI file. The analytic specifically looks for requests to /webauth_operation.php?PHPRC=*, which are used to upload the files and execute the code, respectively. This behavior is worth identifying for a SOC because it indicates that an attacker is attempting to exploit the vulnerability to gain unauthorized access to the device and execute arbitrary code. If a true positive is found, it suggests that an attacker has successfully exploited the vulnerability and may have gained control over the device, leading to data theft, network compromise, or other damaging outcomes. Upon triage, review the request parameters and the response to determine if the exploitation was successful. Capture and inspect any relevant network traffic and server logs to identify the attack source. This approach helps analysts detect potential threats earlier and mitigate the risks.
@@ -70171,7 +70171,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = Be aware of potential false positives - legi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-08-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-08-29
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Juniper Networks Remote Code Execution Exploit Detection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Juniper Networks Remote Code Execution Exploit Detection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70185,7 +70185,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Juniper Networks Remote Code Execution Exploit Detection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Juniper Networks Remote Code Execution Exploit Detection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Juniper JunOS Remote Code Execution"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2023-36844", "CVE-2023-36845", "CVE-2023-36846", "CVE-2023-36847"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1105", "T1059"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "6cc4cc3d-b10a-4fac-be1e-55d384fc690e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70206,7 +70206,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("*/webauth_operation.php?PHPRC=*") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `juniper_networks_remote_code_execution_exploit_detection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule]
+[ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we first limit the scope of our search to the Web Datamodel and use the `| from datamodel` function to benefit from schema accelerated searching capabilities, mainly because the second part of the detection is pretty heavy, it runs a regex across all _raw events that looks for `${jndi:ldap://` pattern across all potential web fields available to the raw data, like http headers for example. If you see results for this detection, it means that there was a attempt at a injection, which could be a reconnaissance activity or a valid expliotation attempt, but this does not exactly mean that the host was indeed successfully exploited.
@@ -70218,7 +70218,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = If there is a vulnerablility scannner lookin
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70232,7 +70232,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-257A", "CISA AA22-320A", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c184f12e-5c90-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70247,7 +70247,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | from datamodel Web.Web | regex _raw="[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\:|\%3A|\/|\%2F)\w+(\:\/\/|\%3A\%2F\%2F)(\$\{.*?\}(\.)?)?" | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_attempt_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule]
+[ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell payloads can be injected via various methods, but on of the most common vectors injection is via Web calls. Many of the vulnerable java web applications that are using log4j have a web component to them are specially targets of this injection, specifically projects like Apache Struts, Flink, Druid, and Solr. The exploit is triggered by a LDAP lookup function in the log4j package, its invocation is similar to `${jndi:ldap://PAYLOAD_INJECTED}`, when executed against vulnerable web applications the invocation can be seen in various part of web logs. Specifically it has been successfully exploited via headers like X-Forwarded-For, User-Agent, Referer, and X-Api-Version. In this detection we match the invocation function with a network connection to a malicious ip address.
@@ -70259,7 +70259,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = If there is a vulnerablility scannner lookin
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-12-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-12-13
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70273,7 +70273,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CISA AA22-320A", "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 30, "cve": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "69afee44-5c91-11ec-bf1f-497c9a704a72", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70288,7 +70288,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | from datamodel Web.Web | rex field=_raw max_match=0 "[jJnNdDiI]{4}(\:|\%3A|\/|\%2F)(?<proto>\w+)(\:\/\/|\%3A\%2F\%2F)(\$\{.*?\}(\.)?)?(?<affected_host>[a-zA-Z0-9\.\-\_\$]+)" | join affected_host type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | rename dest AS affected_host] | fillnull | stats count by action, category, dest, dest_port, http_content_type, http_method, http_referrer, http_user_agent, site, src, url, url_domain, user | `log4shell_jndi_payload_injection_with_outbound_connection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege - Rule]
+[ESCU - Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic detects potential exploitation attempts against Microsoft SharePoint Server vulnerability CVE-2023-29357. This vulnerability pertains to an elevation of privilege due to improper handling of authentication tokens. By monitoring for suspicious activities related to SharePoint Server, the analytic identifies attempts to exploit this vulnerability. If a true positive is detected, it indicates a serious security breach where an attacker might have gained privileged access to the SharePoint environment, potentially leading to data theft or other malicious activities.
@@ -70300,7 +70300,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may occur if there are legit
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-09-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-09-27
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70314,7 +70314,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege CVE-2023-29357"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2023-29357"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fcf4bd3f-a79f-4b7a-83bf-2692d60b859d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70335,7 +70335,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("/_api/web/siteusers*","/_api/web/currentuser*") Web.status=200 Web.http_method=GET by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `microsoft_sharepoint_server_elevation_of_privilege_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule]
+[ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. This search looks for Web requests to faux domains similar to the one that you want to have monitored for abuse. 
@@ -70347,7 +70347,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = None at this time
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70361,7 +70361,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Brand Monitoring"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "134da869-e264-4a8f-8d7e-fcd0ec88f301", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70382,7 +70382,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as urls min(_time) as firstTime from datamodel=Web by Web.src | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `brand_abuse_web` | `monitor_web_traffic_for_brand_abuse_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Nginx ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule]
+[ESCU - Nginx ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic detects attempts to exploit the ConnectWise ScreenConnect CVE-2024-1709 vulnerability, which allows an attacker to bypass authentication using an alternate path or channel. The vulnerability, identified as critical with a CVSS score of 10, enables unauthorized users to access the SetupWizard.aspx page on already-configured ScreenConnect instances, potentially leading to the creation of administrative users and remote code execution. The search query provided looks for web requests to the SetupWizard.aspx page that could indicate exploitation attempts. This detection is crucial for identifying and responding to active exploitation of this vulnerability in environments running affected versions of ScreenConnect (23.9.7 and prior). It is recommended to update to version 23.9.8 or above immediately to remediate the issue, as detailed in the ConnectWise security advisory and further analyzed by Huntress researchers.
@@ -70394,7 +70394,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are not expected, as the det
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-23
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Nginx ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Nginx ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70408,7 +70408,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Nginx ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Nginx ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["ConnectWise ScreenConnect Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2024-1708", "CVE-2024-1709"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b3f7a803-e802-448b-8eb2-e796b223bccc", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70429,7 +70429,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `nginx_access_logs` uri_path IN ("*/SetupWizard.aspx/*","*/SetupWizard/") status=200 http_method=POST  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by src, dest, http_user_agent, url, uri_path, status, http_method, sourcetype, source | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `nginx_connectwise_screenconnect_authentication_bypass_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - PaperCut NG Remote Web Access Attempt - Rule]
+[ESCU - PaperCut NG Remote Web Access Attempt - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is designed to detect potential exploitation attempts on publicly accessible PaperCut NG servers. It identifies connections from public IP addresses to the server and specifically monitors for URI paths commonly found in proof-of-concept (POC) scripts for exploiting PaperCut NG vulnerabilities. These URI paths have been observed in both Metasploit modules and standalone scripts used for attacking PaperCut NG servers. When a public IP address is detected accessing one or more of these suspicious URI paths, an alert may be generated to notify the security team of the potential threat. The team can then investigate the source IP address, the targeted PaperCut NG server, and any other relevant information to determine the nature of the activity and take appropriate actions to mitigate the risk.
@@ -70441,7 +70441,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present, filter as ne
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-05-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-05-15
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - PaperCut NG Remote Web Access Attempt - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - PaperCut NG Remote Web Access Attempt - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70455,7 +70455,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - PaperCut NG Remote Web Access Attempt - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - PaperCut NG Remote Web Access Attempt - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["PaperCut MF NG Vulnerability"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9fcb214a-dc42-4ce7-a650-f1d2cab16a6a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70476,7 +70476,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("/app?service=page/SetupCompleted", "/app", "/app?service=page/PrinterList", "/app?service=direct/1/PrinterList/selectPrinter&sp=*", "/app?service=direct/1/PrinterDetails/printerOptionsTab.tab") NOT (src IN ("10.*.*.*","172.16.*.*", "192.168.*.*", "169.254.*.*", "127.*.*.*", "fc00::*", "fd00::*", "fe80::*")) by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest Web.dest_port sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `papercut_ng_remote_web_access_attempt_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule]
+[ESCU - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following correlation will identify activity related to Windows Exchange being actively exploited by adversaries related to ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell. In addition, the analytic correlates post-exploitation Cobalt Strike analytic story. Common post-exploitation behavior has been seen in the wild includes adversaries running nltest, Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz and adding a new user. The correlation specifically looks for 5 distinct analyticstories to trigger. Modify or tune as needed for your organization. 5 analytics is an arbitrary number but was chosen to reduce the amount of noise but also require the 2 analytic stories or a ProxyShell and CobaltStrike to fire. Adversaries will exploit the vulnerable Exchange server, abuse SSRF, drop a web shell, utilize the PowerShell Exchange modules and begin post-exploitation.
@@ -70488,7 +70488,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be limited, however tun
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70497,7 +70497,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - RIR - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - RIR - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "ProxyNotShell", "ProxyShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Correlation"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c32fab32-6aaf-492d-bfaf-acbed8e50cdf", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70518,7 +70518,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime sum(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_score, count(All_Risk.calculated_risk_score) as risk_event_count, values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic_id) as mitre_tactic_id_count, values(All_Risk.analyticstories) as analyticstories values(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id, dc(All_Risk.annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_technique_id) as mitre_technique_id_count, values(All_Risk.tag) as tag, values(source) as source, dc(source) as source_count dc(All_Risk.analyticstories) as dc_analyticstories from datamodel=Risk.All_Risk where All_Risk.analyticstories IN ("ProxyNotShell","ProxyShell") OR (All_Risk.analyticstories IN ("ProxyNotShell","ProxyShell") AND All_Risk.analyticstories="Cobalt Strike") All_Risk.risk_object_type="system" by _time span=1h All_Risk.risk_object All_Risk.risk_object_type | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Risk)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where source_count >=5 | `proxyshell_proxynotshell_behavior_detected_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Spring4Shell Payload URL Request - Rule]
+[ESCU - Spring4Shell Payload URL Request - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is static indicators related to CVE-2022-22963, Spring4Shell. The 3 indicators provide an amount of fidelity that source IP is attemping to exploit a web shell on the destination. The filename and cmd are arbitrary in this exploitation. Java will write a JSP to disk and a process will spawn from Java based on the cmd passed. This is indicative of typical web shell activity.
@@ -70530,7 +70530,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = The jsp file names are static names used in
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-07-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-07-12
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Spring4Shell Payload URL Request - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Spring4Shell Payload URL Request - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70544,7 +70544,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Spring4Shell Payload URL Request - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Spring4Shell Payload URL Request - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "cve": ["CVE-2022-22965"], "impact": 60, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003", "T1505", "T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9d44d649-7d67-4559-95c1-8022ff49420b", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70565,7 +70565,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN ("GET") Web.url IN ("*tomcatwar.jsp*","*poc.jsp*","*shell.jsp*") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `spring4shell_payload_url_request_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule]
+[ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects long URLs that contain multiple SQL commands. A proactive approach helps to detect and respond to potential threats earlier, mitigating the risks associated with SQL injection attacks. This detection is made by a Splunk query that searches for web traffic data where the destination category is a web server and the URL length is greater than 1024 characters or the HTTP user agent length is greater than 200 characters. This detection is important because it suggests that an attacker is attempting to exploit a web application through SQL injection. SQL injection is a common technique used by attackers to exploit vulnerabilities in web applications and gain unauthorized access to databases. Attackers can insert malicious SQL commands into a URL to manipulate the application's database and retrieve sensitive information or modify data. The impact of a successful SQL injection attack can be severe, potentially leading to data breaches, unauthorized access, and even complete compromise of the affected system. False positives might occur since the legitimate use of web applications or specific URLs in your environment can trigger the detection. Therefore, you must review and validate any alerts generated by this analytic before taking any action. Next steps include reviewing the source and destination of the web traffic, as well as the specific URL and HTTP user agent. Additionally, capture and analyze any relevant on-disk artifacts and review concurrent processes to determine the source of the attack. 
@@ -70577,7 +70577,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = It's possible that legitimate traffic will h
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-03-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-03-28
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70591,7 +70591,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["SQL Injection"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "e0aad4cf-0790-423b-8328-7564d0d938f9", "detection_version": "3"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70612,7 +70612,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web where Web.dest_category=web_server AND (Web.url_length > 1024 OR Web.http_user_agent_length > 200) by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.url_length Web.http_user_agent | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | eval url=lower(url) | eval num_sql_cmds=mvcount(split(url, "alter%20table")) + mvcount(split(url, "between")) + mvcount(split(url, "create%20table")) + mvcount(split(url, "create%20database")) + mvcount(split(url, "create%20index")) + mvcount(split(url, "create%20view")) + mvcount(split(url, "delete")) + mvcount(split(url, "drop%20database")) + mvcount(split(url, "drop%20index")) + mvcount(split(url, "drop%20table")) + mvcount(split(url, "exists")) + mvcount(split(url, "exec")) + mvcount(split(url, "group%20by")) + mvcount(split(url, "having")) + mvcount(split(url, "insert%20into")) + mvcount(split(url, "inner%20join")) + mvcount(split(url, "left%20join")) + mvcount(split(url, "right%20join")) + mvcount(split(url, "full%20join")) + mvcount(split(url, "select")) + mvcount(split(url, "distinct")) + mvcount(split(url, "select%20top")) + mvcount(split(url, "union")) + mvcount(split(url, "xp_cmdshell")) - 24 | where num_sql_cmds > 3 | `sql_injection_with_long_urls_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Supernova Webshell - Rule]
+[ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = **WARNING**, this detection is marked **EXPERIMENTAL** by the Splunk Threat Research Team. This means that the detection has been manually tested but we do not have the associated attack data to perform automated testing or cannot share this attack dataset due to its sensitive nature. If you have any questions feel free to email us at: research@splunk.com. The following analytic detects the presence of the Supernova webshell, which was used in the SUNBURST attack. This webshell can be used by attackers to gain unauthorized access to a compromised system and run arbitrary code. This detection is made by a Splunk query that searches for specific patterns in web URLs, including "*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes*", "*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz*", "*logoimagehandler.ashx*method*", and "*logoimagehandler.ashx*args*". These patterns are commonly used by the Supernova webshell to communicate with its command and control server. This detection is important because it indicates a potential compromise and unauthorized access to the system to run arbitrary code, which can lead to data theft, ransomware, or other damaging outcomes. False positives might occur since the patterns used by the webshell can also be present in legitimate web traffic. In such cases, tune the search to the specific environment and monitor it closely for any suspicious activity. Next steps include reviewing the web URLs and inspecting any relevant on-disk artifacts. Additionally, review concurrent processes and network connections to identify the source of the attack. 
@@ -70624,7 +70624,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = There might be false positives associted wit
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Supernova Webshell - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70638,7 +70638,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Experimental - Supernova Webshell - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Experimental - Supernova Webshell - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["NOBELIUM Group"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2ec08a09-9ff1-4dac-b59f-1efd57972ec1", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70659,7 +70659,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Web.Web where web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*codes* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*clazz* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*method* OR Web.url=*logoimagehandler.ashx*args* by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.vendor_product Web.user Web.http_user_agent _time span=1s | `supernova_webshell_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt - Rule]
+[ESCU - VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is designed to detect potential exploitation attempts against VMWare vRealize Network Insight that align with the characteristics of CVE-2023-20887. This specific vulnerability is a critical security flaw that, if exploited, could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system.\
@@ -70677,7 +70677,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives will be present based on gat
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-06-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-06-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70691,7 +70691,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["VMware Aria Operations vRealize CVE-2023-20887"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1133", "T1190", "T1210", "T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d5d865e4-03e6-43da-98f4-28a4f42d4df7", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70715,7 +70715,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("*/saas./resttosaasservlet*")  Web.http_method=POST Web.status IN ("unknown", "200") by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vmware_aria_operations_exploit_attempt_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt - Rule]
+[ESCU - VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following hunting analytic identifies the server side template injection related to CVE-2022-22954, however is a variation found within the same endpoint of the URL scheme.
@@ -70727,7 +70727,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the activi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70736,7 +70736,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["VMware Server Side Injection and Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 50, "cve": ["CVE-2022-22954"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Hunting"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5796b570-ad12-44df-b1b5-b7e6ae3aabb0", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70751,7 +70751,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN ("GET") Web.url="*deviceudid=*" AND Web.url IN ("*java.lang.ProcessBuilder*","*freemarker.template.utility.ObjectConstructor*") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vmware_server_side_template_injection_hunt_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection - Rule]
+[ESCU - VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the server side template injection related to CVE-2022-22954. Based on the scanning activity across the internet and proof of concept code available the template injection occurs at catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceudid=. Upon triage, review parallel processes and VMware logs. Following the deviceudid= may be a command to be executed. Capture any file creates and review modified files on disk.
@@ -70763,7 +70763,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present if the activi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-19
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70777,7 +70777,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["VMware Server Side Injection and Privilege Escalation"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 70, "cve": ["CVE-2022-22954"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "9e5726fe-8fde-460e-bd74-cddcf6c86113", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70792,7 +70792,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN ("GET") Web.url="*/catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceudid=*" AND Web.url="*freemarker.template.utility.Execute*" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `vmware_workspace_one_freemarker_server_side_template_injection_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Web JSP Request via URL - Rule]
+[ESCU - Web JSP Request via URL - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the common URL requests used by a recent CVE - CVE-2022-22965, or Spring4Shell, to access a webshell on the remote webserver. The filename and cmd are arbitrary in this exploitation. Java will write a JSP to disk and a process will spawn from Java based on the cmd passed. This is indicative of typical web shell activity.
@@ -70804,7 +70804,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present with legitima
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Web JSP Request via URL - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web JSP Request via URL - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70818,7 +70818,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Web JSP Request via URL - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Web JSP Request via URL - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2022-22965"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1505.003", "T1505", "T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "2850c734-2d44-4431-8139-1a56f6f54c01", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70839,7 +70839,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN ("GET") Web.url IN ("*.jsp?cmd=*","*j&cmd=*") by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_jsp_request_via_url_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Web Remote ShellServlet Access - Rule]
+[ESCU - Web Remote ShellServlet Access - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = This analytic identifies attempts to access the Remote ShellServlet on a web server, which is utilized to execute commands. Such activity is commonly linked with web shells and other forms of malicious behavior. It was specifically detected on a Confluence server in relation to CVE-2023-22518 and CVE-2023-22515. Activities preceding access to the shell servlet include the addition of a plugin to Confluence. Additionally, it is advisable to monitor for ShellServlet?act=3, ShellServlet, or obfuscated variations such as Sh3llServlet1.
@@ -70851,7 +70851,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may occur depending on the w
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-04-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-04-02
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Web Remote ShellServlet Access - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Remote ShellServlet Access - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70865,7 +70865,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Web Remote ShellServlet Access - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Web Remote ShellServlet Access - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["CVE-2023-22515 Privilege Escalation Vulnerability Confluence Data Center and Server"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 90, "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "c2a332c3-24a2-4e24-9455-0e80332e6746", "detection_version": "2"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70886,7 +70886,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("*plugins/servlet/com.jsos.shell/*") Web.status=200 by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_remote_shellservlet_access_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module - Rule]
+[ESCU - Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies the payload related to Spring4Shell, CVE-2022-22965. This analytic uses Splunk Stream HTTP to view the http request body, form data. STRT reviewed all the current proof of concept code and determined the commonality with the payloads being passed used the same fields "class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first".
@@ -70898,7 +70898,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may occur and filtering may
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-06
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70912,7 +70912,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2022-22965"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "fcdfd69d-0ca3-4476-920e-9b633cb4593e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70933,7 +70933,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `stream_http` http_method IN ("POST") | stats values(form_data) as http_request_body min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by src dest http_method http_user_agent uri_path url bytes_in bytes_out | search http_request_body IN ("*class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.fileDateFormat=_*", "*class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.pattern*","*suffix=.jsp*") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_spring4shell_http_request_class_module_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter - Rule]
+[ESCU - Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies activity related to the web application Spring Cloud Function that was recently idenfied as vulnerable. This is CVE-2022-22963. Multiple proof of concept code was released. The URI that is hit includes `functionrouter`. The specifics of the exploit include a status of 500. In this query we did not include it, but for filtering you can add Web.status=500. The exploit data itself (based on all the POCs) is located in the form_data field. This field will include all class.modules being called.
@@ -70945,7 +70945,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be present with legitima
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-04-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-04-05
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -70959,7 +70959,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 60, "cve": ["CVE-2022-22963"], "impact": 70, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "89dddbad-369a-4f8a-ace2-2439218735bc", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -70980,7 +70980,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method IN ("POST") Web.url="*/functionRouter*" by Web.http_user_agent Web.http_method, Web.url,Web.url_length Web.src, Web.dest Web.status sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `web_spring_cloud_function_functionrouter_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule]
+[ESCU - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic utilizes the Web datamodel and identifies the ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell abuse. This vulnerability is a Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability, which is a web vulnerability that allows an adversary to exploit vulnerable functionality to access server side or local network services by affectively traversing the external firewall using vulnerable web functionality. This analytic looks for the URI path and query of autodiscover, powershell and mapi along with a POST occurring. It will tally a simple score and show the output of the events that match. This analytic may be added to by simply creating a new eval statement and modifying the hardcode digit for Score.
@@ -70992,7 +70992,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are limited.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-07-10
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -71006,7 +71006,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["BlackByte Ransomware", "ProxyNotShell", "ProxyShell"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2022-41040", "CVE-2022-41082"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190", "T1133"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "d436f9e7-0ee7-4a47-864b-6dea2c4e2752", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -71027,7 +71027,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where (Web.status=200 OR Web.status=302 OR Web.status=401) AND Web.http_method=POST by Web.src Web.status Web.uri_path Web.dest Web.http_method Web.uri_query | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | eval is_autodiscover=if(like(lower(uri_path),"%autodiscover%"),1,0) | eval powershell = if(match(lower(uri_query),"powershell"), "1",0) | eval mapi=if(like(uri_query,"%/mapi/%"),1,0) | addtotals fieldname=Score is_autodiscover, powershell, mapi | fields Score, src,dest, status, uri_query,uri_path,http_method | where Score >= 2 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_exchange_autodiscover_ssrf_abuse_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE - Rule]
+[ESCU - WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic identifies potential exploitation of the WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE vulnerability. The search is focused on the URL path "/wp-json/bricks/v1/render_element" with a status code of 200 and a POST method. It has been addressed by the theme developers in version 1.9.6.1 released on February 13, 2024. The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2024-25600. The POC exploit is simple enough and will spawn commands on the target server. The exploit is actively being used in the wild.
@@ -71039,7 +71039,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives may be possible, however we
 action.escu.creation_date = 2024-02-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2024-02-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -71053,7 +71053,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["WordPress Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 100, "cve": ["CVE-2024-25600"], "impact": 100, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "56a8771a-3fda-4959-b81d-2f266e2f679f", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -71074,7 +71074,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("*/wp-json/bricks/v1/render_element") Web.status=200 Web.http_method=POST by Web.src, Web.dest, Web.http_user_agent, Web.url, Web.uri_path, Web.status, Web.http_method, sourcetype, source | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wordpress_bricks_builder_plugin_rce_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - WS FTP Remote Code Execution - Rule]
+[ESCU - WS FTP Remote Code Execution - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is designed to detect a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2023-40044) in WS_FTP, a managed file transfer software by Progress. The search specifically looks for HTTP requests to the "/AHT/AhtApiService.asmx/AuthUser" URL with a status of 200, which could indicate an exploitation attempt.
@@ -71086,7 +71086,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = If WS_FTP Server is not in use, this analyti
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - WS FTP Remote Code Execution - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - WS FTP Remote Code Execution - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -71100,7 +71100,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - WS FTP Remote Code Execution - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - WS FTP Remote Code Execution - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "confidence": 80, "cve": ["CVE-2023-40044"], "impact": 90, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b84e8f39-4e7b-4d4f-9e7c-fcd29a227845", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -71121,7 +71121,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("/AHT/AhtApiService.asmx/AuthUser") Web.status=200 Web.http_method=POST by Web.http_user_agent, Web.status Web.http_method, Web.url, Web.url_length, Web.src, Web.dest, sourcetype | `drop_dm_object_name("Web")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `ws_ftp_remote_code_execution_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Zscaler Adware Activities Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[ESCU - Zscaler Adware Activities Threat Blocked - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The following analytic is designed to detect potential adware activity which is blocked by Zscaler. Utilizing Splunk search functionality, it filters web proxy logs for blocked actions associated with adware threats. Key data points like the device owner, user, URL category, destination URL and IP, and action taken are analyzed to highlight possible adware intrusions.
@@ -71133,7 +71133,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscaler confi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Adware Activities Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Zscaler Adware Activities Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -71147,7 +71147,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Adware Activities Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Zscaler Adware Activities Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "3407b250-345a-4d71-80db-c91e555a3ece", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -71162,7 +71162,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `zscaler_proxy` action=blocked threatname=*adware* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  by action deviceowner user urlcategory url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_adware_activities_threat_blocked_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Zscaler Behavior Analysis Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[ESCU - Zscaler Behavior Analysis Threat Blocked - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The analytic is built to identify threats blocked by the Zscaler proxy based on behavior analysis. It filters web proxy logs for entries where actions are blocked and threat names and classes are specified. The search further refines the results to include only those with reasons related to "block". It then aggregates the count, providing a clear view of the threat landscape as handled by the behavior analysis proxy.
@@ -71174,7 +71174,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscalar confi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Behavior Analysis Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Zscaler Behavior Analysis Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -71188,7 +71188,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Behavior Analysis Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Zscaler Behavior Analysis Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "289ad59f-8939-4331-b805-f2bd51d36fb8", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -71203,7 +71203,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `zscaler_proxy` action=blocked threatname!="None" threatclass="Behavior Analysis" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user threatname url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_behavior_analysis_threat_blocked_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Zscaler CryptoMiner Downloaded Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[ESCU - Zscaler CryptoMiner Downloaded Threat Blocked - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The analytic is crafted to detect potential download of cryptomining software within a network that is blocked by Zscaler. Utilizing Splunk search functionality, it sifts through web proxy logs for blocked actions associated with cryptominer threats. Key data points like the device owner, user, URL category, destination URL and IP, and action taken are analyzed to highlight possible cryptominer downloads. This detection, categorized as an anomaly, aids in early identification and mitigation of cryptomining activities, ensuring network integrity and resource availability.
@@ -71215,7 +71215,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscaler confi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Zscaler CryptoMiner Downloaded Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Zscaler CryptoMiner Downloaded Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -71229,7 +71229,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Zscaler CryptoMiner Downloaded Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Zscaler CryptoMiner Downloaded Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 40, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ed76ce37-bab9-4ec0-bf3e-9c6a6cf43365", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -71244,7 +71244,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `zscaler_proxy` action=blocked threatname=*miner* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user urlcategory url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_cryptominer_downloaded_threat_blocked_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Zscaler Employment Search Web Activity - Rule]
+[ESCU - Zscaler Employment Search Web Activity - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The analytic is designed to identify destinations within a network deemed as potential Empolyment Searches. Utilizing Splunk's search functionality, it processes web proxy logs, focusing on entries marked as 'Job/Employment Search'. Key data points such as device owner, user, URL category, destination URL and IP, and action taken are analyzed to enumerate the employment risk destinations. This anomaly-type detection aids in monitoring and managing risks, promoting a secure environment from insider threats.
@@ -71256,7 +71256,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscaler confi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-14
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Employment Search Web Activity - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Zscaler Employment Search Web Activity - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -71270,7 +71270,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Employment Search Web Activity - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Zscaler Employment Search Web Activity - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 5, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5456bdef-d765-4565-8e1f-61ca027bc50e", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -71285,7 +71285,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `zscaler_proxy` urlsupercategory="Job/Employment Search" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user urlcategory url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_employment_search_web_activity_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Zscaler Exploit Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[ESCU - Zscaler Exploit Threat Blocked - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The analytic is aimed at detecting potential exploit attempts that involve command and script interpreters blocked by Zscaler. By querying web proxy logs, it isolates incidents where actions have been either blocked with references to exploits. The search compiles statistics by user, threat name, URL, hostname, file class, and filename, giving a detailed view of any exploit-related activity. Marked as a tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP), this analytic is essential for identifying and mitigating exploit attempts.
@@ -71297,7 +71297,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscaler confi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Exploit Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Zscaler Exploit Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -71311,7 +71311,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Exploit Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Zscaler Exploit Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["DE.CM"], "type": "TTP"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "94665d8c-b841-4ff4-acb4-34d613e2cbfe", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -71332,7 +71332,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `zscaler_proxy` action=blocked threatname=*exploit* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime  by user threatname src hostname fileclass filename url dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_exploit_threat_blocked_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Zscaler Legal Liability Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[ESCU - Zscaler Legal Liability Threat Blocked - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The analytic is aimed at identifying the most significant legal liability threats blocked by zcaler web proxy. It leverages web proxy logs to list the  destinations, device owners, users, URL categories, and actions that are associated with Legal Liability, by utilizing stats on unique fields, it ensures a precise focus on unique legal liability threats, thereby providing valuable insights for organizations to enforce legal compliance and risk management.
@@ -71344,7 +71344,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscaler confi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-31
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-31
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Legal Liability Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Zscaler Legal Liability Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -71358,7 +71358,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Legal Liability Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Zscaler Legal Liability Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "bbf55ebf-c416-4f62-94d9-4064f2a28014", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -71373,7 +71373,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `zscaler_proxy` urlclass="Legal Liability" |  stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user urlcategory url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | dedup urlcategory | `zscaler_legal_liability_threat_blocked_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Zscaler Malware Activity Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[ESCU - Zscaler Malware Activity Threat Blocked - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The analytic targets the detection of potential malware activities within a network that are blocked by Zscaler. By filtering web proxy logs for blocked actions associated with malware, where a threat category is specified, the analytic aggregates occurrences by user, URL, and threat category. This approach ensures a focused identification of malware activities, making it an effective tool for ongoing network security monitoring and anomaly detection.
@@ -71385,7 +71385,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscalar confi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-25
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Malware Activity Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Zscaler Malware Activity Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -71399,7 +71399,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Malware Activity Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Zscaler Malware Activity Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "ae874ad8-e353-40a7-87d4-420cdfb27d1a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -71414,7 +71414,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `zscaler_proxy` action=blocked threatname=*malware* threatcategory!=None | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user urlcategory url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_malware_activity_threat_blocked_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Zscaler Phishing Activity Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[ESCU - Zscaler Phishing Activity Threat Blocked - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The analytic is devised to detect likely phishing attempts within a network blocked by Zscaler. By leveraging Splunk search functionality, it evaluates web proxy logs for blocked actions correlated with phishing threats, specifically those tagged as HTML.Phish. Critical data points such as the user, threat name, URL, and hostname are analyzed to accentuate possible phishing activities. This anomaly-type detection serves as an early warning system, facilitating prompt investigation and mitigation of phishing threats, thereby bolstering network security.
@@ -71426,7 +71426,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscalar confi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Phishing Activity Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Zscaler Phishing Activity Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -71440,7 +71440,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Phishing Activity Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Zscaler Phishing Activity Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 20, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "68d3e2c1-e97f-4310-b080-dea180b48aa9", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -71455,7 +71455,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `zscaler_proxy` action=blocked threatname="HTML.Phish*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user threatname url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_phishing_activity_threat_blocked_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Zscaler Potentially Abused File Download - Rule]
+[ESCU - Zscaler Potentially Abused File Download - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The analytic is engineered to detect potential rarely abused malicious filetypes downloaded within a network. They are usually used to spread malwares. Utilizing Splunk search functionality, it examines web proxy logs for blocked actions related to potential threats. Essential data points like the deviceowner, user, urlcategory, url, dest, and filename taken are analyzed to highlight possible malicious endeavors. This detection, marked as an anomaly, aids in early identification and mitigation of malicious download activities, ensuring a safer network environment.
@@ -71467,7 +71467,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscaler confi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-11-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-11-21
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Potentially Abused File Download - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Zscaler Potentially Abused File Download - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -71481,7 +71481,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Potentially Abused File Download - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Zscaler Potentially Abused File Download - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "b0c21379-f4ba-4bac-a958-897e260f964a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -71496,7 +71496,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `zscaler_proxy` url IN ("*.scr", "*.dll", "*.bat", "*.lnk") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by deviceowner user urlcategory url src filename dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_potentially_abused_file_download_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Zscaler Privacy Risk Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[ESCU - Zscaler Privacy Risk Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The analytic is designed to identify blocked destinations within a network deemed as privacy risks by Zscaler. Utilizing Splunk search functionality, it processes web proxy logs, focusing on entries marked as Privacy Risk. Key data points such as device owner, user, URL category, destination URL and IP, and action taken are analyzed to enumerate the privacy risk destinations. This anomaly-type detection aids in monitoring and managing privacy risks, promoting a secure network environment.
@@ -71508,7 +71508,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscaler confi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Privacy Risk Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Zscaler Privacy Risk Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -71522,7 +71522,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Privacy Risk Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Zscaler Privacy Risk Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "5456bdef-d765-4565-8e1f-61ca027bc50d", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -71537,7 +71537,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `zscaler_proxy` action=blocked urlclass="Privacy Risk" |  stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user urlcategory url src dest | dedup urlcategory | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_privacy_risk_destinations_threat_blocked_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Zscaler Scam Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule]
+[ESCU - Zscaler Scam Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The analytic is engineered to detect potential scam activities within a network by Zscaler. Utilizing Splunk search functionality, it examines web proxy logs for blocked actions related to scam threats. Essential data points like the device owner, user, URL category, destination URL and IP, and action taken are analyzed to highlight possible scam endeavors. This detection, marked as an anomaly, aids in early identification and mitigation of scam activities, ensuring a safer network environment.
@@ -71549,7 +71549,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscaler confi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Scam Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Zscaler Scam Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -71563,7 +71563,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Scam Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Zscaler Scam Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 10, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "a0c21379-f4ba-4bac-a958-897e260f964a", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -71578,7 +71578,7 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `zscaler_proxy` action=blocked threatname=*scam* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user urlcategory url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_scam_destinations_threat_blocked_filter`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Zscaler Virus Download threat blocked - Rule]
+[ESCU - Zscaler Virus Download threat blocked - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 description = The analytic is formulated to detect blocked virus download activities within a network by Zscaler. Employing Splunk's search functionality, it reviews web proxy logs for blocked actions indicative of virus threats downloads. Key data points like the device owner, user, URL category, destination URL and IP, and action taken are analyzed to pinpoint possible virus downloads. As an anomaly-type detection, this analytic facilitates early detection and remediation of virus download attempts, contributing to enhanced network security.
@@ -71590,7 +71590,7 @@ action.escu.known_false_positives = False positives are limited to Zscaler confi
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-10-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-10-30
 action.escu.confidence = high
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Virus Download threat blocked - Rule
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Zscaler Virus Download threat blocked - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.product = ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"]
 action.escu.providing_technologies = null
@@ -71604,7 +71604,7 @@ cron_schedule = 0 * * * *
 dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
-action.correlationsearch.label = ES Content Updates - Zscaler Virus Download threat blocked - Rule
+action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Zscaler Virus Download threat blocked - Rule
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats"], "cis20": ["CIS 10"], "confidence": 80, "impact": 50, "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566"], "nist": ["DE.AE"], "type": "Anomaly"}
 action.correlationsearch.metadata = {"deprecated": "0", "detection_id": "aa19e627-d448-4a31-85cd-82068dec5691", "detection_version": "1"}
 schedule_window = auto
@@ -71619,15 +71619,15 @@ realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
 search = `zscaler_proxy` action=blocked threatname!="None" threatclass=Virus | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action deviceowner user urlcategory url src dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `zscaler_virus_download_threat_blocked_filter`
 
-### END ES Content Updates DETECTIONS ###
+### END ESCU DETECTIONS ###
 
-### ES Content Updates BASELINES ###
+### ESCU BASELINES ###
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS]
+[ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS
 description = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of outbound connections blocked in your VPC flow logs by each source IP address (IP address of your EC2 instances). Also recorded is the number of data points for each source IP. This table outputs to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-07
@@ -71645,11 +71645,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudwatchlogs_vpcflow` action=blocked (src_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR src_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR src_ip=192.168.0.0/16) ( dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/8 AND dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 AND dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as numberOfBlockedConnections by _time, src_ip | stats count(numberOfBlockedConnections) as numDataPoints, latest(numberOfBlockedConnections) as latestCount, avg(numberOfBlockedConnections) as avgBlockedConnections, stdev(numberOfBlockedConnections) as stdevBlockedConnections by src_ip | table src_ip, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgBlockedConnections, stdevBlockedConnections | outputlookup baseline_blocked_outbound_connections | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User]
+[ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-07
@@ -71667,11 +71667,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count as api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user!=unknown All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(api_calls) as api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction api_calls by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed]
+[ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are destroyed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances destroyed in a small time window.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-25
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-25
@@ -71690,11 +71690,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count as instances_destroyed from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=deleted AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_destroyed=coalesce(instances_destroyed, (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_destroyed, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction instances_destroyed by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_destroyed_v1 dist=expon show_density=true
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched]
+[ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many instances are created in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of instances created in a small time window.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-14
@@ -71713,11 +71713,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count as instances_launched from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=created) AND All_Changes.status=success AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by _time span=1h | makecontinuous span=1h _time | eval instances_launched=coalesce(instances_launched, (random()%2)*0.0000000001) | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time instances_launched, HourOfDay, isWeekend | fit DensityFunction instances_launched by "HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_instances_created_v1 dist=expon show_density=true
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User]
+[ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many API calls for security groups are performed by each user. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model and the model is rebuilt weekly.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-07
@@ -71735,11 +71735,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count as security_group_api_calls from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.object_category=firewall All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user _time span=1h | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval HourOfDay=floor(HourOfDay/4)*4 | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%w") | eval isWeekend=if(DayOfWeek >= 1 AND DayOfWeek <= 5, 0, 1) | table _time security_group_api_calls, user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | eventstats dc(security_group_api_calls) as security_group_api_calls by user, HourOfDay, isWeekend | where security_group_api_calls >= 1 | fit DensityFunction security_group_api_calls by "user,HourOfDay,isWeekend" into cloud_excessive_security_group_api_calls_v1 dist=norm show_density=true
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK]
+[ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the command lines observed for each user in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies outliers in the length of the command line.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-05-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-05-08
@@ -71757,11 +71757,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as start_time max(_time) as end_time FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | search user!=unknown | `security_content_ctime(start_time)`| `security_content_ctime(end_time)`| eval processlen=len(process) | fit DensityFunction processlen by user into cmdline_pdfmodel
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK]
+[ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the length of the DNS queries for each DNS record type observed in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which uses it to identify outliers in the length of the DNS query.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-05-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-05-08
@@ -71779,11 +71779,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type | search DNS.record_type=* | `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | eval query_length = len(query) | fit DensityFunction query_length by record_type into dns_query_pdfmodel
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO]
+[ESCU - Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO
 description = This baseline rule calculates the average and standard deviation of inbound and outbound network IO for each Kubernetes container. It uses metrics from the Kubernetes API and the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. The rule generates a lookup table with the average and standard deviation of the network IO for each container. This baseline can be used to detect anomalies in network communication behavior, which may indicate security threats such as data exfiltration, command and control communication, or compromised container behavior.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-19
@@ -71801,11 +71801,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats avg(k8s.pod.network.io) as io where `kubernetes_metrics` by k8s.cluster.name k8s.pod.name k8s.node.name direction span=10s | eval service = replace('k8s.pod.name', "-\w{5}$|-[abcdef0-9]{8,10}-\w{5}$", "") | eval key = 'k8s.cluster.name' + ":" + 'service' | stats avg(eval(if(direction="transmit", io,null()))) as avg_outbound_network_io avg(eval(if(direction="receive", io,null()))) as avg_inbound_network_io stdev(eval(if(direction="transmit", io,null()))) as stdev_outbound_network_io stdev(eval(if(direction="receive", io,null()))) as stdev_inbound_network_io count latest(_time) as last_seen by key | outputlookup k8s_container_network_io_baseline 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio]
+[ESCU - Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline Of Kubernetes Container Network IO Ratio
 description = This baseline rule calculates the average ratio of inbound to outbound network IO for each Kubernetes container. It uses metrics from the Kubernetes API and the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. The rule generates a lookup table with the average and standard deviation of the network IO ratio for each container. This baseline can be used to detect anomalies in network communication behavior, which may indicate security threats such as data exfiltration, command and control communication, or compromised container behavior.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-19
@@ -71823,11 +71823,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats avg(k8s.pod.network.io) as io where `kubernetes_metrics` by k8s.cluster.name k8s.pod.name k8s.node.name direction span=10s | eval service = replace('k8s.pod.name', "-\w{5}$|-[abcdef0-9]{8,10}-\w{5}$", "") | eval key = 'k8s.cluster.name' + ":" + 'service' | stats avg(eval(if(direction="transmit", io,null()))) as outbound_network_io avg(eval(if(direction="receive", io,null()))) as inbound_network_io by key _time | eval inbound:outbound = inbound_network_io/outbound_network_io | eval outbound:inbound = outbound_network_io/inbound_network_io | stats avg(*:*) as avg_*:* stdev(*:*) as stdev_*:* count latest(_time) as last_seen by key | outputlookup k8s_container_network_io_ratio_baseline 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline Of Kubernetes Process Resource]
+[ESCU - Baseline Of Kubernetes Process Resource]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline Of Kubernetes Process Resource
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline Of Kubernetes Process Resource
 description = This baseline rule calculates the average and standard deviation of various process resources in a Kubernetes environment. It uses metrics from the Kubernetes API and the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. The rule generates a lookup table with the average and standard deviation of the resource utilization for each process. This baseline can be used to detect anomalies in process resource utilization, which may indicate security threats such as resource exhaustion attacks, cryptojacking, or compromised process behavior.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-18
@@ -71845,11 +71845,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats avg(process.*) as avg_process.* stdev(*) as stdev_* where `kubernetes_metrics` by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.executable.name | eval key = 'k8s.cluster.name' + ":" + 'host.name' + ":" + 'process.executable.name' | fillnull | outputlookup k8s_process_resource_baseline
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline Of Kubernetes Process Resource Ratio]
+[ESCU - Baseline Of Kubernetes Process Resource Ratio]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline Of Kubernetes Process Resource Ratio
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline Of Kubernetes Process Resource Ratio
 description = This baseline rule calculates the average and standard deviation of the ratio of various process resources in a Kubernetes environment. It uses metrics from the Kubernetes API and the Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring Add-on. The rule generates a lookup table with the average and standard deviation of the resource ratios for each process. This baseline can be used to detect anomalies in process resource utilization, which may indicate security threats such as resource exhaustion attacks, cryptojacking, or compromised process behavior.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2023-12-18
 action.escu.modification_date = 2023-12-18
@@ -71867,11 +71867,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | mstats avg(process.*) as process.* where `kubernetes_metrics` by host.name k8s.cluster.name k8s.node.name process.executable.name span=10s | eval cpu:mem = 'process.cpu.utilization'/'process.memory.utilization' | eval cpu:disk = 'process.cpu.utilization'/'process.disk.operations' | eval mem:disk = 'process.memory.utilization'/'process.memory.utilization' | eval cpu:threads = 'process.cpu.utilization'/'process.threads' | eval disk:threads = 'process.disk.operations'/'process.threads' | eval key = 'k8s.cluster.name' + ":" + 'host.name' + ":" + 'process.executable.name' | fillnull | stats avg(cpu:mem) as avg_cpu:mem stdev(cpu:mem) as stdev_cpu:mem avg(cpu:disk) as avg_cpu:disk stdev(cpu:disk) as stdev_cpu:disk avg(mem:disk) as avg_mem:disk stdev(mem:disk) as stdev_mem:disk avg(cpu:threads) as avg_cpu:threads stdev(cpu:threads) as stdev_cpu:threads avg(disk:threads) as avg_disk:threads stdev(disk:threads) as stdev_disk:threads count latest(_time) as last_seen by key | outputlookup k8s_process_resource_ratio_baseline 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN]
+[ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN
 description = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls that were related to network ACLs made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-21
@@ -71889,11 +71889,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` `network_acl_events` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup network_acl_activity_baseline | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN]
+[ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN
 description = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and standard deviation for the number of API calls related to deleting an S3 bucket by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-07-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-07-17
@@ -71911,11 +71911,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=DeleteBucket | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup s3_deletion_baseline | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN]
+[ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN
 description = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation for the number of API calls related to security groups made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-17
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-17
@@ -71933,11 +71933,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` `security_group_api_calls` | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup security_group_activity_baseline | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK]
+[ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model to characterize the number of SMB connections observed each hour for every day of week. By default, the search uses the last 30 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search to identify outliers in the number of SMB connections for that hour and day of the week.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-05-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-05-08
@@ -71955,11 +71955,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=139 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=445 OR All_Traffic.app=smb by _time span=1h, All_Traffic.src | eval HourOfDay=strftime(_time, "%H") | eval DayOfWeek=strftime(_time, "%A") | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | fit DensityFunction count by "HourOfDay,DayOfWeek" into smb_pdfmodel
 
-[ES Content Updates - Count of assets by category]
+[ESCU - Count of assets by category]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Count of assets by category
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Count of assets by category
 description = This search shows you every asset category you have and the assets that belong to those categories.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-13
@@ -71977,11 +71977,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | from datamodel Identity_Management.All_Assets | stats count values(nt_host) by category | sort -count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports]
+[ESCU - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Count of Unique IPs Connecting to Ports
 description = The search counts the number of times a connection was observed to each destination port, and the number of unique source IPs connecting to them.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-13
@@ -71999,11 +71999,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count dc(All_Traffic.src) as numberOfUniqueHosts from datamodel=Network_Traffic by All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | sort - count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts]
+[ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts
 description = This search looks for successful API activity in CloudTrail within the last 30 days, filters out known users from the identity table, and outputs values of users into `aws_service_accounts.csv` lookup file.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-03
@@ -72021,11 +72021,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` errorCode=success | rename userName as identity | search NOT [inputlookup identity_lookup_expanded | fields identity] | stats count by identity | table identity | outputlookup aws_service_accounts | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security]
+[ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Add Prohibited Processes to Enterprise Security
 description = This search takes the existing interesting process table from ES, filters out any existing additions added by ESCU and then updates the table with processes identified by ESCU that should be prohibited on your endpoints.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-15
@@ -72043,11 +72043,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | inputlookup prohibited_processes | search note!=ESCU* | inputlookup append=T prohibited_processes | fillnull value=* dest dest_pci_domain | fillnull value=false is_required is_secure | fillnull value=true is_prohibited | outputlookup prohibited_processes | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN]
+[ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN
 description = This search establishes, on a per-hour basis, the average and the standard deviation of the number of API calls made by each user. Also recorded is the number of data points for each user. This table is then outputted to a lookup file to allow the detection search to operate quickly.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-09
@@ -72065,11 +72065,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall | spath output=arn path=userIdentity.arn | bucket _time span=1h | stats count as apiCalls by _time, arn | stats count(apiCalls) as numDataPoints, latest(apiCalls) as latestCount, avg(apiCalls) as avgApiCalls, stdev(apiCalls) as stdevApiCalls by arn | table arn, latestCount, numDataPoints, avgApiCalls, stdevApiCalls | outputlookup api_call_by_user_baseline | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK]
+[ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many RunInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of RunInstances performed by a user in a small time window.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-11-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-11-14
@@ -72089,11 +72089,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_runinstances_mltk_input_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_launched by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_launched threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_runinstances_v1
 
-[ES Content Updates - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK]
+[ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK
 description = This search is used to build a Machine Learning Toolkit (MLTK) model for how many TerminateInstances users do in the environment. By default, the search uses the last 90 days of data to build the model. The model created by this search is then used in the corresponding detection search, which identifies subsequent outliers in the number of TerminateInstances performed by a user in a small time window.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-11-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-11-14
@@ -72113,11 +72113,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=TerminateInstances errorCode=success `ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_mltk_input_filter` | bucket span=10m _time | stats count as instances_terminated by _time src_user | fit DensityFunction instances_terminated threshold=0.0005 into ec2_excessive_terminateinstances_v1
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail]
+[ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail
 description = This search looks for successful API calls made by different user roles, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this user role. It also returns the name of the API call in our dataset--grouped by user role and name of the API call--that occurred within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for events where the user identity is Assumed Role.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-16
@@ -72135,11 +72135,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=AssumedRole | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by userName eventName | outputlookup previously_seen_api_calls_from_user_roles | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources
 description = This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-16
@@ -72157,11 +72157,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` (eventName=Run* OR eventName=Create*) | iplocation sourceIPAddress | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime by sourceIPAddress, City, Region, Country | outputlookup previously_seen_provisioning_activity_src | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen AMIs used to launch EC2 instances
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12
@@ -72179,11 +72179,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by amiID | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_amis | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen EC2 instance types
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-08
@@ -72201,11 +72201,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename requestParameters.instanceType as instanceType | fillnull value="m1.small" instanceType | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by instanceType | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_instance_types | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-15
@@ -72223,11 +72223,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=RunInstances errorCode=success | rename userIdentity.arn as arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_launches_by_user | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously seen users in CloudTrail]
+[ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously seen users in CloudTrail
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail
 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-30
@@ -72245,11 +72245,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail]
+[ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail
 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-30
@@ -72267,11 +72267,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail
 
-[ES Content Updates - Discover DNS records]
+[ESCU - Discover DNS records]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Discover DNS records
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Discover DNS records
 description = The search takes corporate and common cloud provider domains configured under `cim_corporate_email_domains.csv`, `cim_corporate_web_domains.csv`, and `cloud_domains.csv` finds their responses across the last 30 days from data in the `Network_Resolution ` datamodel, then stores the output under the `discovered_dns_records.csv` lookup
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-14
@@ -72289,11 +72289,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | inputlookup cim_corporate_email_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_corporate_web_domains.csv | inputlookup append=T cim_cloud_domains.csv | eval domain = trim(replace(domain, "\*", "")) | join domain [|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(DNS.record_type) as type, values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.message_type=RESPONSE DNS.answer!="unknown" DNS.answer!="" by DNS.query | rename DNS.query as query | where query!="unknown" | rex field=query "(?<domain>\w+\.\w+?)(?:$|/)"] | makemv delim=" " answer |  makemv delim=" " type | sort -count | table count,domain,type,query,answer | outputlookup createinapp=true discovered_dns_records
 
-[ES Content Updates - DNSTwist Domain Names]
+[ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - DNSTwist Domain Names
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names
 description = This search creates permutations of your existing domains, removes the valid domain names and stores them in a specified lookup file so they can be checked for in the associated detection searches.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08
@@ -72311,11 +72311,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | dnstwist domainlist=domains.csv | `remove_valid_domains` | eval domain_abuse="true" | table domain, domain_abuse | outputlookup brandMonitoring_lookup | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic]
+[ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic
 description = This search counts the numbers of times the system has generated remote desktop traffic.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-15
@@ -72333,11 +72333,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | sort - count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic]
+[ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic
 description = This search counts the numbers of times the system has created remote desktop traffic
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-15
@@ -72355,11 +72355,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=3389 by All_Traffic.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Traffic")` | sort - count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop]
+[ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Identify Systems Using Remote Desktop
 description = This search counts the numbers of times the remote desktop process, mstsc.exe, has run on each system.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01
@@ -72377,11 +72377,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="*mstsc.exe*" by Processes.dest Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | sort - count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Monitor Successful Backups]
+[ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Monitor Successful Backups
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups
 description = This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful backups are conducted in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should investigate.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
@@ -72399,11 +72399,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `netbackup` "Disk/Partition backup completed successfully." | bucket _time span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE
 
-[ES Content Updates - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups]
+[ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups
 description = This search is intended to give you a feel for how often backup failures happen in your environments.  Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should investigate.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
@@ -72421,11 +72421,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `netbackup` "An error occurred, failed to backup." | bucket _time span=1d | stats dc(COMPUTERNAME) as count values(COMPUTERNAME) as dest by _time, MESSAGE
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity
 description = This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-04
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-04
@@ -72443,11 +72443,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` eventName=AssumeRole | spath output=requestingAccountId path=userIdentity.accountId | spath output=requestedAccountId path=resources{}.accountId | search requestingAccountId=* | where requestingAccountId!=requestedAccountId | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by requestingAccountId, requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial
 description = This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-15
@@ -72465,11 +72465,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role |  `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role "arn:aws:sts:*:(?<dest_account>.*):" |  where  vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | table requestingAccountId requestedAccountId firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update
 description = This search looks for **AssumeRole** events where the requesting account differs from the requested account, then writes these relationships to a lookup file.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-15
@@ -72487,11 +72487,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=AssumeRole by Authentication.vendor_account Authentication.user Authentication.src Authentication.user_role | `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)` | rex field=user_role "arn:aws:sts:*:(?<dest_account>.*):" | where vendor_account != dest_account | rename vendor_account as requestingAccountId dest_account as requestedAccountId | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by requestingAccountId requestedAccountId | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_cross_account_activity
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen AWS Regions]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen AWS Regions
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions
 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where an AWS instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time (latest) and the first time (earliest) we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the value awsRegion for the last 30 days
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-01-08
@@ -72509,11 +72509,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` StartInstances | stats earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by awsRegion | outputlookup previously_seen_aws_regions| stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial
 description = This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every user role and command combination. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-03
@@ -72531,11 +72531,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update
 description = This search updates the table of the first and last times seen for every user role and command combination.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-03
@@ -72553,11 +72553,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.user_type=AssumedRole AND All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user, All_Changes.command | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user, command | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table user, command, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_api_calls_per_user_role
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched a cloud compute instance.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-15
@@ -72575,11 +72575,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen users that have launched a cloud compute instance.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-15
@@ -72597,11 +72597,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created AND All_Changes.object_category=instance by All_Changes.user| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "-90d@d") | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_creations_by_user
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud compute instances
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-08
@@ -72619,11 +72619,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created  by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")` | where image_id != "unknown" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen images used to launch cloud compute instances
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-12
@@ -72641,11 +72641,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.image_id | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | `drop_dm_object_name("Instance_Changes")` | where image_id != "unknown" | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_images | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by image_id | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_images
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance types
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-03
@@ -72663,11 +72663,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes.Instance_Changes")` | where instance_type != "unknown" | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen cloud compute instance types
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-03
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-03
@@ -72685,11 +72685,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.Instance_Changes.instance_type | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes.Instance_Changes")` | where instance_type != "unknown" | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by instance_type | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_type_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_compute_instance_types
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen users that have modified a cloud instance.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-29
@@ -72707,11 +72707,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 c=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update
 description = This search updates a table of previously seen Cloud Instance modifications that have been made by a user
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-29
@@ -72729,11 +72729,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=modified All_Changes.change_type=EC2 All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.user | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by user | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_compute_images_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_instance_modifications_by_user
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial
 description = This search builds a table of the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity. This is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something. This table is then cached.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-19
@@ -72751,11 +72751,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update
 description = This returns the first and last times seen for every IP address (along with its physical location) previously associated with cloud-provisioning activity within the last day. Cloud provisioning is broadly defined as any event that runs or creates something.  It then updates this information with historical data and filters out locations that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-08-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-08-20
@@ -72773,11 +72773,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where (All_Changes.action=started OR All_Changes.action=created) All_Changes.status=success by All_Changes.src | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | iplocation src | where isnotnull(Country) | table src, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, City, Country, Region | inputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by src, City, Country, Region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d"), 1, 0) | table src, City, Country, Region, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, enough_data | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_provisioning_activity_sources
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial
 description = This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the last 30 days
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-02
@@ -72795,11 +72795,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update
 description = This search looks for cloud compute events where a compute instance is started and creates a baseline of most recent time, `lastTime` and the first time `firstTime` we've seen this region in our dataset grouped by the region for the last 30 days
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-09-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-09-02
@@ -72817,11 +72817,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Change where All_Changes.action=created by All_Changes.vendor_region | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")` | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_cloud_regions | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by vendor_region | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), `previously_seen_cloud_region_forget_window`) | eventstats min(firstTimeSeen) as globalFirstTime | eval enough_data = if(globalFirstTime <= relative_time(now(), "-14d@d"), 1, 0) | outputlookup previously_seen_cloud_regions | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously seen command line arguments]
+[ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously seen command line arguments
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments
 description = This search looks for command-line arguments where `cmd.exe /c` is used to execute a program, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this command-line argument in our dataset within the last 30 days.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-03-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-03-01
@@ -72839,11 +72839,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process="* /c *" by Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User
 description = This search builds a table of previously seen ARNs that have launched a EC2 instance.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-05
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-05
@@ -72861,11 +72861,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` `ec2_modification_api_calls` errorCode=success | spath output=arn userIdentity.arn | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by arn | outputlookup previously_seen_ec2_modifications_by_user | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial
 description = This collects the services that have been started across your entire enterprise.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23
@@ -72883,11 +72883,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+) service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" | where state="running" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update
 description = This search returns the first and last time a Windows service was seen across your enterprise within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out Windows services pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is then cached.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-23
@@ -72905,11 +72905,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7036 | rex field=Message "The (?<service>[-\(\)\s\w]+) service entered the (?<state>\w+) state" | where state="running" | stats earliest(_time) as firstTimeSeen, latest(_time) as lastTimeSeen by service | inputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen, max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by service | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_windows_service_forget_window`") | outputlookup previously_seen_running_windows_services
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP]
+[ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP
 description = This search looks for successful access to S3 buckets from remote IP addresses, then creates a baseline of the earliest and latest times we have encountered this remote IP within the last 30 days. In this support search, we are only looking for S3 access events where the HTTP response code from AWS is "200"
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-28
@@ -72927,11 +72927,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_s3_accesslogs` http_status=200  | stats  earliest(_time) as earliest latest(_time) as latest by bucket_name remote_ip | outputlookup previously_seen_S3_access_from_remote_ip | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial
 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by username, within the last 30 days.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28
@@ -72949,11 +72949,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update
 description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by user, within the last hour.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28
@@ -72971,11 +72971,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature=ConsoleLogin by Authentication.user Authentication.src | iplocation Authentication.src | rename Authentication.user as user Authentication.src as src | table user src City Region Country firstTime lastTime | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial
 description = This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS). This table is then cached.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20
@@ -72993,11 +72993,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table dest, process_name, firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process
 
-[ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update]
+[ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update
 description = This search returns the first and last time a process was seen per endpoint with a parent process of zoom.exe (Windows) or zoom.us (macOS) within the last hour. It then updates this information with historical data and filters out proces_name and endpoint pairs that have not been seen within the specified time window. This updated table is outputed to disk.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-20
@@ -73015,11 +73015,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTimeSeen max(_time) as lastTimeSeen from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=zoom.us) by Processes.process_name Processes.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | table firstTimeSeen, lastTimeSeen, process_name, dest | inputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process append=t | stats min(firstTimeSeen) as firstTimeSeen max(lastTimeSeen) as lastTimeSeen by process_name, dest | where lastTimeSeen > relative_time(now(), "`previously_seen_zoom_child_processes_forget_window`") | outputlookup zoom_first_time_child_process
 
-[ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK Baseline]
+[ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK Baseline]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK Baseline
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK Baseline
 description = This search supports an analyst looking for abuse or misuse of the risky commands listed here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/latest/Security/SPLsafeguards#Commands_that_trigger_the_warning This is accomplished by using the time spent executing one of these risky commands as a proxy for misuse/abuse of interest during investigation and/or hunting. The search builds a model utilizes the MLTK DensityFunction algorithm on Splunk app audit log data. The model uses the past 7 days of user history executing the above referenced commands then aggregates the total search run time for each hour as indicator of user behavior. The model identifies the top 0.1% of user search run time, indicating a risky use of these commands. Users can adjust this threshold 0.1% as interested however this will correlate to missed/false positive rates. This search should be scheduled to run at least every 7 days. The name of machine learning model generated is "risky_command_abuse" and should be configured to be globally shared (not private) in MLTK app as documented here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/MLApp/5.3.1/User/Models#Sharing_models_from_other_Splunk_apps unless the same account of training this model will be used to perform inference using this model for anomaly detection.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2022-05-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2022-05-27
@@ -73037,11 +73037,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats sum(Search_Activity.total_run_time) as run_time, count FROM datamodel=Splunk_Audit.Search_Activity WHERE (Search_Activity.user!="") AND (Search_Activity.total_run_time>1) AND (earliest=-7d@d latest=now) AND (Search_Activity.search IN ("*| runshellscript *", "*| collect *","*| delete *", "*| fit *", "*| outputcsv *", "*| outputlookup *", "*| run *", "*| script *", "*| sendalert *", "*| sendemail *", "*| tscolle*")) AND (Search_Activity.search_type=adhoc) AND (Search_Activity.user!=splunk-system-user) BY _time, Search_Activity.user span=1h | fit DensityFunction "run_time" dist=auto lower_threshold=0.000001 upper_threshold=0.001 show_density=true by Search_Activity.user into "risky_command_abuse" 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch]
+[ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch
 description = Some AV applications can cause the Spectre/Meltdown patch for Windows not to install successfully. This registry key is supposed to be created by the AV engine when it has been patched to be able to handle the Windows patch. If this key has been written, the system can then be patched for Spectre and Meltdown.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-01-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-01-08
@@ -73059,11 +73059,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Change_Analysis.All_Changes where All_Changes.object_category=registry AND (All_Changes.object_path="HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\QualityCompat*") by All_Changes.dest, All_Changes.command, All_Changes.user, All_Changes.object, All_Changes.object_path | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Updates Install Failures]
+[ESCU - Windows Updates Install Failures]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Updates Install Failures
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Updates Install Failures
 description = This search is intended to give you a feel for how often Windows updates fail to install in your environment. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-14
@@ -73081,11 +73081,11 @@ disabled = true
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FROM datamodel=Updates where Updates.vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" AND Updates.status=failure by _time span=1d
 
-[ES Content Updates - Windows Updates Install Successes]
+[ESCU - Windows Updates Install Successes]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Windows Updates Install Successes
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Windows Updates Install Successes
 description = This search is intended to give you a feel for how often successful Windows updates are applied in your environments. Fluctuations in these numbers will allow you to determine when you should be concerned.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-14
@@ -73105,13 +73105,13 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FRO
 
 
 
-### ES Content Updates RESPONSE TASKS ###
+### ESCU RESPONSE TASKS ###
 
-[ES Content Updates - All backup logs for host - Response Task]
+[ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - All backup logs for host - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task
 description = Retrieve the backup logs for the last 2 weeks for a specific host in order to investigate why backups are not completing successfully.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
@@ -73128,11 +73128,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | search `netbackup` dest=$dest$
 
-[ES Content Updates - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task
 description = This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, verb and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-13
@@ -73149,11 +73149,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_cloudwatchlogs_eks` |rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip |search src_ip=$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(user.username) values(requestURI) values(verb) values(userAgent) by source annotations.authorization.k8s.io/decision src_ip
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task]
+[ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task
 description = This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id).
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-08
@@ -73170,11 +73170,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_securityhub_firehose` "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWSEC2Instance | rex field=findings{}.Resources{}.Id .*instance/(?<instance>.*)| rename instance as dest| search dest = $dest$ |rename findings{}.* as * | rename Remediation.Recommendation.Text as Remediation |  table dest Title ProductArn Description FirstObservedAt RecordState Remediation
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task]
+[ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task
 description = This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event names, and the result of the event for specific credentials.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-08
@@ -73191,11 +73191,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` | rename userIdentity.accessKeyId as accessKeyId| search accessKeyId=$accessKeyId$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn  | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task]
+[ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task
 description = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-30
@@ -73212,11 +73212,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` | search user=$user$| table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task]
+[ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task
 description = This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific network ACL via network ACL ID
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-01-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-01-22
@@ -73233,11 +73233,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_description` | rename id as networkAclId | search  networkAclId=$networkAclId$ | table id account_id vpc_id network_acl_entries{}.*
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task]
+[ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task
 description = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific network interface via network interface ID. The information will include the ARN of the network interface, its relationships with other AWS resources, the public and the private IP associated with the network interface.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-07
@@ -73254,11 +73254,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_config` resourceId=$resourceId$ | table _time ARN relationships{}.resourceType relationships{}.name relationships{}.resourceId  configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.privateIpAddress configuration.privateIpAddresses{}.association.publicIp
 
-[ES Content Updates - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task]
+[ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task
 description = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific S3 bucket. The information returned includes the time the S3 bucket was created, the resource ID, the region it belongs to, the value of action performed, AWS account ID, and configuration values of the access-control lists associated with the bucket.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-26
@@ -73275,11 +73275,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_config` | rename resourceId as bucketName |search bucketName=$bucketName$ | table resourceCreationTime bucketName vendor_region action aws_account_id supplementaryConfiguration.AccessControlList
 
-[ES Content Updates - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task]
+[ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task
 description = This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, resource path and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-13
@@ -73296,11 +73296,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `google_gcp_pubsub_message` | rename data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp as src_ip | search src_ip =$src_ip$ | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(data.protoPayload.methodName) as method_names values(data.protoPayload.resourceName) as resource_name values(data.protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent) as http_user_agent values(data.protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail) as user values(data.protoPayload.status.message) by src_ip data.resource.labels.cluster_name data.resource.type
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task
 description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific city and will create a table containing the time, city, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-19
@@ -73317,11 +73317,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search City=$City$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, City, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task
 description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific country and will create a table containing the time, country, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-19
@@ -73338,11 +73338,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Country=$Country$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Country, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task
 description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address and will create a table containing the time, ARN, username, the type of user, the IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-19
@@ -73359,11 +73359,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task
 description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific geographic region and will create a table containing the time, geographic region, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-19
@@ -73380,11 +73380,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` | iplocation sourceIPAddress | search Region=$Region$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | spath output=awsUserName path=userIdentity.userName | spath output=userType path=userIdentity.type | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, Region, user, userName, userType, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task
 description = This search will tell you the backup status from your netbackup_logs of a specific endpoint for the last week.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-14
@@ -73401,11 +73401,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `netbackup` COMPUTERNAME=$dest$ | rename COMPUTERNAME as dest, MESSAGE as signature | table _time, dest, signature
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task
 description = This search queries the Certificates datamodel and give you all the information for a specific domain. Please note that the certificates issued by "Let's Encrypt" are widely used by attackers.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-29
@@ -73422,11 +73422,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Certificates.All_Certificates where All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name=*$domain$  by All_Certificates.dest All_Certificates.src All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_issuer_common_name All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_subject_common_name All_Certificates.SSL.ssl_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Certificates)` | `drop_dm_object_name(SSL)` | rename ssl_subject_common_name as domain | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task
 description = While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-11-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-09
@@ -73443,11 +73443,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window=1d count values(dest_ip) as dcip by src_ip | table date_mday src_ip dcip count | sort -count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task
 description = This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and coming from a host to a list of DNS servers over the last 24 hours. A high value of this ratio could be very useful to quickly understand if a src_ip (host) is sending a high volume of data out via port 53, could be an indicator of data exfiltration via DNS.  
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-11-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-09
@@ -73464,11 +73464,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as "bytes_out" sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as "bytes_in" from datamodel=Network_Traffic where nodename=All_Traffic All_Traffic.dest_port=53 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as src_ip | rename dest as dest_ip | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip = $dest_ip | eval ratio = (bytes_out/bytes_in) | table ratio
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task
 description = This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific instance via the instanceId field
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-02-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-02-12
@@ -73485,11 +73485,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `aws_description` | dedup id sortby -_time |rename id as instanceId|  search instanceId=$instanceId$ | spath output=tags path=tags | eval tags=mvzip(key,value," = "), ip_address=if((ip_address == "null"),private_ip_address,ip_address) | table id, tags.Name, aws_account_id, placement, instance_type, key_name, ip_address, launch_time, state, vpc_id, subnet_id, tags | rename aws_account_id as "Account ID", id as ID, instance_type as Type, ip_address as "IP Address", key_name as "Key Pair", launch_time as "Launch Time", placement as "Availability Zone", state as State, subnet_id as Subnet, "tags.Name" as Name, vpc_id as VPC
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task
 description = This search returns some of the launch details for a EC2 instance.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12
@@ -73506,11 +73506,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` dest=$dest$ |rename userIdentity.arn as arn, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as dest, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.privateIpAddress as privateIpAddress, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.imageId as amiID, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.architecture as architecture, responseElements.instancesSet.items{}.keyName as keyName | table arn, awsRegion, dest, architecture, privateIpAddress, amiID, keyName
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get Email Info - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get Email Info - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task
 description = This search returns all the information Splunk might have collected a specific email message over the last 2 hours.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-11-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-09
@@ -73527,11 +73527,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | from datamodel Email.All_Email | search message_id=$message_id$
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task
 description = This search returns all the emails from a specific sender over the last 24 and next hours.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-11-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-09
@@ -73548,11 +73548,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | from datamodel Email.All_Email | search src_user=$src_user$
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task
 description = This search allows you to gather more context around a notable which has detected a new device connecting to your network. Use this search to determine the first and last occurrences of the suspicious device attempting to connect with your network.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-13
@@ -73569,11 +73569,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Sessions where nodename=All_Sessions.DHCP All_Sessions.signature=DHCPREQUEST All_Sessions.src_mac= $src_mac$ by All_Sessions.src_ip All_Sessions.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task
 description = This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hours prior to the notable event to 24 hours after, and the number of emails from each source.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-21
@@ -73590,11 +73590,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest values(All_Email.recipient) as recepient  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count from datamodel=Email.All_Email by All_Email.src |`drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search src=$src$
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint - Response Task
 description = This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights associated with a specific host.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
@@ -73611,11 +73611,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) dest=$dest$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified", Access_Right, signature
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User - Response Task
 description = This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights for a specific user account.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-27
@@ -73632,11 +73632,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` (signature_id=4718 OR signature_id=4717) user=$user$ | rename user as "Account Modified" | table _time, dest, "Account Modified", Access_Right, signature
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get Notable History - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task
 description = This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-20
@@ -73653,11 +73653,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name, owner, priority, severity, status_description
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task
 description = This search returns the information of the users that sent emails to the accounts controlled by the Hidden Cobra Threat Actors: specifically to `misswang8107@gmail.com`, and from `redhat@gmail.com`.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-14
@@ -73674,11 +73674,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | from datamodel Email.All_Email | search recipient=misswang8107@gmail.com OR src_user=redhat@gmail.com | stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime values(dest) values(src) by src_user recipient | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task
 description = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-28
@@ -73695,11 +73695,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search  parent_process_name= $parent_process_name$ |search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get Process File Activity - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get Process File Activity - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task
 description = This search returns the file activity for a specific process on a specific endpoint
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-11-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-11-06
@@ -73716,11 +73716,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name values(Filesystem.dest) as dest, values(Filesystem.process_name) as process_name from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.action, _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`  | search dest=$dest$  | search process_name=$process_name$ | table _time, process_name, dest, action, file_name, file_path
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get Process Info - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task
 description = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01
@@ -73737,11 +73737,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | search  process_name= $process_name$ | search dest = $dest$ | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task
 description = This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01
@@ -73758,11 +73758,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest=$dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports by Ports.process_id Ports.src Ports.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | search dest_port=$dest_port$ | rename src as dest]
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task
 description = While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and enter the value of `dest` in the search to get specific details on the process responsible for creating the DNS traffic.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01
@@ -73779,11 +73779,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | search dest = $dest$ | join dest type=inner [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Ports where Ports.dest_port=53 by Ports.process_id Ports.src | `drop_dm_object_name(Ports)` | rename src as dest]
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task
 description = This search queries Sysmon WMI events for the host of interest.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-23
@@ -73800,11 +73800,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `sysmon` EventCode>18 EventCode<22 | rename host as dest | search dest=$dest$| table _time, dest, user, Name, Operation, EventType, Type, Query, Consumer, Filter
 
-[ES Content Updates - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task
 description = This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event to find out more about a specific web session. The search looks for a specific web session ID in the HTTP web traffic and outputs the URL and user agents, grouped by source IP address and HTTP status code.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08
@@ -73821,11 +73821,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `stream_http` session_id  = $session_id$ | stats values(url) values(http_user_agent) by src_ip status
 
-[ES Content Updates - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task
 description = This search lists all the user activities logged by CloudTrail for a specific region in question and will create a table of the values of parameters requested, the type of the event and the response from the AWS API by each user
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-02-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-02-09
@@ -73842,11 +73842,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` vendor_region=$vendor_region$| rename requestParameters.instancesSet.items{}.instanceId as instanceId | stats values(eventName) by user instanceId vendor_region
 
-[ES Content Updates - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task
 description = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and the user's identity information.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12
@@ -73863,11 +73863,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `cloudtrail` user=$user$ | table _time userIdentity.type userIdentity.userName userIdentity.arn aws_account_id src awsRegion eventName eventType 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task
 description = This search returns failed logins to multiple destinations by user.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-12-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-10
@@ -73884,11 +73884,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login dc(Authentication.dest) AS distinct_count_dest values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app  from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=failure by Authentication.user | where distinct_count_dest > 1 | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search user=$user$
 
-[ES Content Updates - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task
 description = This search allows you to find all the network traffic from a specific IP address.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-15
@@ -73905,11 +73905,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | from datamodel Network_Traffic.All_Traffic | search src_ip=$src_ip$
 
-[ES Content Updates - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task
 description = This search returns all okta events associated with a specific app
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-02
@@ -73926,11 +73926,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` app=$app$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason
 
-[ES Content Updates - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task
 description = This search returns all okta events from a specific IP address.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-02
@@ -73947,11 +73947,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` src_ip={src_ip} | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason
 
-[ES Content Updates - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task
 description = This search hunts for dumped NTLM hashes used for pass the hash.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-12-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-10
@@ -73968,11 +73968,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=9 AuthenticationPackageName=Negotiate | stats count earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login by src_user dest | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | search dest=$dest$
 
-[ES Content Updates - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task
 description = This search hunts for dumped kerberos ticket from LSASS memory.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-12-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-10
@@ -73989,11 +73989,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769 | rex field=user "(?<new_user>[^\@]+)" | stats count BY new_user, dest, EventCode | stats max(count) AS max_count sum(count) AS sum_count BY new_user, dest| search dest=$dest$ | where sum_count/max_count!=2 | rename new_user AS user 
 
-[ES Content Updates - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task
 description = This search returns previous unseen user, which didn't log in for 30 days.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-12-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-10
@@ -74010,11 +74010,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as first_login latest(_time) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest values(Authentication.app) AS Authentication.app values(Authentication.action) AS Authentication.action from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.action=success by _time, Authentication.user | bucket _time span=30d | stats count min(first_login) as first_login max(last_login) as last_login values(Authentication.dest) AS Authentication.dest by Authentication.user | where count=1 | where first_login >= relative_time(now(), "-30d") | `security_content_ctime(first_login)` | `security_content_ctime(last_login)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search dest=$dest$
 
-[ES Content Updates - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task
 description = This search returns the source, destination, and user for all successful remote-desktop authentications. A successful authentication after a brute-force attack on a destination machine is suspicious behavior. 
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-14
@@ -74031,11 +74031,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.signature_id=4624 Authentication.app=win:remote by Authentication.src Authentication.dest Authentication.app Authentication.user Authentication.signature Authentication.src_nt_domain | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")` | search dest=$dest$ | table firstTime lastTime src src_nt_domain dest user app count | sort count
 
-[ES Content Updates - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task
 description = This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event related to a potential Apache Struts exploitation. To investigate, we will want to isolate and analyze the "payload" or the commands that were passed to the vulnerable hosts by creating a few regular expressions to carve out the commands focusing on common keywords from the payload, such as cmd.exe, /bin/bash and whois. The search returns these suspicious strings found in the HTTP logs of the system of interest.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-10-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-10-20
@@ -74052,11 +74052,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `stream_http` | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_ip=$dest_ip$ | eval cs_content_type_length = len(cs_content_type) | search cs_content_type_length > 100 | rex field="cs_content_type" (?<suspicious_strings>cmd.exe) | eval suspicious_strings_found=if(match(cs_content_type, "application"), "True", "False")  | rename suspicious_strings_found AS "Suspicious Content-Type Found" | fields "Suspicious Content-Type Found", dest_ip, src_ip, suspicious_strings, cs_content_type, cs_content_type_length, url
 
-[ES Content Updates - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task
 description = This search returns all okta events by a specific user
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-02
@@ -74073,11 +74073,11 @@ schedule_window = auto
 is_visible = false
 search = `okta` user=$user$ | rename client.geographicalContext.country as country, client.geographicalContext.state as state, client.geographicalContext.city as city | table _time, user, displayMessage, app, src_ip, state, city, result, outcome.reason
 
-[ES Content Updates - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task]
+[ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ES Content Updates - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task
 description = This investigative search retrieves POST requests from a specified source IP or hostname. Identifying the POST requests, as well as their associated destination URLs and user agent(s), may help you scope and characterize the suspicious traffic. 
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-06
@@ -74096,4 +74096,4 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Web.url) as url from d
 
 
 
-### END ES Content Updates RESPONSE TASKS ###
\ No newline at end of file
+### END ESCU RESPONSE TASKS ###
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/transforms.conf b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/transforms.conf
index ca77792775..29112ef02d 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/transforms.conf
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/transforms.conf
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:53 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:36 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/workflow_actions.conf b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/workflow_actions.conf
index e2a484225a..6339f2eda3 100644
--- a/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/workflow_actions.conf
+++ b/dist/DA-ESS-ContentUpdate/default/workflow_actions.conf
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by 'contentctl build' from 
 # https://github.com/splunk/contentctl
-# On Date: 2024-05-08T17:10:53 UTC
+# On Date: 2024-05-10T18:00:36 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Threat Research Team - Splunk
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
diff --git a/dist/api/stories.json b/dist/api/stories.json
index b6e3e84192..d1558c7662 100644
--- a/dist/api/stories.json
+++ b/dist/api/stories.json
@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"stories": [{"name": "3CX Supply Chain Attack", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-03-30", "version": 1, "id": "c4d7618c-73a7-4f7c-8071-060c36850785", "description": "On March 29, 2023, CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch observed unexpected malicious activity emanating from a legitimate, signed binary, 3CXDesktopApp,  a softphone application from 3CX. The malicious activity includes beaconing to actor controlled infrastructure, deployment of second stage payloads, and, in a small number of cases, hands on keyboard activity. (CrowdStrike)", "references": ["https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/smoothoperator-ongoing-campaign-trojanizes-3cx-software-in-software-supply-chain-attack/", "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/03/30/supply-chain-attack-against-3cxdesktopapp", "https://www.reddit.com/r/crowdstrike/comments/125r3uu/20230329_situational_awareness_crowdstrike/", "https://www.3cx.com/community/threads/crowdstrike-endpoint-security-detection-re-3cx-desktop-app.119934/page-2#post-558898", "https://www.3cx.com/community/threads/3cx-desktopapp-security-alert.119951/", "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/elastic-users-protected-from-suddenicon-supply-chain-attack", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2023/03/30/3cx-supply-chain-compromise-leads-to-iconic-incident/"], "narrative": "On March 22, 2023, cybersecurity firm SentinelOne observed a surge in behavioral detections of trojanized 3CXDesktopApp installers, a popular PABX voice and video conferencing software. The multi-stage attack chain, which automatically quarantines trojanized installers, involves downloading ICO files with base64 data from GitHub and eventually leads to a 3rd stage infostealer DLL that is still under analysis. While the Mac installer remains unconfirmed as trojanized, ongoing investigations are also examining other potentially compromised applications, such as Chrome extensions. The threat actor behind the supply chain compromise, which started in February 2022, has used a code signing certificate to sign the trojanized binaries, but connections to existing threat clusters remain unclear. SentinelOne updated their IOCs on March 30th, 2023, with contributions from the research community and continues to monitor the situation for further developments. 3CX identified the vulnerability in the recent versions 18.12.407 and 18.12.416 for the desktop app. A new certificate for the app will also be produced.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1195.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Supply Chain", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - 3CX Supply Chain Attack Network Indicators - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hunting 3CXDesktopApp Software - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Vulnerable 3CX Software - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "3CX Supply Chain Attack Network Indicators", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Supply Chain"}]}, {"name": "Hunting 3CXDesktopApp Software", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Supply Chain"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Windows Vulnerable 3CX Software", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Supply Chain"}]}]}, {"name": "Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring", "author": "Matthew Moore, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "date": "2024-01-08", "version": 1, "id": "7589023b-3d98-42b3-ab1c-bb498e68fc2d", "description": "Kubernetes, a complex container orchestration system, is susceptible to a variety of security threats. This story delves into the different strategies and methods adversaries employ to exploit Kubernetes environments. These include attacks on the control plane, exploitation of misconfigurations, and breaches of containerized applications. Observability data, such as metrics, play a crucial role in identifying abnormal and potentially malicious behavior within these environments.", "references": ["https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/", "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5247"], "narrative": "Kubernetes, a complex container orchestration system, is a prime target for adversaries due to its widespread use and inherent complexity. This story focuses on the abnormal behavior within Kubernetes environments that can be indicative of security threats. Key areas of concern include the control plane, worker nodes, and network communication, all of which can be exploited by attackers. Observability data, such as metrics, play a crucial role in identifying these abnormal behaviors. These behaviors could be a result of attacks on the control plane, exploitation of misconfigurations, or breaches of containerized applications. For instance, attackers may attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in the Kubernetes API, misconfigured containers, or insecure network policies. The control plane, which manages cluster operations, is a prime target and its compromise can give attackers control over the entire cluster. Worker nodes, which run the containerized applications, can also be targeted to disrupt services or to gain access to sensitive data.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Network Activity from Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Outbound Network IO - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound to Outbound Network IO Ratio - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Outbound Network Activity from Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Anomalous Traffic on Network Edge - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes newly seen TCP edge - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes newly seen UDP edge - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Container Image Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Process Running From New Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Process with Anomalous Resource Utilisation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Process with Resource Ratio Anomalies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node with CPU Activity - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "author_name": "Matthew Moore", "detections": [{"name": "Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Network Activity from Process", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Outbound Network IO", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound to Outbound Network IO Ratio", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Anomalous Outbound Network Activity from Process", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Anomalous Traffic on Network Edge", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes newly seen TCP edge", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes newly seen UDP edge", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Previously Unseen Container Image Name", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Previously Unseen Process", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Process Running From New Path", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Process with Anomalous Resource Utilisation", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Process with Resource Ratio Anomalies", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node with CPU Activity", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "AcidRain", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-04-12", "version": 1, "id": "c68717c6-4938-434b-987c-e1ce9d516124", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the acidrain malware including deleting of files and etc. AcidRain is an ELF MIPS malware specifically designed to wipe modems and routers. The complete list of targeted devices is unknown at this time, but WatchGuard FireBox has specifically been listed as a target. This malware is capable of wiping and deleting non-standard linux files and overwriting storage device files that might related to router, ssd card and many more.", "references": ["https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/acidrain-a-modem-wiper-rains-down-on-europe/"], "narrative": "Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "Evilnum", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Linux Account Manipulation Of SSH Config and Keys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Linux Account Manipulation Of SSH Config and Keys", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deletion Of Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}]}, {"name": "Active Directory Discovery", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2021-08-20", "version": 1, "id": "8460679c-2b21-463e-b381-b813417c32f2", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Discovery and Reconnaissance within with Active Directory environments.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2535", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "narrative": "Discovery consists of techniques an adversay uses to gain knowledge about an internal environment or network. These techniques provide adversaries with situational awareness and allows them to have the necessary information before deciding how to act or who/what to target next.\nOnce an attacker obtains an initial foothold in an Active Directory environment, she is forced to engage in Discovery techniques in the initial phases of a breach to better understand and navigate the target network. Some examples include but are not limited to enumerating domain users, domain admins, computers, domain controllers, network shares, group policy objects, domain trusts, etc.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN8", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1570", "mitre_attack_technique": "Lateral Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT41", "Aoqin Dragon", "Chimera", "FIN10", "GALLIUM", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "FIN7", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "OilRig", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Magic Hound", "TA2541", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1135", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Sowbug", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Akira", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT5", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ES Content Updates - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Abnormal Object Access Activity - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Privileged Object Access Activity - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Find Domain Organizational Units with GetDomainOU - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Find Interesting ACL with FindInterestingDomainAcl - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Forest Discovery with GetForestDomain - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Get Local Admin with FindLocalAdminAccess - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Lateral Tool Transfer RemCom - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create RemComSvc - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery with Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}]}, {"name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Local Account Discovery with Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}]}, {"name": "Local Account Discovery With Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery"}]}, {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Password Policy Discovery with Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Dsquery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Abnormal Object Access Activity", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Privileged Object Access Activity", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Find Domain Organizational Units with GetDomainOU", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows Find Interesting ACL with FindInterestingDomainAcl", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows Forest Discovery with GetForestDomain", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows Get Local Admin with FindLocalAdminAccess", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Lateral Tool Transfer RemCom", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Lateral Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Create RemComSvc", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}]}, {"name": "Wmic Group Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}]}, {"name": "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2022-02-02", "version": 1, "id": "38b8cf16-8461-11ec-ade1-acde48001122", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Kerberos based attacks within with Active Directory environments.", "references": ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerberos_(protocol)", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/2a32282e-dd48-4ad9-a542-609804b02cc9", "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/"], "narrative": "Kerberos, initially named after Cerberus, the three-headed dog in Greek mythology, is a network authentication protocol that allows computers and users to prove their identity through a trusted third-party. This trusted third-party issues Kerberos tickets using symmetric encryption to allow users access to services and network resources based on their privilege level. Kerberos is the default authentication protocol used on Windows Active Directory networks since the introduction of Windows Server 2003. With Kerberos being the backbone of Windows authentication, it is commonly abused by adversaries across the different phases of a breach including initial access, privilege escalation, defense evasion, credential access, lateral movement, etc.\nThis Analytic Story groups detection use cases in which the Kerberos protocol is abused. Defenders can leverage these analytics to detect and hunt for adversaries engaging in Kerberos based attacks.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1589", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Identity Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN13", "HEXANE", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1589.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Addresses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "EXOTIC LILY", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Silent Librarian", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Golden Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Ke3chang"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT5", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Akira", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Change", "Authentication", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting"}]}, {"name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting"}]}, {"name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting"}]}, {"name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting"}]}, {"name": "Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Golden Ticket"}]}, {"name": "Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}]}, {"name": "Kerberos User Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Identity Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Addresses"}]}, {"name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}]}, {"name": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting"}]}, {"name": "Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}]}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Computer Account With SPN", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView SPN Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}]}, {"name": "Active Directory Lateral Movement", "author": "David Dorsey, Mauricio Velazco Splunk", "date": "2021-12-09", "version": 3, "id": "399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad", "description": "Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within an Active Directory environment. Since lateral movement is often a necessary step in a breach, it is important for cyber defenders to deploy detection coverage.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html", "http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon7/t405-hunting-lateral-movement-for-fun-and-profit-mauricio-velazco"], "narrative": "Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\nIndications of lateral movement in an Active Directory network can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, Service Control Manager, the DCOM protocol, WinRM or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or \"crown jewels\" to a persistent threat actor.\nAn adversary can use lateral movement for multiple purposes, including remote execution of tools, pivoting to additional systems, obtaining access to specific information or files, access to additional credentials, exfiltrating data, or delivering a secondary effect. Adversaries may use legitimate credentials alongside inherent network and operating-system functionality to remotely connect to other systems and remain under the radar of network defenders.\nIf there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to collect evidence of the associated offending hosts. For example, an attacker might leverage host A to gain access to host B. From there, the attacker may try to move laterally to host C. In this example, the analyst should gather as much information as possible from all three hosts.\nIt is also important to collect authentication logs for each host, to ensure that the offending accounts are well-documented. Analysts should account for all processes to ensure that the attackers did not install unauthorized software.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "At", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Hash", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Kimsuky", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1135", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Sowbug", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1563", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Service Session Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "FIN13", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1563.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "RDP Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1210", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "MuddyWater", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk", "Change"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Active Directory Lateral Movement Identified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Start or Stop Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Get CIMInstance Remote Computer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell WMI Win32 ScheduledJob - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows RDP Connection Successful - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Create Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create with Tscon - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Hash"}]}, {"name": "Active Directory Lateral Movement Identified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}]}, {"name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MMC"}]}, {"name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MMC"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Start or Stop Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Randomly Generated Windows Service Name", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Short Lived Windows Accounts", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell Get CIMInstance Remote Computer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell WMI Win32 ScheduledJob", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}]}, {"name": "Windows RDP Connection Successful", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "RDP Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Create Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Create with Tscon", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "RDP Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Service Session Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Active Directory Password Spraying", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2021-04-07", "version": 2, "id": "3de109da-97d2-11eb-8b6a-acde48001122", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Password Spraying attacks within Active Directory environments.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/23/protecting-organization-password-spray-attacks/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn452415(v=ws.11)"], "narrative": "In a password spraying attack, adversaries leverage one or a small list of commonly used / popular passwords against a large volume of usernames to acquire valid account credentials. Unlike a Brute Force attack that targets a specific user or small group of users with a large number of passwords, password spraying follows the opposite aproach and increases the chances of obtaining valid credentials while avoiding account lockouts. This allows adversaries to remain undetected if the target organization does not have the proper monitoring and detection controls in place.\nPassword Spraying can be leveraged by adversaries across different stages in an attack. It can be used to obtain an iniial access to an environment but can also be used to escalate privileges when access has been already achieved. In some scenarios, this technique capitalizes on a security policy most organizations implement, password rotation. As enterprise users change their passwords, it is possible some pick predictable, seasonal passwords such as `$CompanyNameWinter`, `Summer2021`, etc.\nSpecifically, this Analytic Story is focused on detecting possible Password Spraying attacks against Active Directory environments leveraging Windows Event Logs in the `Account Logon` and `Logon/Logoff` Advanced Audit Policy categories. It presents 16 detection analytics which can aid defenders in identifying instances where one source user, source host or source process attempts to authenticate against a target or targets using a high or statiscally unsual, number of unique users. A user, host or process attempting to authenticate with multiple users is not common behavior for legitimate systems and should be monitored by security teams. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. These should be easily spotted when first implementing the detection and addded to an allow list or lookup table. The presented detections can also be used in Threat Hunting exercises.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "FIN10", "FIN7", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "PROMETHIUM", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT5", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Change"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Create Local Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Create Local Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}]}, {"name": "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2023-03-20", "version": 1, "id": "fa34a5d8-df0a-404c-8237-11f99cba1d5f", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Privilege Escalation attacks within Active Directory environments.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2362"], "narrative": "Privilege Escalation consists of techniques that adversaries use to gain higher-level permissions on a system or network. Adversaries can often enter and explore a network with unprivileged access but require elevated permissions to follow through on their objectives. Common approaches are to take advantage of system weaknesses, misconfigurations, and vulnerabilities.\nActive Directory is a central component of most enterprise networks, providing authentication and authorization services for users, computers, and other resources. It stores sensitive information such as passwords, user accounts, and security policies, and is therefore a high-value target for attackers. Privilege escalation attacks in Active Directory typically involve exploiting vulnerabilities or misconfigurations across the network to gain elevated privileges, such as Domain Administrator access. Once an attacker has escalated their privileges and taken full control of a domain, they can easily move laterally throughout the network, access sensitive data, and carry out further attacks. Security teams should monitor for privilege escalation attacks in Active Directory to identify a breach before attackers achieve operational success.\nThe following analytic story groups detection opportunities that seek to identify an adversary attempting to escalate privileges in an Active Directory network.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1484", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1135", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Sowbug", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Golden Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Ke3chang"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT5", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1484.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Preferences", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Active Directory Privilege Escalation Identified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Findstr GPP Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Group Policy Object Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "Active Directory Privilege Escalation Identified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Golden Ticket"}]}, {"name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Findstr GPP Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Preferences"}]}, {"name": "Windows Group Policy Object Created", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Preferences"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}]}, {"name": "Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}]}]}, {"name": "Adobe ColdFusion Arbitrary Code Execution CVE-2023-29298 CVE-2023-26360", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-08-23", "version": 1, "id": "e33e2e38-f9c2-432d-8be6-bc67b92aa82e", "description": "In July 2023, a significant vulnerability, CVE-2023-29298, affecting Adobe ColdFusion was uncovered by Rapid7, shedding light on an access control bypass mechanism. This vulnerability allows attackers to access sensitive ColdFusion Administrator endpoints by exploiting a flaw in the URL path validation. Disturbingly, this flaw can be chained with another critical vulnerability, CVE-2023-26360, which has been actively exploited. The latter enables unauthorized arbitrary code execution and file reading. Adobe has promptly addressed these vulnerabilities, but the intricacies and potential ramifications of their combination underscore the importance of immediate action by organizations. With active exploitation in the wild and the ability to bypass established security measures, the situation is alarming. Organizations are urged to apply the updates provided by Adobe immediately, considering the active threat landscape and the severe implications of these chained vulnerabilities.", "references": ["https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/coldfusion/apsb23-25.html", "https://twitter.com/stephenfewer/status/1678881017526886400?s=20", "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/07/11/cve-2023-29298-adobe-coldfusion-access-control-bypass", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cisa-warns-of-adobe-coldfusion-bug-exploited-as-a-zero-day/"], "narrative": "Adobe ColdFusion, a prominent application server, has been thrust into the cybersecurity spotlight due to two intertwined vulnerabilities. The first, CVE-2023-29298, identified by Rapid7 in July 2023, pertains to an access control bypass in ColdFusion's security mechanisms. This flaw allows attackers to access protected ColdFusion Administrator endpoints simply by manipulating the URL path, specifically by inserting an additional forward slash. Compounding the threat is the revelation that CVE-2023-29298 can be chained with CVE-2023-26360, another severe ColdFusion vulnerability. This latter vulnerability, which has seen active exploitation, permits unauthorized attackers to execute arbitrary code or read arbitrary files on the affected system. In practice, an attacker could exploit the access control bypass to access sensitive ColdFusion endpoints and subsequently exploit the arbitrary code execution vulnerability, broadening their control and access over the targeted system. The consequences of these vulnerabilities are manifold. Attackers can potentially login to the ColdFusion Administrator with known credentials, bruteforce their way in, leak sensitive information, or exploit other vulnerabilities in the exposed CFM and CFC files. This combination of vulnerabilities significantly heightens the risk profile for organizations using the affected versions of Adobe ColdFusion. Addressing the urgency, Adobe released fixes for these vulnerabilities in July 2023, urging organizations to update to ColdFusion 2023 GA build, ColdFusion 2021 Update 7, and ColdFusion 2018 Update 17. However, Rapid7's disclosure highlights a potential incomplete fix, suggesting that organizations should remain vigilant and proactive in their security measures.\nIn conclusion, the discovery of these vulnerabilities and their potential to be exploited in tandem presents a significant security challenge. Organizations using Adobe ColdFusion must prioritize the application of security updates, monitor their systems closely for signs of intrusion, and remain updated on any further developments related to these vulnerabilities.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Adobe ColdFusion Access Control Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Adobe ColdFusion Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Adobe ColdFusion Access Control Bypass", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Adobe ColdFusion Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "AgentTesla", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-04-12", "version": 1, "id": "9bb6077a-843e-418b-b134-c57ef997103c", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the AgentTesla malware including .chm application child process, ftp/smtp connection, persistence and many more. AgentTesla is one of the advanced remote access trojans (RAT) that are capable of stealing sensitive information from the infected or targeted host machine. It can collect various types of data, including browser profile information, keystrokes, capture screenshots and vpn credentials. AgentTesla has been active malware since 2014 and often delivered as a malicious attachment in phishing emails.It is also the top malware in 2021 based on the CISA report.", "references": ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.agent_tesla", "https://cert.gov.ua/article/861292", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-216a", "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/702680/0/html"], "narrative": "Adversaries or threat actor may use this malware to maximize the impact of infection on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Dark Caracal", "OilRig", "Silence"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Winnti Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Kimsuky", "SilverTerrier", "Turla"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mail Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Drop Executable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mail Protocol In Non-Common Process Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}]}, {"name": "Amadey", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-06-16", "version": 1, "id": "a919a01b-3ea5-4ed4-9cbe-11cd8b64c36c", "description": "This analytic story contains searches that aims to detect activities related to Amadey, a type of malware that primarily operates as a banking Trojan. It is designed to steal sensitive information such as login credentials, credit card details, and other financial data from infected systems. The malware typically targets Windows-based computers.", "references": ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.amadey", "https://darktrace.com/blog/amadey-info-stealer-exploiting-n-day-vulnerabilities"], "narrative": "Amadey is one of the active trojans that are capable of stealing sensitive information via its from the infected or targeted host machine. It can collect various types of data, including browser profile information, clipboard data, capture screenshots and system information. Adversaries or threat actors may use this malware to maximize the impact of infection on the target organization in operations where data collection and exfiltration is the goal. The primary function is to steal information and further distribute malware. It aims to extract a variety of information from infected devices and attempts to evade the detection of security measures by reducing the volume of data exfiltration compared to that seen in other malicious instances.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Execution", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Files and Dirs Access Rights Modification Via Icacls - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell RemoteSigned File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process Executed From Container File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Files and Dirs Access Rights Modification Via Icacls", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Powershell RemoteSigned File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "Apache Struts Vulnerability", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2018-12-06", "version": 1, "id": "2dcfd6a2-e7d2-4873-b6ba-adaf819d2a1e", "description": "Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.", "references": ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"], "narrative": "In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's <a href=https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/07/nations-biggest-hacks-and-data-breaches-millions/644311001/> 5th largest data breach</a>. The target, credit giant Equifax, <a href=https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/16/technology/equifax-breach-security-hole/index.html>told investigators</a> that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack.\nThe exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\nThis Analytic Story contains two different searches that help to identify activity that may be related to this issue. The first search looks for characteristics of the `Content-Type` header consistent with attempts to exploit the vulnerability. This should be a relatively pertinent indicator, as the `Content-Type` header is generally consistent and does not have a large degree of variation.\nThe second search looks for the execution of various commands typically entered on the command shell when an attacker first lands on a system. These commands are not generally executed on web servers during the course of day-to-day operation, but they may be used when the system is undergoing maintenance or troubleshooting.\nFirst, it is helpful is to understand how often the notable event is generated, as well as the commonalities in some of these events. This may help determine whether this is a common occurrence that is of a lesser concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It can also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user or system or is broader in scope.\nWhen looking at the target of the behavior illustrated by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to see what other events involving the target have occurred in the recent past. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target.\nVarious types of information for external systems should be reviewed and (potentially) collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. Information like this can be useful in generating your own threat intelligence to create alerts in the future.\nLooking at the country, responsible party, and fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address--as well as the registration information associated with those domain names, if they are frequently visited by others--can help you answer the question of \"who,\" in regard to the external system. Answering that can help qualify the event and may serve useful for tracking. In addition, there are various sources that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining if the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether or not there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect some dots or show other events that should be brought into scope.\nGathering various data elements on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine that something suspicious may be happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\nhen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version to help determine whether or not it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\nhen it is suspected there is an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\nIn the event that a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that have the file open, what processes created and/or modified the file, and the number of systems that may have this file can help to determine if the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes quickly help determine whether it is malicious in nature.\nOften, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, there may be activity initiated via a compromised website the user visited.\nIt can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process that is of interest. For example, if it turns out that the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might also be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, reviewing the network connections made around the time of the event and/or if the process spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script.", "tags": {"category": ["Vulnerability"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", "Investigate Web POSTs From src"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Suspicious Java Classes", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Content-Type Length", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "APT29 Diplomatic Deceptions with WINELOADER", "author": "Michael Haag, splunk", "date": "2024-03-26", "version": 1, "id": "7cb5fdb5-4c36-4721-8b0a-4cc5e78afadd", "description": "APT29, a sophisticated threat actor linked to the Russian SVR, has expanded its cyber espionage activities to target European diplomats and German political parties. Utilizing a novel backdoor variant, WINELOADER, these campaigns leverage diplomatic-themed lures to initiate infection chains, demonstrating APT29's evolving tactics and interest in geopolitical intelligence. The operations, marked by their low volume and high precision, underscore the broad threat APT29 poses to Western political and diplomatic entities.", "references": ["https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-wineloader-german-political-parties", "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/european-diplomats-targeted-spikedwine-wineloader"], "narrative": "APT29, also known as Cozy Bear, has historically focused on espionage activities aligned with Russian intelligence interests. In recent campaigns, APT29 has notably shifted its operational focus, targeting not only its traditional diplomatic missions but also expanding into the political domain, specifically German political parties. These campaigns have been characterized by the deployment of WINELOADER, a sophisticated backdoor that facilitates the exfiltration of sensitive information. The use of themed lures, such as invitations from the Ambassador of India and CDU-themed documents, highlights APT29's strategic use of social engineering to compromise targets. The operations against European diplomats and German political entities reveal APT29's adaptive tactics and its persistent effort to gather intelligence that could influence Russia's geopolitical strategy. The precision of these attacks, coupled with the use of compromised websites for command and control, underscores the evolving threat landscape and the need for heightened cybersecurity vigilance among potential targets.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1140", "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Darkhotel", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Writing File to World Writable Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows SqlWriter SQLDumper DLL Sideload - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unsigned MS DLL Side-Loading - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Writing File to World Writable Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Windows SqlWriter SQLDumper DLL Sideload", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unsigned MS DLL Side-Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Asset Tracking", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-13", "version": 1, "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce77", "description": "Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.", "references": ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"], "narrative": "This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", "Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "AsyncRAT", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-01-24", "version": 1, "id": "d7053072-7dd2-4874-8314-bfcbc99978a4", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the AsyncRAT malware including mshta application child process, bat loader execution, persistence and many more. AsyncRAT is an open source remote administration tool released last 2019. It's designed to remotely control computers via an encrypted connection, with view screen, keylogger, chat communication, persistence, defense evasion (e.g. Windows defender), DOS attack and many more.", "references": ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.asyncrat", "https://www.netskope.com/blog/asyncrat-using-fully-undetected-downloader"], "narrative": "although this project contains legal disclaimer, Adversaries or threat actors are popularly used in some attacks. This malware recently came across a Fully undetected batch script loader that downloads and loads the AsyncRAT from its C2 server. The batch script is obfuscated and will load a powershell loader that will decode and decrypt (AES256) the actual AsyncRAT malware.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BackdoorDiplomacy", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Malteiro", "Putter Panda", "TA505", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Execution", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2022-26134", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-06-03", "version": 1, "id": "91623a50-41fa-4c4e-8637-c239b80ff439", "description": "On June 2, security researchers at Volexity published a blog outlining the discovery of an unauthenticated remote code execution zero day vulnerability (CVE-2022-26134) being actively exploited in Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center instances in the wild. Atlassian released a fix within 24 hours of the blog''s release.", "references": ["https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/atlassian-confluence-vulnerability-cve-2022-26134.html", "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/06/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-cve-2022-26134/", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/"], "narrative": "Atlassian describes the vulnerability as an Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) injection allowing an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Server instance. Volexity did not release proof-of-concept (POC) exploit code, but researchers there have observed coordinated, widespread exploitation. Volexity first discovered the vulnerability over the weekend on two Internet-facing web servers running Confluence Server software. The investigation was due to suspicious activity on the hosts, including JSP webshells that were written to disk.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Application Security", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Java Writing JSP File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Java Writing JSP File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "AwfulShred", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-01-24", "version": 1, "id": "e36935ce-f48c-4fb2-8109-7e80c1cdc9e2", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the AwfulShred malware including wiping files, process kill, system reboot via system request, shred,  and service stops.", "references": ["https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/overview-of-the-cyber-weapons-used-in-the-ukraine-russia-war/", "https://cert.gov.ua/article/3718487"], "narrative": "AwfulShred is a malicious linux shell script designed to corrupt or wipe the linux targeted system. It uses shred command to overwrite files and to increase data damage. This obfuscated malicious script can also disable and corrupts apache, HTTP and SSH services, deactivate swap files, clear bash history and finally reboot the system.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "Evilnum", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1200", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Linux Data Destruction Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Disable Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Stop Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Linux Data Destruction Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deletion Of Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Disable Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions"}]}, {"name": "Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Restarted", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Shred Overwrite Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Stop Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS Cross Account Activity", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2018-06-04", "version": 1, "id": "2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-967a2b49ab5a", "description": "Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.", "references": ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"], "narrative": "Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\nHerein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\nThis Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your AWS CloudTrail logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity.  For example, while accessing multiple AWS accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ES Content Updates - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", "Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "aws detect attach to role policy", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "aws detect permanent key creation", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "aws detect role creation", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "aws detect sts assume role abuse", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "aws detect sts get session token abuse", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS Defense Evasion", "author": "Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk", "date": "2022-07-15", "version": 1, "id": "4e00b690-293f-434d-a9d8-bcfb2ea5fff9", "description": "Identify activity and techniques associated with the Evasion of Defenses within AWS, such as Disabling CloudTrail, Deleting CloudTrail and many others.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"], "narrative": "Adversaries employ a variety of techniques in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security monitoring tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes analytics that identify activity consistent with adversaries attempting to disable various security mechanisms on AWS. Such activity may involve deleting the CloudTrail logs , as this is where all the AWS logs get stored or explicitly changing the retention policy of S3 buckets. Other times, adversaries attempt deletion of a specified AWS CloudWatch log group.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion PutBucketLifecycle - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Gowthamaraj Rajendran", "detections": [{"name": "ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}]}, {"name": "ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}]}, {"name": "AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "AWS Defense Evasion PutBucketLifecycle", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2021-03-08", "version": 1, "id": "ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-22782eec6750", "description": "This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation.", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws"], "narrative": "Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\nHowever, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunks research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. ", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1580", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - ASL AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ASL AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "ASL AWS CreateAccessKey", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "ASL AWS IAM Delete Policy", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "ASL AWS Password Policy Changes", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "AWS CreateAccessKey", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS CreateLoginProfile", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Delete Policy", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS Password Policy Changes", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "AWS UpdateLoginProfile", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", "author": "Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Bhavin Patel,  Splunk", "date": "2022-08-19", "version": 2, "id": "4210b690-293f-411d-a9d8-bcfb2ea5fff9", "description": "Identify activity and techniques associated with accessing credential files from AWS resources, monitor unusual authentication related activities to the AWS Console and other services such as RDS.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"], "narrative": "Amazon Web Services provides a web service known as Identity and Access Management(IAM) for controlling and securly managing various AWS resources. This is basically the foundation of how users in AWS interact with various resources/services in cloud and vice versa. Account Takeover (ATO) is an attack whereby cybercriminals gain unauthorized access to online accounts by using different techniques like brute force, social engineering, phishing & spear phishing, credential stuffing, etc. Adversaries employ a variety of techniques to steal AWS Cloud credentials like account names, passwords and keys and takeover legitmate user accounts. Usage of legitimate keys will assist the attackers to gain access to other sensitive system and they can also mimic legitimate behaviour making them harder to be detected. Such activity may involve multiple failed login to the console, new console logins and password reset activities.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1185", "mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1621", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Resource Development", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ASL AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access Failed Login - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Bhavin Patel,  Splunk", "author_name": "Gowthamaraj Rajendran", "detections": [{"name": "ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "ASL AWS New MFA Method Registered For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "AWS Credential Access Failed Login", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}]}, {"name": "AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}]}, {"name": "AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "AWS New MFA Method Registered For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS Network ACL Activity", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2018-05-21", "version": 2, "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50ff268af4", "description": "Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"], "narrative": "AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get DNS traffic ratio", "Get Notable History", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity", "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "AWS Network Access Control List Deleted", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS Security Hub Alerts", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2020-08-04", "version": 1, "id": "2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-96722b49ab5a", "description": "This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS", "references": ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"], "narrative": "AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "Get EC2 Launch Details"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "AWS User Monitoring", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2018-03-12", "version": 1, "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1269af3", "description": "Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"], "narrative": "It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\nIn addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage.\nFortunately, you can leverage Amazon Web Services (AWS) CloudTrail--a tool that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing of your AWS account--to give you increased visibility into your user and resource activity by recording AWS Management Console actions and API calls. You can identify which users and accounts called AWS, the source IP address from which the calls were made, and when the calls occurred.\nThe detection searches in this Analytic Story are designed to help you uncover AWS API activities from users not listed in the identity table, as well as similar activities from disabled accounts.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "ASL AWS Excessive Security Scanning", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS Excessive Security Scanning", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect API activity from users without MFA", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Detect new API calls from user roles", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Detect Spike in AWS API Activity", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Detect Spike in Security Group Activity", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Azorult", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-06-09", "version": 1, "id": "efed5343-4ac2-42b1-a16d-da2428d0ce94", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Azorult malware including firewall modification, icacl execution, spawning more process, botnet c2 communication, defense evasion and etc. The AZORULT malware was first discovered in 2016 to be an information stealer that steals browsing history, cookies, ID/passwords, cryptocurrency information and more. It can also be a downloader of other malware. A variant of this malware was able to create a new, hidden administrator account on the machine to set a registry key to establish a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connection. Exploit kits such as Fallout Exploit Kit (EK) and phishing mails with social engineering technique are one of the major infection vectors of the AZORult malware. The current malspam and phishing emails use fake product order requests, invoice documents and payment information requests. This Trojan-Spyware connects to Command And Control (C&C) servers of attacker to send and receive information.", "references": ["https://success.trendmicro.com/dcx/s/solution/000146108-azorult-malware-information?language=en_US&sfdcIFrameOrigin=null", "https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/"], "narrative": "Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["HAFNIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Andariel", "HAFNIUM", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1219", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "RTM", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Thrip"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance", "Discovery", "Lateral Movement", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Application Layer Protocol RMS Radmin Tool Namedpipe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Add Xml Applocker Rules - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Deny Security Software With Applocker - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Toast Notifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisAllow Windows App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Regedit Silent Reg Import - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software RMS Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Service Rdpwinst Tool Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Allow Rdp In Firewall - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Allow Remote Assistance - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Services Rdp Enable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop By Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Valid Account With Never Expires Password - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "CHCP Command Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Icacls Deny Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Processes launching netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Application Layer Protocol RMS Radmin Tool Namedpipe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Add Xml Applocker Rules", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Deny Security Software With Applocker", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable Toast Notifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry DisAllow Windows App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Regedit Silent Reg Import", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Access Software RMS Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Service Rdpwinst Tool Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Services Allow Rdp In Firewall", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Services Allow Remote Assistance", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Services Rdp Enable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Stop By Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Windows Valid Account With Never Expires Password", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}]}, {"name": "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2022-07-14", "version": 2, "id": "41514c46-7118-4eab-a9bb-f3bfa4e3bea9", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Account Takeover attacks against Azure Active Directory tenants.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-whatis", "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/active-directory/#overview", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-compare-azure-ad-to-ad", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/account-takeover-ato/", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/azure-active-directory", "https://www.barracuda.com/glossary/account-takeover"], "narrative": "Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) is Microsofts enterprise cloud-based identity and access management (IAM) service. Azure AD is the backbone of most of Azure services like Office 365. It can sync with on-premise Active Directory environments and provide authentication to other cloud-based systems via the OAuth protocol. According to Microsoft, Azure AD manages more than 1.2 billion identities and processes over 8 billion authentications per day. Account Takeover (ATO) is an attack whereby cybercriminals gain unauthorized access to online accounts by using different techniques like brute force, social engineering, phishing & spear phishing, credential stuffing, etc. By posing as the real user, cyber-criminals can change account details, send out phishing emails, steal financial information or sensitive data, or use any stolen information to access further accounts within the organization. This analytic storic groups detections that can help security operations teams identify the potential compromise of Azure Active Directory accounts.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Cloud Security", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1621", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1185", "mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1528", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Resource Development", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Risk", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Device Code Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Denied MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD OAuth Application Consent Granted By User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Device Code Authentication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multiple Denied MFA Requests For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD OAuth Application Consent Granted By User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal Authentication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD User Consent Blocked for Risky Application", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD User Consent Denied for OAuth Application", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token"}]}]}, {"name": "Azure Active Directory Persistence", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2022-08-17", "version": 1, "id": "dca983db-6334-4a0d-be32-80611ca1396c", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with the execution of Persistence techniques against Azure Active Directory tenants.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-whatis", "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/active-directory/#overview", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-compare-azure-ad-to-ad", "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/", "https://microsoft.github.io/Azure-Threat-Research-Matrix/Persistence/Persistence/"], "narrative": "Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) is Microsofts enterprise cloud-based identity and access management (IAM) service. Azure AD is the backbone of most of Azure services like Office 365. It can sync with on-premise Active Directory environments and provide authentication to other cloud-based systems via the OAuth protocol. According to Microsoft, Azure AD manages more than 1.2 billion identities and processes over 8 billion authentications per day. Persistence consists of techniques that adversaries use to keep access to systems across restarts, changed credentials, and other interruptions that could cut off their access. This analytic storic groups detections that can help security operations teams identify the potential execution of Persistence techniques targeting Azure Active Directory tenants. ", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1484.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trust Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1484", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Azure AD External Guest User Invited - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD New Custom Domain Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD PIM Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD User Enabled And Password Reset - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD User ImmutableId Attribute Updated - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure Automation Account Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure Automation Runbook Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure Runbook Webhook Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Account Passwords Changed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Accounts Deleted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Accounts Disabled - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "Azure AD External Guest User Invited", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD New Custom Domain Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trust Modification"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD New Federated Domain Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trust Modification"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD New MFA Method Registered", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD PIM Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal Created", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD User Enabled And Password Reset", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD User ImmutableId Attribute Updated", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Azure Automation Account Created", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure Automation Runbook Created", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure Runbook Webhook Created", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Account Passwords Changed", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Accounts Deleted", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Accounts Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2023-04-24", "version": 1, "id": "ec78e872-b79c-417d-b256-8fde902522fb", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Privilege Escalation attacks within Azure Active Directory tenants.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/", "https://cloudbrothers.info/en/azure-attack-paths/", "https://microsoft.github.io/Azure-Threat-Research-Matrix/PrivilegeEscalation/PrivEsc/", "https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5"], "narrative": "Privilege Escalation consists of techniques that adversaries use to gain higher-level permissions on a system or network. Adversaries can often enter and explore a network with unprivileged access but require elevated permissions to follow through on their objectives. Common approaches are to take advantage of system weaknesses, misconfigurations or vulnerabilities.\nAzure Active Directory (Azure AD) is Microsofts enterprise cloud-based identity and access management (IAM) service. Azure AD is the backbone of most of Azure services like Office 365 and Microsoft Teams. It can sync with on-premise Active Directory environments and provide authentication to other cloud-based systems via the OAuth protocol. According to Microsoft, Azure AD manages more than 1.2 billion identities and processes over 8 billion authentications per day.\nPrivilege escalation attacks in Azure AD typically involve abusing  misconfigurations to gain elevated privileges, such as Global Administrator access. Once an attacker has escalated their privileges and taken full control of a tenant, they may abuse every service that leverages Azure AD including moving laterally to Azure virtual machines to access sensitive data and carry out further attacks. Security teams should monitor for privilege escalation attacks in Azure Active Directory to identify breaches before attackers achieve operational success.\nThe following analytic story groups detection opportunities that seek to identify an adversary attempting to escalate privileges in Azure AD tenants.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Cloud Security", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Credential Access", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD PIM Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Authentication Administrator Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD PIM Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Privileged Authentication Administrator Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}]}, {"name": "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "date": "2021-01-27", "version": 1, "id": "817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe", "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.", "references": ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"], "narrative": "A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing \"\\\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Shannon Davis", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}]}, {"name": "BishopFox Sliver Adversary Emulation Framework", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-01-24", "version": 1, "id": "8c2e2cba-3fd8-424f-a890-5080bdaf3f31", "description": "The following analytic story providers visibility into the latest adversary TTPs in regard to the use of Sliver. Sliver has gained more traction with adversaries as it is often seen as an alternative to Cobalt Strike. It is designed to be scalable and can be used by organizations of all sizes to perform security testing. Sliver is highly modular and contains an Extension package manager (armory) allowing easy install (automatic compilation) of various 3rd party tools such as BOFs and .NET tooling like Ghostpack (Rubeus, Seatbelt, SharpUp, Certify, and so forth) (CyberReason,2023).", "references": ["https://www.cybereason.com/blog/sliver-c2-leveraged-by-many-threat-actors", "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory%20Further%20TTPs%20associated%20with%20SVR%20cyber%20actors.pdf", "https://www.proofpoint.com/uk/blog/security-briefs/ta551-uses-sliver-red-team-tool-new-activity", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-analysis-report-bumblebee-loader-the-high-road-to-enterprise-domain-control", "https://github.com/sliverarmory/armory", "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver"], "narrative": "Sliver is an open source cross-platform adversary emulation/red team framework produced by BishopFox.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gorgon Group", "Rocke"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Notepad with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection into Notepad - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create SliverC2 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Notepad with no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection into Notepad", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Create SliverC2", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "BITS Jobs", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-03-26", "version": 1, "id": "dbc7edce-8e4c-11eb-9f31-acde48001122", "description": "Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool"], "narrative": "Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool. Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1197", "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "BITS Job Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs"}]}, {"name": "BITSAdmin Download File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs"}]}]}, {"name": "BlackByte Ransomware", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-07-10", "version": 1, "id": "b18259ac-0746-45d7-bd1f-81d65274a80b", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the BlackByte ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with BlackByte, persistence, initial access, account registry modification and more.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/06/the-five-day-job-a-blackbyte-ransomware-intrusion-case-study/"], "narrative": "BlackByte ransomware campaigns targeting business operations, involve the use of ransomware payloads, infection chain to collect and exfiltrate data and drop payload on the targeted system. BlackByte Ransomware operates by infiltrating a system through various methods, such as malicious email attachments, exploit kits, or compromised websites. Once inside a system, it begins encrypting files using strong encryption algorithms, rendering them unusable. After completing the encryption process, BlackByte Ransomware typically leaves a ransom note that explains the situation to the victim and provides instructions on how to pay the ransom to obtain the decryption key.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Winnti Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1563.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "RDP Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497", "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Darkhotel"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry EnableLinkedConnections - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry LongPathsEnabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows RDP Connection Successful - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "High Process Termination Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Resize ShadowStorage volume", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Services Escalate Exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry EnableLinkedConnections", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry LongPathsEnabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows RDP Connection Successful", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "RDP Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected", "source": "web", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "BlackLotus Campaign", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-04-14", "version": 1, "id": "8eb0e418-a2b6-4327-a387-85c976662c8f", "description": "The first in-the-wild UEFI bootkit bypassing UEFI Secure Boot on fully updated UEFI systems is now a reality", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/03/01/blacklotus-uefi-bootkit-myth-confirmed/"], "narrative": "The number of UEFI vulnerabilities discovered in recent years and the failures in patching them or revoking vulnerable binaries within a reasonable time window hasn't gone unnoticed by threat actors. As a result, the first publicly known UEFI bootkit bypassing the essential platform security feature  UEFI Secure Boot  is now a reality. present the first public analysis of this UEFI bootkit, which is capable of running on even fully-up-to-date Windows 11 systems with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. Functionality of the bootkit and its individual features leads us to believe that we are dealing with a bootkit known as BlackLotus, the UEFI bootkit being sold on hacking forums for $5,000 since at least October 2022. (ESET, 2023) The following content aims to aid defenders in detecting suspicious bootloaders and understanding the diverse techniques employed in this campaign.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1542.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Firmware", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1542", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Windows BootLoader Inventory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WinLogon with Public Network Connection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows BootLoader Inventory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Firmware"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows WinLogon with Public Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bootkit"}]}]}, {"name": "BlackMatter Ransomware", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-09-06", "version": 1, "id": "0da348a3-78a0-412e-ab27-2de9dd7f9fee", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the BlackMatter ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with BlackMatter, force safe mode boot, autadminlogon account registry modification and more.", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackmatter-ransomware-gang-rises-from-the-ashes-of-darkside-revil/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/ransomware/2021/07/blackmatter-a-new-ransomware-group-claims-link-to-darkside-revil/"], "narrative": "BlackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Change To Safe Mode With Network Config", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement"}]}, {"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}]}, {"name": "Brand Monitoring", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2017-12-19", "version": 1, "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce78", "description": "Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.", "references": ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"], "narrative": "While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible&#51;phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\nYou can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\nNotable events will include IP addresses, URLs, and user data. Drilling down can provide you with even more actionable intelligence, including likely geographic information, contextual searches to help you scope the problem, and investigative searches.", "tags": {"category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": ["Email", "Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Email Info", "Get Emails From Specific Sender", "Get Notable History", "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Brute Ratel C4", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-08-23", "version": 1, "id": "0ec9dbfe-f64e-46bb-8eb8-04e92326f513", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that may be related to Brute Ratel Red Teaming tool. This includes creation, modification and deletion of services, collection or data, ping IP, DNS cache, process injection, debug privileges adjustment, winlogon process duplicate token, lock workstation, get clipboard or screenshot and much more.", "references": ["https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/brute-ratel-c4-tool/", "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/08/part-3-how-i-met-your-beacon-brute-ratel/"], "narrative": "Brute RATEL BRC4 is the latest red-teaming tool that simulate several TTP's. It uses several techniques like syscall, patching ETW/AMSI and written in native C to minimize noise in process command-line. This tool was seen in the wild being abused by some ransomware (blackcat) and adversaries in their campaigns to install the BRC4 agent that can serve as remote admin tool to compromise the target host or network.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gorgon Group", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1589", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Identity Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN13", "HEXANE", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1589.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Chimera", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1219", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "RTM", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Thrip"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Evilnum", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Whitefly", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1056.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "GUI Input Capture", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN4"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1056", "mitre_attack_technique": "Input Capture", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defacement Modify Transcodedwallpaper File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Identity SAM Info - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hijack Execution Flow Version Dll Side Load - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Input Capture Using Credential UI Dll - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection With Public Source Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software BRC4 Loaded Dll - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Deletion In Registry - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defacement Modify Transcodedwallpaper File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement"}]}, {"name": "Windows Gather Victim Identity SAM Info", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Identity Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hijack Execution Flow Version Dll Side Load", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows Input Capture Using Credential UI Dll", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "GUI Input Capture"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Input Capture"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection With Public Source Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Access Software BRC4 Loaded Dll", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Deletion In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}]}, {"name": "Caddy Wiper", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2022-03-25", "version": 1, "id": "435a156a-8ef1-4184-bd52-22328fb65d3a", "description": "Caddy Wiper is a destructive payload that detects if its running on a Domain Controller and executes killswitch if detected. If not in a DC it destroys Users and subsequent mapped drives. This wiper also destroys drive partitions inculding boot partitions.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1503436420886712321", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/03/15/caddywiper-new-wiper-malware-discovered-ukraine/"], "narrative": "Caddy Wiper is destructive malware operation found by ESET multiple organizations in Ukraine. This malicious payload destroys user files, avoids executing on Dnomain Controllers and destroys boot and drive partitions.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}]}, {"name": "Chaos Ransomware", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-01-11", "version": 1, "id": "153d7b8f-27f2-4e4d-bae8-dfafd93a22a8", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Chaos ransomware, including looking for file writes (file encryption and ransomware notes), deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, dropping of files in startup folder, and more.", "references": ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/01/17/the-chaos-ransomware-can-be-ravaging", "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/chaos-ransomware-variant-in-fake-minecraft-alt-list-brings-destruction", "https://marcoramilli.com/2021/06/14/the-allegedly-ryuk-ransomware-builder-ryukjoke/", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/h/chaos-ransomware-a-dangerous-proof-of-concept.html"], "narrative": "CHAOS ransomware has been seen and monitored since 2021. This ransomware is purportedly a .NET version of Ryuk ransomware but upon closer look to its code and behavior, this malware sample reveals that it doesn't share much relation to the notorious RYUK ransomware. This ransomware is one of the known ransomware that was used in the ongoing geo-political war. This ransomware is capable to check that only one copy of itself is running on the targeted host, delay of execution as part of its defense evasion technique, persistence through registry and startup folder, drop a copy of itself in each root drive of the targeted host and also in %appdata% folder and many more. As of writing this ransomware is still active and keeps on infecting Windows Operating machines and Windows networks.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1091", "mitre_attack_technique": "Replication Through Removable Media", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Aoqin Dragon", "Darkhotel", "FIN7", "LuminousMoth", "Mustang Panda", "Tropic Trooper"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Replication Through Removable Media", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Replication Through Removable Media"}]}, {"name": "Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "CISA AA22-257A", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-09-15", "version": 1, "id": "e1aec96e-bc7d-4edf-8ff7-3da9b7b29147", "description": "The Iranian government-sponsored APT actors are actively targeting a broad range of victims across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including the Transportation Sector and the Healthcare and Public Health Sector, as well as Australian organizations.", "references": ["https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-257a", "https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2021/210527.pdf", "https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/AA22-257A.stix.xml", "https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/iran"], "narrative": "This advisory updates joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities, which provides information on these Iranian government-sponsored APT actors exploiting known Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities to gain initial access to a broad range of targeted entities in furtherance of malicious activities, including ransom operations. The authoring agencies now judge these actors are an APT group affiliated with the IRGC. Since the initial reporting of this activity in the FBI Liaison Alert System (FLASH) report APT Actors Exploiting Fortinet Vulnerabilities to Gain Access for Malicious Activity from May 2021, the authoring agencies have continued to observe these IRGC-affiliated actors exploiting known vulnerabilities for initial access. In addition to exploiting Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, the authoring agencies have observed these APT actors exploiting VMware Horizon Log4j vulnerabilities for initial access. The IRGC-affiliated actors have used this access for follow-on activity, including disk encryption and data extortion, to support ransom operations. The IRGC-affiliated actors are actively targeting a broad range of entities, including entities across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors as well as Australian, Canadian, and United Kingdom organizations. These actors often operate under the auspices of Najee Technology Hooshmand Fater LLC, based in Karaj, Iran, and Afkar System Yazd Company, based in Yazd, Iran. The authoring agencies assess the actors are exploiting known vulnerabilities on unprotected networks rather than targeting specific targeted entities or sectors. This advisory provides observed tactics, techniques, and indicators of compromise (IOCs) that the authoring agencies assess are likely associated with this IRGC-affiliated APT. The authoring agencies urge organizations, especially critical infrastructure organizations, to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this advisory to mitigate risk of compromise from these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT5", "BlackTech", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GCMAN", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1572", "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Protocol Tunneling with Plink - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}]}, {"name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Local Admin account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Protocol Tunneling with Plink", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "CISA AA22-264A", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-09-22", "version": 1, "id": "bc7056a5-c3b0-4b83-93ce-5f31739305c8", "description": "Iranian State Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against the Government of Albania.", "references": ["https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-264a", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-264a-iranian-cyber-actors-conduct-cyber-operations-against-the-government-of-albania.pdf", "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/likely-iranian-threat-actor-conducts-politically-motivated-disruptive-activity-against", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government/"], "narrative": "The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory to provide information on recent cyber operations against the Government of Albania in July and September. This advisory provides a timeline of activity observed, from initial access to execution of encryption and wiper attacks. Additional information concerning files used by the actors during their exploitation of and cyber attack against the victim organization is provided in Appendices A and B. In September 2022, Iranian cyber actors launched another wave of cyber attacks against the Government of Albania, using similar TTPs and malware as the cyber attacks in July. These were likely done in retaliation for public attribution of the cyber attacks in July and severed diplomatic ties between Albania and Iran.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aoqin Dragon", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Ferocious Kitten", "Fox Kitten", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Sowbug", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1595", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System File on Disk - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows System File on Disk", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}]}, {"name": "CISA AA22-277A", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-10-05", "version": 1, "id": "db408f93-e915-4215-9962-5fada348bdd7", "description": "From November 2021 through January 2022, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) responded to advanced persistent threat (APT) activity on a Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector organization's enterprise network. During incident response activities, multiple utilities were utilized.", "references": ["https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-277a", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-277a-impacket-and-exfiltration-tool-used-to-steal-sensitive-information-from-defense-industrial-base-organization.pdf"], "narrative": "CISA uncovered that likely multiple APT groups compromised the organization's network, and some APT actors had long-term access to the environment. APT actors used an open-source toolkit called Impacket to gain their foothold within the environment and further compromise the network, and also used a custom data exfiltration tool, CovalentStealer, to steal the victim's sensitive data.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Execution", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery"}]}]}, {"name": "CISA AA22-320A", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-11-16", "version": 1, "id": "c1fca73d-3a8d-49a6-b9c0-1d5d155f7dd4", "description": "CISA and the FBI have identified an APT activity where the adversary gained initial access via Log4Shell via a unpatched VMware Horizon server. From there the adversary moved laterally and continued to its objective.", "references": ["https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-320a", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-320a_joint_csa_iranian_government-sponsored_apt_actors_compromise_federal%20network_deploy_crypto%20miner_credential_harvester.pdf"], "narrative": "From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an incident response engagement at a Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) organization where CISA observed suspected advanced persistent threat (APT) activity. In the course of incident response activities, CISA determined that cyber threat actors exploited the Log4Shell vulnerability in an unpatched VMware Horizon server, installed XMRig crypto mining software, moved laterally to the domain controller (DC), compromised credentials, and then implanted Ngrok reverse proxies on several hosts to maintain persistence. CISA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assess that the FCEB network was compromised by Iranian government-sponsored APT actors.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Winnti Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1102", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "EXOTIC LILY", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "LazyScripter", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Akira", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1572", "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090", "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Web", "Risk", "Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service"}]}, {"name": "Hunting for Log4Shell", "source": "web", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "CISA AA23-347A", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2023-12-14", "version": 1, "id": "d4ebfe94-bb06-429a-916a-c0da1161fa12", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might be related to the  SVR cyber activity tactics and techniques. While SVR followed a similar playbook in each compromise, they also adjusted to each operating environment and not all presented steps or actions below were executed on every host.", "references": ["https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a"], "narrative": "SVR cyber operations pose a persistent threat to public and private organizations' networks globally. Since 2013, cybersecurity companies and governments have reported on SVR operations targeting victim networks to steal confidential and proprietary information. A decade later, the authoring agencies can infer a long-term targeting pattern aimed at collecting, and enabling the collection of, foreign intelligence, a broad concept that for Russia encompasses information on the politics, economics, and military of foreign states; science and technology; and foreign counterintelligence. The SVR also conducts cyber operations targeting technology companies that enable future cyber operations. The SVR's recent operation has targeted networks hosting TeamCity servers, further underscoring its persistent focus on technology companies. By leveraging CVE-2023-42793, a vulnerability within a software development program, the SVR seeks to gain access to victims, potentially compromising numerous software developers' networks. JetBrains responded to this threat by issuing a patch in mid-September 2023, limting the SVR's ability to exploit Internet-accessible TeamCity servers lacking the necessary updates. Despite this mitigation, the SVR has yet to utilize its acquired access to software developers' networks for breaching customer systems. It appears that the SVR is still in the preparatory stages of its operation.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "APT5"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1057", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT37", "APT38", "APT5", "Andariel", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Winnti Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Akira", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSA Secrets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT33", "Dragonfly", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1649", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery for Sam Account Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Account Discovery With NetUser PreauthNotRequire - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Archive Collected Data via Powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Known GraphicalProton Loaded Modules - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows LSA Secrets NoLMhash Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Restricted Admin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Commandline Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Create Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop Win Updates - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System User Privilege Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting"}]}, {"name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "ETW Registry Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting"}]}, {"name": "Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Services Escalate Exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows Account Discovery for Sam Account Name", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Account Discovery With NetUser PreauthNotRequire", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Archive Collected Data via Powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Notification Center", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows DISM Remove Defender", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Known GraphicalProton Loaded Modules", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows LSA Secrets NoLMhash Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSA Secrets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable Restricted Admin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView SPN Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Commandline Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Query Registry Reg Save", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Create Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Stop Win Updates", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Windows System User Privilege Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinRM Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Cisco IOS XE Software Web Management User Interface vulnerability", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-17", "version": 1, "id": "b5394b6a-b774-4bb6-a2bc-98f98cf7be88", "description": "Cisco has identified active exploitation of a previously unknown vulnerability in the Web User Interface (Web UI) feature of Cisco IOS XE software (CVE-2023-20198) when exposed to the internet or untrusted networks. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to create an account on the affected device with privilege level 15 access, effectively granting them full control of the compromised device and allowing possible subsequent unauthorized activity.", "references": ["https://blog.talosintelligence.com/active-exploitation-of-cisco-ios-xe-software/"], "narrative": "Cisco discovered early evidence of potentially malicious activity on September 28, 2023, when a case was opened with Cisco's Technical Assistance Center (TAC) that identified unusual behavior on a customer device. Upon further investigation, they observed what they have determined to be related activity as early as September 18. The activity included an authorized user creating a local user account under the username cisco_tac_admin from a suspicious IP address. On October 12, Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) and TAC detected what they later determined to be an additional cluster of related activity that began on that same day. In this cluster, an unauthorized user was observed creating a local user account under the name cisco_support from a second suspicious IP address. Unlike the September case, this October activity included several subsequent actions, including the deployment of an implant consisting of a configuration file (cisco_service.conf). The configuration file defines the new web server endpoint (URI path) used to interact with the implant. That endpoint receives certain parameters, described in more detail below, that allows the actor to execute arbitrary commands at the system level or IOS level. For the implant to become active, the web server must be restarted; in at least one observed case the server was not restarted so the implant never became active despite being installed.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Cisco IOS XE Implant Access - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Cisco IOS XE Implant Access", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway CVE-2023-4966", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-24", "version": 1, "id": "b194d644-4095-431a-bee0-a8e6ec067414", "description": "A critical security update, CVE-2023-4966, has been released for NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway. This vulnerability, discovered by our internal team, can result in unauthorized data disclosure if exploited. Reports of incidents consistent with session hijacking have been received. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added an entry for CVE-2023-4966 to its Known Exploited and Vulnerabilities Catalog. No workarounds are available for this vulnerability, and immediate installation of the recommended builds is strongly advised.", "references": ["https://www.netscaler.com/blog/news/cve-2023-4966-critical-security-update-now-available-for-netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway/", "https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX579459/netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway-security-bulletin-for-cve20234966-and-cve20234967", "https://www.assetnote.io/resources/research/citrix-bleed-leaking-session-tokens-with-cve-2023-4966", "https://github.com/assetnote/exploits/tree/main/citrix/CVE-2023-4966", "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/b815d23b908de52996060163091395d1c89fbeea/http/cves/2023/CVE-2023-4966.yaml"], "narrative": "On October 10, 2023, Cloud Software Group released builds to fix CVE-2023-4966, a vulnerability affecting NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway. This vulnerability, if exploited, can lead to unauthorized data disclosure and possibly session hijacking. Although there were no known exploits at the time of disclosure, we have since received credible reports of targeted attacks exploiting this vulnerability. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added an entry for CVE-2023-4966 to its Known Exploited and Vulnerabilities Catalog, which contains detection and mitigation guidance for observed exploitations of CVE-2023-4966 by threat actors against NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway. We strongly recommend that users of affected builds immediately install the recommended builds, as this vulnerability has been identified as critical. No workarounds are available for this vulnerability.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Citrix ADC and Gateway Unauthorized Data Disclosure - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Citrix ADC and Gateway Unauthorized Data Disclosure", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Citrix Netscaler ADC CVE-2023-3519", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-07-20", "version": 1, "id": "094df1fe-4345-4c01-8a0f-c65cf7b758bd", "description": "The CVE-2023-3519 vulnerability in NetScaler (formerly Citrix) Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and NetScaler Gateway has been exploited by threat actors, as detailed in a recent advisory. The unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability was utilized as a zero-day to establish a webshell on a non-production environment NetScaler ADC appliance within a critical infrastructure organization. This facilitated the execution of discovery on the victim's active directory and the collection and exfiltration of data. The advisory offers a comprehensive examination of the threat actors' tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), alongside recommended detection methods and incident response guidelines. Immediate patch application from Citrix and the use of the detection guidance in the advisory is strongly recommended for critical infrastructure organizations to mitigate system compromises.", "references": ["https://attackerkb.com/topics/si09VNJhHh/cve-2023-3519", "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/aa23-201a_csa_threat_actors_exploiting_citrix-cve-2023-3519_to_implant_webshells.pdf", "https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX561482/citrix-adc-and-citrix-gateway-security-bulletin-for-cve20233519-cve20233466-cve20233467"], "narrative": "Recent advisories have highlighted the exploitation of CVE-2023-3519, a critical vulnerability in Citrix's NetScaler Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and NetScaler Gateway. In June 2023, threat actors utilized this vulnerability to implant a webshell on a NetScaler ADC appliance within a critical infrastructure organization's non-production environment. This action granted them the ability to perform active directory discovery, data collection, and exfiltration. Notably, attempts for lateral movement to a domain controller were obstructed by network-segmentation controls.\nThe compromised organization reported the breach, leading Citrix to issue a patch on July 18, 2023. Multiple advisories have since outlined the threat actors' tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), including their initial access, persistence, privilege escalation, defense evasion, credential access, discovery, collection, command and control, and impact. These advisories also provide detection methods and recommend incident response measures.\nThe threat actors executed several activities during their attack, such as uploading a TGZ file with a generic webshell, discovery script, and setuid binary on the ADC appliance; conducting SMB scanning on the subnet; using the webshell for active directory enumeration and data exfiltration; and accessing NetScaler configuration files and decryption keys. They also decrypted an active directory credential, queried the active directory for various information, encrypted collected data, exfiltrated it as an image file, and attempted to erase their artifacts. Despite these actions, further discovery and lateral movement were impeded due to the organization's network-segmentation controls. \\\nAdvisories suggest conducting specific checks on the ADC shell interface to detect signs of compromise. If a compromise is detected, organizations should isolate potentially affected hosts, reimage compromised hosts, provide new account credentials, collect and review artifacts, and report the compromise. To mitigate the threat, organizations are advised to promptly install the relevant updates for NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway, adhere to cybersecurity best practices, and apply robust network-segmentation controls on NetScaler appliances and other internet-facing devices.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Citrix ADC Exploitation CVE-2023-3519 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Citrix ADC Exploitation CVE-2023-3519", "source": "web", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Citrix ShareFile RCE CVE-2023-24489", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-07-26", "version": 1, "id": "10c7e01a-5743-4995-99df-a66f6b5db653", "description": "A critical vulnerability has been discovered in ShareFile's Storage Zones Controller software (CVE-2023-24489), used by numerous organizations for file sharing and storage. The vulnerability allows unauthenticated arbitrary file upload and remote code execution due to a cryptographic bug in the software's encryption but lack of authentication system. The risk comes from a failing encryption check, allowing potential cybercriminals to upload malicious files to the server. The bug was found in the Documentum Connector's .aspx files. The security risk has a potentially large impact due to the software's wide use and the sensitivity of the stored data. Citrix has released a security update to address this issue.", "references": ["https://www.greynoise.io/blog/introducing-cve-2023-24489-a-critical-citrix-sharefile-rce-vulnerability", "https://blog.assetnote.io/2023/07/04/citrix-sharefile-rce/"], "narrative": "The ShareFile Storage Zones Controller is a .NET web application running under IIS, which manages the storage of files in ShareFile's system. It was discovered that this software has a critical vulnerability (CVE-2023-24489) in the file upload functionality provided by the Documentum Connector's .aspx files. Specifically, the security flaw lies in the encryption check in the file upload process which could be bypassed, allowing for unauthenticated arbitrary file uploads and remote code execution.\nThe application sets the current principal from a session cookie, but if this is missing, the application continues without authentication. The application uses AES encryption, with CBC mode and PKCS#7 padding. A decryption check is in place which returns an error if the decryption fails, but this can be bypassed by supplying a ciphertext that results in valid padding after decryption, thereby not causing an exception.\nThe Documentum Connector's upload.aspx file, when uploading a file, calls the ProcessRawPostedFile function, which allows a path traversal due to improper sanitization of the 'uploadId' parameter. It allows the 'filename' and 'uploadId' parameters to be concatenated, and while the 'filename' parameter is sanitized, the 'uploadId' is not. The 'parentid' parameter is passed in but is also not used.\nThe vulnerability enables an attacker to upload a webshell or any other malicious file, by providing a properly padded encrypted string for the 'parentid' parameter, and specifying the path for the 'uploadId' and the name for the 'filename'. An attacker can achieve remote code execution by requesting the uploaded file. The issue was addressed by Citrix in a recent security update.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Citrix ShareFile Exploitation CVE-2023-24489 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Citrix ShareFile Exploitation CVE-2023-24489", "source": "web", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Clop Ransomware", "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-03-17", "version": 1, "id": "5a6f6849-1a26-4fae-aa05-fa730556eeb6", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.", "references": ["https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/analyst-note-cl0p-tlp-white.pdf", "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115250/data-breach/qualys-clop-ransomware.html", "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/qualys-is-the-latest-victim-of-accellion-data-breach/d/d-id/1340323"], "narrative": "Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Execution", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "Clop Common Exec Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Clop Ransomware Known Service Name", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "High Process Termination Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Resize ShadowStorage volume", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Cloud Cryptomining", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2019-10-02", "version": 1, "id": "3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a", "description": "Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "narrative": "Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority.\nCryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN.\nWhen malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated.\nThis Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your cloud environment to help prevent cryptominers from gaining a foothold. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Change"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "Get EC2 Launch Details", "Get Notable History", "Investigate AWS activities via region name"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2021-01-26", "version": 1, "id": "cecdc1e7-0af2-4a55-8967-b9ea62c0317d", "description": "This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.", "references": ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"], "narrative": "This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "AWS SAML Update identity provider", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 Added Service Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}]}, {"name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}]}, {"name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-02-16", "version": 1, "id": "bcfd17e8-5461-400a-80a2-3b7d1459220c", "description": "Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.", "references": ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike"], "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\nSplunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\n`Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and injects shellcode into.\nPipename sets the named pipe name used in Cobalt Strikes Beacon SMB C2 traffic.\nWith that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt Strike added as a detection. In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\n- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\n- What is the default, or normal, process lineage for spawnto_ value?\n- Does the spawnto_ value make network connections?\n- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?\nWhile investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning may need to occur to remove any false positives.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Services Escalate Exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}]}, {"name": "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "date": "2019-01-09", "version": 1, "id": "bd91a2bc-d20b-4f44-a982-1bea98e86390", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.", "references": ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"], "narrative": "Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before&#151;a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\nThis Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\nSearches in this Analytic Story leverage the capabilities of OSquery to address ColdRoot detection from several different angles, such as looking for the existence of associated files and processes, and monitoring for signs of an installed keylogger.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Investigate Network Traffic From src ip"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Jose Hernandez", "detections": [{"name": "Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "MacOS - Re-opened Applications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Processes Tapping Keyboard Events", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Collection and Staging", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-03", "version": 1, "id": "8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a", "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. ", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"], "narrative": "A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\nAttacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence.\nUse the searches to detect and monitor suspicious behavior related to these activities.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "Chimera", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN4", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Collection"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Email files written outside of the Outlook directory", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious writes to System Volume Information", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed 7-Zip", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}]}]}, {"name": "Command And Control", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2018-06-01", "version": 1, "id": "943773c6-c4de-4f38-89a8-0b92f98804d8", "description": "Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate Command And Control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"], "narrative": "Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\nBecause this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "LazyScripter", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1095", "mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "BITTER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "FIN6", "HAFNIUM", "Metador", "PLATINUM", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-hop Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "FIN4", "Inception", "Leviathan"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1219", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "RTM", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Thrip"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1568.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1189", "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Andariel", "Axiom", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mustard Tempest", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090", "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Exfiltration", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ES Content Updates - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get DNS traffic ratio", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity", "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detection of DNS Tunnels", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Access Software Hunt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}]}, {"name": "Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Excessive DNS Failures", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Protocol or Port Mismatch", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "TOR Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-hop Proxy"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}]}, {"name": "Compromised User Account", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2023-01-19", "version": 1, "id": "19669154-e9d1-4a01-b144-e6592a078092", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Compromised User Account attacks.", "references": ["https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/compromised-account"], "narrative": "Compromised User Account occurs when cybercriminals gain unauthorized access to accounts by using different techniques like brute force, social engineering, phishing & spear phishing, credential stuffing, etc. By posing as the real user, cyber-criminals can change account details, send out phishing emails, steal financial information or sensitive data, or use any stolen information to access further accounts within the organization. This analytic story groups detections that can help security operations teams identify the potential signs of Compromised User Accounts.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1621", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1185", "mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Resource Development", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Change", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PingID Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PingID New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ASL AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration"}]}, {"name": "PingID Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration"}]}, {"name": "PingID New MFA Method Registered For User", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "ASL AWS Password Policy Changes", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "AWS Password Policy Changes", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}]}, {"name": "Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server Vulnerabilities", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2024-01-22", "version": 1, "id": "509387a5-ab53-4656-8bb5-4bc8c2c074d9", "description": "The following analytic story covers use cases for detecting and investigating potential attacks against Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server.", "references": ["https://confluence.atlassian.com/security/cve-2023-22527-rce-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-confluence-data-center-and-confluence-server-1333990257.html"], "narrative": "The analytic story of Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server encompasses a comprehensive approach to safeguarding these platforms from a variety of threats. By leveraging the analytics created in the project, security teams are equipped to detect, investigate, and respond to potential attacks that target Confluence environments.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Confluence Pre-Auth RCE via OGNL Injection CVE-2023-22527 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Confluence Pre-Auth RCE via OGNL Injection CVE-2023-22527", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "ConnectWise ScreenConnect Vulnerabilities", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2024-02-21", "version": 1, "id": "fbee3185-748c-40d8-a60c-c2e2c9eb738b", "description": "This analytic story provides a comprehensive overview of the ConnectWise ScreenConnect vulnerabilities.", "references": ["https://www.huntress.com/blog/a-catastrophe-for-control-understanding-the-screenconnect-authentication-bypass", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/detection-guidance-for-connectwise-cwe-288-2", "https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/connectwise-screenconnect-23.9.8"], "narrative": "The following analytic story includes content for recently disclosed CWE-288 Authentication Bypass and CWE-22 Path Traversal. The vulnerabilities, identified as critical with CVSS scores of 10 and 9.8, respectively, enable unauthorized users to bypass authentication and perform path traversal attacks on affected ScreenConnect instances. The analytic story includes detection analytics for both vulnerabilities, which are crucial for identifying and responding to active exploitation in environments running affected versions of ScreenConnect (23.9.7 and prior). It is recommended to update to version 23.9.8 or above immediately to remediate the issues, as detailed in the ConnectWise security advisory and further analyzed by Huntress researchers. The analytic story also includes guidance on how to implement the detection analytics, known false positives, and references to additional resources for further analysis and remediation.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Windows SACL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Nginx ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Windows SACL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Nginx ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Credential Dumping", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-04", "version": 3, "id": "854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a", "description": "Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"], "narrative": "Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\nOnce attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\nThe detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, the usage of shadowcopies for credential dumping and some other techniques for credential dumping.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "FIN10", "FIN7", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "PROMETHIUM", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Mustang Panda", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials In Files", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Scattered Spider", "TA505", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca", "LAPSUS$"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Change", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Potential password in username - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Createdump - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", "Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", "Investigate Previous Unseen User"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}]}, {"name": "Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}]}, {"name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Create Remote Thread into LSASS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Esentutl SAM Copy", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Potential password in username", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials In Files"}]}, {"name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Createdump", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}]}, {"name": "CVE-2022-40684 Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-10-14", "version": 1, "id": "55721831-577e-41be-beef-bdc03c81486a", "description": "Fortinet recently patched a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in their FortiOS, FortiProxy, and FortiSwitchManager projects CVE-2022-40684.", "references": ["https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2022/10/threat-advisory-cve-2022-40684-fortinet-appliance-auth-bypass/", "https://www.horizon3.ai/fortios-fortiproxy-and-fortiswitchmanager-authentication-bypass-technical-deep-dive-cve-2022-40684/", "https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2022-40684", "https://attackerkb.com/topics/QWOxGIKkGx/cve-2022-40684/rapid7-analysis", "https://www.greynoise.io/blog/fortios-authentication-bypass"], "narrative": "FortiOS exposes a management web portal that allows a user configure the system. Additionally, a user can SSH into the system which exposes a locked down CLI interface. Any HTTP requests to the management interface of the system that match the conditions above should be cause for concern. An attacker can use this vulnerability to do just about anything they want to the vulnerable system. This includes changing network configurations, adding new users, and initiating packet captures. Note that this is not the only way to exploit this vulnerability and there may be other sets of conditions that work. For instance, a modified version of this exploit uses the User-Agent Node.js. This exploit seems to follow a trend among recently discovered enterprise software vulnerabilities where HTTP headers are improperly validated or overly trusted. (ref Horizon3.ai)", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-03-10", "version": 1, "id": "b1aeaf2c-8496-42e7-b2f7-15c328bc75d9", "description": "A proof-of-concept for CVE-2023-21716, a critical vulnerability in Microsoft Word that allows remote code execution utilizing a heap corruption in rich text files.", "references": ["https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/proof-of-concept-released-for-critical-microsoft-word-rce-bug/"], "narrative": "This analytic story covers content that will assist organizations in identifying potential RTF RCE abuse on endpoints. The vulnerability was assigned a 9.8 out of 10 severity score, with Microsoft addressing it in the February Patch Tuesday security updates along with a couple of workarounds. Security researcher Joshua Drake last year discovered the vulnerability in Microsoft Office''s \"wwlib.dll\" and sent Microsoft a technical advisory containing proof-of-concept (PoC) code showing the issue is exploitable. A remote attacker could potentially take advantage of the issue to execute code with the same privileges as the victim that opens a malicious .RTF document. Delivering the malicious file to a victim can be as easy as an attachment to an email, although plenty of other methods exist. Microsoft warns that users don''t have to open a malicious RTF document and simply loading the file in the Preview Pane is enough for the compromise to start. (BleepingComputer, 2023)", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Office Application Drop Executable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning Windows Script Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}]}, {"name": "CVE-2023-22515 Privilege Escalation Vulnerability Confluence Data Center and Server", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-04", "version": 1, "id": "ead8eb10-9e7c-4a07-a44c-c6e73997a1a3", "description": "On October 4, 2023, Atlassian disclosed a critical privilege escalation vulnerability, CVE-2023-22515, affecting on-premises instances of Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center. This flaw might allow external attackers to exploit accessible Confluence instances, creating unauthorized Confluence administrator accounts. Indicators suggest the vulnerability is remotely exploitable. The affected versions range from 8.0.0 to 8.5.1, but versions prior to 8.0.0 and Atlassian Cloud sites are unaffected. Atlassian advises customers to update to a fixed version or implement mitigation strategies. Indicators of compromise (IoCs) and mitigation steps, such as blocking access to /setup/* endpoints, are provided.", "references": ["https://confluence.atlassian.com/security/cve-2023-22515-privilege-escalation-vulnerability-in-confluence-data-center-and-server-1295682276.html", "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/10/04/etr-cve-2023-22515-zero-day-privilege-escalation-in-confluence-server-and-data-center/"], "narrative": "Upon Atlassian's disclosure of CVE-2023-22515, there's an immediate need to assess the threat landscape of on-premises Confluence installations. As the vulnerability affects privilege escalation and may be exploited remotely, SIEM solutions should be poised to detect potential threats.\nBy monitoring for specific indicators of compromise, security teams can get ahead of any potential breaches. Key indicators include unexpected members in the 'confluence-administrator' group, newly created user accounts, and specific HTTP requests to /setup/*.action endpoints. Any unusual spikes or patterns associated with these indicators might signify an ongoing or attempted exploitation.\nFurthermore, an audit trail of past logs is essential. Analyzing older logs might uncover any unnoticed exploitation, allowing for a post-incident analysis and ensuring affected systems are patched or isolated. An alert mechanism should be established for any access or changes related to /setup/* endpoints.\nIn parallel, updating the affected Confluence Server and Data Center versions to the fixed releases is paramount. If immediate updates aren't feasible, interim mitigation measures, such as blocking external network access to /setup/*, should be implemented, and logs around this activity should be monitored.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Confluence CVE-2023-22515 Trigger Vulnerability - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Web Remote ShellServlet Access - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Confluence CVE-2023-22515 Trigger Vulnerability", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Web Remote ShellServlet Access", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "CVE-2023-23397 Outlook Elevation of Privilege", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-03-15", "version": 1, "id": "b459911b-551f-480f-a402-18cf89ca1e9c", "description": "Microsoft has released CVE-2023-23397 to address the critical elevation of privilege (EoP) vulnerability affecting Microsoft Outlook for Windows.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/ACEResponder/status/1636116096506818562?s=20", "https://twitter.com/domchell/status/1635999068282408962?s=20", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2023/03/microsoft-mitigates-outlook-elevation-of-privilege-vulnerability/", "https://www.pwndefend.com/2023/03/15/the-long-game-persistent-hash-theft/"], "narrative": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence discovered limited, targeted abuse of a vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook for Windows that allows for new technology LAN manager (NTLM) credential theft. Microsoft has released CVE-2023-23397 to address the critical elevation of privilege (EoP) vulnerability affecting Microsoft Outlook for Windows. We strongly recommend all customers update Microsoft Outlook for Windows to remain secure. CVE-2023-23397 is a critical EoP vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook that is triggered when an attacker sends a message with an extended MAPI property with a UNC path to an SMB (TCP 445) share on a threat actor-controlled server. No user interaction is required. The connection to the remote SMB server sends the user''s NTLM negotiation message, which the attacker can then relay for authentication against other systems that support NTLM authentication. Online services such as Microsoft 365 do not support NTLM authentication and are not vulnerable to being attacked by these messages. (2023, Microsoft)", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Windows Rundll32 WebDAV Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Rundll32 WebDav With Network Connection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows Rundll32 WebDAV Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows Rundll32 WebDav With Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}]}, {"name": "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-07-11", "version": 1, "id": "dd7fb691-63d6-47ad-9a7f-1b9005cefad2", "description": "CVE-2023-36884 is an unpatched zero-day vulnerability affecting Windows and Microsoft Office products. The vulnerability allows for remote code execution through specially crafted Microsoft Office documents, enabling an attacker to operate in the context of the victim. As of now, there are no security updates available. However, users of Microsoft Defender for Office and the \"Block all Office applications from creating child processes\" Attack Surface Reduction Rule are safeguarded against this exploit. For other users, temporary mitigation can be achieved by adding specific application names to a designated registry key.", "references": ["https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/22ad19081300493e70ce0b873e98b2d0", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2023-36884", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-july-2023-patch-tuesday-warns-of-6-zero-days-132-flaws/", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/11/storm-0978-attacks-reveal-financial-and-espionage-motives/"], "narrative": "CVE-2023-36884 is a serious security vulnerability that affects a range of Microsoft Office products and Windows systems. It is a zero-day flaw, meaning it was already being exploited before Microsoft became aware of it or had a chance to develop a patch.\nAn attacker exploiting this vulnerability would create a Microsoft Office document containing malicious code. This document, when opened by the victim, allows for remote code execution, giving the attacker the ability to run their own code on the victim's machine. This poses a significant risk as the attacker could perform actions like data theft, system damage, or creating backdoors for future access.\nCurrently, there is no security patch available from Microsoft, which makes the issue more critical. Microsoft is working on investigating these vulnerabilities and will likely provide a security update either through their monthly release cycle or an out-of-cycle update, based on the urgency.\nIn the meantime, users of Microsoft Defender for Office and those utilizing the \"Block all Office applications from creating child processes\" Attack Surface Reduction Rule are protected from attempts to exploit this vulnerability. This is because these protections add an extra layer of security, blocking the malicious code from executing.\nFor users who are not using these protections, Microsoft recommends a workaround by adding specific application names to a particular Windows registry key (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\FeatureControl\\FEATURE_BLOCK_CROSS_PROTOCOL_FILE_NAVIGATION) with data set as \"1\". This action aims to mitigate the risk until a permanent fix is available.\nThe disclosure of this flaw involved multiple entities including Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Vlad Stolyarov, Clement Lecigne and Bahare Sabouri from Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG), Paul Rascagneres and Tom Lancaster from Volexity, and the Microsoft Office Product Group Security Team. This collective effort indicates the severity and importance of addressing this issue.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}]}, {"name": "Cyclops Blink", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2024-03-14", "version": 2, "id": "7c75b1c8-dfff-46f1-8250-e58df91b6fd9", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the cyclopsblink malware including firewall modification, spawning more process, botnet c2 communication, defense evasion and etc. Cyclops Blink is a Linux ELF executable compiled for 32-bit x86 and PowerPC architecture that has targeted several network devices. The complete list of targeted devices is unknown at this time, but WatchGuard FireBox has specifically been listed as a target. The modular malware consists of core components and modules that are deployed as child processes using the Linux API fork. At this point, four modules have been identified that download and upload files, gather system information and contain updating mechanisms for the malware itself. Additional modules can be downloaded and executed from the Command And Control (C2) server.", "references": ["https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Cyclops-Blink-Malware-Analysis-Report.pdf", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/c/cyclops-blink-sets-sights-on-asus-routers--.html"], "narrative": "Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade Task or Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT41", "BITTER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Carbanak", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Linux Iptables Firewall Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade Task or Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}]}, {"name": "DarkCrystal RAT", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-07-26", "version": 1, "id": "639e6006-0885-4847-9394-ddc2902629bf", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DcRat malware including ddos, spawning more process, botnet c2 communication, defense evasion and etc. The DcRat malware is known commercial backdoor that was first released in 2018. This tool was sold in underground forum and known to be one of the cheapest commercial RATs. DcRat is modular and bespoke plugin framework make it a very flexible option, helpful for a range of nefearious uses.", "references": ["https://www.mandiant.com/resources/analyzing-dark-crystal-rat-backdoor", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.dcrat"], "narrative": "Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["HAFNIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Andariel", "HAFNIUM", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1124", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Time Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "Sidewinder", "The White Company", "Turla", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Command Shell DCRat ForkBomb Payload - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Host Information Camera - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Ingress Tool Transfer Using Explorer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System LogOff Commandline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Time Discovery W32tm Delay - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Command Shell DCRat ForkBomb Payload", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Gather Victim Host Information Camera", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows Ingress Tool Transfer Using Explorer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Windows System LogOff Commandline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Reboot CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Shutdown CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Time Discovery W32tm Delay", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Time Discovery"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}]}, {"name": "DarkGate Malware", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-31", "version": 1, "id": "a4727b27-9e68-48f0-94a2-253cfb30c15d", "description": "Telekom Security CTI has uncovered a new phishing-driven malware campaign distributing DarkGate malware. This campaign utilizes stolen email threads to trick users into downloading malicious payloads via hyperlinks. An initial false link to Emotet stirred the security community, but deeper analysis confirmed its true identity as DarkGate, with characteristics like AutoIt scripts and a known command-and-control protocol. This report by Fabian Marquardt details the intricate infection mechanisms, including MSI and VBS file deliveries, sophisticated evasion techniques, and a robust configuration extraction method surpassing current standards. The single developer behind DarkGate, active on cybercrime forums, has shifted the malware's use from private to a rent-out model, implying an expected rise in its deployment. Researchers have also developed a decryption technique for the DarkGate malware, which aids in static analysis and detection, though it requires careful validation to avoid false positives.", "references": ["https://github.security.telekom.com/2023/08/darkgate-loader.html", "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-october-2023"], "narrative": "Telekom Security CTi has recently put a spotlight on the proliferation of DarkGate malware via a sophisticated malspam campaign, initially mistaken for the notorious Emotet malware. The campaign smartly manipulates stolen email conversations, embedding hyperlinks that, once clicked, activate a malware download. Fabian Marquardt's analysis traces the infection's footprint, revealing a dual delivery mechanism through MSI and VBS files. These files, cloaked in legitimate wrappers or obscured with junk code, ultimately download the malware via embedded scripts.\nMarquardt delves into the AutoIt script-based infection, uncovering the calculated use of compiled scripts and base64-encoded data to disguise the execution of malicious shellcode. The subsequent stages of infection exhibit the malware's capability to evade detection, leveraging memory allocation techniques to bypass security measures. Marquardt also explores the loader's function, which decrypts further malicious payloads by interacting with the script's encoded components.\nThe analytical narrative captures a cross-section of the cybersecurity landscape, reflecting the shift in DarkGate's operational strategy from exclusive use by the developer to a broader dissemination through a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model. This transition suggests an anticipated escalation in DarkGate-related attacks.\nSignificantly, the report contributes to cybersecurity defenses by outlining a more effective method for extracting malware configurations, providing the community with the means to anticipate and mitigate the evolving threats posed by this pernicious malware. With the insights gained, researchers and security professionals are better equipped to adapt their strategies, constructing more robust defenses against the sophisticated tactics employed by DarkGate and similar malware strains.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "FIN13", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Machete", "Molerats", "Rancor", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Remote Services Add TrustedHost - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Archive Collected Data via Rar - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AutoIt3 Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows CAB File on Disk - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Indicator Removal Via Rmdir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry AuthenticationLevelOverride - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry DontShowUI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry ProxyEnable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry ProxyServer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Spawn WinDBG - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WinDBG Spawning AutoIt3 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal"}]}, {"name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Of Net Users", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Remote Services Add TrustedHost", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Archive Collected Data via Rar", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Windows AutoIt3 Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows CAB File on Disk", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}]}, {"name": "Windows Indicator Removal Via Rmdir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry AuthenticationLevelOverride", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry DontShowUI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry ProxyEnable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry ProxyServer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSIExec Spawn WinDBG", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Reboot CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Shutdown CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Windows WinDBG Spawning AutoIt3", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "DarkSide Ransomware", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2021-05-12", "version": 1, "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations"], "narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1197", "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1020", "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Sidewinder", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Command And Control", "Exfiltration", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "BITSAdmin Download File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP"}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed RClone", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration"}]}, {"name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}]}, {"name": "Data Destruction", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-04-06", "version": 1, "id": "4ae5c0d1-cebd-47d1-bfce-71bf096e38aa", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the data destruction, including deleting files, overwriting files, wiping disk and unrecoverable file encryption. This analytic story may cover several known activities related to malware implants used in geo-political war to wipe disks or files to interrupt the network-wide operation of a targeted organization. Analytics can detect the behavior of \"DoubleZero Destructor\", \"CaddyWiper\", \"AcidRain\", \"AwfulShred\", \"Hermetic Wiper\", \"Swift Slicer\", \"Whisper Gate\" and many more.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/", "https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/a-brief-history-and-further-technical-analysis-of-sodinokibi-ransomware", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-advisory-strt-ta02-destructive-software.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hermeticwiper.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-doublezero-destructor.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-caddywiper.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/strt-ta03-cpe-destructive-software.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-cyclopsblink.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-acidrain-wiper.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-industroyer2.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-advisory-swiftslicer-wiper-strt-ta03.html"], "narrative": "Adversaries may partially or completely overwrite the contents of a storage device rendering the data irrecoverable through the storage interface or using 3rd party drivers to directly access disk content like Master Boot Record to wipe it. Some of these attacks were seen in geo-political war to impair the operation of targeted organizations or to interrupt network-wide services.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT41", "Axiom", "Deep Panda", "Fox Kitten"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT5", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1200", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Cobalt Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "FIN13", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "APT5"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Aoqin Dragon", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cleaver", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "POLONIUM", "Patchwork", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "TA2541", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "Evilnum", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497", "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Darkhotel"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Deep Panda", "GALLIUM", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Reconnaissance", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Resource Development", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Email"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Weaponization", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Data Destruction Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Disable Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Stop Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Change Default File Association", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "ETW Registry Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Data Destruction Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux DD File Overwrite", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deletion Of Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Disable Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions"}]}, {"name": "Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Restarted", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Shred Overwrite Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Linux Stop Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Linux System Network Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features"}]}, {"name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion"}]}, {"name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MMC"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver"}]}, {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Tool"}]}, {"name": "Windows NirSoft Utilities", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Tool"}]}, {"name": "Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Terminating Lsass Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}]}, {"name": "Data Exfiltration", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Shannon Davis, Splunk", "date": "2023-05-17", "version": 2, "id": "66b0fe0c-1351-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", "description": "Data exfiltration refers to the unauthorized transfer or extraction of sensitive or valuable data from a compromised system or network during a cyber attack. It is a critical phase in many targeted attacks, where adversaries aim to steal confidential information, such as intellectual property, financial records, personal data, or trade secrets.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/", "https://bleemb.medium.com/data-exfiltration-with-native-aws-s3-features-c94ae4d13436", "https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/how-to-exfiltrate-aws-ec2-data/", "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-277a"], "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) leveraged by adversaries to exfiltrate data from your environments. Exfiltration comes in many flavors and its done differently on every environment. Adversaries can collect data over encrypted or non-encrypted channels.  They can utilise Command And Control channels that are already in place to exfiltrate data.  They can use both standard data transfer protocols such as FTP, SCP, etc to exfiltrate data.  Or they can use non-standard protocols such as DNS, ICMP, etc with specially crafted fields to try and circumvent security technologies in place.\nTechniques for getting data out of a target network typically include transferring it over their command and control channel or an alternate channel and may also include putting size limits on the transmission. In context of the cloud, this refers to the unauthorized transfer or extraction of sensitive data from cloud-based systems or services. It involves the compromise of cloud infrastructure or accounts to gain access to valuable information stored in the cloud environment. Attackers may employ various techniques, such as exploiting vulnerabilities, stealing login credentials, or using malicious code to exfiltrate data from cloud repositories or services without detection.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1119", "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "Chimera", "Confucius", "FIN5", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1649", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "Chimera", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1041", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Chimera", "Confucius", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1537", "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1568.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1567", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Exfiltration", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Web", "Risk", "Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Disable Bucket Versioning - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Anomalous GetObject API Activity - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Batch Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - High Volume of Bytes Out to Url - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS Disable Bucket Versioning", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS Exfiltration via Anomalous GetObject API Activity", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Collection"}]}, {"name": "AWS Exfiltration via Batch Service", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Collection"}]}, {"name": "AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Collection"}]}, {"name": "AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified", "source": "cloud", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "O365 PST export alert", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "Detect Certipy File Modifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Linux Curl Upload File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Mailsniper Invoke functions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}]}, {"name": "Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel"}]}, {"name": "High Volume of Bytes Out to Url", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}]}, {"name": "Data Protection", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-14", "version": 1, "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33", "description": "Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.", "references": ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"], "narrative": "Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.", "tags": {"category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "datamodels": ["Change", "Change_Analysis", "Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get DNS traffic ratio", "Get Notable History", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect USB device insertion", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Detection of DNS Tunnels", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}]}, {"name": "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-03-24", "version": 1, "id": "0bd01a54-8cbe-11eb-abcd-acde48001122", "description": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"], "narrative": "An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable executable to a certificate file, which is base64 encoded, to hide the originating file. There are many utilities cross-platform to encode using XOR, using compressed .cab files to hide contents and scripting languages that may perform similar native Windows tasks. Triaging an event related will require the capability to review related process events and file modifications. Using a tool such as CyberChef will assist with identifying the encoding that was used, and potentially assist with decoding the contents.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS Cryptomining", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2018-03-08", "version": 1, "id": "ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-9a782eec6750", "description": "Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "narrative": "Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority.\nCryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN.\nWhen malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So, it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated.\nThis Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your EC2 environment to help prevent such a disaster. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "Get EC2 Launch Details", "Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint", "Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "Get Notable History", "Investigate AWS activities via region name"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2018-03-16", "version": 1, "id": "3338b567-3804-4261-9889-cf0ca4753c7f", "description": "Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "narrative": "Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\nThis Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "Get All AWS Activity From City", "Get All AWS Activity From Country", "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "Get All AWS Activity From Region"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}]}, {"name": "Common Phishing Frameworks", "author": "Splunk Research Team, Splunk", "date": "2019-04-29", "version": 1, "id": "9a64ab44-9214-4639-8163-7eaa2621bd61", "description": "Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email. ", "references": ["https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/", "https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/"], "narrative": "As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Because phishing is a technique that relies on human psychology, you will never be able to eliminate this vulnerability 100%. But you can use automated detection to significantly reduce the risks.\nThis Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs of MiTM attacks enabled by [EvilGinx2](https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2), a toolkit that sets up a transparent proxy between the targeted site and the user. In this way, the attacker is able to intercept credentials and two-factor identification tokens. It employs a proxy template to allow a registered domain to impersonate targeted sites, such as Linkedin, Amazon, Okta, Github, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Office 365, and others. It can even register SSL certificates and camouflage them via a URL shortener, making them difficult to detect. Searches in this story look for signs of MiTM attacks enabled by EvilGinx2.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Certificate logs for a domain"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Splunk Research Team", "detections": [{"name": "Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing via Service"}]}]}, {"name": "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation", "author": "Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-20", "version": 1, "id": "aa0e28b1-0521-4b6f-9d2a-7b87e34af246", "description": "Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry.", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"], "narrative": "Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": [], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": []}, {"name": "Host Redirection", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-14", "version": 1, "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50fe268af4", "description": "Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"], "narrative": "Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.", "tags": {"category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "LazyScripter", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Exfiltration"], "datamodels": ["Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows hosts file modification - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}]}, {"name": "Windows hosts file modification", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2020-05-20", "version": 1, "id": "8b3984d2-17b6-47e9-ba43-a3376e70fdcc", "description": "This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"], "narrative": "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Lateral Movement", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-04", "version": 2, "id": "399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-abd9051f38ad", "description": " DEPRECATED IN FAVOR OF ACTIVE DIRECTORY LATERAL MOVEMENT. Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"], "narrative": "Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation. Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or \"crown jewels\" to a persistent threat actor. An adversary can use lateral movement for multiple purposes, including remote execution of tools, pivoting to additional systems, obtaining access to specific information or files, access to additional credentials, exfiltrating data, or delivering a secondary effect. Adversaries may use legitimate credentials alongside inherent network and operating-system functionality to remotely connect to other systems and remain under the radar of network defenders. If there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to collect evidence of the associated offending hosts. For example, an attacker might leverage host A to gain access to host B. From there, the attacker may try to move laterally to host C. In this example, the analyst should gather as much information as possible from all three hosts. It is also important to collect authentication logs for each host, to ensure that the offending accounts are well-documented. Analysts should account for all processes to ensure that the attackers did not install unauthorized software.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": [], "investigation_names": ["Get History Of Email Sources", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": []}, {"name": "Monitor Backup Solution", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-12", "version": 1, "id": "abe807c7-1eb6-4304-ac32-6e7aacdb891d", "description": "Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.", "references": ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"], "narrative": "Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations.  Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Compliance", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["All backup logs for host", "Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Unsuccessful Netbackup backups", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-15", "version": 1, "id": "8892a655-6205-43f7-abba-06460e38c8ae", "description": "Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. ", "references": ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"], "narrative": "It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\nIt is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. ", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Compliance", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning"}]}]}, {"name": "Office 365 Detections", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2020-12-16", "version": 2, "id": "1a51dd71-effc-48b2-abc4-3e9cdb61e5b9", "description": "Monitor for activities and anomalies indicative of potential threats within Office 365 environments.", "references": ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/cloud/office365/", "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-120a"], "narrative": "Office 365 (O365) is Microsoft's cloud-based suite of productivity tools, encompassing email, collaboration platforms, and office applications, all integrated with Azure Active Directory for identity and access management. Given the centralized storage of sensitive organizational data within O365 and its widespread adoption, it has become a focal point for cybersecurity efforts. The platform's complexity, combined with its ubiquity, makes it both a valuable asset and a prime target for potential threats. As O365's importance grows, it increasingly becomes a target for attackers seeking to exploit organizational data and systems. Security teams should prioritize monitoring O365 not just because of the sensitive data it often holds, but also due to the myriad ways the platform can be exploited. Understanding and monitoring O365's security landscape is crucial for organizations to detect, respond to, and mitigate potential threats in a timely manner.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": [], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "author_name": "Patrick Bareiss", "detections": []}, {"name": "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2018-01-08", "version": 1, "id": "6d3306f6-bb2b-4219-8609-8efad64032f2", "description": "Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story.", "references": ["https://meltdownattack.com/"], "narrative": "Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs that allow unintended access to data in memory. This Analytic Story will help you identify the systems can be patched for these vulnerabilities, as well as those that still need to be patched.", "tags": {"category": ["Vulnerability"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2018-02-09", "version": 1, "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1268af3", "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "narrative": "AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "Get EC2 Launch Details", "Get Notable History", "Investigate AWS activities via region name"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2018-04-09", "version": 1, "id": "73de57ef-0dfc-411f-b1e7-fa24428aeae0", "description": "Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "narrative": "A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised.\nSearches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Web Fraud Detection", "author": "Jim Apger, Splunk", "date": "2018-10-08", "version": 1, "id": "18bb45b9-7684-45c6-9e97-1fdd0d98c0a7", "description": "Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.", "references": ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"], "narrative": "The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\nThese crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\nWhen developing a strategy for preventing fraud in your environment, its important to  look across all of your web services for evidence that attackers are abusing enterprise resources to enumerate systems, harvest data for secondary fraudulent activity, or abuse terms of service.This Analytic Story looks for evidence of common Internet attack techniques that could be indicative of web fraud in your environmentincluding account harvesting, anomalous user clickspeed, and password sharing across accounts, to name just a few.\nThe account-harvesting search focuses on web pages used for user-account registration. It detects the creation of a large number of user accounts using the same email domain name, a type of activity frequently seen in advance of a fraud campaign.\nThe anomalous clickspeed search looks for users who are moving through your website at a faster-than-normal speed or with a perfect click cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), which could indicate that the user is a script, not an actual human.\nAnother search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multiple accounts, which may indicate that a fraudster has infiltrated your environment and embedded a common password within a script.", "tags": {"category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Fraud Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Emails From Specific Sender", "Get Notable History", "Get Web Session Information via session id"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Jim Apger", "detections": [{"name": "Web Fraud - Account Harvesting", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Detect Zerologon Attack", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "date": "2020-09-18", "version": 1, "id": "5d14a962-569e-4578-939f-f386feb63ce4", "description": "Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"], "narrative": "This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1210", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "MuddyWater", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Credential Access"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect Zerologon via Zeek", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Dev Sec Ops", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "date": "2021-08-18", "version": 1, "id": "0ca8c38e-631e-4b81-940c-f9c5450ce41e", "description": "This story is focused around detecting attacks on a DevSecOps lifeccycle which consists of the phases plan, code, build, test, release, deploy, operate and monitor.", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "narrative": "DevSecOps is a collaborative framework, which thinks about application and infrastructure security from the start. This means that security tools are part of the continuous integration and continuous deployment pipeline. In this analytics story, we focused on detections around the tools used in this framework such as GitHub as a version control system, GDrive for the documentation, CircleCI as the CI/CD pipeline, Kubernetes as the container execution engine and multiple security tools such as Semgrep and Kube-Hunter.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1195", "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1554", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Host Software Binary", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1567.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "POLONIUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1195.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Supply Chain", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1199", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "LAPSUS$", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1195.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1567", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1212", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Exfiltration"], "datamodels": ["Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GitHub Actions Disable Security Workflow - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Github Commit In Develop - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Patrick Bareiss", "detections": [{"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Circle CI Disable Security Job", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Host Software Binary"}]}, {"name": "Circle CI Disable Security Step", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Host Software Binary"}]}, {"name": "GitHub Actions Disable Security Workflow", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Supply Chain"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Github Commit Changes In Master", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship"}]}, {"name": "Github Commit In Develop", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship"}]}, {"name": "GitHub Dependabot Alert", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise"}]}, {"name": "GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service"}]}, {"name": "GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository", "source": "cloud", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Correlation by Repository and Risk", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Correlation by User and Risk", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "DHS Report TA18-074A", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2020-01-22", "version": 2, "id": "0c016e5c-88be-4e2c-8c6c-c2b55b4fb4ef", "description": "Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.", "references": ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"], "narrative": "The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity.\nThere is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic data&#1151;all of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure.\nOne joint Technical Alert (TA) issued by the Department of Homeland and the FBI in mid-March of 2018 attributed some cyber activity targeting utility infrastructure to operatives sponsored by the Russian government. The hackers executed spearfishing attacks, installed malware, employed watering-hole domains, and more. While they caused no physical damage, the attacks provoked fears that a nation-state could turn off water, redirect power, or compromise a nuclear power plant.\nSuspicious activities--spikes in SMB traffic, processes that launch netsh (to modify the network configuration), suspicious registry modifications, and many more--may all be events you may wish to investigate further. While the use of these technique may be an indication that a nation-state actor is attempting to compromise your environment, it is important to note that these techniques are often employed by other groups, as well.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "SilverTerrier"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Execution", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process File Activity", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "First time seen command line argument", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Local Admin account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Processes launching netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Single Letter Process On Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Disabling Security Tools", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-04", "version": 2, "id": "fcc27099-46a0-46b0-a271-5c7dab56b6f1", "description": "Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://web.archive.org/web/20220425194457/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"], "narrative": "Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1553", "mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1553.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Processes launching netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "DNS Amplification Attacks", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2016-09-13", "version": 1, "id": "a563972b-d2e2-4978-b6ca-6e83e24af4d3", "description": "DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims.", "references": ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"], "narrative": "The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification or redirection attacks against victims. Because DNS responses to `ANY` queries are so much larger than the queries themselves--and can be made with a UDP packet, which does not require a handshake--attackers can spoof the source address of the packet and cause much more data to be sent to the victim than if they sent the traffic themselves. The `ANY` requests are will be larger than normal DNS server requests, due to the fact that the server provides significant details, such as MX records and associated IP addresses. A large volume of this traffic can result in a DOS on the victim's machine. This misconfiguration leads to two possible victims, the first being the DNS servers participating in an attack and the other being the hosts that are the targets of the DOS attack.\nThe search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service to other victims.", "tags": {"category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Reflection Amplification"}]}]}, {"name": "DNS Hijacking", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-04", "version": 1, "id": "8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aa28-586907301221", "description": "Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"], "narrative": "Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\nThe gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well.\nOn January 22, 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security 2019's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) raised awareness of some high-profile DNS hijacking attacks against infrastructure, both in the United States and abroad. It issued Emergency Directive 19-01 (see https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/), which summarized the activity and required government agencies to take the following four actions, all within 10 days:\n1. For all .gov or other agency-managed domains, audit public DNS records on all authoritative and secondary DNS servers, verify that they resolve to the intended location or report them to CISA.\n1. Update the passwords for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency 2019's DNS records.\n1. Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency's 2019 DNS records or, if impossible, provide CISA with the names of systems, the reasons why MFA cannot be enabled within the required timeline, and an ETA for when it can be enabled.\n1. CISA will begin regular delivery of newly added certificates to Certificate Transparency (CT) logs for agency domains via the Cyber Hygiene service. Upon receipt, agencies must immediately begin monitoring CT log data for certificates issued that they did not request. If an agency confirms that a certificate was unauthorized, it must report the certificate to the issuing certificate authority and to CISA. Of course, it makes sense to put equivalent actions in place within your environment, as well.\nIn DNS hijacking, the attacker assumes control over an account or makes use of a DNS service exploit to make changes to DNS records. Once they gain access, attackers can substitute their own MX records, name-server records, and addresses, redirecting emails and traffic through their infrastructure, where they can read, copy, or modify information seen. They can also generate valid encryption certificates to help them avoid browser-certificate checks. In one notable attack on the Internet service provider, GoDaddy, the hackers altered Sender Policy Framework (SPF) records a relatively minor change that did not inflict excessive damage but allowed for more effective spam campaigns.\nThe searches in this Analytic Story help you detect and investigate activities that may indicate that DNS hijacking has taken place within your environment.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1189", "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Andariel", "Axiom", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mustard Tempest", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "LazyScripter", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1568.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA551"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Exfiltration", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS record changed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get DNS Server History for a host"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}]}, {"name": "DNS record changed", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}]}, {"name": "Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}]}, {"name": "Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}]}]}, {"name": "Domain Trust Discovery", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-03-25", "version": 1, "id": "e6f30f14-8daf-11eb-a017-acde48001122", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/"], "narrative": "Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN8", "Magic Hound"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows AdFind Exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}]}, {"name": "Double Zero Destructor", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2022-03-25", "version": 1, "id": "f56e8c00-3224-4955-9a6e-924ec7da1df7", "description": "Double Zero Destructor is a destructive payload that enumerates Domain Controllers and executes killswitch if detected. Overwrites files with Zero blocks or using MS Windows API calls such as NtFileOpen, NtFSControlFile. This payload also deletes registry hives HKCU,HKLM, HKU, HKLM BCD.", "references": ["https://cert.gov.ua/article/38088", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/threat-advisory-doublezero.html"], "narrative": "Double zero destructor enumerates domain controllers, delete registry hives and overwrites files using zero blocks and API calls.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Terminating Lsass Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}]}, {"name": "Dynamic DNS", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2018-09-06", "version": 2, "id": "8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aae8-586907301221", "description": "Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"], "narrative": "Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Orangeworm", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "SilverTerrier", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1568.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA551"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Exfiltration"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get DNS traffic ratio", "Get Notable History", "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols"}]}, {"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}]}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}]}, {"name": "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2020-01-27", "version": 1, "id": "bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-91c310efcf52", "description": "Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.", "references": ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"], "narrative": "The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/).  For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants.\nAccording to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\nThe searches in this Analytic Story will help you find executables that are rarely used in your environment, specific registry paths that malware often uses to ensure survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that Emotet or other malware has compromised your environment. ", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1072", "mitre_attack_technique": "Software Deployment Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-1314"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Persistence", "Execution", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Email", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get History Of Email Sources", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Detection of tools built by NirSoft", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Software Deployment Tools"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "F5 Authentication Bypass with TMUI", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-30", "version": 1, "id": "e4acbea6-75bb-4873-8c22-bc2da9525e89", "description": "Research into leading software revealed vulnerabilities in both Apache Tomcat and the F5 BIG-IP suite. Apache's AJP protocol vulnerability, designated CVE-2022-26377, relates to AJP request smuggling. Successful exploitation enables unauthorized system activities. F5 BIG-IP Virtual Edition exhibited a distinct vulnerability, an authentication bypass in the Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI), resulting in system compromise. Assigned CVE-2023-46747, this vulnerability also arose from request smuggling, bearing similarity to CVE-2022-26377. Given the wide adoption of both Apache Tomcat and F5 products, these vulnerabilities present grave risks to organizations. Remediation and vulnerability detection mechanisms are essential to address these threats effectively.", "references": ["https://www.praetorian.com/blog/refresh-compromising-f5-big-ip-with-request-smuggling-cve-2023-46747/", "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/3b0bb71bd627c6c3139e1d06c866f8402aa228ae/http/cves/2023/CVE-2023-46747.yaml"], "narrative": "Both Apache Tomcat's AJP protocol and F5's BIG-IP Virtual Edition have been exposed to critical vulnerabilities. Apache's CVE-2022-26377 pertains to request smuggling by manipulating the \"Transfer-Encoding\" header. If successfully exploited, this allows attackers to bypass security controls and undertake unauthorized actions.\nSimilarly, F5 BIG-IP unveiled an authentication bypass vulnerability, CVE-2023-46747. Originating from the TMUI, this vulnerability leads to full system compromise. While distinct, it shares characteristics with Apache's vulnerability, primarily rooted in request smuggling. This vulnerability drew from past F5 CVEs, particularly CVE-2020-5902 and CVE-2022-1388, both previously exploited in real-world scenarios. These highlighted vulnerabilities in Apache HTTP and Apache Tomcat services, as well as authentication flaws in the F5 BIG-IP API.\nNuclei detection templates offer a proactive solution for identifying and mitigating these vulnerabilities. Integrated into vulnerability management frameworks, these templates notify organizations of potential risks, forming a base for further detection strategies. For detection engineers, understanding these vulnerabilities is crucial. Recognizing the mechanisms and effects of request smuggling, especially in Apache's and F5's context, provides a roadmap to effective detection and response. Prompt detection is a linchpin, potentially stymieing further, more destructive attacks.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - F5 TMUI Authentication Bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "F5 TMUI Authentication Bypass", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "F5 BIG-IP Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-05-10", "version": 1, "id": "0367b177-f8d6-4c4b-a62d-86f52a590bff", "description": "CVE-2022-1388 is a unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerablity against BIG-IP iControl REST API.", "references": ["https://github.com/dk4trin/templates-nuclei/blob/main/CVE-2022-1388.yaml", "https://www.randori.com/blog/vulnerability-analysis-cve-2022-1388/", "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-1388", "https://twitter.com/da_667/status/1523770267327250438?s=20&t=-JnB_aNWuJFsmcOmxGUWLQ", "https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2022-1388/blob/main/CVE-2022-1388.py"], "narrative": "CVE-2022-1388 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.8) in the management interface of F5 Networks'' BIG-IP solution that enables an unauthenticated attacker to gain remote code execution on the system through bypassing F5''s iControl REST authentication. The vulnerability was first discovered by F5''s internal product security team and disclosed publicly on May 4, 2022, per Randori. This vulnerability,CVE-2022-1388, may allow an unauthenticated attacker with network access to the BIG-IP system through the management port and/or self IP addresses to execute arbitrary system commands, create or delete files, or disable services. There is no data plane exposure; this is a control plane issue only per F5 article K23605346. Is CVE-2022-1388 Exploitable? Yes. There are now multiple POC scripts available and reports of threat actors scanning and potentially exploiting the vulnerablity. Per Randori the specific interface needed to exploit this vulnerability is rarely publicly exposed, and the risk to most organizations of exploitation by an unauthenticated external actor is low.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "date": "2020-08-02", "version": 1, "id": "7678c968-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code.  This vulnerability can result in full system compromise.", "references": ["https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/"], "narrative": "A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable system. The detection search in this Analytic Story uses syslog to detect the malicious behavior. Syslog is going to be the best detection method, as any systems using SSL to protect their management console will make detection via wire data difficult.  The searches included used Splunk Connect For Syslog (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4740/), and used a custom destination port to help define the data as F5 data (covered in https://splunk-connect-for-syslog.readthedocs.io/en/master/sources/F5/)", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Shannon Davis", "detections": [{"name": "Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "FIN7", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-09-14", "version": 1, "id": "df2b00d3-06ba-49f1-b253-b19cef19b569", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the FIN7 JS Implant and JSSLoader, including looking for Image Loading of ldap and wmi modules, associated with its payload, data collection and script execution.", "references": ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIN7", "https://threatpost.com/fin7-windows-11-release/169206/", "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/jssloader-recoded-and-reloaded"], "narrative": "FIN7 is a Russian criminal advanced persistent threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. A portion of FIN7 is run out of the front company Combi Security. It has been called one of the most successful criminal hacking groups in the world. this passed few day FIN7 tools and implant are seen in the wild where its code is updated. the FIN& is known to use the spear phishing attack as a entry to targetted network or host that will drop its staging payload like the JS and JSSloader. Now this artifacts and implants seen downloading other malware like cobaltstrike and event ransomware to encrypt host.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Check Elevated CMD using whoami", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Drop Executable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing"}]}]}, {"name": "Flax Typhoon", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-08-25", "version": 1, "id": "78fadce9-a07f-4508-8d14-9b20052a62cc", "description": "Microsoft has identified a nation-state activity group, Flax Typhoon, based in China, targeting Taiwanese organizations for espionage. The group maintains long-term access to networks with minimal use of malware, relying on built-in OS tools and benign software. The group's activities are primarily focused on Taiwan, but the techniques used could be easily reused in other operations outside the region. Microsoft has not observed Flax Typhoon using this access to conduct additional actions.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/24/flax-typhoon-using-legitimate-software-to-quietly-access-taiwanese-organizations/"], "narrative": "Flax Typhoon has been active since mid-2021, targeting government agencies, education, critical manufacturing, and IT organizations in Taiwan. The group uses the China Chopper web shell, Metasploit, Juicy Potato privilege escalation tool, Mimikatz, and SoftEther VPN client. However, they primarily rely on living-off-the-land techniques and hands-on-keyboard activity. Initial access is achieved by exploiting known vulnerabilities in public-facing servers and deploying web shells. Following initial access, Flax Typhoon uses command-line tools to establish persistent access over the remote desktop protocol, deploy a VPN connection to actor-controlled network infrastructure, and collect credentials from compromised systems. The group also uses this VPN access to scan for vulnerabilities on targeted systems and organizations from the compromised systems.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1197", "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT41", "Axiom", "Deep Panda", "Fox Kitten"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows SQL Spawning CertUtil - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "BITSAdmin Download File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows SQL Spawning CertUtil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}]}, {"name": "Forest Blizzard", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-09-11", "version": 1, "id": "2c1aceda-f0a5-4c83-8543-e23ec1466958", "description": "CERT-UA has unveiled a cyberattack on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, orchestrated via deceptive emails. These emails, once accessed, lead to a multi-stage cyber operation downloading and executing malicious payloads. Concurrently, Zscaler's \"Steal-It\" campaign detection revealed striking similarities, hinting at a shared origin - APT28 or Fancy Bear. This notorious group, linked to Russia's GRU, utilizes legitimate platforms like Mockbin, making detection challenging. Their operations underline the evolving cyber threat landscape and stress the importance of advanced defenses.", "references": ["https://cert.gov.ua/article/5702579", "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/steal-it-campaign", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007/"], "narrative": "APT28, also known as Fancy Bear, blends stealth and expertise in its cyber operations. Affiliated with Russia's GRU, their signature move involves spear-phishing emails, leading to multi-tiered cyberattacks. In Ukraine's recent breach, a ZIP archive's execution triggered a series of actions, culminating in information flow redirection via the TOR network. Simultaneously, Zscaler's \"Steal-It\" campaign pinpointed similar tactics, specifically targeting NTLMv2 hashes. This campaign used ZIP archives containing LNK files to exfiltrate data via Mockbin. APT28's hallmark is their \"Living Off The Land\" strategy, manipulating legitimate tools and services to blend in, evading detection. Their innovative tactics, coupled with a geofencing focus on specific regions, make them a formidable cyber threat, highlighting the urgent need for advanced defense strategies.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1140", "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Darkhotel", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Window", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "Deep Panda", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Nomadic Octopus", "ToddyCat"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Headless Browser Mockbin or Mocky Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Headless Browser Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "CHCP Command Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Headless Browser Mockbin or Mocky Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Window"}]}, {"name": "Headless Browser Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Window"}]}, {"name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}]}, {"name": "Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-02-21", "version": 1, "id": "2833a527-3b7f-41af-a950-39f7bbaff819", "description": "On Thursday, 16 February 2023, Fortinet released a PSIRT that details CVE-2022-39952, a critical vulnerability affecting its FortiNAC product (Horizon3.ai).", "references": ["https://www.horizon3.ai/fortinet-fortinac-cve-2022-39952-deep-dive-and-iocs/", "https://viz.greynoise.io/tag/fortinac-rce-attempt?days=30", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fortinet-fixes-critical-rce-flaws-in-fortinac-and-fortiweb/"], "narrative": "This vulnerability, discovered by Gwendal Guegniaud of Fortinet, allows an unauthenticated attacker to write arbitrary files on the system and as a result obtain remote code execution in the context of the root user (Horizon3.ai). Impacting FortiNAC, is tracked as CVE-2022-39952 and has a CVSS v3 score of 9.8 (critical). FortiNAC is a network access control solution that helps organizations gain real time network visibility, enforce security policies, and detect and mitigate threats. An external control of file name or path vulnerability CWE-73 in FortiNAC webserver may allow an unauthenticated attacker to perform arbitrary write on the system, reads the security advisory.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Exploit Public-Facing Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Exploit Public-Facing Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "GCP Account Takeover", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2022-10-12", "version": 1, "id": "8601caff-414f-4c6d-9a04-75b66778869d", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Account Takeover attacks against Google Cloud Platform tenants.", "references": ["https://cloud.google.com/gcp", "https://cloud.google.com/architecture/identity/overview-google-authentication", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/account-takeover-ato/", "https://www.barracuda.com/glossary/account-takeover"], "narrative": "Account Takeover (ATO) is an attack whereby cybercriminals gain unauthorized access to online accounts by using different techniques like brute force, social engineering, phishing & spear phishing, credential stuffing, etc. By posing as the real user, cyber-criminals can change account details, send out phishing emails, steal financial information or sensitive data, or use any stolen information to access further accounts within the organization. This analytic story groups detections that can help security operations teams identify the potential compromise of Google cloud accounts.", "tags": {"category": ["Account Compromise"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1621", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Resource Development", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}]}, {"name": "GCP Cross Account Activity", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2020-09-01", "version": 1, "id": "0432039c-ef41-4b03-b157-450c25dad1e6", "description": "Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.", "references": ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"], "narrative": "Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\nIn between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\nThis Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your GCP Audit logs logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity.  For example, while accessing multiple GCP accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Email"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "GCP Detect gcploit framework", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "gcp detect oauth token abuse", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-06-15", "version": 1, "id": "83b15b3c-6bda-45aa-a3b6-b05c52443f44", "description": "This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive attack or campaign found by \"THE DFIR Report\" that uses Truebot, FlawedGrace and MBR killer malware. This analytic story looks for suspicious dropped files, cobalt strike execution, im-packet execution, registry modification, scripts, persistence, lateral movement, impact, exfiltration and recon.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2023/06/12/a-truly-graceful-wipe-out/"], "narrative": "Graceful Wipe Out Attack is a destructive malware campaign found by \"The DFIR Report\" targeting multiple organizations to collect, exfiltrate and wipe the data of targeted networks. This malicious payload corrupts or wipes Master Boot Records by using an NSIS script after the exfiltration of sensitive information from the targeted host or system.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gorgon Group", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "FIN7", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "OilRig", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Akira", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Mustang Panda", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop By Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Of Net Users", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Services Escalate Exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows AdFind Exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection Remote Thread", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Stop By Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}]}, {"name": "HAFNIUM Group", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-03-03", "version": 1, "id": "beae2ab0-7c3f-11eb-8b63-acde48001122", "description": "HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"], "narrative": "On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\nWhile the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\nThe following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups tradecraft and methodology.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN4", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Mustang Panda", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Persistence", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Local Admin account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}]}, {"name": "Hermetic Wiper", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-03-02", "version": 1, "id": "b7511c2e-9a10-11ec-99e3-acde48001122", "description": "This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as \"Hermetic Wiper\". This analytic story looks for abuse of Regsvr32, executables written in administrative SMB Share, suspicious processes, disabling of memory crash dump and more.", "references": ["https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a"], "narrative": "Hermetic Wiper is destructive malware operation found by Sentinel One targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. This malicious payload corrupts Master Boot Records, uses signed drivers and manipulates NTFS attributes for file destruction.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT41", "Axiom", "Deep Panda", "Fox Kitten"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Cobalt Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "FIN13", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "APT5"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Deep Panda", "GALLIUM", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Reconnaissance", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Email"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto, Michael Haag, Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Uncommon Processes On Endpoint", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}]}, {"name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Change Default File Association", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "ETW Registry Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features"}]}, {"name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MMC"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft"}]}, {"name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver"}]}, {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}]}, {"name": "Hidden Cobra Malware", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2020-01-22", "version": 2, "id": "baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335", "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.", "references": ["https://web.archive.org/web/20191220004307/https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://web.archive.org/web/20220421112536/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"], "narrative": "North Korea's government-sponsored \"cyber army\" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as \"Hidden Cobra,\" has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\nThese state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie \"The Interview\" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\nIn June of 2018, The Department of Homeland Security, together with the FBI and other U.S. government partners, issued Technical Alert (TA-18-149A) to advise the public about two variants of North Korean malware. One variant, dubbed \"Joanap,\" is a multi-stage peer-to-peer botnet that allows North Korean state actors to exfiltrate data, download and execute secondary payloads, and initialize proxy communications. The other variant, \"Brambul,\" is a Windows32 SMB worm that is dropped into a victim network. When executed, the malware attempts to spread laterally within a victim's local subnet, connecting via the SMB protocol and initiating brute-force password attacks. It reports details to the Hidden Cobra actors via email, so they can use the information for secondary remote operations.\nAmong other searches in this Analytic Story is a detection search that looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares, such as, \"adnim$,\" which the Hidden Cobra malware creates on the target system. Another looks for the creation of three malicious files associated with the malware. You can also use a search in this story to investigate activity that indicates that malware is sending email back to the attackers.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "SilverTerrier"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "LazyScripter", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Command And Control", "Exfiltration"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get DNS traffic ratio", "Get History Of Email Sources", "Get Notable History", "Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity", "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "First time seen command line argument", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious File Write", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "IcedID", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-07-29", "version": 1, "id": "1d2cc747-63d7-49a9-abb8-93aa36305603", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the IcedID banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection.", "references": ["https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/"], "narrative": "IcedId banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS targetting browser such as firefox and chrom to steal banking information. It is also known to its unique payload downloaded in C2 where it can be a .png file that hides the core shellcode bot using steganography technique or gzip dat file that contains \"license.dat\" which is the actual core icedid bot.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN8", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1135", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Sowbug", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Local System", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Andariel", "Axiom", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CURIUM", "Dark Caracal", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Akira", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Schedule Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Defender Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Share Discovery Via Dir Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", "ES Content Updates - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Account Discovery With Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CHCP Command Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender MpEngine Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Schedule Task", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Defender Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Drop IcedID License dat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}]}, {"name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Share Discovery Via Dir Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}]}, {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Sqlite Module In Temp Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Local System"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Windows AdFind Exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}]}, {"name": "IIS Components", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-12-19", "version": 1, "id": "0fbde550-8252-43ab-a26a-03976f55b58b", "description": "Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/12/12/iis-modules-the-evolution-of-web-shells-and-how-to-detect-them/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/004/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/crowdstrike-iceapple-a-novel-internet-information-services-post-exploitation-framework-1.pdf", "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-oilrig-uses-rgdoor-iis-backdoor-targets-middle-east/", "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/appcmd.exe-055B2B09409F980BF9B5A3969D01E5B2.html"], "narrative": "IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions - Get{Extension/Filter}Version, Http{Extension/Filter}Proc, and (optionally) Terminate{Extension/Filter}. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.\nAdversaries may install malicious ISAPI extensions and filters to observe and/or modify traffic, execute commands on compromised machines, or proxy command and control traffic. ISAPI extensions and filters may have access to all IIS web requests and responses. For example, an adversary may abuse these mechanisms to modify HTTP responses in order to distribute malicious commands/content to previously comprised hosts.\nAdversaries may also install malicious IIS modules to observe and/or modify traffic. IIS 7.0 introduced modules that provide the same unrestricted access to HTTP requests and responses as ISAPI extensions and filters. IIS modules can be written as a DLL that exports RegisterModule, or as a .NET application that interfaces with ASP.NET APIs to access IIS HTTP requests. (reference MITRE)", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Add New Module - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Module Failed to Load - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components New Module Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Add Module to Global Assembly Cache - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell IIS Components WebGlobalModule Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows IIS Components Add New Module", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}]}, {"name": "Windows IIS Components Module Failed to Load", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows IIS Components New Module Added", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell Add Module to Global Assembly Cache", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell IIS Components WebGlobalModule Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}]}, {"name": "Industroyer2", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-04-21", "version": 1, "id": "7ff7db2b-b001-498e-8fe8-caf2dbc3428a", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Industroyer2 attack, including file writes associated with its payload, lateral movement, persistence, privilege escalation and data destruction.", "references": ["https://cert.gov.ua/article/39518", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/04/12/industroyer2-industroyer-reloaded/"], "narrative": "Industroyer2 is part of continuous attack to ukraine targeting energy facilities. This malware is a windows binary that implement IEC-104 protocol to communicate with industrial equipments. This attack consist of several destructive linux script component to wipe or delete several linux critical files, powershell for domain enumeration and caddywiper to wipe boot sector of the targeted host.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT5", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "Evilnum", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Reconnaissance", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Disable Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Stop Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux DD File Overwrite", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Disable Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Shred Overwrite Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Linux Stop Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Linux System Network Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "Information Sabotage", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-11-17", "version": 1, "id": "b71ba595-ef80-4e39-8b66-887578a7a71b", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might correlate to insider threat specially in terms of information sabotage.", "references": ["https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/insider-threat-deep-dive-it-sabotage/"], "narrative": "Information sabotage is the type of crime many people associate with insider threat. Where the current or former employees, contractors, or business partners intentionally exceeded or misused an authorized level of access to networks, systems, or data with the intention of harming a specific individual, the organization, or the organization's data, systems, and/or daily business operations.", "tags": {"category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}]}, {"name": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-03-24", "version": 1, "id": "b3782036-8cbd-11eb-9d8e-acde48001122", "description": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the Command And Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"], "narrative": "Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command And Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\\ During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1649", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1197", "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1095", "mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "BITTER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "FIN6", "HAFNIUM", "Metador", "PLATINUM", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090", "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Certify Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Proxy Socks Curl - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "BITSAdmin Download File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Detect Certify Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Detect Certipy File Modifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Linux Curl Upload File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Linux Proxy Socks Curl", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}]}, {"name": "Insider Threat", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "date": "2022-05-19", "version": 1, "id": "c633df29-a950-4c4c-a0f8-02be6730797c", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with insider threats and specifically focusing on malicious insiders operating with in a corporate environment.", "references": ["https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/insider-threats/", "https://www.cisa.gov/defining-insider-threats", "https://www.code42.com/glossary/types-of-insider-threats/", "https://github.com/Insider-Threat/Insider-Threat", "https://ctid.mitre-engenuity.org/our-work/insider-ttp-kb/"], "narrative": "Insider Threats are best defined by CISA: \"Insider threat incidents are possible in any sector or organization. An insider threat is typically a current or former employee, third-party contractor, or business partner. In their present or former role, the person has or had access to an organization's network systems, data, or premises, and uses their access (sometimes unwittingly). To combat the insider threat, organizations can implement a proactive, prevention-focused mitigation program to detect and identify threats, assess risk, and manage that risk - before an incident occurs.\" An insider is any person who has or had authorized access to or knowledge of an organization's resources, including personnel, facilities, information, equipment, networks, and systems. These are the common insiders that create insider threats: Departing Employees, Security Evaders, Malicious Insiders, and Negligent Employees. This story aims at detecting the malicious insider.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1567.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "POLONIUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "FIN10", "FIN7", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "PROMETHIUM", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1219", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "RTM", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Thrip"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1567", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1537", "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials In Files", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Scattered Spider", "TA505", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Exfiltration"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Authentication", "Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Potential password in username - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Jose Hernandez", "detections": [{"name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Potential password in username", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials In Files"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Access Software Hunt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}]}, {"name": "Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Vulnerabilities", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2024-01-16", "version": 1, "id": "e3b5c3b8-082b-4b4e-b2c9-47ed79e2a5ab", "description": "The following analytic story addresses critical vulnerabilities CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure Gateways. CVE-2023-46805 is an authentication bypass vulnerability, while CVE-2024-21887 is a command injection flaw, both presenting significant risks in versions 9.x and 22.x. Combined, these vulnerabilities enable unauthenticated threat actors to execute arbitrary commands, compromising system integrity. Immediate mitigation is imperative, with patches scheduled for staggered release. Ivanti has provided interim mitigation steps, and it's crucial for customers to apply these measures to protect their systems against potential exploits.", "references": ["https://github.com/RootUp/PersonalStuff/blob/master/http-vuln-cve2023-46805_2024_21887.nse", "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/c6b351e71b0fb0e40e222e97038f1fe09ac58194/http/misconfiguration/ivanti/CVE-2023-46085-CVE-2024-21887-mitigation-not-applied.yaml", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/18708/files", "https://attackerkb.com/topics/AdUh6by52K/cve-2023-46805/rapid7-analysis", "https://labs.watchtowr.com/welcome-to-2024-the-sslvpn-chaos-continues-ivanti-cve-2023-46805-cve-2024-21887/", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2024/01/10/active-exploitation-of-two-zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-ivanti-connect-secure-vpn/", "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/suspected-apt-targets-ivanti-zero-day", "https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2023-46805-Authentication-Bypass-CVE-2024-21887-Command-Injection-for-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-and-Ivanti-Policy-Secure-Gateways?language=en_US"], "narrative": "Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways face a severe security challenge with the discovery of CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887. CVE-2023-46805 allows attackers to bypass authentication in critical web components of versions 9.x and 22.x. More alarmingly, when paired with CVE-2024-21887, a command injection vulnerability, it enables remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands without authentication. This combination poses a heightened threat, undermining the security of enterprise networks. Ivanti has mobilized resources to address these vulnerabilities, offering immediate mitigation advice and scheduling patch releases. Customers are urged to apply these mitigations without delay to safeguard their networks.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Access to Vulnerable Ivanti Connect Secure Bookmark Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure Command Injection Attempts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure SSRF in SAML Component - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ivanti Connect Secure System Information Access via Auth Bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Access to Vulnerable Ivanti Connect Secure Bookmark Endpoint", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Ivanti Connect Secure Command Injection Attempts", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Ivanti Connect Secure SSRF in SAML Component", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Ivanti Connect Secure System Information Access via Auth Bypass", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated Access", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-08-08", "version": 2, "id": "7e36ca54-c096-4a39-b724-6fc935164f0c", "description": "Ivanti, a leading technology company, has disclosed two critical zero-day vulnerabilities in its Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) product, CVE-2023-35078 and CVE-2023-35081. A recent update concerning CVE-2023-35082, closely related to CVE-2023-35078, reveals its impact on more versions of Ivanti's software than initially believed. The former allows unauthenticated attackers to obtain sensitive data, modify servers, and access the API, potentially leading to data breaches or malicious system modifications. Meanwhile, CVE-2023-35081 lets authenticated administrators remotely write arbitrary files to the server. Both vulnerabilities have been exploited in targeted attacks against government ministries and could be used in conjunction. With the presence of PoC code for CVE-2023-35078, the risk of broader exploitation has increased. While initially leveraged in limited attacks, the exploitation is expected to rise, possibly involving state-sponsored actors. Organizations are urged to apply immediate patches and conduct regular system assessments to ensure security.", "references": ["https://www.securityweek.com/second-ivanti-epmm-zero-day-vulnerability-exploited-in-targeted-attacks/", "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/07/28/ivanti-releases-security-updates-epmm-address-cve-2023-35081", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-35078", "https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2023-35078-Remote-unauthenticated-API-access-vulnerability?language=en_US"], "narrative": "Ivantis Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) product, formerly known as MobileIron Core and extensively utilized by IT teams to manage mobile devices, applications, and content, has been found to harbor several critical vulnerabilities. Specifically, CVE-2023-35078 allows remote unauthenticated attackers to access sensitive data and make changes to servers. This flaw has been leveraged in targeted attacks against Norwegian government ministries. In addition, CVE-2023-35081 permits an authenticated attacker with administrative privileges to remotely write arbitrary files to the server.\nRecently, attention has shifted to CVE-2023-35082, which was initially believed to affect only MobileIron Core 11.2 and below. Subsequent investigations revealed its wider influence, affecting EPMM versions 11.10, 11.9, 11.8, and MobileIron Core 11.7 and earlier. This vulnerability facilitates unauthorized access to the API via the URI path /mifs/asfV3/api/v2/.\nWhen combined, these vulnerabilities can be exploited to bypass administrative authentication and access control list (ACL) restrictions, leading to malicious file writing and potential OS command execution. Both have been actively exploited, possibly by state-sponsored actors, prompting urgent advisories from Ivanti and Rapid7, alongside CISA. Given the thousands of potentially vulnerable internet-exposed systems and the presence of PoC code for CVE-2023-35078, the risk of extensive exploitation escalates. The situation is further muddled by Ivanti's 2020 acquisition of MobileIron, which had its known issues. Collectively, these vulnerabilities present a significant risk to organizations utilizing Ivanti's EPMM, emphasizing the need for swift patching, vigilant monitoring, and timely application of fixes to counteract potential threats.", "tags": {"category": ["Vulnerability", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35078 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35082 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35078", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35082", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass CVE-2023-38035", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-08-24", "version": 1, "id": "da229be2-4637-47a5-b551-1d4b64f411c6", "description": "A critical vulnerability, designated as CVE-2023-38035, has been identified in Ivanti Sentry (formerly MobileIron Sentry). It affects all supported versions, including 9.18, 9.17, and 9.16, as well as older versions. The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to access the System Manager Portal (typically hosted on port 8443) and make configuration changes, potentially executing OS commands as root. However, the risk is low for users who haven't exposed port 8443 online. This flaw is distinct from other Ivanti products. It's imperative for organizations to check for unrecognized HTTP requests to /services/* as a potential indicator of compromise.", "references": ["https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2023-38035/blob/main/CVE-2023-38035.py", "https://www.horizon3.ai/ivanti-sentry-authentication-bypass-cve-2023-38035-deep-dive/", "https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/KB-API-Authentication-Bypass-on-Sentry-Administrator-Interface-CVE-2023-38035?language=en_US"], "narrative": "CVE-2023-38035 presents a significant security risk in the Ivanti Sentry administration interface. The vulnerability was identified shortly after another notable vulnerability in Ivanti EPMM (CVE-2023-35078) was discovered being exploited in the wild. The current vulnerability allows a malicious actor, without requiring authentication, to access the System Manager Portal, typically hosted on port 8443. Upon successful exploitation, the attacker can make configuration alterations to both the Sentry system and its underlying OS. The potential damage is significant, enabling the attacker to execute commands on the system with root privileges.\nWhile this vulnerability scored high on the CVSS scale, its risk is relatively mitigated for clients who have not exposed port 8443 to the internet. The primary exploitation vector is the System Manager Portal, an administrative interface for Sentry.\nAs of now, definitive indicators of compromise (IoCs) are elusive. However, any unexpected HTTP requests to the endpoint /services/* could be a red flag. It's worth noting that the exploited endpoint might not be the sole vulnerable point, suggesting other potential gateways for attackers. Ivanti Sentry's system doesn't provide a typical Unix shell, but in the event of a known system breach, the /var/log/tomcat2/ directory contains access logs that may reveal accessed endpoints. Additionally, web interface logs may provide insights into suspicious activities and should be monitored closely.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "JBoss Vulnerability", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-14", "version": 1, "id": "1f5294cb-b85f-4c2d-9c58-ffcf248f52bd", "description": "In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.", "references": ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"], "narrative": "This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\nIt is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\nWhen looking at the target of the behavior uncovered by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to identify other recent events involving the target. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target host.\nVarious types of information for external systems should be reviewed and, potentially, collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. This data may be useful for generating your own threat intelligence, so you can create future alerts.\nThe following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious:\n1. Country of origin\n1. Responsible party\n1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address\n1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address Determining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you qualify and understand the event and possible motivation for the attack. In addition, there are various sources that may provide reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist you in determining whether the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or expose other historic events that might be brought back into scope.\nGathering various data on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have logged into the system recently, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and/or whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\nhen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version, to help determine whether it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\nIf you suspect an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\nIf a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that opened the file, the processes that may have created and/or modified the file, and how many other systems potentially have this file can you determine whether the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes help you quickly determine if it is malicious in nature.\nOften, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if svchost.exe is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names.\nIt can also be helpful to examine various behaviors of and the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see whether the parent process spawned other processes that might also warrant further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made around the time of the event and noting whether the process has spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script.", "tags": {"category": ["Vulnerability"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery", "Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Jenkins Server Vulnerabilities", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2024-01-29", "version": 1, "id": "789e76e6-4b5e-4af3-ab8c-46578d84ccff", "description": "This analytic story provides a comprehensive view of Jenkins server vulnerabilities and associated detection analytics.", "references": ["https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2024-01-24/"], "narrative": "The following analytic story provides a comprehensive view of Jenkins server vulnerabilities and associated detection analytics. Jenkins is a popular open-source automation server that is used to automate tasks associated with building, testing, and deploying software. Jenkins is often used in DevOps environments and is a critical component of the software development lifecycle. As a result, Jenkins servers are often targeted by adversaries to gain access to sensitive information, credentials, and other critical assets. This analytic story provides a comprehensive view of Jenkins server vulnerabilities and associated detection analytics.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "JetBrains TeamCity Unauthenticated RCE", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-01", "version": 1, "id": "7ef2d230-9dbb-4d13-9263-a7d8c3aad9bf", "description": "A critical security vulnerability, CVE-2023-42793, has been discovered affecting all versions of TeamCity On-Premises up to 2023.05.3. This vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to execute remote code and gain administrative control of the TeamCity server, posing a significant risk for supply chain attacks. Although the issue has been fixed in version 2023.05.4, servers running older versions remain at risk. A security patch plugin has been released for immediate mitigation, applicable to TeamCity versions 8.0 and above. Organizations are strongly advised to update to the fixed version or apply the security patch, especially if their TeamCity server is publicly accessible. No impact has been reported on TeamCity Cloud as it has been upgraded to the secure version.", "references": ["https://blog.jetbrains.com/teamcity/2023/09/critical-security-issue-affecting-teamcity-on-premises-update-to-2023-05-4-now/", "https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/teamcity-vulnerability/", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/18408", "https://attackerkb.com/topics/1XEEEkGHzt/cve-2023-42793/rapid7-analysis"], "narrative": "The CVE-2023-42793 vulnerability in TeamCity On-Premises allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass authentication and gain administrative access through Remote Code Execution (RCE). Specifically, the attacker can send a malicious POST request to /app/rest/users/id:1/tokens/RPC2 to create an administrative token. Once the token is obtained, the attacker has the ability to perform various unauthorized activities, including creating new admin users and executing arbitrary shell commands on the server. For Splunk Security Content, the focus should be on identifying suspicious POST requests to /app/rest/users/id:1/tokens/RPC2 and other affected API endpoints, as this is the initial point of exploitation. Monitoring logs for changes to the internal.properties file or the creation of new admin users could also provide crucial indicators of compromise. Furthermore, Splunk can be configured to alert on multiple failed login attempts followed by a successful login from the same IP, which could indicate exploitation attempts.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "JetBrains TeamCity Vulnerabilities", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2024-03-04", "version": 1, "id": "3cd841e8-2f64-45e8-b148-7767255db111", "description": "This story provides a high-level overview of JetBrains TeamCity vulnerabilities and how to detect and respond to them using Splunk.", "references": ["https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2024/03/04/etr-cve-2024-27198-and-cve-2024-27199-jetbrains-teamcity-multiple-authentication-bypass-vulnerabilities-fixed/", "https://blog.jetbrains.com/teamcity/2024/03/teamcity-2023-11-4-is-out/", "https://blog.jetbrains.com/teamcity/2024/03/additional-critical-security-issues-affecting-teamcity-on-premises-cve-2024-27198-and-cve-2024-27199-update-to-2023-11-4-now/"], "narrative": "JetBrains TeamCity is a continuous integration and deployment server that allows developers to automate the process of building, testing, and deploying code. It is a popular tool used by many organizations to streamline their development and deployment processes. However, like any software, JetBrains TeamCity is not immune to vulnerabilities.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass CVE-2024-27198 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27198 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity Limited Auth Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27199 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass CVE-2024-27198", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27198", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "JetBrains TeamCity Limited Auth Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27199", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Juniper JunOS Remote Code Execution", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-08-29", "version": 1, "id": "3fcef843-c97e-4cf3-a72f-749be480cee3", "description": "Juniper Networks has resolved multiple critical vulnerabilities in the J-Web component of Junos OS on SRX and EX Series devices. These vulnerabilities, when chained together, could allow an unauthenticated, network-based attacker to remotely execute code on the devices. The vulnerabilities affect all versions of Junos OS on SRX and EX Series, but specific fixes have been released to address each vulnerability. Juniper Networks recommends applying the necessary fixes to mitigate potential remote code execution threats. As a workaround, users can disable J-Web or limit access to only trusted hosts. Proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code has been released, demonstrating the severity of these flaws and the urgency to apply the fixes.", "references": ["https://supportportal.juniper.net/s/article/2023-08-Out-of-Cycle-Security-Bulletin-Junos-OS-SRX-Series-and-EX-Series-Multiple-vulnerabilities-in-J-Web-can-be-combined-to-allow-a-preAuth-Remote-Code-Execution?language=en_US", "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/main/http/cves/2023/CVE-2023-36844.yaml", "https://thehackernews.com/2023/08/new-juniper-junos-os-flaws-expose.html", "https://github.com/watchtowrlabs/juniper-rce_cve-2023-36844", "https://labs.watchtowr.com/cve-2023-36844-and-friends-rce-in-juniper-firewalls/"], "narrative": "Juniper Networks, a networking hardware company, has released an \"out-of-cycle\" security update to address multiple flaws in the J-Web component of Junos OS that could be combined to achieve remote code execution on susceptible installations. The flaws have a cumulative CVSS rating of 9.8, making them critical in severity. They affect all versions of Junos OS on SRX and EX Series. The J-Web interface allows users to configure, manage, and monitor Junos OS devices. The vulnerabilities include two PHP external variable modification vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-36844 and CVE-2023-36845) and two missing authentications for critical function vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-36846 and CVE-2023-36847). These vulnerabilities could allow an unauthenticated, network-based attacker to control certain important environment variables, cause limited impact to the file system integrity, or upload arbitrary files via J-Web without any authentication.\nThe vulnerabilities have been addressed in specific Junos OS versions for EX Series and SRX Series devices. Users are recommended to apply the necessary fixes to mitigate potential remote code execution threats. As a workaround, Juniper Networks suggests disabling J-Web or limiting access to only trusted hosts.\nAdditionally, a PoC exploit has been released by watchTowr, combining CVE-2023-36846 and CVE-2023-36845 to upload a PHP file containing malicious shellcode and achieve code execution by injecting the PHPRC environment variable to point to a configuration file to load the booby-trapped PHP script. WatchTowr noted that this is an interesting bug chain, utilizing two bugs that would be near-useless in isolation and combining them for a \"world-ending\" unauthenticated remote code execution.\nIn conclusion, these vulnerabilities pose a significant threat to Juniper SRX and EX Series devices, and it is imperative for users to apply the necessary fixes or implement the recommended workaround to mitigate the potential impact.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Juniper Networks Remote Code Execution Exploit Detection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Juniper Networks Remote Code Execution Exploit Detection", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2020-04-15", "version": 1, "id": "a9ef59cf-e981-4e66-9eef-bb049f695c09", "description": "This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"], "narrative": "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "datamodels": ["Email"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip", "Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Security", "author": "Patrick Bareiss", "date": "2023-12-06", "version": 1, "id": "77006b3a-306c-4e32-afd5-30b6e40c1c41", "description": "Kubernetes, as a container orchestration platform, faces unique security challenges. This story explores various tactics and techniques adversaries use to exploit Kubernetes environments, including attacking the control plane, exploiting misconfigurations, and compromising containerized applications.", "references": ["https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/"], "narrative": "Kubernetes, a widely used container orchestration system, presents a complex environment that can be targeted by adversaries. Key areas of concern include the control plane, worker nodes, and network communication. Attackers may attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in the Kubernetes API, misconfigured containers, or insecure network policies. The control plane, responsible for managing cluster operations, is a prime target. Compromising this can give attackers control over the entire cluster. Worker nodes, running the containerized applications, can be targeted to disrupt services or to gain access to sensitive data. Common attack vectors include exploiting vulnerabilities in container images, misconfigured role-based access controls (RBAC), exposed Kubernetes dashboards, and insecure network configurations. Attackers can also target the supply chain, injecting malicious code into container images or Helm charts. To mitigate these threats, it is essential to enforce robust security practices such as regular vulnerability scanning, implementing least privilege access, securing the control plane, network segmentation, and continuous monitoring for suspicious activities. Tools like Kubernetes Network Policies, Pod Security Policies, and third-party security solutions can provide additional layers of defense.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Container API", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Container Orchestration Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1046", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Rocke", "Suckfly", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual Location - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Agent - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Group - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Access Scanning - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Create or Update Privileged Pod - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Cron Job Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes DaemonSet Deployed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Falco Shell Spawned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Node Port Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Pod With Host Network Attachment - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Scanning by Unauthenticated IP Address - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Suspicious Image Pulling - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Unauthorized Access - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "no", "author_name": "Patrick Bareiss", "detections": [{"name": "Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual Location", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Container API"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Agent", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Container API"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Group", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Container API"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Name", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Container API"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Access Scanning", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes Create or Update Privileged Pod", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Cron Job Creation", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Container Orchestration Job"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes DaemonSet Deployed", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Falco Shell Spawned", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Node Port Creation", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Pod With Host Network Attachment", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Scanning by Unauthenticated IP Address", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Suspicious Image Pulling", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Unauthorized Access", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2020-05-20", "version": 1, "id": "c7d4dbf0-a171-4eaf-8444-4f40392e4f92", "description": "This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"], "narrative": "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Linux Living Off The Land", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-07-27", "version": 1, "id": "e405a2d7-dc8e-4227-8e9d-f60267b8c0cd", "description": "Linux Living Off The Land consists of binaries that may be used to bypass local security restrictions within misconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://gtfobins.github.io/"], "narrative": "Similar to Windows LOLBAS project, the GTFOBins project focuses solely on Unix binaries that may be abused in multiple categories including Reverse Shell, File Upload, File Download and much more. These binaries are native to the operating system and the functionality is typically native. The behaviors are typically not malicious by default or vulnerable, but these are built in functionality of the applications. When reviewing any notables or hunting through mountains of events of interest, it's important to identify the binary, review command-line arguments, path of file, and capture any network and file modifications. Linux analysis may be a bit cumbersome due to volume and how process behavior is seen in EDR products. Piecing it together will require some effort.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "At", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT5", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1115", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT39"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1095", "mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "BITTER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "FIN6", "HAFNIUM", "Metador", "PLATINUM", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT5", "BlackTech", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GCMAN", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090", "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Execution", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux APT Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux AWK Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux c89 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux c99 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Clipboard Data Copy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Composer Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Decode Base64 to Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Docker Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Find Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux GDB Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Gem Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Make Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Node Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Obfuscated Files or Information Base64 Decode - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Octave Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux PHP Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Proxy Socks Curl - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux RPM Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux SSH Remote Services Script Execute - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux APT Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux At Application Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux AWK Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux c89 Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux c99 Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Linux Clipboard Data Copy", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data"}]}, {"name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Composer Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Curl Upload File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Linux Decode Base64 to Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell"}]}, {"name": "Linux Docker Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Find Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux GDB Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Gem Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Linux Make Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Node Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Obfuscated Files or Information Base64 Decode", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Linux Octave Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux PHP Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Linux Proxy Socks Curl", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux RPM Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Restarted", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys"}]}, {"name": "Linux SSH Remote Services Script Execute", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}]}, {"name": "Linux Persistence Techniques", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-12-17", "version": 1, "id": "e40d13e5-d38b-457e-af2a-e8e6a2f2b516", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Linux system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", "https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/", "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/", "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2021-CTI-005.pdf"], "narrative": "Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Linux environment.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "At", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT5", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Add User Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Add User Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux At Application Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"}]}, {"name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Restarted", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Shred Overwrite Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}]}, {"name": "Linux Post-Exploitation", "author": "Rod Soto", "date": "2021-12-03", "version": 1, "id": "d310ccfe-5477-11ec-ad05-acde48001122", "description": "This analytic story identifies popular Linux post exploitation tools such as autoSUID, LinEnum, LinPEAS, Linux Exploit Suggesters, MimiPenguin.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/linux/"], "narrative": "These tools allow operators find possible exploits or paths for privilege escalation based on SUID binaries, user permissions, kernel version and distro version.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "no", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell"}]}]}, {"name": "Linux Privilege Escalation", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-12-17", "version": 1, "id": "b9879c24-670a-44c0-895e-98cdb7d0e848", "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Linux privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, schedule task, services, setuid, root execution and more.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"], "narrative": "Privilege escalation is a \"land-and-expand\" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Linux machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "At", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT5", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Add User Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux APT Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux AWK Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux c89 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux c99 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Composer Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Docker Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Find Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux GDB Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Gem Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Make Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Node Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Octave Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux PHP Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux RPM Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Add User Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux APT Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux At Application Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux AWK Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux c89 Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux c99 Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Composer Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Docker Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"}]}, {"name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Find Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux GDB Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Gem Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Make Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Node Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Octave Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux PHP Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux RPM Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Restarted", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Shred Overwrite Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}]}, {"name": "Linux Rootkit", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-07-27", "version": 1, "id": "e30f4054-ac08-4999-b8bc-5cc46886c18d", "description": "Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/", "https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41", "https://medium.com/chronicle-blog/winnti-more-than-just-windows-and-gates-e4f03436031a"], "narrative": "Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or System Firmware. Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. Linux rootkits may not standout as much as a Windows rootkit, therefore understanding what kernel modules are installed today and monitoring for new is important. As with any rootkit, it may blend in using a common kernel name or variation of legitimate names.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Kernel Module Enumeration - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Kernel Module Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}]}]}, {"name": "Living Off The Land", "author": "Lou Stella, Splunk", "date": "2022-03-16", "version": 2, "id": "6f7982e2-900b-11ec-a54a-acde48001122", "description": "Leverage analytics that allow you to identify the presence of an adversary leveraging native applications within your environment.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/"], "narrative": "Living Off The Land refers to an adversary methodology of using native applications already installed on the target operating system to achieve their objective. Native utilities provide the adversary with reduced chances of detection by antivirus software or EDR tools. This allows the adversary to blend in with native process behavior.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Unauthorized Software", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Ember Bear"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "At", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT33", "Blue Mockingbird", "FIN8", "HEXANE", "Leviathan", "Metador", "Mustang Panda", "Rancor", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Odbcconf", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1197", "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Dark Caracal", "OilRig", "Silence"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1216", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Script Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.013", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mavinject", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1647", "mitre_attack_technique": "Plist File Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1202", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Evilnum", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Whitefly", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1140", "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Darkhotel", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Mustang Panda", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1567", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Exfiltration"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Schedule Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Living Off The Land Detection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - LOLBAS With Network Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MacOS LOLbin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MacOS plutil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", "ES Content Updates - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Binary Proxy Execution Mavinject DLL Injection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Identify Protocol Handlers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Known Abused DLL Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MOF Event Triggered Execution via WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Load DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Odbcconf Load Response File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Script Proxy Execution Syncappvpublishingserver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Lou Stella", "detections": [{"name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "BITS Job Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs"}]}, {"name": "BITSAdmin Download File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel"}]}, {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Detect mshta renamed", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Disable Schedule Task", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Esentutl SAM Copy", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Living Off The Land Detection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "LOLBAS With Network Traffic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "MacOS LOLbin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "MacOS plutil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Plist File Modification"}]}, {"name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MMC"}]}, {"name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious mshta child process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious mshta spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Windows Binary Proxy Execution Mavinject DLL Injection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mavinject"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "Windows Identify Protocol Handlers", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Known Abused DLL Created", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows MOF Event Triggered Execution via WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription"}]}, {"name": "Windows Odbcconf Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Odbcconf"}]}, {"name": "Windows Odbcconf Load DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Odbcconf"}]}, {"name": "Windows Odbcconf Load Response File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Odbcconf"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Script Proxy Execution Syncappvpublishingserver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Script Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}]}, {"name": "Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}]}, {"name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}]}, {"name": "Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp", "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2022-04-28", "version": 1, "id": "765790f0-2f8f-4048-8321-fd1928ec2546", "description": "KrbRelayUp is a tool that allows local privilege escalation from low-priviliged domain user to local system on domain-joined computers.", "references": ["https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp", "https://gist.github.com/tothi/bf6c59d6de5d0c9710f23dae5750c4b9", "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html", "https://dirkjanm.io/relaying-kerberos-over-dns-with-krbrelayx-and-mitm6/", "https://github.com/cube0x0/KrbRelay"], "narrative": "In October 2021, James Forshaw from Googles Project Zero released a research  blog post titled `Using Kerberos for Authentication Relay Attacks`. This research introduced, for the first time, ways to make Windows authenticate to a different Service Principal Name (SPN) than what would normally be derived from the hostname the client is connecting to. This effectively proved that relaying Kerberos authentication is possible\\\\. In April 2022, security researcher Mor Davidovich released a tool named KrbRelayUp which implements Kerberos relaying as well as other known Kerberos techniques with the goal of escalating privileges from a low-privileged domain user on a domain-joined device and obtain a SYSTEM shell.", "tags": {"category": ["Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "datamodels": ["Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Computer Account With SPN", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}]}, {"name": "LockBit Ransomware", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-01-16", "version": 1, "id": "67e5b98d-16d6-46a6-8d00-070a3d1a5cfc", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the LockBit ransomware, including looking for file writes (file encryption and ransomware notes), deleting services, terminating processes, registry key modification and more.", "references": ["https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/10/lockbit-3-0-also-known-as-lockbit-black.html", "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/04/24/lockbit-ransomware-borrows-tricks-to-keep-up-with-revil-and-maze/", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-analysis-report-lockbit-2.0-all-paths-lead-to-ransom", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/g/lockbit-ransomware-group-augments-its-latest-variant--lockbit-3-.html"], "narrative": "LockBit ransomware was first seen in 2019. This ransomware was used by cybercriminal in targeting multiple sectors and organizations. Lockbit is one of the ransomware being offered as a Ransomware-as-a-Service(RaaS) and also known to affiliates to implement the 'double extortion' techniques by uploading the stolen and sensitive victim information to their dark website and then threatening to sell/release it in public if their demands are not met. LockBit Ransomware advertised opportunities for threat actors that could provide credential access via RDP and VPN. Aside from this it is also uses threat emulation like Cobalt Strike and Metasploit to gain foot hold to the targeted host and persist if needed.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Execution", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Default Icon Setting - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP"}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "High Process Termination Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement"}]}, {"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP"}]}, {"name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Default Icon Setting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "author": "Jose Hernandez", "date": "2021-12-11", "version": 1, "id": "b4453928-5a98-11ec-afcd-8de10b48fc52", "description": "Log4Shell or CVE-2021-44228 is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Apache Log4j library, a widely used and ubiquitous logging framework for Java. The vulnerability allows an attacker who can control log messages to execute arbitrary code loaded from attacker-controlled servers and we anticipate that most apps using the Log4j library will meet this condition.", "references": ["https://mbechler.github.io/2021/12/10/PSA_Log4Shell_JNDI_Injection/", "https://www.fastly.com/blog/digging-deeper-into-log4shell-0day-rce-exploit-found-in-log4j", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/log4j2-vulnerability-analysis-and-mitigation-recommendations/", "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/log-jammin-log4j-2-rce.html"], "narrative": "In late November 2021, Chen Zhaojun of Alibaba identified a remote code execution vulnerability. Previous work was seen in a 2016 Blackhat talk by Alvaro Munoz and Oleksandr Mirosh called [\"A Journey from JNDI/LDAP Manipulation to Remote Code Execution Dream Land\"](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Munoz-A-Journey-From-JNDI-LDAP-Manipulation-To-RCE.pdf). Reported under the CVE ID : CVE-2021-44228, released to the public on December 10, 2021. The vulnerability is exploited through improper deserialization of user input passed into the framework. It permits remote code execution and it can allow an attacker to leak sensitive data, such as environment variables, or execute malicious software on the target system.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Application Security", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Execution", "Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk", "Network_Traffic", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "no", "author_name": "Jose Hernandez", "detections": [{"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Windows Java Spawning Shells", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Hunting for Log4Shell", "source": "web", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2017-08-23", "version": 5, "id": "2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc", "description": "Attackers are finding stealthy ways \"live off the land,\" leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.", "references": ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"], "narrative": "The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\nThe following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious:\n1. Country of origin\n1. Responsible party\n1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address\n1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address\nDetermining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you answer some questions surrounding the attacker and details related to the external system. In addition, there are various sources--such as VirusTotal&#151; that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining whether the event is malicious. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or show other events that should be brought into scope.\nGathering data on the system of interest can sometimes help you quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include finding out who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\nOften, a simple inspection of the process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when cursorily reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, that could be indicative of activity initiated via a compromised website a user visited.\nIt can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made in and around the time of the event and/or whether the process spawned any child processes could be helpful, as well.\nIn the event a system is suspected of having been compromised via a malicious website, we suggest reviewing the browsing activity from that system around the time of the event. If categories are given for the URLs visited, that can help you zero in on possible malicious sites.\nMost recently we have added new content related to PowerShell Script Block logging, Windows EventCode 4104. Script block logging presents the deobfuscated and raw script executed on an endpoint. The analytics produced were tested against commonly used attack frameworks - PowerShell-Empire, Cobalt Strike and Covenant. In addition, we sampled publicly available samples that utilize PowerShell and validated coverage. The analytics are here to identify suspicious usage, cmdlets, or script values. 4104 events are enabled via the Windows registry and may generate a large volume of data if enabled globally. Enabling on critical systems or a limited set may be best. During triage of 4104 events, review parallel processes for other processes and command executed. Identify any file modifications and network communication and review accordingly. Fortunately, we get the full script to determine the level of threat identified.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "FIN13", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1649", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Deep Panda", "GALLIUM", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Turla"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Reconnaissance", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Enable PowerShell Remoting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Script Block With URL Chain - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell WebRequest Using Memory Stream - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get History Of Email Sources", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MMC"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Enable PowerShell Remoting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Script Block With URL Chain", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell WebRequest Using Memory Stream", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage"}]}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}]}, {"name": "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-04-26", "version": 1, "id": "f0258af4-a6ae-11eb-b3c2-acde48001122", "description": "Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"], "narrative": "Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths.\nThe following content is here to assist with binaries within `system32` or `syswow64` being moved to a new location or an adversary bringing a the binary in to execute.\nThere will be false positives as some native Windows processes are moved or ran by third party applications from different paths. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binarys PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "Evilnum", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Sdelete Application Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}]}, {"name": "MetaSploit", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-11-21", "version": 1, "id": "c149b694-bd08-4535-88d3-1f288a66313f", "description": "The following analytic story highlights content related directly to MetaSploit, which may be default configurations attributed to MetaSploit or behaviors of known knowns that are related.", "references": ["https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/what-is-metasploit"], "narrative": "The Metasploit framework is a very powerful tool which can be used by cybercriminals as well as ethical hackers to probe systematic vulnerabilities on networks and servers. Because it is an open-source framework, it can be easily customized and used with most operating systems.\nThe Metasploit Project was undertaken in 2003 by H.D. Moore for use as a Perl-based portable network tool, with assistance from core developer Matt Miller. It was fully converted to Ruby by 2007, and the license was acquired by Rapid7 in 2009, where it remains as part of the Boston-based company repertoire of IDS signature development and targeted remote exploit, fuzzing, anti-forensic, and evasion tools.\\\nPortions of these other tools reside within the Metasploit framework, which is built into the Kali Linux OS. Rapid7 has also developed two proprietary OpenCore tools, Metasploit Pro, Metasploit Express.\\\nThis framework has become the go-to exploit development and mitigation tool. Prior to Metasploit, pen testers had to perform all probes manually by using a variety of tools that may or may not have supported the platform they were testing, writing their own code by hand, and introducing it onto networks manually. Remote testing was virtually unheard of, and that limited a security specialist reach to the local area and companies spending a fortune on in-house IT or security consultants. (ref. Varonis)", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Powershell Load Module in Meterpreter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Apache Benchmark Binary - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Powershell Load Module in Meterpreter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Windows Apache Benchmark Binary", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "Meterpreter", "author": "Michael Hart", "date": "2021-06-08", "version": 1, "id": "d5f8e298-c85a-11eb-9fea-acde48001122", "description": "Meterpreter provides red teams, pen testers and threat actors interactive access to a compromised host to run commands, upload payloads, download files, and other actions.", "references": ["https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/", "https://doubleoctopus.com/security-wiki/threats-and-tools/meterpreter/", "https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/"], "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Meterpreter. Meterpreter is a Metasploit payload for remote execution that leverages DLL injection to make it extremely difficult to detect.  Since the software runs in memory, no new processes are created upon injection.  It also leverages encrypted communication channels.\nMeterpreter enables the operator to remotely run commands on the target machine, upload payloads, download files, dump password hashes, and much more.  It is difficult to determine from the forensic evidence what actions the operator performed.  Splunk Research, however, has observed anomalous behaviors on the compromised hosts that seem to only appear when Meterpreter is executing various commands.  With that, we have written new detections targeted to these detections.\nWhile investigating a detection related to this analytic story, please bear in mind that the detections look for anomalies in system behavior.  It will be imperative to look for other signs in the endpoint and network logs for lateral movement, discovery and other actions to confirm that the host was compromised and a remote actor used it to progress on their objectives.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "no", "author_name": "Michael Hart", "detections": [{"name": "Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive number of taskhost processes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-09-08", "version": 1, "id": "4ad4253e-10ca-11ec-8235-acde48001122", "description": "CVE-2021-40444 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML, recently used to delivery targeted spearphishing documents.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/windows-mshtml-zero-day-actively-exploited-mitigations-required/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe"], "narrative": "Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444 by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents. MSHTML is a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it is 2019s most commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software. CVE-2021-40444 received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. MSHTML is the beating heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft Office applications use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office documents. The attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware. At the moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks.\n1. Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones will be added, including malicious ones. Open documents from the Internet in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Ember Bear"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel"}]}, {"name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Spawning Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}]}, {"name": "Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege CVE-2023-29357", "author": "Michael Haag, Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk", "date": "2023-09-27", "version": 1, "id": "95ae800d-485e-47f7-866e-8be281aa497d", "description": "This analytic story focuses on the Microsoft SharePoint Server vulnerability CVE-2023-29357, which allows for an elevation of privilege due to improper handling of authentication tokens. Exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to a serious security breach where an attacker might gain privileged access to the SharePoint environment, potentially leading to data theft or other malicious activities. This story is associated with the detection `Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege` which identifies attempts to exploit this vulnerability.", "references": ["https://socradar.io/microsoft-sharepoint-server-elevation-of-privilege-vulnerability-exploit-cve-2023-29357/", "https://github.com/Chocapikk/CVE-2023-29357"], "narrative": "Microsoft SharePoint Server is a widely used web-based collaborative platform. The vulnerability CVE-2023-29357 exposes a flaw in the handling of authentication tokens, allowing an attacker to escalate privileges and gain unauthorized access to the SharePoint environment. This could potentially lead to data theft, unauthorized system modifications, or other malicious activities. Organizations are urged to apply immediate patches and conduct regular system assessments to ensure security.", "tags": {"category": ["Vulnerability", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}]}, {"name": "Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190", "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-05-31", "version": 1, "id": "2a60a99e-c93a-4036-af70-768fac838019", "description": "On Monday May 30, 2022, Microsoft issued CVE-2022-30190 regarding the Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) in Windows vulnerability.", "references": ["https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/30/guidance-for-cve-2022-30190-microsoft-support-diagnostic-tool-vulnerability/", "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28694", "https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e", "https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984?s=20&t=ZiXYI4dQuA-0_dzQzSUb3A", "https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4a24048f81afbe9fb62e7a6a49adbd1faf41f266b5f9feecdceb567aec096784/detection", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/msdt.exe-152D4C9F63EFB332CCB134C6953C0104.html"], "narrative": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists when MSDT is called using the URL protocol from a calling application such as Word. An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can run arbitrary code with the privileges of the calling application. The attacker can then install programs, view, change, or delete data, or create new accounts in the context allowed by the user''s rights.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}]}, {"name": "Monitor for Updates", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-15", "version": 1, "id": "9ef8d677-7b52-4213-a038-99cfc7acc2d8", "description": "Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches.", "references": ["https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download"], "narrative": "It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important to eliminate known vulnerabilities that may be exploited by various threat actors.\nSearches in this analytic story are designed to help analysts monitor endpoints for system patches and/or updates. This helps analysts identify any systems that are not successfully updated in a timely matter.\nMicrosoft releases updates for Windows systems on a monthly cadence. They should be installed as soon as possible after following internal testing and validation procedures. Patches and updates for other systems or applications are typically released as needed.", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Compliance", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "No Windows Updates in a time frame", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "MOVEit Transfer Critical Vulnerability", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-06-01", "version": 1, "id": "e8c05f9b-6ad4-45ac-8f5d-ff044da417c9", "description": "A critical zero-day vulnerability has been discovered in the MOVEit Transfer file transfer software, widely used by businesses and developers worldwide. The vulnerability has been exploited by unknown threat actors to perform mass data theft from organizations. Progress Software Corporation, the developer of MOVEit, has issued a security advisory urging customers to take immediate action to protect their environments. They recommend blocking external traffic to ports 80 and 445 on the MOVEit server, and to check the c:\\MOVEitTransfer\\wwwroot\\ folder for unusual files. A patch is currently released.", "references": ["https://community.progress.com/s/article/MOVEit-Transfer-Critical-Vulnerability-31May2023", "https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/13wxuej/critical_vulnerability_moveit_file_transfer/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-moveit-transfer-zero-day-mass-exploited-in-data-theft-attacks/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/13wxuej/critical_vulnerability_moveit_file_transfer/", "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/faa672b1929a23fc48fc0ee47585cc48"], "narrative": "Hackers have been actively exploiting a zero-day vulnerability found in the MOVEit Transfer software. This software, developed by Progress Software Corporation, a US-based company and its subsidiary Ipswitch, is a managed file transfer solution. It is used by thousands of organizations worldwide, including Chase, Disney, GEICO, and MLB, and by 3.5 million developers. The software allows for secure file transfers between business partners and customers using SFTP, SCP, and HTTP-based uploads.\nThe zero-day vulnerability has been exploited to steal data on a large scale from various organizations. The identity of the threat actors and the exact timeline of the exploitation remains unclear. However, it has been confirmed that multiple organizations have experienced breaches and data theft.\nIn response to this critical situation, Progress released a security advisory warning customers of the vulnerability and providing mitigation strategies while a patch has been released. They urged customers to take immediate action to protect their MOVEit environments. They suggested blocking external traffic to ports 80 and 445 on the MOVEit server and checking the c:\\MOVEitTransfer\\wwwroot\\ folder for unexpected files, including backups or large file downloads.\nBlocking these ports will prevent external access to the web UI, prevent some MOVEit Automation tasks from working, block APIs, and prevent the Outlook MOVEit plugin from working. However, SFTP and FTP/s protocols can continue to be used for file transfers.\nThere is currently no detailed information about the zero-day vulnerability. But based on the ports blocked and the specific location to check for unusual files, the flaw is likely a web-facing vulnerability.\nWhile Progress has officially confirmed that the vulnerability is being actively exploited, it is clear from several reports that multiple organizations have already had data stolen using this zero-day vulnerability. The exploitation appears very similar to the mass exploitation of a GoAnywhere MFT zero-day in January 2023 and the December 2020 zero-day exploitation of Accellion FTA servers. These were both managed file transfer platforms heavily exploited by the Clop ransomware gang to steal data and extort organizations.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Windows MOVEit Transfer Writing ASPX - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows MOVEit Transfer Writing ASPX", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Netsh Abuse", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2017-01-05", "version": 1, "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5f65", "description": "Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"], "narrative": "It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\nTo get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.", "tags": {"category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Processes created by netsh", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}]}, {"name": "Processes launching netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "Network Discovery", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-02-14", "version": 1, "id": "af228995-f182-49d7-90b3-2a732944f00f", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the network discovery, including looking for network configuration, settings such as IP, MAC address, firewall settings and many more.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ESET_Kobalos.pdf", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/"], "narrative": "Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Linux System Network Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}]}]}, {"name": "NjRAT", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-09-07", "version": 2, "id": "f6d52454-6cf3-4759-9627-5868a3e2b2b1", "description": "NjRat is a notorious remote access trojan (RAT) predominantly wielded by malicious operators to infiltrate and wield remote control over compromised systems. This analytical story harnesses targeted search methodologies to uncover and investigate activities that could be indicative of NjRAT's presence. These activities include tracking file write operations for dropped files, scrutinizing registry modifications aimed at establishing persistence mechanisms, monitoring suspicious processes, self-deletion behaviors, browser credential parsing, firewall configuration alterations, spread itself via removable drive and an array of other potentially malicious actions.", "references": ["https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/what-is-njrat-malware/#:~:text=NJRat%20%E2%80%94%20also%20known%20as%20Bladabindi,malware%20variant%20in%20March%202023.", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.njrat"], "narrative": "NjRat is also known as Bladabindi malware that was first discovered in the wild in 2012. Since then this malware remain active and uses different campaign to spred its malware. While its primary infection vectors are phishing attacks and drive-by downloads, it also has \"worm\" capability to spread itself via infected removable drives. This RAT has various of capabilities including keylogging, webcam access, browser credential parsing, file upload and downloads, file and process list, service list, shell command execution, registry modification, screen capture, view the desktop of the infected computer and many more. NjRat does not target any industry in particular, but attacking a wide variety of individuals and organizations to gather sensitive information.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1091", "mitre_attack_technique": "Replication Through Removable Media", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Aoqin Dragon", "Darkhotel", "FIN7", "LuminousMoth", "Mustang Panda", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1102", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "EXOTIC LILY", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "LazyScripter", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1129", "mitre_attack_technique": "Shared Modules", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497", "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Darkhotel"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Abused Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Admin Permission Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Delete or Modify System Firewall - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable or Modify Tools Via Taskkill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Executable in Loaded Modules - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry With MD5 Reg Key Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify System Firewall with Notable Process Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Njrat Fileless Storage via Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System LogOff Commandline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Time Based Evasion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Registry Tool", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling CMD Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Task Manager", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Abused Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Admin Permission Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Delete or Modify System Firewall", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable or Modify Tools Via Taskkill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}]}, {"name": "Windows Executable in Loaded Modules", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Shared Modules"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry With MD5 Reg Key Name", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify System Firewall with Notable Process Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Njrat Fileless Storage via Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Replication Through Removable Media", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Replication Through Removable Media"}]}, {"name": "Windows System LogOff Commandline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Reboot CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Shutdown CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Windows Time Based Evasion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}]}, {"name": "Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}]}, {"name": "NOBELIUM Group", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2020-12-14", "version": 3, "id": "758196b5-2e21-424f-a50c-6e421ce926c2", "description": "NOBELIUM, also known as APT29, The Dukes, Cozy Bear, CozyDuke, Blue Kitsune, and Midnight Blizzard, is a sophisticated nation-state threat actor, reportedly associated with Russian intelligence. Active since at least 2008, this group primarily targets government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, along with research institutes and think tanks. Their operations typically involve advanced persistent threats (APT), leveraging techniques like spear-phishing, malware deployment, and long-term network compromise to achieve information theft and espionage. Notably, APT29 has been implicated in significant cyber espionage incidents, including the 2015 breach of the Pentagon's Joint Staff email system and attacks on the Democratic National Committee in 2016. Their advanced tactics and persistent approach underscore the serious nature of threats posed by this group to global cybersecurity.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/25/midnight-blizzard-guidance-for-responders-on-nation-state-attack/"], "narrative": "This Analytic Story groups detections designed to trigger on a comprehensive range of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) leveraged by the NOBELIUM Group, with a focus on their methods as observed in well-known public breaches.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "SilverTerrier"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-hop Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "FIN4", "Inception", "Leviathan"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN4", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1203", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT12", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "Axiom", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA459", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Akira", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090", "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Resource Development", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Weaponization", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Application Registration Owner Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Supernova Webshell - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "author_name": "Patrick Bareiss", "detections": [{"name": "Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal Authentication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal Created", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "O365 Added Service Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 Application Registration Owner Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}]}, {"name": "O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}]}, {"name": "O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials"}]}, {"name": "O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AdFind Exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "TOR Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-hop Proxy"}]}, {"name": "Supernova Webshell", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Office 365 Account Takeover", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-17", "version": 1, "id": "7dcea963-af44-4db7-a5b9-fd2b543d9bc9", "description": "Monitor for activities and anomalies indicative of initial access techniques within Office 365 environments.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security/compass/incident-response-playbook-password-spray", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-sign-ins-error-codes", "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/", "https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/22/malicious-oauth-applications-used-to-compromise-email-servers-and-spread-spam/", "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/investigate-risky-oauth", "https://www.alteredsecurity.com/post/introduction-to-365-stealer", "https://github.com/AlteredSecurity/365-Stealer"], "narrative": "Office 365 (O365) is Microsoft's cloud-based suite of productivity tools, encompassing email, collaboration platforms, and office applications, all integrated with Azure Active Directory for identity and access management. O365's centralized storage of sensitive data and widespread adoption make it a key asset, yet also a prime target for security threats. The \"Office 365 Account Takeover\" analytic story focuses on the initial techniques attackers employ to breach or compromise these identities. Initial access, in this context, consists of techniques that use various entry vectors to gain their initial foothold . Identifying these early indicators is crucial for establishing the first line of defense against unauthorized access and potential security incidents within O365 environments.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1185", "mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1528", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1621", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Resource Development", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Risk", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 File Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 High Number Of Failed Authentications for User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Mail Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Security And Compliance Alert Triggered - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "High Number of Login Failures from a single source", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "O365 Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "O365 Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}]}, {"name": "O365 File Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token"}]}, {"name": "O365 High Number Of Failed Authentications for User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}]}, {"name": "O365 Mail Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "O365 Security And Compliance Alert Triggered", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "O365 User Consent Blocked for Risky Application", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token"}]}, {"name": "O365 User Consent Denied for OAuth Application", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token"}]}]}, {"name": "Office 365 Collection Techniques", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2024-02-12", "version": 1, "id": "d90f2b80-f675-4717-90af-12fc8c438ae8", "description": "Monitor for activities and anomalies indicative of potential collection techniques within Office 365 environments.", "references": [], "narrative": "Office 365 (O365) is Microsoft's cloud-based suite of productivity tools, encompassing email, collaboration platforms, and office applications, all integrated with Azure Active Directory for identity and access management. O365's centralized storage of sensitive data and widespread adoption make it a key asset, yet also a prime target for security threats. The 'Office 365 Collection Techniques' analytic story focuses on the strategies and methodologies that attackers might use to gather critical information within the O365 ecosystem. 'Collection' in this context refers to the various techniques adversaries deploy to accumulate data that are essential for advancing their malicious objectives. This could include tactics such as intercepting communications, accessing sensitive documents, or extracting data from collaboration tools and email platforms. By identifying and monitoring these collection activities, organizations can more effectively spot and counteract attempts to illicitly gather information", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN4", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Collection"], "datamodels": ["Change", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Compliance Content Search Exported - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Compliance Content Search Started - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Granted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Enabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 New Forwarding Mailflow Rule Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}]}, {"name": "O365 Compliance Content Search Exported", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Compliance Content Search Started", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}]}, {"name": "O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule"}]}, {"name": "O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}]}, {"name": "O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Granted", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Created", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule"}]}, {"name": "O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Enabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule"}]}, {"name": "O365 New Forwarding Mailflow Rule Created", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 PST export alert", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}]}]}, {"name": "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-17", "version": 1, "id": "d230a106-0475-4605-a8d8-abaf4c31ced7", "description": "Monitor for activities and anomalies indicative of potential persistence techniques within Office 365 environments.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://blog.sygnia.co/detection-and-hunting-of-golden-saml-attack?hsLang=en", "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2022-08/remediation-hardening-strategies-for-m365-defend-against-apt29-white-paper.pdf", "https://www.csoonline.com/article/570381/microsoft-365-advanced-audit-what-you-need-to-know.html", "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/manage-apps/overview-assign-app-owners", "https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"], "narrative": "Office 365 (O365) is Microsoft's cloud-based suite of productivity tools, encompassing email, collaboration platforms, and office applications, all integrated with Azure Active Directory for identity and access management. O365's centralized storage of sensitive data and widespread adoption make it a key asset, yet also a prime target for security threats. The \"Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms\" analytic story delves into the tactics and techniques attackers employ to maintain prolonged unauthorized access within the O365 environment. Persistence in this context refers to methods used by adversaries to keep their foothold after an initial compromise. This can involve actions like modifying mailbox rules, establishing covert forwarding rules, manipulating application permissions. By monitoring signs of persistence, organizations can effectively detect and respond to stealthy threats, thereby protecting their O365 assets and data.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Cloud Security", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN4", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Credential Access"], "datamodels": ["Change", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Advanced Audit Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Application Registration Owner Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 High Privilege Role Granted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Inbox Folder Shared with All Users - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 New MFA Method Registered - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 Added Service Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "O365 Advanced Audit Disabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}]}, {"name": "O365 Application Registration Owner Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}]}, {"name": "O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "O365 Disable MFA", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}]}, {"name": "O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "O365 High Privilege Role Granted", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "O365 Mailbox Inbox Folder Shared with All Users", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 New MFA Method Registered", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration"}]}, {"name": "O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}]}, {"name": "O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials"}]}, {"name": "O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}]}, {"name": "Okta Account Takeover", "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2024-03-06", "version": 1, "id": "83a48657-8153-4580-adba-eb0b3a83244e", "description": "The Okta Account Takeover analytic story encompasses a comprehensive suite of detections aimed at identifying unauthorized access and potential takeover attempts of Okta accounts. This collection leverages diverse data points and behavioral analytics to safeguard user identities and access within cloud environments. Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Account Takeover attacks against Okta tenants.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/account-takeover-ato/", "https://www.barracuda.com/glossary/account-takeover", "https://www.okta.com/customer-identity/"], "narrative": "Okta is a cloud-based identity management service that provides organizations with a secure way to manage user access to various applications and services. It enables single sign-on (SSO), multi-factor authentication (MFA), lifecycle management, and more, helping organizations streamline the user authentication process. Account Takeover (ATO) is an attack whereby cybercriminals gain unauthorized access to online accounts by using different techniques like brute force, social engineering, phishing & spear phishing, credential stuffing, etc. By posing as the real user, cyber-criminals can change account details, send out phishing emails, access sensitive applications, or use any stolen information to access further accounts within the organization. This analytic story groups detections that can help security operations teams identify the potential compromise of Okta accounts.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1539", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Web Session Cookie", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Evilnum", "LuminousMoth", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1621", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Session Cookie", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1538", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Dashboard", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Resource Development", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Risk", "Change", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta New API Token Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta New Device Enrolled on Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Suspicious Activity Reported - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Unauthorized Access to Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta User Logins from Multiple Cities - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "Okta Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Okta Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "Okta Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Session Cookie"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Dashboard"}]}, {"name": "Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}]}, {"name": "Okta New API Token Created", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Okta New Device Enrolled on Account", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration"}]}, {"name": "Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}]}, {"name": "Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded", "source": "application", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "Okta Suspicious Activity Reported", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Web Session Cookie"}]}, {"name": "Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Okta Unauthorized Access to Application", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Okta User Logins from Multiple Cities", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Okta MFA Exhaustion", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-09-27", "version": 1, "id": "7c6e508d-4b4d-42c8-82de-5ff4ea3b0cb3", "description": "A social engineering technique called 'MFA Fatigue', aka 'MFA push spam' or 'MFA Exhaustion', is growing more popular with threat actors as it does not require malware or phishing infrastructure and has proven to be successful in attacks.", "references": ["https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/mfa-fatigue-hackers-new-favorite-tactic-in-high-profile-breaches/", "https://www.csoonline.com/article/3674156/multi-factor-authentication-fatigue-attacks-are-on-the-rise-how-to-defend-against-them.html"], "narrative": "An MFA Fatigue attack is when a threat actor runs a script that attempts to log in with stolen credentials over and over, causing what feels like an endless stream of MFA push requests to be sent to the account's owner's mobile device. The goal is to keep this up, day and night, to break down the target's cybersecurity posture and inflict a sense of \"fatigue\" regarding these MFA prompts.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1621", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Risk", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Account Locked Out - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded", "source": "application", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Okta Account Locked Out", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}]}, {"name": "OpenSSL CVE-2022-3602", "author": "Michael Haag, splunk", "date": "2022-11-02", "version": 1, "id": "491e00c9-998b-4c64-91bb-d8f9c79c1f4c", "description": "OpenSSL recently disclosed two vulnerabilities CVE-2022-3602 and CVE-2022-3786. CVE-2022-3602 is a X.509 Email Address 4-byte Buffer Overflow where puny code is utilized. This only affects OpenSSL 3.0.0 - 3.0.6.", "references": ["https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2022/11/01/email-address-overflows/", "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h8jm-2x53-xhp5", "https://community.emergingthreats.net/t/out-of-band-ruleset-update-summary-2022-11-01/117", "https://github.com/corelight/CVE-2022-3602/tree/master/scripts"], "narrative": "A buffer overrun can be triggered in X.509 certificate verification, specifically in name constraint checking. Note that this occurs after certificate chain signature verification and requires either a CA to have signed a malicious certificate or for an application to continue certificate verification despite failure to construct a path to a trusted issuer. An attacker can craft a malicious email address in a certificate to overflow an arbitrary number of bytes containing the . character (decimal 46) on the stack. This buffer overflow could result in a crash (causing a denial of service). In a TLS client, this can be triggered by connecting to a malicious server. In a TLS server, this can be triggered if the server requests client authentication and a malicious client connects. Users of OpenSSL 3.0.0 - 3.0.6 are encouraged to upgrade to 3.0.7 as soon as possible. If you obtain your copy of OpenSSL from your Operating System vendor or other third party then you should seek to obtain an updated version from them as soon as possible. SSL Certificates with Punycode will identify SSL certificates with Punycode. Note that it does not mean it will capture malicious payloads. If using Zeek, modify the Zeek x509 certificate with punycode to match your environment. We found during this exercise that the FULL x509 with SAN must be captured and stored, decoded, in order to query against it.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1573", "mitre_attack_technique": "Encrypted Channel", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BITTER", "Magic Hound", "Tropic Trooper"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - SSL Certificates with Punycode - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zeek x509 Certificate with Punycode - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "SSL Certificates with Punycode", "source": "network", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Encrypted Channel"}]}, {"name": "Zeek x509 Certificate with Punycode", "source": "network", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Encrypted Channel"}]}]}, {"name": "Orangeworm Attack Group", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2020-01-22", "version": 2, "id": "bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-97c370efcf52", "description": "Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.", "references": ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"], "narrative": "In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\nAwareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\nHealthcare may be a promising target, because it is notoriously behind in technology, often using older operating systems and neglecting to patch computers. Even so, the group was able to evade detection for a full three years. Sources say that the malware spread quickly within the target networks, infecting computers used to control medical devices, such as MRI and X-ray machines.\nThis Analytic Story is designed to help you detect and investigate suspicious activities that may be indicative of an Orangeworm attack. One detection search looks for command-line arguments. Another monitors for uses of sc.exe, a non-essential Windows file that can manipulate Windows services. One of the investigative searches helps you get more information on web hosts that you suspect have been compromised.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get History Of Email Sources", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "First time seen command line argument", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}]}, {"name": "Outlook RCE CVE-2024-21378", "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2024-03-20", "version": 1, "id": "d889fcf2-0265-4b44-b29f-4ec063c21880", "description": "CVE-2024-21378 exposes a critical vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook, allowing for authenticated remote code execution (RCE) through the manipulation of synced form objects. Discovered by NetSPI in 2023, this vulnerability capitalizes on the unchanged syncing capability of form objects, despite previous patches aimed at securing script code in custom forms. This technical blog delves into the discovery and weaponization of CVE-2024-21378, enhancing the Outlook penetration testing tool, Ruler, to exploit this flaw. A forthcoming pull request will provide a proof-of-concept code, aiding organizations in mitigating this security risk.", "references": ["https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/red-team-operations/microsoft-outlook-remote-code-execution-cve-2024-21378/"], "narrative": "CVE-2024-21378 is a weakness in Microsoft Outlook that lets hackers execute code remotely if they can authenticate themselves. Researchers at NetSPI found this issue in 2023. The problem started with a technique from 2017 by Etienne Stalmans at SensePost, who found a way to run code using VBScript in Outlook forms. Microsoft tried to fix it by only allowing approved script code in custom forms, but they didn't fix the main issue, which is how these forms sync. To exploit this vulnerability, you need to know how Outlook forms sync, using something called MAPI, and how they use certain properties and attachments when they're set up for the first time. Hackers can mess with these properties and attachments to run their own code. They do this by tricking the form's setup process, changing registry keys and files to get past Outlook's security. To show how this could be done, researchers modified Ruler, a tool for testing Outlook's security. They changed it so it could sync a harmful form with the right properties to run a specific type of file, a COM compliant native DLL. This not only showed that CVE-2024-21378 could be exploited but also that it could affect a lot of companies since so many use Microsoft Outlook. The discovery and the way it was exploited remind us that we always need to be on the lookout for security risks and work hard to protect against them. The cybersecurity world is always watching for the next big threat that could put our digital world at risk. As companies rush to fix this issue, it's a reminder of how important it is to stay ahead of these threats.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Windows InProcServer32 New Outlook Form - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows New InProcServer32 Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Outlook Drop Dll In FORM Dir - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows InProcServer32 New Outlook Form", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows New InProcServer32 Added", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing Outlook Drop Dll In FORM Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}]}, {"name": "PaperCut MF NG Vulnerability", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-05-15", "version": 1, "id": "2493d270-5665-4fb4-99c7-8f886f260676", "description": "The FBI has issued a joint advisory concerning the exploitation of a PaperCut MF/NG vulnerability (CVE-2023-27350) by malicious actors, which began in mid-April 2023 and has been ongoing. In early May 2023, a group identifying themselves as the Bl00dy Ransomware Gang targeted vulnerable PaperCut servers within the Education Facilities Subsector. The advisory provides information on detecting exploitation attempts and shares known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the group's activities.", "references": ["https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/05/11/cisa-and-fbi-release-joint-advisory-response-active-exploitation-papercut-vulnerability", "https://www.papercut.com/kb/Main/PO-1216-and-PO-1219", "https://www.horizon3.ai/papercut-cve-2023-27350-deep-dive-and-indicators-of-compromise/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-actively-exploit-critical-rce-bug-in-papercut-servers/", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software"], "narrative": "PaperCut MF/NG versions 19 and older have reached their end-of-life, as documented on the End of Life Policy page. Customers using these older versions are advised to purchase an updated license online for PaperCut NG or through their PaperCut Partner for PaperCut MF. For users with a currently supported version (version 20 or later), they can upgrade to any maintenance release version they are licensed for. If upgrading to a security patch is not possible, there are alternative options to enhance security. Users can lock down network access to their server(s) by blocking all inbound traffic from external IPs to the web management port (port 9191 and 9192 by default) and blocking all inbound traffic to the web management portal on the firewall to the server. Additionally, users can apply \"Allow list\" restrictions under Options > Advanced > Security > Allowed site server IP addresses, setting this to only allow the IP addresses of verified Site Servers on their network.\nThe vulnerabilities CVE-2023-27350 and CVE-2023-27351 have CVSS scores of 9.8 (Critical) and 8.2 (High), respectively. PaperCut and its partner network have activated response teams to assist PaperCut MF and NG customers, with service desks available 24/7 via their support page. The security response team at PaperCut has been working with external security advisors to compile a list of unpatched PaperCut MF/NG servers that have ports open on the public internet. They have been proactively reaching out to potentially exposed customers since Wednesday afternoon (AEST) and are working around the clock through the weekend.\nThe exploit was first detected in the wild on April 18th, 2023, at 03:30 AEST / April 17th, 2023, at 17:30 UTC. The earliest signature of suspicious activity on a customer server potentially linked to this vulnerability dates back to April 14th, 2023, at 01:29 AEST / April 13th, 2023, at 15:29 UTC.\nApplying the security fixes should not have any negative impact. Users can follow their usual upgrade procedure to obtain the upgrade. Additional links on the -Check for updates- page (accessed through the Admin interface > About > Version info > Check for updates) allow customers to download fixes for previous major versions that are still supported (e.g., 20.1.7 and 21.2.11) as well as the current version available. PaperCut MF users are advised to follow their regular upgrade process and consult their PaperCut partner or reseller for assistance.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - PaperCut NG Suspicious Behavior Debug Log - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PaperCut NG Spawn Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PaperCut NG Remote Web Access Attempt - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "PaperCut NG Suspicious Behavior Debug Log", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows PaperCut NG Spawn Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "PaperCut NG Remote Web Access Attempt", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services", "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2021-08-31", "version": 1, "id": "97aecafc-0a68-11ec-962f-acde48001122", "description": "PetitPotam (CVE-2021-36942,) is a vulnerablity identified in Microsofts EFSRPC Protocol that can allow an unauthenticated account to escalate privileges to domain administrator given the right circumstances.", "references": ["https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/07/27/microsoft-releases-guidance-mitigating-petitpotam-ntlm-relay", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005413-mitigating-ntlm-relay-attacks-on-active-directory-certificate-services-ad-cs-3612b773-4043-4aa9-b23d-b87910cd3429", "https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf", "https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam/", "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases/tag/2.2.0-20210723", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/"], "narrative": "In June 2021, security researchers at SpecterOps released a blog post and white paper detailing several potential attack vectors against Active Directory Certificated Services (ADCS). ADCS is a Microsoft product that implements Public Key Infrastrucutre (PKI) functionality and can be used by organizations to provide and manage digital certiticates within Active Directory.\\ In July 2021, a security researcher released PetitPotam, a tool that allows attackers to coerce Windows systems into authenticating to arbitrary endpoints.\\ Combining PetitPotam with the identified ADCS attack vectors allows attackers to escalate privileges from an unauthenticated anonymous user to full domain admin privileges.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1187", "mitre_attack_technique": "Forced Authentication", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkHydrus", "Dragonfly"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "PetitPotam Network Share Access Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Forced Authentication"}]}, {"name": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}]}, {"name": "Phemedrone Stealer", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2024-01-24", "version": 2, "id": "386f64dd-657b-4dcf-8eb3-5e297d30924c", "description": "Phemedrone Stealer is a potent data-stealing malware designed to infiltrate systems discreetly, primarily targeting sensitive user information. Operating with a stealthy modus operandi, it covertly collects and exfiltrates critical data such as login credentials, personal details, and financial information. Notably evasive, Phemedrone employs sophisticated techniques to bypass security measures and remain undetected. Its capabilities extend to exploiting vulnerabilities, leveraging command and control infrastructure, and facilitating remote access. As a formidable threat, Phemedrone Stealer poses a significant risk to user privacy and system integrity, demanding vigilant cybersecurity measures to counteract its malicious activities.", "references": ["https://www.trendmicro.com/en_vn/research/23/b/investigating-the-plugx-trojan-disguised-as-a-legitimate-windows.html"], "narrative": "Phemedrone Stealer, spotlighted in a recent Trend Micro blog, unveils a concerning chapter in cyber threats. Leveraging the CVE-2023-36025 vulnerability for defense evasion, this malware exhibits a relentless pursuit of sensitive data. Originating from the shadows of the dark web, it capitalizes on forums where cybercriminals refine its evasive maneuvers. The blog sheds light on Phemedrone's exploitation of intricate tactics, illustrating its agility in sidestepping security protocols. As cybersecurity experts delve into the intricacies of CVE-2023-36025, the narrative surrounding Phemedrone Stealer underscores the urgency for heightened vigilance and proactive defense measures against this persistent and evolving digital adversary.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Download Files Using Telegram", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information"}]}]}, {"name": "PlugX", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-12", "version": 2, "id": "a2c94c99-b93b-4bc7-a749-e2198743d0d6", "description": "PlugX, also referred to as \"PlugX RAT\" or \"Kaba,\" is a highly sophisticated remote access Trojan (RAT) discovered in 2012. This malware is notorious for its involvement in targeted cyberattacks, primarily driven by cyber espionage objectives. PlugX provides attackers with comprehensive remote control capabilities over compromised systems, granting them the ability to execute commands, collect sensitive data, and manipulate the infected host.", "references": ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.plugx", "https://blog.sekoia.io/my-teas-not-cold-an-overview-of-china-cyber-threat/", "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/carderbee-software-supply-chain-certificate-abuse", "https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2023-0808.pdf", "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/infected-usb-steal-secrets", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013/"], "narrative": "PlugX, known as the \"silent infiltrator of the digital realm, is a shadowy figure in the world of cyber threats. This remote access Trojan (RAT), first unveiled in 2012, is not your run-of-the-mill malware. It's the go-to tool for sophisticated hackers with one goal in mind, espionage. PlugX's repertoire of capabilities reads like a spy thriller. It doesn't just breach your defenses; it goes a step further, slipping quietly into your systems, much like a ghost. Once inside, it opens the door to a world of possibilities for cybercriminals. With a few keystrokes, they can access your data, capture your screen, and silently watch your every move. In the hands of skilled hackers, it's a versatile instrument for cyber espionage. This malware thrives on persistence. It's not a one-time hit; it's in it for the long haul. Even if you reboot your system, PlugX remains, ensuring that its grip on your infrastructure doesn't waver.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1091", "mitre_attack_technique": "Replication Through Removable Media", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Aoqin Dragon", "Darkhotel", "FIN7", "LuminousMoth", "Mustang Panda", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Execution", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Masquerading Msdtc Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Deletion In Registry - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Drop Executable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Masquerading Msdtc Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Windows Replication Through Removable Media", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Replication Through Removable Media"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Deletion In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}]}, {"name": "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "author": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team, iDefense", "date": "2020-01-22", "version": 1, "id": "988c59c5-0a1c-45b6-a555-0c62276e327e", "description": "Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.", "references": ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"], "narrative": "This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\niDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, \"Orz,\" which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as \"temp.Periscope\" and \"Leviathan\"). The file is executed using Wscript.\nThe MUDCARP techniques include the use of the compressed-folders module from Microsoft, zipfldr.dll, with RouteTheCall export to run the malicious process or command. After a successful reboot, the malware is made persistent by a manipulating `[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run]'help'='c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\rundll32.exe c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall c:\\\\programdata\\\\winapp.exe'`. Though this technique is not exclusive to MUDCARP, it has been spotted in the group's arsenal of advanced techniques seen in the wild.\nThis Analytic Story searches for evidence of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that allow for the use of a endpoint detection-and-response (EDR) bypass technique to mask the true parent of a malicious process. It can also be set as a registry key for further sandbox evasion and to allow the malware to launch only after reboot.\nIf behavioral searches included in this story yield positive hits, iDefense recommends conducting IOC searches for the following:\n1. www.chemscalere[.]com\n1. chemscalere[.]com\n1. about.chemscalere[.]com\n1. autoconfig.chemscalere[.]com\n1. autodiscover.chemscalere[.]com\n1. catalog.chemscalere[.]com\n1. cpanel.chemscalere[.]com\n1. db.chemscalere[.]com\n1. ftp.chemscalere[.]com\n1. mail.chemscalere[.]com\n1. news.chemscalere[.]com\n1. update.chemscalere[.]com\n1. webmail.chemscalere[.]com\n1. www.candlelightparty[.]org\n1. candlelightparty[.]org\n1. newapp.freshasianews[.]com\nIn addition, iDefense also recommends that organizations review their environments for activity related to the following hashes:\n1. cd195ee448a3657b5c2c2d13e9c7a2e2\n1. b43ad826fe6928245d3c02b648296b43\n1. 889a9b52566448231f112a5ce9b5dfaf\n1. b8ec65dab97cdef3cd256cc4753f0c54\n1. 04d83cd3813698de28cfbba326d7647c", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get History Of Email Sources", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "iDefense", "author_name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team", "detections": [{"name": "First time seen command line argument", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Prestige Ransomware", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-11-30", "version": 1, "id": "8b8d8506-b931-450c-b794-f24184ca1deb", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Prestige Ransomware", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/14/new-prestige-ransomware-impacts-organizations-in-ukraine-and-poland/"], "narrative": "This story addresses Prestige ransomware. This ransomware payload seen by Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center(MSTIC) as a ransomware campaign targeting organization in the transportation and logistic industries in some countries. This ransomware campaign highlight the destructive attack to its target organization that directly supplies or transporting military and humanitarian services or assistance. MSTIC observed this ransomware has similarities in terms of its deployment techniques with CaddyWiper and HermeticWiper which is also known malware campaign impacted multiple targeted critical infrastructure organizations. This analytic story will provide techniques and analytics that may help SOC or security researchers to monitor this threat.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Managers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Support Provider", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "FIN7", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "OilRig", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Magic Hound", "TA2541", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cached Domain Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1115", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT39"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1202", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Mustang Panda", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Reconnaissance", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Information Discovery Fsutil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Password Managers Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Private Keys Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System User Discovery Via Quser - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process And Service List - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Change Default File Association", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cached Domain Credentials"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Information Discovery Fsutil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Password Managers Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Managers"}]}, {"name": "Windows Private Keys Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Windows Query Registry Reg Save", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Support Provider"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows System User Discovery Via Quser", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows WMI Process And Service List", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", "author": "Splunk Threat Research Team", "date": "2021-07-01", "version": 1, "id": "fd79470a-da88-11eb-b803-acde48001122", "description": "The following analytic story identifies behaviors related PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously known as (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine.", "references": ["https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "narrative": "This vulnerability affects the Print Spooler service, enabled by default on Windows systems, and allows adversaries to trick this service into installing a remotely hosted print driver using a low privileged user account. Successful exploitation effectively allows adversaries to execute code in the target system (Remote Code Execution) in the context of the Print Spooler service which runs with the highest privileges (Privilege Escalation).\nThe prerequisites for successful exploitation consist of:\n1. Print Spooler service enabled on the target system\n1. Network connectivity to the target system (initial access has been obtained)\n1. Hash or password for a low privileged user ( or computer ) account.\nIn the most impactful scenario, an attacker would be able to leverage this vulnerability to obtain a SYSTEM shell on a domain controller and so escalate their privileges from a low privileged domain account to full domain access in the target environment as shown below.", "tags": {"category": ["Vulnerability"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "no", "author_name": "Splunk Threat Research Team", "detections": [{"name": "Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}]}, {"name": "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-11", "version": 1, "id": "6d13121c-90f3-446d-8ac3-27efbbc65218", "description": "Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.", "references": ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"], "narrative": "A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1189", "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Andariel", "Axiom", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mustard Tempest", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Exfiltration", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ES Content Updates - TOR Traffic - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Enable RDP In Other Port Number", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Protocol or Port Mismatch", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "TOR Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-hop Proxy"}]}]}, {"name": "ProxyNotShell", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-09-30", "version": 1, "id": "4e3f17e7-9ed7-425d-a05e-b65464945836", "description": "Two new zero day Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities have been identified actively exploited in the wild - CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082.", "references": ["https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/09/29/customer-guidance-for-reported-zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/", "https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1575762721353916417?s=20&t=67gq9xCWuyPm1VEm8ydfyA", "https://twitter.com/cglyer/status/1575793769814728705?s=20&t=67gq9xCWuyPm1VEm8ydfyA", "https://www.gteltsc.vn/blog/warning-new-attack-campaign-utilized-a-new-0day-rce-vulnerability-on-microsoft-exchange-server-12715.html", "https://research.splunk.com/stories/proxyshell/", "https://www.inversecos.com/2022/07/hunting-for-apt-abuse-of-exchange.html"], "narrative": "Microsoft is investigating two reported zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019. The first vulnerability, identified as CVE-2022-41040, is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability, while the second, identified as CVE-2022-41082, allows remote code execution (RCE) when PowerShell is accessible to the attacker. Originally identified by GTSC monitoring Exchange, some adversary post-exploitation activity was identified and is tagged to this story.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Execution", "Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected", "source": "web", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "ProxyShell", "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2021-08-24", "version": 1, "id": "413bb68e-04e2-11ec-a835-acde48001122", "description": "ProxyShell is a chain of exploits targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server - CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207.", "references": ["https://y4y.space/2021/08/12/my-steps-of-reproducing-proxyshell/", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do", "https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf", "https://www.inversecos.com/2022/07/hunting-for-apt-abuse-of-exchange.html"], "narrative": "During Pwn2Own April 2021, a security researcher demonstrated an attack chain targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server. August 5th, the same researcher publicly released further details and demonstrated the attack chain. CVE-2021-34473 Pre-auth path confusion leads to ACL Bypass (Patched in April by KB5001779) CVE-2021-34523 - Elevation of privilege on Exchange PowerShell backend (Patched in April by KB5001779) . CVE-2021-31207 - Post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write leads to RCE (Patched in May by KB5003435) Upon successful exploitation, the remote attacker will have SYSTEM privileges on the Exchange Server. In addition to remote access/execution, the adversary may be able to run Exchange PowerShell Cmdlets to perform further actions.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Ransomware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected", "source": "web", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Qakbot", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-11-14", "version": 2, "id": "0c6169b1-f126-4d86-8e4f-f7891007ebc6", "description": "QakBot is a modular banking trojan that has been used primarily by financially-motivated actors since at least 2007. QakBot is continuously maintained and developed and has evolved from an information stealer into a delivery agent for ransomware (ref. MITRE ATT&CK).", "references": ["https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/202010221030_QakBot%20TLPWHITE.pdf", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.QakBot", "https://securelist.com/QakBot-technical-analysis/103931/", "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-variant-of-QakBot-spread-by-phishing-emails", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650/", "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/the-rise-of-qakbot"], "narrative": "QakBot notably has made its way on the CISA top malware list for 2021. QakBot for years has been under continious improvement when it comes to initial access, injection and post-exploitation. Multiple adversaries use QakBot to gain initial access and persist, most notably TA551. The actor(s) behind QakBot possess a modular framework consisting of maldoc builders, signed loaders, and DLLs that produce initially low detection rates at the beginning of the attack, which creates opportunities to deliver additional malware such as Egregor and Cobalt Strike. (ref. Cybersecurity ATT) The more recent campaigns utilize HTML smuggling to deliver a ISO container that has a LNK and QakBot payload. QakBot will either load via regsvr32.exe directly, it will attempt to perform DLL sideloading.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN8", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gorgon Group", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Magic Hound", "TA2541", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BackdoorDiplomacy", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Malteiro", "Putter Panda", "TA505", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Machete", "Molerats", "Rancor", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Evilnum", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Whitefly", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows App Layer Protocol Qakbot NamedPipe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows App Layer Protocol Wermgr Connect To NamedPipe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Command Shell Fetch Env Variables - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Side-Loading In Calc - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Side-Loading Process Child Of Calc - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Qakbot Binary Data Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MsiExec HideWindow Rundll32 Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection In Non-Service SearchIndexer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Of Wermgr to Known Browser - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Regsvr32 Renamed Binary - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Discovery Using Qwinsta - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Impersonate Token - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery"}]}, {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link"}]}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows App Layer Protocol Qakbot NamedPipe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows App Layer Protocol Wermgr Connect To NamedPipe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows Command Shell Fetch Env Variables", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows DLL Side-Loading In Calc", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows DLL Side-Loading Process Child Of Calc", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Qakbot Binary Data Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows MsiExec HideWindow Rundll32 Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection In Non-Service SearchIndexer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection Of Wermgr to Known Browser", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection Remote Thread", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Regsvr32 Renamed Binary", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Discovery Using Qwinsta", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows WMI Impersonate Token", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "Ransomware", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-04", "version": 1, "id": "cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.", "references": ["https://web.archive.org/web/20190826231258/https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"], "narrative": "Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN8", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1020", "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Sidewinder", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "FIN7", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "OilRig", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Aoqin Dragon", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cleaver", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "POLONIUM", "Patchwork", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "TA2541", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-hop Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "FIN4", "Inception", "Leviathan"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1219", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "RTM", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Thrip"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "Evilnum", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Machete", "Molerats", "Rancor", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Deep Panda", "GALLIUM", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090", "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Reconnaissance", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Resource Development", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Exfiltration", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Change", "Network_Traffic", "Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Weaponization", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ES Content Updates - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "Get History Of Email Sources", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity", "Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Conti Common Exec parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed RClone", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}]}, {"name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "ICACLS Grant Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement"}]}, {"name": "MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Permission Modification using Takeown App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Revil Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 LockWorkStation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Spike in File Writes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP"}]}, {"name": "Uninstall App Using MsiExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "USN Journal Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows DiskCryptor Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Tool"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Access Software Hunt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "TOR Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-hop Proxy"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}]}, {"name": "Ransomware Cloud", "author": "Rod Soto, David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2020-10-27", "version": 1, "id": "f52f6c43-05f8-4b19-a9d3-5b8c56da91c2", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"], "narrative": "Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}]}, {"name": "RedLine Stealer", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-04-24", "version": 1, "id": "12e31e8b-671b-4d6e-b362-a682812a71eb", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Redline Stealer trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, screencapture, registry modification, persistence and data collection..", "references": ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.redline_stealer", "https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2021/10/threat-thursday-redline-infostealer-update"], "narrative": "RedLine Stealer is a malware available on underground forum and subscription basis that are compiled or written in C#. This malware is capable of harvesting sensitive information from browsers such as saved credentials, auto file data, browser cookies and credit card information. It also gathers system information of the targeted or compromised host like username, location IP, RAM size available, hardware configuration and software installed. The current version of this malware contains features to steal wallet and crypto currency information.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Updates"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Defender Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Auto Minor Updates - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Auto Update Notif - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Do Not Connect To Win Update - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Reboot With Logon User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Tamper Protection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry UpdateServiceUrlAlternate - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry USeWuServer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry WuServer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry wuStatusServer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry Browser List Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry UnInstall Program List - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Stop Win Updates - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Defender Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Event For Service Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Auto Minor Updates", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Auto Update Notif", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Do Not Connect To Win Update", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry No Auto Reboot With Logon User", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Tamper Protection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry UpdateServiceUrlAlternate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry USeWuServer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry WuServer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry wuStatusServer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Query Registry Browser List Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Query Registry UnInstall Program List", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Stop Win Updates", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}]}, {"name": "Remcos", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-09-23", "version": 1, "id": "2bd4aa08-b9a5-40cf-bfe5-7d43f13d496c", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Remcos RAT trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, screencapture, registry modification, UAC bypassed, persistence and data collection..", "references": ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.remcos#:~:text=Remcos%20(acronym%20of%20Remote%20Control,used%20to%20remotely%20control%20computers.&text=Remcos%20can%20be%20used%20for,been%20used%20in%20hacking%20campaigns."], "narrative": "Remcos or Remote Control and Surveillance, marketed as a legitimate software for remotely managing Windows systems is now widely used in multiple malicious campaigns both APT and commodity malware by threat actors.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1559.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "MuddyWater"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BackdoorDiplomacy", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Malteiro", "Putter Panda", "TA505", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1113", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Dragonfly", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Silence"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection"}]}, {"name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Possible Browser Pass View Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Process Writing DynamicWrapperX", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Remcos client registry install entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process Executed From Container File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture"}]}, {"name": "System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Winhlp32 Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}]}, {"name": "Reverse Network Proxy", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-11-16", "version": 1, "id": "265e4127-21fd-43e4-adac-ec5d12274111", "description": "The following analytic story describes applications that may be abused to reverse proxy back into an organization, either for persistence or remote access.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508/", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-320a_joint_csa_iranian_government-sponsored_apt_actors_compromise_federal%20network_deploy_crypto%20miner_credential_harvester.pdf"], "narrative": "This analytic story covers tools like Ngrok which is a legitimate reverse proxy tool that can create a secure tunnel to servers located behind firewalls or on local machines that do not have a public IP. Ngrok in particular has been leveraged by threat actors in several campaigns including use for lateral movement and data exfiltration. There are many open source and closed/paid that fall into this reverse proxy category. The analytic story and complemented analytics will be released as more are identified.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1572", "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1102", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "EXOTIC LILY", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "LazyScripter", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090", "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Linux Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Linux Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service"}]}, {"name": "Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service"}]}]}, {"name": "Revil Ransomware", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-06-04", "version": 1, "id": "817cae42-f54b-457a-8a36-fbf45521e29e", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Revil ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Revil, encrypting network shares, deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "narrative": "Revil ransomware is a RaaS,that a single group may operates and manges the development of this ransomware. It involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Execution", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement"}]}, {"name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Revil Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP"}]}]}, {"name": "Rhysida Ransomware", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-12-12", "version": 1, "id": "0925ee49-1185-4484-94ac-7867764a9183", "description": "Utilize analytics designed to identify and delve into atypical behaviors, potentially associated with the Rhysida Ransomware. Employing these searches enables the detection of irregular patterns or actions within systems or networks, serving as proactive measures to spot potential indicators of compromise or ongoing threats. By implementing these search strategies, security analysts can effectively pinpoint anomalous activities, such as unusual file modifications, deviations in system behavior, that could potentially signify the presence or attempt of Rhysida Ransomware infiltration. These searches serve as pivotal tools in the arsenal against such threats, aiding in swift detection, investigation, and mitigation efforts to counter the impact of the Rhysida Ransomware or similar malicious entities.", "references": ["https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-319a"], "narrative": "This story addresses Rhysida ransomware. Rhysida Ransomware emerges as a silent predator, infiltrating systems stealthily and unleashing havoc upon its victims. Employing sophisticated encryption tactics, it swiftly locks critical files and databases, holding them hostage behind an impenetrable digital veil. The haunting demand for ransom sends shockwaves through affected organizations, rendering operations inert and plunging them into a tumultuous struggle between compliance and resilience. Threat actors leveraging Rhysida ransomware are known to impact \"targets of opportunity,\" including victims in the education, healthcare, manufacturing, information technology, and government sectors. Open source reporting details similarities between Vice Society activity and the actors observed deploying Rhysida ransomware. Additionally, open source reporting has confirmed observed instances of Rhysida actors operating in a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) capacity, where ransomware tools and infrastructure are leased out in a profit-sharing model. Any ransoms paid are then split between the group and the affiliates.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN8", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "FIN7", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "OilRig", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Akira", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT5", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Mustang Panda", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry NoChangingWallPaper - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Rundll32 Apply User Settings Changes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rare Executables", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "High Process Termination Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Spike in File Writes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry NoChangingWallPaper", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView SPN Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Rundll32 Apply User Settings Changes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "WinRM Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Detect Zerologon via Zeek", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Router and Infrastructure Security", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-12", "version": 1, "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e177e77", "description": "Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.", "references": ["https://web.archive.org/web/20210420020040/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"], "narrative": "Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\nThis Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure&#151; effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1498", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1557", "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cleaver", "LuminousMoth"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1542.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "TFTP Boot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1200", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1542", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Network_Traffic", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect New Login Attempts to Routers", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning"}]}, {"name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning"}]}, {"name": "Detect Port Security Violation", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle"}]}, {"name": "Detect Software Download To Network Device", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "TFTP Boot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot"}]}, {"name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Traffic Duplication"}]}]}, {"name": "Ryuk Ransomware", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "date": "2020-11-06", "version": 1, "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"], "narrative": "Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN8", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Execution", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ES Content Updates - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Jose Hernandez", "detections": [{"name": "Windows connhost exe started forcefully", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Ryuk Test Files Detected", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Ryuk Wake on LAN Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Spike in File Writes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Security Account Manager Stopped", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2021-12-20", "version": 1, "id": "0244fdee-61be-11ec-900e-acde48001122", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with the exploitation of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) vulnerabilities.", "references": ["https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287", "https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html"], "narrative": "On November 9, 2021, Microsoft released patches to address two vulnerabilities that affect Windows Active Directory networks, sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287). On December 10, 2021, security researchers Charlie Clark and Andrew Schwartz released a blog post where they shared how to weaponise these vulnerabilities in a target network an the initial detection opportunities. When successfully exploited, CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 allow an adversary, who has stolen the credentials of a low priviled domain user, to obtain a Kerberos Service ticket for a Domain Controller computer account. The only requirement is to have network connectivity to a domain controller. This attack vector effectivelly allows attackers to escalate their privileges in an Active Directory from a regular domain user account and take control of a domain controller. While patches have been released to address these vulnerabilities, deploying detection controls for this attack may help help defenders identify attackers attempting exploitation.", "tags": {"category": ["Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT5", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "SamSam Ransomware", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2018-12-13", "version": 1, "id": "c4b89506-fbcf-4cb7-bfd6-527e54789604", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.", "references": ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"], "narrative": "The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\nAlthough categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a \"spray-and-pray\" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\nSamSam attacks are different beasts. They have become progressively more targeted and skillful than typical ransomware attacks. First, malicious actors break into a victim's network, surveil it, then run the malware manually. The attacks are tailored to cause maximum damage and the threat actors usually demand amounts in the tens of thousands of dollars.\nIn a typical attack on one large healthcare organization in 2018, the company ended up paying a ransom of four Bitcoins, then worth $56,707. Reports showed that access to the company's files was restored within two hours of paying the sum.\nAccording to Sophos, SamSam previously leveraged  RDP to gain access to targeted networks via brute force. SamSam is not spread automatically, like other malware. It requires skill because it forces the attacker to adapt their tactics to the individual environment. Next, the actors escalate their privileges to admin level. They scan the networks for worthy targets, using conventional tools, such as PsExec or PaExec, to deploy/execute, quickly encrypting files.\nThis Analytic Story includes searches designed to help detect and investigate signs of the SamSam ransomware, such as the creation of fileswrites to system32, writes with tell-tale extensions, batch files written to system32, and evidence of brute-force attacks via RDP.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aoqin Dragon", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Ferocious Kitten", "Fox Kitten", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Sowbug", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1595", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Reconnaissance", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "Get History Of Email Sources", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity", "Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning"}]}, {"name": "Batch File Write to System32", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "File with Samsam Extension", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Samsam Test File Write", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Spike in File Writes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Sandworm Tools", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-04-05", "version": 1, "id": "54146850-9d26-4877-a611-2db33231e63e", "description": "This analytic story features detections that enable security analysts to identify and investigate unusual activities potentially related to the destructive malware and tools employed by the \"Sandworm\" group. This analytic story focuses on monitoring suspicious process executions, command-line activities, Master Boot Record (MBR) wiping, data destruction, and other related indicators.", "references": ["https://cert.gov.ua/article/3718487", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034/"], "narrative": "The Sandworm group's tools are part of destructive malware operations designed to disrupt or attack Ukraine's National Information Agencies. This operation campaign consists of several malware components, including scripts, native Windows executables (LOLBINs), data wiper malware that overwrites or destroys the Master Boot Record (MBR), and file wiping using sdelete.exe on targeted hosts.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade Task or Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT41", "BITTER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Carbanak", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1649", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Reconnaissance", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DNS Gather Network Info - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Icacls Deny Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Linux Iptables Firewall Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade Task or Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Local Account Discovery with Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}]}, {"name": "Permission Modification using Takeown App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows DNS Gather Network Info", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}]}, {"name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Shutdown CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Tasks", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-06-12", "version": 1, "id": "94cff925-d05c-40cf-b925-d6c5702a2399", "description": "The MITRE ATT&CK technique T1053 refers to Scheduled Task/Job. Adversaries might use task scheduling utilities to execute programs or scripts at a predefined date and time. This method is often used for persistence but can also be used for privilege escalation or to execute tasks under certain conditions. Scheduling tasks can be beneficial for an attacker as it can allow them to execute actions at times when the system is less likely to be monitored actively. Different operating systems have different utilities for task scheduling, for example, Unix-like systems have Cron, while Windows has Scheduled Tasks and At Jobs.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"], "narrative": "MITRE ATT&CK technique T1053, labeled \"Scheduled Task/Job\", is a categorization of methods that adversaries use to execute malicious code by scheduling tasks or jobs on a system. This technique is widely utilized for persistence, privilege escalation, and the remote execution of tasks. The technique is applicable across various environments and platforms, including Windows, Linux, and macOS.\nThe technique consists of multiple sub-techniques, each highlighting a distinct mechanism for scheduling tasks or jobs. These sub-techniques include T1053.001 (Scheduled Task), T1053.002 (At for Windows), T1053.003 (Cron), T1053.004 (Launchd), T1053.005 (At for Linux), and T1053.006 (Systemd Timers).\nScheduled Task (T1053.001) focuses on adversaries' methods for scheduling tasks on a Windows system to maintain persistence or escalate privileges. These tasks can be set to execute at specified times, in response to particular events, or after a defined time interval.\nThe At command for Windows (T1053.002) enables administrators to schedule tasks on a Windows system. Adversaries may exploit this command to execute programs at system startup or at a predetermined schedule for persistence.\nCron (T1053.003) is a built-in job scheduler found in Unix-like operating systems. Adversaries can use cron jobs to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.\nLaunchd (T1053.004) is a service management framework present in macOS. Adversaries may utilize launchd to maintain persistence on macOS systems by setting up daemons or agents to execute at specific times or in response to defined events.\nThe At command for Linux (T1053.005) enables administrators to schedule tasks on a Linux system. Adversaries can use this command to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.\nSystemd Timers (T1053.006) offer a means of scheduling tasks on Linux systems using systemd. Adversaries can use systemd timers to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.\nDetection and mitigation strategies vary for each sub-technique. For instance, monitoring the creation of scheduled tasks or looking for uncorrelated changes to tasks that do not align with known software or patch cycles can be effective for detecting malicious activity related to this technique. Mitigation strategies may involve restricting permissions and applying application control solutions to prevent adversaries from scheduling tasks.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT5", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "At", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "FIN13", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell ScheduleTask - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux At Application Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Restarted", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MMC"}]}, {"name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell ScheduleTask", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Delete Task SD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-11-12", "version": 1, "id": "9482a314-43dc-11ec-a3c9-acde48001122", "description": "Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"], "narrative": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v\\InstallUtil.exe.\nThere are multiple ways to instantiate InstallUtil and they are all outlined within Atomic Red Team - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md. Two specific ways may be used and that includes invoking via  installer assembly class constructor through .NET and via InstallUtil.exe.\nTypically, adversaries will utilize the most commonly found way to invoke via InstallUtil Uninstall method.\nNote that parallel processes, and parent process, play a role in how InstallUtil is being used. In particular, a developer using InstallUtil will spawn from VisualStudio. Adversaries, will spawn from non-standard processes like Explorer.exe, cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. It's important to review the command-line to identify the DLL being loaded.\nParallel processes may also include csc.exe being used to compile a local `.cs` file. This file will be the input to the output. Developers usually do not build direct on the command shell, therefore this should raise suspicion.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Silver Sparrow", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-02-24", "version": 1, "id": "cb4f48fe-7699-11eb-af77-acde48001122", "description": "Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/"], "narrative": "Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party affiliates or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Command And Control", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Staged"}]}]}, {"name": "Snake Keylogger", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2024-02-12", "version": 1, "id": "0374f962-c66a-4a67-9a30-24b0708ef802", "description": "SnakeKeylogger is a stealthy malware designed to secretly record keystrokes on infected devices. It operates covertly in the background, capturing sensitive information such as passwords and credit card details. This keylogging threat poses a significant risk to user privacy and security.", "references": ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.404keylogger", "https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/snake-keylogger-malware/"], "narrative": "SnakeKeylogger, a notorious malware, first emerged in the early 2010s, gaining infamy for its clandestine ability to capture keystrokes on compromised systems. As a stealthy threat, it infiltrates computers silently, recording every keystroke entered by users, including sensitive information like passwords and financial details. Over time, it has evolved to evade detection mechanisms, posing a persistent threat to cybersecurity. Its widespread use in various cybercrime activities underscores its significance as a tool for espionage and data theft. Despite efforts to combat it, SnakeKeylogger continues to lurk in the shadows, perpetuating its malicious activities with devastating consequences.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["HAFNIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Andariel", "HAFNIUM", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497", "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Darkhotel"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Kimsuky", "SilverTerrier", "Turla"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credential Access From Browser Password Store - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Non Discord App Access Discord LevelDB - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Time Based Evasion via Choice Exec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unsecured Outlook Credentials Access In Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Download Files Using Telegram", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "High Process Termination Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Processes launching netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process Executed From Container File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credential Access From Browser Password Store", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows Non Discord App Access Discord LevelDB", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Time Based Evasion via Choice Exec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unsecured Outlook Credentials Access In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Snake Malware", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-05-10", "version": 1, "id": "032bacbb-f90d-43aa-bbcc-d87f169a29c8", "description": "The Snake implant is considered the most sophisticated cyber espionage tool designed and used by Center 16 of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) for long-term intelligence collection on sensitive targets.", "references": ["https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/09/2003218554/-1/-1/0/JOINT_CSA_HUNTING_RU_INTEL_SNAKE_MALWARE_20230509.PDF"], "narrative": "The Snake implant is considered the most sophisticated cyber espionage tool designed and used by Center 16 of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) for long-term intelligence collection on sensitive targets. To conduct operations using this tool, the FSB created a covert peer-to-peer (P2P) network of numerous Snake-infected computers worldwide. Many systems in this P2P network serve as relay nodes which route disguised operational traffic to and from Snake implants on the FSB's ultimate targets. Snake's custom communications protocols employ encryption and fragmentation for confidentiality and are designed to hamper detection and collection efforts. We consider Snake to be the most sophisticated cyber espionage tool in the FSB's arsenal. The sophistication of Snake stems from three principal areas. First, Snake employs means to achieve a rare level of stealth in its host components and network communications. Second, Snake's internal technical architecture allows for easy incorporation of new or replacement components. This design also facilitates the development and interoperability of Snake instances running on different host operating systems. We have observed interoperable Snake implants for Windows, MacOS, and Linux operating systems. Lastly, Snake demonstrates careful software engineering design and implementation, with the implant containing surprisingly few bugs given its complexity. (CISA, 2023)", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware File Modification Crmlog - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Registry Modification wav OpenWithProgIds - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Snake Malware Service Create - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Snake Malware File Modification Crmlog", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}]}, {"name": "Windows Snake Malware Registry Modification wav OpenWithProgIds", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Snake Malware Service Create", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks", "author": "Dean Luxton, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2024-03-14", "version": 2, "id": "f676c4c1-c769-4ecb-9611-5fd85b497c56", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Windows Active Directory persistence techniques.", "references": ["https://adsecurity.org/?p=1929", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lz6haohGAMc&feature=youtu.be", "https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/DEFCON23-2015-Metcalf-RedvsBlue-ADAttackAndDefense-Final.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/", "https://www.dcshadow.com/", "https://gist.github.com/gentilkiwi/dcc132457408cf11ad2061340dcb53c2", "https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/mimikatz-dcsync-event-log-detections-john-dwyer"], "narrative": "Persistence consists of techniques that adversaries use to keep access to systems across restarts, changed credentials, and other interruptions that could cut off their access. Active Directory is a centralized and hierarchical database that stores information about users, computers, and other resources on a network. It provides secure and efficient management of these resources and enables administrators to enforce security policies and delegate administrative tasks.\nIn 2015 Active Directory security researcher Sean Metcalf published a blog post titled `Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks`. In this blog post, Sean described several methods through which an attacker could persist administrative access on an Active Directory network after having Domain Admin level rights for a short period of time. At the time of writing, 8 years after the initial blog post, most of these techniques are still possible since they abuse legitimate administrative functionality and not software vulnerabilities. Security engineers defending Active Directory networks should be aware of these technique available to adversaries post exploitation and deploy both preventive and detective security controls for them.\nThis analytic story groups detection opportunities for most of the techniques described on Seans blog post as well as other high impact attacks against Active Directory networks and Domain Controllers like DCSync and DCShadow. For some of these detection opportunities, it is necessary to enable the necessary GPOs and SACLs required, otherwise the event codes will not trigger. Each detection includes a list of requirements for enabling logging.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1207", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1484", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1484.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT5", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Support Provider", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Change", "Authentication", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD AdminSDHolder ACL Modified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Domain Controller Promotion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Domain Replication ACL Addition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD DSRM Password Reset - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Privileged Account SID History Addition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD ServicePrincipalName Added To Domain Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Account ServicePrincipalName - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Controller SPN Attribute - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Short Lived Server Object - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD SID History Attribute Modified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Group Policy Object Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Replication Service Traffic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "author_name": "Dean Luxton", "detections": [{"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD AdminSDHolder ACL Modified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Domain Controller Promotion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Domain Replication ACL Addition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD DSRM Account Changes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD DSRM Password Reset", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Privileged Account SID History Addition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD ServicePrincipalName Added To Domain Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Short Lived Domain Account ServicePrincipalName", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Short Lived Domain Controller SPN Attribute", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Short Lived Server Object", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD SID History Attribute Modified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows Group Policy Object Created", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Support Provider"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Replication Service Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller"}]}]}, {"name": "Spearphishing Attachments", "author": "Splunk Research Team, Splunk", "date": "2019-04-29", "version": 1, "id": "57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27", "description": "Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"], "narrative": "Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email.\nAs most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely \"automate\" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack.\nWhile any kind of file may contain a malicious payload, some are more likely to be perceived as benign (and thus more often escape notice) by the average victim&#151;especially when the attacker sends an email that seems to be from one of their contacts. An example is Microsoft Office files. Most corporate users are familiar with documents with the following suffixes: .doc/.docx (MS Word), .xls/.xlsx (MS Excel), and .ppt/.pptx (MS PowerPoint), so they may click without a second thought, slashing a hole in their organizations' security.\nFollowing is a typical series of events, according to an [article by Trend Micro](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware/):\n1. Attacker sends a phishing email. Recipient downloads the attached file, which is typically a .docx or .zip file with an embedded .lnk file\n1. The .lnk file executes a PowerShell script\n1. Powershell executes a reverse shell, rendering the exploit successful </ol>As a side note, adversaries are likely to use a tool like Empire to craft and obfuscate payloads and their post-injection activities, such as [exfiltration, lateral movement, and persistence](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire).\nThis Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been injected into your environment. For example, one search detects outlook.exe writing a .zip file. Another looks for suspicious .lnk files launching processes.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Right-to-Left Override", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Ferocious Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Scarlet Mimic"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Window", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "Deep Panda", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Nomadic Octopus", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Run Virtual Instance", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect RTLO In File Name - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect RTLO In Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ConHost with Headless Argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Splunk Research Team", "detections": [{"name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite suspicious calendar invite", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Detect RTLO In File Name", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Right-to-Left Override"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Detect RTLO In Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Right-to-Left Override"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Excel Spawning PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Excel Spawning Windows Script Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Creating Schedule Task", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Spawning Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link"}]}, {"name": "Windows ConHost with Headless Argument", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Window"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Run Virtual Instance"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning Windows Script Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}]}, {"name": "Splunk Vulnerabilities", "author": "Lou Stella,Rod Soto, Eric McGinnis, Splunk", "date": "2024-01-22", "version": 1, "id": "5354df00-dce2-48ac-9a64-8adb48006828", "description": "Keeping your Splunk Enterprise deployment up to date is critical and will help you reduce the risk associated with vulnerabilities in the product.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/product-security/announcements.html"], "narrative": "This analytic story includes detections that focus on attacker behavior targeted at your Splunk environment directly.", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Application Security", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1654", "mitre_attack_technique": "Log Enumeration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1587.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Digital Certificates", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "PROMETHIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1498", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1499", "mitre_attack_technique": "Endpoint Denial of Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1212", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1588.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Digital Certificates", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BlackTech", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1189", "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Andariel", "Axiom", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mustard Tempest", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1210", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "MuddyWater", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1083", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aoqin Dragon", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windigo", "Winnti Group", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1001.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Impersonation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Higaisa", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1499.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application or System Exploitation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "HTML Smuggling", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1202", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1567", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Resource Development", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Exfiltration", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Web", "Splunk_Audit"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Weaponization", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Risky SPL using Pretrained ML Model - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Path traversal SPL injection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Persistent XSS in RapidDiag through User Interface Views - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Absolute Path Traversal Using runshellscript - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Account Discovery Drilldown Dashboard Disclosure - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk App for Lookup File Editing RCE via User XSLT - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Authentication Token Exposure in Debug Log - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Code Injection via custom dashboard leading to RCE - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk csrf in the ssg kvstore client endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Data exfiltration from Analytics Workspace using sid query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk DoS Using Malformed SAML Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk DOS Via Dump SPL Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk DOS via printf search function - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Edit User Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Endpoint Denial of Service DoS Zip Bomb - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Enterprise KV Store Incorrect Authorization - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Enterprise Windows Deserialization File Partition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk ES DoS Investigations Manager via Investigation Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk ES DoS Through Investigation Attachments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk HTTP Response Splitting Via Rest SPL Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Improperly Formatted Parameter Crashes splunkd - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Information Disclosure in Splunk Add-on Builder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk list all nonstandard admin accounts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Low Privilege User Can View Hashed Splunk Password - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Path Traversal In Splunk App For Lookup File Edit - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Persistent XSS Via URL Validation Bypass W Dashboard - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk RBAC Bypass On Indexing Preview REST Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via Serialized Session Payload - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via Splunk Secure Gateway  Splunk Mobile alerts feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk RCE via User XSLT - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Reflected XSS in the templates lists radio - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Reflected XSS on App Search Table Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk risky Command Abuse disclosed february 2023 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Stored XSS via Data Model objectName field - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Unauthenticated Log Injection Web Service Log - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk unnecessary file extensions allowed by lookup table uploads - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS in Highlighted JSON Events - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS in Save table dialog header in search page - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk XSS via View - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto, Eric McGinnis, Splunk", "author_name": "Lou Stella", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Risky SPL using Pretrained ML Model", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Path traversal SPL injection", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Persistent XSS in RapidDiag through User Interface Views", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Absolute Path Traversal Using runshellscript", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Account Discovery Drilldown Dashboard Disclosure", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Splunk App for Lookup File Editing RCE via User XSLT", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Authentication Token Exposure in Debug Log", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Log Enumeration"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Code Injection via custom dashboard leading to RCE", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Splunk csrf in the ssg kvstore client endpoint", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Data exfiltration from Analytics Workspace using sid query", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Digital Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Digital Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Splunk DoS Using Malformed SAML Request", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service"}]}, {"name": "Splunk DOS Via Dump SPL Command", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application or System Exploitation"}]}, {"name": "Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service"}]}, {"name": "Splunk DOS via printf search function", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application or System Exploitation"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Edit User Privilege Escalation", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Endpoint Denial of Service DoS Zip Bomb", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Endpoint Denial of Service"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Enterprise KV Store Incorrect Authorization", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Enterprise Windows Deserialization File Partition", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Splunk ES DoS Investigations Manager via Investigation Creation", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Endpoint Denial of Service"}]}, {"name": "Splunk ES DoS Through Investigation Attachments", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Endpoint Denial of Service"}]}, {"name": "Splunk HTTP Response Splitting Via Rest SPL Command", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "HTML Smuggling"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Improperly Formatted Parameter Crashes splunkd", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Endpoint Denial of Service"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Information Disclosure in Splunk Add-on Builder", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Splunk list all nonstandard admin accounts", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Low Privilege User Can View Hashed Splunk Password", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Path Traversal In Splunk App For Lookup File Edit", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Persistent XSS Via URL Validation Bypass W Dashboard", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Impersonation"}]}, {"name": "Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Digital Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Digital Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Splunk RBAC Bypass On Indexing Preview REST Endpoint", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Splunk RCE via Serialized Session Payload", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Splunk RCE via Splunk Secure Gateway  Splunk Mobile alerts feature", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Splunk RCE via User XSLT", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Reflected XSS in the templates lists radio", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Reflected XSS on App Search Table Endpoint", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk risky Command Abuse disclosed february 2023", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Stored XSS via Data Model objectName field", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Unauthenticated Log Injection Web Service Log", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Splunk unnecessary file extensions allowed by lookup table uploads", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk User Enumeration Attempt", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Splunk XSS in Highlighted JSON Events", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk XSS in Save table dialog header in search page", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk XSS via View", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Open Redirect in Splunk Web", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates", "source": "network", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Sniffing"}]}]}, {"name": "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-04-05", "version": 1, "id": "dcc19913-6918-4ed2-bbba-a6b484c10ef4", "description": "Spring4Shell is the nickname given to a zero-day vulnerability in the Spring Core Framework, a programming and configuration model for Java-based enterprise applications.", "references": ["https://www.tenable.com/blog/spring4shell-faq-spring-framework-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"], "narrative": "An attacker could exploit Spring4Shell by sending a specially crafted request to a vulnerable server. However, exploitation of Spring4Shell requires certain prerequisites, whereas the original Log4Shell vulnerability affected all versions of Log4j 2 using the default configuration.\nAccording to Spring, the following requirements were included in the vulnerability report, however the post cautions that there may be other ways in which this can be exploited so this may not be a complete list of requirements at this time:\n- Java Development Kit (JDK) 9 or greater\n- Apache Tomcat as the Servlet container\n- Packaged as a WAR\n- spring-webmvc or spring-webflux dependency\n", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Application Security", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Java Writing JSP File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Spring4Shell Payload URL Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Web JSP Request via URL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Java Writing JSP File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Spring4Shell Payload URL Request", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Web JSP Request via URL", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "SQL Injection", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-19", "version": 1, "id": "4f6632f5-449c-4686-80df-57625f59bab3", "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters.", "references": ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"], "narrative": "It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\nThis Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target environment.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "SQL Injection with Long URLs", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Subvert Trust Controls SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-10", "version": 1, "id": "7faf91b6-532a-4f18-807c-b2761e90b6dc", "description": "Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. This technique involves modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP's function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value to all files using that SIP. This can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003/", "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_sip_persistence.yml", "https://specterops.io/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/06/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf", "https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/SIP", "https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage", "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/11/06/hijacking-digital-signatures/"], "narrative": "In user mode, Windows Authenticode digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code. The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. Because of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and application control tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1553.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows SIP Provider Inventory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows SIP WinVerifyTrust Failed Trust Validation - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "Windows SIP Provider Inventory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "Windows SIP WinVerifyTrust Failed Trust Validation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2019-05-01", "version": 1, "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c59f1268af3", "description": "Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. ", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"], "narrative": "It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect new user AWS Console Login", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2023-04-24", "version": 3, "id": "66732346-8fb0-407b-9633-da16756567d6", "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story using Cloudtrail logs to to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP, permission and policy updates to the bucket, potential misuse of other services leading to data being leaked.", "references": ["https://github.com/nagwww/s3-leaks", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"], "narrative": "One of the most common ways that attackers attempt to steal data from S3 is by gaining unauthorized access to S3 buckets and copying or exfiltrating data to external locations.\nHowever, suspicious S3 activities can refer to any unusual behavior detected within an Amazon Web Services (AWS) Simple Storage Service (S3) bucket, including unauthorized access, unusual data transfer patterns, and access attempts from unknown IP addresses.\nIt is important for organizations to regularly monitor S3 activities for suspicious behavior and implement security best practices, such as using access controls, encryption, and strong authentication mechanisms, to protect sensitive data stored within S3 buckets. By staying vigilant and taking proactive measures, organizations can help prevent potential security breaches and minimize the impact of attacks if they do occur.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1530", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Fox Kitten", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1537", "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1119", "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "Chimera", "Confucius", "FIN5", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Collection", "Impact"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - AWS Disable Bucket Versioning - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "Get Notable History", "Investigate AWS activities via region name"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "AWS Disable Bucket Versioning", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Collection"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Open S3 buckets", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage"}]}, {"name": "Detect S3 access from a new IP", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage"}]}, {"name": "Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2018-05-07", "version": 1, "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f2168af3", "description": "Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"], "narrative": "A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network.\nAmazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\nAttackers may abuse the AWS infrastructure with insecure VPCs so they can co-opt AWS resources for command-and-control nodes, data exfiltration, and more. Once an EC2 instance is compromised, an attacker may initiate outbound network connections for malicious reasons. Monitoring these network traffic behaviors is crucial for understanding the type of traffic flowing in and out of your network and to alert you to suspicious activities.\nThe searches in this Analytic Story will monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get DNS traffic ratio", "Get Notable History", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity", "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2020-06-04", "version": 1, "id": "6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c", "description": "Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. ", "references": ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"], "narrative": "It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\nThis Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Resource Development", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Weaponization", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2020-08-25", "version": 1, "id": "8168ca88-392e-42f4-85a2-767579c660ce", "description": "Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "narrative": "Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1537", "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Initial Access", "Exfiltration"], "datamodels": ["Risk", "Change"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified", "source": "cloud", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2018-08-20", "version": 1, "id": "51045ded-1575-4ba6-aef7-af6c73cffd86", "description": "Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "narrative": "Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\nThis Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Change"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2020-09-04", "version": 1, "id": "1ed5ce7d-5469-4232-92af-89d1a3595b39", "description": "Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"], "narrative": "It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\nIn addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1580", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Execution", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Change"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", "ES Content Updates - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cloud Security Groups Modifications by User - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Security Groups Modifications by User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Cloud Compute Configurations"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-03", "version": 2, "id": "f4368ddf-d59f-4192-84f6-778ac5a3ffc7", "description": "Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"], "narrative": "The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect suspicious processnames using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "First time seen command line argument", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Detect suspicious processnames using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Potentially malicious code on commandline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-02-11", "version": 1, "id": "a09db4d1-3827-4833-87b8-3a397e532119", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/htmlhelp/nf-htmlhelp-htmlhelpa"], "narrative": "Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe).\nHH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file.\nDuring investigation, review all parallel processes and child processes. It is possible for file modification events to occur and it is best to capture the CHM file and decompile it for further analysis.\nUpon usage of InfoTech Storage Handlers, ms-its, its, mk, itss.dll will load.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Dark Caracal", "OilRig", "Silence"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-18", "version": 1, "id": "3c3835c0-255d-4f9e-ab84-e29ec9ec9b56", "description": "Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.", "references": ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"], "narrative": "Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness).  However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "LazyScripter", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1189", "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Andariel", "Axiom", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mustard Tempest", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1568.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Exfiltration", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get DNS traffic ratio", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detection of DNS Tunnels", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}]}, {"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}]}, {"name": "Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Excessive DNS Failures", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Emails", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2020-01-27", "version": 1, "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5d55", "description": "Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"], "narrative": "It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\nOnce a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions:\n1. Which users have received this or a similar message in the past?\n1. When did the targeted campaign begin?\n1. Have any users interacted with the content of the messages (by downloading an attachment or clicking on a malicious URL)?This Analytic Story provides detection searches to identify suspicious emails, as well as contextual and investigative searches to help answer some of these questions.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Email"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Email Info", "Get Emails From Specific Sender", "Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "date": "2020-08-05", "version": 1, "id": "4d656b2e-d6be-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.", "references": ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"], "narrative": "Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model. This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access control lists and permissions on your GCP resources.\\ This Analytics Story concentrates on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write) along with storage bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1530", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Fox Kitten", "Scattered Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Shannon Davis", "detections": [{"name": "Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-01-20", "version": 2, "id": "1e5a5a53-540b-462a-8fb7-f44a4292f5dc", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"], "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\nTriage\nValidate execution\n1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\\windows\\system32 or c:\\windows\\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\n1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\nSituational Awareness\nThe objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\n1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\n1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\n1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\nRetrieval of script code\nThe objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Detect mshta renamed", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious mshta child process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious mshta spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Okta Activity", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2020-04-02", "version": 1, "id": "9cbd34af-8f39-4476-a423-bacd126c750b", "description": "Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"], "narrative": "Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom.\nWhile SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important.\nWith people moving quickly to adopt web-based applications and ways to manage them, many are still struggling to understand how best to monitor these environments. This analytic story provides searches to help monitor this environment, and identify events and activity that warrant further investigation such as credential stuffing or password spraying attacks, and users logging in from multiple locations when travel is disallowed.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1539", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Web Session Cookie", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Evilnum", "LuminousMoth", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Account Locked Out - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Investigate Okta Activity by app", "Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", "Investigate User Activities In Okta"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded", "source": "application", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Web Session Cookie"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Okta Account Locked Out", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Okta Account Lockout Events", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Okta Failed SSO Attempts", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}]}, {"name": "Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-02-11", "version": 1, "id": "2cdf33a0-4805-4b61-b025-59c20f418fbe", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md", "https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/"], "narrative": " Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-01-29", "version": 1, "id": "b8bee41e-624f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/"], "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with \"SquiblyDoo\" using the \"scrobj.dll\" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\\windows\\system32 or c:\\windows\\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? Module loads.  Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-02-03", "version": 1, "id": "80a65487-854b-42f1-80a1-935e4c170694", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"], "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2018-05-31", "version": 1, "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf1351e5d55", "description": "Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"], "narrative": "Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\nThe registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called \"registry\" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\nThe searches in this story are designed to help you detect behaviors associated with manipulation of the Windows registry.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mshta Execution In Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories"}]}, {"name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Suspicious Changes to File Associations", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}]}, {"name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mshta Execution In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious WMI Use", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2018-10-23", "version": 2, "id": "c8ddc5be-69bc-4202-b3ab-4010b27d7ad5", "description": "Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.", "references": ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://web.archive.org/web/20210921091529/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"], "narrative": "WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems. In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT33", "Blue Mockingbird", "FIN8", "HEXANE", "Leviathan", "Metador", "Mustang Panda", "Rancor", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1220", "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "Higaisa"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Invoke WmiExec Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Invoke WmiExec Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Process Execution via WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Script Execution via WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "WMI Temporary Event Subscription", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "WMIC XSL Execution via URL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing"}]}, {"name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2020-04-13", "version": 1, "id": "aa3749a6-49c7-491e-a03f-4eaee5fe0258", "description": "Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.", "references": ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"], "narrative": "Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\nCurrent detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Process File Activity"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}]}, {"name": "Swift Slicer", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2023-02-01", "version": 1, "id": "234c9dd7-52fb-4d6f-aec9-075ef88a2cea", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the swift slicer malware including overwriting of files and etc.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1618960022150729728", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/01/27/swiftslicer-new-destructive-wiper-malware-ukraine/"], "narrative": "Swift Slicer is one of Windows destructive malware found by ESET that was used in a targeted organizarion to wipe critical files like windows drivers and other files to destroy and left the machine inoperable. This malware like Caddy Wiper was deliver through GPO which suggests that the attacker had taken control of the victims active directory environment.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}]}, {"name": "SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-11-09", "version": 1, "id": "228f22cb-3436-4c31-8af4-370d40af7b49", "description": "A zero-day vulnerability was discovered in SysAid's on-premise software, exploited by the group DEV-0950 (Lace Tempest). The attackers uploaded a WebShell and other payloads, gaining unauthorized access and control. SysAid has released a patch (version 23.3.36) to remediate the vulnerability and urges customers to conduct a comprehensive compromise assessment.", "references": ["https://www.sysaid.com/blog/service-desk/on-premise-software-security-vulnerability-notification"], "narrative": "The analytics tagged to this analytic story will aid in capturing initial access and some post-exploitation activities. In addition to the application spawning a shell, consider reviewing STRT's Cobalt Strike and PowerShell script block logging analytic stories. On November 2nd, SysAid's security team identified a potential vulnerability in their on-premise software. The investigation revealed a zero-day vulnerability exploited by the group known as DEV-0950 (Lace Tempest). The attackers uploaded a WebShell and other payloads into the webroot of the SysAid Tomcat web service, thereby gaining unauthorized access and control over the affected system. SysAid promptly initiated their incident response protocol and began proactive communication with their on-premise customers to implement a mitigation solution. SysAid has released a patch (version 23.3.36) to remediate the vulnerability and strongly recommends all customers to conduct a comprehensive compromise assessment of their network.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Execution", "Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Java Writing JSP File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Java Writing JSP File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows Java Spawning Shells", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Text4Shell CVE-2022-42889", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-10-26", "version": 1, "id": "95ae800d-485e-47f7-866e-8be281aa497b", "description": "A new critical vulnerability CVE-2022-42889 a.k.a. Text4shell, similar to the old Spring4Shell and Log4Shell, was originally reported by Alvaro Munoz on the very popular Apache Commons Text library.", "references": ["https://sysdig.com/blog/cve-2022-42889-text4shell/"], "narrative": "Apache Commons Text is a Java library described as \"a library focused on algorithms working on strings.\" We can see it as a general-purpose text manipulation toolkit. This vulnerability affects the StringSubstitutor interpolator class, which is included in the Commons Text library. A default interpolator allows for string lookups that can lead to Remote Code Execution. This is due to a logic flaw that makes the \"script,\" \"dns,\" and \"url\" lookup keys interpolated by default, as opposed to what it should be, according to the documentation of the StringLookupFactory class. Those keys allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code via lookups. In order to exploit the vulnerabilities, the following requirements must be met - Run a version of Apache Commons Text from version 1.5 to 1.9 and use the StringSubstitutor interpolator. It is important to specify that the StringSubstitutor interpolator is not as widely used as the string substitution in Log4j, which led to Log4Shell. According to the CVSSv3 system, it scores 9.8 as CRITICAL severity. The severity is Critical due to the easy exploitability and huge potential impact in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. As we showed in the previous section, you can take full control over the vulnerable system with a crafted request. However, it is not likely the vulnerabilities will have the same impacts as the previous Log4Shell and Spring4Shell.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Application Security", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Trickbot", "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-04-20", "version": 1, "id": "16f93769-8342-44c0-9b1d-f131937cce8e", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the trickbot banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection even in LDAP environment.", "references": ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickbot", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"], "narrative": "trickbot banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS where target security Microsoft Defender to prevent its detection and removal. steal Verizon credentials and targeting banks using its multi component modules that collect and exfiltrate data.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["HAFNIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Andariel", "HAFNIUM", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance", "Discovery", "Lateral Movement", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Execution", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "Account Discovery With Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Trickbot Named Pipe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses"}]}, {"name": "Wermgr Process Create Executable File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-01-12", "version": 1, "id": "270a67a6-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "description": "Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"], "narrative": "Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-01-21", "version": 1, "id": "be3418e2-551b-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md"], "narrative": "Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\nThe inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code.\nTriage\nValidate execution\n1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further PE metadata.\n1. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.\nSituational Awareness\nThe objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe.\n1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\n1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\n1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\nRetrieval of script code\nThe objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}]}, {"name": "Unusual Processes", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-04", "version": 2, "id": "f4368e3f-d59f-4192-84f6-748ac5a3ddb6", "description": "Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.", "references": ["https://web.archive.org/web/20210921093439/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"], "narrative": "Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\nThis Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\nIn the event an unusual process is identified, it is imperative to better understand how that process was able to execute on the host, when it first executed, and whether other hosts are affected. This extra information may provide clues that can help the analyst further investigate any suspicious activity.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Aoqin Dragon", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cleaver", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "POLONIUM", "Patchwork", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "TA2541", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aoqin Dragon", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Ferocious Kitten", "Fox Kitten", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Sowbug", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1595", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Verclsid", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Resource Development", "Execution", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Delivery", "Weaponization", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", "ES Content Updates - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Payload Injection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Uncommon Processes On Endpoint", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}]}, {"name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning"}]}, {"name": "Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rare Executables", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process Executed From Container File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type"}]}, {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Verclsid CLSID Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Verclsid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Tool"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Payload Injection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "WinRM Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}]}, {"name": "Use of Cleartext Protocols", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-15", "version": 1, "id": "826e6431-aeef-41b4-9fc0-6d0985d65a21", "description": "Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.", "references": ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"], "narrative": "Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Process Information For Port Activity"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Protocols passing authentication in cleartext", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "VMware Aria Operations vRealize CVE-2023-20887", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-06-21", "version": 1, "id": "99171cdd-57a1-4b8a-873c-f8bee12e2025", "description": "CVE-2023-20887 is a critical vulnerability affecting VMware's vRealize Network Insight (also known as VMware Aria Operations for Networks). It allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges via the Apache Thrift RPC interface. The exploit, which has a severity score of 9.8, targets an endpoint (\"/saas./resttosaasservlet\") in the application and delivers a malicious payload designed to create a reverse shell, granting the attacker control over the system. VMware has released an advisory recommending users to update to the latest version to mitigate this threat.", "references": ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20887", "https://summoning.team/blog/vmware-vrealize-network-insight-rce-cve-2023-20887/", "https://viz.greynoise.io/tag/VMware-aria-operations-for-networks-rce-attempt?days=30", "https://github.com/sinsinology/CVE-2023-20887"], "narrative": "CVE-2023-20887 is a highly critical vulnerability found in VMware's vRealize Network Insight. This software is widely used for intelligent operations management across physical, virtual, and cloud environments, so a vulnerability in it poses a significant risk to many organizations.\nThis particular vulnerability lies in the application's Apache Thrift RPC interface. The exploit allows an attacker to inject commands that are executed with root privileges, leading to a potential total compromise of the system. The attacker does not need to be authenticated, which further increases the risk posed by this vulnerability.\nThe exploit operates by sending a specially crafted payload to the \"/saas./resttosaasservlet\" endpoint. This payload contains a reverse shell command, which, when executed, allows the attacker to remotely control the victim's system. This control is obtained at the root level, providing the attacker with the ability to perform any action on the system.\nWhat makes this vulnerability particularly dangerous is its high severity score of 9.8, indicating it is a critical threat. It's also noteworthy that the exploitation of this vulnerability leaves specific indicators such as abnormal traffic to the \"/saas./resttosaasservlet\" endpoint and suspicious ncat commands in network traffic, which can help in its detection.\nVMware has acknowledged the vulnerability and has published a security advisory recommending that users update to the latest version of the software. This update effectively patches the vulnerability and protects systems from this exploit. It's crucial that all users of the affected versions of VMware's vRealize Network Insight promptly apply the update to mitigate the risk posed by CVE-2023-20887.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}]}, {"name": "VMware Server Side Injection and Privilege Escalation", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-05-19", "version": 1, "id": "d6d51cc2-a092-43b7-9f61-1159943afe39", "description": "Recently disclosed CVE-2022-22954 and CVE-2022-22960 have been identified in the wild abusing VMware products to compromise internet faced devices and escalate privileges.", "references": ["https://attackerkb.com/topics/BDXyTqY1ld/cve-2022-22954/rapid7-analysis", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-138b"], "narrative": "On April 6, 2022, VMware published VMSA-2022-0011, which discloses multiple vulnerabilities discovered by Steven Seeley (mr_me) of Qihoo 360 Vulnerability Research Institute. The most critical of the CVEs published in VMSA-2022-0011 is CVE-2022-22954, which is a server-side template injection issue with a CVSSv3 base score of 9.8. The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user with network access to the web interface to execute an arbitrary shell command as the VMware user. To further exacerbate this issue, VMware also disclosed a local privilege escalation issue, CVE-2022-22960, which permits the attacker to gain root after exploiting CVE-2022-22954. Products affected include - VMware Workspace ONE Access (Access) 20.10.0.0 - 20.10.0.1, 21.08.0.0 - 21.08.0.1 and VMware Identity Manager (vIDM) 3.3.3 - 3.3.6.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt", "source": "web", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Volt Typhoon", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-05-25", "version": 1, "id": "f73010e4-49eb-44ef-9f3f-2c25a1ae5415", "description": "This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the \"Volt Typhoon\" group targeting critical infrastructure organizations in United States and Guam. The affected organizations include the communications, manufacturing, utility, transportation, construction, maritime, government, information technology, and education sectors. This Analytic story looks for suspicious process execution, lolbin execution, command-line activity, lsass dump and many more.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/"], "narrative": "Volt Typhoon is a state sponsored group typically focuses on espionage and information gathering. Based on Microsoft Threat Intelligence, This threat actor group puts strong emphasis on stealth in this campaign by relying almost exclusively on living-off-the-land techniques and hands-on-keyboard activity.\nThey issue commands via the command line to: 1. collect data, including credentials from local and network systems,\n2. put the data into an archive file to stage it for exfiltration, and then\n3. use the stolen valid credentials to maintain persistence.\nIn addition, Volt Typhoon tries to blend into normal network activity by routing traffic through compromised small office and home office (SOHO) network equipment, including routers, firewalls, and VPN hardware. They have also been observed using custom versions of open-source tools to establish a command and control (C2) channel over proxy to further stay under the radar.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "FIN7", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "OilRig", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Internal Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "FIN13", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "Strider", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Mustang Panda", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090", "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Reconnaissance", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Command And Control", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DNS Gather Network Info - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Ldifde Directory Object Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Proxy Via Netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Proxy Via Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Processes launching netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows DNS Gather Network Info", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}]}, {"name": "Windows Ldifde Directory Object Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Proxy Via Netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Internal Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}]}, {"name": "Windows Proxy Via Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Internal Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}]}, {"name": "Warzone RAT", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-07-26", "version": 1, "id": "8dc84752-f4da-4285-931c-bddd5c4d440b", "description": "This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might related to warzone (Ave maria) RAT. This analytic story looks for suspicious process execution, command-line activity, downloads, persistence, defense evasion and more.", "references": ["https://www.blackberry.com/us/en/solutions/endpoint-security/ransomware-protection/warzone#:~:text=Warzone%20RAT%20(AKA%20Ave%20Maria)%20is%20a%20remote%20access%20trojan,is%20as%20an%20information%20stealer.", "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/02/2-birds-in-one-stone-ave-maria-wshrat.html"], "narrative": "Warzone RAT, also known as Ave Maria, is a sophisticated remote access trojan (RAT) that surfaced in January 2019. Originally offered as malware-as-a-service (MaaS), it rapidly gained notoriety and became one of the most prominent malware strains by 2020. Its exceptional capabilities in stealth and anti-analysis techniques make it a formidable threat in various campaigns, including those targeting sensitive geopolitical entities. The malware's impact is particularly concerning as it has been associated with attacks aimed at compromising government employees and military personnel, notably within India's National Informatics Centre (NIC). Its deployment by several advanced persistent threat (APT) groups further underlines its potency and adaptability in the hands of skilled threat actors. Warzone RAT's capabilities enable attackers to gain unauthorized access to targeted systems, facilitating data theft, surveillance, and the potential to wreak havoc on critical infrastructures. As the threat landscape continues to evolve, vigilance and robust cybersecurity measures are crucial in defending against such malicious tools.\" This version provides more context and elaborates on the malware's capabilities and potential impact. Additionally, it emphasizes the importance of cybersecurity measures to combat such threats effectively.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gorgon Group", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497", "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Darkhotel"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1553.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mark-of-the-Web Bypass", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Bypass UAC via Pkgmgr Tool - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mark Of The Web Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry MaxConnectionPerServer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Drop Executable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Bypass UAC via Pkgmgr Tool", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mark Of The Web Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mark-of-the-Web Bypass"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry MaxConnectionPerServer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection Remote Thread", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}]}]}, {"name": "WhisperGate", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-01-19", "version": 1, "id": "0150e6e5-3171-442e-83f8-1ccd8599569b", "description": "This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as \"WhisperGate\". This analytic story looks for suspicious process execution, command-line activity, downloads, DNS queries and more.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", "https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3"], "narrative": "WhisperGate/DEV-0586 is destructive malware operation found by MSTIC (Microsoft Threat Inteligence Center) targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. This operation campaign consist of several malware component like the downloader that abuses discord platform, overwrite or destroy master boot record (MBR) of the targeted host, wiper and also windows defender evasion techniques.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Aoqin Dragon", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cleaver", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "POLONIUM", "Patchwork", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "TA2541", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497", "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Darkhotel"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Resource Development", "Execution", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Weaponization", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Tool"}]}, {"name": "Windows NirSoft Utilities", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Tool"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows AppLocker", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2024-03-21", "version": 1, "id": "7911b245-e74d-48db-b1cf-69f3eb02ca55", "description": "Windows AppLocker is a feature that enhances security by allowing administrators to specify which users or groups can run particular applications in their organization based on unique identities of files. This story covers various aspects of monitoring and managing AppLocker policies, including detecting unauthorized software installations, enforcing best practices for software usage, and identifying potential security breaches through advanced threat detection techniques. Through the use of Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, and Splunk Cloud, organizations can gain insights into AppLocker events, ensuring compliance with corporate security policies and mitigating risks associated with unauthorized applications.", "references": [], "narrative": "AppLocker, a built-in Windows security feature, provides organizations with the ability to control application usage across their networks. It enables administrators to define rules based on file names, publishers, and file hashes to allow or deny the execution of applications. This level of control helps in preventing malware and unlicensed software from running, thereby enhancing the security posture of an organization. \\\nOrganizations should leverage AppLocker for several reasons. Firstly, it aids in the enforcement of software compliance policies by ensuring that only licensed and approved applications are run on the network. Secondly, by restricting the execution of unauthorized applications, AppLocker significantly reduces the attack surface, making it harder for attackers to exploit vulnerabilities in unapproved software. Thirdly, AppLocker's ability to log attempts to run unauthorized applications provides valuable insights for security monitoring and incident response activities. This logging capability enables organizations to detect and respond to potential security threats in real time. \\\nIn summary, AppLocker is a critical security tool that helps organizations manage application usage, enforce compliance policies, and mitigate security risks. By implementing AppLocker policies, organizations can achieve a robust security posture, protecting their assets from unauthorized software and potential cyber threats.", "tags": {"category": ["Unauthorized Software", "Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Block Events - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Execution from Uncommon Locations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Privilege Escalation via Unauthorized Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AppLocker Rare Application Launch Detection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows AppLocker Block Events", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AppLocker Execution from Uncommon Locations", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AppLocker Privilege Escalation via Unauthorized Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AppLocker Rare Application Launch Detection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Attack Surface Reduction", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-11-27", "version": 1, "id": "1d61c474-3cd6-4c23-8c68-f128ac4b209b", "description": "This story contains detections for Windows Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This story contains detections for ASR events that are generated when a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule.", "references": ["https://asrgen.streamlit.app/", "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction?view=o365-worldwide"], "narrative": "This story contains detections for Windows Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This story contains detections for ASR events that are generated when a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule. It includes detections for both block and audit event IDs. Block event IDs are generated when an action is blocked by an ASR rule, while audit event IDs are generated when an action that would be blocked by an ASR rule is allowed to proceed for auditing purposes.", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Defense Evasion", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Audit Events - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Block Events - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Registry Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Rule Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender ASR Rules Stacking - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows Defender ASR Audit Events", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender ASR Block Events", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender ASR Registry Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender ASR Rule Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender ASR Rules Stacking", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows BootKits", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-05-03", "version": 1, "id": "1bef004d-23b2-4c49-8ceb-b59af0745317", "description": "Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/03/01/blacklotus-uefi-bootkit-myth-confirmed/"], "narrative": "A bootkit is a sophisticated type of malware that targets the boot sectors of a hard drive, specifically the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). The MBR is the initial section of the disk that is loaded following the hardware initialization process executed by the Basic Input/Output System (BIOS). It houses the boot loader, which is responsible for loading the operating system. In contrast, the VBR is located at the beginning of each partition and contains the boot code for that specific partition. When an adversary gains raw access to the boot drive, they can overwrite the MBR or VBR, effectively diverting the execution during startup from the standard boot loader to the malicious code injected by the attacker. This tampering allows the malware to load before the operating system, enabling it to execute malicious activities stealthily and maintain persistence on the compromised system. Bootkits are particularly dangerous because they can bypass security measures implemented by the operating system and antivirus software. Since they load before the operating system, they can easily evade detection and manipulate the system's behavior from the earliest stages of the boot process. This capability makes bootkits a potent tool in an attacker's arsenal for gaining unauthorized access, stealing sensitive information, or launching further attacks on other systems. To defend against bootkit attacks, organizations should implement multiple layers of security, including strong endpoint protection, regular software updates, user awareness training, and monitoring for unusual system behavior. Additionally, hardware-based security features, such as Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot and Trusted Platform Module (TPM), can help protect the integrity of the boot process and reduce the risk of bootkit infections.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1542.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Firmware", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1542", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Windows BootLoader Inventory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry BootExecute Modification - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows BootLoader Inventory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Firmware"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry BootExecute Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Certificate Services", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-02-01", "version": 1, "id": "b92b4ac7-0026-4408-a6b5-c1d20658e124", "description": "Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649/"], "narrative": "The following analytic story focuses on remote and local endpoint certificate theft and abuse. Authentication certificates can be both stolen and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files), misplaced certificate files (i.e. Unsecured Credentials), or directly from the Windows certificate store via various crypto APIs.With appropriate enrollment rights, users and/or machines within a domain can also request and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certificate authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various settings and permissions associated with the certificate. Abusing certificates for authentication credentials may enable other behaviors such as Lateral Movement. Certificate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities for Privilege Escalation, by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs) associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable Persistence via stealing or forging certificates that can be used as Valid Accounts for the duration of the certificate's validity, despite user password resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen and forged for machine accounts. (MITRE ATT&CK)", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1649", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Defense Evasion", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Certify Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Behavior Identified - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Export Certificate - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Export Certificate - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Export PfxCertificate - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Abuse - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Issued - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Request - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CertUtil Backup - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CryptoAPI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CS Backup - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export Certificate - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export PfxCertificate - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Detect Certify Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Certipy File Modifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Behavior Identified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Export Certificate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell Export Certificate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell Export PfxCertificate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Abuse", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Issued", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CertUtil Backup", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CryptoAPI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CS Backup", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export Certificate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export PfxCertificate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2018-05-31", "version": 1, "id": "56e24a28-5003-4047-b2db-e8f3c4618064", "description": "Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others ", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"], "narrative": "Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compile After Delivery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "MuddyWater", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTFS File Attributes", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BackdoorDiplomacy", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Malteiro", "Putter Panda", "TA505", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Evilnum", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Whitefly", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Risk", "Change", "Updates", "Web", "Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ES Content Updates - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Base64 Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Executable Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Alternate DataStream - Process Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Known Abused DLL Created - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Parent PID Spoofing with Explorer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories"}]}, {"name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "CSC Net On The Fly Compilation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compile After Delivery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Disable Registry Tool", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling CMD Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling ControlPanel", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Task Manager", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}]}, {"name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Excessive number of service control start as disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "NET Profiler UAC bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MMC"}]}, {"name": "Windows Alternate DataStream - Base64 Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "NTFS File Attributes"}]}, {"name": "Windows Alternate DataStream - Executable Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "NTFS File Attributes"}]}, {"name": "Windows Alternate DataStream - Process Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "NTFS File Attributes"}]}, {"name": "Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Notification Center", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows DISM Remove Defender", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "Windows Event For Service Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Known Abused DLL Created", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Parent PID Spoofing with Explorer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Rasautou DLL Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}]}, {"name": "Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}]}, {"name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Discovery Techniques", "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", "date": "2021-03-04", "version": 1, "id": "f7aba570-7d59-11eb-825e-acde48001122", "description": "Monitors for behaviors associated with adversaries discovering objects in the environment that can be leveraged in the progression of the attack.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", "https://cyberd.us/penetration-testing", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/"], "narrative": "Attackers may not have much if any insight into their target's environment before the initial compromise.  Once a foothold has been established, attackers will start enumerating objects in the environment (accounts, services, network shares, etc.) that can be used to achieve their objectives.  This Analytic Story provides searches to help identify activities consistent with adversaries gaining knowledge of compromised Windows environments.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN8", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "FIN7", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "OilRig", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect AzureHound File Modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Hart", "detections": [{"name": "Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect AzureHound File Modifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "System Information Discovery Detection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "date": "2020-07-28", "version": 1, "id": "36dbb206-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise.  The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"], "narrative": "When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s).  If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB).  This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included.  The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json.  These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1203", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT12", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "Axiom", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA459", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "admin@338"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Shannon Davis", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution"}]}, {"name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Drivers", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-03-30", "version": 1, "id": "d0a9323f-9411-4da6-86b2-18c184d750c0", "description": "Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/e/avoslocker-ransomware-variant-abuses-driver-file-to-disable-anti-Virus-scans-log4shell.html", "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/daxin-backdoor-espionage", "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064459/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/01/11/signed-kernel-drivers-unguarded-gateway-windows-core/"], "narrative": "A rootkit on Windows may sometimes be in the form of a Windows Driver. A driver typically has a file extension of .sys, however the internals of a sys file is similar to a Windows DLL. For Microsoft Windows to load a driver, a few requirements are needed. First, it must have a valid signature. Second, typically it should load from the windows\\system32\\drivers path. There are a few methods to investigate drivers in the environment. Drivers are noisy. An inventory of all drivers is important to understand prevalence. A driver location (Path) is also important when attempting to baseline. Looking at a driver name and path is not enough, we must also explore the signing information. Product, description, company name, signer and signing result are all items to take into account when reviewing drivers. What makes a driver malicious? Depending if a driver was dropped during a campaign or you are baselining drivers after, triaging a driver to determine maliciousness may be tough. We break this into two categories - 1. vulnerable drivers 2. driver rootkits. Attempt to identify prevelance of the driver. Is it on one or many? Review the signing information if it is present. Is it common? A lot of driver hunting will lead down rabbit holes, but we hope to help lead the way.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1553", "mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Winnti Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1553.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Driver Inventory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System File on Disk - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Driver Inventory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Certificate Added", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows System File on Disk", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Error Reporting Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-08-24", "version": 1, "id": "64dea1e5-2c60-461f-b886-05580ed89b5c", "description": "In July 2023, CrowdStrike's Falcon Complete managed detection and response (MDR) team uncovered an exploit kit using an unknown vulnerability in the Windows Error Reporting (WER) component. The vulnerability, now identified as CVE-2023-36874, was also independently discovered by Google's Threat Analysis Group. The exploit came to light when suspicious binaries were observed on a European technology system. CrowdStrike's Counter Adversary Operations' analysis revealed a zero-day exploit targeting the WER service, allowing attackers to execute unauthorized code with elevated privileges. The exploit kit seen aimed to spawn a privileged interpreter, displaying the versatility and adaptability of the threat. CrowdStrike has listed some potential indicators of compromise, but these are of low fidelity due to their mutable nature.", "references": ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-complete-zero-day-exploit-cve-2023-36874/"], "narrative": "In June 2023, CrowdStrike's Falcon Complete team observed suspicious activities on a European technology entity's system. Multiple binaries were dropped onto the system via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), some of which were flagged as potential exploits for a known vulnerability. However, a string containing the Russian term for \"0day\" suggested an unknown vulnerability was at play. Subsequent investigations identified this as a zero-day vulnerability affecting the Windows Error Reporting (WER) component, now known as CVE-2023-36874.\nThe WER service's function is to report software issues on Windows hosts. The exploit centered around manipulating the WER service by redirecting file systems to execute attacker-controlled code with elevated privileges. This was achieved by creating a symbolic link redirection from the C:\\ drive to an attacker-controlled directory, and then triggering certain WER functions. Consequently, an unauthorized executable was run instead of the legitimate one, giving the attacker high-level access.\nThe observed exploit kit's primary objective was to initiate a privileged interpreter, such as cmd.exe or powershell_ise.exe. If this couldn't be achieved, a privileged scheduled task was created as an alternative. The exploit kit showcased a range of binaries, some packed and others not, some in C++ and others in pure C. This diversity suggests the knowledge of the vulnerability was likely shared among different developers.\nCrowdStrike's Counter Adversary Operations, as of now, hasn't linked this activity to any specific threat actor. They've provided potential indicators of compromise, but caution that these are easily changed, indicating the advanced capabilities of the adversaries.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2018-01-26", "version": 1, "id": "30552a76-ac78-48e4-b3c0-de4e34e9563d", "description": "Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"], "narrative": "Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications.\nSince its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe.\nAttackers take advantage of this expectation by obfuscating the true file extension. They can accomplish this in a couple of ways. One technique involves inserting multiple spaces in the file name before the extension to hide the extension from the GUI, obscuring the true nature of the file. Another approach involves prepending the real extension with a different one. This is especially effective when Windows is configured to \"hide extensions for known file types.\" In this case, the real extension is not displayed, but the prepended one is, leading end users to believe the file is a different type than it actually is.\nChanging the association between a file extension and an application can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. The technique typically involves changing the association for an often-launched file type to associate instead with a malicious program the attacker has dropped on the endpoint. When the end user launches a file that has been manipulated in this way, it will execute the attacker's malware. It will also execute the application the end user expected to run, cleverly obscuring the fact that something suspicious has occurred.\nRun the searches in this story to detect and investigate suspicious behavior that may indicate abuse or manipulation of Windows file extensions and/or associations.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Changes to File Associations", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}]}, {"name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Log Manipulation", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-12", "version": 2, "id": "b6db2c60-a281-48b4-95f1-2cd99ed56835", "description": "Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.", "references": ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"], "narrative": "Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\nThe Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ES Content Updates - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "USN Journal Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Persistence Techniques", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2018-05-31", "version": 2, "id": "30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.", "references": ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"], "narrative": "Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Path Interception by Unquoted Path", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Cobalt Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "APT5"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Event Triggered Image File Execution Options Injection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Mshta Execution In Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories"}]}, {"name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Change Default File Association", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Path Interception by Unquoted Path"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "ETW Registry Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)"}]}, {"name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver"}]}, {"name": "Shim Database File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD DSRM Account Changes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Event Triggered Image File Execution Options Injection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mshta Execution In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Delete Task SD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Post-Exploitation", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-11-30", "version": 1, "id": "992899b7-a5cf-4bcd-bb0d-cf81762188ba", "description": "This analytic story identifies popular Windows post exploitation tools for example winpeas.bat, winpeas.exe, WinPrivCheck.bat and many more.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/14/new-prestige-ransomware-impacts-organizations-in-ukraine-and-poland/"], "narrative": "These tools allow operators to find possible exploits or paths for privilege escalation and persistence on a targeted host. Ransomware operator like the \"Prestige ransomware\" also used or abuses these post exploitation tools such as winPEAS to scan for possible avenue to gain privileges and persistence to a targeted Windows Operating System.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Managers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Support Provider", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "FIN7", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "OilRig", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Magic Hound", "TA2541", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cached Domain Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1115", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT39"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1202", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Reconnaissance", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Information Discovery Fsutil - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Password Managers Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Private Keys Discovery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows System User Discovery Via Quser - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows WMI Process And Service List - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cached Domain Credentials"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Information Discovery Fsutil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Password Managers Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Managers"}]}, {"name": "Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Windows Private Keys Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Windows Query Registry Reg Save", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Support Provider"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows System User Discovery Via Quser", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows WMI Process And Service List", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Privilege Escalation", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-04", "version": 2, "id": "644e22d3-598a-429c-a007-16fdb802cae5", "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"], "narrative": "Privilege escalation is a \"land-and-expand\" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT41", "Axiom", "Deep Panda", "Fox Kitten"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Cobalt Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "APT5"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation Suspicious Process Elevation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation System Process Without System Parent - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Uncommon Processes On Endpoint", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}]}, {"name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Change Default File Association", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "ETW Registry Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)"}]}, {"name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features"}]}, {"name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft"}]}, {"name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver"}]}, {"name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Privilege Escalation Suspicious Process Elevation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Privilege Escalation System Process Without System Parent", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Abuse", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-03-17", "version": 1, "id": "78df1df1-25f1-4387-90f9-c4ea31ce6b75", "description": "Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence, privilege escalation, lateral movement, defense evasion, collection of data, a tool for recon, credential dumping and payload impact. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows registry are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/"], "narrative": "Windows Registry is one of the powerful and yet still mysterious Windows features that can tweak or manipulate Windows policies and low-level configuration settings. Because of this capability,  most malware, adversaries or threat actors abuse this hierarchical database to do their malicious intent on a targeted host or network environment. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify registry in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1553.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "APT5"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Driver", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1553", "mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Lateral Movement", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk", "Updates", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Defender Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Autostart Execution LSASS Driver Registry Modification - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Registry Risk Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Change Default File Association", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender MpEngine Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Registry Tool", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling CMD Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling ControlPanel", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Defender Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Task Manager", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}]}, {"name": "Enable RDP In Other Port Number", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "ETW Registry Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement"}]}, {"name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Remcos client registry install entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Revil Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver"}]}, {"name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD DSRM Account Changes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Autostart Execution LSASS Driver Registry Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Driver"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Notification Center", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Certificate Added", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Delete Task SD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}]}, {"name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Abuse", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2017-11-02", "version": 3, "id": "6dbd810e-f66d-414b-8dfc-e46de55cbfe2", "description": "Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"], "narrative": "The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Execution", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-06-16", "version": 1, "id": "bea2e16b-4599-46ad-a95b-116078726c68", "description": "Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007/"], "narrative": "Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs. Since it may be signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Machete", "Molerats", "Rancor", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Remote Download - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows MSIExec With Network Connections - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSIExec Remote Download", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSIExec With Network Connections", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec"}]}]}, {"name": "WinRAR Spoofing Attack CVE-2023-38831", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-08-29", "version": 1, "id": "9ba776f3-b8c5-4390-a312-6dab6c5561b9", "description": "Group-IB Threat Intelligence unit discovered a zero-day vulnerability, CVE-2023-38831, in WinRAR, a popular compression tool. Cybercriminals exploited this vulnerability to deliver various malware families, including DarkMe and GuLoader, by crafting ZIP archives with spoofed extensions, which were then distributed on trading forums. Once the malware was executed, it allowed cybercriminals to withdraw funds from brokers' accounts. RARLAB was immediately notified about the vulnerability and released a patch. Group-IB recommends users update WinRAR to the latest version, stay informed about cyber threats, be cautious with unknown attachments, enable 2FA, backup data, and follow the principle of least privilege.", "references": ["https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cve-2023-38831-winrar-zero-day/", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-38831"], "narrative": "Group-IB Threat Intelligence unit identified a critical zero-day vulnerability, CVE-2023-38831, in WinRAR, a widely used compression tool. This vulnerability was exploited by cybercriminals to craft ZIP archives containing malicious and non-malicious files, distributed on specialized trading forums. The exploit allowed them to spoof file extensions, hiding the launch of malicious scripts within an archive masquerading as a '.jpg', '.txt', or any other file format. When victims opened the specially crafted archive, it executed the malware, leading to unauthorized access to their broker accounts and enabling the cybercriminals to perform illicit financial transactions and withdraw funds.\nThe vulnerability was discovered while researching the spread of DarkMe malware, a VisualBasic spy Trojan attributed to the financially motivated group, Evilnum. The malware was distributed alongside other malware families, such as GuLoader and Remcos RAT, via malicious ZIP archives posted on popular trading forums or distributed via file-sharing services. Despite efforts by forum administrators to warn users and disable threat actors' accounts, the cybercriminals continued to spread the malicious files, compromising devices, and leading to financial losses.\nGroup-IB immediately notified RARLAB about the vulnerability, and they promptly responded by issuing a patch. The beta version of the patch was released on July 20, 2023, and the final updated version, WinRAR 6.23, was released on August 2, 2023. Group-IB recommends all users install the latest version of WinRAR to mitigate the risk of exploitation.\nIn conclusion, the exploitation of the CVE-2023-38831 vulnerability highlights the constant risks associated with software vulnerabilities and the importance of remaining vigilant, keeping systems updated, and following security guidelines to avoid falling victim to such attacks. Collaboration between security researchers and software developers is essential to quickly identify and fix vulnerabilities, making it harder for cybercriminals to exploit them.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - WinRAR Spawning Shell Application - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "WinRAR Spawning Shell Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}]}, {"name": "Winter Vivern", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-02-16", "version": 1, "id": "5ce5f311-b311-4568-90ca-0c36781d07a4", "description": "Utilize searches that enable you to detect and investigate unusual activities potentially related to the Winter Vivern malicious software. This includes examining multiple timeout executions, scheduled task creations, screenshots, and downloading files through PowerShell, among other indicators.", "references": ["https://cert.gov.ua/article/3761023"], "narrative": "The Winter Vivern malware, identified by CERT UA, is designed to download and run multiple PowerShell scripts on targeted hosts. These scripts aim to gather a variety of files with specific extensions, including (.edb, .ems, .eme, .emz, .key, .pem, .ovpn, .bat, .cer, .p12, .cfg, .log, .txt, .pdf, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, and .rdg), primarily from desktop directories. In addition to this, the malware captures desktop screenshots and performs data exfiltration using HTTP. To maintain its presence on the targeted host, Winter Vivern also establishes a persistence mechanism, such as creating a scheduled task.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1041", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Chimera", "Confucius", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1113", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Dragonfly", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Silence"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Collection", "Execution", "Command And Control", "Exfiltration"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ES Content Updates - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ES Content Updates - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Invoke RestMethod - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Powershell UploadString - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows Screen Capture Via Powershell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Invoke RestMethod", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel"}]}, {"name": "Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Powershell UploadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel"}]}, {"name": "Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Screen Capture Via Powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "WordPress Vulnerabilities", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2024-02-22", "version": 1, "id": "baeaee14-e439-4c95-91e8-aaedd8265c1c", "description": "This analytic story provides a collection of analytics that detect potential exploitation of WordPress vulnerabilities. The analytics are focused on the detection of known vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins and themes.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190", "https://github.com/Tornad0007/CVE-2024-25600-Bricks-Builder-plugin-for-WordPress/blob/main/exploit.py", "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-25600", "https://op-c.net/blog/cve-2024-25600-wordpresss-bricks-builder-rce-flaw-under-active-exploitation/", "https://thehackernews.com/2024/02/wordpress-bricks-theme-under-active.html"], "narrative": "The following collection of analytics are focused on the detection of known vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins and themes. The analytics are focused on the detection of known vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins and themes.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-01", "version": 1, "id": "60466291-3ab4-452b-9c11-456aa2dc7293", "description": "A critical security advisory was released by Progress Software on September 27, 2023, concerning multiple vulnerabilities in WS_FTP Server, a widely-used secure file transfer solution. The two critical vulnerabilities are CVE-2023-40044, a .NET deserialization flaw, and CVE-2023-42657, a directory traversal vulnerability. Rapid7 has observed active exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Affected versions are prior to 8.7.4 and 8.8.2. Immediate action is advised - upgrade to WS_FTP Server version 8.8.2. For those unable to update, disabling the Ad Hoc Transfer module is suggested as a temporary measure. This comes in the wake of increased scrutiny following the Cl0p ransomware attack on MOVEit Transfer in May 2023.", "references": ["https://www.assetnote.io/resources/research/rce-in-progress-ws-ftp-ad-hoc-via-iis-http-modules-cve-2023-40044", "https://community.progress.com/s/article/WS-FTP-Server-Critical-Vulnerability-September-2023", "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-40044", "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/09/29/etr-critical-vulnerabilities-in-ws_ftp-server/", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/fantastic-iis-modules-and-how-to-find-them.html"], "narrative": "Two critical vulnerabilities have been identified in WS_FTP Server, a widely-used secure file transfer solution. The first, CVE-2023-40044, is a .NET deserialization flaw that targets the Ad Hoc Transfer module of WS_FTP Server versions earlier than 8.7.4 and 8.8.2. This flaw allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the server's operating system without needing authentication. The second vulnerability, CVE-2023-42657, is a directory traversal flaw that allows attackers to perform unauthorized file operations outside of their authorized WS_FTP folder. In severe cases, the attacker could escape the WS_FTP Server file structure and perform operations on the underlying operating system. Both vulnerabilities have been observed being exploited in the wild and immediate action for mitigation is strongly advised. Updating to WS_FTP Server version 8.8.2 is recommended. For those unable to update, disabling the Ad Hoc Transfer module is suggested as a temporary measure.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ES Content Updates - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query - Rule", "ES Content Updates - WS FTP Remote Code Execution - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}]}, {"name": "WS FTP Remote Code Execution", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "XMRig", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto Splunk", "date": "2021-05-07", "version": 1, "id": "06723e6a-6bd8-4817-ace2-5fb8a7b06628", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the xmrig monero, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process command-line, defense evasion (killing services, deleting users, modifying files or folder permission, killing other malware or other coin miner) and hacking tools including Telegram as mean of Command And Control (C2) to download other files. Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. (1) Servers and cloud-based (2) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.", "references": ["https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig", "https://www.getmonero.org/resources/user-guides/mine-to-pool.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"], "narrative": "XMRig is a high performance, open source, cross platform RandomX, KawPow, CryptoNight and AstroBWT unified CPU/GPU miner. This monero is seen in the wild on May 2017.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aoqin Dragon", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Ferocious Kitten", "Fox Kitten", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Sowbug", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1595", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Privilege Escalation", "Discovery", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Command And Control", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Disabling Net User Account - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ES Content Updates - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Of Net Users", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Net User Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Download Files Using Telegram", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Icacls Deny Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "ICACLS Grant Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Process Kill Base On File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats", "author": "Rod Soto, Gowthamaraj Rajendran", "date": "2023-10-25", "version": 1, "id": "5d4ba315-39df-4309-982f-a7052efccffd", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to malicious activity from Zscaler. This also encompasses monitoring for events such as users downloading harmful files or accessing websites that pose a risk to system and network security. Additionally, the narrative extends to the detection of insider threats, ensuring comprehensive protection from both external and internal vulnerabilities. By leveraging Zscaler with Splunk, organizations can fortify their defenses, safeguarding against a wide spectrum of cyber threats and maintaining a secure operational environment.", "references": ["https://threatlibrary.zscaler.com/", "https://help.zscaler.com/zia/about-threat-categories"], "narrative": "Zscaler Client Connector is an application installed on your device to ensure that your internet traffic and access to your organization's internal apps are secure and in compliance with your organization's policies, even when you're off your corporate network.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ES Content Updates - Zscaler Adware Activities Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Behavior Analysis Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler CryptoMiner Downloaded Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Employment Search Web Activity - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Exploit Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Legal Liability Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Malware Activity Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Phishing Activity Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Potentially Abused File Download - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Privacy Risk Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Scam Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule", "ES Content Updates - Zscaler Virus Download threat blocked - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Gowthamaraj Rajendran", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "Zscaler Adware Activities Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Behavior Analysis Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler CryptoMiner Downloaded Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Employment Search Web Activity", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Exploit Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Legal Liability Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Malware Activity Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Phishing Activity Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Potentially Abused File Download", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Privacy Risk Destinations Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Scam Destinations Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Virus Download threat blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}]}]}
\ No newline at end of file
+{"stories": [{"name": "3CX Supply Chain Attack", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-03-30", "version": 1, "id": "c4d7618c-73a7-4f7c-8071-060c36850785", "description": "On March 29, 2023, CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch observed unexpected malicious activity emanating from a legitimate, signed binary, 3CXDesktopApp,  a softphone application from 3CX. The malicious activity includes beaconing to actor controlled infrastructure, deployment of second stage payloads, and, in a small number of cases, hands on keyboard activity. (CrowdStrike)", "references": ["https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/smoothoperator-ongoing-campaign-trojanizes-3cx-software-in-software-supply-chain-attack/", "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/03/30/supply-chain-attack-against-3cxdesktopapp", "https://www.reddit.com/r/crowdstrike/comments/125r3uu/20230329_situational_awareness_crowdstrike/", "https://www.3cx.com/community/threads/crowdstrike-endpoint-security-detection-re-3cx-desktop-app.119934/page-2#post-558898", "https://www.3cx.com/community/threads/3cx-desktopapp-security-alert.119951/", "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/elastic-users-protected-from-suddenicon-supply-chain-attack", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2023/03/30/3cx-supply-chain-compromise-leads-to-iconic-incident/"], "narrative": "On March 22, 2023, cybersecurity firm SentinelOne observed a surge in behavioral detections of trojanized 3CXDesktopApp installers, a popular PABX voice and video conferencing software. The multi-stage attack chain, which automatically quarantines trojanized installers, involves downloading ICO files with base64 data from GitHub and eventually leads to a 3rd stage infostealer DLL that is still under analysis. While the Mac installer remains unconfirmed as trojanized, ongoing investigations are also examining other potentially compromised applications, such as Chrome extensions. The threat actor behind the supply chain compromise, which started in February 2022, has used a code signing certificate to sign the trojanized binaries, but connections to existing threat clusters remain unclear. SentinelOne updated their IOCs on March 30th, 2023, with contributions from the research community and continues to monitor the situation for further developments. 3CX identified the vulnerability in the recent versions 18.12.407 and 18.12.416 for the desktop app. A new certificate for the app will also be produced.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1195.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Supply Chain", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - 3CX Supply Chain Attack Network Indicators - Rule", "ESCU - Hunting 3CXDesktopApp Software - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Vulnerable 3CX Software - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "3CX Supply Chain Attack Network Indicators", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Supply Chain"}]}, {"name": "Hunting 3CXDesktopApp Software", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Supply Chain"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Windows Vulnerable 3CX Software", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Supply Chain"}]}]}, {"name": "Abnormal Kubernetes Behavior using Splunk Infrastructure Monitoring", "author": "Matthew Moore, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "date": "2024-01-08", "version": 1, "id": "7589023b-3d98-42b3-ab1c-bb498e68fc2d", "description": "Kubernetes, a complex container orchestration system, is susceptible to a variety of security threats. This story delves into the different strategies and methods adversaries employ to exploit Kubernetes environments. These include attacks on the control plane, exploitation of misconfigurations, and breaches of containerized applications. Observability data, such as metrics, play a crucial role in identifying abnormal and potentially malicious behavior within these environments.", "references": ["https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/", "https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5247"], "narrative": "Kubernetes, a complex container orchestration system, is a prime target for adversaries due to its widespread use and inherent complexity. This story focuses on the abnormal behavior within Kubernetes environments that can be indicative of security threats. Key areas of concern include the control plane, worker nodes, and network communication, all of which can be exploited by attackers. Observability data, such as metrics, play a crucial role in identifying these abnormal behaviors. These behaviors could be a result of attacks on the control plane, exploitation of misconfigurations, or breaches of containerized applications. For instance, attackers may attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in the Kubernetes API, misconfigured containers, or insecure network policies. The control plane, which manages cluster operations, is a prime target and its compromise can give attackers control over the entire cluster. Worker nodes, which run the containerized applications, can also be targeted to disrupt services or to gain access to sensitive data.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Network Activity from Process - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Outbound Network IO - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound to Outbound Network IO Ratio - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Outbound Network Activity from Process - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Anomalous Traffic on Network Edge - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes newly seen TCP edge - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes newly seen UDP edge - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Container Image Name - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Previously Unseen Process - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Process Running From New Path - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Process with Anomalous Resource Utilisation - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Process with Resource Ratio Anomalies - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node with CPU Activity - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "author_name": "Matthew Moore", "detections": [{"name": "Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Network Activity from Process", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound Outbound Network IO", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Anomalous Inbound to Outbound Network IO Ratio", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Anomalous Outbound Network Activity from Process", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Anomalous Traffic on Network Edge", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes newly seen TCP edge", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes newly seen UDP edge", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Previously Unseen Container Image Name", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Previously Unseen Process", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Process Running From New Path", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Process with Anomalous Resource Utilisation", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Process with Resource Ratio Anomalies", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Shell Running on Worker Node with CPU Activity", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "AcidRain", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-04-12", "version": 1, "id": "c68717c6-4938-434b-987c-e1ce9d516124", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the acidrain malware including deleting of files and etc. AcidRain is an ELF MIPS malware specifically designed to wipe modems and routers. The complete list of targeted devices is unknown at this time, but WatchGuard FireBox has specifically been listed as a target. This malware is capable of wiping and deleting non-standard linux files and overwriting storage device files that might related to router, ssd card and many more.", "references": ["https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/acidrain-a-modem-wiper-rains-down-on-europe/"], "narrative": "Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "Evilnum", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Linux Account Manipulation Of SSH Config and Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate - Rule", "ESCU - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Linux Account Manipulation Of SSH Config and Keys", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deletion Of Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deletion of SSL Certificate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}]}, {"name": "Active Directory Discovery", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2021-08-20", "version": 1, "id": "8460679c-2b21-463e-b381-b813417c32f2", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Discovery and Reconnaissance within with Active Directory environments.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2535", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"], "narrative": "Discovery consists of techniques an adversay uses to gain knowledge about an internal environment or network. These techniques provide adversaries with situational awareness and allows them to have the necessary information before deciding how to act or who/what to target next.\nOnce an attacker obtains an initial foothold in an Active Directory environment, she is forced to engage in Discovery techniques in the initial phases of a breach to better understand and navigate the target network. Some examples include but are not limited to enumerating domain users, domain admins, computers, domain controllers, network shares, group policy objects, domain trusts, etc.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT5", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Magic Hound", "TA2541", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "FIN7", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "OilRig", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN8", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1135", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Sowbug", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Akira", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1570", "mitre_attack_technique": "Lateral Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT41", "Aoqin Dragon", "Chimera", "FIN10", "GALLIUM", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - Local Account Discovery With Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Password Policy Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Dsquery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Query - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Abnormal Object Access Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Privileged Object Access Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Find Domain Organizational Units with GetDomainOU - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Find Interesting ACL with FindInterestingDomainAcl - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Forest Discovery with GetForestDomain - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Get Local Admin with FindLocalAdminAccess - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Lateral Tool Transfer RemCom - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Create RemComSvc - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Wmic Group Discovery - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery with Dsquery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery with Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery with Adsisearcher", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Dsquery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery with PowerView", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get-DomainTrust with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get-ForestTrust with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Get WMIObject Group Discovery with Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "GetAdGroup with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetCurrent User with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainComputer with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainController with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "GetDomainGroup with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}]}, {"name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject Ds Group with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject DS User with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Local Account Discovery with Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}]}, {"name": "Local Account Discovery With Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery"}]}, {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Password Policy Discovery with Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Get LocalGroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Get LocalGroup Discovery with Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Dsquery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "User Discovery With Env Vars PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Abnormal Object Access Activity", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Privileged Object Access Activity", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Find Domain Organizational Units with GetDomainOU", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows Find Interesting ACL with FindInterestingDomainAcl", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows Forest Discovery with GetForestDomain", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows Get Local Admin with FindLocalAdminAccess", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Lateral Tool Transfer RemCom", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Lateral Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Create RemComSvc", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Suspect Process With Authentication Traffic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}]}, {"name": "Wmic Group Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}]}, {"name": "Active Directory Kerberos Attacks", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2022-02-02", "version": 1, "id": "38b8cf16-8461-11ec-ade1-acde48001122", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Kerberos based attacks within with Active Directory environments.", "references": ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerberos_(protocol)", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/2a32282e-dd48-4ad9-a542-609804b02cc9", "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", "https://stealthbits.com/blog/cracking-active-directory-passwords-with-as-rep-roasting/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/004/"], "narrative": "Kerberos, initially named after Cerberus, the three-headed dog in Greek mythology, is a network authentication protocol that allows computers and users to prove their identity through a trusted third-party. This trusted third-party issues Kerberos tickets using symmetric encryption to allow users access to services and network resources based on their privilege level. Kerberos is the default authentication protocol used on Windows Active Directory networks since the introduction of Windows Server 2003. With Kerberos being the backbone of Windows authentication, it is commonly abused by adversaries across the different phases of a breach including initial access, privilege escalation, defense evasion, credential access, lateral movement, etc.\nThis Analytic Story groups detection use cases in which the Kerberos protocol is abused. Defenders can leverage these analytics to detect and hunt for adversaries engaging in Kerberos based attacks.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Golden Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Ke3chang"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1589.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Addresses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "EXOTIC LILY", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Silent Librarian", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT5", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Akira", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1589", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Identity Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN13", "HEXANE", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Discovery", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Change", "Network_Traffic", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule", "ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos User Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting"}]}, {"name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With PowerView", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting"}]}, {"name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled in UserAccountControl", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting"}]}, {"name": "Kerberos Pre-Authentication Flag Disabled with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting"}]}, {"name": "Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Golden Ticket"}]}, {"name": "Kerberos TGT Request Using RC4 Encryption", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}]}, {"name": "Kerberos User Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Identity Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Addresses"}]}, {"name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}]}, {"name": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting"}]}, {"name": "Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}]}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Kerberos Service Tickets Requested", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Computer Account With SPN", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Get-AdComputer Unconstrained Delegation Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView SPN Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}]}, {"name": "Active Directory Lateral Movement", "author": "David Dorsey, Mauricio Velazco Splunk", "date": "2021-12-09", "version": 3, "id": "399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-aad9051f38ad", "description": "Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within an Active Directory environment. Since lateral movement is often a necessary step in a breach, it is important for cyber defenders to deploy detection coverage.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html", "http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon7/t405-hunting-lateral-movement-for-fun-and-profit-mauricio-velazco"], "narrative": "Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation.\nIndications of lateral movement in an Active Directory network can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, Service Control Manager, the DCOM protocol, WinRM or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or \"crown jewels\" to a persistent threat actor.\nAn adversary can use lateral movement for multiple purposes, including remote execution of tools, pivoting to additional systems, obtaining access to specific information or files, access to additional credentials, exfiltrating data, or delivering a secondary effect. Adversaries may use legitimate credentials alongside inherent network and operating-system functionality to remotely connect to other systems and remain under the radar of network defenders.\nIf there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to collect evidence of the associated offending hosts. For example, an attacker might leverage host A to gain access to host B. From there, the attacker may try to move laterally to host C. In this example, the analyst should gather as much information as possible from all three hosts.\nIt is also important to collect authentication logs for each host, to ensure that the offending accounts are well-documented. Analysts should account for all processes to ensure that the attackers did not install unauthorized software.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "At", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1210", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "MuddyWater", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "FIN13", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1563", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Service Session Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1135", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Sowbug", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Hash", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Kimsuky", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1563.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "RDP Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Change", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Active Directory Lateral Movement Identified - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Start or Stop Service - Rule", "ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule", "ESCU - Randomly Generated Windows Service Name - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Windows Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell Get CIMInstance Remote Computer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell WMI Win32 ScheduledJob - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Windows RDP Connection Successful - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Create Service - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Create with Tscon - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Hash"}]}, {"name": "Active Directory Lateral Movement Identified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Interactive Session on Remote Endpoint with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}]}, {"name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MMC"}]}, {"name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MMC"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Start or Stop Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Randomly Generated Windows Service Name", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via DCOM and PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WinRM and Winrs", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI and PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Short Lived Windows Accounts", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell Get CIMInstance Remote Computer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell WMI Win32 ScheduledJob", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}]}, {"name": "Windows RDP Connection Successful", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "RDP Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Create Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Create with Tscon", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "RDP Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Service Session Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Wmiprsve LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Wsmprovhost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Active Directory Password Spraying", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2021-04-07", "version": 2, "id": "3de109da-97d2-11eb-8b6a-acde48001122", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Password Spraying attacks within Active Directory environments.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/23/protecting-organization-password-spray-attacks/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn452415(v=ws.11)"], "narrative": "In a password spraying attack, adversaries leverage one or a small list of commonly used / popular passwords against a large volume of usernames to acquire valid account credentials. Unlike a Brute Force attack that targets a specific user or small group of users with a large number of passwords, password spraying follows the opposite aproach and increases the chances of obtaining valid credentials while avoiding account lockouts. This allows adversaries to remain undetected if the target organization does not have the proper monitoring and detection controls in place.\nPassword Spraying can be leveraged by adversaries across different stages in an attack. It can be used to obtain an iniial access to an environment but can also be used to escalate privileges when access has been already achieved. In some scenarios, this technique capitalizes on a security policy most organizations implement, password rotation. As enterprise users change their passwords, it is possible some pick predictable, seasonal passwords such as `$CompanyNameWinter`, `Summer2021`, etc.\nSpecifically, this Analytic Story is focused on detecting possible Password Spraying attacks against Active Directory environments leveraging Windows Event Logs in the `Account Logon` and `Logon/Logoff` Advanced Audit Policy categories. It presents 16 detection analytics which can aid defenders in identifying instances where one source user, source host or source process attempts to authenticate against a target or targets using a high or statiscally unsual, number of unique users. A user, host or process attempting to authenticate with multiple users is not common behavior for legitimate systems and should be monitored by security teams. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. These should be easily spotted when first implementing the detection and addded to an allow list or lookup table. The presented detections can also be used in Threat Hunting exercises.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT5", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "FIN10", "FIN7", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "PROMETHIUM", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Change"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Create Local Account - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Excessive Account Lockouts From Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Create Local Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}]}, {"name": "Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2023-03-20", "version": 1, "id": "fa34a5d8-df0a-404c-8237-11f99cba1d5f", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Privilege Escalation attacks within Active Directory environments.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2362"], "narrative": "Privilege Escalation consists of techniques that adversaries use to gain higher-level permissions on a system or network. Adversaries can often enter and explore a network with unprivileged access but require elevated permissions to follow through on their objectives. Common approaches are to take advantage of system weaknesses, misconfigurations, and vulnerabilities.\nActive Directory is a central component of most enterprise networks, providing authentication and authorization services for users, computers, and other resources. It stores sensitive information such as passwords, user accounts, and security policies, and is therefore a high-value target for attackers. Privilege escalation attacks in Active Directory typically involve exploiting vulnerabilities or misconfigurations across the network to gain elevated privileges, such as Domain Administrator access. Once an attacker has escalated their privileges and taken full control of a domain, they can easily move laterally throughout the network, access sensitive data, and carry out further attacks. Security teams should monitor for privilege escalation attacks in Active Directory to identify a breach before attackers achieve operational success.\nThe following analytic story groups detection opportunities that seek to identify an adversary attempting to escalate privileges in an Active Directory network.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Golden Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Ke3chang"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT5", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1484.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1484", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1135", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Sowbug", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Preferences", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Discovery", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Active Directory Privilege Escalation Identified - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Findstr GPP Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Group Policy Object Created - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "Active Directory Privilege Escalation Identified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Kerberos Service Ticket Request Using RC4 Encryption", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Golden Ticket"}]}, {"name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Unusual Number of Remote Endpoint Authentication Events", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Administrative Shares Accessed On Multiple Hosts", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows File Share Discovery With Powerview", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Findstr GPP Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Preferences"}]}, {"name": "Windows Group Policy Object Created", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Large Number of Computer Service Tickets Requested", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerSploit GPP Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Preferences"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Rapid Authentication On Multiple Hosts", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}]}, {"name": "Windows Special Privileged Logon On Multiple Hosts", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}]}]}, {"name": "Adobe ColdFusion Arbitrary Code Execution CVE-2023-29298 CVE-2023-26360", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-08-23", "version": 1, "id": "e33e2e38-f9c2-432d-8be6-bc67b92aa82e", "description": "In July 2023, a significant vulnerability, CVE-2023-29298, affecting Adobe ColdFusion was uncovered by Rapid7, shedding light on an access control bypass mechanism. This vulnerability allows attackers to access sensitive ColdFusion Administrator endpoints by exploiting a flaw in the URL path validation. Disturbingly, this flaw can be chained with another critical vulnerability, CVE-2023-26360, which has been actively exploited. The latter enables unauthorized arbitrary code execution and file reading. Adobe has promptly addressed these vulnerabilities, but the intricacies and potential ramifications of their combination underscore the importance of immediate action by organizations. With active exploitation in the wild and the ability to bypass established security measures, the situation is alarming. Organizations are urged to apply the updates provided by Adobe immediately, considering the active threat landscape and the severe implications of these chained vulnerabilities.", "references": ["https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/coldfusion/apsb23-25.html", "https://twitter.com/stephenfewer/status/1678881017526886400?s=20", "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/07/11/cve-2023-29298-adobe-coldfusion-access-control-bypass", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cisa-warns-of-adobe-coldfusion-bug-exploited-as-a-zero-day/"], "narrative": "Adobe ColdFusion, a prominent application server, has been thrust into the cybersecurity spotlight due to two intertwined vulnerabilities. The first, CVE-2023-29298, identified by Rapid7 in July 2023, pertains to an access control bypass in ColdFusion's security mechanisms. This flaw allows attackers to access protected ColdFusion Administrator endpoints simply by manipulating the URL path, specifically by inserting an additional forward slash. Compounding the threat is the revelation that CVE-2023-29298 can be chained with CVE-2023-26360, another severe ColdFusion vulnerability. This latter vulnerability, which has seen active exploitation, permits unauthorized attackers to execute arbitrary code or read arbitrary files on the affected system. In practice, an attacker could exploit the access control bypass to access sensitive ColdFusion endpoints and subsequently exploit the arbitrary code execution vulnerability, broadening their control and access over the targeted system. The consequences of these vulnerabilities are manifold. Attackers can potentially login to the ColdFusion Administrator with known credentials, bruteforce their way in, leak sensitive information, or exploit other vulnerabilities in the exposed CFM and CFC files. This combination of vulnerabilities significantly heightens the risk profile for organizations using the affected versions of Adobe ColdFusion. Addressing the urgency, Adobe released fixes for these vulnerabilities in July 2023, urging organizations to update to ColdFusion 2023 GA build, ColdFusion 2021 Update 7, and ColdFusion 2018 Update 17. However, Rapid7's disclosure highlights a potential incomplete fix, suggesting that organizations should remain vigilant and proactive in their security measures.\nIn conclusion, the discovery of these vulnerabilities and their potential to be exploited in tandem presents a significant security challenge. Organizations using Adobe ColdFusion must prioritize the application of security updates, monitor their systems closely for signs of intrusion, and remain updated on any further developments related to these vulnerabilities.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Adobe ColdFusion Access Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Adobe ColdFusion Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Adobe ColdFusion Access Control Bypass", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Adobe ColdFusion Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "AgentTesla", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-04-12", "version": 1, "id": "9bb6077a-843e-418b-b134-c57ef997103c", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the AgentTesla malware including .chm application child process, ftp/smtp connection, persistence and many more. AgentTesla is one of the advanced remote access trojans (RAT) that are capable of stealing sensitive information from the infected or targeted host machine. It can collect various types of data, including browser profile information, keystrokes, capture screenshots and vpn credentials. AgentTesla has been active malware since 2014 and often delivered as a malicious attachment in phishing emails.It is also the top malware in 2021 based on the CISA report.", "references": ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.agent_tesla", "https://cert.gov.ua/article/861292", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-216a", "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/702680/0/html"], "narrative": "Adversaries or threat actor may use this malware to maximize the impact of infection on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Dark Caracal", "OilRig", "Silence"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Winnti Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Kimsuky", "SilverTerrier", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mail Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Drop Executable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mail Protocol In Non-Common Process Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multi hop Proxy TOR Website Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}]}, {"name": "Amadey", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-06-16", "version": 1, "id": "a919a01b-3ea5-4ed4-9cbe-11cd8b64c36c", "description": "This analytic story contains searches that aims to detect activities related to Amadey, a type of malware that primarily operates as a banking Trojan. It is designed to steal sensitive information such as login credentials, credit card details, and other financial data from infected systems. The malware typically targets Windows-based computers.", "references": ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.amadey", "https://darktrace.com/blog/amadey-info-stealer-exploiting-n-day-vulnerabilities"], "narrative": "Amadey is one of the active trojans that are capable of stealing sensitive information via its from the infected or targeted host machine. It can collect various types of data, including browser profile information, clipboard data, capture screenshots and system information. Adversaries or threat actors may use this malware to maximize the impact of infection on the target organization in operations where data collection and exfiltration is the goal. The primary function is to steal information and further distribute malware. It aims to extract a variety of information from infected devices and attempts to evade the detection of security measures by reducing the volume of data exfiltration compared to that seen in other malicious instances.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Files and Dirs Access Rights Modification Via Icacls - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Powershell RemoteSigned File - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process Executed From Container File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Files and Dirs Access Rights Modification Via Icacls", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Powershell RemoteSigned File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "Apache Struts Vulnerability", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2018-12-06", "version": 1, "id": "2dcfd6a2-e7d2-4873-b6ba-adaf819d2a1e", "description": "Detect and investigate activities--such as unusually long `Content-Type` length, suspicious java classes and web servers executing suspicious processes--consistent with attempts to exploit Apache Struts vulnerabilities.", "references": ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"], "narrative": "In March of 2017, a remote code-execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts, a widely used open-source framework for creating Java web applications, was disclosed and assigned to CVE-2017-5638. About two months later, hackers exploited the flaw to carry out the world's <a href=https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/07/nations-biggest-hacks-and-data-breaches-millions/644311001/> 5th largest data breach</a>. The target, credit giant Equifax, <a href=https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/16/technology/equifax-breach-security-hole/index.html>told investigators</a> that it had become aware of the vulnerability two months before the attack.\nThe exploit involved manipulating the `Content-Type HTTP` header to execute commands embedded in the header.\nThis Analytic Story contains two different searches that help to identify activity that may be related to this issue. The first search looks for characteristics of the `Content-Type` header consistent with attempts to exploit the vulnerability. This should be a relatively pertinent indicator, as the `Content-Type` header is generally consistent and does not have a large degree of variation.\nThe second search looks for the execution of various commands typically entered on the command shell when an attacker first lands on a system. These commands are not generally executed on web servers during the course of day-to-day operation, but they may be used when the system is undergoing maintenance or troubleshooting.\nFirst, it is helpful is to understand how often the notable event is generated, as well as the commonalities in some of these events. This may help determine whether this is a common occurrence that is of a lesser concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It can also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user or system or is broader in scope.\nWhen looking at the target of the behavior illustrated by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to see what other events involving the target have occurred in the recent past. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target.\nVarious types of information for external systems should be reviewed and (potentially) collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. Information like this can be useful in generating your own threat intelligence to create alerts in the future.\nLooking at the country, responsible party, and fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address--as well as the registration information associated with those domain names, if they are frequently visited by others--can help you answer the question of \"who,\" in regard to the external system. Answering that can help qualify the event and may serve useful for tracking. In addition, there are various sources that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining if the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether or not there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect some dots or show other events that should be brought into scope.\nGathering various data elements on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine that something suspicious may be happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\nhen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version to help determine whether or not it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\nhen it is suspected there is an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\nIn the event that a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that have the file open, what processes created and/or modified the file, and the number of systems that may have this file can help to determine if the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes quickly help determine whether it is malicious in nature.\nOften, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, there may be activity initiated via a compromised website the user visited.\nIt can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process that is of interest. For example, if it turns out that the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might also be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, reviewing the network connections made around the time of the event and/or if the process spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script.", "tags": {"category": ["Vulnerability"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header", "Investigate Web POSTs From src"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Suspicious Java Classes", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Content-Type Length", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "APT29 Diplomatic Deceptions with WINELOADER", "author": "Michael Haag, splunk", "date": "2024-03-26", "version": 1, "id": "7cb5fdb5-4c36-4721-8b0a-4cc5e78afadd", "description": "APT29, a sophisticated threat actor linked to the Russian SVR, has expanded its cyber espionage activities to target European diplomats and German political parties. Utilizing a novel backdoor variant, WINELOADER, these campaigns leverage diplomatic-themed lures to initiate infection chains, demonstrating APT29's evolving tactics and interest in geopolitical intelligence. The operations, marked by their low volume and high precision, underscore the broad threat APT29 poses to Western political and diplomatic entities.", "references": ["https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-wineloader-german-political-parties", "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/european-diplomats-targeted-spikedwine-wineloader"], "narrative": "APT29, also known as Cozy Bear, has historically focused on espionage activities aligned with Russian intelligence interests. In recent campaigns, APT29 has notably shifted its operational focus, targeting not only its traditional diplomatic missions but also expanding into the political domain, specifically German political parties. These campaigns have been characterized by the deployment of WINELOADER, a sophisticated backdoor that facilitates the exfiltration of sensitive information. The use of themed lures, such as invitations from the Ambassador of India and CDU-themed documents, highlights APT29's strategic use of social engineering to compromise targets. The operations against European diplomats and German political entities reveal APT29's adaptive tactics and its persistent effort to gather intelligence that could influence Russia's geopolitical strategy. The precision of these attacks, coupled with the use of compromised websites for command and control, underscores the evolving threat landscape and the need for heightened cybersecurity vigilance among potential targets.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1140", "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Darkhotel", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Writing File to World Writable Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows SqlWriter SQLDumper DLL Sideload - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unsigned MS DLL Side-Loading - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Writing File to World Writable Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Windows SqlWriter SQLDumper DLL Sideload", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unsigned MS DLL Side-Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Asset Tracking", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-13", "version": 1, "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce77", "description": "Keep a careful inventory of every asset on your network to make it easier to detect rogue devices. Unauthorized/unmanaged devices could be an indication of malicious behavior that should be investigated further.", "references": ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"], "narrative": "This Analytic Story is designed to help you develop a better understanding of what authorized and unauthorized devices are part of your enterprise. This story can help you better categorize and classify assets, providing critical business context and awareness of their assets during an incident. Information derived from this Analytic Story can be used to better inform and support other analytic stories. For successful detection, you will need to leverage the Assets and Identity Framework from Enterprise Security to populate your known assets.", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", "Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "AsyncRAT", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-01-24", "version": 1, "id": "d7053072-7dd2-4874-8314-bfcbc99978a4", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the AsyncRAT malware including mshta application child process, bat loader execution, persistence and many more. AsyncRAT is an open source remote administration tool released last 2019. It's designed to remotely control computers via an encrypted connection, with view screen, keylogger, chat communication, persistence, defense evasion (e.g. Windows defender), DOS attack and many more.", "references": ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.asyncrat", "https://www.netskope.com/blog/asyncrat-using-fully-undetected-downloader"], "narrative": "although this project contains legal disclaimer, Adversaries or threat actors are popularly used in some attacks. This malware recently came across a Fully undetected batch script loader that downloads and loads the AsyncRAT from its C2 server. The batch script is obfuscated and will load a powershell loader that will decode and decrypt (AES256) the actual AsyncRAT malware.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BackdoorDiplomacy", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Malteiro", "Putter Panda", "TA505", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Powershell Cryptography Namespace", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2022-26134", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-06-03", "version": 1, "id": "91623a50-41fa-4c4e-8637-c239b80ff439", "description": "On June 2, security researchers at Volexity published a blog outlining the discovery of an unauthenticated remote code execution zero day vulnerability (CVE-2022-26134) being actively exploited in Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center instances in the wild. Atlassian released a fix within 24 hours of the blog''s release.", "references": ["https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/atlassian-confluence-vulnerability-cve-2022-26134.html", "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/06/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-cve-2022-26134/", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/"], "narrative": "Atlassian describes the vulnerability as an Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) injection allowing an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Server instance. Volexity did not release proof-of-concept (POC) exploit code, but researchers there have observed coordinated, widespread exploitation. Volexity first discovered the vulnerability over the weekend on two Internet-facing web servers running Confluence Server software. The investigation was due to suspicious activity on the hosts, including JSP webshells that were written to disk.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Application Security", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule", "ESCU - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Java Writing JSP File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "AwfulShred", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-01-24", "version": 1, "id": "e36935ce-f48c-4fb2-8109-7e80c1cdc9e2", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the AwfulShred malware including wiping files, process kill, system reboot via system request, shred,  and service stops.", "references": ["https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/overview-of-the-cyber-weapons-used-in-the-ukraine-russia-war/", "https://cert.gov.ua/article/3718487"], "narrative": "AwfulShred is a malicious linux shell script designed to corrupt or wipe the linux targeted system. It uses shred command to overwrite files and to increase data damage. This obfuscated malicious script can also disable and corrupts apache, HTTP and SSH services, deactivate swap files, clear bash history and finally reboot the system.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "Evilnum", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1200", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Linux Data Destruction Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Disable Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Stop Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Linux Data Destruction Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deletion Of Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Disable Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions"}]}, {"name": "Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Restarted", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Shred Overwrite Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Stop Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS Cross Account Activity", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2018-06-04", "version": 1, "id": "2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-967a2b49ab5a", "description": "Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another AWS account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.", "references": ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"], "narrative": "Amazon Web Services (AWS) admins manage access to AWS resources and services across the enterprise using AWS's Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage AWS users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as EC2 instances, the AWS Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\nHerein lies the rub. In between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\nThis Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your AWS CloudTrail logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity.  For example, while accessing multiple AWS accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", "Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "aws detect attach to role policy", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "aws detect permanent key creation", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "aws detect role creation", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "aws detect sts assume role abuse", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "aws detect sts get session token abuse", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS Defense Evasion", "author": "Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk", "date": "2022-07-15", "version": 1, "id": "4e00b690-293f-434d-a9d8-bcfb2ea5fff9", "description": "Identify activity and techniques associated with the Evasion of Defenses within AWS, such as Disabling CloudTrail, Deleting CloudTrail and many others.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"], "narrative": "Adversaries employ a variety of techniques in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security monitoring tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes analytics that identify activity consistent with adversaries attempting to disable various security mechanisms on AWS. Such activity may involve deleting the CloudTrail logs , as this is where all the AWS logs get stored or explicitly changing the retention policy of S3 buckets. Other times, adversaries attempt deletion of a specified AWS CloudWatch log group.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule", "ESCU - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule", "ESCU - ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion PutBucketLifecycle - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Gowthamaraj Rajendran", "detections": [{"name": "ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "ASL AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}]}, {"name": "ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "AWS Defense Evasion Delete Cloudtrail", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "AWS Defense Evasion Delete CloudWatch Log Group", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}]}, {"name": "AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "AWS Defense Evasion PutBucketLifecycle", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "AWS Defense Evasion Update Cloudtrail", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Privilege Escalation", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2021-03-08", "version": 1, "id": "ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-22782eec6750", "description": "This analytic story contains detections that query your AWS Cloudtrail for activities related to privilege escalation.", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", "https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/the-cloud-shadow-admin-threat-10-permissions-to-protect", "https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws"], "narrative": "Amazon Web Services provides a neat feature called Identity and Access Management (IAM) that enables organizations to manage various AWS services and resources in a secure way. All IAM users have roles, groups and policies associated with them which governs and sets permissions to allow a user to access specific restrictions.\nHowever, if these IAM policies are misconfigured and have specific combinations of weak permissions; it can allow attackers to escalate their privileges and further compromise the organization. Rhino Security Labs have published comprehensive blogs detailing various AWS Escalation methods. By using this as an inspiration, Splunks research team wants to highlight how these attack vectors look in AWS Cloudtrail logs and provide you with detection queries to uncover these potentially malicious events via this Analytic Story. ", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1580", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Discovery", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - ASL AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - ASL AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ESCU - ASL AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateAccessKey - Rule", "ESCU - AWS CreateLoginProfile - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Delete Policy - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion - Rule", "ESCU - AWS UpdateLoginProfile - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "ASL AWS CreateAccessKey", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "ASL AWS IAM Delete Policy", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "ASL AWS Password Policy Changes", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS Create Policy Version to allow all resources", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "AWS CreateAccessKey", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS CreateLoginProfile", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Assume Role Policy Brute Force", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Delete Policy", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Failure Group Deletion", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM Successful Group Deletion", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS Password Policy Changes", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS SetDefaultPolicyVersion", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "AWS UpdateLoginProfile", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS Identity and Access Management Account Takeover", "author": "Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Bhavin Patel,  Splunk", "date": "2022-08-19", "version": 2, "id": "4210b690-293f-411d-a9d8-bcfb2ea5fff9", "description": "Identify activity and techniques associated with accessing credential files from AWS resources, monitor unusual authentication related activities to the AWS Console and other services such as RDS.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"], "narrative": "Amazon Web Services provides a web service known as Identity and Access Management(IAM) for controlling and securly managing various AWS resources. This is basically the foundation of how users in AWS interact with various resources/services in cloud and vice versa. Account Takeover (ATO) is an attack whereby cybercriminals gain unauthorized access to online accounts by using different techniques like brute force, social engineering, phishing & spear phishing, credential stuffing, etc. Adversaries employ a variety of techniques to steal AWS Cloud credentials like account names, passwords and keys and takeover legitmate user accounts. Usage of legitimate keys will assist the attackers to gain access to other sensitive system and they can also mimic legitimate behaviour making them harder to be detected. Such activity may involve multiple failed login to the console, new console logins and password reset activities.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1185", "mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1621", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Discovery", "Resource Development", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - ASL AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Credential Access Failed Login - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset - Rule", "ESCU - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - AWS New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Bhavin Patel,  Splunk", "author_name": "Gowthamaraj Rajendran", "detections": [{"name": "ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "ASL AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "ASL AWS New MFA Method Registered For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "AWS Credential Access Failed Login", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}]}, {"name": "AWS Credential Access GetPasswordData", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}]}, {"name": "AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "AWS Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "AWS New MFA Method Registered For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "AWS Successful Single-Factor Authentication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "AWS Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS Network ACL Activity", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2018-05-21", "version": 2, "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50ff268af4", "description": "Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"], "narrative": "AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and operational/risk auditing of your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Management Console, AWS Command Line Interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your servers are not vulnerable to attacks. This analytic story contains detection searches that leverage CloudTrail logs from AWS to check for bad configurations and malicious activity in your AWS network access controls.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get DNS traffic ratio", "Get Notable History", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity", "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "AWS Network Access Control List Deleted", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Cloud Network Access Control List Deleted", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS Security Hub Alerts", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2020-08-04", "version": 1, "id": "2f2f610a-d64d-48c2-b57c-96722b49ab5a", "description": "This story is focused around detecting Security Hub alerts generated from AWS", "references": ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"], "narrative": "AWS Security Hub collects and consolidates findings from AWS security services enabled in your environment, such as intrusion detection findings from Amazon GuardDuty, vulnerability scans from Amazon Inspector, S3 bucket policy findings from Amazon Macie, publicly accessible and cross-account resources from IAM Access Analyzer, and resources lacking WAF coverage from AWS Firewall Manager.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "Get EC2 Launch Details"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "AWS User Monitoring", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2018-03-12", "version": 1, "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1269af3", "description": "Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"], "narrative": "It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\nIn addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new EC2 instances and increased bandwidth usage.\nFortunately, you can leverage Amazon Web Services (AWS) CloudTrail--a tool that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing of your AWS account--to give you increased visibility into your user and resource activity by recording AWS Management Console actions and API calls. You can identify which users and accounts called AWS, the source IP address from which the calls were made, and when the calls occurred.\nThe detection searches in this Analytic Story are designed to help you uncover AWS API activities from users not listed in the identity table, as well as similar activities from disabled accounts.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - ASL AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Excessive Security Scanning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "ASL AWS Excessive Security Scanning", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS Excessive Security Scanning", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect API activity from users without MFA", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Detect new API calls from user roles", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Detect Spike in AWS API Activity", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Detect Spike in Security Group Activity", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Azorult", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-06-09", "version": 1, "id": "efed5343-4ac2-42b1-a16d-da2428d0ce94", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Azorult malware including firewall modification, icacl execution, spawning more process, botnet c2 communication, defense evasion and etc. The AZORULT malware was first discovered in 2016 to be an information stealer that steals browsing history, cookies, ID/passwords, cryptocurrency information and more. It can also be a downloader of other malware. A variant of this malware was able to create a new, hidden administrator account on the machine to set a registry key to establish a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connection. Exploit kits such as Fallout Exploit Kit (EK) and phishing mails with social engineering technique are one of the major infection vectors of the AZORult malware. The current malspam and phishing emails use fake product order requests, invoice documents and payment information requests. This Trojan-Spyware connects to Command And Control (C&C) servers of attacker to send and receive information.", "references": ["https://success.trendmicro.com/dcx/s/solution/000146108-azorult-malware-information?language=en_US&sfdcIFrameOrigin=null", "https://app.any.run/tasks/a6f2ffe2-e6e2-4396-ae2e-04ea0143f2d8/"], "narrative": "Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Andariel", "HAFNIUM", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1219", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "RTM", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Thrip"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["HAFNIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance", "Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Application Layer Protocol RMS Radmin Tool Namedpipe - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Add Xml Applocker Rules - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Deny Security Software With Applocker - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Toast Notifications - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisAllow Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Regedit Silent Reg Import - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software RMS Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Service Rdpwinst Tool Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Services Allow Rdp In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Services Allow Remote Assistance - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Services Rdp Enable - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Stop By Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Valid Account With Never Expires Password - Rule", "ESCU - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "CHCP Command Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Icacls Deny Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Processes launching netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Application Layer Protocol RMS Radmin Tool Namedpipe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Add Xml Applocker Rules", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Deny Security Software With Applocker", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable Toast Notifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry DisAllow Windows App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Regedit Silent Reg Import", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows Powershell Import Applocker Policy", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Access Software RMS Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Service Rdpwinst Tool Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Services Allow Rdp In Firewall", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Services Allow Remote Assistance", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Services Rdp Enable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Stop By Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Windows Valid Account With Never Expires Password", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}]}, {"name": "Azure Active Directory Account Takeover", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2022-07-14", "version": 2, "id": "41514c46-7118-4eab-a9bb-f3bfa4e3bea9", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Account Takeover attacks against Azure Active Directory tenants.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-whatis", "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/active-directory/#overview", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-compare-azure-ad-to-ad", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/account-takeover-ato/", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/azure-active-directory", "https://www.barracuda.com/glossary/account-takeover"], "narrative": "Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) is Microsofts enterprise cloud-based identity and access management (IAM) service. Azure AD is the backbone of most of Azure services like Office 365. It can sync with on-premise Active Directory environments and provide authentication to other cloud-based systems via the OAuth protocol. According to Microsoft, Azure AD manages more than 1.2 billion identities and processes over 8 billion authentications per day. Account Takeover (ATO) is an attack whereby cybercriminals gain unauthorized access to online accounts by using different techniques like brute force, social engineering, phishing & spear phishing, credential stuffing, etc. By posing as the real user, cyber-criminals can change account details, send out phishing emails, steal financial information or sensitive data, or use any stolen information to access further accounts within the organization. This analytic storic groups detections that can help security operations teams identify the potential compromise of Azure Active Directory accounts.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Cloud Security", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1621", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1185", "mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1528", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Collection", "Resource Development", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Authentication", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Device Code Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Denied MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD OAuth Application Consent Granted By User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "Azure Active Directory High Risk Sign-in", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Device Code Authentication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multiple Denied MFA Requests For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD OAuth Application Consent Granted By User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal Authentication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Successful PowerShell Authentication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Successful Single-Factor Authentication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD User Consent Blocked for Risky Application", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD User Consent Denied for OAuth Application", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token"}]}]}, {"name": "Azure Active Directory Persistence", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2022-08-17", "version": 1, "id": "dca983db-6334-4a0d-be32-80611ca1396c", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with the execution of Persistence techniques against Azure Active Directory tenants.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-whatis", "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/active-directory/#overview", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/active-directory-compare-azure-ad-to-ad", "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/", "https://microsoft.github.io/Azure-Threat-Research-Matrix/Persistence/Persistence/"], "narrative": "Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) is Microsofts enterprise cloud-based identity and access management (IAM) service. Azure AD is the backbone of most of Azure services like Office 365. It can sync with on-premise Active Directory environments and provide authentication to other cloud-based systems via the OAuth protocol. According to Microsoft, Azure AD manages more than 1.2 billion identities and processes over 8 billion authentications per day. Persistence consists of techniques that adversaries use to keep access to systems across restarts, changed credentials, and other interruptions that could cut off their access. This analytic storic groups detections that can help security operations teams identify the potential execution of Persistence techniques targeting Azure Active Directory tenants. ", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1484.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trust Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1484", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Azure AD External Guest User Invited - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD New Custom Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD PIM Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Created - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD User Enabled And Password Reset - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD User ImmutableId Attribute Updated - Rule", "ESCU - Azure Automation Account Created - Rule", "ESCU - Azure Automation Runbook Created - Rule", "ESCU - Azure Runbook Webhook Created - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Account Passwords Changed - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Accounts Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Accounts Disabled - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "Azure AD External Guest User Invited", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD New Custom Domain Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trust Modification"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD New Federated Domain Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trust Modification"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD New MFA Method Registered", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD PIM Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal Created", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD User Enabled And Password Reset", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD User ImmutableId Attribute Updated", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Azure Automation Account Created", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure Automation Runbook Created", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure Runbook Webhook Created", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Account Passwords Changed", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Accounts Deleted", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Accounts Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2023-04-24", "version": 1, "id": "ec78e872-b79c-417d-b256-8fde902522fb", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Privilege Escalation attacks within Azure Active Directory tenants.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/", "https://cloudbrothers.info/en/azure-attack-paths/", "https://microsoft.github.io/Azure-Threat-Research-Matrix/PrivilegeEscalation/PrivEsc/", "https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5"], "narrative": "Privilege Escalation consists of techniques that adversaries use to gain higher-level permissions on a system or network. Adversaries can often enter and explore a network with unprivileged access but require elevated permissions to follow through on their objectives. Common approaches are to take advantage of system weaknesses, misconfigurations or vulnerabilities.\nAzure Active Directory (Azure AD) is Microsofts enterprise cloud-based identity and access management (IAM) service. Azure AD is the backbone of most of Azure services like Office 365 and Microsoft Teams. It can sync with on-premise Active Directory environments and provide authentication to other cloud-based systems via the OAuth protocol. According to Microsoft, Azure AD manages more than 1.2 billion identities and processes over 8 billion authentications per day.\nPrivilege escalation attacks in Azure AD typically involve abusing  misconfigurations to gain elevated privileges, such as Global Administrator access. Once an attacker has escalated their privileges and taken full control of a tenant, they may abuse every service that leverages Azure AD including moving laterally to Azure virtual machines to access sensitive data and carry out further attacks. Security teams should monitor for privilege escalation attacks in Azure Active Directory to identify breaches before attackers achieve operational success.\nThe following analytic story groups detection opportunities that seek to identify an adversary attempting to escalate privileges in Azure AD tenants.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Cloud Security", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD PIM Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Authentication Administrator Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Application Administrator Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Global Administrator Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD PIM Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD PIM Role Assignment Activated", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Privileged Authentication Administrator Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}]}, {"name": "Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "date": "2021-01-27", "version": 1, "id": "817b0dfc-23ba-4bcc-96cc-2cb77e428fbe", "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2021-3156. Discovered by the Qualys Research Team, this vulnerability has been found to affect sudo across multiple Linux distributions (Ubuntu 20.04 and prior, Debian 10 and prior, Fedora 33 and prior). As this vulnerability was committed to code in July 2011, there will be many distributions affected. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows any unprivileged user to gain root privileges on the vulnerable host.", "references": ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit"], "narrative": "A non-privledged user is able to execute the sudoedit command to trigger a buffer overflow. After the successful buffer overflow, they are then able to gain root privileges on the affected host. The conditions needed to be run are a trailing \"\\\" along with shell and edit flags. Monitoring the /var/log directory on Linux hosts using the Splunk Universal Forwarder will allow you to pick up this behavior when using the provided detection.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Shannon Davis", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 Segfault", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Detect Baron Samedit CVE-2021-3156 via OSQuery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}]}, {"name": "BishopFox Sliver Adversary Emulation Framework", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-01-24", "version": 1, "id": "8c2e2cba-3fd8-424f-a890-5080bdaf3f31", "description": "The following analytic story providers visibility into the latest adversary TTPs in regard to the use of Sliver. Sliver has gained more traction with adversaries as it is often seen as an alternative to Cobalt Strike. It is designed to be scalable and can be used by organizations of all sizes to perform security testing. Sliver is highly modular and contains an Extension package manager (armory) allowing easy install (automatic compilation) of various 3rd party tools such as BOFs and .NET tooling like Ghostpack (Rubeus, Seatbelt, SharpUp, Certify, and so forth) (CyberReason,2023).", "references": ["https://www.cybereason.com/blog/sliver-c2-leveraged-by-many-threat-actors", "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory%20Further%20TTPs%20associated%20with%20SVR%20cyber%20actors.pdf", "https://www.proofpoint.com/uk/blog/security-briefs/ta551-uses-sliver-red-team-tool-new-activity", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-analysis-report-bumblebee-loader-the-high-road-to-enterprise-domain-control", "https://github.com/sliverarmory/armory", "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver"], "narrative": "Sliver is an open source cross-platform adversary emulation/red team framework produced by BishopFox.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gorgon Group", "Rocke"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Notepad with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection into Notepad - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Create SliverC2 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Notepad with no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection into Notepad", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Create SliverC2", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "BITS Jobs", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-03-26", "version": 1, "id": "dbc7edce-8e4c-11eb-9f31-acde48001122", "description": "Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/bitsadmin-tool"], "narrative": "Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool. Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1197", "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "BITS Job Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs"}]}, {"name": "BITSAdmin Download File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs"}]}]}, {"name": "BlackByte Ransomware", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-07-10", "version": 1, "id": "b18259ac-0746-45d7-bd1f-81d65274a80b", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the BlackByte ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with BlackByte, persistence, initial access, account registry modification and more.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/06/the-five-day-job-a-blackbyte-ransomware-intrusion-case-study/"], "narrative": "BlackByte ransomware campaigns targeting business operations, involve the use of ransomware payloads, infection chain to collect and exfiltrate data and drop payload on the targeted system. BlackByte Ransomware operates by infiltrating a system through various methods, such as malicious email attachments, exploit kits, or compromised websites. Once inside a system, it begins encrypting files using strong encryption algorithms, rendering them unusable. After completing the encryption process, BlackByte Ransomware typically leaves a ransom note that explains the situation to the victim and provides instructions on how to pay the ransom to obtain the decryption key.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Winnti Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497", "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Darkhotel"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1563.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "RDP Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Collection", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry EnableLinkedConnections - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry LongPathsEnabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - Windows RDP Connection Successful - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded - Rule", "ESCU - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "High Process Termination Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Resize ShadowStorage volume", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Services Escalate Exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry EnableLinkedConnections", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry LongPathsEnabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows RDP Connection Successful", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "RDP Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected", "source": "web", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "BlackLotus Campaign", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-04-14", "version": 1, "id": "8eb0e418-a2b6-4327-a387-85c976662c8f", "description": "The first in-the-wild UEFI bootkit bypassing UEFI Secure Boot on fully updated UEFI systems is now a reality", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/03/01/blacklotus-uefi-bootkit-myth-confirmed/"], "narrative": "The number of UEFI vulnerabilities discovered in recent years and the failures in patching them or revoking vulnerable binaries within a reasonable time window hasn't gone unnoticed by threat actors. As a result, the first publicly known UEFI bootkit bypassing the essential platform security feature  UEFI Secure Boot  is now a reality. present the first public analysis of this UEFI bootkit, which is capable of running on even fully-up-to-date Windows 11 systems with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. Functionality of the bootkit and its individual features leads us to believe that we are dealing with a bootkit known as BlackLotus, the UEFI bootkit being sold on hacking forums for $5,000 since at least October 2022. (ESET, 2023) The following content aims to aid defenders in detecting suspicious bootloaders and understanding the diverse techniques employed in this campaign.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1542.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Firmware", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1542", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows BootLoader Inventory - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WinLogon with Public Network Connection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows BootLoader Inventory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Firmware"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows WinLogon with Public Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bootkit"}]}]}, {"name": "BlackMatter Ransomware", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-09-06", "version": 1, "id": "0da348a3-78a0-412e-ab27-2de9dd7f9fee", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the BlackMatter ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with BlackMatter, force safe mode boot, autadminlogon account registry modification and more.", "references": ["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/08/09/blackmatter-ransomware-emerges-from-the-shadow-of-darkside/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackmatter-ransomware-gang-rises-from-the-ashes-of-darkside-revil/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/ransomware/2021/07/blackmatter-a-new-ransomware-group-claims-link-to-darkside-revil/"], "narrative": "BlackMatter ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Impact"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Change To Safe Mode With Network Config - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Add DefaultUser And Password In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Bcdedit Command Back To Normal Mode Boot", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Change To Safe Mode With Network Config", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement"}]}, {"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "SchCache Change By App Connect And Create ADSI Object", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}]}, {"name": "Brand Monitoring", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2017-12-19", "version": 1, "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce78", "description": "Detect and investigate activity that may indicate that an adversary is using faux domains to mislead users into interacting with malicious infrastructure. Monitor DNS, email, and web traffic for permutations of your brand name.", "references": ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"], "narrative": "While you can educate your users and customers about the risks and threats posed by typosquatting, phishing, and corporate espionage, human error is a persistent fact of life. Of course, your adversaries are all too aware of this reality and will happily leverage it for nefarious purposes whenever possible&#51;phishing with lookalike addresses, embedding faux command-and-control domains in malware, and hosting malicious content on domains that closely mimic your corporate servers. This is where brand monitoring comes in.\nYou can use our adaptation of `DNSTwist`, together with the support searches in this Analytic Story, to generate permutations of specified brands and external domains. Splunk can monitor email, DNS requests, and web traffic for these permutations and provide you with early warnings and situational awareness--powerful elements of an effective defense.\nNotable events will include IP addresses, URLs, and user data. Drilling down can provide you with even more actionable intelligence, including likely geographic information, contextual searches to help you scope the problem, and investigative searches.", "tags": {"category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": ["Email", "Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Email Info", "Get Emails From Specific Sender", "Get Notable History", "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Brute Ratel C4", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-08-23", "version": 1, "id": "0ec9dbfe-f64e-46bb-8eb8-04e92326f513", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that may be related to Brute Ratel Red Teaming tool. This includes creation, modification and deletion of services, collection or data, ping IP, DNS cache, process injection, debug privileges adjustment, winlogon process duplicate token, lock workstation, get clipboard or screenshot and much more.", "references": ["https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/brute-ratel-c4-tool/", "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/08/part-3-how-i-met-your-beacon-brute-ratel/"], "narrative": "Brute RATEL BRC4 is the latest red-teaming tool that simulate several TTP's. It uses several techniques like syscall, patching ETW/AMSI and written in native C to minimize noise in process command-line. This tool was seen in the wild being abused by some ransomware (blackcat) and adversaries in their campaigns to install the BRC4 agent that can serve as remote admin tool to compromise the target host or network.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Evilnum", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Whitefly", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gorgon Group", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1219", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "RTM", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Thrip"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1589", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Identity Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "FIN13", "HEXANE", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1589.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Chimera", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1056.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "GUI Input Capture", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN4"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1056", "mitre_attack_technique": "Input Capture", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Collection", "Impact", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defacement Modify Transcodedwallpaper File - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Identity SAM Info - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hijack Execution Flow Version Dll Side Load - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Input Capture Using Credential UI Dll - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection With Public Source Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software BRC4 Loaded Dll - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Deletion In Registry - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defacement Modify Transcodedwallpaper File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement"}]}, {"name": "Windows Gather Victim Identity SAM Info", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Identity Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hijack Execution Flow Version Dll Side Load", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows Input Capture Using Credential UI Dll", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "GUI Input Capture"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Input Capture"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection With Public Source Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Access Software BRC4 Loaded Dll", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Deletion In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}]}, {"name": "Caddy Wiper", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2022-03-25", "version": 1, "id": "435a156a-8ef1-4184-bd52-22328fb65d3a", "description": "Caddy Wiper is a destructive payload that detects if its running on a Domain Controller and executes killswitch if detected. If not in a DC it destroys Users and subsequent mapped drives. This wiper also destroys drive partitions inculding boot partitions.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1503436420886712321", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/03/15/caddywiper-new-wiper-malware-discovered-ukraine/"], "narrative": "Caddy Wiper is destructive malware operation found by ESET multiple organizations in Ukraine. This malicious payload destroys user files, avoids executing on Dnomain Controllers and destroys boot and drive partitions.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}]}, {"name": "Chaos Ransomware", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-01-11", "version": 1, "id": "153d7b8f-27f2-4e4d-bae8-dfafd93a22a8", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Chaos ransomware, including looking for file writes (file encryption and ransomware notes), deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, dropping of files in startup folder, and more.", "references": ["https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/01/17/the-chaos-ransomware-can-be-ravaging", "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/chaos-ransomware-variant-in-fake-minecraft-alt-list-brings-destruction", "https://marcoramilli.com/2021/06/14/the-allegedly-ryuk-ransomware-builder-ryukjoke/", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/h/chaos-ransomware-a-dangerous-proof-of-concept.html"], "narrative": "CHAOS ransomware has been seen and monitored since 2021. This ransomware is purportedly a .NET version of Ryuk ransomware but upon closer look to its code and behavior, this malware sample reveals that it doesn't share much relation to the notorious RYUK ransomware. This ransomware is one of the known ransomware that was used in the ongoing geo-political war. This ransomware is capable to check that only one copy of itself is running on the targeted host, delay of execution as part of its defense evasion technique, persistence through registry and startup folder, drop a copy of itself in each root drive of the targeted host and also in %appdata% folder and many more. As of writing this ransomware is still active and keeps on infecting Windows Operating machines and Windows networks.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1091", "mitre_attack_technique": "Replication Through Removable Media", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Aoqin Dragon", "Darkhotel", "FIN7", "LuminousMoth", "Mustang Panda", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule", "ESCU - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Replication Through Removable Media", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Replication Through Removable Media"}]}, {"name": "Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "CISA AA22-257A", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-09-15", "version": 1, "id": "e1aec96e-bc7d-4edf-8ff7-3da9b7b29147", "description": "The Iranian government-sponsored APT actors are actively targeting a broad range of victims across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including the Transportation Sector and the Healthcare and Public Health Sector, as well as Australian organizations.", "references": ["https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-257a", "https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2021/210527.pdf", "https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/AA22-257A.stix.xml", "https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/iran"], "narrative": "This advisory updates joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities, which provides information on these Iranian government-sponsored APT actors exploiting known Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities to gain initial access to a broad range of targeted entities in furtherance of malicious activities, including ransom operations. The authoring agencies now judge these actors are an APT group affiliated with the IRGC. Since the initial reporting of this activity in the FBI Liaison Alert System (FLASH) report APT Actors Exploiting Fortinet Vulnerabilities to Gain Access for Malicious Activity from May 2021, the authoring agencies have continued to observe these IRGC-affiliated actors exploiting known vulnerabilities for initial access. In addition to exploiting Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, the authoring agencies have observed these APT actors exploiting VMware Horizon Log4j vulnerabilities for initial access. The IRGC-affiliated actors have used this access for follow-on activity, including disk encryption and data extortion, to support ransom operations. The IRGC-affiliated actors are actively targeting a broad range of entities, including entities across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors as well as Australian, Canadian, and United Kingdom organizations. These actors often operate under the auspices of Najee Technology Hooshmand Fater LLC, based in Karaj, Iran, and Afkar System Yazd Company, based in Yazd, Iran. The authoring agencies assess the actors are exploiting known vulnerabilities on unprotected networks rather than targeting specific targeted entities or sectors. This advisory provides observed tactics, techniques, and indicators of compromise (IOCs) that the authoring agencies assess are likely associated with this IRGC-affiliated APT. The authoring agencies urge organizations, especially critical infrastructure organizations, to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this advisory to mitigate risk of compromise from these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1572", "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT5", "BlackTech", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GCMAN", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Protocol Tunneling with Plink - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}]}, {"name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Local Admin account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Protocol Tunneling with Plink", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "CISA AA22-264A", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-09-22", "version": 1, "id": "bc7056a5-c3b0-4b83-93ce-5f31739305c8", "description": "Iranian State Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against the Government of Albania.", "references": ["https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-264a", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-264a-iranian-cyber-actors-conduct-cyber-operations-against-the-government-of-albania.pdf", "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/likely-iranian-threat-actor-conducts-politically-motivated-disruptive-activity-against", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government/"], "narrative": "The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory to provide information on recent cyber operations against the Government of Albania in July and September. This advisory provides a timeline of activity observed, from initial access to execution of encryption and wiper attacks. Additional information concerning files used by the actors during their exploitation of and cyber attack against the victim organization is provided in Appendices A and B. In September 2022, Iranian cyber actors launched another wave of cyber attacks against the Government of Albania, using similar TTPs and malware as the cyber attacks in July. These were likely done in retaliation for public attribution of the cyber attacks in July and severed diplomatic ties between Albania and Iran.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aoqin Dragon", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Ferocious Kitten", "Fox Kitten", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Sowbug", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1595", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System File on Disk - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows System File on Disk", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}]}, {"name": "CISA AA22-277A", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-10-05", "version": 1, "id": "db408f93-e915-4215-9962-5fada348bdd7", "description": "From November 2021 through January 2022, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) responded to advanced persistent threat (APT) activity on a Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector organization's enterprise network. During incident response activities, multiple utilities were utilized.", "references": ["https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-277a", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-277a-impacket-and-exfiltration-tool-used-to-steal-sensitive-information-from-defense-industrial-base-organization.pdf"], "narrative": "CISA uncovered that likely multiple APT groups compromised the organization's network, and some APT actors had long-term access to the environment. APT actors used an open-source toolkit called Impacket to gain their foothold within the environment and further compromise the network, and also used a custom data exfiltration tool, CovalentStealer, to steal the victim's sensitive data.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Collection", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery"}]}]}, {"name": "CISA AA22-320A", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-11-16", "version": 1, "id": "c1fca73d-3a8d-49a6-b9c0-1d5d155f7dd4", "description": "CISA and the FBI have identified an APT activity where the adversary gained initial access via Log4Shell via a unpatched VMware Horizon server. From there the adversary moved laterally and continued to its objective.", "references": ["https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-320a", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-320a_joint_csa_iranian_government-sponsored_apt_actors_compromise_federal%20network_deploy_crypto%20miner_credential_harvester.pdf"], "narrative": "From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an incident response engagement at a Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) organization where CISA observed suspected advanced persistent threat (APT) activity. In the course of incident response activities, CISA determined that cyber threat actors exploited the Log4Shell vulnerability in an unpatched VMware Horizon server, installed XMRig crypto mining software, moved laterally to the domain controller (DC), compromised credentials, and then implanted Ngrok reverse proxies on several hosts to maintain persistence. CISA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assess that the FCEB network was compromised by Iranian government-sponsored APT actors.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090", "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Winnti Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1572", "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1102", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "EXOTIC LILY", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "LazyScripter", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Akira", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Web", "Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ESCU - GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver - Rule", "ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule", "ESCU - Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network - Rule", "ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "GetAdComputer with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service"}]}, {"name": "Hunting for Log4Shell", "source": "web", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "CISA AA23-347A", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2023-12-14", "version": 1, "id": "16fc8e63-7b1e-4b25-8984-6fa595fe480f", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might be related to the  SVR cyber activity tactics and techniques. While SVR followed a similar playbook in each compromise, they also adjusted to each operating environment and not all presented steps or actions below were executed on every host.", "references": ["https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a"], "narrative": "SVR cyber operations pose a persistent threat to public and private organizations' networks globally. Since 2013, cybersecurity companies and governments have reported on SVR operations targeting victim networks to steal confidential and proprietary information. A decade later, the authoring agencies can infer a long-term targeting pattern aimed at collecting, and enabling the collection of, foreign intelligence, a broad concept that for Russia encompasses information on the politics, economics, and military of foreign states; science and technology; and foreign counterintelligence. The SVR also conducts cyber operations targeting technology companies that enable future cyber operations. The SVR's recent operation has targeted networks hosting TeamCity servers, further underscoring its persistent focus on technology companies. By leveraging CVE-2023-42793, a vulnerability within a software development program, the SVR seeks to gain access to victims, potentially compromising numerous software developers' networks. JetBrains responded to this threat by issuing a patch in mid-September 2023, limting the SVR's ability to exploit Internet-accessible TeamCity servers lacking the necessary updates. Despite this mitigation, the SVR has yet to utilize its acquired access to software developers' networks for breaching customer systems. It appears that the SVR is still in the preparatory stages of its operation.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSA Secrets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT33", "Dragonfly", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "APT5"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1649", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Akira", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1057", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT37", "APT38", "APT5", "Andariel", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Winnti Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Collection", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Command Line Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Account Discovery for Sam Account Name - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Account Discovery With NetUser PreauthNotRequire - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Archive Collected Data via Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Known GraphicalProton Loaded Modules - Rule", "ESCU - Windows LSA Secrets NoLMhash Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Restricted Admin - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Commandline Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Create Service - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Stop Win Updates - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System User Privilege Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabled Kerberos Pre-Authentication Discovery With Get-ADUser", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting"}]}, {"name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "ETW Registry Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUser with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy with Powershell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Get DomainUser with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Rubeus Command Line Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "AS-REP Roasting"}]}, {"name": "Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Services Escalate Exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Account Discovery for None Disable User Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows Account Discovery for Sam Account Name", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Account Discovery With NetUser PreauthNotRequire", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Archive Collected Data via Powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Notification Center", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows DISM Remove Defender", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Domain Account Discovery Via Get-NetComputer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}]}, {"name": "Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Known GraphicalProton Loaded Modules", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows LSA Secrets NoLMhash Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSA Secrets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable Restricted Admin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable Win Defender Raw Write Notif", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable Windows Security Center Notif", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disabling WER Settings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Suppress Win Defender Notif", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView SPN Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Commandline Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Query Registry Reg Save", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Create Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation on Remote Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Stop Win Updates", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Windows System User Privilege Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinRM Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Cisco IOS XE Software Web Management User Interface vulnerability", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-17", "version": 1, "id": "b5394b6a-b774-4bb6-a2bc-98f98cf7be88", "description": "Cisco has identified active exploitation of a previously unknown vulnerability in the Web User Interface (Web UI) feature of Cisco IOS XE software (CVE-2023-20198) when exposed to the internet or untrusted networks. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to create an account on the affected device with privilege level 15 access, effectively granting them full control of the compromised device and allowing possible subsequent unauthorized activity.", "references": ["https://blog.talosintelligence.com/active-exploitation-of-cisco-ios-xe-software/"], "narrative": "Cisco discovered early evidence of potentially malicious activity on September 28, 2023, when a case was opened with Cisco's Technical Assistance Center (TAC) that identified unusual behavior on a customer device. Upon further investigation, they observed what they have determined to be related activity as early as September 18. The activity included an authorized user creating a local user account under the username cisco_tac_admin from a suspicious IP address. On October 12, Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) and TAC detected what they later determined to be an additional cluster of related activity that began on that same day. In this cluster, an unauthorized user was observed creating a local user account under the name cisco_support from a second suspicious IP address. Unlike the September case, this October activity included several subsequent actions, including the deployment of an implant consisting of a configuration file (cisco_service.conf). The configuration file defines the new web server endpoint (URI path) used to interact with the implant. That endpoint receives certain parameters, described in more detail below, that allows the actor to execute arbitrary commands at the system level or IOS level. For the implant to become active, the web server must be restarted; in at least one observed case the server was not restarted so the implant never became active despite being installed.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Cisco IOS XE Implant Access - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Cisco IOS XE Implant Access", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway CVE-2023-4966", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-24", "version": 1, "id": "b194d644-4095-431a-bee0-a8e6ec067414", "description": "A critical security update, CVE-2023-4966, has been released for NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway. This vulnerability, discovered by our internal team, can result in unauthorized data disclosure if exploited. Reports of incidents consistent with session hijacking have been received. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added an entry for CVE-2023-4966 to its Known Exploited and Vulnerabilities Catalog. No workarounds are available for this vulnerability, and immediate installation of the recommended builds is strongly advised.", "references": ["https://www.netscaler.com/blog/news/cve-2023-4966-critical-security-update-now-available-for-netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway/", "https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX579459/netscaler-adc-and-netscaler-gateway-security-bulletin-for-cve20234966-and-cve20234967", "https://www.assetnote.io/resources/research/citrix-bleed-leaking-session-tokens-with-cve-2023-4966", "https://github.com/assetnote/exploits/tree/main/citrix/CVE-2023-4966", "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/b815d23b908de52996060163091395d1c89fbeea/http/cves/2023/CVE-2023-4966.yaml"], "narrative": "On October 10, 2023, Cloud Software Group released builds to fix CVE-2023-4966, a vulnerability affecting NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway. This vulnerability, if exploited, can lead to unauthorized data disclosure and possibly session hijacking. Although there were no known exploits at the time of disclosure, we have since received credible reports of targeted attacks exploiting this vulnerability. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added an entry for CVE-2023-4966 to its Known Exploited and Vulnerabilities Catalog, which contains detection and mitigation guidance for observed exploitations of CVE-2023-4966 by threat actors against NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway. We strongly recommend that users of affected builds immediately install the recommended builds, as this vulnerability has been identified as critical. No workarounds are available for this vulnerability.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Citrix ADC and Gateway Unauthorized Data Disclosure - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Citrix ADC and Gateway Unauthorized Data Disclosure", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Citrix Netscaler ADC CVE-2023-3519", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-07-20", "version": 1, "id": "094df1fe-4345-4c01-8a0f-c65cf7b758bd", "description": "The CVE-2023-3519 vulnerability in NetScaler (formerly Citrix) Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and NetScaler Gateway has been exploited by threat actors, as detailed in a recent advisory. The unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability was utilized as a zero-day to establish a webshell on a non-production environment NetScaler ADC appliance within a critical infrastructure organization. This facilitated the execution of discovery on the victim's active directory and the collection and exfiltration of data. The advisory offers a comprehensive examination of the threat actors' tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), alongside recommended detection methods and incident response guidelines. Immediate patch application from Citrix and the use of the detection guidance in the advisory is strongly recommended for critical infrastructure organizations to mitigate system compromises.", "references": ["https://attackerkb.com/topics/si09VNJhHh/cve-2023-3519", "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/aa23-201a_csa_threat_actors_exploiting_citrix-cve-2023-3519_to_implant_webshells.pdf", "https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX561482/citrix-adc-and-citrix-gateway-security-bulletin-for-cve20233519-cve20233466-cve20233467"], "narrative": "Recent advisories have highlighted the exploitation of CVE-2023-3519, a critical vulnerability in Citrix's NetScaler Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and NetScaler Gateway. In June 2023, threat actors utilized this vulnerability to implant a webshell on a NetScaler ADC appliance within a critical infrastructure organization's non-production environment. This action granted them the ability to perform active directory discovery, data collection, and exfiltration. Notably, attempts for lateral movement to a domain controller were obstructed by network-segmentation controls.\nThe compromised organization reported the breach, leading Citrix to issue a patch on July 18, 2023. Multiple advisories have since outlined the threat actors' tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), including their initial access, persistence, privilege escalation, defense evasion, credential access, discovery, collection, command and control, and impact. These advisories also provide detection methods and recommend incident response measures.\nThe threat actors executed several activities during their attack, such as uploading a TGZ file with a generic webshell, discovery script, and setuid binary on the ADC appliance; conducting SMB scanning on the subnet; using the webshell for active directory enumeration and data exfiltration; and accessing NetScaler configuration files and decryption keys. They also decrypted an active directory credential, queried the active directory for various information, encrypted collected data, exfiltrated it as an image file, and attempted to erase their artifacts. Despite these actions, further discovery and lateral movement were impeded due to the organization's network-segmentation controls. \\\nAdvisories suggest conducting specific checks on the ADC shell interface to detect signs of compromise. If a compromise is detected, organizations should isolate potentially affected hosts, reimage compromised hosts, provide new account credentials, collect and review artifacts, and report the compromise. To mitigate the threat, organizations are advised to promptly install the relevant updates for NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway, adhere to cybersecurity best practices, and apply robust network-segmentation controls on NetScaler appliances and other internet-facing devices.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Citrix ADC Exploitation CVE-2023-3519 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Citrix ADC Exploitation CVE-2023-3519", "source": "web", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Citrix ShareFile RCE CVE-2023-24489", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-07-26", "version": 1, "id": "10c7e01a-5743-4995-99df-a66f6b5db653", "description": "A critical vulnerability has been discovered in ShareFile's Storage Zones Controller software (CVE-2023-24489), used by numerous organizations for file sharing and storage. The vulnerability allows unauthenticated arbitrary file upload and remote code execution due to a cryptographic bug in the software's encryption but lack of authentication system. The risk comes from a failing encryption check, allowing potential cybercriminals to upload malicious files to the server. The bug was found in the Documentum Connector's .aspx files. The security risk has a potentially large impact due to the software's wide use and the sensitivity of the stored data. Citrix has released a security update to address this issue.", "references": ["https://www.greynoise.io/blog/introducing-cve-2023-24489-a-critical-citrix-sharefile-rce-vulnerability", "https://blog.assetnote.io/2023/07/04/citrix-sharefile-rce/"], "narrative": "The ShareFile Storage Zones Controller is a .NET web application running under IIS, which manages the storage of files in ShareFile's system. It was discovered that this software has a critical vulnerability (CVE-2023-24489) in the file upload functionality provided by the Documentum Connector's .aspx files. Specifically, the security flaw lies in the encryption check in the file upload process which could be bypassed, allowing for unauthenticated arbitrary file uploads and remote code execution.\nThe application sets the current principal from a session cookie, but if this is missing, the application continues without authentication. The application uses AES encryption, with CBC mode and PKCS#7 padding. A decryption check is in place which returns an error if the decryption fails, but this can be bypassed by supplying a ciphertext that results in valid padding after decryption, thereby not causing an exception.\nThe Documentum Connector's upload.aspx file, when uploading a file, calls the ProcessRawPostedFile function, which allows a path traversal due to improper sanitization of the 'uploadId' parameter. It allows the 'filename' and 'uploadId' parameters to be concatenated, and while the 'filename' parameter is sanitized, the 'uploadId' is not. The 'parentid' parameter is passed in but is also not used.\nThe vulnerability enables an attacker to upload a webshell or any other malicious file, by providing a properly padded encrypted string for the 'parentid' parameter, and specifying the path for the 'uploadId' and the name for the 'filename'. An attacker can achieve remote code execution by requesting the uploaded file. The issue was addressed by Citrix in a recent security update.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Citrix ShareFile Exploitation CVE-2023-24489 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Citrix ShareFile Exploitation CVE-2023-24489", "source": "web", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Clop Ransomware", "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-03-17", "version": 1, "id": "5a6f6849-1a26-4fae-aa05-fa730556eeb6", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Clop ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Clope, encrypting network shares, deleting and resizing shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.", "references": ["https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/analyst-note-cl0p-tlp-white.pdf", "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115250/data-breach/qualys-clop-ransomware.html", "https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/qualys-is-the-latest-victim-of-accellion-data-breach/d/d-id/1340323"], "narrative": "Clop ransomware campaigns targeting healthcare and other vertical sectors, involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data per HHS bulletin. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Execution", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Clop Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Clop Ransomware Known Service Name - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - Resize ShadowStorage volume - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "Clop Common Exec Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Clop Ransomware Known Service Name", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "High Process Termination Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Resize ShadowStorage volume", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Cloud Cryptomining", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2019-10-02", "version": 1, "id": "3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a", "description": "Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "narrative": "Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority.\nCryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Azure. It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN.\nWhen malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated.\nThis Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your cloud environment to help prevent cryptominers from gaining a foothold. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Change"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "Get EC2 Launch Details", "Get Notable History", "Investigate AWS activities via region name"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Cloud Federated Credential Abuse", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2021-01-26", "version": 1, "id": "cecdc1e7-0af2-4a55-8967-b9ea62c0317d", "description": "This analytical story addresses events that indicate abuse of cloud federated credentials. These credentials are usually extracted from endpoint desktop or servers specially those servers that provide federation services such as Windows Active Directory Federation Services. Identity Federation relies on objects such as Oauth2 tokens, cookies or SAML assertions in order to provide seamless access between cloud and perimeter environments. If these objects are either hijacked or forged then attackers will be able to pivot into victim's cloud environements.", "references": ["https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/golden-saml-newly-discovered-attack-technique-forges-authentication-to-cloud-apps", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a"], "narrative": "This story is composed of detection searches based on endpoint that addresses the use of Mimikatz, Escalation of Privileges and Abnormal processes that may indicate the extraction of Federated directory objects such as passwords, Oauth2 tokens, certificates and keys. Cloud environment (AWS, Azure) related events are also addressed in specific cloud environment detection searches.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal - Rule", "ESCU - AWS SAML Update identity provider - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703 - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "AWS SAML Access by Provider User and Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "AWS SAML Update identity provider", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 Added Service Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}]}, {"name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4703", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}]}, {"name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-02-16", "version": 1, "id": "bcfd17e8-5461-400a-80a2-3b7d1459220c", "description": "Cobalt Strike is threat emulation software. Red teams and penetration testers use Cobalt Strike to demonstrate the risk of a breach and evaluate mature security programs. Most recently, Cobalt Strike has become the choice tool by threat groups due to its ease of use and extensibility.", "references": ["https://www.cobaltstrike.com/", "https://www.infocyte.com/blog/2020/09/02/cobalt-strike-the-new-favorite-among-thieves/", "https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2017-01-24-how-to-write-malleable-c2-profiles-for-cobalt-strike/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/09/coverage-strikes-back-cobalt-strike-paper.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html", "https://github.com/MichaelKoczwara/Awesome-CobaltStrike-Defence", "https://github.com/zer0yu/Awesome-CobaltStrike"], "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has many ways to be enhanced by using aggressor scripts, malleable C2 profiles, default attack packages, and much more. For endpoint behavior, Cobalt Strike is most commonly identified via named pipes, spawn to processes, and DLL function names. Many additional variables are provided for in memory operation of the beacon implant. On the network, depending on the malleable C2 profile used, it is near infinite in the amount of ways to conceal the C2 traffic with Cobalt Strike. Not every query may be specific to Cobalt Strike the tool, but the methodologies and techniques used by it.\nSplunk Threat Research reviewed all publicly available instances of Malleabe C2 Profiles and generated a list of the most commonly used spawnto and pipenames.\n`Spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64` is the process that Cobalt Strike will spawn and injects shellcode into.\nPipename sets the named pipe name used in Cobalt Strikes Beacon SMB C2 traffic.\nWith that, new detections were generated focused on these spawnto processes spawning without command line arguments. Similar, the named pipes most commonly used by Cobalt Strike added as a detection. In generating content for Cobalt Strike, the following is considered:\n- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to have no command line arguments? No command line arguments and a network connection?\n- What is the default, or normal, process lineage for spawnto_ value?\n- Does the spawnto_ value make network connections?\n- Is it normal for spawnto_ value to load jscript, vbscript, Amsi.dll, and clr.dll?\nWhile investigating a detection related to this Analytic Story, keep in mind the parent process, process path, and any file modifications that may occur. Tuning may need to occur to remove any false positives.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Collection", "Execution", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Services Escalate Exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}]}, {"name": "ColdRoot MacOS RAT", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "date": "2019-01-09", "version": 1, "id": "bd91a2bc-d20b-4f44-a982-1bea98e86390", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that relate to the ColdRoot Remote Access Trojan that affects MacOS. An example of some of these activities are changing sensative binaries in the MacOS sub-system, detecting process names and executables associated with the RAT, detecting when a keyboard tab is installed on a MacOS machine and more.", "references": ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"], "narrative": "Conventional wisdom holds that Apple's MacOS operating system is significantly less vulnerable to attack than Windows machines. While that point is debatable, it is true that attacks against MacOS systems are much less common. However, this fact does not mean that Macs are impervious to breaches. To the contrary, research has shown that that Mac malware is increasing at an alarming rate. According to AV-test, in 2018, there were 86,865 new MacOS malware variants, up from 27,338 the year before&#151;a 31% increase. In contrast, the independent research firm found that new Windows malware had increased from 65.17M to 76.86M during that same period, less than half the rate of growth. The bottom line is that while the numbers look a lot smaller than Windows, it's definitely time to take Mac security more seriously.\nThis Analytic Story addresses the ColdRoot remote access trojan (RAT), which was uploaded to Github in 2016, but was still escaping detection by the first quarter of 2018, when a new, more feature-rich variant was discovered masquerading as an Apple audio driver. Among other capabilities, the Pascal-based ColdRoot can heist passwords from users' keychains and remotely control infected machines without detection. In the initial report of his findings, Patrick Wardle, Chief Research Officer for Digita Security, explained that the new ColdRoot RAT could start and kill processes on the breached system, spawn new remote-desktop sessions, take screen captures and assemble them into a live stream of the victim's desktop, and more.\nSearches in this Analytic Story leverage the capabilities of OSquery to address ColdRoot detection from several different angles, such as looking for the existence of associated files and processes, and monitoring for signs of an installed keylogger.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - MacOS - Re-opened Applications - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Investigate Network Traffic From src ip"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Jose Hernandez", "detections": [{"name": "Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "MacOS - Re-opened Applications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Processes Tapping Keyboard Events", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Collection and Staging", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-03", "version": 1, "id": "8e03c61e-13c4-4dcd-bfbe-5ce5a8dc031a", "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities--such as suspicious writes to the Windows Recycling Bin or email servers sending high amounts of traffic to specific hosts, for example--that may indicate that an adversary is harvesting and exfiltrating sensitive data. ", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"], "narrative": "A common adversary goal is to identify and exfiltrate data of value from a target organization. This data may include email conversations and addresses, confidential company information, links to network design/infrastructure, important dates, and so on.\nAttacks are composed of three activities: identification, collection, and staging data for exfiltration. Identification typically involves scanning systems and observing user activity. Collection can involve the transfer of large amounts of data from various repositories. Staging/preparation includes moving data to a central location and compressing (and optionally encoding and/or encrypting) it. All of these activities provide opportunities for defenders to identify their presence.\nUse the searches to detect and monitor suspicious behavior related to these activities.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "Chimera", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN4", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed 7-Zip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed WinRAR - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Email files written outside of the Outlook directory", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious writes to System Volume Information", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed 7-Zip", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed WinRAR", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}]}]}, {"name": "Command And Control", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2018-06-01", "version": 1, "id": "943773c6-c4de-4f38-89a8-0b92f98804d8", "description": "Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate Command And Control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"], "narrative": "Threat actors typically architect and implement an infrastructure to use in various ways during the course of their attack campaigns. In some cases, they leverage this infrastructure for scanning and performing reconnaissance activities. In others, they may use this infrastructure to launch actual attacks. One of the most important functions of this infrastructure is to establish servers that will communicate with implants on compromised endpoints. These servers establish a command and control channel that is used to proxy data between the compromised endpoint and the attacker. These channels relay commands from the attacker to the compromised endpoint and the output of those commands back to the attacker.\nBecause this communication is so critical for an adversary, they often use techniques designed to hide the true nature of the communications. There are many different techniques used to establish and communicate over these channels. This Analytic Story provides searches that look for a variety of the techniques used for these channels, as well as indications that these channels are active, by examining logs associated with border control devices and network-access control lists.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1219", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "RTM", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Thrip"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "LazyScripter", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1568.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1095", "mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "BITTER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "FIN6", "HAFNIUM", "Metador", "PLATINUM", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090", "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-hop Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "FIN4", "Inception", "Leviathan"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1189", "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Andariel", "Axiom", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mustard Tempest", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Command And Control", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get DNS traffic ratio", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity", "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detection of DNS Tunnels", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Access Software Hunt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}]}, {"name": "Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Excessive DNS Failures", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Protocol or Port Mismatch", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "TOR Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-hop Proxy"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}]}, {"name": "Compromised User Account", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2023-01-19", "version": 1, "id": "19669154-e9d1-4a01-b144-e6592a078092", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Compromised User Account attacks.", "references": ["https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/compromised-account"], "narrative": "Compromised User Account occurs when cybercriminals gain unauthorized access to accounts by using different techniques like brute force, social engineering, phishing & spear phishing, credential stuffing, etc. By posing as the real user, cyber-criminals can change account details, send out phishing emails, steal financial information or sensitive data, or use any stolen information to access further accounts within the organization. This analytic story groups detections that can help security operations teams identify the potential signs of Compromised User Accounts.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1621", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1185", "mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1201", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Collection", "Discovery", "Resource Development", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Change", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Weaponization", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response - Rule", "ESCU - PingID Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ESCU - PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset - Rule", "ESCU - PingID New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - ASL AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ESCU - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule", "ESCU - AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Password Policy Changes - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "PingID Mismatch Auth Source and Verification Response", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration"}]}, {"name": "PingID Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "PingID New MFA Method After Credential Reset", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration"}]}, {"name": "PingID New MFA Method Registered For User", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "ASL AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "ASL AWS Password Policy Changes", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "AWS Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "AWS Password Policy Changes", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Policy Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD New MFA Method Registered For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Successful Authentication From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}]}, {"name": "Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server Vulnerabilities", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2024-01-22", "version": 1, "id": "509387a5-ab53-4656-8bb5-4bc8c2c074d9", "description": "The following analytic story covers use cases for detecting and investigating potential attacks against Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server.", "references": ["https://confluence.atlassian.com/security/cve-2023-22527-rce-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-confluence-data-center-and-confluence-server-1333990257.html"], "narrative": "The analytic story of Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server encompasses a comprehensive approach to safeguarding these platforms from a variety of threats. By leveraging the analytics created in the project, security teams are equipped to detect, investigate, and respond to potential attacks that target Confluence environments.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Confluence Pre-Auth RCE via OGNL Injection CVE-2023-22527 - Rule", "ESCU - Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Confluence Pre-Auth RCE via OGNL Injection CVE-2023-22527", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Confluence Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution CVE-2022-26134", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "ConnectWise ScreenConnect Vulnerabilities", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2024-02-21", "version": 1, "id": "fbee3185-748c-40d8-a60c-c2e2c9eb738b", "description": "This analytic story provides a comprehensive overview of the ConnectWise ScreenConnect vulnerabilities.", "references": ["https://www.huntress.com/blog/a-catastrophe-for-control-understanding-the-screenconnect-authentication-bypass", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/detection-guidance-for-connectwise-cwe-288-2", "https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/connectwise-screenconnect-23.9.8"], "narrative": "The following analytic story includes content for recently disclosed CWE-288 Authentication Bypass and CWE-22 Path Traversal. The vulnerabilities, identified as critical with CVSS scores of 10 and 9.8, respectively, enable unauthorized users to bypass authentication and perform path traversal attacks on affected ScreenConnect instances. The analytic story includes detection analytics for both vulnerabilities, which are crucial for identifying and responding to active exploitation in environments running affected versions of ScreenConnect (23.9.7 and prior). It is recommended to update to version 23.9.8 or above immediately to remediate the issues, as detailed in the ConnectWise security advisory and further analyzed by Huntress researchers. The analytic story also includes guidance on how to implement the detection analytics, known false positives, and references to additional resources for further analysis and remediation.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal - Rule", "ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Windows SACL - Rule", "ESCU - ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Nginx ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Windows SACL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Nginx ConnectWise ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Credential Dumping", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-04", "version": 3, "id": "854d78bf-d0e2-4f4e-b05c-640905f86d7a", "description": "Uncover activity consistent with credential dumping, a technique wherein attackers compromise systems and attempt to obtain and exfiltrate passwords. The threat actors use these pilfered credentials to further escalate privileges and spread throughout a target environment. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to credential dumping.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"], "narrative": "Credential dumping&#151;gathering credentials from a target system, often hashed or encrypted&#151;is a common attack technique. Even though the credentials may not be in plain text, an attacker can still exfiltrate the data and set to cracking it offline, on their own systems. The threat actors target a variety of sources to extract them, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority (LSA), NTDS from Domain Controllers, or the Group Policy Preference (GPP) files.\nOnce attackers obtain valid credentials, they use them to move throughout a target network with ease, discovering new systems and identifying assets of interest. Credentials obtained in this manner typically include those of privileged users, which may provide access to more sensitive information and system operations.\nThe detection searches in this Analytic Story monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, the usage of shadowcopies for credential dumping and some other techniques for credential dumping.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Mustang Panda", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "FIN10", "FIN7", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "PROMETHIUM", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials In Files", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Scattered Spider", "TA505", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Change", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Potential password in username - Rule", "ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Createdump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", "Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts", "Investigate Previous Unseen User"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}]}, {"name": "Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}]}, {"name": "Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Create Remote Thread into LSASS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect Copy of ShadowCopy with Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Esentutl SAM Copy", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Potential password in username", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials In Files"}]}, {"name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Createdump", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hunting System Account Targeting Lsass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Non-System Account Targeting Lsass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}]}, {"name": "CVE-2022-40684 Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-10-14", "version": 1, "id": "55721831-577e-41be-beef-bdc03c81486a", "description": "Fortinet recently patched a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in their FortiOS, FortiProxy, and FortiSwitchManager projects CVE-2022-40684.", "references": ["https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2022/10/threat-advisory-cve-2022-40684-fortinet-appliance-auth-bypass/", "https://www.horizon3.ai/fortios-fortiproxy-and-fortiswitchmanager-authentication-bypass-technical-deep-dive-cve-2022-40684/", "https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2022-40684", "https://attackerkb.com/topics/QWOxGIKkGx/cve-2022-40684/rapid7-analysis", "https://www.greynoise.io/blog/fortios-authentication-bypass"], "narrative": "FortiOS exposes a management web portal that allows a user configure the system. Additionally, a user can SSH into the system which exposes a locked down CLI interface. Any HTTP requests to the management interface of the system that match the conditions above should be cause for concern. An attacker can use this vulnerability to do just about anything they want to the vulnerable system. This includes changing network configurations, adding new users, and initiating packet captures. Note that this is not the only way to exploit this vulnerability and there may be other sets of conditions that work. For instance, a modified version of this exploit uses the User-Agent Node.js. This exploit seems to follow a trend among recently discovered enterprise software vulnerabilities where HTTP headers are improperly validated or overly trusted. (ref Horizon3.ai)", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Fortinet Appliance Auth bypass", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-03-10", "version": 1, "id": "b1aeaf2c-8496-42e7-b2f7-15c328bc75d9", "description": "A proof-of-concept for CVE-2023-21716, a critical vulnerability in Microsoft Word that allows remote code execution utilizing a heap corruption in rich text files.", "references": ["https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/proof-of-concept-released-for-critical-microsoft-word-rce-bug/"], "narrative": "This analytic story covers content that will assist organizations in identifying potential RTF RCE abuse on endpoints. The vulnerability was assigned a 9.8 out of 10 severity score, with Microsoft addressing it in the February Patch Tuesday security updates along with a couple of workarounds. Security researcher Joshua Drake last year discovered the vulnerability in Microsoft Office''s \"wwlib.dll\" and sent Microsoft a technical advisory containing proof-of-concept (PoC) code showing the issue is exploitable. A remote attacker could potentially take advantage of the issue to execute code with the same privileges as the victim that opens a malicious .RTF document. Delivering the malicious file to a victim can be as easy as an attachment to an email, although plenty of other methods exist. Microsoft warns that users don''t have to open a malicious RTF document and simply loading the file in the Preview Pane is enough for the compromise to start. (BleepingComputer, 2023)", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Office Application Drop Executable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning Windows Script Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}]}, {"name": "CVE-2023-22515 Privilege Escalation Vulnerability Confluence Data Center and Server", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-04", "version": 1, "id": "ead8eb10-9e7c-4a07-a44c-c6e73997a1a3", "description": "On October 4, 2023, Atlassian disclosed a critical privilege escalation vulnerability, CVE-2023-22515, affecting on-premises instances of Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center. This flaw might allow external attackers to exploit accessible Confluence instances, creating unauthorized Confluence administrator accounts. Indicators suggest the vulnerability is remotely exploitable. The affected versions range from 8.0.0 to 8.5.1, but versions prior to 8.0.0 and Atlassian Cloud sites are unaffected. Atlassian advises customers to update to a fixed version or implement mitigation strategies. Indicators of compromise (IoCs) and mitigation steps, such as blocking access to /setup/* endpoints, are provided.", "references": ["https://confluence.atlassian.com/security/cve-2023-22515-privilege-escalation-vulnerability-in-confluence-data-center-and-server-1295682276.html", "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/10/04/etr-cve-2023-22515-zero-day-privilege-escalation-in-confluence-server-and-data-center/"], "narrative": "Upon Atlassian's disclosure of CVE-2023-22515, there's an immediate need to assess the threat landscape of on-premises Confluence installations. As the vulnerability affects privilege escalation and may be exploited remotely, SIEM solutions should be poised to detect potential threats.\nBy monitoring for specific indicators of compromise, security teams can get ahead of any potential breaches. Key indicators include unexpected members in the 'confluence-administrator' group, newly created user accounts, and specific HTTP requests to /setup/*.action endpoints. Any unusual spikes or patterns associated with these indicators might signify an ongoing or attempted exploitation.\nFurthermore, an audit trail of past logs is essential. Analyzing older logs might uncover any unnoticed exploitation, allowing for a post-incident analysis and ensuring affected systems are patched or isolated. An alert mechanism should be established for any access or changes related to /setup/* endpoints.\nIn parallel, updating the affected Confluence Server and Data Center versions to the fixed releases is paramount. If immediate updates aren't feasible, interim mitigation measures, such as blocking external network access to /setup/*, should be implemented, and logs around this activity should be monitored.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Confluence CVE-2023-22515 Trigger Vulnerability - Rule", "ESCU - Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Web Remote ShellServlet Access - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Confluence CVE-2023-22515 Trigger Vulnerability", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Confluence Data Center and Server Privilege Escalation", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Web Remote ShellServlet Access", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "CVE-2023-23397 Outlook Elevation of Privilege", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-03-15", "version": 1, "id": "b459911b-551f-480f-a402-18cf89ca1e9c", "description": "Microsoft has released CVE-2023-23397 to address the critical elevation of privilege (EoP) vulnerability affecting Microsoft Outlook for Windows.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/ACEResponder/status/1636116096506818562?s=20", "https://twitter.com/domchell/status/1635999068282408962?s=20", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2023/03/microsoft-mitigates-outlook-elevation-of-privilege-vulnerability/", "https://www.pwndefend.com/2023/03/15/the-long-game-persistent-hash-theft/"], "narrative": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence discovered limited, targeted abuse of a vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook for Windows that allows for new technology LAN manager (NTLM) credential theft. Microsoft has released CVE-2023-23397 to address the critical elevation of privilege (EoP) vulnerability affecting Microsoft Outlook for Windows. We strongly recommend all customers update Microsoft Outlook for Windows to remain secure. CVE-2023-23397 is a critical EoP vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook that is triggered when an attacker sends a message with an extended MAPI property with a UNC path to an SMB (TCP 445) share on a threat actor-controlled server. No user interaction is required. The connection to the remote SMB server sends the user''s NTLM negotiation message, which the attacker can then relay for authentication against other systems that support NTLM authentication. Online services such as Microsoft 365 do not support NTLM authentication and are not vulnerable to being attacked by these messages. (2023, Microsoft)", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows Rundll32 WebDAV Request - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rundll32 WebDav With Network Connection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows Rundll32 WebDAV Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows Rundll32 WebDav With Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}]}, {"name": "CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-07-11", "version": 1, "id": "dd7fb691-63d6-47ad-9a7f-1b9005cefad2", "description": "CVE-2023-36884 is an unpatched zero-day vulnerability affecting Windows and Microsoft Office products. The vulnerability allows for remote code execution through specially crafted Microsoft Office documents, enabling an attacker to operate in the context of the victim. As of now, there are no security updates available. However, users of Microsoft Defender for Office and the \"Block all Office applications from creating child processes\" Attack Surface Reduction Rule are safeguarded against this exploit. For other users, temporary mitigation can be achieved by adding specific application names to a designated registry key.", "references": ["https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/22ad19081300493e70ce0b873e98b2d0", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2023-36884", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-july-2023-patch-tuesday-warns-of-6-zero-days-132-flaws/", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/07/11/storm-0978-attacks-reveal-financial-and-espionage-motives/"], "narrative": "CVE-2023-36884 is a serious security vulnerability that affects a range of Microsoft Office products and Windows systems. It is a zero-day flaw, meaning it was already being exploited before Microsoft became aware of it or had a chance to develop a patch.\nAn attacker exploiting this vulnerability would create a Microsoft Office document containing malicious code. This document, when opened by the victim, allows for remote code execution, giving the attacker the ability to run their own code on the victim's machine. This poses a significant risk as the attacker could perform actions like data theft, system damage, or creating backdoors for future access.\nCurrently, there is no security patch available from Microsoft, which makes the issue more critical. Microsoft is working on investigating these vulnerabilities and will likely provide a security update either through their monthly release cycle or an out-of-cycle update, based on the urgency.\nIn the meantime, users of Microsoft Defender for Office and those utilizing the \"Block all Office applications from creating child processes\" Attack Surface Reduction Rule are protected from attempts to exploit this vulnerability. This is because these protections add an extra layer of security, blocking the malicious code from executing.\nFor users who are not using these protections, Microsoft recommends a workaround by adding specific application names to a particular Windows registry key (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\FeatureControl\\FEATURE_BLOCK_CROSS_PROTOCOL_FILE_NAVIGATION) with data set as \"1\". This action aims to mitigate the risk until a permanent fix is available.\nThe disclosure of this flaw involved multiple entities including Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Vlad Stolyarov, Clement Lecigne and Bahare Sabouri from Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG), Paul Rascagneres and Tom Lancaster from Volexity, and the Microsoft Office Product Group Security Team. This collective effort indicates the severity and importance of addressing this issue.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}]}, {"name": "Cyclops Blink", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2024-03-14", "version": 2, "id": "7c75b1c8-dfff-46f1-8250-e58df91b6fd9", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the cyclopsblink malware including firewall modification, spawning more process, botnet c2 communication, defense evasion and etc. Cyclops Blink is a Linux ELF executable compiled for 32-bit x86 and PowerPC architecture that has targeted several network devices. The complete list of targeted devices is unknown at this time, but WatchGuard FireBox has specifically been listed as a target. The modular malware consists of core components and modules that are deployed as child processes using the Linux API fork. At this point, four modules have been identified that download and upload files, gather system information and contain updating mechanisms for the malware itself. Additional modules can be downloaded and executed from the Command And Control (C2) server.", "references": ["https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Cyclops-Blink-Malware-Analysis-Report.pdf", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/c/cyclops-blink-sets-sights-on-asus-routers--.html"], "narrative": "Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade Task or Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT41", "BITTER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Carbanak", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Linux Iptables Firewall Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade Task or Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}]}, {"name": "DarkCrystal RAT", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-07-26", "version": 1, "id": "639e6006-0885-4847-9394-ddc2902629bf", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DcRat malware including ddos, spawning more process, botnet c2 communication, defense evasion and etc. The DcRat malware is known commercial backdoor that was first released in 2018. This tool was sold in underground forum and known to be one of the cheapest commercial RATs. DcRat is modular and bespoke plugin framework make it a very flexible option, helpful for a range of nefearious uses.", "references": ["https://www.mandiant.com/resources/analyzing-dark-crystal-rat-backdoor", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.dcrat"], "narrative": "Adversaries may use this technique to maximize the impact on the target organization in operations where network wide availability interruption is the goal.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Andariel", "HAFNIUM", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["HAFNIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1124", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Time Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "Sidewinder", "The White Company", "Turla", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance", "Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command Shell DCRat ForkBomb Payload - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Host Information Camera - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Ingress Tool Transfer Using Explorer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System LogOff Commandline - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Time Discovery W32tm Delay - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Command Shell DCRat ForkBomb Payload", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Gather Victim Host Information Camera", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows Ingress Tool Transfer Using Explorer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Windows System LogOff Commandline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Reboot CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Shutdown CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Time Discovery W32tm Delay", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Time Discovery"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}]}, {"name": "DarkGate Malware", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-31", "version": 1, "id": "a4727b27-9e68-48f0-94a2-253cfb30c15d", "description": "Telekom Security CTI has uncovered a new phishing-driven malware campaign distributing DarkGate malware. This campaign utilizes stolen email threads to trick users into downloading malicious payloads via hyperlinks. An initial false link to Emotet stirred the security community, but deeper analysis confirmed its true identity as DarkGate, with characteristics like AutoIt scripts and a known command-and-control protocol. This report by Fabian Marquardt details the intricate infection mechanisms, including MSI and VBS file deliveries, sophisticated evasion techniques, and a robust configuration extraction method surpassing current standards. The single developer behind DarkGate, active on cybercrime forums, has shifted the malware's use from private to a rent-out model, implying an expected rise in its deployment. Researchers have also developed a decryption technique for the DarkGate malware, which aids in static analysis and detection, though it requires careful validation to avoid false positives.", "references": ["https://github.security.telekom.com/2023/08/darkgate-loader.html", "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-october-2023"], "narrative": "Telekom Security CTi has recently put a spotlight on the proliferation of DarkGate malware via a sophisticated malspam campaign, initially mistaken for the notorious Emotet malware. The campaign smartly manipulates stolen email conversations, embedding hyperlinks that, once clicked, activate a malware download. Fabian Marquardt's analysis traces the infection's footprint, revealing a dual delivery mechanism through MSI and VBS files. These files, cloaked in legitimate wrappers or obscured with junk code, ultimately download the malware via embedded scripts.\nMarquardt delves into the AutoIt script-based infection, uncovering the calculated use of compiled scripts and base64-encoded data to disguise the execution of malicious shellcode. The subsequent stages of infection exhibit the malware's capability to evade detection, leveraging memory allocation techniques to bypass security measures. Marquardt also explores the loader's function, which decrypts further malicious payloads by interacting with the script's encoded components.\nThe analytical narrative captures a cross-section of the cybersecurity landscape, reflecting the shift in DarkGate's operational strategy from exclusive use by the developer to a broader dissemination through a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model. This transition suggests an anticipated escalation in DarkGate-related attacks.\nSignificantly, the report contributes to cybersecurity defenses by outlining a more effective method for extracting malware configurations, providing the community with the means to anticipate and mitigate the evolving threats posed by this pernicious malware. With the insights gained, researchers and security professionals are better equipped to adapt their strategies, constructing more robust defenses against the sophisticated tactics employed by DarkGate and similar malware strains.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "FIN13", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Machete", "Molerats", "Rancor", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Collection", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Remote Services Add TrustedHost - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Archive Collected Data via Rar - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AutoIt3 Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows CAB File on Disk - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Indicator Removal Via Rmdir - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry AuthenticationLevelOverride - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry DontShowUI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry ProxyEnable - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry ProxyServer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSIExec Spawn WinDBG - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WinDBG Spawning AutoIt3 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal"}]}, {"name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Of Net Users", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Remote Services Add TrustedHost", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Archive Collected Data via Rar", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Windows AutoIt3 Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows CAB File on Disk", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}]}, {"name": "Windows Indicator Removal Via Rmdir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry AuthenticationLevelOverride", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry DisableSecuritySettings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry DontShowUI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry ProxyEnable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry ProxyServer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSIExec Spawn WinDBG", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Reboot CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Shutdown CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Windows WinDBG Spawning AutoIt3", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "DarkSide Ransomware", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2021-05-12", "version": 1, "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9114ded1f35", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the DarkSide Ransomware", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/the-darkside-of-the-ransomware-pipeline.htmlbig-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations"], "narrative": "This story addresses Darkside ransomware. This ransomware payload has many similarities to common ransomware however there are certain items particular to it. The creation of a .TXT log that shows every item being encrypted as well as the creation of ransomware notes and files adding a machine ID created based on CRC32 checksum algorithm. This ransomware payload leaves machines in minimal operation level,enough to browse the attackers websites. A customized URI with leaked information is presented to each victim.This is the ransomware payload that shut down the Colonial pipeline. The story is composed of several detection searches covering similar items to other ransomware payloads and those particular to Darkside payload.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1197", "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1020", "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Sidewinder", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Exfiltration", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "BITSAdmin Download File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP"}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed RClone", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration"}]}, {"name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}]}, {"name": "Data Destruction", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-04-06", "version": 1, "id": "4ae5c0d1-cebd-47d1-bfce-71bf096e38aa", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the data destruction, including deleting files, overwriting files, wiping disk and unrecoverable file encryption. This analytic story may cover several known activities related to malware implants used in geo-political war to wipe disks or files to interrupt the network-wide operation of a targeted organization. Analytics can detect the behavior of \"DoubleZero Destructor\", \"CaddyWiper\", \"AcidRain\", \"AwfulShred\", \"Hermetic Wiper\", \"Swift Slicer\", \"Whisper Gate\" and many more.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/", "https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/a-brief-history-and-further-technical-analysis-of-sodinokibi-ransomware", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-advisory-strt-ta02-destructive-software.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hermeticwiper.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-doublezero-destructor.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-caddywiper.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/strt-ta03-cpe-destructive-software.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-cyclopsblink.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-acidrain-wiper.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-industroyer2.html", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-advisory-swiftslicer-wiper-strt-ta03.html"], "narrative": "Adversaries may partially or completely overwrite the contents of a storage device rendering the data irrecoverable through the storage interface or using 3rd party drivers to directly access disk content like Master Boot Record to wipe it. Some of these attacks were seen in geo-political war to impair the operation of targeted organizations or to interrupt network-wide services.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT5", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "APT5"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "Evilnum", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1200", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "FIN13", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Aoqin Dragon", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cleaver", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "POLONIUM", "Patchwork", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "TA2541", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497", "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Darkhotel"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Cobalt Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT41", "Axiom", "Deep Panda", "Fox Kitten"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Deep Panda", "GALLIUM", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Resource Development", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Email"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance", "Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives", "Weaponization"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Data Destruction Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deletion Of Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Disable Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff - Rule", "ESCU - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Stop Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions - Rule", "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Change Default File Association", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "ETW Registry Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Data Destruction Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux DD File Overwrite", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deletion Of Cron Jobs", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deletion Of Init Daemon Script", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deletion Of Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Disable Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions"}]}, {"name": "Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Etc Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Impair Defenses Process Kill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Linux Indicator Removal Clear Cache", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Indicator Removal Service File Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Restarted", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Shred Overwrite Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Linux Stop Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Linux System Network Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Linux System Reboot Via System Request Key", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Linux Unix Shell Enable All SysRq Functions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features"}]}, {"name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion"}]}, {"name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MMC"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver"}]}, {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Tool"}]}, {"name": "Windows NirSoft Utilities", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Tool"}]}, {"name": "Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Terminating Lsass Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}]}, {"name": "Data Exfiltration", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Shannon Davis, Splunk", "date": "2023-05-17", "version": 2, "id": "66b0fe0c-1351-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", "description": "Data exfiltration refers to the unauthorized transfer or extraction of sensitive or valuable data from a compromised system or network during a cyber attack. It is a critical phase in many targeted attacks, where adversaries aim to steal confidential information, such as intellectual property, financial records, personal data, or trade secrets.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/", "https://bleemb.medium.com/data-exfiltration-with-native-aws-s3-features-c94ae4d13436", "https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/how-to-exfiltrate-aws-ec2-data/", "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-277a"], "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) leveraged by adversaries to exfiltrate data from your environments. Exfiltration comes in many flavors and its done differently on every environment. Adversaries can collect data over encrypted or non-encrypted channels.  They can utilise Command And Control channels that are already in place to exfiltrate data.  They can use both standard data transfer protocols such as FTP, SCP, etc to exfiltrate data.  Or they can use non-standard protocols such as DNS, ICMP, etc with specially crafted fields to try and circumvent security technologies in place.\nTechniques for getting data out of a target network typically include transferring it over their command and control channel or an alternate channel and may also include putting size limits on the transmission. In context of the cloud, this refers to the unauthorized transfer or extraction of sensitive data from cloud-based systems or services. It involves the compromise of cloud infrastructure or accounts to gain access to valuable information stored in the cloud environment. Attackers may employ various techniques, such as exploiting vulnerabilities, stealing login credentials, or using malicious code to exfiltrate data from cloud repositories or services without detection.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1537", "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1119", "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "Chimera", "Confucius", "FIN5", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "Chimera", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1568.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1649", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1041", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Chimera", "Confucius", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1567", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Initial Access", "Exfiltration", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Web", "Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Disable Bucket Versioning - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Anomalous GetObject API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Batch Service - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified - Rule", "ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule", "ESCU - Mailsniper Invoke functions - Rule", "ESCU - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule", "ESCU - High Volume of Bytes Out to Url - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS Disable Bucket Versioning", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS Exfiltration via Anomalous GetObject API Activity", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Collection"}]}, {"name": "AWS Exfiltration via Batch Service", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Collection"}]}, {"name": "AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Collection"}]}, {"name": "AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified", "source": "cloud", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "O365 PST export alert", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "Detect Certipy File Modifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Linux Curl Upload File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Mailsniper Invoke functions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}]}, {"name": "Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel"}]}, {"name": "High Volume of Bytes Out to Url", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Plain HTTP POST Exfiltrated Data", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}]}, {"name": "Data Protection", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-14", "version": 1, "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33", "description": "Fortify your data-protection arsenal--while continuing to ensure data confidentiality and integrity--with searches that monitor for and help you investigate possible signs of data exfiltration.", "references": ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"], "narrative": "Attackers can leverage a variety of resources to compromise or exfiltrate enterprise data. Common exfiltration techniques include remote-access channels via low-risk, high-payoff active-collections operations and close-access operations using insiders and removable media. While this Analytic Story is not a comprehensive listing of all the methods by which attackers can exfiltrate data, it provides a useful starting point.", "tags": {"category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "datamodels": ["Change_Analysis", "Network_Resolution", "Change"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get DNS traffic ratio", "Get Notable History", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect USB device insertion", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Detection of DNS Tunnels", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}]}, {"name": "Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-03-24", "version": 1, "id": "0bd01a54-8cbe-11eb-abcd-acde48001122", "description": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"], "narrative": "An example of obfuscated files is `Certutil.exe` usage to encode a portable executable to a certificate file, which is base64 encoded, to hide the originating file. There are many utilities cross-platform to encode using XOR, using compressed .cab files to hide contents and scripting languages that may perform similar native Windows tasks. Triaging an event related will require the capability to review related process events and file modifications. Using a tool such as CyberChef will assist with identifying the encoding that was used, and potentially assist with decoding the contents.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS Cryptomining", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2018-03-08", "version": 1, "id": "ced74200-8465-4bc3-bd2c-9a782eec6750", "description": "Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "narrative": "Cryptomining is an intentionally difficult, resource-intensive business. Its complexity was designed into the process to ensure that the number of blocks mined each day would remain steady. So, it's par for the course that ambitious, but unscrupulous, miners make amassing the computing power of large enterprises--a practice known as cryptojacking--a top priority.\nCryptojacking has attracted an increasing amount of media attention since its explosion in popularity in the fall of 2017. The attacks have moved from in-browser exploits and mobile phones to enterprise cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). It's difficult to determine exactly how widespread the practice has become, since bad actors continually evolve their ability to escape detection, including employing unlisted endpoints, moderating their CPU usage, and hiding the mining pool's IP address behind a free CDN.\nWhen malicious miners appropriate a cloud instance, often spinning up hundreds of new instances, the costs can become astronomical for the account holder. So, it is critically important to monitor your systems for suspicious activities that could indicate that your network has been infiltrated.\nThis Analytic Story is focused on detecting suspicious new instances in your EC2 environment to help prevent such a disaster. It contains detection searches that will detect when a previously unused instance type or AMI is used. It also contains support searches to build lookup files to ensure proper execution of the detection searches.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "Get EC2 Launch Details", "Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint", "Get Logon Rights Modifications For User", "Get Notable History", "Investigate AWS activities via region name"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "AWS Suspicious Provisioning Activities", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2018-03-16", "version": 1, "id": "3338b567-3804-4261-9889-cf0ca4753c7f", "description": "Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "narrative": "Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\nThis Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "Get All AWS Activity From City", "Get All AWS Activity From Country", "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "Get All AWS Activity From Region"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}]}, {"name": "Common Phishing Frameworks", "author": "Splunk Research Team, Splunk", "date": "2019-04-29", "version": 1, "id": "9a64ab44-9214-4639-8163-7eaa2621bd61", "description": "Detect DNS and web requests to fake websites generated by the EvilGinx2 toolkit. These websites are designed to fool unwitting users who have clicked on a malicious link in a phishing email. ", "references": ["https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/", "https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/"], "narrative": "As most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Because phishing is a technique that relies on human psychology, you will never be able to eliminate this vulnerability 100%. But you can use automated detection to significantly reduce the risks.\nThis Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs of MiTM attacks enabled by [EvilGinx2](https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2), a toolkit that sets up a transparent proxy between the targeted site and the user. In this way, the attacker is able to intercept credentials and two-factor identification tokens. It employs a proxy template to allow a registered domain to impersonate targeted sites, such as Linkedin, Amazon, Okta, Github, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, Office 365, and others. It can even register SSL certificates and camouflage them via a URL shortener, making them difficult to detect. Searches in this story look for signs of MiTM attacks enabled by EvilGinx2.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Certificate logs for a domain"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Splunk Research Team", "detections": [{"name": "Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing via Service"}]}]}, {"name": "Container Implantation Monitoring and Investigation", "author": "Rod Soto, Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-20", "version": 1, "id": "aa0e28b1-0521-4b6f-9d2a-7b87e34af246", "description": "Use the searches in this story to monitor your Kubernetes registry repositories for upload, and deployment of potentially vulnerable, backdoor, or implanted containers. These searches provide information on source users, destination path, container names and repository names. The searches provide context to address Mitre T1525 which refers to container implantation upload to a company's repository either in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Google Container Registry and Azure Container Registry.", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"], "narrative": "Container Registrys provide a way for organizations to keep customized images of their development and infrastructure environment in private. However if these repositories are misconfigured or priviledge users credentials are compromise, attackers can potentially upload implanted containers which can be deployed across the organization. These searches allow operator to monitor who, when and what was uploaded to container registry.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": [], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": []}, {"name": "Host Redirection", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-14", "version": 1, "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50fe268af4", "description": "Detect evidence of tactics used to redirect traffic from a host to a destination other than the one intended--potentially one that is part of an adversary's attack infrastructure. An example is redirecting communications regarding patches and updates or misleading users into visiting a malicious website.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"], "narrative": "Attackers will often attempt to manipulate client communications for nefarious purposes. In some cases, an attacker may endeavor to modify a local host file to redirect communications with resources (such as antivirus or system-update services) to prevent clients from receiving patches or updates. In other cases, an attacker might use this tactic to have the client connect to a site that looks like the intended site, but instead installs malware or collects information from the victim. Additionally, an attacker may redirect a victim in order to execute a MITM attack and observe communications.", "tags": {"category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "LazyScripter", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}]}, {"name": "Windows hosts file modification", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Sensitive Role Activity", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2020-05-20", "version": 1, "id": "8b3984d2-17b6-47e9-ba43-a3376e70fdcc", "description": "This story addresses detection and response around Sensitive Role usage within a Kubernetes clusters against cluster resources and namespaces.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"], "narrative": "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive roles within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes role activities", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure active service accounts by pod namespace", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Lateral Movement", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-04", "version": 2, "id": "399d65dc-1f08-499b-a259-abd9051f38ad", "description": " DEPRECATED IN FAVOR OF ACTIVE DIRECTORY LATERAL MOVEMENT. Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures around how attackers move laterally within the enterprise. Because lateral movement can expose the adversary to detection, it should be an important focus for security analysts.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"], "narrative": "Once attackers gain a foothold within an enterprise, they will seek to expand their accesses and leverage techniques that facilitate lateral movement. Attackers will often spend quite a bit of time and effort moving laterally. Because lateral movement renders an attacker the most vulnerable to detection, it's an excellent focus for detection and investigation. Indications of lateral movement can include the abuse of system utilities (such as `psexec.exe`), unauthorized use of remote desktop services, `file/admin$` shares, WMI, PowerShell, pass-the-hash, or the abuse of scheduled tasks. Organizations must be extra vigilant in detecting lateral movement techniques and look for suspicious activity in and around high-value strategic network assets, such as Active Directory, which are often considered the primary target or \"crown jewels\" to a persistent threat actor. An adversary can use lateral movement for multiple purposes, including remote execution of tools, pivoting to additional systems, obtaining access to specific information or files, access to additional credentials, exfiltrating data, or delivering a secondary effect. Adversaries may use legitimate credentials alongside inherent network and operating-system functionality to remotely connect to other systems and remain under the radar of network defenders. If there is evidence of lateral movement, it is imperative for analysts to collect evidence of the associated offending hosts. For example, an attacker might leverage host A to gain access to host B. From there, the attacker may try to move laterally to host C. In this example, the analyst should gather as much information as possible from all three hosts. It is also important to collect authentication logs for each host, to ensure that the offending accounts are well-documented. Analysts should account for all processes to ensure that the attackers did not install unauthorized software.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": [], "investigation_names": ["Get History Of Email Sources", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": []}, {"name": "Monitor Backup Solution", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-12", "version": 1, "id": "abe807c7-1eb6-4304-ac32-6e7aacdb891d", "description": "Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.", "references": ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"], "narrative": "Having backups is a standard best practice that helps ensure continuity of business operations.  Having mature backup processes can also help you reduce the risks of many security-related incidents and streamline your response processes. The detection searches in this Analytic Story will help you identify systems that have backup failures, as well as systems that have not been backed up for an extended period of time. The story will also return the notable event history and all of the backup logs for an endpoint.", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Compliance", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["All backup logs for host", "Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Unsuccessful Netbackup backups", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Monitor for Unauthorized Software", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-15", "version": 1, "id": "8892a655-6205-43f7-abba-06460e38c8ae", "description": "Identify and investigate prohibited/unauthorized software or processes that may be concealing malicious behavior within your environment. ", "references": ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"], "narrative": "It is critical to identify unauthorized software and processes running on enterprise endpoints and determine whether they are likely to be malicious. This Analytic Story requires the user to populate the Interesting Processes table within Enterprise Security with prohibited processes. An included support search will augment this data, adding information on processes thought to be malicious. This search requires data from endpoint detection-and-response solutions, endpoint data sources (such as Sysmon), or Windows Event Logs--assuming that the Active Directory administrator has enabled process tracking within the System Event Audit Logs.\nIt is important to investigate any software identified as suspicious, in order to understand how it was installed or executed. Analyzing authentication logs or any historic notable events might elicit additional investigative leads of interest. For best results, schedule the search to run every two weeks. ", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Compliance", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning"}]}]}, {"name": "Office 365 Detections", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2020-12-16", "version": 2, "id": "1a51dd71-effc-48b2-abc4-3e9cdb61e5b9", "description": "Monitor for activities and anomalies indicative of potential threats within Office 365 environments.", "references": ["https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/cloud/office365/", "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-120a"], "narrative": "Office 365 (O365) is Microsoft's cloud-based suite of productivity tools, encompassing email, collaboration platforms, and office applications, all integrated with Azure Active Directory for identity and access management. Given the centralized storage of sensitive organizational data within O365 and its widespread adoption, it has become a focal point for cybersecurity efforts. The platform's complexity, combined with its ubiquity, makes it both a valuable asset and a prime target for potential threats. As O365's importance grows, it increasingly becomes a target for attackers seeking to exploit organizational data and systems. Security teams should prioritize monitoring O365 not just because of the sensitive data it often holds, but also due to the myriad ways the platform can be exploited. Understanding and monitoring O365's security landscape is crucial for organizations to detect, respond to, and mitigate potential threats in a timely manner.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": [], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "author_name": "Patrick Bareiss", "detections": []}, {"name": "Spectre And Meltdown Vulnerabilities", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2018-01-08", "version": 1, "id": "6d3306f6-bb2b-4219-8609-8efad64032f2", "description": "Assess and mitigate your systems' vulnerability to Spectre and Meltdown exploitation with the searches in this Analytic Story.", "references": ["https://meltdownattack.com/"], "narrative": "Meltdown and Spectre exploit critical vulnerabilities in modern CPUs that allow unintended access to data in memory. This Analytic Story will help you identify the systems can be patched for these vulnerabilities, as well as those that still need to be patched.", "tags": {"category": ["Vulnerability"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Suspicious AWS EC2 Activities", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2018-02-09", "version": 1, "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f1268af3", "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "narrative": "AWS CloudTrail is an AWS service that helps you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing within your AWS account. Actions taken by a user, role, or an AWS service are recorded as events in CloudTrail. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the AWS Console, AWS command-line interface, and AWS SDKs and APIs to ensure that your EC2 instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your AWS EC2 instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "Get EC2 Launch Details", "Get Notable History", "Investigate AWS activities via region name"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Unusual AWS EC2 Modifications", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2018-04-09", "version": 1, "id": "73de57ef-0dfc-411f-b1e7-fa24428aeae0", "description": "Identify unusual changes to your AWS EC2 instances that may indicate malicious activity. Modifications to your EC2 instances by previously unseen users is an example of an activity that may warrant further investigation.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "narrative": "A common attack technique is to infiltrate a cloud instance and make modifications. The adversary can then secure access to your infrastructure or hide their activities. So it's important to stay alert to changes that may indicate that your environment has been compromised.\nSearches within this Analytic Story can help you detect the presence of a threat by monitoring for EC2 instances that have been created or changed--either by users that have never previously performed these activities or by known users who modify or create instances in a way that have not been done before. This story also provides investigative searches that help you go deeper once you detect suspicious behavior.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Web Fraud Detection", "author": "Jim Apger, Splunk", "date": "2018-10-08", "version": 1, "id": "18bb45b9-7684-45c6-9e97-1fdd0d98c0a7", "description": "Monitor your environment for activity consistent with common attack techniques bad actors use when attempting to compromise web servers or other web-related assets.", "references": ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"], "narrative": "The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines Internet fraud as the use of Internet services or software with Internet access to defraud victims or to otherwise take advantage of them. According to the Bureau, Internet crime schemes are used to steal millions of dollars each year from victims and continue to plague the Internet through various methods. The agency includes phishing scams, data breaches, Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, email account compromise, malware, spoofing, and ransomware in this category.\nThese crimes are not the fraud itself, but rather the attack techniques commonly employed by fraudsters in their pursuit of data that enables them to commit malicious actssuch as obtaining and using stolen credit cards. They represent a serious problem that is steadily increasing and not likely to go away anytime soon.\nWhen developing a strategy for preventing fraud in your environment, its important to  look across all of your web services for evidence that attackers are abusing enterprise resources to enumerate systems, harvest data for secondary fraudulent activity, or abuse terms of service.This Analytic Story looks for evidence of common Internet attack techniques that could be indicative of web fraud in your environmentincluding account harvesting, anomalous user clickspeed, and password sharing across accounts, to name just a few.\nThe account-harvesting search focuses on web pages used for user-account registration. It detects the creation of a large number of user accounts using the same email domain name, a type of activity frequently seen in advance of a fraud campaign.\nThe anomalous clickspeed search looks for users who are moving through your website at a faster-than-normal speed or with a perfect click cadence (high periodicity or low standard deviation), which could indicate that the user is a script, not an actual human.\nAnother search detects incidents wherein a single password is used across multiple accounts, which may indicate that a fraudster has infiltrated your environment and embedded a common password within a script.", "tags": {"category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Fraud Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Emails From Specific Sender", "Get Notable History", "Get Web Session Information via session id"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Jim Apger", "detections": [{"name": "Web Fraud - Account Harvesting", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Detect Zerologon Attack", "author": "Rod Soto, Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "date": "2020-09-18", "version": 1, "id": "5d14a962-569e-4578-939f-f386feb63ce4", "description": "Uncover activity related to the execution of Zerologon CVE-2020-11472, a technique wherein attackers target a Microsoft Windows Domain Controller to reset its computer account password. The result from this attack is attackers can now provide themselves high privileges and take over Domain Controller. The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify attempts to reset Domain Controller Computer Account via exploit code remotely or via the use of tool Mimikatz as payload carrier.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"], "narrative": "This attack is a privilege escalation technique, where attacker targets a Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). This vulnerability exposes vulnerable Windows Domain Controllers to be targeted via unaunthenticated RPC calls which eventually reset Domain Contoller computer account ($) providing the attacker the opportunity to exfil domain controller credential secrets and assign themselve high privileges that can lead to domain controller and potentially complete network takeover. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use Windows Event viewer events and Sysmon events to detect attack execution, these searches monitor access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process which is an indicator of the use of Mimikatz tool which has bee updated to carry this attack payload.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1210", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "MuddyWater", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Lateral Movement"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Possible Credential Dumping - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Jose Hernandez, Stan Miskowicz, David Dorsey, Shannon Davis Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Possible Credential Dumping", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect Zerologon via Zeek", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Dev Sec Ops", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "date": "2021-08-18", "version": 1, "id": "0ca8c38e-631e-4b81-940c-f9c5450ce41e", "description": "This story is focused around detecting attacks on a DevSecOps lifeccycle which consists of the phases plan, code, build, test, release, deploy, operate and monitor.", "references": ["https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/devops/what-is-devsecops"], "narrative": "DevSecOps is a collaborative framework, which thinks about application and infrastructure security from the start. This means that security tools are part of the continuous integration and continuous deployment pipeline. In this analytics story, we focused on detections around the tools used in this framework such as GitHub as a version control system, GDrive for the documentation, CircleCI as the CI/CD pipeline, Kubernetes as the container execution engine and multiple security tools such as Semgrep and Kube-Hunter.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1195.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1212", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1554", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Host Software Binary", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1195", "mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1195.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Supply Chain", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1199", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "LAPSUS$", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1567.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "POLONIUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1567", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Credential Access", "Discovery", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Exfiltration"], "datamodels": ["Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours - Rule", "ESCU - AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Job - Rule", "ESCU - Circle CI Disable Security Step - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Actions Disable Security Workflow - Rule", "ESCU - Github Commit Changes In Master - Rule", "ESCU - Github Commit In Develop - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Dependabot Alert - Rule", "ESCU - GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule", "ESCU - GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling - Rule", "ESCU - Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by Repository and Risk - Rule", "ESCU - Correlation by User and Risk - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Patrick Bareiss", "detections": [{"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Circle CI Disable Security Job", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Host Software Binary"}]}, {"name": "Circle CI Disable Security Step", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Host Software Binary"}]}, {"name": "GitHub Actions Disable Security Workflow", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Supply Chain"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Github Commit Changes In Master", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship"}]}, {"name": "Github Commit In Develop", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Relationship"}]}, {"name": "GitHub Dependabot Alert", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise"}]}, {"name": "GitHub Pull Request from Unknown User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Supply Chain Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service"}]}, {"name": "GSuite Email Suspicious Attachment", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Email Suspicious Subject With Attachment", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Email With Known Abuse Web Service Link", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Suspicious Shared File Name", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress LFI", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Nginx Ingress RFI", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Scanner Image Pulling", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Risk Rule for Dev Sec Ops by Repository", "source": "cloud", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Correlation by Repository and Risk", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Correlation by User and Risk", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Image"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "DHS Report TA18-074A", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2020-01-22", "version": 2, "id": "0c016e5c-88be-4e2c-8c6c-c2b55b4fb4ef", "description": "Monitor for suspicious activities associated with DHS Technical Alert US-CERT TA18-074A. Some of the activities that adversaries used in these compromises included spearfishing attacks, malware, watering-hole domains, many and more.", "references": ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"], "narrative": "The frequency of nation-state cyber attacks has increased significantly over the last decade. Employing numerous tactics and techniques, these attacks continue to escalate in complexity.\nThere is a wide range of motivations for these state-sponsored hacks, including stealing valuable corporate, military, or diplomatic data&#1151;all of which could confer advantages in various arenas. They may also target critical infrastructure.\nOne joint Technical Alert (TA) issued by the Department of Homeland and the FBI in mid-March of 2018 attributed some cyber activity targeting utility infrastructure to operatives sponsored by the Russian government. The hackers executed spearfishing attacks, installed malware, employed watering-hole domains, and more. While they caused no physical damage, the attacks provoked fears that a nation-state could turn off water, redirect power, or compromise a nuclear power plant.\nSuspicious activities--spikes in SMB traffic, processes that launch netsh (to modify the network configuration), suspicious registry modifications, and many more--may all be events you may wish to investigate further. While the use of these technique may be an indication that a nation-state actor is attempting to compromise your environment, it is important to note that these techniques are often employed by other groups, as well.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "SilverTerrier"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process File Activity", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "First time seen command line argument", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Create local admin accounts using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Local Admin account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Processes launching netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Single Letter Process On Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Disabling Security Tools", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-04", "version": 2, "id": "fcc27099-46a0-46b0-a271-5c7dab56b6f1", "description": "Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://web.archive.org/web/20220425194457/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"], "narrative": "Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1553.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1553", "mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Processes launching netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Unload Sysmon Filter Driver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "DNS Amplification Attacks", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2016-09-13", "version": 1, "id": "a563972b-d2e2-4978-b6ca-6e83e24af4d3", "description": "DNS poses a serious threat as a Denial of Service (DOS) amplifier, if it responds to `ANY` queries. This Analytic Story can help you detect attackers who may be abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch amplification attacks, causing Denial of Service to other victims.", "references": ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"], "narrative": "The Domain Name System (DNS) is the protocol used to map domain names to IP addresses. It has been proven to work very well for its intended function. However if DNS is misconfigured, servers can be abused by attackers to levy amplification or redirection attacks against victims. Because DNS responses to `ANY` queries are so much larger than the queries themselves--and can be made with a UDP packet, which does not require a handshake--attackers can spoof the source address of the packet and cause much more data to be sent to the victim than if they sent the traffic themselves. The `ANY` requests are will be larger than normal DNS server requests, due to the fact that the server provides significant details, such as MX records and associated IP addresses. A large volume of this traffic can result in a DOS on the victim's machine. This misconfiguration leads to two possible victims, the first being the DNS servers participating in an attack and the other being the hosts that are the targets of the DOS attack.\nThe search in this story can help you to detect if attackers are abusing your company's DNS infrastructure to launch DNS amplification attacks causing Denial of Service to other victims.", "tags": {"category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Reflection Amplification"}]}]}, {"name": "DNS Hijacking", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-04", "version": 1, "id": "8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aa28-586907301221", "description": "Secure your environment against DNS hijacks with searches that help you detect and investigate unauthorized changes to DNS records.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"], "narrative": "Dubbed the Achilles heel of the Internet (see https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/dns-is-still-the-achilles-heel-of-the-internet-25613), DNS plays a critical role in routing web traffic but is notoriously vulnerable to attack. One reason is its distributed nature. It relies on unstructured connections between millions of clients and servers over inherently insecure protocols.\nThe gravity and extent of the importance of securing DNS from attacks is undeniable. The fallout of compromised DNS can be disastrous. Not only can hackers bring down an entire business, they can intercept confidential information, emails, and login credentials, as well.\nOn January 22, 2019, the US Department of Homeland Security 2019's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) raised awareness of some high-profile DNS hijacking attacks against infrastructure, both in the United States and abroad. It issued Emergency Directive 19-01 (see https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/), which summarized the activity and required government agencies to take the following four actions, all within 10 days:\n1. For all .gov or other agency-managed domains, audit public DNS records on all authoritative and secondary DNS servers, verify that they resolve to the intended location or report them to CISA.\n1. Update the passwords for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency 2019's DNS records.\n1. Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all accounts on systems that can make changes to each agency's 2019 DNS records or, if impossible, provide CISA with the names of systems, the reasons why MFA cannot be enabled within the required timeline, and an ETA for when it can be enabled.\n1. CISA will begin regular delivery of newly added certificates to Certificate Transparency (CT) logs for agency domains via the Cyber Hygiene service. Upon receipt, agencies must immediately begin monitoring CT log data for certificates issued that they did not request. If an agency confirms that a certificate was unauthorized, it must report the certificate to the issuing certificate authority and to CISA. Of course, it makes sense to put equivalent actions in place within your environment, as well.\nIn DNS hijacking, the attacker assumes control over an account or makes use of a DNS service exploit to make changes to DNS records. Once they gain access, attackers can substitute their own MX records, name-server records, and addresses, redirecting emails and traffic through their infrastructure, where they can read, copy, or modify information seen. They can also generate valid encryption certificates to help them avoid browser-certificate checks. In one notable attack on the Internet service provider, GoDaddy, the hackers altered Sender Policy Framework (SPF) records a relatively minor change that did not inflict excessive damage but allowed for more effective spam campaigns.\nThe searches in this Analytic Story help you detect and investigate activities that may indicate that DNS hijacking has taken place within your environment.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "LazyScripter", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1189", "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Andariel", "Axiom", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mustard Tempest", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1568.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA551"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Command And Control", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get DNS Server History for a host"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}]}, {"name": "DNS record changed", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}]}, {"name": "Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}]}, {"name": "Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}]}]}, {"name": "Domain Trust Discovery", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-03-25", "version": 1, "id": "e6f30f14-8daf-11eb-a017-acde48001122", "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/"], "narrative": "Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN8", "Magic Hound"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - DSQuery Domain Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "DSQuery Domain Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows AdFind Exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}]}, {"name": "Double Zero Destructor", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2022-03-25", "version": 1, "id": "f56e8c00-3224-4955-9a6e-924ec7da1df7", "description": "Double Zero Destructor is a destructive payload that enumerates Domain Controllers and executes killswitch if detected. Overwrites files with Zero blocks or using MS Windows API calls such as NtFileOpen, NtFSControlFile. This payload also deletes registry hives HKCU,HKLM, HKU, HKLM BCD.", "references": ["https://cert.gov.ua/article/38088", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/threat-advisory-doublezero.html"], "narrative": "Double zero destructor enumerates domain controllers, delete registry hives and overwrites files using zero blocks and API calls.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Terminating Lsass Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Deleted Registry By A Non Critical Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Terminating Lsass Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}]}, {"name": "Dynamic DNS", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2018-09-06", "version": 2, "id": "8169f17b-ef68-4b59-aae8-586907301221", "description": "Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"], "narrative": "Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Orangeworm", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "SilverTerrier", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1568.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA551"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Web", "Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get DNS traffic ratio", "Get Notable History", "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Protocols"}]}, {"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}]}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}]}, {"name": "Emotet Malware DHS Report TA18-201A", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2020-01-27", "version": 1, "id": "bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-91c310efcf52", "description": "Detect rarely used executables, specific registry paths that may confer malware survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that the Emotet financial malware has compromised your environment.", "references": ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"], "narrative": "The trojan downloader known as Emotet first surfaced in 2014, when it was discovered targeting the banking industry to steal credentials. However, according to a joint technical alert (TA) issued by three government agencies (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A), Emotet has evolved far beyond those beginnings to become what a ThreatPost article called a threat-delivery service(see https://threatpost.com/emotet-malware-evolves-beyond-banking-to-threat-delivery-service/134342/).  For example, in early 2018, Emotet was found to be using its loader function to spread the Quakbot and Ransomware variants.\nAccording to the TA, the the malware continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting the private and public sectors. Researchers have linked it to the threat group Mealybug, which has also been on the security communitys radar since 2014.\nThe searches in this Analytic Story will help you find executables that are rarely used in your environment, specific registry paths that malware often uses to ensure survivability and persistence, instances where cmd.exe is used to launch script interpreters, and other indicators that Emotet or other malware has compromised your environment. ", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1072", "mitre_attack_technique": "Software Deployment Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-1314"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Email", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get History Of Email Sources", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Detection of tools built by NirSoft", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Software Deployment Tools"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "F5 Authentication Bypass with TMUI", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-30", "version": 1, "id": "e4acbea6-75bb-4873-8c22-bc2da9525e89", "description": "Research into leading software revealed vulnerabilities in both Apache Tomcat and the F5 BIG-IP suite. Apache's AJP protocol vulnerability, designated CVE-2022-26377, relates to AJP request smuggling. Successful exploitation enables unauthorized system activities. F5 BIG-IP Virtual Edition exhibited a distinct vulnerability, an authentication bypass in the Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI), resulting in system compromise. Assigned CVE-2023-46747, this vulnerability also arose from request smuggling, bearing similarity to CVE-2022-26377. Given the wide adoption of both Apache Tomcat and F5 products, these vulnerabilities present grave risks to organizations. Remediation and vulnerability detection mechanisms are essential to address these threats effectively.", "references": ["https://www.praetorian.com/blog/refresh-compromising-f5-big-ip-with-request-smuggling-cve-2023-46747/", "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/3b0bb71bd627c6c3139e1d06c866f8402aa228ae/http/cves/2023/CVE-2023-46747.yaml"], "narrative": "Both Apache Tomcat's AJP protocol and F5's BIG-IP Virtual Edition have been exposed to critical vulnerabilities. Apache's CVE-2022-26377 pertains to request smuggling by manipulating the \"Transfer-Encoding\" header. If successfully exploited, this allows attackers to bypass security controls and undertake unauthorized actions.\nSimilarly, F5 BIG-IP unveiled an authentication bypass vulnerability, CVE-2023-46747. Originating from the TMUI, this vulnerability leads to full system compromise. While distinct, it shares characteristics with Apache's vulnerability, primarily rooted in request smuggling. This vulnerability drew from past F5 CVEs, particularly CVE-2020-5902 and CVE-2022-1388, both previously exploited in real-world scenarios. These highlighted vulnerabilities in Apache HTTP and Apache Tomcat services, as well as authentication flaws in the F5 BIG-IP API.\nNuclei detection templates offer a proactive solution for identifying and mitigating these vulnerabilities. Integrated into vulnerability management frameworks, these templates notify organizations of potential risks, forming a base for further detection strategies. For detection engineers, understanding these vulnerabilities is crucial. Recognizing the mechanisms and effects of request smuggling, especially in Apache's and F5's context, provides a roadmap to effective detection and response. Prompt detection is a linchpin, potentially stymieing further, more destructive attacks.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - F5 TMUI Authentication Bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "F5 TMUI Authentication Bypass", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "F5 BIG-IP Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-05-10", "version": 1, "id": "0367b177-f8d6-4c4b-a62d-86f52a590bff", "description": "CVE-2022-1388 is a unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerablity against BIG-IP iControl REST API.", "references": ["https://github.com/dk4trin/templates-nuclei/blob/main/CVE-2022-1388.yaml", "https://www.randori.com/blog/vulnerability-analysis-cve-2022-1388/", "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-1388", "https://twitter.com/da_667/status/1523770267327250438?s=20&t=-JnB_aNWuJFsmcOmxGUWLQ", "https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2022-1388/blob/main/CVE-2022-1388.py"], "narrative": "CVE-2022-1388 is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.8) in the management interface of F5 Networks'' BIG-IP solution that enables an unauthenticated attacker to gain remote code execution on the system through bypassing F5''s iControl REST authentication. The vulnerability was first discovered by F5''s internal product security team and disclosed publicly on May 4, 2022, per Randori. This vulnerability,CVE-2022-1388, may allow an unauthenticated attacker with network access to the BIG-IP system through the management port and/or self IP addresses to execute arbitrary system commands, create or delete files, or disable services. There is no data plane exposure; this is a control plane issue only per F5 article K23605346. Is CVE-2022-1388 Exploitable? Yes. There are now multiple POC scripts available and reports of threat actors scanning and potentially exploiting the vulnerablity. Per Randori the specific interface needed to exploit this vulnerability is rarely publicly exposed, and the risk to most organizations of exploitation by an unauthenticated external actor is low.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Vulnerability CVE-2022-1388", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "date": "2020-08-02", "version": 1, "id": "7678c968-d46e-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-5902. Discovered by Positive Technologies researchers, this vulnerability affects F5 BIG-IP, BIG-IQ. and Traffix SDC devices (vulnerable versions in F5 support link below). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated users, along with authenticated users, who have access to the configuration utility to execute system commands, create/delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code.  This vulnerability can result in full system compromise.", "references": ["https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/"], "narrative": "A client is able to perform a remote code execution on an exposed and vulnerable system. The detection search in this Analytic Story uses syslog to detect the malicious behavior. Syslog is going to be the best detection method, as any systems using SSL to protect their management console will make detection via wire data difficult.  The searches included used Splunk Connect For Syslog (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/4740/), and used a custom destination port to help define the data as F5 data (covered in https://splunk-connect-for-syslog.readthedocs.io/en/master/sources/F5/)", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Shannon Davis", "detections": [{"name": "Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "FIN7", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-09-14", "version": 1, "id": "df2b00d3-06ba-49f1-b253-b19cef19b569", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the FIN7 JS Implant and JSSLoader, including looking for Image Loading of ldap and wmi modules, associated with its payload, data collection and script execution.", "references": ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIN7", "https://threatpost.com/fin7-windows-11-release/169206/", "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/jssloader-recoded-and-reloaded"], "narrative": "FIN7 is a Russian criminal advanced persistent threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. A portion of FIN7 is run out of the front company Combi Security. It has been called one of the most successful criminal hacking groups in the world. this passed few day FIN7 tools and implant are seen in the wild where its code is updated. the FIN& is known to use the spear phishing attack as a entry to targetted network or host that will drop its staging payload like the JS and JSSloader. Now this artifacts and implants seen downloading other malware like cobaltstrike and event ransomware to encrypt host.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Check Elevated CMD using whoami - Rule", "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module - Rule", "ESCU - MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Check Elevated CMD using whoami", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "MS Scripting Process Loading Ldap Module", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "MS Scripting Process Loading WMI Module", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Drop Executable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing"}]}]}, {"name": "Flax Typhoon", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-08-25", "version": 1, "id": "78fadce9-a07f-4508-8d14-9b20052a62cc", "description": "Microsoft has identified a nation-state activity group, Flax Typhoon, based in China, targeting Taiwanese organizations for espionage. The group maintains long-term access to networks with minimal use of malware, relying on built-in OS tools and benign software. The group's activities are primarily focused on Taiwan, but the techniques used could be easily reused in other operations outside the region. Microsoft has not observed Flax Typhoon using this access to conduct additional actions.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/08/24/flax-typhoon-using-legitimate-software-to-quietly-access-taiwanese-organizations/"], "narrative": "Flax Typhoon has been active since mid-2021, targeting government agencies, education, critical manufacturing, and IT organizations in Taiwan. The group uses the China Chopper web shell, Metasploit, Juicy Potato privilege escalation tool, Mimikatz, and SoftEther VPN client. However, they primarily rely on living-off-the-land techniques and hands-on-keyboard activity. Initial access is achieved by exploiting known vulnerabilities in public-facing servers and deploying web shells. Following initial access, Flax Typhoon uses command-line tools to establish persistent access over the remote desktop protocol, deploy a VPN connection to actor-controlled network infrastructure, and collect credentials from compromised systems. The group also uses this VPN access to scan for vulnerabilities on targeted systems and organizations from the compromised systems.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1197", "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT41", "Axiom", "Deep Panda", "Fox Kitten"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows SQL Spawning CertUtil - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "BITSAdmin Download File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows SQL Spawning CertUtil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}]}, {"name": "Forest Blizzard", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-09-11", "version": 1, "id": "2c1aceda-f0a5-4c83-8543-e23ec1466958", "description": "CERT-UA has unveiled a cyberattack on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, orchestrated via deceptive emails. These emails, once accessed, lead to a multi-stage cyber operation downloading and executing malicious payloads. Concurrently, Zscaler's \"Steal-It\" campaign detection revealed striking similarities, hinting at a shared origin - APT28 or Fancy Bear. This notorious group, linked to Russia's GRU, utilizes legitimate platforms like Mockbin, making detection challenging. Their operations underline the evolving cyber threat landscape and stress the importance of advanced defenses.", "references": ["https://cert.gov.ua/article/5702579", "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/steal-it-campaign", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007/"], "narrative": "APT28, also known as Fancy Bear, blends stealth and expertise in its cyber operations. Affiliated with Russia's GRU, their signature move involves spear-phishing emails, leading to multi-tiered cyberattacks. In Ukraine's recent breach, a ZIP archive's execution triggered a series of actions, culminating in information flow redirection via the TOR network. Simultaneously, Zscaler's \"Steal-It\" campaign pinpointed similar tactics, specifically targeting NTLMv2 hashes. This campaign used ZIP archives containing LNK files to exfiltrate data via Mockbin. APT28's hallmark is their \"Living Off The Land\" strategy, manipulating legitimate tools and services to blend in, evading detection. Their innovative tactics, coupled with a geofencing focus on specific regions, make them a formidable cyber threat, highlighting the urgent need for advanced defense strategies.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Window", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "Deep Panda", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Nomadic Octopus", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1140", "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Darkhotel", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Defense Evasion", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule", "ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Headless Browser Mockbin or Mocky Request - Rule", "ESCU - Headless Browser Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "CHCP Command Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Headless Browser Mockbin or Mocky Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Window"}]}, {"name": "Headless Browser Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Window"}]}, {"name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}]}, {"name": "Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-02-21", "version": 1, "id": "2833a527-3b7f-41af-a950-39f7bbaff819", "description": "On Thursday, 16 February 2023, Fortinet released a PSIRT that details CVE-2022-39952, a critical vulnerability affecting its FortiNAC product (Horizon3.ai).", "references": ["https://www.horizon3.ai/fortinet-fortinac-cve-2022-39952-deep-dive-and-iocs/", "https://viz.greynoise.io/tag/fortinac-rce-attempt?days=30", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fortinet-fixes-critical-rce-flaws-in-fortinac-and-fortiweb/"], "narrative": "This vulnerability, discovered by Gwendal Guegniaud of Fortinet, allows an unauthenticated attacker to write arbitrary files on the system and as a result obtain remote code execution in the context of the root user (Horizon3.ai). Impacting FortiNAC, is tracked as CVE-2022-39952 and has a CVSS v3 score of 9.8 (critical). FortiNAC is a network access control solution that helps organizations gain real time network visibility, enforce security policies, and detect and mitigate threats. An external control of file name or path vulnerability CWE-73 in FortiNAC webserver may allow an unauthenticated attacker to perform arbitrary write on the system, reads the security advisory.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Exploit Public-Facing Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Exploit Public-Facing Fortinet FortiNAC CVE-2022-39952", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "GCP Account Takeover", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2022-10-12", "version": 1, "id": "8601caff-414f-4c6d-9a04-75b66778869d", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Account Takeover attacks against Google Cloud Platform tenants.", "references": ["https://cloud.google.com/gcp", "https://cloud.google.com/architecture/identity/overview-google-authentication", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/account-takeover-ato/", "https://www.barracuda.com/glossary/account-takeover"], "narrative": "Account Takeover (ATO) is an attack whereby cybercriminals gain unauthorized access to online accounts by using different techniques like brute force, social engineering, phishing & spear phishing, credential stuffing, etc. By posing as the real user, cyber-criminals can change account details, send out phishing emails, steal financial information or sensitive data, or use any stolen information to access further accounts within the organization. This analytic story groups detections that can help security operations teams identify the potential compromise of Google cloud accounts.", "tags": {"category": ["Account Compromise"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1621", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Resource Development", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Weaponization", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "GCP Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "GCP Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "GCP Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "GCP Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "GCP Successful Single-Factor Authentication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "GCP Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}]}, {"name": "GCP Cross Account Activity", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2020-09-01", "version": 1, "id": "0432039c-ef41-4b03-b157-450c25dad1e6", "description": "Track when a user assumes an IAM role in another GCP account to obtain cross-account access to services and resources in that account. Accessing new roles could be an indication of malicious activity.", "references": ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"], "narrative": "Google Cloud Platform (GCP) admins manage access to GCP resources and services across the enterprise using GCP Identity and Access Management (IAM) functionality. IAM provides the ability to create and manage GCP users, groups, and roles-each with their own unique set of privileges and defined access to specific resources (such as Compute instances, the GCP Management Console, API, or the command-line interface). Unlike conventional (human) users, IAM roles are potentially assumable by anyone in the organization. They provide users with dynamically created temporary security credentials that expire within a set time period.\nIn between the time between when the temporary credentials are issued and when they expire is a period of opportunity, where a user could leverage the temporary credentials to wreak havoc-spin up or remove instances, create new users, elevate privileges, and other malicious activities-throughout the environment.\nThis Analytic Story includes searches that will help you monitor your GCP Audit logs logs for evidence of suspicious cross-account activity.  For example, while accessing multiple GCP accounts and roles may be perfectly valid behavior, it may be suspicious when an account requests privileges of an account it has not accessed in the past. After identifying suspicious activities, you can use the provided investigative searches to help you probe more deeply.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Email"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "GCP Detect gcploit framework", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "gcp detect oauth token abuse", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Graceful Wipe Out Attack", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-06-15", "version": 1, "id": "83b15b3c-6bda-45aa-a3b6-b05c52443f44", "description": "This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive attack or campaign found by \"THE DFIR Report\" that uses Truebot, FlawedGrace and MBR killer malware. This analytic story looks for suspicious dropped files, cobalt strike execution, im-packet execution, registry modification, scripts, persistence, lateral movement, impact, exfiltration and recon.", "references": ["https://thedfirreport.com/2023/06/12/a-truly-graceful-wipe-out/"], "narrative": "Graceful Wipe Out Attack is a destructive malware campaign found by \"The DFIR Report\" targeting multiple organizations to collect, exfiltrate and wipe the data of targeted networks. This malicious payload corrupts or wipes Master Boot Records by using an NSIS script after the exfiltration of sensitive information from the targeted host or system.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gorgon Group", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Mustang Panda", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "FIN7", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "OilRig", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Akira", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network - Rule", "ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Services Escalate Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Stop By Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Of Net Users", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "DLLHost with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "GPUpdate with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "SearchProtocolHost with no Command Line with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Services Escalate Exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious DLLHost no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious GPUpdate no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious SearchProtocolHost no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows AdFind Exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection Remote Thread", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Stop By Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}]}, {"name": "HAFNIUM Group", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-03-03", "version": 1, "id": "beae2ab0-7c3f-11eb-8b63-acde48001122", "description": "HAFNIUM group was identified by Microsoft as exploiting 4 Microsoft Exchange CVEs in the wild - CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-hafnium-exchange-server-zero-day-activity-in-splunk.html", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/03/rapid7s-insightidr-enables-detection-and-response-to-microsoft-exchange-0-day/"], "narrative": "On Tuesday, March 2, 2021, Microsoft released a set of security patches for its mail server, Microsoft Exchange. These patches respond to a group of vulnerabilities known to impact Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. It is important to note that an Exchange 2010 security update has also been issued, though the CVEs do not reference that version as being vulnerable.\nWhile the CVEs do not shed much light on the specifics of the vulnerabilities or exploits, the first vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) has a remote network attack vector that allows the attacker, a group Microsoft named HAFNIUM, to authenticate as the Exchange server. Three additional vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) were also identified as part of this activity. When chained together along with CVE-2021-26855 for initial access, the attacker would have complete control over the Exchange server. This includes the ability to run code as SYSTEM and write to any path on the server.\nThe following Splunk detections assist with identifying the HAFNIUM groups tradecraft and methodology.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN4", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Mustang Panda", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via procdump - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump Rename", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Local Admin account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via procdump", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Nishang PowershellTCPOneLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}]}, {"name": "Hermetic Wiper", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-03-02", "version": 1, "id": "b7511c2e-9a10-11ec-99e3-acde48001122", "description": "This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as \"Hermetic Wiper\". This analytic story looks for abuse of Regsvr32, executables written in administrative SMB Share, suspicious processes, disabling of memory crash dump and more.", "references": ["https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a"], "narrative": "Hermetic Wiper is destructive malware operation found by Sentinel One targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. This malicious payload corrupts Master Boot Records, uses signed drivers and manipulates NTFS attributes for file destruction.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "APT5"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "FIN13", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Cobalt Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT41", "Axiom", "Deep Panda", "Fox Kitten"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Deep Panda", "GALLIUM", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Turla"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Email"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance", "Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto, Michael Haag, Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Uncommon Processes On Endpoint", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}]}, {"name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Change Default File Association", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "ETW Registry Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features"}]}, {"name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MMC"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft"}]}, {"name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver"}]}, {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows File Without Extension In Critical Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}]}, {"name": "Hidden Cobra Malware", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2020-01-22", "version": 2, "id": "baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335", "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.", "references": ["https://web.archive.org/web/20191220004307/https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://web.archive.org/web/20220421112536/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"], "narrative": "North Korea's government-sponsored \"cyber army\" has been slowly building momentum and gaining sophistication over the last 15 years or so. As a result, the group's activity, which the US government refers to as \"Hidden Cobra,\" has surreptitiously crept onto the collective radar as a preeminent global threat.\nThese state-sponsored actors are thought to be responsible for everything from a hack on a South Korean nuclear plant to an attack on Sony in anticipation of its release of the movie \"The Interview\" at the end of 2014. They're also notorious for cyberespionage. In recent years, the group seems to be focused on financial crimes, such as cryptojacking.\nIn June of 2018, The Department of Homeland Security, together with the FBI and other U.S. government partners, issued Technical Alert (TA-18-149A) to advise the public about two variants of North Korean malware. One variant, dubbed \"Joanap,\" is a multi-stage peer-to-peer botnet that allows North Korean state actors to exfiltrate data, download and execute secondary payloads, and initialize proxy communications. The other variant, \"Brambul,\" is a Windows32 SMB worm that is dropped into a victim network. When executed, the malware attempts to spread laterally within a victim's local subnet, connecting via the SMB protocol and initiating brute-force password attacks. It reports details to the Hidden Cobra actors via email, so they can use the information for secondary remote operations.\nAmong other searches in this Analytic Story is a detection search that looks for the creation or deletion of hidden shares, such as, \"adnim$,\" which the Hidden Cobra malware creates on the target system. Another looks for the creation of three malicious files associated with the malware. You can also use a search in this story to investigate activity that indicates that malware is sending email back to the attackers.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "SilverTerrier"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "LazyScripter", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Exfiltration", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get DNS traffic ratio", "Get History Of Email Sources", "Get Notable History", "Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity", "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "First time seen command line argument", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious File Write", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Process Running On System", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "IcedID", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-07-29", "version": 1, "id": "1d2cc747-63d7-49a9-abb8-93aa36305603", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the IcedID banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection.", "references": ["https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/", "https://app.any.run/tasks/48414a33-3d66-4a46-afe5-c2003bb55ccf/"], "narrative": "IcedId banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS targetting browser such as firefox and chrom to steal banking information. It is also known to its unique payload downloaded in C2 where it can be a .png file that hides the core shellcode bot using steganography technique or gzip dat file that contains \"license.dat\" which is the actual core icedid bot.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1135", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Sowbug", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN8", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Akira", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Local System", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Andariel", "Axiom", "BRONZE BUTLER", "CURIUM", "Dark Caracal", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Collection", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - CHCP Command Execution - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Defender Services - Rule", "ESCU - Drop IcedID License dat - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ESCU - Network Share Discovery Via Dir Command - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Remote System Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Sqlite Module In Temp Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ESCU - Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Account Discovery With Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CHCP Command Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender MpEngine Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Schedule Task", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Defender Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Drop IcedID License dat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}]}, {"name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "IcedID Exfiltrated Archived File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Share Discovery Via Dir Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Discovery"}]}, {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Remote System Discovery with Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Sqlite Module In Temp Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Local System"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 PluginInit", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Windows AdFind Exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Wmic NonInteractive App Uninstallation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}]}, {"name": "IIS Components", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-12-19", "version": 1, "id": "0fbde550-8252-43ab-a26a-03976f55b58b", "description": "Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/12/12/iis-modules-the-evolution-of-web-shells-and-how-to-detect-them/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/004/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/crowdstrike-iceapple-a-novel-internet-information-services-post-exploitation-framework-1.pdf", "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-oilrig-uses-rgdoor-iis-backdoor-targets-middle-east/", "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/appcmd.exe-055B2B09409F980BF9B5A3969D01E5B2.html"], "narrative": "IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions - Get{Extension/Filter}Version, Http{Extension/Filter}Proc, and (optionally) Terminate{Extension/Filter}. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.\nAdversaries may install malicious ISAPI extensions and filters to observe and/or modify traffic, execute commands on compromised machines, or proxy command and control traffic. ISAPI extensions and filters may have access to all IIS web requests and responses. For example, an adversary may abuse these mechanisms to modify HTTP responses in order to distribute malicious commands/content to previously comprised hosts.\nAdversaries may also install malicious IIS modules to observe and/or modify traffic. IIS 7.0 introduced modules that provide the same unrestricted access to HTTP requests and responses as ISAPI extensions and filters. IIS modules can be written as a DLL that exports RegisterModule, or as a .NET application that interfaces with ASP.NET APIs to access IIS HTTP requests. (reference MITRE)", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows IIS Components Add New Module - Rule", "ESCU - Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows IIS Components Module Failed to Load - Rule", "ESCU - Windows IIS Components New Module Added - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell Add Module to Global Assembly Cache - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell IIS Components WebGlobalModule Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows IIS Components Add New Module", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}]}, {"name": "Windows IIS Components Module Failed to Load", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows IIS Components New Module Added", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell Add Module to Global Assembly Cache", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell IIS Components WebGlobalModule Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows Server Software Component GACUtil Install to GAC", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}]}, {"name": "Industroyer2", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-04-21", "version": 1, "id": "7ff7db2b-b001-498e-8fe8-caf2dbc3428a", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Industroyer2 attack, including file writes associated with its payload, lateral movement, persistence, privilege escalation and data destruction.", "references": ["https://cert.gov.ua/article/39518", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/04/12/industroyer2-industroyer-reloaded/"], "narrative": "Industroyer2 is part of continuous attack to ukraine targeting energy facilities. This malware is a windows binary that implement IEC-104 protocol to communicate with industrial equipments. This attack consist of several destructive linux script component to wipe or delete several linux critical files, powershell for domain enumeration and caddywiper to wipe boot sector of the targeted host.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT5", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "Evilnum", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AdsiSearcher Account Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux DD File Overwrite - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Disable Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Stop Services - Rule", "ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "AdsiSearcher Account Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux DD File Overwrite", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Deleting Critical Directory Using RM Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Disable Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Linux Shred Overwrite Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Stdout Redirection To Dev Null File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Linux Stop Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Linux System Network Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Processes Killed By Industroyer2 Malware", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Windows Root Domain linked policies Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "Information Sabotage", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-11-17", "version": 1, "id": "b71ba595-ef80-4e39-8b66-887578a7a71b", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might correlate to insider threat specially in terms of information sabotage.", "references": ["https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/insider-threat-deep-dive-it-sabotage/"], "narrative": "Information sabotage is the type of crime many people associate with insider threat. Where the current or former employees, contractors, or business partners intentionally exceeded or misused an authorized level of access to networks, systems, or data with the intention of harming a specific individual, the organization, or the organization's data, systems, and/or daily business operations.", "tags": {"category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}]}, {"name": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-03-24", "version": 1, "id": "b3782036-8cbd-11eb-9d8e-acde48001122", "description": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the Command And Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"], "narrative": "Ingress tool transfer is a Technique under tactic Command And Control. Behaviors will include the use of living off the land binaries to download implants or binaries over alternate communication ports. It is imperative to baseline applications on endpoints to understand what generates network activity, to where, and what is its native behavior. These utilities, when abused, will write files to disk in world writeable paths.\\ During triage, review the reputation of the remote public destination IP or domain. Capture any files written to disk and perform analysis. Review other parrallel processes for additional behaviors.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1197", "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090", "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1095", "mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "BITTER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "FIN6", "HAFNIUM", "Metador", "PLATINUM", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1649", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Collection", "Execution", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Certify Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Proxy Socks Curl - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "BITSAdmin Download File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Detect Certify Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Detect Certipy File Modifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Linux Curl Upload File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Linux Proxy Socks Curl", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Windows Curl Download to Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Windows Curl Upload to Remote Destination", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}]}, {"name": "Insider Threat", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "date": "2022-05-19", "version": 1, "id": "c633df29-a950-4c4c-a0f8-02be6730797c", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with insider threats and specifically focusing on malicious insiders operating with in a corporate environment.", "references": ["https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/insider-threats/", "https://www.cisa.gov/defining-insider-threats", "https://www.code42.com/glossary/types-of-insider-threats/", "https://github.com/Insider-Threat/Insider-Threat", "https://ctid.mitre-engenuity.org/our-work/insider-ttp-kb/"], "narrative": "Insider Threats are best defined by CISA: \"Insider threat incidents are possible in any sector or organization. An insider threat is typically a current or former employee, third-party contractor, or business partner. In their present or former role, the person has or had access to an organization's network systems, data, or premises, and uses their access (sometimes unwittingly). To combat the insider threat, organizations can implement a proactive, prevention-focused mitigation program to detect and identify threats, assess risk, and manage that risk - before an incident occurs.\" An insider is any person who has or had authorized access to or knowledge of an organization's resources, including personnel, facilities, information, equipment, networks, and systems. These are the common insiders that create insider threats: Departing Employees, Security Evaders, Malicious Insiders, and Negligent Employees. This story aims at detecting the malicious insider.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud", "Splunk Behavioral Analytics"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1219", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "RTM", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Thrip"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1537", "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1567.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "POLONIUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1567", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "FIN10", "FIN7", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "PROMETHIUM", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials In Files", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Scattered Spider", "TA505", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Exfiltration", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Gsuite Drive Share In External Email - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule", "ESCU - High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share - Rule", "ESCU - Potential password in username - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Jose Hernandez", "detections": [{"name": "Gsuite Drive Share In External Email", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite Outbound Email With Attachment To External Domain", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "High Frequency Copy Of Files In Network Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Potential password in username", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials In Files"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Access Software Hunt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}]}, {"name": "Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Vulnerabilities", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2024-01-16", "version": 1, "id": "e3b5c3b8-082b-4b4e-b2c9-47ed79e2a5ab", "description": "The following analytic story addresses critical vulnerabilities CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure Gateways. CVE-2023-46805 is an authentication bypass vulnerability, while CVE-2024-21887 is a command injection flaw, both presenting significant risks in versions 9.x and 22.x. Combined, these vulnerabilities enable unauthenticated threat actors to execute arbitrary commands, compromising system integrity. Immediate mitigation is imperative, with patches scheduled for staggered release. Ivanti has provided interim mitigation steps, and it's crucial for customers to apply these measures to protect their systems against potential exploits.", "references": ["https://github.com/RootUp/PersonalStuff/blob/master/http-vuln-cve2023-46805_2024_21887.nse", "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/c6b351e71b0fb0e40e222e97038f1fe09ac58194/http/misconfiguration/ivanti/CVE-2023-46085-CVE-2024-21887-mitigation-not-applied.yaml", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/18708/files", "https://attackerkb.com/topics/AdUh6by52K/cve-2023-46805/rapid7-analysis", "https://labs.watchtowr.com/welcome-to-2024-the-sslvpn-chaos-continues-ivanti-cve-2023-46805-cve-2024-21887/", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2024/01/10/active-exploitation-of-two-zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-ivanti-connect-secure-vpn/", "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/suspected-apt-targets-ivanti-zero-day", "https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2023-46805-Authentication-Bypass-CVE-2024-21887-Command-Injection-for-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-and-Ivanti-Policy-Secure-Gateways?language=en_US"], "narrative": "Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways face a severe security challenge with the discovery of CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887. CVE-2023-46805 allows attackers to bypass authentication in critical web components of versions 9.x and 22.x. More alarmingly, when paired with CVE-2024-21887, a command injection vulnerability, it enables remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands without authentication. This combination poses a heightened threat, undermining the security of enterprise networks. Ivanti has mobilized resources to address these vulnerabilities, offering immediate mitigation advice and scheduling patch releases. Customers are urged to apply these mitigations without delay to safeguard their networks.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Access to Vulnerable Ivanti Connect Secure Bookmark Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure Command Injection Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure SSRF in SAML Component - Rule", "ESCU - Ivanti Connect Secure System Information Access via Auth Bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Access to Vulnerable Ivanti Connect Secure Bookmark Endpoint", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Ivanti Connect Secure Command Injection Attempts", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Ivanti Connect Secure SSRF in SAML Component", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Ivanti Connect Secure System Information Access via Auth Bypass", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated Access", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-08-08", "version": 2, "id": "7e36ca54-c096-4a39-b724-6fc935164f0c", "description": "Ivanti, a leading technology company, has disclosed two critical zero-day vulnerabilities in its Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) product, CVE-2023-35078 and CVE-2023-35081. A recent update concerning CVE-2023-35082, closely related to CVE-2023-35078, reveals its impact on more versions of Ivanti's software than initially believed. The former allows unauthenticated attackers to obtain sensitive data, modify servers, and access the API, potentially leading to data breaches or malicious system modifications. Meanwhile, CVE-2023-35081 lets authenticated administrators remotely write arbitrary files to the server. Both vulnerabilities have been exploited in targeted attacks against government ministries and could be used in conjunction. With the presence of PoC code for CVE-2023-35078, the risk of broader exploitation has increased. While initially leveraged in limited attacks, the exploitation is expected to rise, possibly involving state-sponsored actors. Organizations are urged to apply immediate patches and conduct regular system assessments to ensure security.", "references": ["https://www.securityweek.com/second-ivanti-epmm-zero-day-vulnerability-exploited-in-targeted-attacks/", "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/07/28/ivanti-releases-security-updates-epmm-address-cve-2023-35081", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-35078", "https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2023-35078-Remote-unauthenticated-API-access-vulnerability?language=en_US"], "narrative": "Ivantis Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) product, formerly known as MobileIron Core and extensively utilized by IT teams to manage mobile devices, applications, and content, has been found to harbor several critical vulnerabilities. Specifically, CVE-2023-35078 allows remote unauthenticated attackers to access sensitive data and make changes to servers. This flaw has been leveraged in targeted attacks against Norwegian government ministries. In addition, CVE-2023-35081 permits an authenticated attacker with administrative privileges to remotely write arbitrary files to the server.\nRecently, attention has shifted to CVE-2023-35082, which was initially believed to affect only MobileIron Core 11.2 and below. Subsequent investigations revealed its wider influence, affecting EPMM versions 11.10, 11.9, 11.8, and MobileIron Core 11.7 and earlier. This vulnerability facilitates unauthorized access to the API via the URI path /mifs/asfV3/api/v2/.\nWhen combined, these vulnerabilities can be exploited to bypass administrative authentication and access control list (ACL) restrictions, leading to malicious file writing and potential OS command execution. Both have been actively exploited, possibly by state-sponsored actors, prompting urgent advisories from Ivanti and Rapid7, alongside CISA. Given the thousands of potentially vulnerable internet-exposed systems and the presence of PoC code for CVE-2023-35078, the risk of extensive exploitation escalates. The situation is further muddled by Ivanti's 2020 acquisition of MobileIron, which had its known issues. Collectively, these vulnerabilities present a significant risk to organizations utilizing Ivanti's EPMM, emphasizing the need for swift patching, vigilant monitoring, and timely application of fixes to counteract potential threats.", "tags": {"category": ["Vulnerability", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35078 - Rule", "ESCU - Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35082 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35078", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Ivanti EPMM Remote Unauthenticated API Access CVE-2023-35082", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass CVE-2023-38035", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-08-24", "version": 1, "id": "da229be2-4637-47a5-b551-1d4b64f411c6", "description": "A critical vulnerability, designated as CVE-2023-38035, has been identified in Ivanti Sentry (formerly MobileIron Sentry). It affects all supported versions, including 9.18, 9.17, and 9.16, as well as older versions. The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to access the System Manager Portal (typically hosted on port 8443) and make configuration changes, potentially executing OS commands as root. However, the risk is low for users who haven't exposed port 8443 online. This flaw is distinct from other Ivanti products. It's imperative for organizations to check for unrecognized HTTP requests to /services/* as a potential indicator of compromise.", "references": ["https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2023-38035/blob/main/CVE-2023-38035.py", "https://www.horizon3.ai/ivanti-sentry-authentication-bypass-cve-2023-38035-deep-dive/", "https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/KB-API-Authentication-Bypass-on-Sentry-Administrator-Interface-CVE-2023-38035?language=en_US"], "narrative": "CVE-2023-38035 presents a significant security risk in the Ivanti Sentry administration interface. The vulnerability was identified shortly after another notable vulnerability in Ivanti EPMM (CVE-2023-35078) was discovered being exploited in the wild. The current vulnerability allows a malicious actor, without requiring authentication, to access the System Manager Portal, typically hosted on port 8443. Upon successful exploitation, the attacker can make configuration alterations to both the Sentry system and its underlying OS. The potential damage is significant, enabling the attacker to execute commands on the system with root privileges.\nWhile this vulnerability scored high on the CVSS scale, its risk is relatively mitigated for clients who have not exposed port 8443 to the internet. The primary exploitation vector is the System Manager Portal, an administrative interface for Sentry.\nAs of now, definitive indicators of compromise (IoCs) are elusive. However, any unexpected HTTP requests to the endpoint /services/* could be a red flag. It's worth noting that the exploited endpoint might not be the sole vulnerable point, suggesting other potential gateways for attackers. Ivanti Sentry's system doesn't provide a typical Unix shell, but in the event of a known system breach, the /var/log/tomcat2/ directory contains access logs that may reveal accessed endpoints. Additionally, web interface logs may provide insights into suspicious activities and should be monitored closely.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "JBoss Vulnerability", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-14", "version": 1, "id": "1f5294cb-b85f-4c2d-9c58-ffcf248f52bd", "description": "In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility used for testing and exploiting JBoss application servers. These searches help detect evidence of these attacks, such as network connections to external resources or web services spawning atypical child processes, among others.", "references": ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"], "narrative": "This Analytic Story looks for probing and exploitation attempts targeting JBoss application servers. While the vulnerabilities associated with this story are rather dated, they were leveraged in a spring 2016 campaign in connection with the Samsam ransomware variant. Incidents involving this ransomware are unique, in that they begin with attacks against vulnerable services, rather than the phishing or drive-by attacks more common with ransomware. In this case, vulnerable JBoss applications appear to be the target of choice.\nIt is helpful to understand how often a notable event generated by this story occurs, as well as the commonalities between some of these events, both of which may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. It may also help to understand whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or whether it is broader in scope.\nWhen looking at the target of the behavior uncovered by the event, you should note the sensitivity of the user and or/system to help determine the potential impact. It is also helpful to identify other recent events involving the target. This can help tie different events together and give further situational awareness regarding the target host.\nVarious types of information for external systems should be reviewed and, potentially, collected if the incident is, indeed, judged to be malicious. This data may be useful for generating your own threat intelligence, so you can create future alerts.\nThe following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious:\n1. Country of origin\n1. Responsible party\n1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address\n1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address Determining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you qualify and understand the event and possible motivation for the attack. In addition, there are various sources that may provide reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist you in determining whether the event is malicious in nature. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or expose other historic events that might be brought back into scope.\nGathering various data on the system of interest can sometimes help quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include determining who else may have logged into the system recently, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and/or whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\nhen a specific service or application is targeted, it is often helpful to know the associated version, to help determine whether it is vulnerable to a specific exploit.\nIf you suspect an attack targeting a web server, it is helpful to look at some of the behavior of the web service to see if there is evidence that the service has been compromised. Some indications of this might be network connections to external resources, the web service spawning child processes that are not associated with typical behavior, and whether the service wrote any files that might be malicious in nature.\nIf a suspicious file is found, we can review more information about it to help determine if it is, in fact, malicious. Identifying the file type, any processes that opened the file, the processes that may have created and/or modified the file, and how many other systems potentially have this file can you determine whether the file is malicious. Also, determining the file hash and checking it against reputation sources, such as VirusTotal, can sometimes help you quickly determine if it is malicious in nature.\nOften, a simple inspection of a suspect process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if svchost.exe is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when simply reviewing process names.\nIt can also be helpful to examine various behaviors of and the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see whether the parent process spawned other processes that might also warrant further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made around the time of the event and noting whether the process has spawned any child processes could be helpful in determining whether it is malicious or executing a malicious script.", "tags": {"category": ["Vulnerability"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Discovery", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Jenkins Server Vulnerabilities", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2024-01-29", "version": 1, "id": "789e76e6-4b5e-4af3-ab8c-46578d84ccff", "description": "This analytic story provides a comprehensive view of Jenkins server vulnerabilities and associated detection analytics.", "references": ["https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2024-01-24/"], "narrative": "The following analytic story provides a comprehensive view of Jenkins server vulnerabilities and associated detection analytics. Jenkins is a popular open-source automation server that is used to automate tasks associated with building, testing, and deploying software. Jenkins is often used in DevOps environments and is a critical component of the software development lifecycle. As a result, Jenkins servers are often targeted by adversaries to gain access to sensitive information, credentials, and other critical assets. This analytic story provides a comprehensive view of Jenkins server vulnerabilities and associated detection analytics.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897 - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Jenkins Arbitrary File Read CVE-2024-23897", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "JetBrains TeamCity Unauthenticated RCE", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-01", "version": 1, "id": "7ef2d230-9dbb-4d13-9263-a7d8c3aad9bf", "description": "A critical security vulnerability, CVE-2023-42793, has been discovered affecting all versions of TeamCity On-Premises up to 2023.05.3. This vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to execute remote code and gain administrative control of the TeamCity server, posing a significant risk for supply chain attacks. Although the issue has been fixed in version 2023.05.4, servers running older versions remain at risk. A security patch plugin has been released for immediate mitigation, applicable to TeamCity versions 8.0 and above. Organizations are strongly advised to update to the fixed version or apply the security patch, especially if their TeamCity server is publicly accessible. No impact has been reported on TeamCity Cloud as it has been upgraded to the secure version.", "references": ["https://blog.jetbrains.com/teamcity/2023/09/critical-security-issue-affecting-teamcity-on-premises-update-to-2023-05-4-now/", "https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/teamcity-vulnerability/", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/18408", "https://attackerkb.com/topics/1XEEEkGHzt/cve-2023-42793/rapid7-analysis"], "narrative": "The CVE-2023-42793 vulnerability in TeamCity On-Premises allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass authentication and gain administrative access through Remote Code Execution (RCE). Specifically, the attacker can send a malicious POST request to /app/rest/users/id:1/tokens/RPC2 to create an administrative token. Once the token is obtained, the attacker has the ability to perform various unauthorized activities, including creating new admin users and executing arbitrary shell commands on the server. For Splunk Security Content, the focus should be on identifying suspicious POST requests to /app/rest/users/id:1/tokens/RPC2 and other affected API endpoints, as this is the initial point of exploitation. Monitoring logs for changes to the internal.properties file or the creation of new admin users could also provide crucial indicators of compromise. Furthermore, Splunk can be configured to alert on multiple failed login attempts followed by a successful login from the same IP, which could indicate exploitation attempts.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "JetBrains TeamCity Vulnerabilities", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2024-03-04", "version": 1, "id": "3cd841e8-2f64-45e8-b148-7767255db111", "description": "This story provides a high-level overview of JetBrains TeamCity vulnerabilities and how to detect and respond to them using Splunk.", "references": ["https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2024/03/04/etr-cve-2024-27198-and-cve-2024-27199-jetbrains-teamcity-multiple-authentication-bypass-vulnerabilities-fixed/", "https://blog.jetbrains.com/teamcity/2024/03/teamcity-2023-11-4-is-out/", "https://blog.jetbrains.com/teamcity/2024/03/additional-critical-security-issues-affecting-teamcity-on-premises-cve-2024-27198-and-cve-2024-27199-update-to-2023-11-4-now/"], "narrative": "JetBrains TeamCity is a continuous integration and deployment server that allows developers to automate the process of building, testing, and deploying code. It is a popular tool used by many organizations to streamline their development and deployment processes. However, like any software, JetBrains TeamCity is not immune to vulnerabilities.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass CVE-2024-27198 - Rule", "ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27198 - Rule", "ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity Limited Auth Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27199 - Rule", "ESCU - JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass CVE-2024-27198", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27198", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "JetBrains TeamCity Limited Auth Bypass Suricata CVE-2024-27199", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "JetBrains TeamCity RCE Attempt", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Juniper JunOS Remote Code Execution", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-08-29", "version": 1, "id": "3fcef843-c97e-4cf3-a72f-749be480cee3", "description": "Juniper Networks has resolved multiple critical vulnerabilities in the J-Web component of Junos OS on SRX and EX Series devices. These vulnerabilities, when chained together, could allow an unauthenticated, network-based attacker to remotely execute code on the devices. The vulnerabilities affect all versions of Junos OS on SRX and EX Series, but specific fixes have been released to address each vulnerability. Juniper Networks recommends applying the necessary fixes to mitigate potential remote code execution threats. As a workaround, users can disable J-Web or limit access to only trusted hosts. Proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code has been released, demonstrating the severity of these flaws and the urgency to apply the fixes.", "references": ["https://supportportal.juniper.net/s/article/2023-08-Out-of-Cycle-Security-Bulletin-Junos-OS-SRX-Series-and-EX-Series-Multiple-vulnerabilities-in-J-Web-can-be-combined-to-allow-a-preAuth-Remote-Code-Execution?language=en_US", "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/main/http/cves/2023/CVE-2023-36844.yaml", "https://thehackernews.com/2023/08/new-juniper-junos-os-flaws-expose.html", "https://github.com/watchtowrlabs/juniper-rce_cve-2023-36844", "https://labs.watchtowr.com/cve-2023-36844-and-friends-rce-in-juniper-firewalls/"], "narrative": "Juniper Networks, a networking hardware company, has released an \"out-of-cycle\" security update to address multiple flaws in the J-Web component of Junos OS that could be combined to achieve remote code execution on susceptible installations. The flaws have a cumulative CVSS rating of 9.8, making them critical in severity. They affect all versions of Junos OS on SRX and EX Series. The J-Web interface allows users to configure, manage, and monitor Junos OS devices. The vulnerabilities include two PHP external variable modification vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-36844 and CVE-2023-36845) and two missing authentications for critical function vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-36846 and CVE-2023-36847). These vulnerabilities could allow an unauthenticated, network-based attacker to control certain important environment variables, cause limited impact to the file system integrity, or upload arbitrary files via J-Web without any authentication.\nThe vulnerabilities have been addressed in specific Junos OS versions for EX Series and SRX Series devices. Users are recommended to apply the necessary fixes to mitigate potential remote code execution threats. As a workaround, Juniper Networks suggests disabling J-Web or limiting access to only trusted hosts.\nAdditionally, a PoC exploit has been released by watchTowr, combining CVE-2023-36846 and CVE-2023-36845 to upload a PHP file containing malicious shellcode and achieve code execution by injecting the PHPRC environment variable to point to a configuration file to load the booby-trapped PHP script. WatchTowr noted that this is an interesting bug chain, utilizing two bugs that would be near-useless in isolation and combining them for a \"world-ending\" unauthenticated remote code execution.\nIn conclusion, these vulnerabilities pose a significant threat to Juniper SRX and EX Series devices, and it is imperative for users to apply the necessary fixes or implement the recommended workaround to mitigate the potential impact.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Juniper Networks Remote Code Execution Exploit Detection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Juniper Networks Remote Code Execution Exploit Detection", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Scanning Activity", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2020-04-15", "version": 1, "id": "a9ef59cf-e981-4e66-9eef-bb049f695c09", "description": "This story addresses detection against Kubernetes cluster fingerprint scan and attack by providing information on items such as source ip, user agent, cluster names.", "references": ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"], "narrative": "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitve information and management priviledges of production workloads, microservices and applications. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious unauthenticated requests from the internet to kubernetes cluster.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "datamodels": ["Email"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip", "Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Security", "author": "Patrick Bareiss", "date": "2023-12-06", "version": 1, "id": "77006b3a-306c-4e32-afd5-30b6e40c1c41", "description": "Kubernetes, as a container orchestration platform, faces unique security challenges. This story explores various tactics and techniques adversaries use to exploit Kubernetes environments, including attacking the control plane, exploiting misconfigurations, and compromising containerized applications.", "references": ["https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/"], "narrative": "Kubernetes, a widely used container orchestration system, presents a complex environment that can be targeted by adversaries. Key areas of concern include the control plane, worker nodes, and network communication. Attackers may attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in the Kubernetes API, misconfigured containers, or insecure network policies. The control plane, responsible for managing cluster operations, is a prime target. Compromising this can give attackers control over the entire cluster. Worker nodes, running the containerized applications, can be targeted to disrupt services or to gain access to sensitive data. Common attack vectors include exploiting vulnerabilities in container images, misconfigured role-based access controls (RBAC), exposed Kubernetes dashboards, and insecure network configurations. Attackers can also target the supply chain, injecting malicious code into container images or Helm charts. To mitigate these threats, it is essential to enforce robust security practices such as regular vulnerability scanning, implementing least privilege access, securing the control plane, network segmentation, and continuous monitoring for suspicious activities. Tools like Kubernetes Network Policies, Pod Security Policies, and third-party security solutions can provide additional layers of defense.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Container API", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1046", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Rocke", "Suckfly", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Container Orchestration Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1526", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Credential Access", "Discovery", "Execution", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual Location - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Agent - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Group - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Name - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Access Scanning - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Create or Update Privileged Pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Cron Job Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes DaemonSet Deployed - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Falco Shell Spawned - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Node Port Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Pod With Host Network Attachment - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Scanning by Unauthenticated IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Suspicious Image Pulling - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Unauthorized Access - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "no", "author_name": "Patrick Bareiss", "detections": [{"name": "Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual Location", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Container API"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Agent", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Container API"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Group", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Container API"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Abuse of Secret by Unusual User Name", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Container API"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Access Scanning", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes Create or Update Privileged Pod", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Cron Job Creation", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Container Orchestration Job"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes DaemonSet Deployed", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Falco Shell Spawned", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Node Port Creation", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Pod With Host Network Attachment", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Scanning by Unauthenticated IP Address", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Suspicious Image Pulling", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Unauthorized Access", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Kubernetes Sensitive Object Access Activity", "author": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2020-05-20", "version": 1, "id": "c7d4dbf0-a171-4eaf-8444-4f40392e4f92", "description": "This story addresses detection and response of accounts acccesing Kubernetes cluster sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets providing information on items such as user user, group. object, namespace and authorization reason.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"], "narrative": "Kubernetes is the most used container orchestration platform, this orchestration platform contains sensitive objects within its architecture, specifically configmaps and secrets, if accessed by an attacker can lead to further compromise. These searches allow operator to detect suspicious requests against Kubernetes sensitive objects.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Linux Living Off The Land", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-07-27", "version": 1, "id": "e405a2d7-dc8e-4227-8e9d-f60267b8c0cd", "description": "Linux Living Off The Land consists of binaries that may be used to bypass local security restrictions within misconfigured systems.", "references": ["https://gtfobins.github.io/"], "narrative": "Similar to Windows LOLBAS project, the GTFOBins project focuses solely on Unix binaries that may be abused in multiple categories including Reverse Shell, File Upload, File Download and much more. These binaries are native to the operating system and the functionality is typically native. The behaviors are typically not malicious by default or vulnerable, but these are built in functionality of the applications. When reviewing any notables or hunting through mountains of events of interest, it's important to identify the binary, review command-line arguments, path of file, and capture any network and file modifications. Linux analysis may be a bit cumbersome due to volume and how process behavior is seen in EDR products. Piecing it together will require some effort.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT5", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "At", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090", "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1095", "mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "BITTER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "FIN6", "HAFNIUM", "Metador", "PLATINUM", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT5", "BlackTech", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GCMAN", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1115", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT39"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Collection", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux APT Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux AWK Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux c89 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux c99 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Clipboard Data Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Composer Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Curl Upload File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Decode Base64 to Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Docker Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Find Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux GDB Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Gem Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Make Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Node Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Obfuscated Files or Information Base64 Decode - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Octave Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux PHP Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Proxy Socks Curl - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux RPM Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Linux SSH Remote Services Script Execute - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux APT Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux At Application Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux AWK Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux c89 Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux c99 Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Linux Clipboard Data Copy", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data"}]}, {"name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Composer Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Curl Upload File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Linux Decode Base64 to Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell"}]}, {"name": "Linux Docker Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Find Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux GDB Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Gem Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Ingress Tool Transfer Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Linux Ingress Tool Transfer with Curl", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Linux Make Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Node Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Obfuscated Files or Information Base64 Decode", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Linux Octave Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux PHP Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Linux Proxy Socks Curl", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Non-Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux RPM Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Restarted", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux SSH Authorized Keys Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys"}]}, {"name": "Linux SSH Remote Services Script Execute", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}]}, {"name": "Linux Persistence Techniques", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-12-17", "version": 1, "id": "e40d13e5-d38b-457e-af2a-e8e6a2f2b516", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Linux system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", "https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/", "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/", "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2021-CTI-005.pdf"], "narrative": "Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Linux environment.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT5", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "At", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Execution", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Add User Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux At Application Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"}]}, {"name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Restarted", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Shred Overwrite Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}]}, {"name": "Linux Post-Exploitation", "author": "Rod Soto", "date": "2021-12-03", "version": 1, "id": "d310ccfe-5477-11ec-ad05-acde48001122", "description": "This analytic story identifies popular Linux post exploitation tools such as autoSUID, LinEnum, LinPEAS, Linux Exploit Suggesters, MimiPenguin.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/linux/"], "narrative": "These tools allow operators find possible exploits or paths for privilege escalation based on SUID binaries, user permissions, kernel version and distro version.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "no", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "Suspicious Linux Discovery Commands", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell"}]}]}, {"name": "Linux Privilege Escalation", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-12-17", "version": 1, "id": "b9879c24-670a-44c0-895e-98cdb7d0e848", "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Linux privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, schedule task, services, setuid, root execution and more.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"], "narrative": "Privilege escalation is a \"land-and-expand\" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Linux machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT5", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "At", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "TeamTNT", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Execution", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Add User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux APT Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux AWK Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux c89 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux c99 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Change File Owner To Root - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Common Process For Elevation Control - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Composer Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Conf File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Doas Tool Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Docker Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux File Creation In Profile Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Find Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux GDB Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Gem Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Make Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Node Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Octave Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Linux PHP Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Credential Files - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux RPM Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Shred Overwrite Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudo OR Su Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Visudo Utility Execution - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Add User Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux apt-get Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux APT Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux At Application Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux AWK Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Busybox Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux c89 Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux c99 Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Change File Owner To Root", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Linux Common Process For Elevation Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Composer Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Cpulimit Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Csvtool Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Docker Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Emacs Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux File Creation In Init Boot Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "RC Scripts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"}]}, {"name": "Linux File Creation In Profile Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Find Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux GDB Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Gem Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux GNU Awk Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Make Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux MySQL Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Node Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux NOPASSWD Entry In Sudoers File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Octave Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux OpenVPN Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Persistence and Privilege Escalation Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux PHP Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux pkexec Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Access To Credential Files", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Access To Sudoers File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Command To Profile Config File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Ssh Key File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SSH Authorized Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Linux Preload Hijack Library Calls", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Linux Puppet Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux RPM Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Ruby Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Restarted", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Setuid Using Chmod Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Setuid Using Setcap Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Setuid and Setgid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Shred Overwrite Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Linux Sqlite3 Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Sudo OR Su Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Sudoers Tmp File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Linux Visudo Utility Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}]}, {"name": "Linux Rootkit", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-07-27", "version": 1, "id": "e30f4054-ac08-4999-b8bc-5cc46886c18d", "description": "Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014/", "https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41", "https://medium.com/chronicle-blog/winnti-more-than-just-windows-and-gates-e4f03436031a"], "narrative": "Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or System Firmware. Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. Linux rootkits may not standout as much as a Windows rootkit, therefore understanding what kernel modules are installed today and monitoring for new is important. As with any rootkit, it may blend in using a common kernel name or variation of legitimate names.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Kernel Module Enumeration - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Linux File Created In Kernel Driver Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Insert Kernel Module Using Insmod Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Install Kernel Module Using Modprobe Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Linux Kernel Module Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}]}]}, {"name": "Living Off The Land", "author": "Lou Stella, Splunk", "date": "2022-03-16", "version": 2, "id": "6f7982e2-900b-11ec-a54a-acde48001122", "description": "Leverage analytics that allow you to identify the presence of an adversary leveraging native applications within your environment.", "references": ["https://lolbas-project.github.io/"], "narrative": "Living Off The Land refers to an adversary methodology of using native applications already installed on the target operating system to achieve their objective. Native utilities provide the adversary with reduced chances of detection by antivirus software or EDR tools. This allows the adversary to blend in with native process behavior.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Unauthorized Software", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Evilnum", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Whitefly", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "At", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1216", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Script Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT33", "Blue Mockingbird", "FIN8", "HEXANE", "Leviathan", "Metador", "Mustang Panda", "Rancor", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1197", "mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "APT41", "Leviathan", "Patchwork", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1140", "mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Darkhotel", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "WIRTE", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Ember Bear"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Mustang Panda", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Dark Caracal", "OilRig", "Silence"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1647", "mitre_attack_technique": "Plist File Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.013", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mavinject", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1202", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1567", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Odbcconf", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Exfiltration", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - BITS Job Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - BITSAdmin Download File - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - CertUtil With Decode Argument - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Esentutl SAM Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Living Off The Land Detection - Rule", "ESCU - LOLBAS With Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - MacOS LOLbin - Rule", "ESCU - MacOS plutil - Rule", "ESCU - Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 DNSQuery - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Binary Proxy Execution Mavinject DLL Injection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Identify Protocol Handlers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Known Abused DLL Created - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MOF Event Triggered Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Load DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Odbcconf Load Response File - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Script Proxy Execution Syncappvpublishingserver - Rule", "ESCU - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Lou Stella", "detections": [{"name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "BITS Job Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs"}]}, {"name": "BITSAdmin Download File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "BITS Jobs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CertUtil Download With VerifyCtl and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "CertUtil With Decode Argument", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel"}]}, {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Detect mshta renamed", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Disable Schedule Task", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Esentutl SAM Copy", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Living Off The Land Detection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "LOLBAS With Network Traffic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "MacOS LOLbin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unix Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "MacOS plutil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Plist File Modification"}]}, {"name": "Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MMC"}]}, {"name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Create Remote Thread To A Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 CreateRemoteThread In Browser", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 DNSQuery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious IcedID Rundll32 Cmdline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious mshta child process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious mshta spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Windows Binary Proxy Execution Mavinject DLL Injection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mavinject"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Diskshadow Proxy Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "Windows Identify Protocol Handlers", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Indirect Command Execution Via pcalua", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Known Abused DLL Created", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows MOF Event Triggered Execution via WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription"}]}, {"name": "Windows Odbcconf Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Odbcconf"}]}, {"name": "Windows Odbcconf Load DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Odbcconf"}]}, {"name": "Windows Odbcconf Load Response File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Odbcconf"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Script Proxy Execution Syncappvpublishingserver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Script Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}]}, {"name": "Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}]}, {"name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}]}, {"name": "Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp", "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2022-04-28", "version": 1, "id": "765790f0-2f8f-4048-8321-fd1928ec2546", "description": "KrbRelayUp is a tool that allows local privilege escalation from low-priviliged domain user to local system on domain-joined computers.", "references": ["https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp", "https://gist.github.com/tothi/bf6c59d6de5d0c9710f23dae5750c4b9", "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html", "https://dirkjanm.io/relaying-kerberos-over-dns-with-krbrelayx-and-mitm6/", "https://github.com/cube0x0/KrbRelay"], "narrative": "In October 2021, James Forshaw from Googles Project Zero released a research  blog post titled `Using Kerberos for Authentication Relay Attacks`. This research introduced, for the first time, ways to make Windows authenticate to a different Service Principal Name (SPN) than what would normally be derived from the hostname the client is connecting to. This effectively proved that relaying Kerberos authentication is possible\\\\. In April 2022, security researcher Mor Davidovich released a tool named KrbRelayUp which implements Kerberos relaying as well as other known Kerberos techniques with the goal of escalating privileges from a low-privileged domain user on a domain-joined device and obtain a SYSTEM shell.", "tags": {"category": ["Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "datamodels": ["Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Computer Account With SPN - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon - Rule", "ESCU - Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows Computer Account Created by Computer Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Computer Account With SPN", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows Kerberos Local Successful Logon", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows KrbRelayUp Service Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}]}, {"name": "LockBit Ransomware", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-01-16", "version": 1, "id": "67e5b98d-16d6-46a6-8d00-070a3d1a5cfc", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the LockBit ransomware, including looking for file writes (file encryption and ransomware notes), deleting services, terminating processes, registry key modification and more.", "references": ["https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/10/lockbit-3-0-also-known-as-lockbit-black.html", "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/04/24/lockbit-ransomware-borrows-tricks-to-keep-up-with-revil-and-maze/", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-analysis-report-lockbit-2.0-all-paths-lead-to-ransom", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/g/lockbit-ransomware-group-augments-its-latest-variant--lockbit-3-.html"], "narrative": "LockBit ransomware was first seen in 2019. This ransomware was used by cybercriminal in targeting multiple sectors and organizations. Lockbit is one of the ransomware being offered as a Ransomware-as-a-Service(RaaS) and also known to affiliates to implement the 'double extortion' techniques by uploading the stolen and sensitive victim information to their dark website and then threatening to sell/release it in public if their demands are not met. LockBit Ransomware advertised opportunities for threat actors that could provide credential access via RDP and VPN. Aside from this it is also uses threat emulation like Cobalt Strike and Metasploit to gain foot hold to the targeted host and persist if needed.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Execution", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Default Icon Setting - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP"}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "High Process Termination Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement"}]}, {"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP"}]}, {"name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Default Icon Setting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228", "author": "Jose Hernandez", "date": "2021-12-11", "version": 1, "id": "b4453928-5a98-11ec-afcd-8de10b48fc52", "description": "Log4Shell or CVE-2021-44228 is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Apache Log4j library, a widely used and ubiquitous logging framework for Java. The vulnerability allows an attacker who can control log messages to execute arbitrary code loaded from attacker-controlled servers and we anticipate that most apps using the Log4j library will meet this condition.", "references": ["https://mbechler.github.io/2021/12/10/PSA_Log4Shell_JNDI_Injection/", "https://www.fastly.com/blog/digging-deeper-into-log4shell-0day-rce-exploit-found-in-log4j", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/log4j2-vulnerability-analysis-and-mitigation-recommendations/", "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/log-jammin-log4j-2-rce.html"], "narrative": "In late November 2021, Chen Zhaojun of Alibaba identified a remote code execution vulnerability. Previous work was seen in a 2016 Blackhat talk by Alvaro Munoz and Oleksandr Mirosh called [\"A Journey from JNDI/LDAP Manipulation to Remote Code Execution Dream Land\"](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Munoz-A-Journey-From-JNDI-LDAP-Manipulation-To-RCE.pdf). Reported under the CVE ID : CVE-2021-44228, released to the public on December 10, 2021. The vulnerability is exploited through improper deserialization of user input passed into the framework. It permits remote code execution and it can allow an attacker to leak sensitive data, such as environment variables, or execute malicious software on the target system.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Application Security", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Persistence", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk", "Network_Traffic", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Curl Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Java Class File download by Java User Agent - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation - Rule", "ESCU - Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Wget Download and Bash Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Hunting for Log4Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "no", "author_name": "Jose Hernandez", "detections": [{"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Curl Download and Bash Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Java Class File download by Java User Agent", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 Exploitation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Outbound Network Connection from Java Using Default Ports", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Wget Download and Bash Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Windows Java Spawning Shells", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outbound LDAP Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Hunting for Log4Shell", "source": "web", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection Attempt", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Log4Shell JNDI Payload Injection with Outbound Connection", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2017-08-23", "version": 5, "id": "2c8ff66e-0b57-42af-8ad7-912438a403fc", "description": "Attackers are finding stealthy ways \"live off the land,\" leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.", "references": ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"], "narrative": "The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope.\nThe following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious:\n1. Country of origin\n1. Responsible party\n1. Fully qualified domain names associated with the external IP address\n1. Registration of fully qualified domain names associated with external IP address\nDetermining whether it is a dynamic domain frequently visited by others and/or how third parties categorize it can also help you answer some questions surrounding the attacker and details related to the external system. In addition, there are various sources--such as VirusTotal&#151; that can provide some reputation information on the IP address or domain name, which can assist in determining whether the event is malicious. Finally, determining whether there are other events associated with the IP address may help connect data points or show other events that should be brought into scope.\nGathering data on the system of interest can sometimes help you quickly determine whether something suspicious is happening. Some of these items include finding out who else may have recently logged into the system, whether any unusual scheduled tasks exist, whether the system is communicating on suspicious ports, whether there are modifications to sensitive registry keys, and whether there are any known vulnerabilities on the system. This information can often highlight other activity commonly seen in attack scenarios or give more information about how the system may have been targeted.\nOften, a simple inspection of the process name and path can tell you if the system has been compromised. For example, if `svchost.exe` is found running from a location other than `C:\\Windows\\System32`, it is likely something malicious designed to hide in plain sight when cursorily reviewing process names. Similarly, if the process itself seems legitimate, but the parent process is running from the temporary browser cache, that could be indicative of activity initiated via a compromised website a user visited.\nIt can also be very helpful to examine various behaviors of the process of interest or the parent of the process of interest. For example, if it turns out the process of interest is malicious, it would be good to see if the parent to that process spawned other processes that might be worth further scrutiny. If a process is suspect, a review of the network connections made in and around the time of the event and/or whether the process spawned any child processes could be helpful, as well.\nIn the event a system is suspected of having been compromised via a malicious website, we suggest reviewing the browsing activity from that system around the time of the event. If categories are given for the URLs visited, that can help you zero in on possible malicious sites.\nMost recently we have added new content related to PowerShell Script Block logging, Windows EventCode 4104. Script block logging presents the deobfuscated and raw script executed on an endpoint. The analytics produced were tested against commonly used attack frameworks - PowerShell-Empire, Cobalt Strike and Covenant. In addition, we sampled publicly available samples that utilize PowerShell and validated coverage. The analytics are here to identify suspicious usage, cmdlets, or script values. 4104 events are enabled via the Windows registry and may generate a large volume of data if enabled globally. Enabling on critical systems or a limited set may be best. During triage of 4104 events, review parallel processes for other processes and command executed. Identify any file modifications and network communication and review accordingly. Fortunately, we get the full script to determine the level of threat identified.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "FIN13", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1649", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Deep Panda", "GALLIUM", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Turla"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Reconnaissance", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Enable PowerShell Remoting - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Script Block With URL Chain - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell WebRequest Using Memory Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get History Of Email Sources", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Suspicious Powershell Command-Line Arguments", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "GetLocalUser with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MMC"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Creating Thread Mutex", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Domain Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Enable PowerShell Remoting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Invoke CIMMethod CIMSession", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Processing Stream Of Data", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Script Block With URL Chain", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Using memory As Backing Store", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell WebRequest Using Memory Stream", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage"}]}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Unloading AMSI via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "WMI Recon Running Process Or Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}]}, {"name": "Masquerading - Rename System Utilities", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-04-26", "version": 1, "id": "f0258af4-a6ae-11eb-b3c2-acde48001122", "description": "Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"], "narrative": "Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths.\nThe following content is here to assist with binaries within `system32` or `syswow64` being moved to a new location or an adversary bringing a the binary in to execute.\nThere will be false positives as some native Windows processes are moved or ran by third party applications from different paths. If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binarys PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "Evilnum", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Sdelete Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Sdelete Application Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}]}, {"name": "MetaSploit", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-11-21", "version": 1, "id": "c149b694-bd08-4535-88d3-1f288a66313f", "description": "The following analytic story highlights content related directly to MetaSploit, which may be default configurations attributed to MetaSploit or behaviors of known knowns that are related.", "references": ["https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework", "https://www.varonis.com/blog/what-is-metasploit"], "narrative": "The Metasploit framework is a very powerful tool which can be used by cybercriminals as well as ethical hackers to probe systematic vulnerabilities on networks and servers. Because it is an open-source framework, it can be easily customized and used with most operating systems.\nThe Metasploit Project was undertaken in 2003 by H.D. Moore for use as a Perl-based portable network tool, with assistance from core developer Matt Miller. It was fully converted to Ruby by 2007, and the license was acquired by Rapid7 in 2009, where it remains as part of the Boston-based company repertoire of IDS signature development and targeted remote exploit, fuzzing, anti-forensic, and evasion tools.\\\nPortions of these other tools reside within the Metasploit framework, which is built into the Kali Linux OS. Rapid7 has also developed two proprietary OpenCore tools, Metasploit Pro, Metasploit Express.\\\nThis framework has become the go-to exploit development and mitigation tool. Prior to Metasploit, pen testers had to perform all probes manually by using a variety of tools that may or may not have supported the platform they were testing, writing their own code by hand, and introducing it onto networks manually. Remote testing was virtually unheard of, and that limited a security specialist reach to the local area and companies spending a fortune on in-house IT or security consultants. (ref. Varonis)", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Powershell Load Module in Meterpreter - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Apache Benchmark Binary - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Powershell Load Module in Meterpreter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Windows Apache Benchmark Binary", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "Meterpreter", "author": "Michael Hart", "date": "2021-06-08", "version": 1, "id": "d5f8e298-c85a-11eb-9fea-acde48001122", "description": "Meterpreter provides red teams, pen testers and threat actors interactive access to a compromised host to run commands, upload payloads, download files, and other actions.", "references": ["https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/about-meterpreter/", "https://doubleoctopus.com/security-wiki/threats-and-tools/meterpreter/", "https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/"], "narrative": "This Analytic Story supports you to detect Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) from Meterpreter. Meterpreter is a Metasploit payload for remote execution that leverages DLL injection to make it extremely difficult to detect.  Since the software runs in memory, no new processes are created upon injection.  It also leverages encrypted communication channels.\nMeterpreter enables the operator to remotely run commands on the target machine, upload payloads, download files, dump password hashes, and much more.  It is difficult to determine from the forensic evidence what actions the operator performed.  Splunk Research, however, has observed anomalous behaviors on the compromised hosts that seem to only appear when Meterpreter is executing various commands.  With that, we have written new detections targeted to these detections.\nWhile investigating a detection related to this analytic story, please bear in mind that the detections look for anomalies in system behavior.  It will be imperative to look for other signs in the endpoint and network logs for lateral movement, discovery and other actions to confirm that the host was compromised and a remote actor used it to progress on their objectives.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of taskhost processes - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "no", "author_name": "Michael Hart", "detections": [{"name": "Excessive distinct processes from Windows Temp", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive number of taskhost processes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution CVE-2021-40444", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-09-08", "version": 1, "id": "4ad4253e-10ca-11ec-8235-acde48001122", "description": "CVE-2021-40444 is a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML, recently used to delivery targeted spearphishing documents.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/09/windows-mshtml-zero-day-actively-exploited-mitigations-required/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/control.exe"], "narrative": "Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444 by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents. MSHTML is a software component used to render web pages on Windows. Although it is 2019s most commonly associated with Internet Explorer, it is also used in other software. CVE-2021-40444 received a CVSS score of 8.8 out of 10. MSHTML is the beating heart of Internet Explorer, the vulnerability also exists in that browser. Although given its limited use, there is little risk of infection by that vector. Microsoft Office applications use the MSHTML component to display web content in Office documents. The attack depends on MSHTML loading a specially crafted ActiveX control when the target opens a malicious Office document. The loaded ActiveX control can then run arbitrary code to infect the system with more malware. At the moment all supported Windows versions are vulnerable. Since there is no patch available yet, Microsoft proposes a few methods to block these attacks.\n1. Disable the installation of all ActiveX controls in Internet Explorer via the registry. Previously-installed ActiveX controls will still run, but no new ones will be added, including malicious ones. Open documents from the Internet in Protected View or Application Guard for Office, both of which prevent the current attack. This is a default setting but it may have been changed.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Ember Bear"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Control Loading from World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Control Loading from World Writable Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Control Panel"}]}, {"name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Spawning Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}]}, {"name": "Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege CVE-2023-29357", "author": "Michael Haag, Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk", "date": "2023-09-27", "version": 1, "id": "95ae800d-485e-47f7-866e-8be281aa497d", "description": "This analytic story focuses on the Microsoft SharePoint Server vulnerability CVE-2023-29357, which allows for an elevation of privilege due to improper handling of authentication tokens. Exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to a serious security breach where an attacker might gain privileged access to the SharePoint environment, potentially leading to data theft or other malicious activities. This story is associated with the detection `Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege` which identifies attempts to exploit this vulnerability.", "references": ["https://socradar.io/microsoft-sharepoint-server-elevation-of-privilege-vulnerability-exploit-cve-2023-29357/", "https://github.com/Chocapikk/CVE-2023-29357"], "narrative": "Microsoft SharePoint Server is a widely used web-based collaborative platform. The vulnerability CVE-2023-29357 exposes a flaw in the handling of authentication tokens, allowing an attacker to escalate privileges and gain unauthorized access to the SharePoint environment. This could potentially lead to data theft, unauthorized system modifications, or other malicious activities. Organizations are urged to apply immediate patches and conduct regular system assessments to ensure security.", "tags": {"category": ["Vulnerability", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Gowthamaraj Rajendran, Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}]}, {"name": "Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190", "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-05-31", "version": 1, "id": "2a60a99e-c93a-4036-af70-768fac838019", "description": "On Monday May 30, 2022, Microsoft issued CVE-2022-30190 regarding the Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) in Windows vulnerability.", "references": ["https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/30/guidance-for-cve-2022-30190-microsoft-support-diagnostic-tool-vulnerability/", "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28694", "https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e", "https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984?s=20&t=ZiXYI4dQuA-0_dzQzSUb3A", "https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/", "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4a24048f81afbe9fb62e7a6a49adbd1faf41f266b5f9feecdceb567aec096784/detection", "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/msdt.exe-152D4C9F63EFB332CCB134C6953C0104.html"], "narrative": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists when MSDT is called using the URL protocol from a calling application such as Word. An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can run arbitrary code with the privileges of the calling application. The attacker can then install programs, view, change, or delete data, or create new accounts in the context allowed by the user''s rights.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Execute Arbitrary Commands with MSDT", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}]}, {"name": "Monitor for Updates", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-15", "version": 1, "id": "9ef8d677-7b52-4213-a038-99cfc7acc2d8", "description": "Monitor your enterprise to ensure that your endpoints are being patched and updated. Adversaries notoriously exploit known vulnerabilities that could be mitigated by applying routine security patches.", "references": ["https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download"], "narrative": "It is a common best practice to ensure that endpoints are being patched and updated in a timely manner, in order to reduce the risk of compromise via a publicly disclosed vulnerability. Timely application of updates/patches is important to eliminate known vulnerabilities that may be exploited by various threat actors.\nSearches in this analytic story are designed to help analysts monitor endpoints for system patches and/or updates. This helps analysts identify any systems that are not successfully updated in a timely matter.\nMicrosoft releases updates for Windows systems on a monthly cadence. They should be installed as soon as possible after following internal testing and validation procedures. Patches and updates for other systems or applications are typically released as needed.", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Compliance", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "No Windows Updates in a time frame", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "MOVEit Transfer Critical Vulnerability", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-06-01", "version": 1, "id": "e8c05f9b-6ad4-45ac-8f5d-ff044da417c9", "description": "A critical zero-day vulnerability has been discovered in the MOVEit Transfer file transfer software, widely used by businesses and developers worldwide. The vulnerability has been exploited by unknown threat actors to perform mass data theft from organizations. Progress Software Corporation, the developer of MOVEit, has issued a security advisory urging customers to take immediate action to protect their environments. They recommend blocking external traffic to ports 80 and 445 on the MOVEit server, and to check the c:\\MOVEitTransfer\\wwwroot\\ folder for unusual files. A patch is currently released.", "references": ["https://community.progress.com/s/article/MOVEit-Transfer-Critical-Vulnerability-31May2023", "https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/13wxuej/critical_vulnerability_moveit_file_transfer/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-moveit-transfer-zero-day-mass-exploited-in-data-theft-attacks/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/13wxuej/critical_vulnerability_moveit_file_transfer/", "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/faa672b1929a23fc48fc0ee47585cc48"], "narrative": "Hackers have been actively exploiting a zero-day vulnerability found in the MOVEit Transfer software. This software, developed by Progress Software Corporation, a US-based company and its subsidiary Ipswitch, is a managed file transfer solution. It is used by thousands of organizations worldwide, including Chase, Disney, GEICO, and MLB, and by 3.5 million developers. The software allows for secure file transfers between business partners and customers using SFTP, SCP, and HTTP-based uploads.\nThe zero-day vulnerability has been exploited to steal data on a large scale from various organizations. The identity of the threat actors and the exact timeline of the exploitation remains unclear. However, it has been confirmed that multiple organizations have experienced breaches and data theft.\nIn response to this critical situation, Progress released a security advisory warning customers of the vulnerability and providing mitigation strategies while a patch has been released. They urged customers to take immediate action to protect their MOVEit environments. They suggested blocking external traffic to ports 80 and 445 on the MOVEit server and checking the c:\\MOVEitTransfer\\wwwroot\\ folder for unexpected files, including backups or large file downloads.\nBlocking these ports will prevent external access to the web UI, prevent some MOVEit Automation tasks from working, block APIs, and prevent the Outlook MOVEit plugin from working. However, SFTP and FTP/s protocols can continue to be used for file transfers.\nThere is currently no detailed information about the zero-day vulnerability. But based on the ports blocked and the specific location to check for unusual files, the flaw is likely a web-facing vulnerability.\nWhile Progress has officially confirmed that the vulnerability is being actively exploited, it is clear from several reports that multiple organizations have already had data stolen using this zero-day vulnerability. The exploitation appears very similar to the mass exploitation of a GoAnywhere MFT zero-day in January 2023 and the December 2020 zero-day exploitation of Accellion FTA servers. These were both managed file transfer platforms heavily exploited by the Clop ransomware gang to steal data and extort organizations.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows MOVEit Transfer Writing ASPX - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows MOVEit Transfer Writing ASPX", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Netsh Abuse", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2017-01-05", "version": 1, "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5f65", "description": "Detect activities and various techniques associated with the abuse of `netsh.exe`, which can disable local firewall settings or set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"], "narrative": "It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage native Windows tools and functionality to execute commands for malicious reasons. One such tool on Windows OS is `netsh.exe`,a command-line scripting utility that allows you to--either locally or remotely--display or modify the network configuration of a computer that is currently running. `Netsh.exe` can be used to discover and disable local firewall settings. It can also be used to set up a remote connection to a host from an infected system.\nTo get started, run the detection search to identify parent processes of `netsh.exe`.", "tags": {"category": ["Abuse"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Processes created by netsh", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}]}, {"name": "Processes launching netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "Network Discovery", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-02-14", "version": 1, "id": "af228995-f182-49d7-90b3-2a732944f00f", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the network discovery, including looking for network configuration, settings such as IP, MAC address, firewall settings and many more.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ESET_Kobalos.pdf", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/"], "narrative": "Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Linux System Network Discovery - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Linux System Network Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}]}]}, {"name": "NjRAT", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-09-07", "version": 2, "id": "f6d52454-6cf3-4759-9627-5868a3e2b2b1", "description": "NjRat is a notorious remote access trojan (RAT) predominantly wielded by malicious operators to infiltrate and wield remote control over compromised systems. This analytical story harnesses targeted search methodologies to uncover and investigate activities that could be indicative of NjRAT's presence. These activities include tracking file write operations for dropped files, scrutinizing registry modifications aimed at establishing persistence mechanisms, monitoring suspicious processes, self-deletion behaviors, browser credential parsing, firewall configuration alterations, spread itself via removable drive and an array of other potentially malicious actions.", "references": ["https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/what-is-njrat-malware/#:~:text=NJRat%20%E2%80%94%20also%20known%20as%20Bladabindi,malware%20variant%20in%20March%202023.", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.njrat"], "narrative": "NjRat is also known as Bladabindi malware that was first discovered in the wild in 2012. Since then this malware remain active and uses different campaign to spred its malware. While its primary infection vectors are phishing attacks and drive-by downloads, it also has \"worm\" capability to spread itself via infected removable drives. This RAT has various of capabilities including keylogging, webcam access, browser credential parsing, file upload and downloads, file and process list, service list, shell command execution, registry modification, screen capture, view the desktop of the infected computer and many more. NjRat does not target any industry in particular, but attacking a wide variety of individuals and organizations to gather sensitive information.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1091", "mitre_attack_technique": "Replication Through Removable Media", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Aoqin Dragon", "Darkhotel", "FIN7", "LuminousMoth", "Mustang Panda", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1102", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "EXOTIC LILY", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "LazyScripter", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497", "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Darkhotel"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1129", "mitre_attack_technique": "Shared Modules", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Abused Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Admin Permission Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Delete or Modify System Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable or Modify Tools Via Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Executable in Loaded Modules - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry With MD5 Reg Key Name - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify System Firewall with Notable Process Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Njrat Fileless Storage via Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System LogOff Commandline - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Reboot CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Time Based Evasion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Registry Tool", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling CMD Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Task Manager", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Abused Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Admin Permission Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Delete or Modify System Firewall", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable or Modify Tools Via Taskkill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}]}, {"name": "Windows Executable in Loaded Modules", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Shared Modules"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry With MD5 Reg Key Name", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify System Firewall with Notable Process Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Njrat Fileless Storage via Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Disk Volume Partition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Windows Replication Through Removable Media", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Replication Through Removable Media"}]}, {"name": "Windows System LogOff Commandline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Reboot CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Shutdown CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "Windows Time Based Evasion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}]}, {"name": "Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}]}, {"name": "NOBELIUM Group", "author": "Patrick Bareiss, Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2020-12-14", "version": 3, "id": "758196b5-2e21-424f-a50c-6e421ce926c2", "description": "NOBELIUM, also known as APT29, The Dukes, Cozy Bear, CozyDuke, Blue Kitsune, and Midnight Blizzard, is a sophisticated nation-state threat actor, reportedly associated with Russian intelligence. Active since at least 2008, this group primarily targets government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, along with research institutes and think tanks. Their operations typically involve advanced persistent threats (APT), leveraging techniques like spear-phishing, malware deployment, and long-term network compromise to achieve information theft and espionage. Notably, APT29 has been implicated in significant cyber espionage incidents, including the 2015 breach of the Pentagon's Joint Staff email system and attacks on the Democratic National Committee in 2016. Their advanced tactics and persistent approach underscore the serious nature of threats posed by this group to global cybersecurity.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016/", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/25/midnight-blizzard-guidance-for-responders-on-nation-state-attack/"], "narrative": "This Analytic Story groups detections designed to trigger on a comprehensive range of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) leveraged by the NOBELIUM Group, with a focus on their methods as observed in well-known public breaches.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "SilverTerrier"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090", "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1203", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT12", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "Axiom", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA459", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN4", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-hop Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "FIN4", "Inception", "Leviathan"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Akira", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Collection", "Discovery", "Execution", "Resource Development", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Web", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation", "Command and Control", "Weaponization"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Created - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added - Rule", "ESCU - Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Application Registration Owner Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS - Rule", "ESCU - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule", "ESCU - Anomalous usage of 7zip - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "author_name": "Patrick Bareiss", "detections": [{"name": "Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by SP", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Multiple Service Principals Created by User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal Authentication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal Created", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Service Principal Owner Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "O365 Added Service Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 Application Registration Owner Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}]}, {"name": "O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}]}, {"name": "O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials"}]}, {"name": "O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "Anomalous usage of 7zip", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AdFind Exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outbound SMB Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File Transfer Protocols"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "TOR Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-hop Proxy"}]}, {"name": "Supernova Webshell", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Office 365 Account Takeover", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-17", "version": 1, "id": "7dcea963-af44-4db7-a5b9-fd2b543d9bc9", "description": "Monitor for activities and anomalies indicative of initial access techniques within Office 365 environments.", "references": ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security/compass/incident-response-playbook-password-spray", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-sign-ins-error-codes", "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/", "https://stealthbits.com/blog/bypassing-mfa-with-pass-the-cookie/", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/22/malicious-oauth-applications-used-to-compromise-email-servers-and-spread-spam/", "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/investigate-risky-oauth", "https://www.alteredsecurity.com/post/introduction-to-365-stealer", "https://github.com/AlteredSecurity/365-Stealer"], "narrative": "Office 365 (O365) is Microsoft's cloud-based suite of productivity tools, encompassing email, collaboration platforms, and office applications, all integrated with Azure Active Directory for identity and access management. O365's centralized storage of sensitive data and widespread adoption make it a key asset, yet also a prime target for security threats. The \"Office 365 Account Takeover\" analytic story focuses on the initial techniques attackers employ to breach or compromise these identities. Initial access, in this context, consists of techniques that use various entry vectors to gain their initial foothold . Identifying these early indicators is crucial for establishing the first line of defense against unauthorized access and potential security incidents within O365 environments.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1185", "mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1621", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1528", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Collection", "Resource Development", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Authentication", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Excessive SSO logon errors - Rule", "ESCU - O365 File Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 High Number Of Failed Authentications for User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Mail Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Security And Compliance Alert Triggered - Rule", "ESCU - O365 User Consent Blocked for Risky Application - Rule", "ESCU - O365 User Consent Denied for OAuth Application - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "High Number of Login Failures from a single source", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "O365 Block User Consent For Risky Apps Disabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "O365 Concurrent Sessions From Different Ips", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Browser Session Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "O365 Excessive Authentication Failures Alert", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "O365 Excessive SSO logon errors", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}]}, {"name": "O365 File Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token"}]}, {"name": "O365 High Number Of Failed Authentications for User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Guessing"}]}, {"name": "O365 Mail Permissioned Application Consent Granted by User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple AppIDs and UserAgents Authentication Spike", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "O365 Security And Compliance Alert Triggered", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "O365 User Consent Blocked for Risky Application", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token"}]}, {"name": "O365 User Consent Denied for OAuth Application", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Application Access Token"}]}]}, {"name": "Office 365 Collection Techniques", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2024-02-12", "version": 1, "id": "d90f2b80-f675-4717-90af-12fc8c438ae8", "description": "Monitor for activities and anomalies indicative of potential collection techniques within Office 365 environments.", "references": [], "narrative": "Office 365 (O365) is Microsoft's cloud-based suite of productivity tools, encompassing email, collaboration platforms, and office applications, all integrated with Azure Active Directory for identity and access management. O365's centralized storage of sensitive data and widespread adoption make it a key asset, yet also a prime target for security threats. The 'Office 365 Collection Techniques' analytic story focuses on the strategies and methodologies that attackers might use to gather critical information within the O365 ecosystem. 'Collection' in this context refers to the various techniques adversaries deploy to accumulate data that are essential for advancing their malicious objectives. This could include tactics such as intercepting communications, accessing sensitive documents, or extracting data from collaboration tools and email platforms. By identifying and monitoring these collection activities, organizations can more effectively spot and counteract attempts to illicitly gather information", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN4", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Silent Librarian"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Web", "Change"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Compliance Content Search Exported - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Compliance Content Search Started - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Granted - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Created - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Forwarding Mailflow Rule Created - Rule", "ESCU - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS - Rule", "ESCU - O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API - Rule", "ESCU - O365 PST export alert - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}]}, {"name": "O365 Compliance Content Search Exported", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Compliance Content Search Started", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Elevated Mailbox Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}]}, {"name": "O365 Mailbox Email Forwarding Enabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule"}]}, {"name": "O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}]}, {"name": "O365 Mailbox Folder Read Permission Granted", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Mailboxes Accessed via API", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Created", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule"}]}, {"name": "O365 New Email Forwarding Rule Enabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule"}]}, {"name": "O365 New Forwarding Mailflow Rule Created", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via EWS", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 OAuth App Mailbox Access via Graph API", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 PST export alert", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious Admin Email Forwarding", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious Rights Delegation", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "O365 Suspicious User Email Forwarding", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Forwarding Rule"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}]}]}, {"name": "Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-17", "version": 1, "id": "d230a106-0475-4605-a8d8-abaf4c31ced7", "description": "Monitor for activities and anomalies indicative of potential persistence techniques within Office 365 environments.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", "https://blog.sygnia.co/detection-and-hunting-of-golden-saml-attack?hsLang=en", "https://www.mandiant.com/sites/default/files/2022-08/remediation-hardening-strategies-for-m365-defend-against-apt29-white-paper.pdf", "https://www.csoonline.com/article/570381/microsoft-365-advanced-audit-what-you-need-to-know.html", "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/manage-apps/overview-assign-app-owners", "https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Thursday/us-20-Bienstock-My-Cloud-Is-APTs-Cloud-Investigating-And-Defending-Office-365.pdf"], "narrative": "Office 365 (O365) is Microsoft's cloud-based suite of productivity tools, encompassing email, collaboration platforms, and office applications, all integrated with Azure Active Directory for identity and access management. O365's centralized storage of sensitive data and widespread adoption make it a key asset, yet also a prime target for security threats. The \"Office 365 Persistence Mechanisms\" analytic story delves into the tactics and techniques attackers employ to maintain prolonged unauthorized access within the O365 environment. Persistence in this context refers to methods used by adversaries to keep their foothold after an initial compromise. This can involve actions like modifying mailbox rules, establishing covert forwarding rules, manipulating application permissions. By monitoring signs of persistence, organizations can effectively detect and respond to stealthy threats, thereby protecting their O365 assets and data.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Cloud Security", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114", "mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1114.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN4", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1136", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Change", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Added Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Advanced Audit Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Application Registration Owner Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Disable MFA - Rule", "ESCU - O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 High Privilege Role Granted - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Mailbox Inbox Folder Shared with All Users - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New Federated Domain Added - Rule", "ESCU - O365 New MFA Method Registered - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials - Rule", "ESCU - O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Patrick Bareiss, Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "O365 Add App Role Assignment Grant User", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 Added Service Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "O365 Advanced Audit Disabled", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}]}, {"name": "O365 Application Registration Owner Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "O365 ApplicationImpersonation Role Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}]}, {"name": "O365 Bypass MFA via Trusted IP", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "O365 Disable MFA", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}]}, {"name": "O365 FullAccessAsApp Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "O365 High Privilege Role Granted", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "O365 Mailbox Inbox Folder Shared with All Users", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}]}, {"name": "O365 Mailbox Read Access Granted to Application", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Email Collection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by SP", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 Multiple Service Principals Created by User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 New Federated Domain Added", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Account"}]}, {"name": "O365 New MFA Method Registered", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration"}]}, {"name": "O365 Privileged Graph API Permission Assigned", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}]}, {"name": "O365 Service Principal New Client Credentials", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Credentials"}]}, {"name": "O365 Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Additional Cloud Roles"}]}]}, {"name": "Okta Account Takeover", "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2024-03-06", "version": 1, "id": "83a48657-8153-4580-adba-eb0b3a83244e", "description": "The Okta Account Takeover analytic story encompasses a comprehensive suite of detections aimed at identifying unauthorized access and potential takeover attempts of Okta accounts. This collection leverages diverse data points and behavioral analytics to safeguard user identities and access within cloud environments. Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Account Takeover attacks against Okta tenants.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/account-takeover-ato/", "https://www.barracuda.com/glossary/account-takeover", "https://www.okta.com/customer-identity/"], "narrative": "Okta is a cloud-based identity management service that provides organizations with a secure way to manage user access to various applications and services. It enables single sign-on (SSO), multi-factor authentication (MFA), lifecycle management, and more, helping organizations streamline the user authentication process. Account Takeover (ATO) is an attack whereby cybercriminals gain unauthorized access to online accounts by using different techniques like brute force, social engineering, phishing & spear phishing, credential stuffing, etc. By posing as the real user, cyber-criminals can change account details, send out phishing emails, access sensitive applications, or use any stolen information to access further accounts within the organization. This analytic story groups detections that can help security operations teams identify the potential compromise of Okta accounts.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1621", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1538", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Dashboard", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1539", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Web Session Cookie", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Evilnum", "LuminousMoth", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Session Cookie", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Discovery", "Lateral Movement", "Resource Development", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Risk", "Change", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Weaponization", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge - Rule", "ESCU - Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip - Rule", "ESCU - Okta New API Token Created - Rule", "ESCU - Okta New Device Enrolled on Account - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Suspicious Activity Reported - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie - Rule", "ESCU - Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Unauthorized Access to Application - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins from Multiple Cities - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco, Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Okta Authentication Failed During MFA Challenge", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "Okta Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}]}, {"name": "Okta Multiple Accounts Locked Out", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Okta Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "Okta Multiple Failed Requests to Access Applications", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Session Cookie"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Service Dashboard"}]}, {"name": "Okta Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}]}, {"name": "Okta New API Token Created", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Okta New Device Enrolled on Account", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Device Registration"}]}, {"name": "Okta Phishing Detection with FastPass Origin Check", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}]}, {"name": "Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded", "source": "application", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Okta Successful Single Factor Authentication", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "Okta Suspicious Activity Reported", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Web Session Cookie"}]}, {"name": "Okta ThreatInsight Threat Detected", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Okta Unauthorized Access to Application", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Okta User Logins from Multiple Cities", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Okta MFA Exhaustion", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-09-27", "version": 1, "id": "7c6e508d-4b4d-42c8-82de-5ff4ea3b0cb3", "description": "A social engineering technique called 'MFA Fatigue', aka 'MFA push spam' or 'MFA Exhaustion', is growing more popular with threat actors as it does not require malware or phishing infrastructure and has proven to be successful in attacks.", "references": ["https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/mfa-fatigue-hackers-new-favorite-tactic-in-high-profile-breaches/", "https://www.csoonline.com/article/3674156/multi-factor-authentication-fatigue-attacks-are-on-the-rise-how-to-defend-against-them.html"], "narrative": "An MFA Fatigue attack is when a threat actor runs a script that attempts to log in with stolen credentials over and over, causing what feels like an endless stream of MFA push requests to be sent to the account's owner's mobile device. The goal is to keep this up, day and night, to break down the target's cybersecurity posture and inflict a sense of \"fatigue\" regarding these MFA prompts.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1621", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Risk", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Locked Out - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Okta MFA Exhaustion Hunt", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Okta Mismatch Between Source and Response for Verify Push Request", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}]}, {"name": "Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded", "source": "application", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Okta Account Locked Out", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}]}, {"name": "OpenSSL CVE-2022-3602", "author": "Michael Haag, splunk", "date": "2022-11-02", "version": 1, "id": "491e00c9-998b-4c64-91bb-d8f9c79c1f4c", "description": "OpenSSL recently disclosed two vulnerabilities CVE-2022-3602 and CVE-2022-3786. CVE-2022-3602 is a X.509 Email Address 4-byte Buffer Overflow where puny code is utilized. This only affects OpenSSL 3.0.0 - 3.0.6.", "references": ["https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2022/11/01/email-address-overflows/", "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h8jm-2x53-xhp5", "https://community.emergingthreats.net/t/out-of-band-ruleset-update-summary-2022-11-01/117", "https://github.com/corelight/CVE-2022-3602/tree/master/scripts"], "narrative": "A buffer overrun can be triggered in X.509 certificate verification, specifically in name constraint checking. Note that this occurs after certificate chain signature verification and requires either a CA to have signed a malicious certificate or for an application to continue certificate verification despite failure to construct a path to a trusted issuer. An attacker can craft a malicious email address in a certificate to overflow an arbitrary number of bytes containing the . character (decimal 46) on the stack. This buffer overflow could result in a crash (causing a denial of service). In a TLS client, this can be triggered by connecting to a malicious server. In a TLS server, this can be triggered if the server requests client authentication and a malicious client connects. Users of OpenSSL 3.0.0 - 3.0.6 are encouraged to upgrade to 3.0.7 as soon as possible. If you obtain your copy of OpenSSL from your Operating System vendor or other third party then you should seek to obtain an updated version from them as soon as possible. SSL Certificates with Punycode will identify SSL certificates with Punycode. Note that it does not mean it will capture malicious payloads. If using Zeek, modify the Zeek x509 certificate with punycode to match your environment. We found during this exercise that the FULL x509 with SAN must be captured and stored, decoded, in order to query against it.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1573", "mitre_attack_technique": "Encrypted Channel", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "BITTER", "Magic Hound", "Tropic Trooper"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - SSL Certificates with Punycode - Rule", "ESCU - Zeek x509 Certificate with Punycode - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "SSL Certificates with Punycode", "source": "network", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Encrypted Channel"}]}, {"name": "Zeek x509 Certificate with Punycode", "source": "network", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Encrypted Channel"}]}]}, {"name": "Orangeworm Attack Group", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2020-01-22", "version": 2, "id": "bb9f5ed2-916e-4364-bb6d-97c370efcf52", "description": "Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.", "references": ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"], "narrative": "In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\nAwareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\nHealthcare may be a promising target, because it is notoriously behind in technology, often using older operating systems and neglecting to patch computers. Even so, the group was able to evade detection for a full three years. Sources say that the malware spread quickly within the target networks, infecting computers used to control medical devices, such as MRI and X-ray machines.\nThis Analytic Story is designed to help you detect and investigate suspicious activities that may be indicative of an Orangeworm attack. One detection search looks for command-line arguments. Another monitors for uses of sc.exe, a non-essential Windows file that can manipulate Windows services. One of the investigative searches helps you get more information on web hosts that you suspect have been compromised.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get History Of Email Sources", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "First time seen command line argument", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}]}, {"name": "Outlook RCE CVE-2024-21378", "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2024-03-20", "version": 1, "id": "d889fcf2-0265-4b44-b29f-4ec063c21880", "description": "CVE-2024-21378 exposes a critical vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook, allowing for authenticated remote code execution (RCE) through the manipulation of synced form objects. Discovered by NetSPI in 2023, this vulnerability capitalizes on the unchanged syncing capability of form objects, despite previous patches aimed at securing script code in custom forms. This technical blog delves into the discovery and weaponization of CVE-2024-21378, enhancing the Outlook penetration testing tool, Ruler, to exploit this flaw. A forthcoming pull request will provide a proof-of-concept code, aiding organizations in mitigating this security risk.", "references": ["https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/red-team-operations/microsoft-outlook-remote-code-execution-cve-2024-21378/"], "narrative": "CVE-2024-21378 is a weakness in Microsoft Outlook that lets hackers execute code remotely if they can authenticate themselves. Researchers at NetSPI found this issue in 2023. The problem started with a technique from 2017 by Etienne Stalmans at SensePost, who found a way to run code using VBScript in Outlook forms. Microsoft tried to fix it by only allowing approved script code in custom forms, but they didn't fix the main issue, which is how these forms sync. To exploit this vulnerability, you need to know how Outlook forms sync, using something called MAPI, and how they use certain properties and attachments when they're set up for the first time. Hackers can mess with these properties and attachments to run their own code. They do this by tricking the form's setup process, changing registry keys and files to get past Outlook's security. To show how this could be done, researchers modified Ruler, a tool for testing Outlook's security. They changed it so it could sync a harmful form with the right properties to run a specific type of file, a COM compliant native DLL. This not only showed that CVE-2024-21378 could be exploited but also that it could affect a lot of companies since so many use Microsoft Outlook. The discovery and the way it was exploited remind us that we always need to be on the lookout for security risks and work hard to protect against them. The cybersecurity world is always watching for the next big threat that could put our digital world at risk. As companies rush to fix this issue, it's a reminder of how important it is to stay ahead of these threats.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows InProcServer32 New Outlook Form - Rule", "ESCU - Windows New InProcServer32 Added - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing Outlook Drop Dll In FORM Dir - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows InProcServer32 New Outlook Form", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows New InProcServer32 Added", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing Outlook Drop Dll In FORM Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}]}, {"name": "PaperCut MF NG Vulnerability", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-05-15", "version": 1, "id": "2493d270-5665-4fb4-99c7-8f886f260676", "description": "The FBI has issued a joint advisory concerning the exploitation of a PaperCut MF/NG vulnerability (CVE-2023-27350) by malicious actors, which began in mid-April 2023 and has been ongoing. In early May 2023, a group identifying themselves as the Bl00dy Ransomware Gang targeted vulnerable PaperCut servers within the Education Facilities Subsector. The advisory provides information on detecting exploitation attempts and shares known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the group's activities.", "references": ["https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/05/11/cisa-and-fbi-release-joint-advisory-response-active-exploitation-papercut-vulnerability", "https://www.papercut.com/kb/Main/PO-1216-and-PO-1219", "https://www.horizon3.ai/papercut-cve-2023-27350-deep-dive-and-indicators-of-compromise/", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-actively-exploit-critical-rce-bug-in-papercut-servers/", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software"], "narrative": "PaperCut MF/NG versions 19 and older have reached their end-of-life, as documented on the End of Life Policy page. Customers using these older versions are advised to purchase an updated license online for PaperCut NG or through their PaperCut Partner for PaperCut MF. For users with a currently supported version (version 20 or later), they can upgrade to any maintenance release version they are licensed for. If upgrading to a security patch is not possible, there are alternative options to enhance security. Users can lock down network access to their server(s) by blocking all inbound traffic from external IPs to the web management port (port 9191 and 9192 by default) and blocking all inbound traffic to the web management portal on the firewall to the server. Additionally, users can apply \"Allow list\" restrictions under Options > Advanced > Security > Allowed site server IP addresses, setting this to only allow the IP addresses of verified Site Servers on their network.\nThe vulnerabilities CVE-2023-27350 and CVE-2023-27351 have CVSS scores of 9.8 (Critical) and 8.2 (High), respectively. PaperCut and its partner network have activated response teams to assist PaperCut MF and NG customers, with service desks available 24/7 via their support page. The security response team at PaperCut has been working with external security advisors to compile a list of unpatched PaperCut MF/NG servers that have ports open on the public internet. They have been proactively reaching out to potentially exposed customers since Wednesday afternoon (AEST) and are working around the clock through the weekend.\nThe exploit was first detected in the wild on April 18th, 2023, at 03:30 AEST / April 17th, 2023, at 17:30 UTC. The earliest signature of suspicious activity on a customer server potentially linked to this vulnerability dates back to April 14th, 2023, at 01:29 AEST / April 13th, 2023, at 15:29 UTC.\nApplying the security fixes should not have any negative impact. Users can follow their usual upgrade procedure to obtain the upgrade. Additional links on the -Check for updates- page (accessed through the Admin interface > About > Version info > Check for updates) allow customers to download fixes for previous major versions that are still supported (e.g., 20.1.7 and 21.2.11) as well as the current version available. PaperCut MF users are advised to follow their regular upgrade process and consult their PaperCut partner or reseller for assistance.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - PaperCut NG Suspicious Behavior Debug Log - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PaperCut NG Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - PaperCut NG Remote Web Access Attempt - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "PaperCut NG Suspicious Behavior Debug Log", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows PaperCut NG Spawn Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "PaperCut NG Remote Web Access Attempt", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services", "author": "Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2021-08-31", "version": 1, "id": "97aecafc-0a68-11ec-962f-acde48001122", "description": "PetitPotam (CVE-2021-36942,) is a vulnerablity identified in Microsofts EFSRPC Protocol that can allow an unauthenticated account to escalate privileges to domain administrator given the right circumstances.", "references": ["https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/07/27/microsoft-releases-guidance-mitigating-petitpotam-ntlm-relay", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005413-mitigating-ntlm-relay-attacks-on-active-directory-certificate-services-ad-cs-3612b773-4043-4aa9-b23d-b87910cd3429", "https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf", "https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam/", "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/releases/tag/2.2.0-20210723", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/"], "narrative": "In June 2021, security researchers at SpecterOps released a blog post and white paper detailing several potential attack vectors against Active Directory Certificated Services (ADCS). ADCS is a Microsoft product that implements Public Key Infrastrucutre (PKI) functionality and can be used by organizations to provide and manage digital certiticates within Active Directory.\\ In July 2021, a security researcher released PetitPotam, a tool that allows attackers to coerce Windows systems into authenticating to arbitrary endpoints.\\ Combining PetitPotam with the identified ADCS attack vectors allows attackers to escalate privileges from an unauthenticated anonymous user to full domain admin privileges.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1187", "mitre_attack_technique": "Forced Authentication", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkHydrus", "Dragonfly"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - PetitPotam Network Share Access Request - Rule", "ESCU - PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "PetitPotam Network Share Access Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Forced Authentication"}]}, {"name": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}]}, {"name": "Phemedrone Stealer", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2024-01-24", "version": 2, "id": "386f64dd-657b-4dcf-8eb3-5e297d30924c", "description": "Phemedrone Stealer is a potent data-stealing malware designed to infiltrate systems discreetly, primarily targeting sensitive user information. Operating with a stealthy modus operandi, it covertly collects and exfiltrates critical data such as login credentials, personal details, and financial information. Notably evasive, Phemedrone employs sophisticated techniques to bypass security measures and remain undetected. Its capabilities extend to exploiting vulnerabilities, leveraging command and control infrastructure, and facilitating remote access. As a formidable threat, Phemedrone Stealer poses a significant risk to user privacy and system integrity, demanding vigilant cybersecurity measures to counteract its malicious activities.", "references": ["https://www.trendmicro.com/en_vn/research/23/b/investigating-the-plugx-trojan-disguised-as-a-legitimate-windows.html"], "narrative": "Phemedrone Stealer, spotlighted in a recent Trend Micro blog, unveils a concerning chapter in cyber threats. Leveraging the CVE-2023-36025 vulnerability for defense evasion, this malware exhibits a relentless pursuit of sensitive data. Originating from the shadows of the dark web, it capitalizes on forums where cybercriminals refine its evasive maneuvers. The blog sheds light on Phemedrone's exploitation of intricate tactics, illustrating its agility in sidestepping security protocols. As cybersecurity experts delve into the intricacies of CVE-2023-36025, the narrative surrounding Phemedrone Stealer underscores the urgency for heightened vigilance and proactive defense measures against this persistent and evolving digital adversary.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Credential Access", "Discovery", "Execution", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Any Powershell DownloadFile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Download Files Using Telegram", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information"}]}]}, {"name": "PlugX", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-12", "version": 2, "id": "a2c94c99-b93b-4bc7-a749-e2198743d0d6", "description": "PlugX, also referred to as \"PlugX RAT\" or \"Kaba,\" is a highly sophisticated remote access Trojan (RAT) discovered in 2012. This malware is notorious for its involvement in targeted cyberattacks, primarily driven by cyber espionage objectives. PlugX provides attackers with comprehensive remote control capabilities over compromised systems, granting them the ability to execute commands, collect sensitive data, and manipulate the infected host.", "references": ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.plugx", "https://blog.sekoia.io/my-teas-not-cold-an-overview-of-china-cyber-threat/", "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/carderbee-software-supply-chain-certificate-abuse", "https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2023-0808.pdf", "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/infected-usb-steal-secrets", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013/"], "narrative": "PlugX, known as the \"silent infiltrator of the digital realm, is a shadowy figure in the world of cyber threats. This remote access Trojan (RAT), first unveiled in 2012, is not your run-of-the-mill malware. It's the go-to tool for sophisticated hackers with one goal in mind, espionage. PlugX's repertoire of capabilities reads like a spy thriller. It doesn't just breach your defenses; it goes a step further, slipping quietly into your systems, much like a ghost. Once inside, it opens the door to a world of possibilities for cybercriminals. With a few keystrokes, they can access your data, capture your screen, and silently watch your every move. In the hands of skilled hackers, it's a versatile instrument for cyber espionage. This malware thrives on persistence. It's not a one-time hit; it's in it for the long haul. Even if you reboot your system, PlugX remains, ensuring that its grip on your infrastructure doesn't waver.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1091", "mitre_attack_technique": "Replication Through Removable Media", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Aoqin Dragon", "Darkhotel", "FIN7", "LuminousMoth", "Mustang Panda", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Masquerading Msdtc Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Replication Through Removable Media - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Deletion In Registry - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Drop Executable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create Process with Token"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Masquerading Msdtc Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Windows Replication Through Removable Media", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Replication Through Removable Media"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Deletion In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}]}, {"name": "Possible Backdoor Activity Associated With MUDCARP Espionage Campaigns", "author": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team, iDefense", "date": "2020-01-22", "version": 1, "id": "988c59c5-0a1c-45b6-a555-0c62276e327e", "description": "Monitor your environment for suspicious behaviors that resemble the techniques employed by the MUDCARP threat group.", "references": ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"], "narrative": "This story was created as a joint effort between iDefense and Splunk.\niDefense analysts have recently discovered a Windows executable file that, upon execution, spoofs a decryption tool and then drops a file that appears to be the custom-built javascript backdoor, \"Orz,\" which is associated with the threat actors known as MUDCARP (as well as \"temp.Periscope\" and \"Leviathan\"). The file is executed using Wscript.\nThe MUDCARP techniques include the use of the compressed-folders module from Microsoft, zipfldr.dll, with RouteTheCall export to run the malicious process or command. After a successful reboot, the malware is made persistent by a manipulating `[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run]'help'='c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\rundll32.exe c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\zipfldr.dll,RouteTheCall c:\\\\programdata\\\\winapp.exe'`. Though this technique is not exclusive to MUDCARP, it has been spotted in the group's arsenal of advanced techniques seen in the wild.\nThis Analytic Story searches for evidence of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that allow for the use of a endpoint detection-and-response (EDR) bypass technique to mask the true parent of a malicious process. It can also be set as a registry key for further sandbox evasion and to allow the malware to launch only after reboot.\nIf behavioral searches included in this story yield positive hits, iDefense recommends conducting IOC searches for the following:\n1. www.chemscalere[.]com\n1. chemscalere[.]com\n1. about.chemscalere[.]com\n1. autoconfig.chemscalere[.]com\n1. autodiscover.chemscalere[.]com\n1. catalog.chemscalere[.]com\n1. cpanel.chemscalere[.]com\n1. db.chemscalere[.]com\n1. ftp.chemscalere[.]com\n1. mail.chemscalere[.]com\n1. news.chemscalere[.]com\n1. update.chemscalere[.]com\n1. webmail.chemscalere[.]com\n1. www.candlelightparty[.]org\n1. candlelightparty[.]org\n1. newapp.freshasianews[.]com\nIn addition, iDefense also recommends that organizations review their environments for activity related to the following hashes:\n1. cd195ee448a3657b5c2c2d13e9c7a2e2\n1. b43ad826fe6928245d3c02b648296b43\n1. 889a9b52566448231f112a5ce9b5dfaf\n1. b8ec65dab97cdef3cd256cc4753f0c54\n1. 04d83cd3813698de28cfbba326d7647c", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get History Of Email Sources", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "iDefense", "author_name": "iDefense Cyber Espionage Team", "detections": [{"name": "First time seen command line argument", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Prestige Ransomware", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-11-30", "version": 1, "id": "8b8d8506-b931-450c-b794-f24184ca1deb", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Prestige Ransomware", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/14/new-prestige-ransomware-impacts-organizations-in-ukraine-and-poland/"], "narrative": "This story addresses Prestige ransomware. This ransomware payload seen by Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center(MSTIC) as a ransomware campaign targeting organization in the transportation and logistic industries in some countries. This ransomware campaign highlight the destructive attack to its target organization that directly supplies or transporting military and humanitarian services or assistance. MSTIC observed this ransomware has similarities in terms of its deployment techniques with CaddyWiper and HermeticWiper which is also known malware campaign impacted multiple targeted critical infrastructure organizations. This analytic story will provide techniques and analytics that may help SOC or security researchers to monitor this threat.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cached Domain Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Support Provider", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Mustang Panda", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Magic Hound", "TA2541", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1202", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Managers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "FIN7", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "OilRig", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1115", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT39"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Collection", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Information Discovery Fsutil - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Password Managers Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Private Keys Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System User Discovery Via Quser - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process And Service List - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Change Default File Association", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cached Domain Credentials"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Change Default File Association For No File Ext", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Information Discovery Fsutil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Password Managers Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Managers"}]}, {"name": "Windows Private Keys Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Windows Query Registry Reg Save", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Support Provider"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Stop Via Net  and SC Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows System User Discovery Via Quser", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows WMI Process And Service List", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527", "author": "Splunk Threat Research Team", "date": "2021-07-01", "version": 1, "id": "fd79470a-da88-11eb-b803-acde48001122", "description": "The following analytic story identifies behaviors related PrintNightmare, or CVE-2021-34527 previously known as (CVE-2021-1675), to gain privilege escalation on the vulnerable machine.", "references": ["https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/fix-for-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-exploit-to-keep-your-print-servers-running-while-a-patch-is-not-available/", "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/06/30/exploitable-critical-rce-vulnerability-allows-regular-users-to-fully-compromise-active-directory-printnightmare-cve-2021-1675/", "https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/ob6y02/critical_vulnerability_printnightmare_exposes"], "narrative": "This vulnerability affects the Print Spooler service, enabled by default on Windows systems, and allows adversaries to trick this service into installing a remotely hosted print driver using a low privileged user account. Successful exploitation effectively allows adversaries to execute code in the target system (Remote Code Execution) in the context of the Print Spooler service which runs with the highest privileges (Privilege Escalation).\nThe prerequisites for successful exploitation consist of:\n1. Print Spooler service enabled on the target system\n1. Network connectivity to the target system (initial access has been obtained)\n1. Hash or password for a low privileged user ( or computer ) account.\nIn the most impactful scenario, an attacker would be able to leverage this vulnerability to obtain a SYSTEM shell on a domain controller and so escalate their privileges from a low privileged domain account to full domain access in the target environment as shown below.", "tags": {"category": ["Vulnerability"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32 - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "no", "author_name": "Splunk Threat Research Team", "detections": [{"name": "Print Spooler Adding A Printer Driver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Print Spooler Failed to Load a Plug-in", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Spawning Rundll32", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Loaded Modules", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Suspicious Process Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Spoolsv Writing a DLL - Sysmon", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}]}, {"name": "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-11", "version": 1, "id": "6d13121c-90f3-446d-8ac3-27efbbc65218", "description": "Detect instances of prohibited network traffic allowed in the environment, as well as protocols running on non-standard ports. Both of these types of behaviors typically violate policy and can be leveraged by attackers.", "references": ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"], "narrative": "A traditional security best practice is to control the ports, protocols, and services allowed within your environment. By limiting the services and protocols to those explicitly approved by policy, administrators can minimize the attack surface. The combined effect allows both network defenders and security controls to focus and not be mired in superfluous traffic or data types. Looking for deviations to policy can identify attacker activity that abuses services and protocols to run on alternate or non-standard ports in the attempt to avoid detection or frustrate forensic analysts.", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1189", "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Andariel", "Axiom", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mustard Tempest", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement", "Exfiltration", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule - Rule", "ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Enable RDP In Other Port Number", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Protocol or Port Mismatch", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "TOR Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-hop Proxy"}]}]}, {"name": "ProxyNotShell", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-09-30", "version": 1, "id": "4e3f17e7-9ed7-425d-a05e-b65464945836", "description": "Two new zero day Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities have been identified actively exploited in the wild - CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082.", "references": ["https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/09/29/customer-guidance-for-reported-zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/", "https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1575762721353916417?s=20&t=67gq9xCWuyPm1VEm8ydfyA", "https://twitter.com/cglyer/status/1575793769814728705?s=20&t=67gq9xCWuyPm1VEm8ydfyA", "https://www.gteltsc.vn/blog/warning-new-attack-campaign-utilized-a-new-0day-rce-vulnerability-on-microsoft-exchange-server-12715.html", "https://research.splunk.com/stories/proxyshell/", "https://www.inversecos.com/2022/07/hunting-for-apt-abuse-of-exchange.html"], "narrative": "Microsoft is investigating two reported zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019. The first vulnerability, identified as CVE-2022-41040, is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability, while the second, identified as CVE-2022-41082, allows remote code execution (RCE) when PowerShell is accessible to the attacker. Originally identified by GTSC monitoring Exchange, some adversary post-exploitation activity was identified and is tagged to this story.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Persistence", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule", "ESCU - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "CertUtil Download With URLCache and Split Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected", "source": "web", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "ProxyShell", "author": "Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2021-08-24", "version": 1, "id": "413bb68e-04e2-11ec-a835-acde48001122", "description": "ProxyShell is a chain of exploits targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server - CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207.", "references": ["https://y4y.space/2021/08/12/my-steps-of-reproducing-proxyshell/", "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI", "https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do", "https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-ProxyLogon-Is-Just-The-Tip-Of-The-Iceberg-A-New-Attack-Surface-On-Microsoft-Exchange-Server.pdf", "https://www.inversecos.com/2022/07/hunting-for-apt-abuse-of-exchange.html"], "narrative": "During Pwn2Own April 2021, a security researcher demonstrated an attack chain targeting on-premise Microsoft Exchange Server. August 5th, the same researcher publicly released further details and demonstrated the attack chain. CVE-2021-34473 Pre-auth path confusion leads to ACL Bypass (Patched in April by KB5001779) CVE-2021-34523 - Elevation of privilege on Exchange PowerShell backend (Patched in April by KB5001779) . CVE-2021-31207 - Post-auth Arbitrary-File-Write leads to RCE (Patched in May by KB5003435) Upon successful exploitation, the remote attacker will have SYSTEM privileges on the Exchange Server. In addition to remote access/execution, the adversary may be able to run Exchange PowerShell Cmdlets to perform further actions.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Ransomware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Exchange Web Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF - Rule", "ESCU - Exchange PowerShell Module Usage - Rule", "ESCU - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage - Rule", "ESCU - ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Exchange Web Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Abuse via SSRF", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Exchange PowerShell Module Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSExchange Management Mailbox Cmdlet Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "ProxyShell ProxyNotShell Behavior Detected", "source": "web", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows Exchange Autodiscover SSRF Abuse", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Qakbot", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-11-14", "version": 2, "id": "0c6169b1-f126-4d86-8e4f-f7891007ebc6", "description": "QakBot is a modular banking trojan that has been used primarily by financially-motivated actors since at least 2007. QakBot is continuously maintained and developed and has evolved from an information stealer into a delivery agent for ransomware (ref. MITRE ATT&CK).", "references": ["https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/202010221030_QakBot%20TLPWHITE.pdf", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.QakBot", "https://securelist.com/QakBot-technical-analysis/103931/", "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-variant-of-QakBot-spread-by-phishing-emails", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650/", "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/the-rise-of-qakbot"], "narrative": "QakBot notably has made its way on the CISA top malware list for 2021. QakBot for years has been under continious improvement when it comes to initial access, injection and post-exploitation. Multiple adversaries use QakBot to gain initial access and persist, most notably TA551. The actor(s) behind QakBot possess a modular framework consisting of maldoc builders, signed loaders, and DLLs that produce initially low detection rates at the beginning of the attack, which creates opportunities to deliver additional malware such as Egregor and Cobalt Strike. (ref. Cybersecurity ATT) The more recent campaigns utilize HTML smuggling to deliver a ISO container that has a LNK and QakBot payload. QakBot will either load via regsvr32.exe directly, it will attempt to perform DLL sideloading.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Evilnum", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Whitefly", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BackdoorDiplomacy", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Malteiro", "Putter Panda", "TA505", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gorgon Group", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Magic Hound", "TA2541", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN8", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Machete", "Molerats", "Rancor", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance", "Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ESCU - Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows App Layer Protocol Qakbot NamedPipe - Rule", "ESCU - Windows App Layer Protocol Wermgr Connect To NamedPipe - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command Shell Fetch Env Variables - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DLL Side-Loading In Calc - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DLL Side-Loading Process Child Of Calc - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Qakbot Binary Data Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MsiExec HideWindow Rundll32 Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection In Non-Service SearchIndexer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection Of Wermgr to Known Browser - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Regsvr32 Renamed Binary - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Discovery Using Qwinsta - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Impersonate Token - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery"}]}, {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn Regsvr32 process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link"}]}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Recon Using WMI Class", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows App Layer Protocol Qakbot NamedPipe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows App Layer Protocol Wermgr Connect To NamedPipe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows Command Shell Fetch Env Variables", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows DLL Side-Loading In Calc", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows DLL Side-Loading Process Child Of Calc", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Masquerading Explorer As Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Qakbot Binary Data Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows MsiExec HideWindow Rundll32 Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection In Non-Service SearchIndexer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection Of Wermgr to Known Browser", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection Remote Thread", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Regsvr32 Renamed Binary", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Discovery Using ldap Nslookup", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Discovery Using Qwinsta", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows WMI Impersonate Token", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "Ransomware", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-04", "version": 1, "id": "cf309d0d-d4aa-4fbb-963d-1e79febd3756", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.", "references": ["https://web.archive.org/web/20190826231258/https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"], "narrative": "Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1560.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Akira", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Sowbug", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090", "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "Evilnum", "FIN10", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "TeamTNT", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "MuddyWater"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1020", "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Sidewinder", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1219", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Carbanak", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Evilnum", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Kimsuky", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "RTM", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Thrip"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.015", "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-hop Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "FIN4", "Inception", "Leviathan"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN8", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "FIN7", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "OilRig", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Machete", "Molerats", "Rancor", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "Deep Panda", "GALLIUM", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Aoqin Dragon", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cleaver", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "POLONIUM", "Patchwork", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "TA2541", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Collection", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Resource Development", "Initial Access", "Exfiltration", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Change", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance", "Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives", "Weaponization"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - 7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path - Rule", "ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage File - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", "ESCU - Fsutil Zeroing File - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Execute COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 LockWorkStation - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object - Rule", "ESCU - Uninstall App Using MsiExec - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DiskCryptor Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Access Software Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "Get History Of Email Sources", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity", "Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "7zip CommandLine To SMB Share Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive via Utility"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Conti Common Exec parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect RClone Command-Line Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage FileInfo", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed RClone", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}]}, {"name": "Fsutil Zeroing File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "ICACLS Grant Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Known Services Killed by Ransomware", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement"}]}, {"name": "MS Exchange Mailbox Replication service writing Active Server Pages", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Permission Modification using Takeown App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal from Tools"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Execute COM Object", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File Deletion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Revil Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 LockWorkStation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Spike in File Writes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP"}]}, {"name": "Uninstall App Using MsiExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "USN Journal Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows DiskCryptor Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Tool"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raccine Scheduled Task Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Access Software Hunt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage DNS", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}, {"name": "Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "TOR Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Multi-hop Proxy"}]}, {"name": "Detect Remote Access Software Usage URL", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Access Software"}]}]}, {"name": "Ransomware Cloud", "author": "Rod Soto, David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2020-10-27", "version": 1, "id": "f52f6c43-05f8-4b19-a9d3-5b8c56da91c2", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware. These searches include cloud related objects that may be targeted by malicious actors via cloud providers own encryption features.", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"], "narrative": "Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise.Cloud ransomware can be deployed by obtaining high privilege credentials from targeted users or resources.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}]}, {"name": "RedLine Stealer", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-04-24", "version": 1, "id": "12e31e8b-671b-4d6e-b362-a682812a71eb", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Redline Stealer trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, screencapture, registry modification, persistence and data collection..", "references": ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.redline_stealer", "https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2021/10/threat-thursday-redline-infostealer-update"], "narrative": "RedLine Stealer is a malware available on underground forum and subscription basis that are compiled or written in C#. This malware is capable of harvesting sensitive information from browsers such as saved credentials, auto file data, browser cookies and credit card information. It also gathers system information of the targeted or compromised host like username, location IP, RAM size available, hardware configuration and software installed. The current version of this malware contains features to steal wallet and crypto currency information.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Discovery", "Execution", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Updates"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Defender Services - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Auto Minor Updates - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Auto Update Notif - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Do Not Connect To Win Update - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Reboot With Logon User - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Tamper Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry UpdateServiceUrlAlternate - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry USeWuServer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry WuServer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry wuStatusServer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Query Registry Browser List Application - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Query Registry UnInstall Program List - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Stop Win Updates - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Defender Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Boot or Logon Autostart Execution In Startup Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Event For Service Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Auto Minor Updates", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Auto Update Notif", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Disable WinDefender Notifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Do Not Connect To Win Update", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry No Auto Reboot With Logon User", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry No Auto Update", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Tamper Protection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry UpdateServiceUrlAlternate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry USeWuServer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry WuServer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry wuStatusServer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Query Registry Browser List Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Query Registry UnInstall Program List", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Stop Win Updates", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}]}, {"name": "Remcos", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-09-23", "version": 1, "id": "2bd4aa08-b9a5-40cf-bfe5-7d43f13d496c", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Remcos RAT trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, screencapture, registry modification, UAC bypassed, persistence and data collection..", "references": ["https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1123281-remcos-malware-information", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.remcos#:~:text=Remcos%20(acronym%20of%20Remote%20Control,used%20to%20remotely%20control%20computers.&text=Remcos%20can%20be%20used%20for,been%20used%20in%20hacking%20campaigns."], "narrative": "Remcos or Remote Control and Surveillance, marketed as a legitimate software for remotely managing Windows systems is now widely used in multiple malicious campaigns both APT and commodity malware by threat actors.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BackdoorDiplomacy", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Malteiro", "Putter Panda", "TA505", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1559.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "MuddyWater"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1113", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Dragonfly", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Silence"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Volt Typhoon"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Collection", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Jscript Execution Using Cscript App - Rule", "ESCU - Loading Of Dynwrapx Module - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Browser Pass View Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Process Writing DynamicWrapperX - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule", "ESCU - Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder - Rule", "ESCU - System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application - Rule", "ESCU - Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Winhlp32 Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Jscript Execution Using Cscript App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Loading Of Dynwrapx Module", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection"}]}, {"name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Possible Browser Pass View Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Process Writing DynamicWrapperX", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Component Object Model"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Remcos client registry install entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Remcos RAT File Creation in Remcos Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Image Creation In Appdata Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process Executed From Container File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious WAV file in Appdata Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture"}]}, {"name": "System Info Gathering Using Dxdiag Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Vbscript Execution Using Wscript App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Winhlp32 Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}]}, {"name": "Reverse Network Proxy", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-11-16", "version": 1, "id": "265e4127-21fd-43e4-adac-ec5d12274111", "description": "The following analytic story describes applications that may be abused to reverse proxy back into an organization, either for persistence or remote access.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508/", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-320a_joint_csa_iranian_government-sponsored_apt_actors_compromise_federal%20network_deploy_crypto%20miner_credential_harvester.pdf"], "narrative": "This analytic story covers tools like Ngrok which is a legitimate reverse proxy tool that can create a secure tunnel to servers located behind firewalls or on local machines that do not have a public IP. Ngrok in particular has been leveraged by threat actors in several campaigns including use for lateral movement and data exfiltration. There are many open source and closed/paid that fall into this reverse proxy category. The analytic story and complemented analytics will be released as more are identified.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1572", "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090", "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1102", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "EXOTIC LILY", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "LazyScripter", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Turla"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Linux Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Linux Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Ngrok Reverse Proxy Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service"}]}, {"name": "Ngrok Reverse Proxy on Network", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Tunneling"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Service"}]}]}, {"name": "Revil Ransomware", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-06-04", "version": 1, "id": "817cae42-f54b-457a-8a36-fbf45521e29e", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Revil ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Revil, encrypting network shares, deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.", "references": ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"], "narrative": "Revil ransomware is a RaaS,that a single group may operates and manges the development of this ransomware. It involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Execution", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Allow Network Discovery In Firewall", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement"}]}, {"name": "Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Disable Security Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Revil Common Exec Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Revil Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Wbemprox COM Object Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "CMSTP"}]}]}, {"name": "Rhysida Ransomware", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-12-12", "version": 1, "id": "0925ee49-1185-4484-94ac-7867764a9183", "description": "Utilize analytics designed to identify and delve into atypical behaviors, potentially associated with the Rhysida Ransomware. Employing these searches enables the detection of irregular patterns or actions within systems or networks, serving as proactive measures to spot potential indicators of compromise or ongoing threats. By implementing these search strategies, security analysts can effectively pinpoint anomalous activities, such as unusual file modifications, deviations in system behavior, that could potentially signify the presence or attempt of Rhysida Ransomware infiltration. These searches serve as pivotal tools in the arsenal against such threats, aiding in swift detection, investigation, and mitigation efforts to counter the impact of the Rhysida Ransomware or similar malicious entities.", "references": ["https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-319a"], "narrative": "This story addresses Rhysida ransomware. Rhysida Ransomware emerges as a silent predator, infiltrating systems stealthily and unleashing havoc upon its victims. Employing sophisticated encryption tactics, it swiftly locks critical files and databases, holding them hostage behind an impenetrable digital veil. The haunting demand for ransom sends shockwaves through affected organizations, rendering operations inert and plunging them into a tumultuous struggle between compliance and resilience. Threat actors leveraging Rhysida ransomware are known to impact \"targets of opportunity,\" including victims in the education, healthcare, manufacturing, information technology, and government sectors. Open source reporting details similarities between Vice Society activity and the actors observed deploying Rhysida ransomware. Additionally, open source reporting has confirmed observed instances of Rhysida actors operating in a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) capacity, where ransomware tools and infrastructure are leased out in a profit-sharing model. Any ransoms paid are then split between the group and the affiliates.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Mustang Panda", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT5", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "FIN7", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "OilRig", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN8", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1018", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Akira", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Leafminer", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell 4104 Hunting - Rule", "ESCU - Ransomware Notes bulk creation - Rule", "ESCU - SAM Database File Access Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry NoChangingWallPaper - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView SPN Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rundll32 Apply User Settings Changes - Rule", "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rare Executables", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Disable Logs Using WevtUtil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Domain Account Discovery With Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "High Process Termination Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell 4104 Hunting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Ransomware Notes bulk creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "SAM Database File Access Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "SecretDumps Offline NTDS Dumping Tool", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Spike in File Writes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry NoChangingWallPaper", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView AD Access Control List Enumeration", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView Constrained Delegation Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView Kerberos Service Ticket Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView SPN Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote System Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Rundll32 Apply User Settings Changes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "WinRM Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Detect Zerologon via Zeek", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Router and Infrastructure Security", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-12", "version": 1, "id": "91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e177e77", "description": "Validate the security configuration of network infrastructure and verify that only authorized users and systems are accessing critical assets. Core routing and switching infrastructure are common strategic targets for attackers.", "references": ["https://web.archive.org/web/20210420020040/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"], "narrative": "Networking devices, such as routers and switches, are often overlooked as resources that attackers will leverage to subvert an enterprise. Advanced threats actors have shown a proclivity to target these critical assets as a means to siphon and redirect network traffic, flash backdoored operating systems, and implement cryptographic weakened algorithms to more easily decrypt network traffic.\nThis Analytic Story helps you gain a better understanding of how your network devices are interacting with your hosts. By compromising your network devices, attackers can obtain direct access to the company's internal infrastructure&#151; effectively increasing the attack surface and accessing private services/data.", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1557.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cleaver", "LuminousMoth"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1542", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1200", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["DarkVishnya"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1557", "mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1498", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1542.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "TFTP Boot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Collection", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Network_Traffic", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect New Login Attempts to Routers", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Detect ARP Poisoning", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning"}]}, {"name": "Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning"}]}, {"name": "Detect Port Security Violation", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "ARP Cache Poisoning"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rogue DHCP Server", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Adversary-in-the-Middle"}]}, {"name": "Detect Software Download To Network Device", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "TFTP Boot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot"}]}, {"name": "Detect Traffic Mirroring", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hardware Additions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Exfiltration"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Traffic Duplication"}]}]}, {"name": "Ryuk Ransomware", "author": "Jose Hernandez, Splunk", "date": "2020-11-06", "version": 1, "id": "507edc74-13d5-4339-878e-b9744ded1f35", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Ryuk ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Ryuk, Stopping Security Access Manager, DisableAntiSpyware registry key modification, suspicious psexec use, and more.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"], "narrative": "Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released Alert (AA20-302A) on October 28th called Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. This alert details TTPs associated with ongoing and possible imminent attacks against the Healthcare sector, and is a joint advisory in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies. The objective of these malicious campaigns is to infiltrate targets in named sectors and to drop ransomware payloads, which will likely cause disruption of service and increase risk of actual harm to the health and safety of patients at hospitals, even with the aggravant of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. This document specifically refers to several crimeware exploitation frameworks, emphasizing the use of Ryuk ransomware as payload. The Ryuk ransomware payload is not new. It has been well documented and identified in multiple variants. Payloads need a carrier, and for Ryuk it has often been exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, or popular crimeware frameworks such as Emotet or Trickbot.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN8", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - NLTest Domain Trust Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Wake on LAN Command - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Jose Hernandez", "detections": [{"name": "Windows connhost exe started forcefully", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "NLTest Domain Trust Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Ryuk Test Files Detected", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Ryuk Wake on LAN Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Spike in File Writes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WBAdmin Delete System Backups", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Security Account Manager Stopped", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation", "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2021-12-20", "version": 1, "id": "0244fdee-61be-11ec-900e-acde48001122", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with the exploitation of the sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287) vulnerabilities.", "references": ["https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287", "https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html"], "narrative": "On November 9, 2021, Microsoft released patches to address two vulnerabilities that affect Windows Active Directory networks, sAMAccountName Spoofing (CVE-2021-42278) and Domain Controller Impersonation (CVE-2021-42287). On December 10, 2021, security researchers Charlie Clark and Andrew Schwartz released a blog post where they shared how to weaponise these vulnerabilities in a target network an the initial detection opportunities. When successfully exploited, CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 allow an adversary, who has stolen the credentials of a low priviled domain user, to obtain a Kerberos Service ticket for a Domain Controller computer account. The only requirement is to have network connectivity to a domain controller. This attack vector effectivelly allows attackers to escalate their privileges in an Active Directory from a regular domain user account and take control of a domain controller. While patches have been released to address these vulnerabilities, deploying detection controls for this attack may help help defenders identify attackers attempting exploitation.", "tags": {"category": ["Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT5", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Suspicious Computer Account Name Change - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Mauricio Velazco", "detections": [{"name": "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "SamSam Ransomware", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2018-12-13", "version": 1, "id": "c4b89506-fbcf-4cb7-bfd6-527e54789604", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the SamSam ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with SamSam, RDP brute force attacks, the presence of files with SamSam ransomware extensions, suspicious psexec use, and more.", "references": ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"], "narrative": "The first version of the SamSam ransomware (a.k.a. Samas or SamsamCrypt) was launched in 2015 by a group of Iranian threat actors. The malicious software has affected and continues to affect thousands of victims and has raised almost $6M in ransom.\nAlthough categorized under the heading of ransomware, SamSam campaigns have some importance distinguishing characteristics. Most notable is the fact that conventional ransomware is a numbers game. Perpetrators use a \"spray-and-pray\" approach with phishing campaigns or other mechanisms, charging a small ransom (typically under $1,000). The goal is to find a large number of victims willing to pay these mini-ransoms, adding up to a lucrative payday. They use relatively simple methods for infecting systems.\nSamSam attacks are different beasts. They have become progressively more targeted and skillful than typical ransomware attacks. First, malicious actors break into a victim's network, surveil it, then run the malware manually. The attacks are tailored to cause maximum damage and the threat actors usually demand amounts in the tens of thousands of dollars.\nIn a typical attack on one large healthcare organization in 2018, the company ended up paying a ransom of four Bitcoins, then worth $56,707. Reports showed that access to the company's files was restored within two hours of paying the sum.\nAccording to Sophos, SamSam previously leveraged  RDP to gain access to targeted networks via brute force. SamSam is not spread automatically, like other malware. It requires skill because it forces the attacker to adapt their tactics to the individual environment. Next, the actors escalate their privileges to admin level. They scan the networks for worthy targets, using conventional tools, such as PsExec or PaExec, to deploy/execute, quickly encrypting files.\nThis Analytic Story includes searches designed to help detect and investigate signs of the SamSam ransomware, such as the creation of fileswrites to system32, writes with tell-tale extensions, batch files written to system32, and evidence of brute-force attacks via RDP.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aoqin Dragon", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Ferocious Kitten", "Fox Kitten", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Sowbug", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1595", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Installation", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "Get History Of Email Sources", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity", "Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Prohibited Software On Endpoint", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": []}, {"name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning"}]}, {"name": "Batch File Write to System32", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Common Ransomware Notes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "File with Samsam Extension", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Samsam Test File Write", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Spike in File Writes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Remote Desktop Network Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Sandworm Tools", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-04-05", "version": 1, "id": "54146850-9d26-4877-a611-2db33231e63e", "description": "This analytic story features detections that enable security analysts to identify and investigate unusual activities potentially related to the destructive malware and tools employed by the \"Sandworm\" group. This analytic story focuses on monitoring suspicious process executions, command-line activities, Master Boot Record (MBR) wiping, data destruction, and other related indicators.", "references": ["https://cert.gov.ua/article/3718487", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034/"], "narrative": "The Sandworm group's tools are part of destructive malware operations designed to disrupt or attack Ukraine's National Information Agencies. This operation campaign consists of several malware components, including scripts, native Windows executables (LOLBINs), data wiper malware that overwrites or destroys the Master Boot Record (MBR), and file wiping using sdelete.exe on targeted hosts.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1649", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade Task or Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT41", "BITTER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Carbanak", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed PSExec - Rule", "ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Iptables Firewall Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path - Rule", "ESCU - Local Account Discovery with Net - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DNS Gather Network Info - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Shutdown CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Detect Renamed PSExec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Icacls Deny Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Linux Iptables Firewall Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Linux Kworker Process In Writable Process Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade Task or Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Local Account Discovery with Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Mimikatz PassTheTicket CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pass the Ticket"}]}, {"name": "Permission Modification using Takeown App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows DNS Gather Network Info", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}]}, {"name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Shutdown CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Tasks", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-06-12", "version": 1, "id": "94cff925-d05c-40cf-b925-d6c5702a2399", "description": "The MITRE ATT&CK technique T1053 refers to Scheduled Task/Job. Adversaries might use task scheduling utilities to execute programs or scripts at a predefined date and time. This method is often used for persistence but can also be used for privilege escalation or to execute tasks under certain conditions. Scheduling tasks can be beneficial for an attacker as it can allow them to execute actions at times when the system is less likely to be monitored actively. Different operating systems have different utilities for task scheduling, for example, Unix-like systems have Cron, while Windows has Scheduled Tasks and At Jobs.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"], "narrative": "MITRE ATT&CK technique T1053, labeled \"Scheduled Task/Job\", is a categorization of methods that adversaries use to execute malicious code by scheduling tasks or jobs on a system. This technique is widely utilized for persistence, privilege escalation, and the remote execution of tasks. The technique is applicable across various environments and platforms, including Windows, Linux, and macOS.\nThe technique consists of multiple sub-techniques, each highlighting a distinct mechanism for scheduling tasks or jobs. These sub-techniques include T1053.001 (Scheduled Task), T1053.002 (At for Windows), T1053.003 (Cron), T1053.004 (Launchd), T1053.005 (At for Linux), and T1053.006 (Systemd Timers).\nScheduled Task (T1053.001) focuses on adversaries' methods for scheduling tasks on a Windows system to maintain persistence or escalate privileges. These tasks can be set to execute at specified times, in response to particular events, or after a defined time interval.\nThe At command for Windows (T1053.002) enables administrators to schedule tasks on a Windows system. Adversaries may exploit this command to execute programs at system startup or at a predetermined schedule for persistence.\nCron (T1053.003) is a built-in job scheduler found in Unix-like operating systems. Adversaries can use cron jobs to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.\nLaunchd (T1053.004) is a service management framework present in macOS. Adversaries may utilize launchd to maintain persistence on macOS systems by setting up daemons or agents to execute at specific times or in response to defined events.\nThe At command for Linux (T1053.005) enables administrators to schedule tasks on a Linux system. Adversaries can use this command to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.\nSystemd Timers (T1053.006) offer a means of scheduling tasks on Linux systems using systemd. Adversaries can use systemd timers to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.\nDetection and mitigation strategies vary for each sub-technique. For instance, monitoring the creation of scheduled tasks or looking for uncorrelated changes to tasks that do not align with known software or patch cycles can be effective for detecting malicious activity related to this technique. Mitigation strategies may involve restricting permissions and applying application control solutions to prevent adversaries from scheduling tasks.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cron", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT5", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "At", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "FIN13", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Allow Config File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Linux At Application Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Restarted - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Service Started Or Enabled - Rule", "ESCU - Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Short Lived Scheduled Task - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell ScheduleTask - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Linux Add Files In Known Crontab Directories", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux At Allow Config File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux At Application Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Edit Cron Table Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Command To At Allow Config File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Append Cronjob Entry on Existing Cronjob File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Possible Cronjob Modification With Editor", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cron"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service File Created In Systemd Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Restarted", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Linux Service Started Or Enabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Systemd Timers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Remote Management"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MMC"}]}, {"name": "Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Creation on Remote Endpoint using At", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "At"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks scheduling job on remote system", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Short Lived Scheduled Task", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Windows Enable Win32 ScheduledJob via Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell ScheduleTask", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Delete Task SD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution InstallUtil", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-11-12", "version": 1, "id": "9482a314-43dc-11ec-a3c9-acde48001122", "description": "Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/004/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md"], "narrative": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v\\InstallUtil.exe.\nThere are multiple ways to instantiate InstallUtil and they are all outlined within Atomic Red Team - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.004/T1218.004.md. Two specific ways may be used and that includes invoking via  installer assembly class constructor through .NET and via InstallUtil.exe.\nTypically, adversaries will utilize the most commonly found way to invoke via InstallUtil Uninstall method.\nNote that parallel processes, and parent process, play a role in how InstallUtil is being used. In particular, a developer using InstallUtil will spawn from VisualStudio. Adversaries, will spawn from non-standard processes like Explorer.exe, cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. It's important to review the command-line to identify the DLL being loaded.\nParallel processes may also include csc.exe being used to compile a local `.cs` file. This file will be the input to the output. Developers usually do not build direct on the command shell, therefore this should raise suspicion.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Credential Theft", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Remote Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil Uninstall Option with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil URL in Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Silver Sparrow", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-02-24", "version": 1, "id": "cb4f48fe-7699-11eb-af77-acde48001122", "description": "Silver Sparrow, identified by Red Canary Intelligence, is a new forward looking MacOS (Intel and M1) malicious software downloader utilizing JavaScript for execution and a launchAgent to establish persistence.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/", "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-silver-sparrow/"], "narrative": "Silver Sparrow works is a dropper and uses typical persistence mechanisms on a Mac. It is cross platform, covering both Intel and Apple M1 architecture. To this date, no implant has been downloaded for malicious purposes. During installation of the update.pkg or updater.pkg file, the malicious software utilizes JavaScript to generate files and scripts on disk for persistence.These files later download a implant from an S3 bucket every hour. This analytic assists with identifying different types of macOS malware families establishing LaunchAgent persistence. Per SentinelOne source, it is predicted that Silver Sparrow is likely selling itself as a mechanism to 3rd party affiliates or pay-per-install (PPI) partners, typically seen as commodity adware/malware. Additional indicators and behaviors may be found within the references.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Suspicious Curl Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Suspicious Curl Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious PlistBuddy Usage via OSquery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Launch Agent"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious SQLite3 LSQuarantine Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Staged"}]}]}, {"name": "Snake Keylogger", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2024-02-12", "version": 1, "id": "0374f962-c66a-4a67-9a30-24b0708ef802", "description": "SnakeKeylogger is a stealthy malware designed to secretly record keystrokes on infected devices. It operates covertly in the background, capturing sensitive information such as passwords and credit card details. This keylogging threat poses a significant risk to user privacy and security.", "references": ["https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.404keylogger", "https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/what-is-malware/snake-keylogger-malware/"], "narrative": "SnakeKeylogger, a notorious malware, first emerged in the early 2010s, gaining infamy for its clandestine ability to capture keystrokes on compromised systems. As a stealthy threat, it infiltrates computers silently, recording every keystroke entered by users, including sensitive information like passwords and financial details. Over time, it has evolved to evade detection mechanisms, posing a persistent threat to cybersecurity. Its widespread use in various cybercrime activities underscores its significance as a tool for espionage and data theft. Despite efforts to combat it, SnakeKeylogger continues to lurk in the shadows, perpetuating its malicious activities with devastating consequences.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1486", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Akira", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Andariel", "HAFNIUM", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["HAFNIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Kimsuky", "SilverTerrier", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497", "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Darkhotel"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - High Process Termination Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credential Access From Browser Password Store - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Non Discord App Access Discord LevelDB - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Time Based Evasion via Choice Exec - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unsecured Outlook Credentials Access In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Download Files Using Telegram", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "High Process Termination Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Processes launching netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process Executed From Container File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credential Access From Browser Password Store", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows File Transfer Protocol In Non-Common Process Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mail Protocols"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Windows Gather Victim Network Info Through Ip Check Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows Non Discord App Access Discord LevelDB", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Time Based Evasion via Choice Exec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unsecured Outlook Credentials Access In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Snake Malware", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-05-10", "version": 1, "id": "032bacbb-f90d-43aa-bbcc-d87f169a29c8", "description": "The Snake implant is considered the most sophisticated cyber espionage tool designed and used by Center 16 of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) for long-term intelligence collection on sensitive targets.", "references": ["https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/09/2003218554/-1/-1/0/JOINT_CSA_HUNTING_RU_INTEL_SNAKE_MALWARE_20230509.PDF"], "narrative": "The Snake implant is considered the most sophisticated cyber espionage tool designed and used by Center 16 of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) for long-term intelligence collection on sensitive targets. To conduct operations using this tool, the FSB created a covert peer-to-peer (P2P) network of numerous Snake-infected computers worldwide. Many systems in this P2P network serve as relay nodes which route disguised operational traffic to and from Snake implants on the FSB's ultimate targets. Snake's custom communications protocols employ encryption and fragmentation for confidentiality and are designed to hamper detection and collection efforts. We consider Snake to be the most sophisticated cyber espionage tool in the FSB's arsenal. The sophistication of Snake stems from three principal areas. First, Snake employs means to achieve a rare level of stealth in its host components and network communications. Second, Snake's internal technical architecture allows for easy incorporation of new or replacement components. This design also facilitates the development and interoperability of Snake instances running on different host operating systems. We have observed interoperable Snake implants for Windows, MacOS, and Linux operating systems. Lastly, Snake demonstrates careful software engineering design and implementation, with the implant containing surprisingly few bugs given its complexity. (CISA, 2023)", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Snake Malware File Modification Crmlog - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Registry Modification wav OpenWithProgIds - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Snake Malware Service Create - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows Service Created with Suspicious Service Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Windows Snake Malware File Modification Crmlog", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows Snake Malware Kernel Driver Comadmin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}]}, {"name": "Windows Snake Malware Registry Modification wav OpenWithProgIds", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Snake Malware Service Create", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks", "author": "Dean Luxton, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "date": "2024-03-14", "version": 2, "id": "f676c4c1-c769-4ecb-9611-5fd85b497c56", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Windows Active Directory persistence techniques.", "references": ["https://adsecurity.org/?p=1929", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lz6haohGAMc&feature=youtu.be", "https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/DEFCON23-2015-Metcalf-RedvsBlue-ADAttackAndDefense-Final.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/", "https://www.dcshadow.com/", "https://gist.github.com/gentilkiwi/dcc132457408cf11ad2061340dcb53c2", "https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/mimikatz-dcsync-event-log-detections-john-dwyer"], "narrative": "Persistence consists of techniques that adversaries use to keep access to systems across restarts, changed credentials, and other interruptions that could cut off their access. Active Directory is a centralized and hierarchical database that stores information about users, computers, and other resources on a network. It provides secure and efficient management of these resources and enables administrators to enforce security policies and delegate administrative tasks.\nIn 2015 Active Directory security researcher Sean Metcalf published a blog post titled `Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks`. In this blog post, Sean described several methods through which an attacker could persist administrative access on an Active Directory network after having Domain Admin level rights for a short period of time. At the time of writing, 8 years after the initial blog post, most of these techniques are still possible since they abuse legitimate administrative functionality and not software vulnerabilities. Security engineers defending Active Directory networks should be aware of these technique available to adversaries post exploitation and deploy both preventive and detective security controls for them.\nThis analytic story groups detection opportunities for most of the techniques described on Seans blog post as well as other high impact attacks against Active Directory networks and Domain Controllers like DCSync and DCShadow. For some of these detection opportunities, it is necessary to enable the necessary GPOs and SACLs required, otherwise the event codes will not trigger. Each detection includes a list of requirements for enabling logging.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics", "Account Compromise", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1207", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1484.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT5", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Indrik Spider", "Magic Hound", "Naikon", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1484", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Support Provider", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Change", "Network_Traffic", "Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD AdminSDHolder ACL Modified - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Domain Controller Promotion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Domain Replication ACL Addition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD DSRM Password Reset - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Privileged Account SID History Addition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD ServicePrincipalName Added To Domain Account - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Account ServicePrincipalName - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Domain Controller SPN Attribute - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Short Lived Server Object - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD SID History Attribute Modified - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Group Policy Object Created - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Replication Service Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Mauricio Velazco, Splunk", "author_name": "Dean Luxton", "detections": [{"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD AdminSDHolder ACL Modified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Domain Controller Promotion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Domain Replication ACL Addition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD DSRM Account Changes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD DSRM Password Reset", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Privileged Account SID History Addition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD ServicePrincipalName Added To Domain Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Short Lived Domain Account ServicePrincipalName", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Short Lived Domain Controller SPN Attribute", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Short Lived Server Object", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD SID History Attribute Modified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Admon Default Group Policy Object Modified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows Admon Group Policy Object Created", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}]}, {"name": "Windows Group Policy Object Created", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Group Policy Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Support Provider"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Replication Service Traffic", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "DCSync"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rogue Domain Controller"}]}]}, {"name": "Spearphishing Attachments", "author": "Splunk Research Team, Splunk", "date": "2019-04-29", "version": 1, "id": "57226b40-94f3-4ce5-b101-a75f67759c27", "description": "Detect signs of malicious payloads that may indicate that your environment has been breached via a phishing attack.", "references": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"], "narrative": "Despite its simplicity, phishing remains the most pervasive and dangerous cyberthreat. In fact, research shows that as many as [91% of all successful attacks](https://digitalguardian.com/blog/91-percent-cyber-attacks-start-phishing-email-heres-how-protect-against-phishing) are initiated via a phishing email.\nAs most people know, these emails use fraudulent domains, [email scraping](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), familiar contact names inserted as senders, and other tactics to lure targets into clicking a malicious link, opening an attachment with a [nefarious payload](https://www.cyberscoop.com/emotet-trojan-phishing-scraping-templates-cofense-geodo/), or entering sensitive personal information that perpetrators may intercept. This attack technique requires a relatively low level of skill and allows adversaries to easily cast a wide net. Worse, because its success relies on the gullibility of humans, it's impossible to completely \"automate\" it out of your environment. However, you can use ES and ESCU to detect and investigate potentially malicious payloads injected into your environment subsequent to a phishing attack.\nWhile any kind of file may contain a malicious payload, some are more likely to be perceived as benign (and thus more often escape notice) by the average victim&#151;especially when the attacker sends an email that seems to be from one of their contacts. An example is Microsoft Office files. Most corporate users are familiar with documents with the following suffixes: .doc/.docx (MS Word), .xls/.xlsx (MS Excel), and .ppt/.pptx (MS PowerPoint), so they may click without a second thought, slashing a hole in their organizations' security.\nFollowing is a typical series of events, according to an [article by Trend Micro](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rising-trend-attackers-using-lnk-files-download-malware/):\n1. Attacker sends a phishing email. Recipient downloads the attached file, which is typically a .docx or .zip file with an embedded .lnk file\n1. The .lnk file executes a PowerShell script\n1. Powershell executes a reverse shell, rendering the exploit successful </ol>As a side note, adversaries are likely to use a tool like Empire to craft and obfuscate payloads and their post-injection activities, such as [exfiltration, lateral movement, and persistence](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire).\nThis Analytic Story focuses on detecting signs that a malicious payload has been injected into your environment. For example, one search detects outlook.exe writing a .zip file. Another looks for suspicious .lnk files launching processes.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Right-to-Left Override", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Ferocious Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Scarlet Mimic"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Window", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "Deep Panda", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Nomadic Octopus", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Run Virtual Instance", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Execution", "Defense Evasion", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Gdrive suspicious file sharing - Rule", "ESCU - Gsuite suspicious calendar invite - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RTLO In File Name - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RTLO In Process - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Excel Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - MSHTML Module Load in Office Product - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Creating Schedule Task - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning MSHTA - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning Wmic - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Writing cab or inf - Rule", "ESCU - Office Spawning Control - Rule", "ESCU - Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ConHost with Headless Argument - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Cmd - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Winword Spawning Windows Script Host - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Splunk Research Team", "detections": [{"name": "Gdrive suspicious file sharing", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Gsuite suspicious calendar invite", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Detect RTLO In File Name", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Right-to-Left Override"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Detect RTLO In Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Right-to-Left Override"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Excel Spawning PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Excel Spawning Windows Script Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "MSHTML Module Load in Office Product", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Creating Schedule Task", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Spawned Child Process To Download", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning BITSAdmin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning MSHTA", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Rundll32 with no DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Windows Script Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning Wmic", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Writing cab or inf", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Spawning Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Process Creating LNK file in Suspicious Location", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link"}]}, {"name": "Windows ConHost with Headless Argument", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Window"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Run Virtual Instance"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Office Product Spawning MSDT", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing PDF File Executes URL Link", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows Spearphishing Attachment Connect To None MS Office Domain", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows Spearphishing Attachment Onenote Spawn Mshta", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning Cmd", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Winword Spawning Windows Script Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}]}, {"name": "Splunk Vulnerabilities", "author": "Lou Stella,Rod Soto, Eric McGinnis, Splunk", "date": "2024-01-22", "version": 1, "id": "5354df00-dce2-48ac-9a64-8adb48006828", "description": "Keeping your Splunk Enterprise deployment up to date is critical and will help you reduce the risk associated with vulnerabilities in the product.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/product-security/announcements.html"], "narrative": "This analytic story includes detections that focus on attacker behavior targeted at your Splunk environment directly.", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Application Security", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1654", "mitre_attack_technique": "Log Enumeration", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1499.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application or System Exploitation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1499", "mitre_attack_technique": "Endpoint Denial of Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1210", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "MuddyWater", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1212", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1083", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aoqin Dragon", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windigo", "Winnti Group", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1202", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1001.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Impersonation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Higaisa", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1189", "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Andariel", "Axiom", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mustard Tempest", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1587.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Digital Certificates", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "PROMETHIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "HTML Smuggling", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1588.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Digital Certificates", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BlackTech", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1567", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1498", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Resource Development", "Initial Access", "Exfiltration", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Web", "Splunk_Audit"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives", "Weaponization"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Risky SPL using Pretrained ML Model - Rule", "ESCU - Path traversal SPL injection - Rule", "ESCU - Persistent XSS in RapidDiag through User Interface Views - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Absolute Path Traversal Using runshellscript - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Account Discovery Drilldown Dashboard Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk App for Lookup File Editing RCE via User XSLT - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Authentication Token Exposure in Debug Log - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Code Injection via custom dashboard leading to RCE - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk csrf in the ssg kvstore client endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Data exfiltration from Analytics Workspace using sid query - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk DoS Using Malformed SAML Request - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk DOS Via Dump SPL Command - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk DOS via printf search function - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Edit User Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Endpoint Denial of Service DoS Zip Bomb - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Enterprise KV Store Incorrect Authorization - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Windows Deserialization File Partition - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk ES DoS Investigations Manager via Investigation Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk ES DoS Through Investigation Attachments - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk HTTP Response Splitting Via Rest SPL Command - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Improperly Formatted Parameter Crashes splunkd - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Information Disclosure in Splunk Add-on Builder - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk list all nonstandard admin accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Low Privilege User Can View Hashed Splunk Password - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Path Traversal In Splunk App For Lookup File Edit - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Persistent XSS Via URL Validation Bypass W Dashboard - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk RBAC Bypass On Indexing Preview REST Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk RCE via Serialized Session Payload - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk RCE via Splunk Secure Gateway  Splunk Mobile alerts feature - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk RCE via User XSLT - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Reflected XSS in the templates lists radio - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Reflected XSS on App Search Table Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk risky Command Abuse disclosed february 2023 - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Stored XSS via Data Model objectName field - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Unauthenticated Log Injection Web Service Log - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk unnecessary file extensions allowed by lookup table uploads - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk User Enumeration Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk XSS in Highlighted JSON Events - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk XSS in Save table dialog header in search page - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk XSS via View - Rule", "ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule", "ESCU - Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto, Eric McGinnis, Splunk", "author_name": "Lou Stella", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Risky SPL using Pretrained ML Model", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Path traversal SPL injection", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Persistent XSS in RapidDiag through User Interface Views", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Absolute Path Traversal Using runshellscript", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Account Discovery Drilldown Dashboard Disclosure", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Splunk App for Lookup File Editing RCE via User XSLT", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Authentication Token Exposure in Debug Log", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Log Enumeration"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Code Injection via custom dashboard leading to RCE", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Delete Usage", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky Commands", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Command and Scripting Interpreter Risky SPL MLTK", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Splunk csrf in the ssg kvstore client endpoint", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Data exfiltration from Analytics Workspace using sid query", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Web Service"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Digital Certificates Infrastructure Version", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Digital Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Digital Certificates Lack of Encryption", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Digital Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Splunk DoS Using Malformed SAML Request", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service"}]}, {"name": "Splunk DOS Via Dump SPL Command", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application or System Exploitation"}]}, {"name": "Splunk DoS via Malformed S2S Request", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Denial of Service"}]}, {"name": "Splunk DOS via printf search function", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application or System Exploitation"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Edit User Privilege Escalation", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Endpoint Denial of Service DoS Zip Bomb", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Endpoint Denial of Service"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Enterprise KV Store Incorrect Authorization", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Enterprise Windows Deserialization File Partition", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Splunk ES DoS Investigations Manager via Investigation Creation", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Endpoint Denial of Service"}]}, {"name": "Splunk ES DoS Through Investigation Attachments", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Endpoint Denial of Service"}]}, {"name": "Splunk HTTP Response Splitting Via Rest SPL Command", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "HTML Smuggling"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Improperly Formatted Parameter Crashes splunkd", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Endpoint Denial of Service"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Information Disclosure in Splunk Add-on Builder", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Splunk list all nonstandard admin accounts", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Low Privilege User Can View Hashed Splunk Password", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Credential Access"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Path Traversal In Splunk App For Lookup File Edit", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Persistent XSS Via URL Validation Bypass W Dashboard", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Process Injection Forwarder Bundle Downloads", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Protocol Impersonation Weak Encryption Configuration", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Protocol Impersonation"}]}, {"name": "Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption selfsigned", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Digital Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Splunk protocol impersonation weak encryption simplerequest", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Digital Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Splunk RBAC Bypass On Indexing Preview REST Endpoint", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Splunk RCE via Serialized Session Payload", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Splunk RCE via Splunk Secure Gateway  Splunk Mobile alerts feature", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Splunk RCE via User XSLT", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Reflected XSS in the templates lists radio", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Reflected XSS on App Search Table Endpoint", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk risky Command Abuse disclosed february 2023", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Stored XSS via Data Model objectName field", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk Unauthenticated Log Injection Web Service Log", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Splunk unnecessary file extensions allowed by lookup table uploads", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk User Enumeration Attempt", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Splunk XSS in Highlighted JSON Events", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk XSS in Monitoring Console", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk XSS in Save table dialog header in search page", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Splunk XSS via View", "source": "application", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Open Redirect in Splunk Web", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Splunk Identified SSL TLS Certificates", "source": "network", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Sniffing"}]}]}, {"name": "Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-04-05", "version": 1, "id": "dcc19913-6918-4ed2-bbba-a6b484c10ef4", "description": "Spring4Shell is the nickname given to a zero-day vulnerability in the Spring Core Framework, a programming and configuration model for Java-based enterprise applications.", "references": ["https://www.tenable.com/blog/spring4shell-faq-spring-framework-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"], "narrative": "An attacker could exploit Spring4Shell by sending a specially crafted request to a vulnerable server. However, exploitation of Spring4Shell requires certain prerequisites, whereas the original Log4Shell vulnerability affected all versions of Log4j 2 using the default configuration.\nAccording to Spring, the following requirements were included in the vulnerability report, however the post cautions that there may be other ways in which this can be exploited so this may not be a complete list of requirements at this time:\n- Java Development Kit (JDK) 9 or greater\n- Apache Tomcat as the Servlet container\n- Packaged as a WAR\n- spring-webmvc or spring-webflux dependency\n", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Application Security", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule", "ESCU - Linux Java Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Spring4Shell Payload URL Request - Rule", "ESCU - Web JSP Request via URL - Rule", "ESCU - Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module - Rule", "ESCU - Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Java Writing JSP File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Linux Java Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Spring4Shell Payload URL Request", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Web JSP Request via URL", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Web Spring4Shell HTTP Request Class Module", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Web Spring Cloud Function FunctionRouter", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "SQL Injection", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-19", "version": 1, "id": "4f6632f5-449c-4686-80df-57625f59bab3", "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to help you detect structured query language (SQL) injection attempts characterized by long URLs that contain malicious parameters.", "references": ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"], "narrative": "It is very common for attackers to inject SQL parameters into vulnerable web applications, which then interpret the malicious SQL statements.\nThis Analytic Story contains a search designed to identify attempts by attackers to leverage this technique to compromise a host and gain a foothold in the target environment.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "SQL Injection with Long URLs", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "Subvert Trust Controls SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-10", "version": 1, "id": "7faf91b6-532a-4f18-807c-b2761e90b6dc", "description": "Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. This technique involves modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP's function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value to all files using that SIP. This can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/003/", "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_sip_persistence.yml", "https://specterops.io/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/06/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf", "https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/SIP", "https://github.com/mattifestation/PoCSubjectInterfacePackage", "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/11/06/hijacking-digital-signatures/"], "narrative": "In user mode, Windows Authenticode digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code. The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. Because of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and application control tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1553.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Windows SIP Provider Inventory - Rule", "ESCU - Windows SIP WinVerifyTrust Failed Trust Validation - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows Registry SIP Provider Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "Windows SIP Provider Inventory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "Windows SIP WinVerifyTrust Failed Trust Validation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious AWS Login Activities", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2019-05-01", "version": 1, "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c59f1268af3", "description": "Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. ", "references": ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"], "narrative": "It is important to monitor and control who has access to your AWS infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins to your AWS infrastructure will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any EC2 instances created by the attacker.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "AWS Successful Console Authentication From Multiple IPs", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect new user AWS Console Login", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious AWS S3 Activities", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2023-04-24", "version": 3, "id": "66732346-8fb0-407b-9633-da16756567d6", "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story using Cloudtrail logs to to monitor your AWS S3 buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open S3 buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP, permission and policy updates to the bucket, potential misuse of other services leading to data being leaked.", "references": ["https://github.com/nagwww/s3-leaks", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"], "narrative": "One of the most common ways that attackers attempt to steal data from S3 is by gaining unauthorized access to S3 buckets and copying or exfiltrating data to external locations.\nHowever, suspicious S3 activities can refer to any unusual behavior detected within an Amazon Web Services (AWS) Simple Storage Service (S3) bucket, including unauthorized access, unusual data transfer patterns, and access attempts from unknown IP addresses.\nIt is important for organizations to regularly monitor S3 activities for suspicious behavior and implement security best practices, such as using access controls, encryption, and strong authentication mechanisms, to protect sensitive data stored within S3 buckets. By staying vigilant and taking proactive measures, organizations can help prevent potential security breaches and minimize the impact of attacks if they do occur.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1119", "mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Collection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "Chimera", "Confucius", "FIN5", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1530", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Fox Kitten", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1537", "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection", "Impact", "Exfiltration"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS Disable Bucket Versioning - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "Get Notable History", "Investigate AWS activities via region name"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "AWS Disable Bucket Versioning", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS Exfiltration via Bucket Replication", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS Exfiltration via DataSync Task", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Automated Collection"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Open S3 buckets", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage"}]}, {"name": "Detect S3 access from a new IP", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage"}]}, {"name": "Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious AWS Traffic", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2018-05-07", "version": 1, "id": "2e8948a5-5239-406b-b56b-6c50f2168af3", "description": "Leverage these searches to monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as a spike in blocked outbound traffic in your virtual private cloud (VPC).", "references": ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"], "narrative": "A virtual private cloud (VPC) is an on-demand managed cloud-computing service that isolates computing resources for each client. Inside the VPC container, the environment resembles a physical network.\nAmazon's VPC service enables you to launch EC2 instances and leverage other Amazon resources. The traffic that flows in and out of this VPC can be controlled via network access-control rules and security groups. Amazon also has a feature called VPC Flow Logs that enables you to log IP traffic going to and from the network interfaces in your VPC. This data is stored using Amazon CloudWatch Logs.\nAttackers may abuse the AWS infrastructure with insecure VPCs so they can co-opt AWS resources for command-and-control nodes, data exfiltration, and more. Once an EC2 instance is compromised, an attacker may initiate outbound network connections for malicious reasons. Monitoring these network traffic behaviors is crucial for understanding the type of traffic flowing in and out of your network and to alert you to suspicious activities.\nThe searches in this Analytic Story will monitor your AWS network traffic for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get DNS traffic ratio", "Get Notable History", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Information For Port Activity", "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Cloud Authentication Activities", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2020-06-04", "version": 1, "id": "6380ebbb-55c5-4fce-b754-01fd565fb73c", "description": "Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. ", "references": ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"], "narrative": "It is important to monitor and control who has access to your cloud infrastructure. Detecting suspicious logins will provide good starting points for investigations. Abusive behaviors caused by compromised credentials can lead to direct monetary costs, as you will be billed for any compute activity whether legitimate or otherwise.\nThis Analytic Story has data model versions of cloud searches leveraging Authentication data, including those looking for suspicious login activity, and cross-account activity for AWS.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1586", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1535", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1586.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Resource Development", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Authentication"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Investigate AWS User Activities by user field"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by New User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}, {"name": "Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compromise Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2020-08-25", "version": 1, "id": "8168ca88-392e-42f4-85a2-767579c660ce", "description": "Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "narrative": "Monitoring your cloud infrastructure logs allows you enable governance, compliance, and risk auditing. It is crucial for a company to monitor events and actions taken in the their cloud environments to ensure that your instances are not vulnerable to attacks. This Analytic Story identifies suspicious activities in your cloud compute instances and helps you respond and investigate those activities.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1537", "mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Exfiltration", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Change", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration - Rule", "ESCU - AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot - Rule", "ESCU - AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "Get All AWS Activity From IP Address"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "AWS AMI Attribute Modification for Exfiltration", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS EC2 Snapshot Shared Externally", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS Exfiltration via EC2 Snapshot", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "AWS S3 Exfiltration Behavior Identified", "source": "cloud", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Cloud Provisioning Activities", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2018-08-20", "version": 1, "id": "51045ded-1575-4ba6-aef7-af6c73cffd86", "description": "Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"], "narrative": "Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\nThis Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Change"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Cloud User Activities", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2020-09-04", "version": 1, "id": "1ed5ce7d-5469-4232-92af-89d1a3595b39", "description": "Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.", "references": ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"], "narrative": "It seems obvious that it is critical to monitor and control the users who have access to your cloud infrastructure. Nevertheless, it's all too common for enterprises to lose track of ad-hoc accounts, leaving their servers vulnerable to attack. In fact, this was the very oversight that led to Tesla's cryptojacking attack in February, 2018.\nIn addition to compromising the security of your data, when bad actors leverage your compute resources, it can incur monumental costs, since you will be billed for any new instances and increased bandwidth usage.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Security Analytics for AWS", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT5", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1580", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Change"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Security Groups Modifications by User - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "AWS IAM AccessDenied Discovery Events", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery"}]}, {"name": "AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode", "source": "cloud", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Cloud Security Groups Modifications by User", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Cloud Compute Configurations"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Command-Line Executions", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-03", "version": 2, "id": "f4368ddf-d59f-4192-84f6-778ac5a3ffc7", "description": "Leveraging the Windows command-line interface (CLI) is one of the most common attack techniques--one that is also detailed in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Use this Analytic Story to help you identify unusual or suspicious use of the CLI on Windows systems.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"], "narrative": "The ability to execute arbitrary commands via the Windows CLI is a primary goal for the adversary. With access to the shell, an attacker can easily run scripts and interact with the target system. Often, attackers may only have limited access to the shell or may obtain access in unusual ways. In addition, malware may execute and interact with the CLI in ways that would be considered unusual and inconsistent with typical user activity. This provides defenders with opportunities to identify suspicious use and investigate, as appropriate. This Analytic Story contains various searches to help identify this suspicious activity, as well as others to aid you in deeper investigation.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect suspicious processnames using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Potentially malicious code on commandline - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "First time seen command line argument", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Detect suspicious processnames using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Potentially malicious code on commandline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Compiled HTML Activity", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-02-11", "version": 1, "id": "a09db4d1-3827-4833-87b8-3a397e532119", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/001/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/htmlhelp/nf-htmlhelp-htmlhelpa"], "narrative": "Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe).\nHH.exe relies upon hhctrl.ocx to load CHM topics.This will load upon execution of a chm file.\nDuring investigation, review all parallel processes and child processes. It is possible for file modification events to occur and it is best to capture the CHM file and decompile it for further analysis.\nUpon usage of InfoTech Storage Handlers, ms-its, its, mk, itss.dll will load.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT41", "Dark Caracal", "OilRig", "Silence"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect HTML Help Renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect HTML Help Renamed", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Spawn Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help URL in Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Detect HTML Help Using InfoTech Storage Handlers", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Decompile", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compiled HTML File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-18", "version": 1, "id": "3c3835c0-255d-4f9e-ab84-e29ec9ec9b56", "description": "Attackers often attempt to hide within or otherwise abuse the domain name system (DNS). You can thwart attempts to manipulate this omnipresent protocol by monitoring for these types of abuses.", "references": ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"], "narrative": "Although DNS is one of the fundamental underlying protocols that make the Internet work, it is often ignored (perhaps because of its complexity and effectiveness).  However, attackers have discovered ways to abuse the protocol to meet their objectives. One potential abuse involves manipulating DNS to hijack traffic and redirect it to an IP address under the attacker's control. This could inadvertently send users intending to visit google.com, for example, to an unrelated malicious website. Another technique involves using the DNS protocol for command-and-control activities with the attacker's malicious code or to covertly exfiltrate data. The searches within this Analytic Story look for these types of abuses.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1048", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "LazyScripter", "OilRig", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1568.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1071", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Rocke", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1048.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT33", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Thrip", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1189", "mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "Andariel", "Axiom", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mustard Tempest", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windigo", "Windshift"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration", "Command And Control", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Delivery", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App - Rule", "ESCU - Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get DNS Server History for a host", "Get DNS traffic ratio", "Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detection of DNS Tunnels", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}]}, {"name": "DNS Exfiltration Using Nslookup App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage of NSLOOKUP App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect DGA domains using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}]}, {"name": "Detect DNS Data Exfiltration using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Drive-by Compromise"}]}, {"name": "Detect suspicious DNS TXT records using pretrained model in DSDL", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}, {"name": "DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}]}, {"name": "Excessive DNS Failures", "source": "network", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Layer Protocol"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Emails", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2020-01-27", "version": 1, "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47ec-a981-fdf1351e5d55", "description": "Email remains one of the primary means for attackers to gain an initial foothold within the modern enterprise. Detect and investigate suspicious emails in your environment with the help of the searches in this Analytic Story.", "references": ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"], "narrative": "It is a common practice for attackers of all types to leverage targeted spearphishing campaigns and mass mailers to deliver weaponized email messages and attachments. Fortunately, there are a number of ways to monitor email data in Splunk to detect suspicious content.\nOnce a phishing message has been detected, the next steps are to answer the following questions:\n1. Which users have received this or a similar message in the past?\n1. When did the targeted campaign begin?\n1. Have any users interacted with the content of the messages (by downloading an attachment or clicking on a malicious URL)?This Analytic Story provides detection searches to identify suspicious emails, as well as contextual and investigative searches to help answer some of these questions.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Email"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Email Info", "Get Emails From Specific Sender", "Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Monitor Email For Brand Abuse", "source": "application", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious GCP Storage Activities", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "date": "2020-08-05", "version": 1, "id": "4d656b2e-d6be-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "description": "Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your GCP Storage buckets for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as detecting open storage buckets and buckets being accessed from a new IP. The contextual and investigative searches will give you more information, when required.", "references": ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"], "narrative": "Similar to other cloud providers, GCP operates on a shared responsibility model. This means the end user, you, are responsible for setting appropriate access control lists and permissions on your GCP resources.\\ This Analytics Story concentrates on detecting things like open storage buckets (both read and write) along with storage bucket access from unfamiliar users and IP addresses.", "tags": {"category": ["Cloud Security"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1530", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Fox Kitten", "Scattered Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Shannon Davis", "detections": [{"name": "Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP", "source": "cloud", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage"}]}, {"name": "Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets", "source": "cloud", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data from Cloud Storage"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSHTA Activity", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-01-20", "version": 2, "id": "1e5a5a53-540b-462a-8fb7-f44a4292f5dc", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5"], "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the mshta.exe process, which loads Microsoft HTML applications (mshtml.dll) with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to proxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.\nTriage\nValidate execution\n1. Determine if MSHTA.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSHTA.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\\windows\\system32 or c:\\windows\\syswow64, it should be highly suspect.\n1. Determine if script code was executed with MSHTA.\nSituational Awareness\nThe objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSHTA.exe.\n1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\n1. Module loads. Are the known MSHTA.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSHTA loading any suspicious .DLLs?\n1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\nRetrieval of script code\nThe objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect mshta inline hta execution - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta renamed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta child process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious mshta spawn - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Detect mshta inline hta execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Detect mshta renamed", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious mshta child process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious mshta spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSHTA Writing to World Writable Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Okta Activity", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2020-04-02", "version": 1, "id": "9cbd34af-8f39-4476-a423-bacd126c750b", "description": "Monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities. Due to the Covid outbreak, many users are migrating over to leverage cloud services more and more. Okta is a popular tool to manage multiple users and the web-based applications they need to stay productive. The searches in this story will help monitor your Okta environment for suspicious activities and associated user behaviors.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"], "narrative": "Okta is the leading single sign on (SSO) provider, allowing users to authenticate once to Okta, and from there access a variety of web-based applications. These applications are assigned to users and allow administrators to centrally manage which users are allowed to access which applications. It also provides centralized logging to help understand how the applications are used and by whom.\nWhile SSO is a major convenience for users, it also provides attackers with an opportunity. If the attacker can gain access to Okta, they can access a variety of applications. As such monitoring the environment is important.\nWith people moving quickly to adopt web-based applications and ways to manage them, many are still struggling to understand how best to monitor these environments. This analytic story provides searches to help monitor this environment, and identify events and activity that warrant further investigation such as credential stuffing or password spraying attacks, and users logging in from multiple locations when travel is disallowed.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1078.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1539", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Web Session Cookie", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Evilnum", "LuminousMoth", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1078", "mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Initial Access", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "Akira", "Axiom", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN4", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "POLONIUM", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "Suckfly", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Discovery", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie - Rule", "ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Locked Out - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users - Rule", "ESCU - Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Investigate Okta Activity by app", "Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", "Investigate User Activities In Okta"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cloud Account"}]}, {"name": "Okta Risk Threshold Exceeded", "source": "application", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Okta Suspicious Use of a Session Cookie", "source": "application", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal Web Session Cookie"}]}, {"name": "Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentials From The Same IP", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Okta Account Locked Out", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Okta Account Lockout Events", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Okta Failed SSO Attempts", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts"}]}, {"name": "Okta ThreatInsight Login Failure with High Unknown users", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credential Stuffing"}]}, {"name": "Okta ThreatInsight Suspected PasswordSpray Attack", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Valid Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Default Accounts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}]}, {"name": "Okta Two or More Rejected Okta Pushes", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-02-11", "version": 1, "id": "2cdf33a0-4805-4b61-b025-59c20f418fbe", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/", "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/documentation/modules/evasion/windows/applocker_evasion_regasm_regsvcs.md", "https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/"], "narrative": " Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. The following queries assist with detecting suspicious and malicious usage of Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe. Upon reviewing usage of Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe, review file modification events for possible script code written. Review parallel process events for csc.exe being utilized to compile script code.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Regasm Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Regasm Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm with Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regasm with no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs with Network Connection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}, {"name": "Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-01-29", "version": 1, "id": "b8bee41e-624f-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the regsvr32.exe process to execute malicious code.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/"], "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the regsvr32.exe process. This particular bypass was popularized with \"SquiblyDoo\" using the \"scrobj.dll\" dll to load .sct scriptlets. This technique is still widely used by adversaries to bypass detection and prevention controls. The file extension of the DLL is irrelevant (it may load a .txt file extension for example). The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging regsvr32.exe to execute malicious code. Validate execution Determine if regsvr32.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of regsvr32.exe and further PE metadata. If executed outside of c:\\windows\\system32 or c:\\windows\\syswow64, it should be highly suspect. Determine if script code was executed with regsvr32. Situational Awareness - The objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by regsvr32.exe. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application? Module loads.  Is regsvr32 loading any suspicious .DLLs? Unsigned or signed from non-standard paths. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain. Retrieval of Script Code - confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cobalt Group", "Deep Panda", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "TA551", "WIRTE"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious InProcServer32 Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Regsvr32 Application Control Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Malicious InProcServer32 Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Regsvr32 with Known Silent Switch Cmdline", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Regsvr32"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-02-03", "version": 1, "id": "80a65487-854b-42f1-80a1-935e4c170694", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage rundll32.exe to execute arbitrary malicious code.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32"], "narrative": "One common adversary tactic is to bypass application control solutions via the rundll32.exe process. Natively, rundll32.exe will load DLLs and is a great example of a Living off the Land Binary. Rundll32.exe may load malicious DLLs by ordinals, function names or directly. The queries in this story focus on loading default DLLs, syssetup.dll, ieadvpack.dll, advpack.dll and setupapi.dll from disk that may be abused by adversaries. Additionally, two analytics developed to assist with identifying DLLRegisterServer, Start and StartW functions being called. The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging rundll32.exe to execute malicious code.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 Rename", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - advpack", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - syssetup", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL Hunt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Control RunDLL World Writable Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 with no Command Line Arguments with Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 dllregisterserver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Windows Registry Activities", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2018-05-31", "version": 1, "id": "2b1800dd-92f9-47dd-a981-fdf1351e5d55", "description": "Monitor and detect registry changes initiated from remote locations, which can be a sign that an attacker has infiltrated your system.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"], "narrative": "Attackers are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques for hijacking target servers, while evading detection. One such technique that has become progressively more common is registry modification.\nThe registry is a key component of the Windows operating system. It has a hierarchical database called \"registry\" that contains settings, options, and values for executables. Once the threat actor gains access to a machine, they can use reg.exe to modify their account to obtain administrator-level privileges, maintain persistence, and move laterally within the environment.\nThe searches in this story are designed to help you detect behaviors associated with manipulation of the Windows registry.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mshta Execution In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories"}]}, {"name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Suspicious Changes to File Associations", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}]}, {"name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mshta Execution In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious WMI Use", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2018-10-23", "version": 2, "id": "c8ddc5be-69bc-4202-b3ab-4010b27d7ad5", "description": "Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.", "references": ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://web.archive.org/web/20210921091529/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"], "narrative": "WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems. In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT33", "Blue Mockingbird", "FIN8", "HEXANE", "Leviathan", "Metador", "Mustang Panda", "Rancor", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1220", "mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Cobalt Group", "Higaisa"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Invoke WmiExec Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMIC XSL Execution via URL - Rule", "ESCU - XSL Script Execution With WMIC - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info", "Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Invoke WmiExec Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Process Execution via WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Remote Process Instantiation via WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Script Execution via WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "WMI Temporary Event Subscription", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "WMIC XSL Execution via URL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing"}]}, {"name": "XSL Script Execution With WMIC", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "XSL Script Processing"}]}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Zoom Child Processes", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2020-04-13", "version": 1, "id": "aa3749a6-49c7-491e-a03f-4eaee5fe0258", "description": "Attackers are using Zoom as an vector to increase privileges on a sytems. This story detects new child processes of zoom and provides investigative actions for this detection.", "references": ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"], "narrative": "Zoom is a leader in modern enterprise video communications and its usage has increased dramatically with a large amount of the population under stay-at-home orders due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With increased usage has come increased scrutiny and several security flaws have been found with this application on both Windows and macOS systems.\nCurrent detections focus on finding new child processes of this application on a per host basis. Investigative searches are included to gather information needed during an investigation.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Process File Activity"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}]}, {"name": "First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}]}, {"name": "Swift Slicer", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto, Splunk", "date": "2023-02-01", "version": 1, "id": "234c9dd7-52fb-4d6f-aec9-075ef88a2cea", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the swift slicer malware including overwriting of files and etc.", "references": ["https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1618960022150729728", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/01/27/swiftslicer-new-destructive-wiper-malware-ukraine/"], "narrative": "Swift Slicer is one of Windows destructive malware found by ESET that was used in a targeted organizarion to wipe critical files like windows drivers and other files to destroy and left the machine inoperable. This malware like Caddy Wiper was deliver through GPO which suggests that the attacker had taken control of the victims active directory environment.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto, Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Data Destruction Recursive Exec Files Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}]}, {"name": "SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-11-09", "version": 1, "id": "228f22cb-3436-4c31-8af4-370d40af7b49", "description": "A zero-day vulnerability was discovered in SysAid's on-premise software, exploited by the group DEV-0950 (Lace Tempest). The attackers uploaded a WebShell and other payloads, gaining unauthorized access and control. SysAid has released a patch (version 23.3.36) to remediate the vulnerability and urges customers to conduct a comprehensive compromise assessment.", "references": ["https://www.sysaid.com/blog/service-desk/on-premise-software-security-vulnerability-notification"], "narrative": "The analytics tagged to this analytic story will aid in capturing initial access and some post-exploitation activities. In addition to the application spawning a shell, consider reviewing STRT's Cobalt Strike and PowerShell script block logging analytic stories. On November 2nd, SysAid's security team identified a potential vulnerability in their on-premise software. The investigation revealed a zero-day vulnerability exploited by the group known as DEV-0950 (Lace Tempest). The attackers uploaded a WebShell and other payloads into the webroot of the SysAid Tomcat web service, thereby gaining unauthorized access and control over the affected system. SysAid promptly initiated their incident response protocol and began proactive communication with their on-premise customers to implement a mitigation solution. SysAid has released a patch (version 23.3.36) to remediate the vulnerability and strongly recommends all customers to conduct a comprehensive compromise assessment of their network.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Command And Control", "Persistence", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Java Writing JSP File - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Java Spawning Shells - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Java Writing JSP File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Windows Java Spawning Shells", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Text4Shell CVE-2022-42889", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-10-26", "version": 1, "id": "95ae800d-485e-47f7-866e-8be281aa497b", "description": "A new critical vulnerability CVE-2022-42889 a.k.a. Text4shell, similar to the old Spring4Shell and Log4Shell, was originally reported by Alvaro Munoz on the very popular Apache Commons Text library.", "references": ["https://sysdig.com/blog/cve-2022-42889-text4shell/"], "narrative": "Apache Commons Text is a Java library described as \"a library focused on algorithms working on strings.\" We can see it as a general-purpose text manipulation toolkit. This vulnerability affects the StringSubstitutor interpolator class, which is included in the Commons Text library. A default interpolator allows for string lookups that can lead to Remote Code Execution. This is due to a logic flaw that makes the \"script,\" \"dns,\" and \"url\" lookup keys interpolated by default, as opposed to what it should be, according to the documentation of the StringLookupFactory class. Those keys allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code via lookups. In order to exploit the vulnerabilities, the following requirements must be met - Run a version of Apache Commons Text from version 1.5 to 1.9 and use the StringSubstitutor interpolator. It is important to specify that the StringSubstitutor interpolator is not as widely used as the string substitution in Log4j, which led to Log4Shell. According to the CVSSv3 system, it scores 9.8 as CRITICAL severity. The severity is Critical due to the easy exploitability and huge potential impact in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. As we showed in the previous section, you can take full control over the vulnerable system with a crafted request. However, it is not likely the vulnerabilities will have the same impacts as the previous Log4Shell and Spring4Shell.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Application Security", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Exploit Public Facing Application via Apache Commons Text", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Trickbot", "author": "Rod Soto, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2021-04-20", "version": 1, "id": "16f93769-8342-44c0-9b1d-f131937cce8e", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the trickbot banking trojan, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process injection, shellcode execution and data collection even in LDAP environment.", "references": ["https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickbot", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"], "narrative": "trickbot banking trojan campaigns targeting banks and other vertical sectors.This malware is known in Microsoft Windows OS where target security Microsoft Defender to prevent its detection and removal. steal Verizon credentials and targeting banks using its multi component modules that collect and exfiltrate data.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Andariel", "HAFNIUM", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["HAFNIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Account Discovery With Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Cobalt Strike Named Pipes - Rule", "ESCU - Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Spawn rundll32 process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Document Executing Macro Code - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawning CertUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Rundll32 StartW - Rule", "ESCU - Trickbot Named Pipe - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Create Executable File - Rule", "ESCU - Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "Account Discovery With Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Cobalt Strike Named Pipes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Executable File Written in Administrative SMB Share", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Mshta spawning Rundll32 OR Regsvr32 Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Spawn rundll32 process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Document Executing Macro Code", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawning CertUtil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Remote Thread To Known Windows Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Rundll32 StartW", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Trickbot Named Pipe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Wermgr Process Connecting To IP Check Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Network Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IP Addresses"}]}, {"name": "Wermgr Process Create Executable File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Wermgr Process Spawned CMD Or Powershell Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-01-12", "version": 1, "id": "270a67a6-55d8-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "description": "Monitor and detect behaviors used by attackers who leverage trusted developer utilities to execute malicious code.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler/"], "narrative": "Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe to execute malicious code.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2021-01-21", "version": 1, "id": "be3418e2-551b-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", "description": "Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the msbuild.exe process to execute malicious code.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/", "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md", "https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild", "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/master/Invoke-ExecuteMSBuild.ps1", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/", "https://github.com/MHaggis/CBR-Queries/blob/master/msbuild.md"], "narrative": "Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio and is native to Windows. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\nThe inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.\nThe searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an adversary is leveraging msbuild.exe to execute malicious code.\nTriage\nValidate execution\n1. Determine if MSBuild.exe executed. Validate the OriginalFileName of MSBuild.exe and further PE metadata.\n1. Determine if script code was executed with MSBuild.\nSituational Awareness\nThe objective of this step is meant to identify suspicious behavioral indicators related to executed of Script code by MSBuild.exe.\n1. Parent process. Is the parent process a known LOLBin? Is the parent process an Office Application?\n1. Module loads. Are the known MSBuild.exe modules being loaded by a non-standard application? Is MSbuild loading any suspicious .DLLs?\n1. Network connections. Any network connections? Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain.\nRetrieval of script code\nThe objective of this step is to confirm the executed script code is benign or malicious.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1127.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious msbuild path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Rename - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious MSBuild Spawn - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "MSBuild Suspicious Spawned By Script Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious msbuild path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Rename", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious MSBuild Spawn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MSBuild"}]}]}, {"name": "Unusual Processes", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-04", "version": 2, "id": "f4368e3f-d59f-4192-84f6-748ac5a3ddb6", "description": "Quickly identify systems running new or unusual processes in your environment that could be indicators of suspicious activity. Processes run from unusual locations, those with conspicuously long command lines, and rare executables are all examples of activities that may warrant deeper investigation.", "references": ["https://web.archive.org/web/20210921093439/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"], "narrative": "Being able to profile a host's processes within your environment can help you more quickly identify processes that seem out of place when compared to the rest of the population of hosts or asset types.\nThis Analytic Story lets you identify processes that are either a) not typically seen running or b) have some sort of suspicious command-line arguments associated with them. This Analytic Story will also help you identify the user running these processes and the associated process activity on the host.\nIn the event an unusual process is identified, it is imperative to better understand how that process was able to execute on the host, when it first executed, and whether other hosts are affected. This extra information may provide clues that can help the analyst further investigate any suspicious activity.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "CopyKittens", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "TA505", "TA551", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aoqin Dragon", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Ferocious Kitten", "Fox Kitten", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Sowbug", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Aoqin Dragon", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cleaver", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "POLONIUM", "Patchwork", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "TA2541", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1595", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Verclsid", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Volt Typhoon"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Discovery", "Execution", "Resource Development", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance", "Delivery", "Installation", "Weaponization"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Rundll32 Shimcache Flush - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process Executed From Container File - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Verclsid CLSID Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Payload Injection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process - Rule", "ESCU - WinRM Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Uncommon Processes On Endpoint", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}]}, {"name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning"}]}, {"name": "Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect Rare Executables", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Rundll32 Shimcache Flush", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rundll32"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process Executed From Container File", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerade File Type"}]}, {"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": []}, {"name": "Verclsid CLSID Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Verclsid"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Tool"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Payload Injection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Fileless Storage"}]}, {"name": "Windows Remote Assistance Spawning Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "WinRM Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}, {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}]}, {"name": "Use of Cleartext Protocols", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-15", "version": 1, "id": "826e6431-aeef-41b4-9fc0-6d0985d65a21", "description": "Leverage searches that detect cleartext network protocols that may leak credentials or should otherwise be encrypted.", "references": ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"], "narrative": "Various legacy protocols operate by default in the clear, without the protections of encryption. This potentially leaks sensitive information that can be exploited by passively sniffing network traffic. Depending on the protocol, this information could be highly sensitive, or could allow for session hijacking. In addition, these protocols send authentication information, which would allow for the harvesting of usernames and passwords that could potentially be used to authenticate and compromise secondary systems.", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Process Information For Port Activity"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Protocols passing authentication in cleartext", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}]}, {"name": "VMware Aria Operations vRealize CVE-2023-20887", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-06-21", "version": 1, "id": "99171cdd-57a1-4b8a-873c-f8bee12e2025", "description": "CVE-2023-20887 is a critical vulnerability affecting VMware's vRealize Network Insight (also known as VMware Aria Operations for Networks). It allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges via the Apache Thrift RPC interface. The exploit, which has a severity score of 9.8, targets an endpoint (\"/saas./resttosaasservlet\") in the application and delivers a malicious payload designed to create a reverse shell, granting the attacker control over the system. VMware has released an advisory recommending users to update to the latest version to mitigate this threat.", "references": ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20887", "https://summoning.team/blog/vmware-vrealize-network-insight-rce-cve-2023-20887/", "https://viz.greynoise.io/tag/VMware-aria-operations-for-networks-rce-attempt?days=30", "https://github.com/sinsinology/CVE-2023-20887"], "narrative": "CVE-2023-20887 is a highly critical vulnerability found in VMware's vRealize Network Insight. This software is widely used for intelligent operations management across physical, virtual, and cloud environments, so a vulnerability in it poses a significant risk to many organizations.\nThis particular vulnerability lies in the application's Apache Thrift RPC interface. The exploit allows an attacker to inject commands that are executed with root privileges, leading to a potential total compromise of the system. The attacker does not need to be authenticated, which further increases the risk posed by this vulnerability.\nThe exploit operates by sending a specially crafted payload to the \"/saas./resttosaasservlet\" endpoint. This payload contains a reverse shell command, which, when executed, allows the attacker to remotely control the victim's system. This control is obtained at the root level, providing the attacker with the ability to perform any action on the system.\nWhat makes this vulnerability particularly dangerous is its high severity score of 9.8, indicating it is a critical threat. It's also noteworthy that the exploitation of this vulnerability leaves specific indicators such as abnormal traffic to the \"/saas./resttosaasservlet\" endpoint and suspicious ncat commands in network traffic, which can help in its detection.\nVMware has acknowledged the vulnerability and has published a security advisory recommending that users update to the latest version of the software. This update effectively patches the vulnerability and protects systems from this exploit. It's crucial that all users of the affected versions of VMware's vRealize Network Insight promptly apply the update to mitigate the risk posed by CVE-2023-20887.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "VMWare Aria Operations Exploit Attempt", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation of Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}]}, {"name": "VMware Server Side Injection and Privilege Escalation", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-05-19", "version": 1, "id": "d6d51cc2-a092-43b7-9f61-1159943afe39", "description": "Recently disclosed CVE-2022-22954 and CVE-2022-22960 have been identified in the wild abusing VMware products to compromise internet faced devices and escalate privileges.", "references": ["https://attackerkb.com/topics/BDXyTqY1ld/cve-2022-22954/rapid7-analysis", "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-138b"], "narrative": "On April 6, 2022, VMware published VMSA-2022-0011, which discloses multiple vulnerabilities discovered by Steven Seeley (mr_me) of Qihoo 360 Vulnerability Research Institute. The most critical of the CVEs published in VMSA-2022-0011 is CVE-2022-22954, which is a server-side template injection issue with a CVSSv3 base score of 9.8. The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user with network access to the web interface to execute an arbitrary shell command as the VMware user. To further exacerbate this issue, VMware also disclosed a local privilege escalation issue, CVE-2022-22960, which permits the attacker to gain root after exploiting CVE-2022-22954. Products affected include - VMware Workspace ONE Access (Access) 20.10.0.0 - 20.10.0.1, 21.08.0.0 - 21.08.0.1 and VMware Identity Manager (vIDM) 3.3.3 - 3.3.6.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1190", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1133", "mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT41", "Akira", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN5", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leviathan", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Web"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "VMware Server Side Template Injection Hunt", "source": "web", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "VMware Workspace ONE Freemarker Server-side Template Injection", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "External Remote Services"}]}]}, {"name": "Volt Typhoon", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-05-25", "version": 1, "id": "f73010e4-49eb-44ef-9f3f-2c25a1ae5415", "description": "This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the \"Volt Typhoon\" group targeting critical infrastructure organizations in United States and Guam. The affected organizations include the communications, manufacturing, utility, transportation, construction, maritime, government, information technology, and education sectors. This Analytic story looks for suspicious process execution, lolbin execution, command-line activity, lsass dump and many more.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/"], "narrative": "Volt Typhoon is a state sponsored group typically focuses on espionage and information gathering. Based on Microsoft Threat Intelligence, This threat actor group puts strong emphasis on stealth in this campaign by relying almost exclusively on living-off-the-land techniques and hands-on-keyboard activity.\nThey issue commands via the command line to: 1. collect data, including credentials from local and network systems,\n2. put the data into an archive file to stage it for exfiltration, and then\n3. use the stolen valid credentials to maintain persistence.\nIn addition, Volt Typhoon tries to blend into normal network activity by routing traffic through compromised small office and home office (SOHO) network equipment, including routers, firewalls, and VPN hardware. They have also been observed using custom versions of open-source tools to establish a command and control (C2) channel over proxy to further stay under the radar.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Internal Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT39", "FIN13", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "Strider", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1090", "mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cinnamon Tempest", "CopyKittens", "Earth Lusca", "Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "POLONIUM", "Sandworm Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT33", "Chimera", "HEXANE", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "Silent Librarian"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "HAFNIUM", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "Mustang Panda", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leafminer", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA505", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Cleaver", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Leafminer", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Threat Group-3390", "Volt Typhoon", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "FIN7", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "OilRig", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1110", "mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT38", "APT39", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1590.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DNS", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance", "Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Elevated Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Extraction of Registry Hives - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Ntdsutil Export NTDS - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Copy on System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DNS Gather Network Info - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Ldifde Directory Object Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Proxy Via Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Proxy Via Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process Call Create - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Cmdline Tool Not Executed In CMD Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "JavaScript"}]}, {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}]}, {"name": "Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Memory"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Elevated Group Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Extraction of Registry Hives", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Ntdsutil Export NTDS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "NTDS"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Processes launching netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Remote WMI Command Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Copy on System32", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows DNS Gather Network Info", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DNS"}]}, {"name": "Windows Ldifde Directory Object Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Invalid Users Fail To Authenticate Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Invalid Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Fail To Authenticate Wth ExplicitCredentials", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate From Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Failed To Authenticate Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Multiple Users Remotely Failed To Authenticate From Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Proxy Via Netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Internal Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}]}, {"name": "Windows Proxy Via Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Internal Proxy"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Proxy"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Fail To Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Invalid Users Failed To Auth Using NTLM", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Fail To Auth Wth ExplicitCredentials", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate Using NTLM", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unusual Count Of Users Remotely Failed To Auth From Host", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Spraying"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Brute Force"}]}, {"name": "Windows WMI Process Call Create", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}]}, {"name": "Warzone RAT", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-07-26", "version": 1, "id": "8dc84752-f4da-4285-931c-bddd5c4d440b", "description": "This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might related to warzone (Ave maria) RAT. This analytic story looks for suspicious process execution, command-line activity, downloads, persistence, defense evasion and more.", "references": ["https://www.blackberry.com/us/en/solutions/endpoint-security/ransomware-protection/warzone#:~:text=Warzone%20RAT%20(AKA%20Ave%20Maria)%20is%20a%20remote%20access%20trojan,is%20as%20an%20information%20stealer.", "https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2020/02/2-birds-in-one-stone-ave-maria-wshrat.html"], "narrative": "Warzone RAT, also known as Ave Maria, is a sophisticated remote access trojan (RAT) that surfaced in January 2019. Originally offered as malware-as-a-service (MaaS), it rapidly gained notoriety and became one of the most prominent malware strains by 2020. Its exceptional capabilities in stealth and anti-analysis techniques make it a formidable threat in various campaigns, including those targeting sensitive geopolitical entities. The malware's impact is particularly concerning as it has been associated with attacks aimed at compromising government employees and military personnel, notably within India's National Informatics Centre (NIC). Its deployment by several advanced persistent threat (APT) groups further underlines its potency and adaptability in the hands of skilled threat actors. Warzone RAT's capabilities enable attackers to gain unauthorized access to targeted systems, facilitating data theft, surveillance, and the potential to wreak havoc on critical infrastructures. As the threat landscape continues to evolve, vigilance and robust cybersecurity measures are crucial in defending against such malicious tools.\" This version provides more context and elaborates on the malware's capabilities and potential impact. Additionally, it emphasizes the importance of cybersecurity measures to combat such threats effectively.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1553.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mark-of-the-Web Bypass", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gorgon Group", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204", "mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["LAPSUS$", "Scattered Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497", "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Darkhotel"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Discovery", "Execution", "Initial Access", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread In Shell Application - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ESCU - Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir - Rule", "ESCU - Office Application Drop Executable - Rule", "ESCU - Office Product Spawn CMD Process - Rule", "ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Bypass UAC via Pkgmgr Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ISO LNK File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mark Of The Web Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry MaxConnectionPerServer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection Remote Thread - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Create Remote Thread In Shell Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Non Chrome Process Accessing Chrome Default Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}]}, {"name": "Office Application Drop Executable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Office Product Spawn CMD Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}]}, {"name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Bypass UAC via Pkgmgr Tool", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Login Data Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows ISO LNK File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "User Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mark Of The Web Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mark-of-the-Web Bypass"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry MaxConnectionPerServer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Phishing Recent ISO Exec Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection Remote Thread", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Portable Executable Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}]}]}, {"name": "WhisperGate", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-01-19", "version": 1, "id": "0150e6e5-3171-442e-83f8-1ccd8599569b", "description": "This analytic story contains detections that allow security analysts to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations also known as \"WhisperGate\". This analytic story looks for suspicious process execution, command-line activity, downloads, DNS queries and more.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", "https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3"], "narrative": "WhisperGate/DEV-0586 is destructive malware operation found by MSTIC (Microsoft Threat Inteligence Center) targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. This operation campaign consist of several malware component like the downloader that abuses discord platform, overwrite or destroy master boot record (MBR) of the targeted host, wiper and also windows defender evasion techniques.", "tags": {"category": ["Data Destruction", "Malware", "Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1047", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN4", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "WIRTE", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1588.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Tool", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Resource Development"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Aoqin Dragon", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackTech", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cleaver", "Cobalt Group", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Leafminer", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "POLONIUM", "Patchwork", "PittyTiger", "Sandworm Team", "Silence", "Silent Librarian", "TA2541", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1561", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Mustang Panda", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1497", "mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Darkhotel"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Deep Panda", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Moses Staff", "Orangeworm", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-1314", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Resource Development", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Weaponization", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Ping Sleep Batch Command - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Process Deleting Its Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows High File Deletion Frequency - Rule", "ESCU - Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun - Rule", "ESCU - Windows NirSoft Utilities - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive - Rule", "ESCU - Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Attempt To Stop Security Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Excessive File Deletion In WinDefender Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Distributed Component Object Model"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}, {"name": "Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Ping Sleep Batch Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Based Evasion"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Remove Windows Defender Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Process Deleting Its Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process DNS Query Known Abuse Web Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Visual Basic"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows High File Deletion Frequency", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "InstallUtil"}]}, {"name": "Windows NirSoft AdvancedRun", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Tool"}]}, {"name": "Windows NirSoft Utilities", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Tool"}]}, {"name": "Windows Raw Access To Master Boot Record Drive", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Structure Wipe"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disk Wipe"}]}, {"name": "Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows AppLocker", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2024-03-21", "version": 1, "id": "7911b245-e74d-48db-b1cf-69f3eb02ca55", "description": "Windows AppLocker is a feature that enhances security by allowing administrators to specify which users or groups can run particular applications in their organization based on unique identities of files. This story covers various aspects of monitoring and managing AppLocker policies, including detecting unauthorized software installations, enforcing best practices for software usage, and identifying potential security breaches through advanced threat detection techniques. Through the use of Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, and Splunk Cloud, organizations can gain insights into AppLocker events, ensuring compliance with corporate security policies and mitigating risks associated with unauthorized applications.", "references": [], "narrative": "AppLocker, a built-in Windows security feature, provides organizations with the ability to control application usage across their networks. It enables administrators to define rules based on file names, publishers, and file hashes to allow or deny the execution of applications. This level of control helps in preventing malware and unlicensed software from running, thereby enhancing the security posture of an organization. \\\nOrganizations should leverage AppLocker for several reasons. Firstly, it aids in the enforcement of software compliance policies by ensuring that only licensed and approved applications are run on the network. Secondly, by restricting the execution of unauthorized applications, AppLocker significantly reduces the attack surface, making it harder for attackers to exploit vulnerabilities in unapproved software. Thirdly, AppLocker's ability to log attempts to run unauthorized applications provides valuable insights for security monitoring and incident response activities. This logging capability enables organizations to detect and respond to potential security threats in real time. \\\nIn summary, AppLocker is a critical security tool that helps organizations manage application usage, enforce compliance policies, and mitigate security risks. By implementing AppLocker policies, organizations can achieve a robust security posture, protecting their assets from unauthorized software and potential cyber threats.", "tags": {"category": ["Unauthorized Software", "Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows AppLocker Block Events - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AppLocker Execution from Uncommon Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AppLocker Privilege Escalation via Unauthorized Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AppLocker Rare Application Launch Detection - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows AppLocker Block Events", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AppLocker Execution from Uncommon Locations", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AppLocker Privilege Escalation via Unauthorized Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AppLocker Rare Application Launch Detection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Attack Surface Reduction", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-11-27", "version": 1, "id": "1d61c474-3cd6-4c23-8c68-f128ac4b209b", "description": "This story contains detections for Windows Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This story contains detections for ASR events that are generated when a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule.", "references": ["https://asrgen.streamlit.app/", "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction?view=o365-worldwide"], "narrative": "This story contains detections for Windows Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This story contains detections for ASR events that are generated when a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule. It includes detections for both block and audit event IDs. Block event IDs are generated when an action is blocked by an ASR rule, while audit event IDs are generated when an action that would be blocked by an ASR rule is allowed to proceed for auditing purposes.", "tags": {"category": ["Best Practices"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT39", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN4", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA505", "Transparent Tribe", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1566.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT1", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access", "Defense Evasion", "Execution"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Delivery", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Audit Events - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Block Events - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Registry Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Rule Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender ASR Rules Stacking - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows Defender ASR Audit Events", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender ASR Block Events", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender ASR Registry Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender ASR Rule Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender ASR Rules Stacking", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Attachment"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Spearphishing Link"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows BootKits", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-05-03", "version": 1, "id": "1bef004d-23b2-4c49-8ceb-b59af0745317", "description": "Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/03/01/blacklotus-uefi-bootkit-myth-confirmed/"], "narrative": "A bootkit is a sophisticated type of malware that targets the boot sectors of a hard drive, specifically the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). The MBR is the initial section of the disk that is loaded following the hardware initialization process executed by the Basic Input/Output System (BIOS). It houses the boot loader, which is responsible for loading the operating system. In contrast, the VBR is located at the beginning of each partition and contains the boot code for that specific partition. When an adversary gains raw access to the boot drive, they can overwrite the MBR or VBR, effectively diverting the execution during startup from the standard boot loader to the malicious code injected by the attacker. This tampering allows the malware to load before the operating system, enabling it to execute malicious activities stealthily and maintain persistence on the compromised system. Bootkits are particularly dangerous because they can bypass security measures implemented by the operating system and antivirus software. Since they load before the operating system, they can easily evade detection and manipulate the system's behavior from the earliest stages of the boot process. This capability makes bootkits a potent tool in an attacker's arsenal for gaining unauthorized access, stealing sensitive information, or launching further attacks on other systems. To defend against bootkit attacks, organizations should implement multiple layers of security, including strong endpoint protection, regular software updates, user awareness training, and monitoring for unusual system behavior. Additionally, hardware-based security features, such as Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot and Trusted Platform Module (TPM), can help protect the integrity of the boot process and reduce the risk of bootkit infections.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1542.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Firmware", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1542", "mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows BootLoader Inventory - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry BootExecute Modification - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows BootLoader Inventory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Firmware"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry BootExecute Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Pre-OS Boot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Certificate Services", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-02-01", "version": 1, "id": "b92b4ac7-0026-4408-a6b5-c1d20658e124", "description": "Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649/"], "narrative": "The following analytic story focuses on remote and local endpoint certificate theft and abuse. Authentication certificates can be both stolen and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files), misplaced certificate files (i.e. Unsecured Credentials), or directly from the Windows certificate store via various crypto APIs.With appropriate enrollment rights, users and/or machines within a domain can also request and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certificate authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various settings and permissions associated with the certificate. Abusing certificates for authentication credentials may enable other behaviors such as Lateral Movement. Certificate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities for Privilege Escalation, by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs) associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable Persistence via stealing or forging certificates that can be used as Valid Accounts for the duration of the certificate's validity, despite user password resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen and forged for machine accounts. (MITRE ATT&CK)", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1550", "mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1649", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1560", "mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "Axiom", "Dragonfly", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Patchwork", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Collection", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Command And Control"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Certify Command Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Certipy File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Behavior Identified - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Export Certificate - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell Export Certificate - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell Export PfxCertificate - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Issued - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Request - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CertUtil Backup - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CryptoAPI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CS Backup - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export Certificate - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export PfxCertificate - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Detect Certify Command Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Detect Certify With PowerShell Script Block Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Detect Certipy File Modifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Archive Collected Data"}]}, {"name": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Behavior Identified", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Export Certificate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mimikatz Crypto Export File Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell Export Certificate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell Export PfxCertificate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Abuse", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates - ESC1 Authentication", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Issued", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Certificate Request", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CertUtil Backup", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CryptoAPI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates CS Backup", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export Certificate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal Authentication Certificates Export PfxCertificate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Defense Evasion Tactics", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2018-05-31", "version": 1, "id": "56e24a28-5003-4047-b2db-e8f3c4618064", "description": "Detect tactics used by malware to evade defenses on Windows endpoints. A few of these include suspicious `reg.exe` processes, files hidden with `attrib.exe` and disabling user-account control, among many others ", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"], "narrative": "Defense evasion is a tactic--identified in the MITRE ATT&CK framework--that adversaries employ in a variety of ways to bypass or defeat defensive security measures. There are many techniques enumerated by the MITRE ATT&CK framework that are applicable in this context. This Analytic Story includes searches designed to identify the use of such techniques on Windows platforms.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Evilnum", "RTM", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Whitefly", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "NTFS File Attributes", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["BackdoorDiplomacy", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Malteiro", "Putter Panda", "TA505", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Compile After Delivery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Gamaredon Group", "MuddyWater", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Carbanak", "Dragonfly", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "MMC", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Change", "Risk", "Web", "Endpoint", "Updates"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt - Rule", "ESCU - Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion - Rule", "ESCU - CSC Net On The Fly Compilation - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Firewall with Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive number of service control start as disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Firewall Allowed Program Enable - Rule", "ESCU - FodHelper UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - NET Profiler UAC bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI RunAs Elevated - Rule", "ESCU - SLUI Spawning a Process - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Base64 Content - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Executable Content - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Alternate DataStream - Process Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DISM Remove Defender - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event For Service Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Known Abused DLL Created - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Parent PID Spoofing with Explorer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Rasautou DLL Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories"}]}, {"name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "CSC Net On The Fly Compilation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Compile After Delivery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}]}, {"name": "Disable Registry Tool", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling CMD Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling ControlPanel", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Firewall with Netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Task Manager", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}]}, {"name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Excessive number of service control start as disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Firewall Allowed Program Enable", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "FodHelper UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "NET Profiler UAC bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "SLUI RunAs Elevated", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "SLUI Spawning a Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Reg exe Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "MMC"}]}, {"name": "Windows Alternate DataStream - Base64 Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "NTFS File Attributes"}]}, {"name": "Windows Alternate DataStream - Executable Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "NTFS File Attributes"}]}, {"name": "Windows Alternate DataStream - Process Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "NTFS File Attributes"}]}, {"name": "Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Path Traversal Exec", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Change Password Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Notification Center", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Windows Event Logging Disable HTTP Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows DISM Remove Defender", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking Hunt with Sysmon", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows DLL Search Order Hijacking with iscsicpl", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}]}, {"name": "Windows Event For Service Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Excessive Disabled Services Event", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Known Abused DLL Created", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Parent PID Spoofing with Explorer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Parent PID Spoofing"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows PowerShell Disable HTTP Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable Windows Event Logging"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Rasautou DLL Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Dynamic-link Library Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}]}, {"name": "Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}]}, {"name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Discovery Techniques", "author": "Michael Hart, Splunk", "date": "2021-03-04", "version": 1, "id": "f7aba570-7d59-11eb-825e-acde48001122", "description": "Monitors for behaviors associated with adversaries discovering objects in the environment that can be leveraged in the progression of the attack.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", "https://cyberd.us/penetration-testing", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/"], "narrative": "Attackers may not have much if any insight into their target's environment before the initial compromise.  Once a foothold has been established, attackers will start enumerating objects in the environment (accounts, services, network shares, etc.) that can be used to achieve their objectives.  This Analytic Story provides searches to help identify activities consistent with adversaries gaining knowledge of compromised Windows environments.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Behavioral Analytics", "Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "FIN6", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Scattered Spider", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1482", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN8", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "FIN7", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "OilRig", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AzureHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol - Rule", "ESCU - System Information Discovery Detection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Hart", "detections": [{"name": "Detect AzureHound Command-Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect AzureHound File Modifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound File Modifications", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Detect SharpHound Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Network Traffic to Active Directory Web Services Protocol", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}, {"name": "System Information Discovery Detection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Trust Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows DNS SIGRed CVE-2020-1350", "author": "Shannon Davis, Splunk", "date": "2020-07-28", "version": 1, "id": "36dbb206-d073-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", "description": "Uncover activity consistent with CVE-2020-1350, or SIGRed. Discovered by Checkpoint researchers, this vulnerability affects Windows 2003 to 2019, and is triggered by a malicious DNS response (only affects DNS over TCP). An attacker can use the malicious payload to cause a buffer overflow on the vulnerable system, leading to compromise.  The included searches in this Analytic Story are designed to identify the large response payload for SIG and KEY DNS records which can be used for the exploit.", "references": ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"], "narrative": "When a client requests a DNS record for a particular domain, that request gets routed first through the client's locally configured DNS server, then to any DNS server(s) configured as forwarders, and then onto the target domain's own DNS server(s).  If a attacker wanted to, they could host a malicious DNS server that responds to the initial request with a specially crafted large response (~65KB).  This response would flow through to the client's local DNS server, which if not patched for CVE-2020-1350, would cause the buffer overflow. The detection searches in this Analytic Story use wire data to detect the malicious behavior. Searches for Splunk Stream and Zeek are included.  The Splunk Stream search correlates across stream:dns and stream:tcp, while the Zeek search correlates across bro:dns:json and bro:conn:json.  These correlations are required to pick up both the DNS record types (SIG and KEY) along with the payload size (>65KB).", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1203", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT12", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT41", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "Axiom", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "TA459", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "admin@338"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Shannon Davis", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution"}]}, {"name": "Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek", "source": "network", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Client Execution"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Drivers", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-03-30", "version": 1, "id": "d0a9323f-9411-4da6-86b2-18c184d750c0", "description": "Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.", "references": ["https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/e/avoslocker-ransomware-variant-abuses-driver-file-to-disable-anti-Virus-scans-log4shell.html", "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/daxin-backdoor-espionage", "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064459/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/01/11/signed-kernel-drivers-unguarded-gateway-windows-core/"], "narrative": "A rootkit on Windows may sometimes be in the form of a Windows Driver. A driver typically has a file extension of .sys, however the internals of a sys file is similar to a Windows DLL. For Microsoft Windows to load a driver, a few requirements are needed. First, it must have a valid signature. Second, typically it should load from the windows\\system32\\drivers path. There are a few methods to investigate drivers in the environment. Drivers are noisy. An inventory of all drivers is important to understand prevalence. A driver location (Path) is also important when attempting to baseline. Looking at a driver name and path is not enough, we must also explore the signing information. Product, description, company name, signer and signing result are all items to take into account when reviewing drivers. What makes a driver malicious? Depending if a driver was dropped during a campaign or you are baselining drivers after, triaging a driver to determine maliciousness may be tough. We break this into two categories - 1. vulnerable drivers 2. driver rootkits. Attempt to identify prevelance of the driver. Is it on one or many? Review the signing information if it is present. Is it common? A lot of driver hunting will lead down rabbit holes, but we hope to help lead the way.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT41", "Rocke", "TeamTNT", "Winnti Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1553.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1553", "mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Driver Inventory - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System File on Disk - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Windows Driver Inventory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Driver Load Non-Standard Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Drivers Loaded by Signature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rootkit"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Certificate Added", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Create Kernel Mode Driver", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows System File on Disk", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Vulnerable Driver Loaded", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Error Reporting Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-08-24", "version": 1, "id": "64dea1e5-2c60-461f-b886-05580ed89b5c", "description": "In July 2023, CrowdStrike's Falcon Complete managed detection and response (MDR) team uncovered an exploit kit using an unknown vulnerability in the Windows Error Reporting (WER) component. The vulnerability, now identified as CVE-2023-36874, was also independently discovered by Google's Threat Analysis Group. The exploit came to light when suspicious binaries were observed on a European technology system. CrowdStrike's Counter Adversary Operations' analysis revealed a zero-day exploit targeting the WER service, allowing attackers to execute unauthorized code with elevated privileges. The exploit kit seen aimed to spawn a privileged interpreter, displaying the versatility and adaptability of the threat. CrowdStrike has listed some potential indicators of compromise, but these are of low fidelity due to their mutable nature.", "references": ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-complete-zero-day-exploit-cve-2023-36874/"], "narrative": "In June 2023, CrowdStrike's Falcon Complete team observed suspicious activities on a European technology entity's system. Multiple binaries were dropped onto the system via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), some of which were flagged as potential exploits for a known vulnerability. However, a string containing the Russian term for \"0day\" suggested an unknown vulnerability was at play. Subsequent investigations identified this as a zero-day vulnerability affecting the Windows Error Reporting (WER) component, now known as CVE-2023-36874.\nThe WER service's function is to report software issues on Windows hosts. The exploit centered around manipulating the WER service by redirecting file systems to execute attacker-controlled code with elevated privileges. This was achieved by creating a symbolic link redirection from the C:\\ drive to an attacker-controlled directory, and then triggering certain WER functions. Consequently, an unauthorized executable was run instead of the legitimate one, giving the attacker high-level access.\nThe observed exploit kit's primary objective was to initiate a privileged interpreter, such as cmd.exe or powershell_ise.exe. If this couldn't be achieved, a privileged scheduled task was created as an alternative. The exploit kit showcased a range of binaries, some packed and others not, some in C++ and others in pure C. This diversity suggests the knowledge of the vulnerability was likely shared among different developers.\nCrowdStrike's Counter Adversary Operations, as of now, hasn't linked this activity to any specific threat actor. They've provided potential indicators of compromise, but caution that these are easily changed, indicating the advanced capabilities of the adversaries.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1055", "mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT37", "APT41", "APT5", "Cobalt Group", "Kimsuky", "PLATINUM", "Silence", "TA2541", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Windows Process Injection Wermgr Child Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Process Injection"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows File Extension and Association Abuse", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2018-01-26", "version": 1, "id": "30552a76-ac78-48e4-b3c0-de4e34e9563d", "description": "Detect and investigate suspected abuse of file extensions and Windows file associations. Some of the malicious behaviors involved may include inserting spaces before file extensions or prepending the file extension with a different one, among other techniques.", "references": ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"], "narrative": "Attackers use a variety of techniques to entice users to run malicious code or to persist on an endpoint. One way to accomplish these goals is to leverage file extensions and the mechanism Windows uses to associate files with specific applications.\nSince its earliest days, Windows has used extensions to identify file types. Users have become familiar with these extensions and their application associations. For example, if users see that a file ends in `.doc` or `.docx`, they will assume that it is a Microsoft Word document and expect that double-clicking will open it using `winword.exe`. The user will typically also presume that the `.docx` file is safe.\nAttackers take advantage of this expectation by obfuscating the true file extension. They can accomplish this in a couple of ways. One technique involves inserting multiple spaces in the file name before the extension to hide the extension from the GUI, obscuring the true nature of the file. Another approach involves prepending the real extension with a different one. This is especially effective when Windows is configured to \"hide extensions for known file types.\" In this case, the real extension is not displayed, but the prepended one is, leading end users to believe the file is a different type than it actually is.\nChanging the association between a file extension and an application can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. The technique typically involves changing the association for an often-launched file type to associate instead with a malicious program the attacker has dropped on the endpoint. When the end user launches a file that has been manipulated in this way, it will execute the attacker's malware. It will also execute the application the end user expected to run, cleverly obscuring the fact that something suspicious has occurred.\nRun the searches in this story to detect and investigate suspicious behavior that may indicate abuse or manipulation of Windows file extensions and/or associations.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "GALLIUM", "Lazarus Group", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Changes to File Associations", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}]}, {"name": "Execution of File with Multiple Extensions", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Rename System Utilities"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Log Manipulation", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2017-09-12", "version": 2, "id": "b6db2c60-a281-48b4-95f1-2cd99ed56835", "description": "Adversaries often try to cover their tracks by manipulating Windows logs. Use these searches to help you monitor for suspicious activity surrounding log files--an essential component of an effective defense.", "references": ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"], "narrative": "Because attackers often modify system logs to cover their tracks and/or to thwart the investigative process, log monitoring is an industry-recognized best practice. While there are legitimate reasons to manipulate system logs, it is still worthwhile to keep track of who manipulated the logs, when they manipulated them, and in what way they manipulated them (determining which accesses, tools, or utilities were employed). Even if no malicious activity is detected, the knowledge of an attempt to manipulate system logs may be indicative of a broader security risk that should be thoroughly investigated.\nThe Analytic Story gives users two different ways to detect manipulation of Windows Event Logs and one way to detect deletion of the Update Sequence Number (USN) Change Journal. The story helps determine the history of the host and the users who have accessed it. Finally, the story aides in investigation by retrieving all the information on the process that caused these events (if the process has been identified).", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN8", "Indrik Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "Deleting Shadow Copies", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious wevtutil Usage", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "USN Journal Deletion", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}]}, {"name": "Windows Event Log Cleared", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Persistence Techniques", "author": "Bhavin Patel, Splunk", "date": "2018-05-31", "version": 2, "id": "30874d4f-20a1-488f-85ec-5d52ef74e3f9", "description": "Monitor for activities and techniques associated with maintaining persistence on a Windows system--a sign that an adversary may have compromised your environment.", "references": ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"], "narrative": "Maintaining persistence is one of the first steps taken by attackers after the initial compromise. Attackers leverage various custom and built-in tools to ensure survivability and persistent access within a compromised enterprise. This Analytic Story provides searches to help you identify various behaviors used by attackers to maintain persistent access to a Windows environment.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1222.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.009", "mitre_attack_technique": "Path Interception by Unquoted Path", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "APT5"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT32", "Confucius", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Inception", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "TA2541", "TA551"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Cobalt Group"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation", "Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Certutil exe certificate extraction - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Triggered Image File Execution Options Injection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Mshta Execution In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Schtasks Create Run As System - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Bhavin Patel", "detections": [{"name": "Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories"}]}, {"name": "Remote Registry Key modifications", "source": "deprecated", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Certutil exe certificate extraction", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": []}, {"name": "Change Default File Association", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Path Interception by Unquoted Path"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "ETW Registry Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)"}]}, {"name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks used for forcing a reboot", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver"}]}, {"name": "Shim Database File Creation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD DSRM Account Changes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "SID-History Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Event Triggered Image File Execution Options Injection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection"}]}, {"name": "Windows Mshta Execution In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Mshta"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Delete Task SD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Scheduled Task Service Spawned Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Schtasks Create Run As System", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Post-Exploitation", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-11-30", "version": 1, "id": "992899b7-a5cf-4bcd-bb0d-cf81762188ba", "description": "This analytic story identifies popular Windows post exploitation tools for example winpeas.bat, winpeas.exe, WinPrivCheck.bat and many more.", "references": ["https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/14/new-prestige-ransomware-impacts-organizations-in-ukraine-and-poland/"], "narrative": "These tools allow operators to find possible exploits or paths for privilege escalation and persistence on a targeted host. Ransomware operator like the \"Prestige ransomware\" also used or abuses these post exploitation tools such as winPEAS to scan for possible avenue to gain privileges and persistence to a targeted Windows Operating System.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Cached Domain Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "Leafminer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT33", "APT39", "Evilnum", "FIN6", "HEXANE", "Leafminer", "Malteiro", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1592", "mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1082", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "Aquatic Panda", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Sowbug", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Windigo", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069", "mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "FIN13", "TA505"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1049", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Andariel", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "FIN13", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Magic Hound", "TA2541", "Turla"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1202", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Fox Kitten", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1555.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Password Managers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Fox Kitten", "LAPSUS$", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Support Provider", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT5", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Dragonfly", "FIN7", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "LAPSUS$", "OilRig", "ToddyCat", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1016", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1529", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT37", "APT38", "Lazarus Group"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1115", "mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "APT39"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1070.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1069.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Chimera", "HEXANE", "OilRig", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Rocke", "Scattered Spider", "TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Collection", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint", "Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Domain Group Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Net Localgroup Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Arp - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Net - Rule", "ESCU - Network Connection Discovery With Netstat - Rule", "ESCU - Network Discovery Using Route Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Information Discovery Fsutil - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Password Managers Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Private Keys Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Query Registry Reg Save - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Windows System User Discovery Via Quser - Rule", "ESCU - Windows WMI Process And Service List - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Create or delete windows shares using net exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Removal"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Network Share Connection Removal"}]}, {"name": "Domain Group Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Domain Groups"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Net Localgroup Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Groups"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Arp", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Net", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Connection Discovery With Netstat", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Network Discovery Using Route Windows App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Internet Connection Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Gather Victim Host Information"}]}, {"name": "Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Cached Domain Credentials"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data"}]}, {"name": "Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials from Password Stores"}]}, {"name": "Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indirect Command Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Information Discovery Fsutil", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Password Managers Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Password Managers"}]}, {"name": "Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Permission Groups Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "System Information Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Clipboard Data"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Windows Private Keys Discovery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Private Keys"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Windows Query Registry Reg Save", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Query Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Support Provider"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Network Connections Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows System User Discovery Via Quser", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows WMI Process And Service List", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Privilege Escalation", "author": "David Dorsey, Splunk", "date": "2020-02-04", "version": 2, "id": "644e22d3-598a-429c-a007-16fdb802cae5", "description": "Monitor for and investigate activities that may be associated with a Windows privilege-escalation attack, including unusual processes running on endpoints, modified registry keys, and more.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"], "narrative": "Privilege escalation is a \"land-and-expand\" technique, wherein an adversary gains an initial foothold on a host and then exploits its weaknesses to increase his privileges. The motivation is simple: certain actions on a Windows machine--such as installing software--may require higher-level privileges than those the attacker initially acquired. By increasing his privilege level, the attacker can gain the control required to carry out his malicious ends. This Analytic Story provides searches to detect and investigate behaviors that attackers may use to elevate their privileges in your environment.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "APT5"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558", "mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1068", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT33", "BITTER", "Cobalt Group", "FIN6", "FIN8", "LAPSUS$", "MoustachedBouncer", "PLATINUM", "Scattered Spider", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Whitefly", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Higaisa", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Patchwork", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "Rocke"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "FIN8"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1134", "mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Blue Mockingbird", "FIN6"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.014", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1558.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT3", "APT41", "Axiom", "Deep Panda", "Fox Kitten"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1204.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT12", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT30", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aoqin Dragon", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BlackTech", "CURIUM", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "DarkHydrus", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "EXOTIC LILY", "Earth Lusca", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "FIN4", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Ferocious Kitten", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Inception", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Malteiro", "Mofang", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "RTM", "Rancor", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TA551", "The White Company", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1037.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "Cobalt Group"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Execution", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Active Setup Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Logon Script Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Print Processor Registry Autostart - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Runas Execution in CommandLine - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation Suspicious Process Elevation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation System Process Without System Parent - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "David Dorsey", "detections": [{"name": "Uncommon Processes On Endpoint", "source": "deprecated", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Malicious File"}]}, {"name": "Active Setup Registry Autostart", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Setup"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Change Default File Association", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Child Processes of Spoolsv exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}]}, {"name": "ETW Registry Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Kerberoasting"}]}, {"name": "Logon Script Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Logon Script (Windows)"}]}, {"name": "MSI Module Loaded by Non-System Binary", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "DLL Side-Loading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Overwriting Accessibility Binaries", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Accessibility Features"}]}, {"name": "Print Processor Registry Autostart", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Print Processors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Runas Execution in CommandLine", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Token Impersonation/Theft"}]}, {"name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver"}]}, {"name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Privilege Escalation Suspicious Process Elevation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Privilege Escalation System Process Without System Parent", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Privilege Escalation User Process Spawn System Process", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Access Token Manipulation"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Abuse", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2022-03-17", "version": 1, "id": "78df1df1-25f1-4387-90f9-c4ea31ce6b75", "description": "Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence, privilege escalation, lateral movement, defense evasion, collection of data, a tool for recon, credential dumping and payload impact. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows registry are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/"], "narrative": "Windows Registry is one of the powerful and yet still mysterious Windows features that can tweak or manipulate Windows policies and low-level configuration settings. Because of this capability,  most malware, adversaries or threat actors abuse this hierarchical database to do their malicious intent on a targeted host or network environment. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify registry in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1003.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "GALLIUM", "Ke3chang", "Threat Group-3390", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.006", "mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT41", "APT5"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548", "mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1564.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Kimsuky"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1098", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT41", "APT5", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1485", "mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT38", "Gamaredon Group", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Sandworm Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1021.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Axiom", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "HEXANE", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Silence", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.010", "mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT18", "APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT39", "APT41", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Higaisa", "Inception", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Putter Panda", "RTM", "Rocke", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.012", "mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1553.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546", "mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1127", "mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1491", "mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN7"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1546.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547.008", "mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Driver", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1553", "mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1552", "mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1548.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT29", "APT37", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Cobalt Group", "Earth Lusca", "Evilnum", "MuddyWater", "Patchwork", "Threat Group-3390"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1490", "mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1556", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access", "Defense Evasion", "Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1547", "mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Execution", "Lateral Movement", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Web", "Endpoint", "Risk", "Updates"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Change Default File Association - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Enhanced Notification - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender MpEngine Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Spynet Reporting - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Registry Tool - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Show Hidden Files - Rule", "ESCU - Disable UAC Remote Restriction - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling CMD Application - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling ControlPanel - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Defender Services - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling NoRun Windows App - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling SystemRestore In Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Task Manager - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Enable RDP In Other Port Number - Rule", "ESCU - Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry - Rule", "ESCU - ETW Registry Disabled - Rule", "ESCU - Eventvwr UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Remcos client registry install entry - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Screensaver Event Trigger Execution - Rule", "ESCU - Sdclt UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - SilentCleanup UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Time Provider Persistence Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AD DSRM Account Changes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Autostart Execution LSASS Driver Registry Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Notification Center - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Registry Risk Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Certificate Added - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Delete Task SD - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - WSReset UAC Bypass - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Allow Operation with Consent Admin", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Security Account Manager"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Credentials in Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Unsecured Credentials"}]}, {"name": "Change Default File Association", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Change Default File Association"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Disable AMSI Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender AntiVirus Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender BlockAtFirstSeen Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Enhanced Notification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender MpEngine Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Spynet Reporting", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Defender Submit Samples Consent Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable ETW Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Registry Tool", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable Security Logs Using MiniNt Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable Show Hidden Files", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Hidden Files and Directories"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hide Artifacts"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable UAC Remote Restriction", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows SmartScreen Protection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling CMD Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling ControlPanel", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Defender Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling FolderOptions Windows Feature", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling NoRun Windows App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Remote User Account Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Disabling SystemRestore In Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Inhibit System Recovery"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Task Manager", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Windows Local Security Authority Defences via Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Authentication Process"}]}, {"name": "Enable RDP In Other Port Number", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Remote Services"}]}, {"name": "Enable WDigest UseLogonCredential Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}]}, {"name": "ETW Registry Disabled", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Indicator Blocking"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Eventvwr UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Modification Of Wallpaper", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Defacement"}]}, {"name": "Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Port Monitors"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Application Shimming"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Image File Execution Options Injection"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}]}, {"name": "Remcos client registry install entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Revil Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Screensaver Event Trigger Execution", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Event Triggered Execution"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Screensaver"}]}, {"name": "Sdclt UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "SilentCleanup UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}, {"name": "Time Provider Persistence Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Time Providers"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows AD DSRM Account Changes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Manipulation"}]}, {"name": "Windows Autostart Execution LSASS Driver Registry Modification", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "LSASS Driver"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Lock Workstation Feature Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable LogOff Button Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Memory Crash Dump", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Data Destruction"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Notification Center", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Disable Windows Group Policy Features Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Hide Notification Features Through Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Health Check Intervals", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Quick Scan Interval", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Throttle Rate", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Change Win Defender Tracing Level", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Configure App Install Control", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Define Win Defender Threat Action", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Context Menu", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Delete Win Defender Profile Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Controlled Folder Access", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Firewall And Network", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Defender Protocol Recognition", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable PUA Protection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Realtime Signature Delivery", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Web Evaluation", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender App Guard", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Compute File Hashes", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Gen reports", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Network Protection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Report Infection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Scan On Update", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Disable Win Defender Signature Retirement", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Overide Win Defender Phishing Filter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Override SmartScreen Prompt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defense Set Win Defender Smart Screen Level To Warn", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defenses Disable HVCI", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Impair Defenses Disable Win Defender Auto Logging", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Registry Risk Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Correlation", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Modify Show Compress Color And Info Tip Registry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Certificate Added", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Install Root Certificate"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Subvert Trust Controls"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Delete Task SD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Windows Registry Modification for Safe Mode Persistence", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}]}, {"name": "WSReset UAC Bypass", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Bypass User Account Control"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows Service Abuse", "author": "Rico Valdez, Splunk", "date": "2017-11-02", "version": 3, "id": "6dbd810e-f66d-414b-8dfc-e46de55cbfe2", "description": "Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"], "narrative": "The Windows operating system uses a services architecture to allow for running code in the background, similar to a UNIX daemon. Attackers will often leverage Windows services for persistence, hiding in plain sight, seeking the ability to run privileged code that can interact with the kernel. In many cases, attackers will create a new service to host their malicious code. Attackers have also been observed modifying unnecessary or unused services to point to their own code, as opposed to what was intended. In these cases, attackers often use tools to create or modify services in ways that are not typical for most environments, providing opportunities for detection.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1569", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Services", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["TeamTNT"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574.011", "mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1574", "mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1569.002", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "FIN6", "Ke3chang", "Silence", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Privilege Escalation", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Execution"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"], "investigation_names": ["Get Notable History", "Get Parent Process Info", "Get Process Info"], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Rico Valdez", "detections": [{"name": "First Time Seen Running Windows Service", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Services"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Execution"}]}, {"name": "Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Hijack Execution Flow"}]}, {"name": "Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}]}, {"name": "Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2022-06-16", "version": 1, "id": "bea2e16b-4599-46ad-a95b-116078726c68", "description": "Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007/"], "narrative": "Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs. Since it may be signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1218.007", "mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Machete", "Molerats", "Rancor", "TA505", "ZIRCONIUM"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSIExec Remote Download - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer - Rule", "ESCU - Windows MSIExec With Network Connections - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Windows MSIExec DLLRegisterServer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSIExec Remote Download", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSIExec Unregister DLLRegisterServer", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec"}]}, {"name": "Windows MSIExec With Network Connections", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Msiexec"}]}]}, {"name": "WinRAR Spoofing Attack CVE-2023-38831", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-08-29", "version": 1, "id": "9ba776f3-b8c5-4390-a312-6dab6c5561b9", "description": "Group-IB Threat Intelligence unit discovered a zero-day vulnerability, CVE-2023-38831, in WinRAR, a popular compression tool. Cybercriminals exploited this vulnerability to deliver various malware families, including DarkMe and GuLoader, by crafting ZIP archives with spoofed extensions, which were then distributed on trading forums. Once the malware was executed, it allowed cybercriminals to withdraw funds from brokers' accounts. RARLAB was immediately notified about the vulnerability and released a patch. Group-IB recommends users update WinRAR to the latest version, stay informed about cyber threats, be cautious with unknown attachments, enable 2FA, backup data, and follow the principle of least privilege.", "references": ["https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cve-2023-38831-winrar-zero-day/", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-38831"], "narrative": "Group-IB Threat Intelligence unit identified a critical zero-day vulnerability, CVE-2023-38831, in WinRAR, a widely used compression tool. This vulnerability was exploited by cybercriminals to craft ZIP archives containing malicious and non-malicious files, distributed on specialized trading forums. The exploit allowed them to spoof file extensions, hiding the launch of malicious scripts within an archive masquerading as a '.jpg', '.txt', or any other file format. When victims opened the specially crafted archive, it executed the malware, leading to unauthorized access to their broker accounts and enabling the cybercriminals to perform illicit financial transactions and withdraw funds.\nThe vulnerability was discovered while researching the spread of DarkMe malware, a VisualBasic spy Trojan attributed to the financially motivated group, Evilnum. The malware was distributed alongside other malware families, such as GuLoader and Remcos RAT, via malicious ZIP archives posted on popular trading forums or distributed via file-sharing services. Despite efforts by forum administrators to warn users and disable threat actors' accounts, the cybercriminals continued to spread the malicious files, compromising devices, and leading to financial losses.\nGroup-IB immediately notified RARLAB about the vulnerability, and they promptly responded by issuing a patch. The beta version of the patch was released on July 20, 2023, and the final updated version, WinRAR 6.23, was released on August 2, 2023. Group-IB recommends all users install the latest version of WinRAR to mitigate the risk of exploitation.\nIn conclusion, the exploitation of the CVE-2023-38831 vulnerability highlights the constant risks associated with software vulnerabilities and the importance of remaining vigilant, keeping systems updated, and following security guidelines to avoid falling victim to such attacks. Collaboration between security researchers and software developers is essential to quickly identify and fix vulnerabilities, making it harder for cybercriminals to exploit them.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - WinRAR Spawning Shell Application - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "WinRAR Spawning Shell Application", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}]}, {"name": "Winter Vivern", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Splunk", "date": "2023-02-16", "version": 1, "id": "5ce5f311-b311-4568-90ca-0c36781d07a4", "description": "Utilize searches that enable you to detect and investigate unusual activities potentially related to the Winter Vivern malicious software. This includes examining multiple timeout executions, scheduled task creations, screenshots, and downloading files through PowerShell, among other indicators.", "references": ["https://cert.gov.ua/article/3761023"], "narrative": "The Winter Vivern malware, identified by CERT UA, is designed to download and run multiple PowerShell scripts on targeted hosts. These scripts aim to gather a variety of files with specific extensions, including (.edb, .ems, .eme, .emz, .key, .pem, .ovpn, .bat, .cer, .p12, .cfg, .log, .txt, .pdf, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, and .rdg), primarily from desktop directories. In addition to this, the malware captures desktop screenshots and performs data exfiltration using HTTP. To maintain its presence on the targeted host, Winter Vivern also establishes a persistence mechanism, such as creating a scheduled task.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1059", "mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT37", "APT39", "Dragonfly", "FIN5", "FIN6", "FIN7", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "OilRig", "Stealth Falcon", "Whitefly", "Windigo"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT18", "APT28", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Dark Caracal", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "Higaisa", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-1314", "Threat Group-3390", "ToddyCat", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT3", "APT32", "APT41", "Chimera", "Fox Kitten", "Ke3chang", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Poseidon Group", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "admin@338"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Dragonfly", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HEXANE", "Higaisa", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Naikon", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "ToddyCat", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1033", "mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Chimera", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "FIN10", "FIN7", "FIN8", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Ke3chang", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Stealth Falcon", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "Windshift", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1059.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Blue Mockingbird", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "CopyKittens", "DarkHydrus", "DarkVishnya", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN10", "FIN13", "FIN6", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "Inception", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Molerats", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Sandworm Team", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Stealth Falcon", "TA2541", "TA459", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Thrip", "ToddyCat", "Tonto Team", "Turla", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Wizard Spider", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1027", "mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT3", "APT37", "APT41", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "BlackOasis", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "GALLIUM", "Gallmaker", "Gamaredon Group", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Mustang Panda", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "Windshift"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1041", "mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Exfiltration"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT3", "APT32", "APT39", "Chimera", "Confucius", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Higaisa", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "MuddyWater", "Sandworm Team", "Stealth Falcon", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1113", "mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Collection"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT39", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dark Caracal", "Dragonfly", "FIN7", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD", "Gamaredon Group", "Group5", "Magic Hound", "MoustachedBouncer", "MuddyWater", "OilRig", "Silence"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Collection", "Discovery", "Execution", "Exfiltration", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives", "Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - System User Discovery With Whoami - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Invoke RestMethod - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Powershell UploadString - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Screen Capture Via Powershell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Any Powershell DownloadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "CMD Carry Out String Command Parameter", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Command Shell"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}]}, {"name": "GetWmiObject User Account with PowerShell Script Block", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Local Account"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "PowerShell"}]}, {"name": "Schedule Task with HTTP Command Arguments", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "System User Discovery With Whoami", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "System Owner/User Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Invoke RestMethod", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel"}]}, {"name": "Windows Exfiltration Over C2 Via Powershell UploadString", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel"}]}, {"name": "Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XML", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Windows Screen Capture Via Powershell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Screen Capture"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}, {"name": "WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task"}]}]}, {"name": "WordPress Vulnerabilities", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2024-02-22", "version": 1, "id": "baeaee14-e439-4c95-91e8-aaedd8265c1c", "description": "This analytic story provides a collection of analytics that detect potential exploitation of WordPress vulnerabilities. The analytics are focused on the detection of known vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins and themes.", "references": ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190", "https://github.com/Tornad0007/CVE-2024-25600-Bricks-Builder-plugin-for-WordPress/blob/main/exploit.py", "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-25600", "https://op-c.net/blog/cve-2024-25600-wordpresss-bricks-builder-rce-flaw-under-active-exploitation/", "https://thehackernews.com/2024/02/wordpress-bricks-theme-under-active.html"], "narrative": "The following collection of analytics are focused on the detection of known vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins and themes. The analytics are focused on the detection of known vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins and themes.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [], "mitre_attack_tactics": [], "datamodels": [], "kill_chain_phases": []}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "WordPress Bricks Builder plugin RCE", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities", "author": "Michael Haag, Splunk", "date": "2023-10-01", "version": 1, "id": "60466291-3ab4-452b-9c11-456aa2dc7293", "description": "A critical security advisory was released by Progress Software on September 27, 2023, concerning multiple vulnerabilities in WS_FTP Server, a widely-used secure file transfer solution. The two critical vulnerabilities are CVE-2023-40044, a .NET deserialization flaw, and CVE-2023-42657, a directory traversal vulnerability. Rapid7 has observed active exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Affected versions are prior to 8.7.4 and 8.8.2. Immediate action is advised - upgrade to WS_FTP Server version 8.8.2. For those unable to update, disabling the Ad Hoc Transfer module is suggested as a temporary measure. This comes in the wake of increased scrutiny following the Cl0p ransomware attack on MOVEit Transfer in May 2023.", "references": ["https://www.assetnote.io/resources/research/rce-in-progress-ws-ftp-ad-hoc-via-iis-http-modules-cve-2023-40044", "https://community.progress.com/s/article/WS-FTP-Server-Critical-Vulnerability-September-2023", "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-40044", "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/09/29/etr-critical-vulnerabilities-in-ws_ftp-server/", "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/fantastic-iis-modules-and-how-to-find-them.html"], "narrative": "Two critical vulnerabilities have been identified in WS_FTP Server, a widely-used secure file transfer solution. The first, CVE-2023-40044, is a .NET deserialization flaw that targets the Ad Hoc Transfer module of WS_FTP Server versions earlier than 8.7.4 and 8.8.2. This flaw allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the server's operating system without needing authentication. The second vulnerability, CVE-2023-42657, is a directory traversal flaw that allows attackers to perform unauthorized file operations outside of their authorized WS_FTP folder. In severe cases, the attacker could escape the WS_FTP Server file structure and perform operations on the underlying operating system. Both vulnerabilities have been observed being exploited in the wild and immediate action for mitigation is strongly advised. Updating to WS_FTP Server version 8.8.2 is recommended. For those unable to update, disabling the Ad Hoc Transfer module is suggested as a temporary measure.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1505", "mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.004", "mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1505.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT38", "APT39", "APT5", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Deep Panda", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "HAFNIUM", "Kimsuky", "Leviathan", "Magic Hound", "Moses Staff", "OilRig", "Sandworm Team", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Volatile Cedar", "Volt Typhoon"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - W3WP Spawning Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query - Rule", "ESCU - WS FTP Remote Code Execution - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Splunk", "author_name": "Michael Haag", "detections": [{"name": "Detect Webshell Exploit Behavior", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "W3WP Spawning Shell", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Web Shell"}]}, {"name": "Windows IIS Components Get-WebGlobalModule Module Query", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Hunting", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "IIS Components"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Server Software Component"}]}, {"name": "WS FTP Remote Code Execution", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}]}]}, {"name": "XMRig", "author": "Teoderick Contreras, Rod Soto Splunk", "date": "2021-05-07", "version": 1, "id": "06723e6a-6bd8-4817-ace2-5fb8a7b06628", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the xmrig monero, including looking for file writes associated with its payload, process command-line, defense evasion (killing services, deleting users, modifying files or folder permission, killing other malware or other coin miner) and hacking tools including Telegram as mean of Command And Control (C2) to download other files. Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. (1) Servers and cloud-based (2) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.", "references": ["https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig", "https://www.getmonero.org/resources/user-guides/mine-to-pool.html", "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/february-2021s-most-wanted-malware-trickbot-takes-over-following-emotet-shutdown/"], "narrative": "XMRig is a high performance, open source, cross platform RandomX, KawPow, CryptoNight and AstroBWT unified CPU/GPU miner. This monero is seen in the wild on May 2017.", "tags": {"category": ["Malware"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Advanced Threat Detection", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1531", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Akira", "LAPSUS$"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562.001", "mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Aquatic Panda", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Ember Bear", "FIN6", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Putter Panda", "Rocke", "TA2541", "TA505", "TeamTNT", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1112", "mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Dragonfly", "Earth Lusca", "Ember Bear", "FIN8", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "Kimsuky", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Patchwork", "Silence", "TA505", "Threat Group-3390", "Turla", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1087", "mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Discovery"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["FIN13"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1489", "mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Impact"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Indrik Spider", "LAPSUS$", "Lazarus Group", "Wizard Spider"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1053", "mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Earth Lusca"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543", "mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036.005", "mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT1", "APT28", "APT29", "APT32", "APT39", "APT41", "APT5", "Aoqin Dragon", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Chimera", "Darkhotel", "Earth Lusca", "FIN13", "FIN7", "Ferocious Kitten", "Fox Kitten", "Gamaredon Group", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LuminousMoth", "Machete", "Magic Hound", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Naikon", "PROMETHIUM", "Patchwork", "Poseidon Group", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "Sowbug", "TA2541", "TeamTNT", "ToddyCat", "Transparent Tribe", "Tropic Trooper", "Volt Typhoon", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "admin@338", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1595", "mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1036", "mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "BRONZE BUTLER", "Dragonfly", "FIN13", "LazyScripter", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Sandworm Team", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Windshift", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1003", "mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Credential Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT28", "APT32", "APT39", "Axiom", "Leviathan", "Poseidon Group", "Sowbug", "Suckfly", "Tonto Team"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1562", "mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Magic Hound"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1105", "mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Command And Control"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT-C-36", "APT18", "APT28", "APT29", "APT3", "APT32", "APT33", "APT37", "APT38", "APT39", "APT41", "Ajax Security Team", "Andariel", "Aquatic Panda", "BITTER", "BRONZE BUTLER", "BackdoorDiplomacy", "Chimera", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "Confucius", "Darkhotel", "Dragonfly", "Elderwood", "Ember Bear", "Evilnum", "FIN13", "FIN7", "FIN8", "Fox Kitten", "GALLIUM", "Gamaredon Group", "Gorgon Group", "HAFNIUM", "HEXANE", "IndigoZebra", "Indrik Spider", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "LazyScripter", "Leviathan", "LuminousMoth", "Magic Hound", "Metador", "Molerats", "Moses Staff", "MuddyWater", "Mustang Panda", "Mustard Tempest", "Nomadic Octopus", "OilRig", "PLATINUM", "Patchwork", "Rancor", "Rocke", "Sandworm Team", "SideCopy", "Sidewinder", "Silence", "TA2541", "TA505", "TA551", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tonto Team", "Tropic Trooper", "Turla", "Volatile Cedar", "WIRTE", "Whitefly", "Windshift", "Winnti Group", "Wizard Spider", "ZIRCONIUM", "menuPass"]}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1222", "mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Defense Evasion"], "mitre_attack_groups": []}, {"mitre_attack_id": "T1543.003", "mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Persistence", "Privilege Escalation"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["APT19", "APT3", "APT32", "APT38", "APT41", "Blue Mockingbird", "Carbanak", "Cinnamon Tempest", "Cobalt Group", "DarkVishnya", "Earth Lusca", "FIN7", "Ke3chang", "Kimsuky", "Lazarus Group", "PROMETHIUM", "TeamTNT", "Threat Group-3390", "Tropic Trooper", "Wizard Spider"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Reconnaissance", "Persistence", "Defense Evasion", "Credential Access", "Impact", "Discovery", "Execution", "Command And Control", "Privilege Escalation"], "datamodels": ["Endpoint"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation", "Reconnaissance", "Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Attacker Tools On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Of Net Users - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows App Hotkeys - Rule", "ESCU - Disabling Net User Account - Rule", "ESCU - Download Files Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Attempt To Disable Services - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Cacls App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule", "ESCU - Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path - Rule", "ESCU - Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen - Rule", "ESCU - Icacls Deny Command - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder - Rule", "ESCU - Process Kill Base On File Path - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks Run Task On Demand - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Driver Loaded Path - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Process File Path - Rule", "ESCU - XMRIG Driver Loaded - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Rod Soto Splunk", "author_name": "Teoderick Contreras", "detections": [{"name": "Attacker Tools On Endpoint", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Match Legitimate Name or Location"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "OS Credential Dumping"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Active Scanning"}]}, {"name": "Deleting Of Net Users", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Disable Windows App Hotkeys", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Modify Registry"}]}, {"name": "Disabling Net User Account", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Download Files Using Telegram", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}]}, {"name": "Enumerate Users Local Group Using Telegram", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Discovery"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Attempt To Disable Services", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Service Stop Attempt", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Service Stop"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Cacls App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Net App", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Account Access Removal"}]}, {"name": "Excessive Usage Of Taskkill", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Executables Or Script Creation In Suspicious Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Masquerading"}]}, {"name": "Hide User Account From Sign-In Screen", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Icacls Deny Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "ICACLS Grant Command", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Modify ACL permission To Files Or Folder", "source": "endpoint", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}]}, {"name": "Process Kill Base On File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Disable or Modify Tools"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Impair Defenses"}]}, {"name": "Schtasks Run Task On Demand", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Scheduled Task/Job"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Driver Loaded Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "Suspicious Process File Path", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}, {"name": "XMRIG Driver Loaded", "source": "endpoint", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Windows Service"}, {"mitre_attack_technique": "Create or Modify System Process"}]}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Browser Proxy Threats", "author": "Rod Soto, Gowthamaraj Rajendran", "date": "2023-10-25", "version": 1, "id": "5d4ba315-39df-4309-982f-a7052efccffd", "description": "Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to malicious activity from Zscaler. This also encompasses monitoring for events such as users downloading harmful files or accessing websites that pose a risk to system and network security. Additionally, the narrative extends to the detection of insider threats, ensuring comprehensive protection from both external and internal vulnerabilities. By leveraging Zscaler with Splunk, organizations can fortify their defenses, safeguarding against a wide spectrum of cyber threats and maintaining a secure operational environment.", "references": ["https://threatlibrary.zscaler.com/", "https://help.zscaler.com/zia/about-threat-categories"], "narrative": "Zscaler Client Connector is an application installed on your device to ensure that your internet traffic and access to your organization's internal apps are secure and in compliance with your organization's policies, even when you're off your corporate network.", "tags": {"category": ["Adversary Tactics"], "product": ["Splunk Enterprise", "Splunk Enterprise Security", "Splunk Cloud"], "usecase": "Security Monitoring", "mitre_attack_enrichments": [{"mitre_attack_id": "T1566", "mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing", "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "mitre_attack_groups": ["Axiom", "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"]}], "mitre_attack_tactics": ["Initial Access"], "datamodels": ["Risk"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"]}, "detection_names": ["ESCU - Zscaler Adware Activities Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Behavior Analysis Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler CryptoMiner Downloaded Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Employment Search Web Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Exploit Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Legal Liability Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Malware Activity Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Phishing Activity Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Potentially Abused File Download - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Privacy Risk Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Scam Destinations Threat Blocked - Rule", "ESCU - Zscaler Virus Download threat blocked - Rule"], "investigation_names": [], "baseline_names": [], "author_company": "Gowthamaraj Rajendran", "author_name": "Rod Soto", "detections": [{"name": "Zscaler Adware Activities Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Behavior Analysis Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler CryptoMiner Downloaded Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Employment Search Web Activity", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Exploit Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "TTP", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Legal Liability Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Malware Activity Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Phishing Activity Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Potentially Abused File Download", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Privacy Risk Destinations Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Scam Destinations Threat Blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}, {"name": "Zscaler Virus Download threat blocked", "source": "web", "type": "Anomaly", "tags": [{"mitre_attack_technique": "Phishing"}]}]}]}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dist/api/version.json b/dist/api/version.json
index 958c344b36..8d10a98bd5 100644
--- a/dist/api/version.json
+++ b/dist/api/version.json
@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version": {"name": "v4.31.0", "published_at": "2024-05-08T17:10:55Z"}}
\ No newline at end of file
+{"version": {"name": "v4.31.0", "published_at": "2024-05-10T18:00:38Z"}}
\ No newline at end of file